Wikiversity enwikiversity https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Wikiversity:Main_Page MediaWiki 1.47.0-wmf.24 first-letter Media Special Talk User User talk Wikiversity Wikiversity talk File File talk MediaWiki MediaWiki talk Template Template talk Help Help talk Category Category talk School School talk Portal Portal talk Topic Topic talk Collection Collection talk Draft Draft talk TimedText TimedText talk Module Module talk Event Event talk 4 28 2842298 2842246 2026-10-23T13:56:30Z Koavf 147 /* Discussion */ 2842298 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Add an edit count requirement for autoconfirmed? == Currently, only waiting for four days is required for a user to become autoconfirmed. I am proposing that we include a minimum edit count of <s>10 edits (akin to Wikipedia)</s> 5 edits especially because of [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|a private abuse filter]], and LTAs may game autoconfirmed permissions to vandalize here. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 23:01, 23 August 2026 (UTC) : [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]] : Are you suggesting an additional requirement? i.e., 4 days + 10 edits? : How is it adjusted? -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 03:57, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :: Yes. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:30, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]: I said yes to your first question. As for the adjustment question, in the InitialiseSettings.php file on noc.wikimedia.org, on <code>wgAutoConfirmCount</code> is where English Wikiversity would be added as <code>'enwikiversity' => 10,</code>. Does my reply make sense? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:31, 15 September 2026 (UTC) :As a newly volunteered member, it doesn't seem unreasonable to me to require a certain number of edits to establish my bona fides. [[User:Cfm490|Cfm490]] ([[User talk:Cfm490|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Cfm490|contribs]]) 17:53, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :I agree that adding an edit count requirement is a reasonable expectation before the user can become autoconfirmed. [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 18:56, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :+ 1 —[[User:Atcovi|Atcovi]] [[User talk:Atcovi|(Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Atcovi|Contribs)]] 19:40, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :'''Weak support''' Generally reasonable, but I would caution that we should really make this clear for those instances where professors have students edit here and make it frictionless for them to get autoconfirmed status. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 19:42, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : {{oppose|No support}} because I cannot see the [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|abuse filter]] cited as the primary reason and I do not know what LTAs is. I guess you don’t want support from ''ordinary'' users. ‑‑[[User:Kai Burghardt|Kays]] ([[User talk:Kai Burghardt|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Kai Burghardt|contribs]]) 18:18, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::Also some readers may be interested in this: ::* [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]] ::[[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 19:05, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::: An LTA means a long-term abuser, and it means someone who is usually abusive. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:42, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::::@[[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]], an LTA is someone who is usually abusive? That's news to me. Can you please point us to the source of this information. ::::Thanks in advance, [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 15:50, 14 October 2026 (UTC) :::::[[w:WP:LTA|WP:LTA]] :::::[[User:Chrisblammo123|Chrisblammo123]] ([[User talk:Chrisblammo123|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Chrisblammo123|contribs]]) 08:59, 15 October 2026 (UTC) :'''Strong''' {{support}}; specially to battle LTA [[User:Mbataw|Mbataw]] ([[User talk:Mbataw|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mbataw|contribs]]) 13:17, 18 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}}, having no edit count requirement for autoconfirmed is a bad idea in general. [[User:BooksBooksBooks3|BooksBooksBooks3]] ([[User talk:BooksBooksBooks3|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BooksBooksBooks3|contribs]]) 01:43, 19 September 2026 (UTC) :Comment: I realize that it is not easy to be an admin on wikimedia projects. I realize that many admins have to deal with some VERY unpleasant personalities. But.. :Admins are not the only users who encounter harassment on wikimedia projects, big or small. Anyone who's been here as long as I have, has come across users who are not tolerated by the "community". Not necessarily because they are spammers, trollers, paid editors, LTAs , disruptive etc, but simply because they are different. :When I "edit" without logging in, I carry no baggage. I also get encouraging prompts such as this: :* This year, Wikipedia has had fewer visitors and fewer new supporters, so '''<big>your visit today means a lot</BIG>''' :Anyway, back to the topic at hand [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]]. I believe the section about IP editors is outdated since wikimedia now views users who are not logged-in as anonymous, and only trusted users are allowed to see their IP address (I am not clear on the details). I wonder if anyone participating here has an interest in bringing this page uptodate? [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 04:13, 22 September 2026 (UTC) : If there's some obvious things to fix, I'd say go ahead. It looks like there were several useful anonymous contributions to that page recently. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 07:54, 22 September 2026 (UTC) :hmm [[User:Tornaiden|Tornaiden]] ([[User talk:Tornaiden|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Tornaiden|contribs]]) 02:02, 27 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}} Having a reasonable (and very modest) number of edits in addition to 4 days is sensible and not overly burdensome. The benefits outweigh any inconveniences. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:18, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::I agree that the 5 edit minimum described below is sufficient. [[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 01:14, 13 October 2026 (UTC) :I'd say that a minimum of five (5) edits would be a good compromise, given the lower user activity/user traffic present here (when compared with Wikipedia). [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:47, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I agree that a minimum edit count is a prudent addition, but also agree with @[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLazaraox]] that a minimum of 5 is sufficient. It can be frustrating for new, genuine users when they get caught in new user restrictions. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:49, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :: I adjusted the proposal to require at least 5 edits for autoconfirmed users, instead of 10. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:18, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Here is current page about [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:50, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I made [[phab:T442057]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:37, 22 October 2026 (UTC) == Bartending Course on Wikiversity == I recently finished the course on [[Bartending]], and while I have experience editing on Wikipedia, this is my first Wikiversity project. If any of you have the time or interest, I could use an experienced eye to see if there's anything obviously missing from the course in terms of Wikiversity administration. I'm not sure what's active, if the course should belong in an existing school, or if there's any obvious discoverability tool I haven't implemented. Any tips are welcomed, or just a thumbs up saying it looks fine would be great. [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] recommended I post this here in case someone wanted to include the new course under News on the [[Wikiversity:Main Page|Main Page]]. Thanks! [[User:Sabbier|Sabbier]] ([[User talk:Sabbier|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Sabbier|contribs]]) 01:24, 1 September 2026 (UTC) :Wow! Fantastic work- I'm so impressed! Your work gives me inspiration on how to better organize the courses I'm working on. :) [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 21:32, 3 September 2026 (UTC) : Awesome work. I've added this course to the [[Main Page/News|main page news]]. : We could also consider for [[Wikiversity:Featured]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:43, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::The course [[Creating Wikiversity Courses]] is intended to provide guidance to new Wikiversity editors. I hope it is helpful and I welcome improvement suggestions. Thanks. [[User:Lbeaumont|Lbeaumont]] ([[User talk:Lbeaumont|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Lbeaumont|contribs]]) 14:08, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :Just checked it out; Very impressive! [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:48, 12 October 2026 (UTC) == Writing news here == I'm bringing up this discussion again because I think it is beneficial to the project since Wikinews is gone, thank you. [[User:BigKrow|BigKrow]] ([[User talk:BigKrow|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BigKrow|contribs]]) 03:17, 1 September 2026 (UTC) : Given that the community consensus here was not to replicate WikiNews within Wikiversity, I suggest thinking differently e.g., in terms of specific news-related projects you are interested in that have educational objectives that satisfy Wikiversity's mission. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:46, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::I wonder if you mean <u>Wikiversity:Main Page/News ?</u> ::If so I have just checked this page and I see it only contains news for 2026 and part of 2025, even though the history indicates it was created in the 2000-decade. If you go back and check all revisions there is a wealth of (historical?) information. [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 16:28, 13 September 2026 (UTC) ::: I didn't mean that page, but yes, its history could be reconstructed into a more accessible format. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:37, 13 September 2026 (UTC) == [[Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group]] == {{Archive top}} Per [[User:Codename_Noreste]] withdrawing this proposal I am archiving it. I will reopen a new discussion on the particulars of IA policy in a new thread. We will continue discussion of the topic there. I'm optimistic that we can agree on some some minor changes to IA policy. It might take a bit more discussion to agree on major changes. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 03:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) As I suggested, I would like to propose allowing permanent interface administrators on English Wikiversity. My temporary interface admin rights are about to expire soon, and I will soon create a new CfIA page (and its header). We should also have a minimum of two interface administrators. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:44, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :I am also in favor of this and we did discuss it pretty recently and came to a consensus on extending IA rights and lowering the administrative overhead, but not allowing indefinite at this juncture. From my perspective, since we discussed this so recently and nothing seems to have changed much, I personally would recommend holding off for a couple of years or until/unless there is some critical new information. Again, I would continue to support indef IA rights were it to come up again and think that at least two is also a sensible proposal. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:32, 6 September 2026 (UTC) ::Responding to myself so that I don't derail: I would be interested/willing to be an indef IA. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:36, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : I made [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Interface Adminship]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:24, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: CC to @[[User:Koavf|Koavf]]. I made a request since my IA rights are about to expire. We should also hold a separate vote to allow permanent IAs here (for this policy). [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:55, 7 September 2026 (UTC) : @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]], I count at least three in favor (votes below, and Koavf agreeing), so can you close this request? Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:22, 24 September 2026 (UTC) :: Second ping to @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 02:24, 7 October 2026 (UTC) :Temporary rights can be extended for a year. I'd like a little more time to consider permanent rights and justin's sensible suggestion of a minimum of two. Let's not rush into this. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:38, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::Sorry, my mistake, policy is 120 days. Interface allows 1 year or indef. I don't see any reason why a nom couldn't request extending rights for another 120 days while we clarify indef and other wording of policy. I'll look closer tomorrow. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:00, 7 October 2026 (UTC) : Personally, I'm not convinced of the need for permanent interface administrators. This isn't necessarily a strong view. But it seems that Wikiversity's interface administration needs can largely currently be met by permitting temporary periods for individual users. : If there are users who make productive use of several temporary periods, then that could strengthen a case for allowing longer periods or permanent use. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 10:15, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :I am also not (yet) convinced of the need for permanent, but could be persuaded. My main concern is that we are simultaneously voting on changing the policy while also voting for a nom to hold the right based on a policy that doesn't yet exist. The current [[WV:IA|policy]] states "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship '''may only be granted temporarily'''..." This should have been addressed before the community even started a discussion on a permanent nomination. I'd be inclined to change temporary from "between 14 and 120 days" to "between 1 week and 1 year" just to align with the pull down menu options in [[Special:UserRights|UserRights]]. I'm in favor of the suggestion that there be a minimum of two with permanent, should we adopt that. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Okay, so considering the opinions of the bureaucrats above, I would sincerely like to withdraw this proposal. Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:14, 22 October 2026 (UTC) === Votes === * For the record, I am creating a separate subsection for voting, whether or not we should allow permanent interface administrators. {{support}} accordingly. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:32, 15 September 2026 (UTC) *: To the above, I support for indefinite interface adminship rights. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:47, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} [[User:PieWriter|PieWriter]] ([[User talk:PieWriter|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/PieWriter|contribs]]) 00:51, 18 September 2026 (UTC) *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 02:22, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * Temporary {{oppose}} until there has been further discussion. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) {{Archive bottom}} == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. 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We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. 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The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== fd83cdn8llslmpqy1rrza9sphhy6t4y 2842299 2842298 2026-10-23T13:56:42Z Koavf 147 /* Discussion */ 2842299 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Add an edit count requirement for autoconfirmed? == Currently, only waiting for four days is required for a user to become autoconfirmed. I am proposing that we include a minimum edit count of <s>10 edits (akin to Wikipedia)</s> 5 edits especially because of [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|a private abuse filter]], and LTAs may game autoconfirmed permissions to vandalize here. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 23:01, 23 August 2026 (UTC) : [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]] : Are you suggesting an additional requirement? i.e., 4 days + 10 edits? : How is it adjusted? -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 03:57, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :: Yes. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:30, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]: I said yes to your first question. As for the adjustment question, in the InitialiseSettings.php file on noc.wikimedia.org, on <code>wgAutoConfirmCount</code> is where English Wikiversity would be added as <code>'enwikiversity' => 10,</code>. Does my reply make sense? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:31, 15 September 2026 (UTC) :As a newly volunteered member, it doesn't seem unreasonable to me to require a certain number of edits to establish my bona fides. [[User:Cfm490|Cfm490]] ([[User talk:Cfm490|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Cfm490|contribs]]) 17:53, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :I agree that adding an edit count requirement is a reasonable expectation before the user can become autoconfirmed. [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 18:56, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :+ 1 —[[User:Atcovi|Atcovi]] [[User talk:Atcovi|(Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Atcovi|Contribs)]] 19:40, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :'''Weak support''' Generally reasonable, but I would caution that we should really make this clear for those instances where professors have students edit here and make it frictionless for them to get autoconfirmed status. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 19:42, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : {{oppose|No support}} because I cannot see the [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|abuse filter]] cited as the primary reason and I do not know what LTAs is. I guess you don’t want support from ''ordinary'' users. ‑‑[[User:Kai Burghardt|Kays]] ([[User talk:Kai Burghardt|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Kai Burghardt|contribs]]) 18:18, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::Also some readers may be interested in this: ::* [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]] ::[[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 19:05, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::: An LTA means a long-term abuser, and it means someone who is usually abusive. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:42, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::::@[[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]], an LTA is someone who is usually abusive? That's news to me. Can you please point us to the source of this information. ::::Thanks in advance, [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 15:50, 14 October 2026 (UTC) :::::[[w:WP:LTA|WP:LTA]] :::::[[User:Chrisblammo123|Chrisblammo123]] ([[User talk:Chrisblammo123|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Chrisblammo123|contribs]]) 08:59, 15 October 2026 (UTC) :'''Strong''' {{support}}; specially to battle LTA [[User:Mbataw|Mbataw]] ([[User talk:Mbataw|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mbataw|contribs]]) 13:17, 18 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}}, having no edit count requirement for autoconfirmed is a bad idea in general. [[User:BooksBooksBooks3|BooksBooksBooks3]] ([[User talk:BooksBooksBooks3|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BooksBooksBooks3|contribs]]) 01:43, 19 September 2026 (UTC) :Comment: I realize that it is not easy to be an admin on wikimedia projects. I realize that many admins have to deal with some VERY unpleasant personalities. But.. :Admins are not the only users who encounter harassment on wikimedia projects, big or small. Anyone who's been here as long as I have, has come across users who are not tolerated by the "community". Not necessarily because they are spammers, trollers, paid editors, LTAs , disruptive etc, but simply because they are different. :When I "edit" without logging in, I carry no baggage. I also get encouraging prompts such as this: :* This year, Wikipedia has had fewer visitors and fewer new supporters, so '''<big>your visit today means a lot</BIG>''' :Anyway, back to the topic at hand [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]]. I believe the section about IP editors is outdated since wikimedia now views users who are not logged-in as anonymous, and only trusted users are allowed to see their IP address (I am not clear on the details). I wonder if anyone participating here has an interest in bringing this page uptodate? [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 04:13, 22 September 2026 (UTC) : If there's some obvious things to fix, I'd say go ahead. It looks like there were several useful anonymous contributions to that page recently. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 07:54, 22 September 2026 (UTC) :hmm [[User:Tornaiden|Tornaiden]] ([[User talk:Tornaiden|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Tornaiden|contribs]]) 02:02, 27 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}} Having a reasonable (and very modest) number of edits in addition to 4 days is sensible and not overly burdensome. The benefits outweigh any inconveniences. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:18, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::I agree that the 5 edit minimum described below is sufficient. [[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 01:14, 13 October 2026 (UTC) :I'd say that a minimum of five (5) edits would be a good compromise, given the lower user activity/user traffic present here (when compared with Wikipedia). [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:47, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I agree that a minimum edit count is a prudent addition, but also agree with @[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLazaraox]] that a minimum of 5 is sufficient. It can be frustrating for new, genuine users when they get caught in new user restrictions. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:49, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :: I adjusted the proposal to require at least 5 edits for autoconfirmed users, instead of 10. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:18, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Here is current page about [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:50, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I made [[phab:T442057]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:37, 22 October 2026 (UTC) == Bartending Course on Wikiversity == I recently finished the course on [[Bartending]], and while I have experience editing on Wikipedia, this is my first Wikiversity project. If any of you have the time or interest, I could use an experienced eye to see if there's anything obviously missing from the course in terms of Wikiversity administration. I'm not sure what's active, if the course should belong in an existing school, or if there's any obvious discoverability tool I haven't implemented. Any tips are welcomed, or just a thumbs up saying it looks fine would be great. [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] recommended I post this here in case someone wanted to include the new course under News on the [[Wikiversity:Main Page|Main Page]]. Thanks! [[User:Sabbier|Sabbier]] ([[User talk:Sabbier|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Sabbier|contribs]]) 01:24, 1 September 2026 (UTC) :Wow! Fantastic work- I'm so impressed! Your work gives me inspiration on how to better organize the courses I'm working on. :) [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 21:32, 3 September 2026 (UTC) : Awesome work. I've added this course to the [[Main Page/News|main page news]]. : We could also consider for [[Wikiversity:Featured]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:43, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::The course [[Creating Wikiversity Courses]] is intended to provide guidance to new Wikiversity editors. I hope it is helpful and I welcome improvement suggestions. Thanks. [[User:Lbeaumont|Lbeaumont]] ([[User talk:Lbeaumont|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Lbeaumont|contribs]]) 14:08, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :Just checked it out; Very impressive! [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:48, 12 October 2026 (UTC) == Writing news here == I'm bringing up this discussion again because I think it is beneficial to the project since Wikinews is gone, thank you. [[User:BigKrow|BigKrow]] ([[User talk:BigKrow|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BigKrow|contribs]]) 03:17, 1 September 2026 (UTC) : Given that the community consensus here was not to replicate WikiNews within Wikiversity, I suggest thinking differently e.g., in terms of specific news-related projects you are interested in that have educational objectives that satisfy Wikiversity's mission. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:46, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::I wonder if you mean <u>Wikiversity:Main Page/News ?</u> ::If so I have just checked this page and I see it only contains news for 2026 and part of 2025, even though the history indicates it was created in the 2000-decade. If you go back and check all revisions there is a wealth of (historical?) information. [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 16:28, 13 September 2026 (UTC) ::: I didn't mean that page, but yes, its history could be reconstructed into a more accessible format. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:37, 13 September 2026 (UTC) == [[Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group]] == {{Archive top}} Per [[User:Codename_Noreste]] withdrawing this proposal I am archiving it. I will reopen a new discussion on the particulars of IA policy in a new thread. We will continue discussion of the topic there. I'm optimistic that we can agree on some some minor changes to IA policy. It might take a bit more discussion to agree on major changes. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 03:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) As I suggested, I would like to propose allowing permanent interface administrators on English Wikiversity. My temporary interface admin rights are about to expire soon, and I will soon create a new CfIA page (and its header). We should also have a minimum of two interface administrators. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:44, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :I am also in favor of this and we did discuss it pretty recently and came to a consensus on extending IA rights and lowering the administrative overhead, but not allowing indefinite at this juncture. From my perspective, since we discussed this so recently and nothing seems to have changed much, I personally would recommend holding off for a couple of years or until/unless there is some critical new information. Again, I would continue to support indef IA rights were it to come up again and think that at least two is also a sensible proposal. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:32, 6 September 2026 (UTC) ::Responding to myself so that I don't derail: I would be interested/willing to be an indef IA. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:36, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : I made [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Interface Adminship]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:24, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: CC to @[[User:Koavf|Koavf]]. I made a request since my IA rights are about to expire. We should also hold a separate vote to allow permanent IAs here (for this policy). [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:55, 7 September 2026 (UTC) : @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]], I count at least three in favor (votes below, and Koavf agreeing), so can you close this request? Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:22, 24 September 2026 (UTC) :: Second ping to @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 02:24, 7 October 2026 (UTC) :Temporary rights can be extended for a year. I'd like a little more time to consider permanent rights and justin's sensible suggestion of a minimum of two. Let's not rush into this. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:38, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::Sorry, my mistake, policy is 120 days. Interface allows 1 year or indef. I don't see any reason why a nom couldn't request extending rights for another 120 days while we clarify indef and other wording of policy. I'll look closer tomorrow. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:00, 7 October 2026 (UTC) : Personally, I'm not convinced of the need for permanent interface administrators. This isn't necessarily a strong view. But it seems that Wikiversity's interface administration needs can largely currently be met by permitting temporary periods for individual users. : If there are users who make productive use of several temporary periods, then that could strengthen a case for allowing longer periods or permanent use. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 10:15, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :I am also not (yet) convinced of the need for permanent, but could be persuaded. My main concern is that we are simultaneously voting on changing the policy while also voting for a nom to hold the right based on a policy that doesn't yet exist. The current [[WV:IA|policy]] states "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship '''may only be granted temporarily'''..." This should have been addressed before the community even started a discussion on a permanent nomination. I'd be inclined to change temporary from "between 14 and 120 days" to "between 1 week and 1 year" just to align with the pull down menu options in [[Special:UserRights|UserRights]]. I'm in favor of the suggestion that there be a minimum of two with permanent, should we adopt that. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Okay, so considering the opinions of the bureaucrats above, I would sincerely like to withdraw this proposal. Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:14, 22 October 2026 (UTC) === Votes === * For the record, I am creating a separate subsection for voting, whether or not we should allow permanent interface administrators. {{support}} accordingly. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:32, 15 September 2026 (UTC) *: To the above, I support for indefinite interface adminship rights. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:47, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} [[User:PieWriter|PieWriter]] ([[User talk:PieWriter|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/PieWriter|contribs]]) 00:51, 18 September 2026 (UTC) *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 02:22, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * Temporary {{oppose}} until there has been further discussion. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) {{Archive bottom}} == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== i00ninmqd4vuzo6ufm5pk385e88ctoq 2842300 2842299 2026-10-23T13:56:51Z Koavf 147 /* Discussion */ 2842300 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Add an edit count requirement for autoconfirmed? == Currently, only waiting for four days is required for a user to become autoconfirmed. I am proposing that we include a minimum edit count of <s>10 edits (akin to Wikipedia)</s> 5 edits especially because of [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|a private abuse filter]], and LTAs may game autoconfirmed permissions to vandalize here. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 23:01, 23 August 2026 (UTC) : [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]] : Are you suggesting an additional requirement? i.e., 4 days + 10 edits? : How is it adjusted? -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 03:57, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :: Yes. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:30, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]: I said yes to your first question. As for the adjustment question, in the InitialiseSettings.php file on noc.wikimedia.org, on <code>wgAutoConfirmCount</code> is where English Wikiversity would be added as <code>'enwikiversity' => 10,</code>. Does my reply make sense? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:31, 15 September 2026 (UTC) :As a newly volunteered member, it doesn't seem unreasonable to me to require a certain number of edits to establish my bona fides. [[User:Cfm490|Cfm490]] ([[User talk:Cfm490|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Cfm490|contribs]]) 17:53, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :I agree that adding an edit count requirement is a reasonable expectation before the user can become autoconfirmed. [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 18:56, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :+ 1 —[[User:Atcovi|Atcovi]] [[User talk:Atcovi|(Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Atcovi|Contribs)]] 19:40, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :'''Weak support''' Generally reasonable, but I would caution that we should really make this clear for those instances where professors have students edit here and make it frictionless for them to get autoconfirmed status. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 19:42, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : {{oppose|No support}} because I cannot see the [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|abuse filter]] cited as the primary reason and I do not know what LTAs is. I guess you don’t want support from ''ordinary'' users. ‑‑[[User:Kai Burghardt|Kays]] ([[User talk:Kai Burghardt|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Kai Burghardt|contribs]]) 18:18, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::Also some readers may be interested in this: ::* [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]] ::[[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 19:05, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::: An LTA means a long-term abuser, and it means someone who is usually abusive. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:42, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::::@[[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]], an LTA is someone who is usually abusive? That's news to me. Can you please point us to the source of this information. ::::Thanks in advance, [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 15:50, 14 October 2026 (UTC) :::::[[w:WP:LTA|WP:LTA]] :::::[[User:Chrisblammo123|Chrisblammo123]] ([[User talk:Chrisblammo123|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Chrisblammo123|contribs]]) 08:59, 15 October 2026 (UTC) :'''Strong''' {{support}}; specially to battle LTA [[User:Mbataw|Mbataw]] ([[User talk:Mbataw|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mbataw|contribs]]) 13:17, 18 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}}, having no edit count requirement for autoconfirmed is a bad idea in general. [[User:BooksBooksBooks3|BooksBooksBooks3]] ([[User talk:BooksBooksBooks3|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BooksBooksBooks3|contribs]]) 01:43, 19 September 2026 (UTC) :Comment: I realize that it is not easy to be an admin on wikimedia projects. I realize that many admins have to deal with some VERY unpleasant personalities. But.. :Admins are not the only users who encounter harassment on wikimedia projects, big or small. Anyone who's been here as long as I have, has come across users who are not tolerated by the "community". Not necessarily because they are spammers, trollers, paid editors, LTAs , disruptive etc, but simply because they are different. :When I "edit" without logging in, I carry no baggage. I also get encouraging prompts such as this: :* This year, Wikipedia has had fewer visitors and fewer new supporters, so '''<big>your visit today means a lot</BIG>''' :Anyway, back to the topic at hand [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]]. I believe the section about IP editors is outdated since wikimedia now views users who are not logged-in as anonymous, and only trusted users are allowed to see their IP address (I am not clear on the details). I wonder if anyone participating here has an interest in bringing this page uptodate? [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 04:13, 22 September 2026 (UTC) : If there's some obvious things to fix, I'd say go ahead. It looks like there were several useful anonymous contributions to that page recently. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 07:54, 22 September 2026 (UTC) :hmm [[User:Tornaiden|Tornaiden]] ([[User talk:Tornaiden|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Tornaiden|contribs]]) 02:02, 27 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}} Having a reasonable (and very modest) number of edits in addition to 4 days is sensible and not overly burdensome. The benefits outweigh any inconveniences. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:18, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::I agree that the 5 edit minimum described below is sufficient. [[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 01:14, 13 October 2026 (UTC) :I'd say that a minimum of five (5) edits would be a good compromise, given the lower user activity/user traffic present here (when compared with Wikipedia). [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:47, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I agree that a minimum edit count is a prudent addition, but also agree with @[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLazaraox]] that a minimum of 5 is sufficient. It can be frustrating for new, genuine users when they get caught in new user restrictions. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:49, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :: I adjusted the proposal to require at least 5 edits for autoconfirmed users, instead of 10. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:18, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Here is current page about [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:50, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I made [[phab:T442057]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:37, 22 October 2026 (UTC) == Bartending Course on Wikiversity == I recently finished the course on [[Bartending]], and while I have experience editing on Wikipedia, this is my first Wikiversity project. If any of you have the time or interest, I could use an experienced eye to see if there's anything obviously missing from the course in terms of Wikiversity administration. I'm not sure what's active, if the course should belong in an existing school, or if there's any obvious discoverability tool I haven't implemented. Any tips are welcomed, or just a thumbs up saying it looks fine would be great. [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] recommended I post this here in case someone wanted to include the new course under News on the [[Wikiversity:Main Page|Main Page]]. Thanks! [[User:Sabbier|Sabbier]] ([[User talk:Sabbier|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Sabbier|contribs]]) 01:24, 1 September 2026 (UTC) :Wow! Fantastic work- I'm so impressed! Your work gives me inspiration on how to better organize the courses I'm working on. :) [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 21:32, 3 September 2026 (UTC) : Awesome work. I've added this course to the [[Main Page/News|main page news]]. : We could also consider for [[Wikiversity:Featured]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:43, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::The course [[Creating Wikiversity Courses]] is intended to provide guidance to new Wikiversity editors. I hope it is helpful and I welcome improvement suggestions. Thanks. [[User:Lbeaumont|Lbeaumont]] ([[User talk:Lbeaumont|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Lbeaumont|contribs]]) 14:08, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :Just checked it out; Very impressive! [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:48, 12 October 2026 (UTC) == Writing news here == I'm bringing up this discussion again because I think it is beneficial to the project since Wikinews is gone, thank you. [[User:BigKrow|BigKrow]] ([[User talk:BigKrow|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BigKrow|contribs]]) 03:17, 1 September 2026 (UTC) : Given that the community consensus here was not to replicate WikiNews within Wikiversity, I suggest thinking differently e.g., in terms of specific news-related projects you are interested in that have educational objectives that satisfy Wikiversity's mission. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:46, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::I wonder if you mean <u>Wikiversity:Main Page/News ?</u> ::If so I have just checked this page and I see it only contains news for 2026 and part of 2025, even though the history indicates it was created in the 2000-decade. If you go back and check all revisions there is a wealth of (historical?) information. [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 16:28, 13 September 2026 (UTC) ::: I didn't mean that page, but yes, its history could be reconstructed into a more accessible format. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:37, 13 September 2026 (UTC) == [[Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group]] == {{Archive top}} Per [[User:Codename_Noreste]] withdrawing this proposal I am archiving it. I will reopen a new discussion on the particulars of IA policy in a new thread. We will continue discussion of the topic there. I'm optimistic that we can agree on some some minor changes to IA policy. It might take a bit more discussion to agree on major changes. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 03:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) As I suggested, I would like to propose allowing permanent interface administrators on English Wikiversity. My temporary interface admin rights are about to expire soon, and I will soon create a new CfIA page (and its header). We should also have a minimum of two interface administrators. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:44, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :I am also in favor of this and we did discuss it pretty recently and came to a consensus on extending IA rights and lowering the administrative overhead, but not allowing indefinite at this juncture. From my perspective, since we discussed this so recently and nothing seems to have changed much, I personally would recommend holding off for a couple of years or until/unless there is some critical new information. Again, I would continue to support indef IA rights were it to come up again and think that at least two is also a sensible proposal. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:32, 6 September 2026 (UTC) ::Responding to myself so that I don't derail: I would be interested/willing to be an indef IA. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:36, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : I made [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Interface Adminship]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:24, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: CC to @[[User:Koavf|Koavf]]. I made a request since my IA rights are about to expire. We should also hold a separate vote to allow permanent IAs here (for this policy). [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:55, 7 September 2026 (UTC) : @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]], I count at least three in favor (votes below, and Koavf agreeing), so can you close this request? Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:22, 24 September 2026 (UTC) :: Second ping to @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 02:24, 7 October 2026 (UTC) :Temporary rights can be extended for a year. I'd like a little more time to consider permanent rights and justin's sensible suggestion of a minimum of two. Let's not rush into this. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:38, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::Sorry, my mistake, policy is 120 days. Interface allows 1 year or indef. I don't see any reason why a nom couldn't request extending rights for another 120 days while we clarify indef and other wording of policy. I'll look closer tomorrow. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:00, 7 October 2026 (UTC) : Personally, I'm not convinced of the need for permanent interface administrators. This isn't necessarily a strong view. But it seems that Wikiversity's interface administration needs can largely currently be met by permitting temporary periods for individual users. : If there are users who make productive use of several temporary periods, then that could strengthen a case for allowing longer periods or permanent use. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 10:15, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :I am also not (yet) convinced of the need for permanent, but could be persuaded. My main concern is that we are simultaneously voting on changing the policy while also voting for a nom to hold the right based on a policy that doesn't yet exist. The current [[WV:IA|policy]] states "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship '''may only be granted temporarily'''..." This should have been addressed before the community even started a discussion on a permanent nomination. I'd be inclined to change temporary from "between 14 and 120 days" to "between 1 week and 1 year" just to align with the pull down menu options in [[Special:UserRights|UserRights]]. I'm in favor of the suggestion that there be a minimum of two with permanent, should we adopt that. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Okay, so considering the opinions of the bureaucrats above, I would sincerely like to withdraw this proposal. Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:14, 22 October 2026 (UTC) === Votes === * For the record, I am creating a separate subsection for voting, whether or not we should allow permanent interface administrators. {{support}} accordingly. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:32, 15 September 2026 (UTC) *: To the above, I support for indefinite interface adminship rights. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:47, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} [[User:PieWriter|PieWriter]] ([[User talk:PieWriter|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/PieWriter|contribs]]) 00:51, 18 September 2026 (UTC) *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 02:22, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * Temporary {{oppose}} until there has been further discussion. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) {{Archive bottom}} == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ggevlmnz6ttqe8oftjg0xtfax6taiws 2842303 2842300 2026-10-23T13:59:09Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Discussion */ reply ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842303 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Add an edit count requirement for autoconfirmed? == Currently, only waiting for four days is required for a user to become autoconfirmed. I am proposing that we include a minimum edit count of <s>10 edits (akin to Wikipedia)</s> 5 edits especially because of [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|a private abuse filter]], and LTAs may game autoconfirmed permissions to vandalize here. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 23:01, 23 August 2026 (UTC) : [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]] : Are you suggesting an additional requirement? i.e., 4 days + 10 edits? : How is it adjusted? -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 03:57, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :: Yes. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:30, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]: I said yes to your first question. As for the adjustment question, in the InitialiseSettings.php file on noc.wikimedia.org, on <code>wgAutoConfirmCount</code> is where English Wikiversity would be added as <code>'enwikiversity' => 10,</code>. Does my reply make sense? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:31, 15 September 2026 (UTC) :As a newly volunteered member, it doesn't seem unreasonable to me to require a certain number of edits to establish my bona fides. [[User:Cfm490|Cfm490]] ([[User talk:Cfm490|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Cfm490|contribs]]) 17:53, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :I agree that adding an edit count requirement is a reasonable expectation before the user can become autoconfirmed. [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 18:56, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :+ 1 —[[User:Atcovi|Atcovi]] [[User talk:Atcovi|(Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Atcovi|Contribs)]] 19:40, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :'''Weak support''' Generally reasonable, but I would caution that we should really make this clear for those instances where professors have students edit here and make it frictionless for them to get autoconfirmed status. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 19:42, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : {{oppose|No support}} because I cannot see the [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|abuse filter]] cited as the primary reason and I do not know what LTAs is. I guess you don’t want support from ''ordinary'' users. ‑‑[[User:Kai Burghardt|Kays]] ([[User talk:Kai Burghardt|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Kai Burghardt|contribs]]) 18:18, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::Also some readers may be interested in this: ::* [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]] ::[[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 19:05, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::: An LTA means a long-term abuser, and it means someone who is usually abusive. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:42, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::::@[[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]], an LTA is someone who is usually abusive? That's news to me. Can you please point us to the source of this information. ::::Thanks in advance, [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 15:50, 14 October 2026 (UTC) :::::[[w:WP:LTA|WP:LTA]] :::::[[User:Chrisblammo123|Chrisblammo123]] ([[User talk:Chrisblammo123|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Chrisblammo123|contribs]]) 08:59, 15 October 2026 (UTC) :'''Strong''' {{support}}; specially to battle LTA [[User:Mbataw|Mbataw]] ([[User talk:Mbataw|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mbataw|contribs]]) 13:17, 18 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}}, having no edit count requirement for autoconfirmed is a bad idea in general. [[User:BooksBooksBooks3|BooksBooksBooks3]] ([[User talk:BooksBooksBooks3|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BooksBooksBooks3|contribs]]) 01:43, 19 September 2026 (UTC) :Comment: I realize that it is not easy to be an admin on wikimedia projects. I realize that many admins have to deal with some VERY unpleasant personalities. But.. :Admins are not the only users who encounter harassment on wikimedia projects, big or small. Anyone who's been here as long as I have, has come across users who are not tolerated by the "community". Not necessarily because they are spammers, trollers, paid editors, LTAs , disruptive etc, but simply because they are different. :When I "edit" without logging in, I carry no baggage. I also get encouraging prompts such as this: :* This year, Wikipedia has had fewer visitors and fewer new supporters, so '''<big>your visit today means a lot</BIG>''' :Anyway, back to the topic at hand [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]]. I believe the section about IP editors is outdated since wikimedia now views users who are not logged-in as anonymous, and only trusted users are allowed to see their IP address (I am not clear on the details). I wonder if anyone participating here has an interest in bringing this page uptodate? [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 04:13, 22 September 2026 (UTC) : If there's some obvious things to fix, I'd say go ahead. It looks like there were several useful anonymous contributions to that page recently. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 07:54, 22 September 2026 (UTC) :hmm [[User:Tornaiden|Tornaiden]] ([[User talk:Tornaiden|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Tornaiden|contribs]]) 02:02, 27 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}} Having a reasonable (and very modest) number of edits in addition to 4 days is sensible and not overly burdensome. The benefits outweigh any inconveniences. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:18, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::I agree that the 5 edit minimum described below is sufficient. [[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 01:14, 13 October 2026 (UTC) :I'd say that a minimum of five (5) edits would be a good compromise, given the lower user activity/user traffic present here (when compared with Wikipedia). [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:47, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I agree that a minimum edit count is a prudent addition, but also agree with @[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLazaraox]] that a minimum of 5 is sufficient. It can be frustrating for new, genuine users when they get caught in new user restrictions. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:49, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :: I adjusted the proposal to require at least 5 edits for autoconfirmed users, instead of 10. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:18, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Here is current page about [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:50, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I made [[phab:T442057]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:37, 22 October 2026 (UTC) == Bartending Course on Wikiversity == I recently finished the course on [[Bartending]], and while I have experience editing on Wikipedia, this is my first Wikiversity project. If any of you have the time or interest, I could use an experienced eye to see if there's anything obviously missing from the course in terms of Wikiversity administration. I'm not sure what's active, if the course should belong in an existing school, or if there's any obvious discoverability tool I haven't implemented. Any tips are welcomed, or just a thumbs up saying it looks fine would be great. [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] recommended I post this here in case someone wanted to include the new course under News on the [[Wikiversity:Main Page|Main Page]]. Thanks! [[User:Sabbier|Sabbier]] ([[User talk:Sabbier|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Sabbier|contribs]]) 01:24, 1 September 2026 (UTC) :Wow! Fantastic work- I'm so impressed! Your work gives me inspiration on how to better organize the courses I'm working on. :) [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 21:32, 3 September 2026 (UTC) : Awesome work. I've added this course to the [[Main Page/News|main page news]]. : We could also consider for [[Wikiversity:Featured]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:43, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::The course [[Creating Wikiversity Courses]] is intended to provide guidance to new Wikiversity editors. I hope it is helpful and I welcome improvement suggestions. Thanks. [[User:Lbeaumont|Lbeaumont]] ([[User talk:Lbeaumont|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Lbeaumont|contribs]]) 14:08, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :Just checked it out; Very impressive! [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:48, 12 October 2026 (UTC) == Writing news here == I'm bringing up this discussion again because I think it is beneficial to the project since Wikinews is gone, thank you. [[User:BigKrow|BigKrow]] ([[User talk:BigKrow|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BigKrow|contribs]]) 03:17, 1 September 2026 (UTC) : Given that the community consensus here was not to replicate WikiNews within Wikiversity, I suggest thinking differently e.g., in terms of specific news-related projects you are interested in that have educational objectives that satisfy Wikiversity's mission. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:46, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::I wonder if you mean <u>Wikiversity:Main Page/News ?</u> ::If so I have just checked this page and I see it only contains news for 2026 and part of 2025, even though the history indicates it was created in the 2000-decade. If you go back and check all revisions there is a wealth of (historical?) information. [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 16:28, 13 September 2026 (UTC) ::: I didn't mean that page, but yes, its history could be reconstructed into a more accessible format. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:37, 13 September 2026 (UTC) == [[Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group]] == {{Archive top}} Per [[User:Codename_Noreste]] withdrawing this proposal I am archiving it. I will reopen a new discussion on the particulars of IA policy in a new thread. We will continue discussion of the topic there. I'm optimistic that we can agree on some some minor changes to IA policy. It might take a bit more discussion to agree on major changes. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 03:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) As I suggested, I would like to propose allowing permanent interface administrators on English Wikiversity. My temporary interface admin rights are about to expire soon, and I will soon create a new CfIA page (and its header). We should also have a minimum of two interface administrators. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:44, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :I am also in favor of this and we did discuss it pretty recently and came to a consensus on extending IA rights and lowering the administrative overhead, but not allowing indefinite at this juncture. From my perspective, since we discussed this so recently and nothing seems to have changed much, I personally would recommend holding off for a couple of years or until/unless there is some critical new information. Again, I would continue to support indef IA rights were it to come up again and think that at least two is also a sensible proposal. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:32, 6 September 2026 (UTC) ::Responding to myself so that I don't derail: I would be interested/willing to be an indef IA. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:36, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : I made [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Interface Adminship]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:24, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: CC to @[[User:Koavf|Koavf]]. I made a request since my IA rights are about to expire. We should also hold a separate vote to allow permanent IAs here (for this policy). [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:55, 7 September 2026 (UTC) : @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]], I count at least three in favor (votes below, and Koavf agreeing), so can you close this request? Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:22, 24 September 2026 (UTC) :: Second ping to @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 02:24, 7 October 2026 (UTC) :Temporary rights can be extended for a year. I'd like a little more time to consider permanent rights and justin's sensible suggestion of a minimum of two. Let's not rush into this. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:38, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::Sorry, my mistake, policy is 120 days. Interface allows 1 year or indef. I don't see any reason why a nom couldn't request extending rights for another 120 days while we clarify indef and other wording of policy. I'll look closer tomorrow. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:00, 7 October 2026 (UTC) : Personally, I'm not convinced of the need for permanent interface administrators. This isn't necessarily a strong view. But it seems that Wikiversity's interface administration needs can largely currently be met by permitting temporary periods for individual users. : If there are users who make productive use of several temporary periods, then that could strengthen a case for allowing longer periods or permanent use. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 10:15, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :I am also not (yet) convinced of the need for permanent, but could be persuaded. My main concern is that we are simultaneously voting on changing the policy while also voting for a nom to hold the right based on a policy that doesn't yet exist. The current [[WV:IA|policy]] states "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship '''may only be granted temporarily'''..." This should have been addressed before the community even started a discussion on a permanent nomination. I'd be inclined to change temporary from "between 14 and 120 days" to "between 1 week and 1 year" just to align with the pull down menu options in [[Special:UserRights|UserRights]]. I'm in favor of the suggestion that there be a minimum of two with permanent, should we adopt that. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Okay, so considering the opinions of the bureaucrats above, I would sincerely like to withdraw this proposal. Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:14, 22 October 2026 (UTC) === Votes === * For the record, I am creating a separate subsection for voting, whether or not we should allow permanent interface administrators. {{support}} accordingly. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:32, 15 September 2026 (UTC) *: To the above, I support for indefinite interface adminship rights. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:47, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} [[User:PieWriter|PieWriter]] ([[User talk:PieWriter|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/PieWriter|contribs]]) 00:51, 18 September 2026 (UTC) *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 02:22, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * Temporary {{oppose}} until there has been further discussion. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) {{Archive bottom}} == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. 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'''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * I would {{support|support}} this option for permanent IA per previous discussion. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) rese873fiifqs18rj3f5xfhhoywxaow 2842311 2842303 2026-10-23T14:56:21Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Discussion */ reply: {{support}}. (-) ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842311 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Add an edit count requirement for autoconfirmed? == Currently, only waiting for four days is required for a user to become autoconfirmed. I am proposing that we include a minimum edit count of <s>10 edits (akin to Wikipedia)</s> 5 edits especially because of [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|a private abuse filter]], and LTAs may game autoconfirmed permissions to vandalize here. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 23:01, 23 August 2026 (UTC) : [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]] : Are you suggesting an additional requirement? i.e., 4 days + 10 edits? : How is it adjusted? -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 03:57, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :: Yes. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:30, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]: I said yes to your first question. As for the adjustment question, in the InitialiseSettings.php file on noc.wikimedia.org, on <code>wgAutoConfirmCount</code> is where English Wikiversity would be added as <code>'enwikiversity' => 10,</code>. Does my reply make sense? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:31, 15 September 2026 (UTC) :As a newly volunteered member, it doesn't seem unreasonable to me to require a certain number of edits to establish my bona fides. [[User:Cfm490|Cfm490]] ([[User talk:Cfm490|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Cfm490|contribs]]) 17:53, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :I agree that adding an edit count requirement is a reasonable expectation before the user can become autoconfirmed. [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 18:56, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :+ 1 —[[User:Atcovi|Atcovi]] [[User talk:Atcovi|(Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Atcovi|Contribs)]] 19:40, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :'''Weak support''' Generally reasonable, but I would caution that we should really make this clear for those instances where professors have students edit here and make it frictionless for them to get autoconfirmed status. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 19:42, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : {{oppose|No support}} because I cannot see the [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|abuse filter]] cited as the primary reason and I do not know what LTAs is. I guess you don’t want support from ''ordinary'' users. ‑‑[[User:Kai Burghardt|Kays]] ([[User talk:Kai Burghardt|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Kai Burghardt|contribs]]) 18:18, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::Also some readers may be interested in this: ::* [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]] ::[[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 19:05, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::: An LTA means a long-term abuser, and it means someone who is usually abusive. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:42, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::::@[[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]], an LTA is someone who is usually abusive? That's news to me. Can you please point us to the source of this information. ::::Thanks in advance, [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 15:50, 14 October 2026 (UTC) :::::[[w:WP:LTA|WP:LTA]] :::::[[User:Chrisblammo123|Chrisblammo123]] ([[User talk:Chrisblammo123|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Chrisblammo123|contribs]]) 08:59, 15 October 2026 (UTC) :'''Strong''' {{support}}; specially to battle LTA [[User:Mbataw|Mbataw]] ([[User talk:Mbataw|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mbataw|contribs]]) 13:17, 18 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}}, having no edit count requirement for autoconfirmed is a bad idea in general. [[User:BooksBooksBooks3|BooksBooksBooks3]] ([[User talk:BooksBooksBooks3|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BooksBooksBooks3|contribs]]) 01:43, 19 September 2026 (UTC) :Comment: I realize that it is not easy to be an admin on wikimedia projects. I realize that many admins have to deal with some VERY unpleasant personalities. But.. :Admins are not the only users who encounter harassment on wikimedia projects, big or small. Anyone who's been here as long as I have, has come across users who are not tolerated by the "community". Not necessarily because they are spammers, trollers, paid editors, LTAs , disruptive etc, but simply because they are different. :When I "edit" without logging in, I carry no baggage. I also get encouraging prompts such as this: :* This year, Wikipedia has had fewer visitors and fewer new supporters, so '''<big>your visit today means a lot</BIG>''' :Anyway, back to the topic at hand [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]]. I believe the section about IP editors is outdated since wikimedia now views users who are not logged-in as anonymous, and only trusted users are allowed to see their IP address (I am not clear on the details). I wonder if anyone participating here has an interest in bringing this page uptodate? [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 04:13, 22 September 2026 (UTC) : If there's some obvious things to fix, I'd say go ahead. It looks like there were several useful anonymous contributions to that page recently. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 07:54, 22 September 2026 (UTC) :hmm [[User:Tornaiden|Tornaiden]] ([[User talk:Tornaiden|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Tornaiden|contribs]]) 02:02, 27 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}} Having a reasonable (and very modest) number of edits in addition to 4 days is sensible and not overly burdensome. The benefits outweigh any inconveniences. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:18, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::I agree that the 5 edit minimum described below is sufficient. [[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 01:14, 13 October 2026 (UTC) :I'd say that a minimum of five (5) edits would be a good compromise, given the lower user activity/user traffic present here (when compared with Wikipedia). [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:47, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I agree that a minimum edit count is a prudent addition, but also agree with @[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLazaraox]] that a minimum of 5 is sufficient. It can be frustrating for new, genuine users when they get caught in new user restrictions. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:49, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :: I adjusted the proposal to require at least 5 edits for autoconfirmed users, instead of 10. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:18, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Here is current page about [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:50, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I made [[phab:T442057]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:37, 22 October 2026 (UTC) == Bartending Course on Wikiversity == I recently finished the course on [[Bartending]], and while I have experience editing on Wikipedia, this is my first Wikiversity project. If any of you have the time or interest, I could use an experienced eye to see if there's anything obviously missing from the course in terms of Wikiversity administration. I'm not sure what's active, if the course should belong in an existing school, or if there's any obvious discoverability tool I haven't implemented. Any tips are welcomed, or just a thumbs up saying it looks fine would be great. [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] recommended I post this here in case someone wanted to include the new course under News on the [[Wikiversity:Main Page|Main Page]]. Thanks! [[User:Sabbier|Sabbier]] ([[User talk:Sabbier|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Sabbier|contribs]]) 01:24, 1 September 2026 (UTC) :Wow! Fantastic work- I'm so impressed! Your work gives me inspiration on how to better organize the courses I'm working on. :) [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 21:32, 3 September 2026 (UTC) : Awesome work. I've added this course to the [[Main Page/News|main page news]]. : We could also consider for [[Wikiversity:Featured]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:43, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::The course [[Creating Wikiversity Courses]] is intended to provide guidance to new Wikiversity editors. I hope it is helpful and I welcome improvement suggestions. Thanks. [[User:Lbeaumont|Lbeaumont]] ([[User talk:Lbeaumont|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Lbeaumont|contribs]]) 14:08, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :Just checked it out; Very impressive! [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:48, 12 October 2026 (UTC) == Writing news here == I'm bringing up this discussion again because I think it is beneficial to the project since Wikinews is gone, thank you. [[User:BigKrow|BigKrow]] ([[User talk:BigKrow|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BigKrow|contribs]]) 03:17, 1 September 2026 (UTC) : Given that the community consensus here was not to replicate WikiNews within Wikiversity, I suggest thinking differently e.g., in terms of specific news-related projects you are interested in that have educational objectives that satisfy Wikiversity's mission. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:46, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::I wonder if you mean <u>Wikiversity:Main Page/News ?</u> ::If so I have just checked this page and I see it only contains news for 2026 and part of 2025, even though the history indicates it was created in the 2000-decade. If you go back and check all revisions there is a wealth of (historical?) information. [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 16:28, 13 September 2026 (UTC) ::: I didn't mean that page, but yes, its history could be reconstructed into a more accessible format. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:37, 13 September 2026 (UTC) == [[Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group]] == {{Archive top}} Per [[User:Codename_Noreste]] withdrawing this proposal I am archiving it. I will reopen a new discussion on the particulars of IA policy in a new thread. We will continue discussion of the topic there. I'm optimistic that we can agree on some some minor changes to IA policy. It might take a bit more discussion to agree on major changes. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 03:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) As I suggested, I would like to propose allowing permanent interface administrators on English Wikiversity. My temporary interface admin rights are about to expire soon, and I will soon create a new CfIA page (and its header). We should also have a minimum of two interface administrators. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:44, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :I am also in favor of this and we did discuss it pretty recently and came to a consensus on extending IA rights and lowering the administrative overhead, but not allowing indefinite at this juncture. From my perspective, since we discussed this so recently and nothing seems to have changed much, I personally would recommend holding off for a couple of years or until/unless there is some critical new information. Again, I would continue to support indef IA rights were it to come up again and think that at least two is also a sensible proposal. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:32, 6 September 2026 (UTC) ::Responding to myself so that I don't derail: I would be interested/willing to be an indef IA. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:36, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : I made [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Interface Adminship]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:24, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: CC to @[[User:Koavf|Koavf]]. I made a request since my IA rights are about to expire. We should also hold a separate vote to allow permanent IAs here (for this policy). [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:55, 7 September 2026 (UTC) : @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]], I count at least three in favor (votes below, and Koavf agreeing), so can you close this request? Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:22, 24 September 2026 (UTC) :: Second ping to @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 02:24, 7 October 2026 (UTC) :Temporary rights can be extended for a year. I'd like a little more time to consider permanent rights and justin's sensible suggestion of a minimum of two. Let's not rush into this. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:38, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::Sorry, my mistake, policy is 120 days. Interface allows 1 year or indef. I don't see any reason why a nom couldn't request extending rights for another 120 days while we clarify indef and other wording of policy. I'll look closer tomorrow. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:00, 7 October 2026 (UTC) : Personally, I'm not convinced of the need for permanent interface administrators. This isn't necessarily a strong view. But it seems that Wikiversity's interface administration needs can largely currently be met by permitting temporary periods for individual users. : If there are users who make productive use of several temporary periods, then that could strengthen a case for allowing longer periods or permanent use. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 10:15, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :I am also not (yet) convinced of the need for permanent, but could be persuaded. My main concern is that we are simultaneously voting on changing the policy while also voting for a nom to hold the right based on a policy that doesn't yet exist. The current [[WV:IA|policy]] states "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship '''may only be granted temporarily'''..." This should have been addressed before the community even started a discussion on a permanent nomination. I'd be inclined to change temporary from "between 14 and 120 days" to "between 1 week and 1 year" just to align with the pull down menu options in [[Special:UserRights|UserRights]]. I'm in favor of the suggestion that there be a minimum of two with permanent, should we adopt that. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Okay, so considering the opinions of the bureaucrats above, I would sincerely like to withdraw this proposal. Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:14, 22 October 2026 (UTC) === Votes === * For the record, I am creating a separate subsection for voting, whether or not we should allow permanent interface administrators. {{support}} accordingly. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:32, 15 September 2026 (UTC) *: To the above, I support for indefinite interface adminship rights. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:47, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} [[User:PieWriter|PieWriter]] ([[User talk:PieWriter|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/PieWriter|contribs]]) 00:51, 18 September 2026 (UTC) *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 02:22, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * Temporary {{oppose}} until there has been further discussion. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) {{Archive bottom}} == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * I would {{support|support}} this option for permanent IA per previous discussion. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) eyeep9ojhvl0q72xrubzaw572sn38fw 2842312 2842311 2026-10-23T14:56:39Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Discussion */ reply: {{support}} for more than one extension. (-) ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842312 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Add an edit count requirement for autoconfirmed? == Currently, only waiting for four days is required for a user to become autoconfirmed. I am proposing that we include a minimum edit count of <s>10 edits (akin to Wikipedia)</s> 5 edits especially because of [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|a private abuse filter]], and LTAs may game autoconfirmed permissions to vandalize here. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 23:01, 23 August 2026 (UTC) : [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]] : Are you suggesting an additional requirement? i.e., 4 days + 10 edits? : How is it adjusted? -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 03:57, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :: Yes. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:30, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]: I said yes to your first question. As for the adjustment question, in the InitialiseSettings.php file on noc.wikimedia.org, on <code>wgAutoConfirmCount</code> is where English Wikiversity would be added as <code>'enwikiversity' => 10,</code>. Does my reply make sense? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:31, 15 September 2026 (UTC) :As a newly volunteered member, it doesn't seem unreasonable to me to require a certain number of edits to establish my bona fides. [[User:Cfm490|Cfm490]] ([[User talk:Cfm490|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Cfm490|contribs]]) 17:53, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :I agree that adding an edit count requirement is a reasonable expectation before the user can become autoconfirmed. [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 18:56, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :+ 1 —[[User:Atcovi|Atcovi]] [[User talk:Atcovi|(Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Atcovi|Contribs)]] 19:40, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :'''Weak support''' Generally reasonable, but I would caution that we should really make this clear for those instances where professors have students edit here and make it frictionless for them to get autoconfirmed status. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 19:42, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : {{oppose|No support}} because I cannot see the [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|abuse filter]] cited as the primary reason and I do not know what LTAs is. I guess you don’t want support from ''ordinary'' users. ‑‑[[User:Kai Burghardt|Kays]] ([[User talk:Kai Burghardt|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Kai Burghardt|contribs]]) 18:18, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::Also some readers may be interested in this: ::* [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]] ::[[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 19:05, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::: An LTA means a long-term abuser, and it means someone who is usually abusive. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:42, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::::@[[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]], an LTA is someone who is usually abusive? That's news to me. Can you please point us to the source of this information. ::::Thanks in advance, [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 15:50, 14 October 2026 (UTC) :::::[[w:WP:LTA|WP:LTA]] :::::[[User:Chrisblammo123|Chrisblammo123]] ([[User talk:Chrisblammo123|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Chrisblammo123|contribs]]) 08:59, 15 October 2026 (UTC) :'''Strong''' {{support}}; specially to battle LTA [[User:Mbataw|Mbataw]] ([[User talk:Mbataw|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mbataw|contribs]]) 13:17, 18 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}}, having no edit count requirement for autoconfirmed is a bad idea in general. [[User:BooksBooksBooks3|BooksBooksBooks3]] ([[User talk:BooksBooksBooks3|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BooksBooksBooks3|contribs]]) 01:43, 19 September 2026 (UTC) :Comment: I realize that it is not easy to be an admin on wikimedia projects. I realize that many admins have to deal with some VERY unpleasant personalities. But.. :Admins are not the only users who encounter harassment on wikimedia projects, big or small. Anyone who's been here as long as I have, has come across users who are not tolerated by the "community". Not necessarily because they are spammers, trollers, paid editors, LTAs , disruptive etc, but simply because they are different. :When I "edit" without logging in, I carry no baggage. I also get encouraging prompts such as this: :* This year, Wikipedia has had fewer visitors and fewer new supporters, so '''<big>your visit today means a lot</BIG>''' :Anyway, back to the topic at hand [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]]. I believe the section about IP editors is outdated since wikimedia now views users who are not logged-in as anonymous, and only trusted users are allowed to see their IP address (I am not clear on the details). I wonder if anyone participating here has an interest in bringing this page uptodate? [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 04:13, 22 September 2026 (UTC) : If there's some obvious things to fix, I'd say go ahead. It looks like there were several useful anonymous contributions to that page recently. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 07:54, 22 September 2026 (UTC) :hmm [[User:Tornaiden|Tornaiden]] ([[User talk:Tornaiden|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Tornaiden|contribs]]) 02:02, 27 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}} Having a reasonable (and very modest) number of edits in addition to 4 days is sensible and not overly burdensome. The benefits outweigh any inconveniences. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:18, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::I agree that the 5 edit minimum described below is sufficient. [[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 01:14, 13 October 2026 (UTC) :I'd say that a minimum of five (5) edits would be a good compromise, given the lower user activity/user traffic present here (when compared with Wikipedia). [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:47, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I agree that a minimum edit count is a prudent addition, but also agree with @[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLazaraox]] that a minimum of 5 is sufficient. It can be frustrating for new, genuine users when they get caught in new user restrictions. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:49, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :: I adjusted the proposal to require at least 5 edits for autoconfirmed users, instead of 10. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:18, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Here is current page about [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:50, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I made [[phab:T442057]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:37, 22 October 2026 (UTC) == Bartending Course on Wikiversity == I recently finished the course on [[Bartending]], and while I have experience editing on Wikipedia, this is my first Wikiversity project. If any of you have the time or interest, I could use an experienced eye to see if there's anything obviously missing from the course in terms of Wikiversity administration. I'm not sure what's active, if the course should belong in an existing school, or if there's any obvious discoverability tool I haven't implemented. Any tips are welcomed, or just a thumbs up saying it looks fine would be great. [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] recommended I post this here in case someone wanted to include the new course under News on the [[Wikiversity:Main Page|Main Page]]. Thanks! [[User:Sabbier|Sabbier]] ([[User talk:Sabbier|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Sabbier|contribs]]) 01:24, 1 September 2026 (UTC) :Wow! Fantastic work- I'm so impressed! Your work gives me inspiration on how to better organize the courses I'm working on. :) [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 21:32, 3 September 2026 (UTC) : Awesome work. I've added this course to the [[Main Page/News|main page news]]. : We could also consider for [[Wikiversity:Featured]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:43, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::The course [[Creating Wikiversity Courses]] is intended to provide guidance to new Wikiversity editors. I hope it is helpful and I welcome improvement suggestions. Thanks. [[User:Lbeaumont|Lbeaumont]] ([[User talk:Lbeaumont|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Lbeaumont|contribs]]) 14:08, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :Just checked it out; Very impressive! [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:48, 12 October 2026 (UTC) == Writing news here == I'm bringing up this discussion again because I think it is beneficial to the project since Wikinews is gone, thank you. [[User:BigKrow|BigKrow]] ([[User talk:BigKrow|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BigKrow|contribs]]) 03:17, 1 September 2026 (UTC) : Given that the community consensus here was not to replicate WikiNews within Wikiversity, I suggest thinking differently e.g., in terms of specific news-related projects you are interested in that have educational objectives that satisfy Wikiversity's mission. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:46, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::I wonder if you mean <u>Wikiversity:Main Page/News ?</u> ::If so I have just checked this page and I see it only contains news for 2026 and part of 2025, even though the history indicates it was created in the 2000-decade. If you go back and check all revisions there is a wealth of (historical?) information. [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 16:28, 13 September 2026 (UTC) ::: I didn't mean that page, but yes, its history could be reconstructed into a more accessible format. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:37, 13 September 2026 (UTC) == [[Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group]] == {{Archive top}} Per [[User:Codename_Noreste]] withdrawing this proposal I am archiving it. I will reopen a new discussion on the particulars of IA policy in a new thread. We will continue discussion of the topic there. I'm optimistic that we can agree on some some minor changes to IA policy. It might take a bit more discussion to agree on major changes. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 03:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) As I suggested, I would like to propose allowing permanent interface administrators on English Wikiversity. My temporary interface admin rights are about to expire soon, and I will soon create a new CfIA page (and its header). We should also have a minimum of two interface administrators. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:44, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :I am also in favor of this and we did discuss it pretty recently and came to a consensus on extending IA rights and lowering the administrative overhead, but not allowing indefinite at this juncture. From my perspective, since we discussed this so recently and nothing seems to have changed much, I personally would recommend holding off for a couple of years or until/unless there is some critical new information. Again, I would continue to support indef IA rights were it to come up again and think that at least two is also a sensible proposal. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:32, 6 September 2026 (UTC) ::Responding to myself so that I don't derail: I would be interested/willing to be an indef IA. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:36, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : I made [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Interface Adminship]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:24, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: CC to @[[User:Koavf|Koavf]]. I made a request since my IA rights are about to expire. We should also hold a separate vote to allow permanent IAs here (for this policy). [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:55, 7 September 2026 (UTC) : @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]], I count at least three in favor (votes below, and Koavf agreeing), so can you close this request? Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:22, 24 September 2026 (UTC) :: Second ping to @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 02:24, 7 October 2026 (UTC) :Temporary rights can be extended for a year. I'd like a little more time to consider permanent rights and justin's sensible suggestion of a minimum of two. Let's not rush into this. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:38, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::Sorry, my mistake, policy is 120 days. Interface allows 1 year or indef. I don't see any reason why a nom couldn't request extending rights for another 120 days while we clarify indef and other wording of policy. I'll look closer tomorrow. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:00, 7 October 2026 (UTC) : Personally, I'm not convinced of the need for permanent interface administrators. This isn't necessarily a strong view. But it seems that Wikiversity's interface administration needs can largely currently be met by permitting temporary periods for individual users. : If there are users who make productive use of several temporary periods, then that could strengthen a case for allowing longer periods or permanent use. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 10:15, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :I am also not (yet) convinced of the need for permanent, but could be persuaded. My main concern is that we are simultaneously voting on changing the policy while also voting for a nom to hold the right based on a policy that doesn't yet exist. The current [[WV:IA|policy]] states "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship '''may only be granted temporarily'''..." This should have been addressed before the community even started a discussion on a permanent nomination. I'd be inclined to change temporary from "between 14 and 120 days" to "between 1 week and 1 year" just to align with the pull down menu options in [[Special:UserRights|UserRights]]. I'm in favor of the suggestion that there be a minimum of two with permanent, should we adopt that. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Okay, so considering the opinions of the bureaucrats above, I would sincerely like to withdraw this proposal. Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:14, 22 October 2026 (UTC) === Votes === * For the record, I am creating a separate subsection for voting, whether or not we should allow permanent interface administrators. {{support}} accordingly. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:32, 15 September 2026 (UTC) *: To the above, I support for indefinite interface adminship rights. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:47, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} [[User:PieWriter|PieWriter]] ([[User talk:PieWriter|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/PieWriter|contribs]]) 00:51, 18 September 2026 (UTC) *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 02:22, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * Temporary {{oppose}} until there has been further discussion. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) {{Archive bottom}} == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. 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If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * I would {{support|support}} this option for permanent IA per previous discussion. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) fyeksp96qgi029n3o54uc0xi5chcikg 2842313 2842312 2026-10-23T15:00:10Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Discussion */ I think that wasn't about permanent IA… ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842313 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Add an edit count requirement for autoconfirmed? == Currently, only waiting for four days is required for a user to become autoconfirmed. I am proposing that we include a minimum edit count of <s>10 edits (akin to Wikipedia)</s> 5 edits especially because of [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|a private abuse filter]], and LTAs may game autoconfirmed permissions to vandalize here. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 23:01, 23 August 2026 (UTC) : [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]] : Are you suggesting an additional requirement? i.e., 4 days + 10 edits? : How is it adjusted? -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 03:57, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :: Yes. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:30, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]: I said yes to your first question. As for the adjustment question, in the InitialiseSettings.php file on noc.wikimedia.org, on <code>wgAutoConfirmCount</code> is where English Wikiversity would be added as <code>'enwikiversity' => 10,</code>. Does my reply make sense? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:31, 15 September 2026 (UTC) :As a newly volunteered member, it doesn't seem unreasonable to me to require a certain number of edits to establish my bona fides. [[User:Cfm490|Cfm490]] ([[User talk:Cfm490|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Cfm490|contribs]]) 17:53, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :I agree that adding an edit count requirement is a reasonable expectation before the user can become autoconfirmed. [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 18:56, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :+ 1 —[[User:Atcovi|Atcovi]] [[User talk:Atcovi|(Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Atcovi|Contribs)]] 19:40, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :'''Weak support''' Generally reasonable, but I would caution that we should really make this clear for those instances where professors have students edit here and make it frictionless for them to get autoconfirmed status. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 19:42, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : {{oppose|No support}} because I cannot see the [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|abuse filter]] cited as the primary reason and I do not know what LTAs is. I guess you don’t want support from ''ordinary'' users. ‑‑[[User:Kai Burghardt|Kays]] ([[User talk:Kai Burghardt|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Kai Burghardt|contribs]]) 18:18, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::Also some readers may be interested in this: ::* [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]] ::[[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 19:05, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::: An LTA means a long-term abuser, and it means someone who is usually abusive. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:42, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::::@[[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]], an LTA is someone who is usually abusive? That's news to me. Can you please point us to the source of this information. ::::Thanks in advance, [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 15:50, 14 October 2026 (UTC) :::::[[w:WP:LTA|WP:LTA]] :::::[[User:Chrisblammo123|Chrisblammo123]] ([[User talk:Chrisblammo123|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Chrisblammo123|contribs]]) 08:59, 15 October 2026 (UTC) :'''Strong''' {{support}}; specially to battle LTA [[User:Mbataw|Mbataw]] ([[User talk:Mbataw|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mbataw|contribs]]) 13:17, 18 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}}, having no edit count requirement for autoconfirmed is a bad idea in general. [[User:BooksBooksBooks3|BooksBooksBooks3]] ([[User talk:BooksBooksBooks3|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BooksBooksBooks3|contribs]]) 01:43, 19 September 2026 (UTC) :Comment: I realize that it is not easy to be an admin on wikimedia projects. I realize that many admins have to deal with some VERY unpleasant personalities. But.. :Admins are not the only users who encounter harassment on wikimedia projects, big or small. Anyone who's been here as long as I have, has come across users who are not tolerated by the "community". Not necessarily because they are spammers, trollers, paid editors, LTAs , disruptive etc, but simply because they are different. :When I "edit" without logging in, I carry no baggage. I also get encouraging prompts such as this: :* This year, Wikipedia has had fewer visitors and fewer new supporters, so '''<big>your visit today means a lot</BIG>''' :Anyway, back to the topic at hand [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]]. I believe the section about IP editors is outdated since wikimedia now views users who are not logged-in as anonymous, and only trusted users are allowed to see their IP address (I am not clear on the details). I wonder if anyone participating here has an interest in bringing this page uptodate? [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 04:13, 22 September 2026 (UTC) : If there's some obvious things to fix, I'd say go ahead. It looks like there were several useful anonymous contributions to that page recently. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 07:54, 22 September 2026 (UTC) :hmm [[User:Tornaiden|Tornaiden]] ([[User talk:Tornaiden|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Tornaiden|contribs]]) 02:02, 27 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}} Having a reasonable (and very modest) number of edits in addition to 4 days is sensible and not overly burdensome. The benefits outweigh any inconveniences. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:18, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::I agree that the 5 edit minimum described below is sufficient. [[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 01:14, 13 October 2026 (UTC) :I'd say that a minimum of five (5) edits would be a good compromise, given the lower user activity/user traffic present here (when compared with Wikipedia). [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:47, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I agree that a minimum edit count is a prudent addition, but also agree with @[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLazaraox]] that a minimum of 5 is sufficient. It can be frustrating for new, genuine users when they get caught in new user restrictions. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:49, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :: I adjusted the proposal to require at least 5 edits for autoconfirmed users, instead of 10. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:18, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Here is current page about [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:50, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I made [[phab:T442057]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:37, 22 October 2026 (UTC) == Bartending Course on Wikiversity == I recently finished the course on [[Bartending]], and while I have experience editing on Wikipedia, this is my first Wikiversity project. If any of you have the time or interest, I could use an experienced eye to see if there's anything obviously missing from the course in terms of Wikiversity administration. I'm not sure what's active, if the course should belong in an existing school, or if there's any obvious discoverability tool I haven't implemented. Any tips are welcomed, or just a thumbs up saying it looks fine would be great. [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] recommended I post this here in case someone wanted to include the new course under News on the [[Wikiversity:Main Page|Main Page]]. Thanks! [[User:Sabbier|Sabbier]] ([[User talk:Sabbier|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Sabbier|contribs]]) 01:24, 1 September 2026 (UTC) :Wow! Fantastic work- I'm so impressed! Your work gives me inspiration on how to better organize the courses I'm working on. :) [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 21:32, 3 September 2026 (UTC) : Awesome work. I've added this course to the [[Main Page/News|main page news]]. : We could also consider for [[Wikiversity:Featured]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:43, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::The course [[Creating Wikiversity Courses]] is intended to provide guidance to new Wikiversity editors. I hope it is helpful and I welcome improvement suggestions. Thanks. [[User:Lbeaumont|Lbeaumont]] ([[User talk:Lbeaumont|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Lbeaumont|contribs]]) 14:08, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :Just checked it out; Very impressive! [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:48, 12 October 2026 (UTC) == Writing news here == I'm bringing up this discussion again because I think it is beneficial to the project since Wikinews is gone, thank you. [[User:BigKrow|BigKrow]] ([[User talk:BigKrow|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BigKrow|contribs]]) 03:17, 1 September 2026 (UTC) : Given that the community consensus here was not to replicate WikiNews within Wikiversity, I suggest thinking differently e.g., in terms of specific news-related projects you are interested in that have educational objectives that satisfy Wikiversity's mission. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:46, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::I wonder if you mean <u>Wikiversity:Main Page/News ?</u> ::If so I have just checked this page and I see it only contains news for 2026 and part of 2025, even though the history indicates it was created in the 2000-decade. If you go back and check all revisions there is a wealth of (historical?) information. [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 16:28, 13 September 2026 (UTC) ::: I didn't mean that page, but yes, its history could be reconstructed into a more accessible format. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:37, 13 September 2026 (UTC) == [[Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group]] == {{Archive top}} Per [[User:Codename_Noreste]] withdrawing this proposal I am archiving it. I will reopen a new discussion on the particulars of IA policy in a new thread. We will continue discussion of the topic there. I'm optimistic that we can agree on some some minor changes to IA policy. It might take a bit more discussion to agree on major changes. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 03:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) As I suggested, I would like to propose allowing permanent interface administrators on English Wikiversity. My temporary interface admin rights are about to expire soon, and I will soon create a new CfIA page (and its header). We should also have a minimum of two interface administrators. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:44, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :I am also in favor of this and we did discuss it pretty recently and came to a consensus on extending IA rights and lowering the administrative overhead, but not allowing indefinite at this juncture. From my perspective, since we discussed this so recently and nothing seems to have changed much, I personally would recommend holding off for a couple of years or until/unless there is some critical new information. Again, I would continue to support indef IA rights were it to come up again and think that at least two is also a sensible proposal. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:32, 6 September 2026 (UTC) ::Responding to myself so that I don't derail: I would be interested/willing to be an indef IA. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:36, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : I made [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Interface Adminship]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:24, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: CC to @[[User:Koavf|Koavf]]. I made a request since my IA rights are about to expire. We should also hold a separate vote to allow permanent IAs here (for this policy). [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:55, 7 September 2026 (UTC) : @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]], I count at least three in favor (votes below, and Koavf agreeing), so can you close this request? Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:22, 24 September 2026 (UTC) :: Second ping to @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 02:24, 7 October 2026 (UTC) :Temporary rights can be extended for a year. I'd like a little more time to consider permanent rights and justin's sensible suggestion of a minimum of two. Let's not rush into this. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:38, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::Sorry, my mistake, policy is 120 days. Interface allows 1 year or indef. I don't see any reason why a nom couldn't request extending rights for another 120 days while we clarify indef and other wording of policy. I'll look closer tomorrow. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:00, 7 October 2026 (UTC) : Personally, I'm not convinced of the need for permanent interface administrators. This isn't necessarily a strong view. But it seems that Wikiversity's interface administration needs can largely currently be met by permitting temporary periods for individual users. : If there are users who make productive use of several temporary periods, then that could strengthen a case for allowing longer periods or permanent use. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 10:15, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :I am also not (yet) convinced of the need for permanent, but could be persuaded. My main concern is that we are simultaneously voting on changing the policy while also voting for a nom to hold the right based on a policy that doesn't yet exist. The current [[WV:IA|policy]] states "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship '''may only be granted temporarily'''..." This should have been addressed before the community even started a discussion on a permanent nomination. I'd be inclined to change temporary from "between 14 and 120 days" to "between 1 week and 1 year" just to align with the pull down menu options in [[Special:UserRights|UserRights]]. I'm in favor of the suggestion that there be a minimum of two with permanent, should we adopt that. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Okay, so considering the opinions of the bureaucrats above, I would sincerely like to withdraw this proposal. Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:14, 22 October 2026 (UTC) === Votes === * For the record, I am creating a separate subsection for voting, whether or not we should allow permanent interface administrators. {{support}} accordingly. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:32, 15 September 2026 (UTC) *: To the above, I support for indefinite interface adminship rights. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:47, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} [[User:PieWriter|PieWriter]] ([[User talk:PieWriter|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/PieWriter|contribs]]) 00:51, 18 September 2026 (UTC) *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 02:22, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * Temporary {{oppose}} until there has been further discussion. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) {{Archive bottom}} == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for having at least two members because there shouldn't be only one. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) dxmx18x124cx3uba79vgqn1pt5o5jsy 2842315 2842313 2026-10-23T15:08:34Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Add an edit count requirement for autoconfirmed? */ archive to [[Wikiversity:Colloquium/archives/August/2026#Add an edit count requirement for autoconfirmed?]] ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842315 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Bartending Course on Wikiversity == I recently finished the course on [[Bartending]], and while I have experience editing on Wikipedia, this is my first Wikiversity project. If any of you have the time or interest, I could use an experienced eye to see if there's anything obviously missing from the course in terms of Wikiversity administration. I'm not sure what's active, if the course should belong in an existing school, or if there's any obvious discoverability tool I haven't implemented. Any tips are welcomed, or just a thumbs up saying it looks fine would be great. [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] recommended I post this here in case someone wanted to include the new course under News on the [[Wikiversity:Main Page|Main Page]]. Thanks! [[User:Sabbier|Sabbier]] ([[User talk:Sabbier|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Sabbier|contribs]]) 01:24, 1 September 2026 (UTC) :Wow! Fantastic work- I'm so impressed! Your work gives me inspiration on how to better organize the courses I'm working on. :) [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 21:32, 3 September 2026 (UTC) : Awesome work. I've added this course to the [[Main Page/News|main page news]]. : We could also consider for [[Wikiversity:Featured]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:43, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::The course [[Creating Wikiversity Courses]] is intended to provide guidance to new Wikiversity editors. I hope it is helpful and I welcome improvement suggestions. Thanks. [[User:Lbeaumont|Lbeaumont]] ([[User talk:Lbeaumont|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Lbeaumont|contribs]]) 14:08, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :Just checked it out; Very impressive! [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:48, 12 October 2026 (UTC) == Writing news here == I'm bringing up this discussion again because I think it is beneficial to the project since Wikinews is gone, thank you. [[User:BigKrow|BigKrow]] ([[User talk:BigKrow|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BigKrow|contribs]]) 03:17, 1 September 2026 (UTC) : Given that the community consensus here was not to replicate WikiNews within Wikiversity, I suggest thinking differently e.g., in terms of specific news-related projects you are interested in that have educational objectives that satisfy Wikiversity's mission. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:46, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::I wonder if you mean <u>Wikiversity:Main Page/News ?</u> ::If so I have just checked this page and I see it only contains news for 2026 and part of 2025, even though the history indicates it was created in the 2000-decade. If you go back and check all revisions there is a wealth of (historical?) information. [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 16:28, 13 September 2026 (UTC) ::: I didn't mean that page, but yes, its history could be reconstructed into a more accessible format. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:37, 13 September 2026 (UTC) == [[Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group]] == {{Archive top}} Per [[User:Codename_Noreste]] withdrawing this proposal I am archiving it. I will reopen a new discussion on the particulars of IA policy in a new thread. We will continue discussion of the topic there. I'm optimistic that we can agree on some some minor changes to IA policy. It might take a bit more discussion to agree on major changes. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 03:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) As I suggested, I would like to propose allowing permanent interface administrators on English Wikiversity. My temporary interface admin rights are about to expire soon, and I will soon create a new CfIA page (and its header). We should also have a minimum of two interface administrators. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:44, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :I am also in favor of this and we did discuss it pretty recently and came to a consensus on extending IA rights and lowering the administrative overhead, but not allowing indefinite at this juncture. From my perspective, since we discussed this so recently and nothing seems to have changed much, I personally would recommend holding off for a couple of years or until/unless there is some critical new information. Again, I would continue to support indef IA rights were it to come up again and think that at least two is also a sensible proposal. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:32, 6 September 2026 (UTC) ::Responding to myself so that I don't derail: I would be interested/willing to be an indef IA. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:36, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : I made [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Interface Adminship]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:24, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: CC to @[[User:Koavf|Koavf]]. I made a request since my IA rights are about to expire. We should also hold a separate vote to allow permanent IAs here (for this policy). [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:55, 7 September 2026 (UTC) : @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]], I count at least three in favor (votes below, and Koavf agreeing), so can you close this request? Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:22, 24 September 2026 (UTC) :: Second ping to @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 02:24, 7 October 2026 (UTC) :Temporary rights can be extended for a year. I'd like a little more time to consider permanent rights and justin's sensible suggestion of a minimum of two. Let's not rush into this. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:38, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::Sorry, my mistake, policy is 120 days. Interface allows 1 year or indef. I don't see any reason why a nom couldn't request extending rights for another 120 days while we clarify indef and other wording of policy. I'll look closer tomorrow. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:00, 7 October 2026 (UTC) : Personally, I'm not convinced of the need for permanent interface administrators. This isn't necessarily a strong view. But it seems that Wikiversity's interface administration needs can largely currently be met by permitting temporary periods for individual users. : If there are users who make productive use of several temporary periods, then that could strengthen a case for allowing longer periods or permanent use. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 10:15, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :I am also not (yet) convinced of the need for permanent, but could be persuaded. My main concern is that we are simultaneously voting on changing the policy while also voting for a nom to hold the right based on a policy that doesn't yet exist. The current [[WV:IA|policy]] states "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship '''may only be granted temporarily'''..." This should have been addressed before the community even started a discussion on a permanent nomination. I'd be inclined to change temporary from "between 14 and 120 days" to "between 1 week and 1 year" just to align with the pull down menu options in [[Special:UserRights|UserRights]]. I'm in favor of the suggestion that there be a minimum of two with permanent, should we adopt that. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Okay, so considering the opinions of the bureaucrats above, I would sincerely like to withdraw this proposal. Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:14, 22 October 2026 (UTC) === Votes === * For the record, I am creating a separate subsection for voting, whether or not we should allow permanent interface administrators. {{support}} accordingly. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:32, 15 September 2026 (UTC) *: To the above, I support for indefinite interface adminship rights. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:47, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} [[User:PieWriter|PieWriter]] ([[User talk:PieWriter|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/PieWriter|contribs]]) 00:51, 18 September 2026 (UTC) *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 02:22, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * Temporary {{oppose}} until there has been further discussion. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) {{Archive bottom}} == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for having at least two members because there shouldn't be only one. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) c4s7gll0erdtg8vuvltzqtnhdr7zfaz 2842317 2842315 2026-10-23T15:09:39Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Bartending Course on Wikiversity */ archive to [[Wikiversity:Colloquium/archives/September 2026#Bartending Course on Wikiversity]] ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842317 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Writing news here == I'm bringing up this discussion again because I think it is beneficial to the project since Wikinews is gone, thank you. [[User:BigKrow|BigKrow]] ([[User talk:BigKrow|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BigKrow|contribs]]) 03:17, 1 September 2026 (UTC) : Given that the community consensus here was not to replicate WikiNews within Wikiversity, I suggest thinking differently e.g., in terms of specific news-related projects you are interested in that have educational objectives that satisfy Wikiversity's mission. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:46, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::I wonder if you mean <u>Wikiversity:Main Page/News ?</u> ::If so I have just checked this page and I see it only contains news for 2026 and part of 2025, even though the history indicates it was created in the 2000-decade. If you go back and check all revisions there is a wealth of (historical?) information. [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 16:28, 13 September 2026 (UTC) ::: I didn't mean that page, but yes, its history could be reconstructed into a more accessible format. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:37, 13 September 2026 (UTC) == [[Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group]] == {{Archive top}} Per [[User:Codename_Noreste]] withdrawing this proposal I am archiving it. I will reopen a new discussion on the particulars of IA policy in a new thread. We will continue discussion of the topic there. I'm optimistic that we can agree on some some minor changes to IA policy. It might take a bit more discussion to agree on major changes. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 03:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) As I suggested, I would like to propose allowing permanent interface administrators on English Wikiversity. My temporary interface admin rights are about to expire soon, and I will soon create a new CfIA page (and its header). We should also have a minimum of two interface administrators. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:44, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :I am also in favor of this and we did discuss it pretty recently and came to a consensus on extending IA rights and lowering the administrative overhead, but not allowing indefinite at this juncture. From my perspective, since we discussed this so recently and nothing seems to have changed much, I personally would recommend holding off for a couple of years or until/unless there is some critical new information. Again, I would continue to support indef IA rights were it to come up again and think that at least two is also a sensible proposal. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:32, 6 September 2026 (UTC) ::Responding to myself so that I don't derail: I would be interested/willing to be an indef IA. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:36, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : I made [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Interface Adminship]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:24, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: CC to @[[User:Koavf|Koavf]]. I made a request since my IA rights are about to expire. We should also hold a separate vote to allow permanent IAs here (for this policy). [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:55, 7 September 2026 (UTC) : @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]], I count at least three in favor (votes below, and Koavf agreeing), so can you close this request? Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:22, 24 September 2026 (UTC) :: Second ping to @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 02:24, 7 October 2026 (UTC) :Temporary rights can be extended for a year. I'd like a little more time to consider permanent rights and justin's sensible suggestion of a minimum of two. Let's not rush into this. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:38, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::Sorry, my mistake, policy is 120 days. Interface allows 1 year or indef. I don't see any reason why a nom couldn't request extending rights for another 120 days while we clarify indef and other wording of policy. I'll look closer tomorrow. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:00, 7 October 2026 (UTC) : Personally, I'm not convinced of the need for permanent interface administrators. This isn't necessarily a strong view. But it seems that Wikiversity's interface administration needs can largely currently be met by permitting temporary periods for individual users. : If there are users who make productive use of several temporary periods, then that could strengthen a case for allowing longer periods or permanent use. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 10:15, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :I am also not (yet) convinced of the need for permanent, but could be persuaded. My main concern is that we are simultaneously voting on changing the policy while also voting for a nom to hold the right based on a policy that doesn't yet exist. The current [[WV:IA|policy]] states "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship '''may only be granted temporarily'''..." This should have been addressed before the community even started a discussion on a permanent nomination. I'd be inclined to change temporary from "between 14 and 120 days" to "between 1 week and 1 year" just to align with the pull down menu options in [[Special:UserRights|UserRights]]. I'm in favor of the suggestion that there be a minimum of two with permanent, should we adopt that. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Okay, so considering the opinions of the bureaucrats above, I would sincerely like to withdraw this proposal. Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:14, 22 October 2026 (UTC) === Votes === * For the record, I am creating a separate subsection for voting, whether or not we should allow permanent interface administrators. {{support}} accordingly. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:32, 15 September 2026 (UTC) *: To the above, I support for indefinite interface adminship rights. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:47, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} [[User:PieWriter|PieWriter]] ([[User talk:PieWriter|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/PieWriter|contribs]]) 00:51, 18 September 2026 (UTC) *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 02:22, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * Temporary {{oppose}} until there has been further discussion. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) {{Archive bottom}} == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for having at least two members because there shouldn't be only one. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) nqtlzt9c7ygy2qqqghz00gz4sa9zcsy 2842319 2842317 2026-10-23T15:09:54Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Writing news here */ archive to [[Wikiversity:Colloquium/archives/September 2026#Writing news here]] ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842319 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == [[Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group]] == {{Archive top}} Per [[User:Codename_Noreste]] withdrawing this proposal I am archiving it. I will reopen a new discussion on the particulars of IA policy in a new thread. We will continue discussion of the topic there. I'm optimistic that we can agree on some some minor changes to IA policy. It might take a bit more discussion to agree on major changes. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 03:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) As I suggested, I would like to propose allowing permanent interface administrators on English Wikiversity. My temporary interface admin rights are about to expire soon, and I will soon create a new CfIA page (and its header). We should also have a minimum of two interface administrators. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:44, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :I am also in favor of this and we did discuss it pretty recently and came to a consensus on extending IA rights and lowering the administrative overhead, but not allowing indefinite at this juncture. From my perspective, since we discussed this so recently and nothing seems to have changed much, I personally would recommend holding off for a couple of years or until/unless there is some critical new information. Again, I would continue to support indef IA rights were it to come up again and think that at least two is also a sensible proposal. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:32, 6 September 2026 (UTC) ::Responding to myself so that I don't derail: I would be interested/willing to be an indef IA. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:36, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : I made [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Interface Adminship]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:24, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: CC to @[[User:Koavf|Koavf]]. I made a request since my IA rights are about to expire. We should also hold a separate vote to allow permanent IAs here (for this policy). [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:55, 7 September 2026 (UTC) : @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]], I count at least three in favor (votes below, and Koavf agreeing), so can you close this request? Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:22, 24 September 2026 (UTC) :: Second ping to @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 02:24, 7 October 2026 (UTC) :Temporary rights can be extended for a year. I'd like a little more time to consider permanent rights and justin's sensible suggestion of a minimum of two. Let's not rush into this. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:38, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::Sorry, my mistake, policy is 120 days. Interface allows 1 year or indef. I don't see any reason why a nom couldn't request extending rights for another 120 days while we clarify indef and other wording of policy. I'll look closer tomorrow. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:00, 7 October 2026 (UTC) : Personally, I'm not convinced of the need for permanent interface administrators. This isn't necessarily a strong view. But it seems that Wikiversity's interface administration needs can largely currently be met by permitting temporary periods for individual users. : If there are users who make productive use of several temporary periods, then that could strengthen a case for allowing longer periods or permanent use. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 10:15, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :I am also not (yet) convinced of the need for permanent, but could be persuaded. My main concern is that we are simultaneously voting on changing the policy while also voting for a nom to hold the right based on a policy that doesn't yet exist. The current [[WV:IA|policy]] states "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship '''may only be granted temporarily'''..." This should have been addressed before the community even started a discussion on a permanent nomination. I'd be inclined to change temporary from "between 14 and 120 days" to "between 1 week and 1 year" just to align with the pull down menu options in [[Special:UserRights|UserRights]]. I'm in favor of the suggestion that there be a minimum of two with permanent, should we adopt that. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Okay, so considering the opinions of the bureaucrats above, I would sincerely like to withdraw this proposal. Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:14, 22 October 2026 (UTC) === Votes === * For the record, I am creating a separate subsection for voting, whether or not we should allow permanent interface administrators. {{support}} accordingly. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:32, 15 September 2026 (UTC) *: To the above, I support for indefinite interface adminship rights. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:47, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} [[User:PieWriter|PieWriter]] ([[User talk:PieWriter|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/PieWriter|contribs]]) 00:51, 18 September 2026 (UTC) *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 02:22, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * Temporary {{oppose}} until there has been further discussion. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) {{Archive bottom}} == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for having at least two members because there shouldn't be only one. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) l09jus2sva5h1wu1lw07jaaus63wa3p 2842321 2842319 2026-10-23T15:10:06Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group */ archive to [[Wikiversity:Colloquium/archives/September 2026#Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group]] ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842321 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for having at least two members because there shouldn't be only one. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) rtlcdqhsj4zo3byl4typxer3sictcux 2842325 2842321 2026-10-23T16:30:05Z Mu301 3705 /* Discussion */ 2842325 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer.--[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for having at least two members because there shouldn't be only one. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) qyxnubc441d4s0ovijdvz1cpfumdsni 2842326 2842325 2026-10-23T16:30:45Z Mu301 3705 /* Discussion */ 2842326 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer.--[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for having at least two members because there shouldn't be only one. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) 4zou79cks9ueh6axvqxqpoh96uqayos 2842335 2842326 2026-10-23T17:56:18Z Mu301 3705 /* Discussion */ 2842335 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer.--[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for having at least two members because there shouldn't be only one. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * Conditional {{support}} with the understanding that there be a minimum of 2 (if only 1 is remaining, the other perm is set to temp until a 2nd becomes active) and perm can only be granted after having a temp. I also think a perm nom should have a requirement to demonstrate need - for example show activity logs so that the community can assess that IA is needed long term. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 17:55, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ojtde4edjdcaqmfquayilx1t0vria5e 2842336 2842335 2026-10-23T18:24:25Z Mu301 3705 /* Demote Wikiversity:CheckUser policy? */ 2842336 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) :I don't see much point in demoting it. Even if we are not currently (or recently) using the policy, it is there should a need ever arise. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 18:24, 23 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer.--[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for having at least two members because there shouldn't be only one. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * Conditional {{support}} with the understanding that there be a minimum of 2 (if only 1 is remaining, the other perm is set to temp until a 2nd becomes active) and perm can only be granted after having a temp. I also think a perm nom should have a requirement to demonstrate need - for example show activity logs so that the community can assess that IA is needed long term. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 17:55, 23 October 2026 (UTC) h80yh96tph1lw189koihahj0o87fkpj 2842338 2842336 2026-10-23T20:34:09Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Discussion */ reply to Mu301 ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842338 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) :I don't see much point in demoting it. Even if we are not currently (or recently) using the policy, it is there should a need ever arise. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 18:24, 23 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer.--[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for having at least two members because there shouldn't be only one. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * Conditional {{support}} with the understanding that there be a minimum of 2 (if only 1 is remaining, the other perm is set to temp until a 2nd becomes active) and perm can only be granted after having a temp. I also think a perm nom should have a requirement to demonstrate need - for example show activity logs so that the community can assess that IA is needed long term. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 17:55, 23 October 2026 (UTC) *: You mean that we may have at least 2 permanent IAs, but if one is removed, the other one's is set to temporary until another IA is appointed, makes sense? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:34, 23 October 2026 (UTC) b63k52wfs7q3sivjcwgr5txr8xbo8ym 2842411 2842338 2026-10-24T04:15:50Z Mu301 3705 /* Discussion */ r 2842411 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) :I don't see much point in demoting it. Even if we are not currently (or recently) using the policy, it is there should a need ever arise. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 18:24, 23 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer.--[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for having at least two members because there shouldn't be only one. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * Conditional {{support}} with the understanding that there be a minimum of 2 (if only 1 is remaining, the other perm is set to temp until a 2nd becomes active) and perm can only be granted after having a temp. I also think a perm nom should have a requirement to demonstrate need - for example show activity logs so that the community can assess that IA is needed long term. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 17:55, 23 October 2026 (UTC) *: You mean that we may have at least 2 permanent IAs, but if one is removed, the other one's is set to temporary until another IA is appointed, makes sense? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:34, 23 October 2026 (UTC) *::Yes, I meant that if the second IA is no longer active, the remaining IA would be reset to 1 year temporary. That should give enough time to find a second perm IA. That 1 year could be extended, if it takes more time to find a second. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:15, 24 October 2026 (UTC) 65ax4jn8t234f7u30zmwokod4rdzk4n 2842412 2842411 2026-10-24T04:26:02Z Mu301 3705 /* Discussion */ 2842412 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Wikiversity:Colloquium/Header}} <!-- MESSAGES GO BELOW --> == Paid part-time Administrative Officer position with WikiJournal == [[WikiJournal User Group|WikiJournal]] is an open-access, nonprofit scholarly publisher hosted on Wikiversity. It uses the wiki format to allow authors to write and develop scholarly articles directly online. Submitted articles then undergo formal academic peer review and, when accepted, are published as citable journal articles while remaining freely accessible. WikiJournal is seeking expressions of interest in a new part-time '''Administrative Officer''' position. The officer would support the project's day-to-day organizational work, including: * Setting up and administering a system for tracking contractor hours and issuing payments. * Coordinating the contracting, onboarding, timekeeping and payment of technical editors and other contractors. * Maintaining financial, contractor and administrative records. * Assisting with grant administration, budget tracking and reporting. * Following up on board action items, deadlines and recurring obligations. * Supporting recruitment and other operational tasks as needed. This is a remote, flexibly scheduled contractor role averaging approximately '''6 hours per week'''. Compensation is proposed at '''US$25 per hour''', with up to approximately '''320 hours (US$8,000) available over the year'''. Applicants may be based internationally, although appointment will depend on WikiJournal being able to establish a practical and legally appropriate contracting and payment arrangement in the applicant's country of residence. Relevant experience may include administrative organization, bookkeeping or financial administration, contractor or personnel coordination, nonprofit or grant administration, Wikimedia participation, academic publishing, and open-access work. Applicants are not expected to have experience in every area. For the complete role description and further details, see [[WikiJournal User Group/Administrative officer]]. Those interested should reply in the '''[[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Call for interest: Administrative Officer|Call for interest: Administrative Officer]]''' discussion by '''30 September 2026''', briefly describing their relevant experience, any connection to WikiJournal or related communities, and their general availability. Expressions of interest received later may still be considered if the position has not been filled. Recommendations of potentially suitable candidates are also welcome. [[User:Mikael Häggström|Mikael Häggström]] ([[User talk:Mikael Häggström|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mikael Häggström|contribs]]) 20:00, 10 September 2026 (UTC) == Server switch - Your wiki will be read-only for a short time soon == <section begin="server-switch"/><div class="plainlinks"> [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Tech/Server switch|Read this message in another language]] • [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Translate&group=page-Tech%2FServer+switch&language=&action=page&filter= {{int:please-translate}}] The [[foundation:|Wikimedia Foundation]] will switch the traffic between its data centers. This will make sure that Wikipedia and the other Wikimedia wikis can stay online even after a disaster. All traffic will switch on '''{{#time:j xg|2026-09-23|en}}'''. The switch will start at '''[https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/{{#time:U|2026-09-23T14:00|en}} {{#time:H:i e|2026-09-23T14:00}}]'''. Unfortunately, because of some limitations in [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/Manual:What is MediaWiki?|MediaWiki]], all editing must stop while the switch is made. We apologize for this disruption, and we are working to minimize it in the future. A banner will be displayed on all wikis 30 minutes before this operation happens. This banner will remain visible until the end of the operation. You can contribute to the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ATranslate&group=Centralnotice-tgroup-read_only_banner&task=view&language=&filter=&action=translate translation or proofreading] of this banner text. '''You will be able to read, but not edit, all wikis for a short period of time.''' * You will not be able to edit for up to an hour on {{#time:l j xg Y|2026-09-23|en}}. * If you try to edit or save during these times, you will see an error message. We hope that no edits will be lost during these minutes, but we can't guarantee it. If you see the error message, then please wait until everything is back to normal. Then you should be able to save your edit. But, we recommend that you make a copy of your changes first, just in case. ''Other effects'': * Background jobs will be slower and some may be dropped. Red links might not be updated as quickly as normal. If you create an article that is already linked somewhere else, the link will stay red longer than usual. Some long-running scripts will have to be stopped. * We expect the code deployments to happen as any other week. However, some case-by-case code freezes could punctually happen if the operation require them afterwards. * [[mw:Special:MyLanguage/GitLab|GitLab]] will be unavailable for about 90 minutes. This project may be postponed if necessary. You can [[wikitech:Switch_Datacenter|read the schedule at wikitech.wikimedia.org]]. Any changes will be announced in the schedule. '''Please share this information with your community.'''</div><section end="server-switch"/> [[m:user:Trizek (WMF)|Trizek (WMF)]] 12:58, 15 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Trizek (WMF)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Distribution_list/Non-Technical_Village_Pumps_distribution_list&oldid=30513874 --> == Your feedback wanted: Remove ''(Language link added:) and similar'' edits from Special:RecentChanges == ''(Apologies for posting in English. You can help by translating it)'' Hello, I’m Danny from [[:en:w:Wikimedia_Deutschland|Wikimedia Deutschland’s]] [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects|Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects]] team.<br/> We have been investigating and examining how Wikidata’s use in the [[Special:RecentChanges]] and [[Special:Watchlist]] pages can be made to be more useful, or less ‘noisy’ (fewer edits that have little value to the reader). We are currently exploring to make a change in the volume and the type of Wikidata edits that appear in these pages, and '''we need your feedback''' to help us ensure this is a positive change for the Wikis and won’t disrupt your workflows.<br/> Language links are also known as sitelinks or interlanguage links and describe when a Wikidata item is connected to a Wiki, adding it to the language dropdown tool for other connected Wikis. [[File:Types of Lang Link changes.png|x350px|frame|A variety of "Language Link" edits as seen in the Recent Changes feed]] The request for feedback is whether you support the removal of these language link edits from the Recent Changes and Watchlist feed, or would you oppose such a change and if so, why? Please share you thoughts on the dedicated '''[[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|metawiki Talk page]]'''. Further information about this change: [[m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|m:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Hide_Language_Link_edits]] Thank you for any participation or feedback you give, -- [[m:User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] 12:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31080985 --> == Wikidata Sitelink changes in Recent Changes and Watchlist == ''(Apologies for cross-posting in English, translating it will help spread the message)'' Editors on group 1 wikis, including Wikiquote, Wikibooks, Wikiversity, Wikivoyage, and Wikisource, will no longer see notifications on [[Special:RecentChanges|Recent Changes]] and [[Special:Watchlist|Watchlist]] when a link to ''another'' language version of a page is added, removed, or changed in its Wikidata item. This change will begin on '''October 5 at 07:00 UTC''' as a two-week trial to reduce high-volume, low-value notifications and make higher-value changes easier to identify. Editors who rely on these notifications should be aware of the change and can share feedback or concerns on the [[m:Wikidata For Wikimedia Projects/Clearer Wikidata Edit Summaries/Hide Language Link edits|project]] or [[m:Talk:Wikidata_For_Wikimedia_Projects/Clearer_Wikidata_Edit_Summaries/Hide_Language_Link_edits|talk page]].<br/>Please reach out if you have any questions, thank you! -- [[User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|Danny Benjafield (WMDE)]] ([[User_talk:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)|talk]]) sent via [[User:MediaWiki message delivery|MediaWiki message delivery]] ([[User talk:MediaWiki message delivery|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MediaWiki message delivery|contribs]]) 12:42, 1 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Message sent by User:Danny Benjafield (WMDE)@metawiki using the list at https://meta.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Danny_Benjafield_(WMDE)/MassMessage_test_list&oldid=31106967 --> == Demote [[Wikiversity:CheckUser policy]]? == I am proposing that we demote that policy to a standard page, mostly for two reasons: # Considering the few amount of custodians and the size of this wiki, I'd say that this project is considered too small to have any CUs, and relying on the stewards would be a more logical choice. # We haven't elected two CUs in a few years. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:53, 1 October 2026 (UTC) :Reasonable. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:09, 4 October 2026 (UTC) :I don't see much point in demoting it. Even if we are not currently (or recently) using the policy, it is there should a need ever arise. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 18:24, 23 October 2026 (UTC) == General Questions and Reference Questions == <p>Hey everyone,</p> <p> My apologies in advance if these questions are oblivious or their responses readily apparent, but I figured I'd ask just to be safe.</p> <p> '''Questions'''</p> <p> 1. Should pages have inline citations and a reference section? A [[Fundamentals of Neuroscience/What is Neuroscience|majority of pages]] I have explored have neither, while [[Neurobiology of emotion|others have a more traditional approach to references]].</br> 2. Are there widely-used templates for weasel-words, references, etc.? </p> '''CONTEXT''': I migrated from Wikipedia, so I'm not entirely sure what the norms/roc are here.</br> Thanks in advance,</br> [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 18:40, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :You're asking fine questions. I posted {{tl|welcome}} to your talk page which I think will help you. To answer your direct questions: :#This project spun out of [[:b:]] and both here and there, you can post original research. This does not mean that you can post just anything, so if you want to post an educational resource and you want to justify claims you make with inline citations, that's great. If you want to include a bibliography, that's also quite helpful for readers. Generally, the way that Wikiversity works in practice is that individual users make a resource and then tend to work on it solo and have broad latitude about what you can do and how it looks. :#You can take al look at [[:Category:Templates]] and the subcat [[:Category:Maintenance templates]]. At Wikipedia, it's very common to point out issues with tone or uncited claims. That's not really as common here. We [[:d:Q7780480|do not have an equivalent]] of [[:w:en:Template:weasel]], but we do have a [[Template:Citation needed|local version]] of [[:w:en:Template:Citation needed]]. :―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 20:31, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ::Thanks for the heads up on both accounts; I'm happy to join forces with all y'all! ::[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 23:39, 12 October 2026 (UTC) ==Agent editors== What about inviting agents to edit this wiki? And they would need a human being responsible for them. [[User:Michael Ten|Michael Ten]] ([[User talk:Michael Ten|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Michael Ten|contribs]]) 06:31, 17 October 2026 (UTC) == October 2026 Wikimedia Café: legal issues on Commons, and WMF Board selection process == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! There will be two '''[https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Wikimedia Café]''' discussion opportunities in October. In a change from the usual Café practice, this month's sessions will have different topics. Anyone who meets the Café attendance criteria is welcome to attend either or both sessions. Session A will happen on Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 15:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792854000 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe. This session will feature [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:PBradley-WMF Wikimedia Foundation lawyer Phil Bradley-Schmieg]. We will discuss legal issues on Wikimedia Commons, including complexities of international law. (I am hoping that in a future month, a similar Café session will be offered at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific.) Session B will happen on Sunday, 25 October 2026 at 03:00 UTC ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1792897200 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific, we will discuss [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposed changes to how Wikimedia Foundation Board candidates are selected]. The latest proposals are much different from the earlier July 2026 proposals. The due date for feedback on current proposals is 27 October, and Wikimedians are welcome to participate on the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Talk:Wikimedia_Foundation_elections/2027/Proposed_eligibility_criteria proposal talk page] regardless of Café attendance. Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 06:22, 18 October 2026 (UTC) == A new cosmological model == I would like to publish independent research that challenges the standard cosmological model. Does this fall within the scope of the "Original research" space? And what precautions should I take to ensure the page is not considered an inadmissible personal work, and is not open to modification by other users? [[User:Wb525|Wb525]] ([[User talk:Wb525|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Wb525|contribs]]) 11:53, 20 October 2026 (UTC) : This sounds like it could be [[Wikiversity:Original research|original research]]. Some things to note: :* Sometimes what an author considers original research turns out to be original theory :* Some qualities that may help to ensure viability: objectivity, use of simple language, careful use of peer-reviewed citations, and minimal use of genAI with careful attribution/acknowledgement if AI is used per [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence]] :* Consider starting with a sub-page in user space e.g., [[User:Wb525/Subpage name]] :* As an open knowledge project, Wikiversity content is openly editable by others : -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:05, 20 October 2026 (UTC) == Interface administrators policy== This is a discussion of potential changes to [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] policy. Please refer to: "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship may only be granted temporarily by bureaucrats (between 14 and 120 days based on discussion, at the discretion of that bureaucrat and perceived need)." --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights duration === I propose that temporary rights be granted for a duration of from one day to one year. (to conform with selections in [[Special:UserRights]] in the pull down menus.) --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer.--[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Temporary rights extention === I propose that we clarify that temporary rights can be extended. If the community approves of an extension, it can be granted more than once. The temporary rights can repeatedly be extended, for new temporary durations. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for more than one extension. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} as proposer. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:30, 23 October 2026 (UTC) === Permanent IA === There has been a suggestion of permanent IA rights. Another suggestion is that there should be at least two members with such rights. Please express your preference. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:14, 23 October 2026 (UTC) ==== Discussion ==== *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 13:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} for having at least two members because there shouldn't be only one. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 13:59, 23 October 2026 (UTC) * Conditional {{support}} with the understanding that there be a minimum of 2 (if only 1 is remaining, the other perm is set to temp until a 2nd becomes active) and perm can only be granted after having a temp. I also think a perm nom should have a requirement to demonstrate need - for example show activity logs so that the community can assess that IA is needed long term. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 17:55, 23 October 2026 (UTC) *: You mean that we may have at least 2 permanent IAs, but if one is removed, the other one's is set to temporary until another IA is appointed, makes sense? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:34, 23 October 2026 (UTC) *::Yes, I meant that if the second IA is no longer active, the remaining IA would be reset to 1 year temporary. That should give enough time to find a second perm IA. That 1 year could be extended, if it takes more time to find a second. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:15, 24 October 2026 (UTC) *:::Once the community approves a perm IA, there is no need to renominate. A crat can just reset the time to temp until the conditions are met, and reset to perm when we have two or more. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:25, 24 October 2026 (UTC) 38y8yzj5d9vn4maepbub1chypu9xz8q 8 1213 2842327 2833343 2026-10-23T16:37:01Z Mu301 3705 update 2842327 wikitext text/x-wiki <div style="text-align: left; display: inline-block;"> <ul> <li>[[Wikiversity:Colloquium#Interface_administrators_policy|A '''new''' discussion is underway about interface administrator policy]].</li> <li>[[Wikiversity:Colloquium#Add an edit count requirement for autoconfirmed?|A discussion is underway about changing the autoconfirmed requirements]].</li> </ul> </div> gz08kb7ibm6hdj7kz9lioembtp5gim8 2842329 2842327 2026-10-23T16:37:52Z Codename Noreste 2969951 + 2842329 wikitext text/x-wiki [[Wikiversity:Colloquium#Interface_administrators_policy|A '''new''' discussion is underway regarding changes to our interface administrator policy]]. s4y512c6c5y9kns6sqkv68oyvmda3oc 4 1558 2842323 2841541 2026-10-23T15:25:46Z ~2026-56921-78 3113172 Potator 2842323 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Please leave this line alone (sandbox heading)}} What <quiz> 1111111-000000=1111111 90+10=100 </quiz> final work <quiz> 10-2=8 212+8+220 scotland forever A A G AG A KAGA KG:AS LAG SGSA"ASG G GSA AGSA GS AG GA GS GSAG AS <nowiki><quiz></nowiki> 22-1=21 23+21(11)=354 <======= What does this mean??? i don't know you tell me EDUCATION = GOOD who tells what to tell who Potator Sandbox practice edit by Milan Horvat 9: learning how editing works before creating a course page. 4p6w1htw03y9dmx3jtuzsbe15poz1tr 8 37502 2842328 2833624 2026-10-23T16:37:32Z Mu301 3705 +1 2842328 wikitext text/x-wiki 115 rzs8w0pn501i0i4xgv619wv8b35de00 3 54428 2842289 2834265 2026-10-23T12:25:10Z Regliste 3029369 /* Answered to reviewers */ Reply 2842289 wikitext text/x-wiki Thank you for making this happen: [[User:OhanaUnited/Sister Projects Interview]] - I am sure your readers will profit from the better info from all here. Below more info about Wikiversity, ----[[User:Erkan_Yilmaz|Erkan Yilmaz]] <small>uses the [[Wikiversity:Chat|Wikiversity:Chat]] ([http://java.freenode.net//index.php?channel=wikiversity-en try])</small> 18:51, 27 March 2008 (UTC) ==Welcome== '''Hello OhanaUnited, and [[Wikiversity:Welcome, newcomers|welcome]] to [[Wikiversity:What is Wikiversity?|Wikiversity]]!''' If you need [[Help:Contents|help]], feel free to visit my talk page, or [[Wikiversity:Contact|contact us]] and [[Wikiversity:Questions|ask questions]]. After you leave a comment on a [[Wikiversity:Talk page|talk page]], remember to [[Wikiversity:Signature|sign and date]]; it helps everyone follow the threads of the discussion. The signature icon [[Image:Signature_icon.png]] in the edit window makes it simple. To [[Wikiversity:Introduction|get started]], you may <div style="width:50.0%; float:left"> * [[Wikiversity:Guided tour|Take a guided tour]] and learn [[Help:Editing|to edit]]; * Explore our [[Portal:Learning Projects|learning projects]]; * [[Wikiversity:Browse|Browse]] our [[Wikiversity:Portals|portals]], [[Wikiversity:Schools|schools]], and [[Wikiversity:Research|research]] activities; </div> <div style="width:50.0%; float:left"> * Read and help develop our community [[Wikiversity:Policies|policies]]；or * [[Wikiversity:Chat|Chat]] with other Wikiversitans on [irc://irc.freenode.net/wikiversity-en <kbd>#wikiversity-en</kbd>]. </div> <br clear="both"/> And don't forget to [[Wikiversity:Introduction explore|explore]] Wikiversity with the links to your left. [[Wikiversity:Be bold|Be bold]], and see you around Wikiversity! ----[[User:Erkan_Yilmaz|Erkan Yilmaz]] <small>uses the [[Wikiversity:Chat|Wikiversity:Chat]] ([http://java.freenode.net//index.php?channel=wikiversity-en try])</small> 18:51, 27 March 2008 (UTC) == Environmental experts needed :) == Hi OhanaUnited, There have been a number of environmental projects started here and there... a few I can think of offhand: *[[Project proposal:global warming]] -- I'm not sure where that stands now... it was one of the first proposals back in 2006 I think *[[Bloom Clock]] -- Essentially a phenology project... among other things the data collections will hopefully be handy for later projects tracking changes in bloom time as local and global temperature trends change *[[Radio Discussion/Living on Earth]] -- Something a couple of us were experimenting with this past winter, using a radio show as our "lecture" and collecting materials for further learning. I'm not by any means an expert in environmental science, but as a horticulurist and farmer I'm well-versed in managing my local ecology... let me know if you start something! --[[User:SB_Johnny|{{font|color=green|'''SB_Johnny'''}}]] | ^{[[User_talk:SB_Johnny|{{font|color=green|talk}}]]} 15:06, 28 March 2008 (UTC) :See also [[:Category:Ecology]], ----[[User:Erkan_Yilmaz|Erkan Yilmaz]] <small>uses the [[Wikiversity:Chat|Wikiversity:Chat]] ([http://java.freenode.net//index.php?channel=wikiversity-en try])</small> 11:18, 29 March 2008 (UTC) == Commons == Is there a page on commons somewhere with the questions? I'm sure I could round up a few interested commonists on IRC if you give me a link :). --[[User:SB_Johnny|{{font|color=green|'''SB_Johnny'''}}]] | ^{[[User_talk:SB_Johnny|{{font|color=green|talk}}]]} 14:15, 30 March 2008 (UTC) == Clarifications == Hi OhanaUnited, I've asked some questions at [[User talk:OhanaUnited/Sister Projects Interview#Voice(s)]] - I'd appreciate if you could clarify before I contribute to your initiative. Thanks, [[User:Cormaggio|Cormaggio]] ^{<small>[[User talk:Cormaggio|talk]]</small>} 13:54, 1 April 2008 (UTC) == removing == I removed the signatures after names in order to move forward summarizing the answers... and then I saw that you said to not do that... I reverted... How would be best to summarize the answers? --[[User:Remi|Remi]] 04:05, 21 April 2008 (UTC) :I voiced a related question in the "Voice(s)" section on the talk page.. [[User:Cormaggio|Cormaggio]] ^{<small>[[User talk:Cormaggio|talk]]</small>} 12:40, 21 April 2008 (UTC) == Publication date == Hi OhanaUnited, would you be able to let us know when [[User:OhanaUnited/Sister_Projects_Interview|your interview]] will be published? Perhaps either on the talk page or on the [[Wikiversity:Colloquium#User:OhanaUnited/Sister Projects Interview - the earliest publication date is April 21|Colloquium]]. Thanks. [[User:Cormaggio|Cormaggio]] ^{<small>[[User talk:Cormaggio|talk]]</small>} 12:39, 21 April 2008 (UTC) == Font Tag == The font tag is now obsolete. Please adjust your signature to something like: <blockquote> <pre> [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] </pre> </blockquote> Let me know if you have any questions. -- [[User:Dave Braunschweig|Dave Braunschweig]] ([[User talk:Dave Braunschweig|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Dave Braunschweig|contribs]]) 17:37, 29 May 2018 (UTC) == Reorganised discussion == This is to let you know that the discussion at [[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Code of Conduct]] has been reorganised to ease constructive inputs that help in updating the [[WikiJournal User Group/Code of conduct draft|document]]. If you would like to summarily oppose implementation of any Code of Conduct, feel free to place your opposition at [[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Discussion: Whether any Code of Conduct needs to be defined and implemented]]. For any other constructive inputs please feel free to do so at [[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Discussion: Salient updates that need to be made to the existing draft]]. Thanks for your cooperation. <span style="font-family:Segoe script">[[w:User:Diptanshu Das|<b style="color:#f00">D</b><b style="color:#f60">ip</b><b style="color:#090">ta</b><b style="color:#00f">ns</b><b style="color:#60c">hu</b>]] [[User talk:Diptanshu Das|&#128172;]]</span> 12:20, 16 December 2018 (UTC) == Maps via Wikidata == I remember you were testing maybe plotting a map of editor locations. I've been testing [https://w.wiki/CGk generating a map in Wikidata]. If we include all journal editors on the WikiJournal's page then it's possible to find the geocoordinates of their employer. Eventually it should be automate-able via [[wikidata:Wikidata:Bot_requests#Automated_addition_of_WikiJournal_metadata_to_Wikidata|this bot request]], but would have to be done manually for now. [[User:Evolution and evolvability|T.Shafee(Evo&#65120;Evo)]]^{[[User talk:Evolution and evolvability|talk]]} 06:22, 18 November 2019 (UTC) :Note, [https://w.wiki/CWP updated version] with better interface for multiple points. [[User:Evolution and evolvability|T.Shafee(Evo&#65120;Evo)]]^{[[User talk:Evolution and evolvability|talk]]} 02:48, 23 November 2019 (UTC) == Query at review page == I just noticed there's a query for you at [[Talk:WikiJournal Preprints/Working with Bipolar Disorder During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Both Crisis and Opportunity|this page]] (the editor forgot to ping, or is unaware of the practice). [[User:Evolution and evolvability|T.Shafee(Evo&#65120;Evo)]]^{[[User talk:Evolution and evolvability|talk]]} 09:43, 17 May 2020 (UTC) == Re: A Phonological Analysis of Selected Nigerian Newscasters Rendition == I appreciate your consideration of my article for publication. However, you have not provided an email address where I could send the word version or preferably, I would like to be guided on how to get the article uploaded on wiki commons. Thank you. [[User:Margob28|Margob28]] ([[User talk:Margob28|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Margob28|contribs]]) 07:35, 25 August 2022 (UTC) == The Validity of [[WikiJournal Preprints/The Effect of Corticosteroids on the Mortality Rate in COVID-19 Patients, v2]] == Hello Andrew, I'm coming to you to ask whether the mentioned paper's topic/objective is suitable for publication in the WikiJournal of Medicine. I was going to extensively work on it this summer, but I wanted to get written confirmation that this paper would be suited for my time in developing it. I also wanted to see if a Wikijournal of Humanities paper on Meditation would be suitable. I'm not sure if you're familiar with that wikijournal's guidelines, but I figured it was worth asking. Thank you, —[[User:Atcovi|Atcovi]] [[User talk:Atcovi|(Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Atcovi|Contribs)]] 21:20, 27 August 2022 (UTC) == Request == Please, I do not know whether you could help upload the article if I send its soft copy as MS word document or pdf to you. Thanks. [[User:Margob28|Margob28]] ([[User talk:Margob28|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Margob28|contribs]]) 03:44, 5 September 2022 (UTC) == Volunteering to help with WikiJournal of Humanities == I kinf of forgot about WikiJournals for a few years, and I am amazed at the progress made. Well, as a real-life professor of sociology, I'd be happy to help with WikiJournal of Humanities which seems to be closed to my field. Do let me know how I can help, assuming of course you need any assistance. (If you reply here, please ping me back, TIA). [[User:Piotrus|Piotrus]] ([[User talk:Piotrus|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Piotrus|contribs]]) 03:31, 8 November 2022 (UTC) == In other news == I am a strict believer in learning from the bottoms up (as a teacher who tells students to edit Wikipedia, for example, I never ask them to do things I haven't done myself before). And it so happens, I have a publication that I think is within the scope of WikiJournal Medicine, and now that I know it is indexed in SCOPUS, it meets my university's requirements too. As I am not yet on the board or such, I think I have no COI, so I decided to went ahead and submit my work at [[WikiJournal Preprints/Where experts and amateurs meet: the ideological hobby of medical volunteering on Wikipedia]] . Before I finish copyediting it (I think I need to upload images to Wikimedia Commons and reformat references to footnotes) and finish the rest of the submission procedure, can I ask you to confirm that this topic is within the scope of WJMED and our previous conversation does not create any COI for me to submit it (I am fine putting my editorial application fpr WJHUM from yesterday on hold for the duration of the review process, if necessary)? Oh, to confirm, WikiJournals allows and prefers non-anonymous submissions, right? So I don't need to anonymize citations to my own work, etc.? [[User:Piotrus|Piotrus]] ([[User talk:Piotrus|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Piotrus|contribs]]) 05:08, 10 November 2022 (UTC) :{{re|Piotrus}} Each WikiJournal (Medicine, Science, Humanities) has separate editorial boards, similar to how "Nature Medicine" and "Nature Chemistry" are two different journals, have different editor-in-chief and different ISSN/DOI even though they are both owned and published by Springer Nature. Each WikiJournal operates and makes article decisions independently from each other while sharing same pool of resources (hired contractors, H/R, overhead cost). Therefore, whether or not you are on the Humanities board will not cause a COI when submitting to Medicine. I am the managing editor for Science, so our conversations won't cause any COI. I will defer your question on whether your preprint falls into the scope of Medicine to [[User:Rwatson1955]], who is the managing editor for the Medicine journal. And yes, we [[WikiJournal of Medicine/Publishing#Duties_of_authors|ask that "authors should be given by real names in their articles"]] so there is no need to anonymize. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 15:58, 10 November 2022 (UTC) ::I submitted [[WikiJournal Preprints/Where experts and amateurs meet: the ideological hobby of medical volunteering on Wikipedia|my article]] two days ago and filled in a Google Form, which suggested I'd receive confirmation email, but nothing happened and the article still has a notice that it is not submitted for review. Any chance you could check from your end if things are fine or ping someone who can, as maybe I haven't clicked something correctly or such? [[User:Piotrus|Piotrus]] ([[User talk:Piotrus|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Piotrus|contribs]]) 14:09, 16 November 2022 (UTC) :::{{re|Piotrus}} That's my fault. Been busy with work. I'll process the new submissions today and update the status. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 15:14, 16 November 2022 (UTC) == Concerning an article == Hello, I'm not sure if you are aware that I have written a new article on Wikiversity, entitled: [[WikiJournal Preprints/Orhan Gazi, the first statesman|Orhan Gazi, the first Statesman]], I started it in September 2022 and finished it in March of the same year, and I was hoping that finding some peer reviewers wouldn't take much time. However, the article remained as it was for more than a year, and I had to ask two professors I know personally to check my work, which they did and their notes were sent in pdf format and added [[Talk:WikiJournal Preprints/Orhan Gazi, the first statesman|here]]. Now the article still needs an editor, before it can be finalized and published, and a fellow Wikipedian, [[User:علاء|Alaa]], suggested your name. I hope that perhaps you could check it. Please let me know what you think, best wishes-- [[User:باسم|باسم]] ([[User talk:باسم|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/باسم|contribs]]) 20:17, 7 May 2023 (UTC) == Files Missing Information == Thanks for uploading files to Wikiversity. All files must have source and license information to stay at Wikiversity. The following files are missing {{tlx|Information}} and/or [[Wikiversity:License tags]], and will be deleted if the missing information is not added. See [[Wikiversity:Uploading files]] for more information. {{colbegin|3}} * [[:File:WikiJournal Bioclogging - ES.pdf]] {{colend}} [[User:MaintenanceBot|MaintenanceBot]] ([[User talk:MaintenanceBot|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MaintenanceBot|contribs]]) 15:41, 19 December 2023 (UTC) ==Japanese rendering== Thanks to your help, I could make [[WikiJournal_of_Science/Bioclogging/ja|Japanese translation of bioclogging article]]. I feel that display style of Japanese sentense is wierd, because breakline is restricted to some characters such as "、". Japanese does not break words with spaces, as normal in western languages, and therefore we break lines anywhere. For example, see [[w:ja:バイオクロッギング|Japanese edition of bioclogging article in Wikipedia]]. It can be fixed by using css. For example, in this paragraph バイオクロッギングは、水が浸透する様々な現場で観察される。たとえば、[[w:ja:ため池|ため池]]、浸透トレンチ、[[w:ja:灌漑|灌漑]]水路、[[w:ja:下水処理場|下水処理場]]、人工湿地、廃棄物処分場における遮水ライナー、川床や土壌のような自然環境などである。また、透過反応壁 ([[:w:Permeable reactive barrier|PRB]]) や微生物利用石油増進回収法 ([[:w:Microbial enhanced oil recovery|MEOR]]) などにおいて、[[w:ja:帯水層|帯水層]]における[[w:ja:地下水|地下水]]の流れにも影響を及ぼす。適度な水の浸透速度を保つことが必要とされるような現場では、バイオクロッギングが問題となり、定期的に水を抜くなどの対策が取られることがある。一方で、たとえば、難透水層を作って浸透速度を低下させたり、地盤工学的性質を改善させたりするなど、バイオクロッギングが有効に活用されることもある。 We can set word-break: break-all, and then <span style="word-break: break-all">バイオクロッギングは、水が浸透する様々な現場で観察される。たとえば、[[w:ja:ため池|ため池]]、浸透トレンチ、[[w:ja:灌漑|灌漑]]水路、[[w:ja:下水処理場|下水処理場]]、人工湿地、廃棄物処分場における遮水ライナー、川床や土壌のような自然環境などである。また、透過反応壁 ([[:w:Permeable reactive barrier|PRB]]) や微生物利用石油増進回収法 ([[:w:Microbial enhanced oil recovery|MEOR]]) などにおいて、[[w:ja:帯水層|帯水層]]における[[w:ja:地下水|地下水]]の流れにも影響を及ぼす。適度な水の浸透速度を保つことが必要とされるような現場では、バイオクロッギングが問題となり、定期的に水を抜くなどの対策が取られることがある。一方で、たとえば、難透水層を作って浸透速度を低下させたり、地盤工学的性質を改善させたりするなど、バイオクロッギングが有効に活用されることもある。</span> Setting this to all paragraphs may be a solution. I would like to know if there is a smarter way to do the same thing. [[User:Katsutoshi Seki|Katsutoshi Seki]] ([[User talk:Katsutoshi Seki|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Katsutoshi Seki|contribs]]) 08:55, 16 February 2024 (UTC) :@[[User:Katsutoshi Seki|Katsutoshi Seki]] Thanks for raising this issue. I can read and write in Chinese (and therefore I can read Japanese Kanji) so I understand what you're describing about the software not finding spaces to break up words to the next line. I have [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=WikiJournal_of_Science%2FBioclogging%2Fja&diff=2606145&oldid=2605982 forced] the software to consider appropriate line break locations. I'm confident with the line breaks in Kanji but less so in Katakana and Hiragana. And I don't know how it may look like under different computer screens (or mobile phone). Please review and see if the line breaks are done accurately. Also, can you please provide a Japanese translation for the phrases "For the English translation, please see this link." and "For the Japanese translation, please see this link."? [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 22:49, 16 February 2024 (UTC) :: Unfortunately, giving <nowiki>{{wbr}}</nowiki> to some places does not help much, because appropriate place for breaking line changes to various width of windows. Therefore, using <nowiki><span style="word-break: break-all"></nowiki> to all paragraphs, as I showed above, is necessary. I would like to know if there is an appropriate way to change the stylesheet in the page at once. For the translation, "For the English translation, please see '''this link'''."　to "英語版は'''このリンク'''参照", and "For the Japanese translation, please see '''this link'''." to "日本語版は'''このリンク'''参照" [[User:Katsutoshi Seki|Katsutoshi Seki]] ([[User talk:Katsutoshi Seki|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Katsutoshi Seki|contribs]]) 01:39, 17 February 2024 (UTC) :::Thanks for verifying. I have removed {{tl|wbr}} and added <nowiki><span style="word-break: break-all"></nowiki>. It doesn't seem very effective to bulleted items. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 04:35, 17 February 2024 (UTC) :::: I also added css to bulleted items. Now it works find. [[User:Katsutoshi Seki|Katsutoshi Seki]] ([[User talk:Katsutoshi Seki|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Katsutoshi Seki|contribs]]) 04:50, 17 February 2024 (UTC) :::: I created [[Template:BreakAll]] and applied. ChatGPT was helpful for creating the LUA module. [[User:Katsutoshi Seki|Katsutoshi Seki]] ([[User talk:Katsutoshi Seki|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Katsutoshi Seki|contribs]]) 12:55, 17 February 2024 (UTC) == Article progress == Hi Ohana, it was great to meet you at the conference in November. I finally got around to finishing the revisions for [[WikiJournal Preprints/The Holocaust in Slovakia]]. As we discussed, I didn't expand the scope of the article to include Romani people, and I was unable to implement some of reviewer #2's comments because the information that would clarify is not in the cited source, or any other source that I'm aware of. Sorry for the very long delay on this article and I apologize if this is not the right forum to report progress. [[User:Buidhe|Buidhe]] ([[User talk:Buidhe|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Buidhe|contribs]]) 03:45, 21 February 2024 (UTC) :Hi @[[User:Buidhe|Buidhe]], our apologies for the very long delay in replying to you. [[User:Fransplace|Fransplace]], the editor-in-chief for WikiJournal of Humanities, will be looking at your submission shortly. Since we already received two reviewers' comments and you have completed your revisions, are you ok with continuing with the submission process? I think we are on the home stretch with very few items remaining. Can you add your comments to the reviews to mark which items you have completed and which ones you cannot implement? This will speed up the review process. It probably will not take long for Fransplaces to render her publication decision once she has gone through the comments and your rebuttals. Many thanks for your patience! [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 23:06, 26 March 2025 (UTC) == Mail == {{ygm}} [[User:Serial Number 54129|Serial Number 54129]] ([[User talk:Serial Number 54129|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Serial Number 54129|contribs]]) 12:04, 26 March 2024 (UTC) ==new submissions/need to be imported== Hi, I noticed there are two new submissions (from new editors) at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:WikiJournal_article_nominations, thank you --[[User:Ozzie10aaaa|Ozzie10aaaa]] ([[User talk:Ozzie10aaaa|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Ozzie10aaaa|contribs]]) 11:59, 1 April 2024 (UTC) :I don't have the required permission to import articles from Wikipedia to Wikiversity. I will need the "transwiki importer" permission, presumably to preserve article history and proper copyright attribution. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 04:40, 15 April 2024 (UTC) ==A message from Guy vandegrift== Hi. I am so-called "founder" of the WikiJournal of Science (although dozens of people contributed much more than I ever did.) I was wondering if the WikiJournal project needs help. If so, let me know.----[[User:Guy vandegrift|Guy vandegrift]] ([[User talk:Guy vandegrift|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Guy vandegrift|contribs]]) 01:25, 13 April 2024 (UTC) :Yes, I'll email you with the details. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 03:58, 15 April 2024 (UTC) ::@[[User:Guy vandegrift|Guy vandegrift]] Did you receive the email that I sent last week? [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 18:17, 22 April 2024 (UTC) :::I will look for it.--[[User:Guy vandegrift|Guy vandegrift]] ([[User talk:Guy vandegrift|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Guy vandegrift|contribs]]) 22:17, 22 April 2024 (UTC). ::::My guess is that you used the google wikijournal system and it went to a google email I rarely check. I just sent you an email through Wikiversity. Meanwhile I will lookup my google email password and probably find your message.[[User:Guy vandegrift|Guy vandegrift]] ([[User talk:Guy vandegrift|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Guy vandegrift|contribs]]) 22:35, 22 April 2024 (UTC) == [[WikiJournal_Preprints/Induced_stem_cells]] == Hello, I assume that you are involved in the management of Wikijournals and their preprints. Thank you for your contributions. I'm sending this message to alert you that a preprint is currently subject to copyright-related investigations, this may affect the preprint review procedure and I thought someone who knows more about Wikijournals should be contacted. The background information can be seen at [[Wikiversity:Request_custodian_action#Induced_stem_cells_copyright_issues]]. In your opinion, what should be done by the custodians for this preprint? I look forward to hearing from you. [[User:MathXplore|MathXplore]] ([[User talk:MathXplore|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MathXplore|contribs]]) 02:02, 6 June 2024 (UTC) :Thanks for bringing this to our attention. What you described is very concerning. We did [[Talk:WikiJournal Preprints/Induced stem cells#Plagiarism check|conduct a plagiarism check]] 3 years ago when the preprint was submitted and it was determined that the similarities were deemed to be common phases in that field. Right now the tool is timing out due to high request volume so I can't do another check now. I'm going to ping @[[User:Evolution and evolvability|Evolution and evolvability]] since he's the handling editor for this submission and he knows more about cells & proteins than me. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 04:15, 6 June 2024 (UTC) == Question about the WikiJournal license status == Hello. At [[Special:Diff/2639304]], [[User:MGA73]] asked about the Wikijournal license status, so I'm forwarding the question here. Do you know anything about this? Should we contact [[User:Evolution and evolvability]]? [[User:MathXplore|MathXplore]] ([[User talk:MathXplore|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MathXplore|contribs]]) 08:02, 30 July 2024 (UTC) == Preprint related to Wikidata == Hello! I have written an article titled "[[WikiJournal Preprints/Is there a relationship between volcanoes and earthquakes based on Wikidata?|Is there a relationship between volcanoes and earthquakes based on Wikidata?]]". Could you please include this preprint in the list of [[WikiJournal of Science/Potential upcoming articles|Potential upcoming articles]]? -- [[User:AKA MBG|Andrew Krizhanovsky]] ([[User talk:AKA MBG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/AKA MBG|contribs]]) 14:17, 17 February 2025 (UTC) :@[[User:AKA MBG|AKA MBG]] Hello, not sure why I didn't get a notification when you leave this message. I have taken a look at your preprint. Unfortunately I don't think we have the expertise in our editorial board to take on the role for potential publication of your submission. As a general and personal comment, I think you need to tighten up the paper by drawing comparison with existing literature around SPARQL and Wikidata, such as [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-46547-0_10] and [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-33455-9_40] [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 02:00, 24 March 2025 (UTC) == Status of WikiJournals == Good morning, I have had an article submitted to WikiJournal PrePrints since October 2024. It seems that the chair of the WikiJournal Usergroup (E&E) is entirely inactive, and I'm not sure what your status is as editor-in-chief of the science journal. If these projects are not currently working, then there should be some kind of alert given so people don't submit articles that will never be reviewed. If they are currently working, please let me know what the next steps in the process are for my submitted article. If there is any way I can help with other articles as well, I am happy to do so. [[User:Fritzmann2002|Fritzmann2002]] ([[User talk:Fritzmann2002|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Fritzmann2002|contribs]]) 14:00, 6 March 2025 (UTC) :@[[User:Fritzmann2002|Fritzmann2002]] Hello, it has been busy for many of us at the board over the past few months focusing on the grant request and sustainability of the user group, and all of us serving in volunteer capacity with a daytime job. I should have a handling editor for your submission ([[WikiJournal Preprints/Hypericum sechmenii]]) within 2 weeks. Thanks. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 01:45, 24 March 2025 (UTC) ::@[[User:OhanaUnited|OhanaUnited]], thanks for your response, and apologies for the brusque nature of my original message. I appreciate the work that you do, and want to reiterate my desire to assist in any way that I can! [[User:Fritzmann2002|Fritzmann2002]] ([[User talk:Fritzmann2002|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Fritzmann2002|contribs]]) 01:45, 25 March 2025 (UTC) == [[WikiJournal of Psychology, Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences]] == Hi OhanaUnited, I'm planning on working on a paper for the WikiJournal of PPB regarding mental health in Sri Lanka (which does not seem to have a corresponding Wikipedia article, so I think this would be a very good start; especially as an aspiring clinical PhD student). I wanted to double check and make sure that this WikiJournal has personnel that can peer-review the article for submission, as there seems to be [[WikiJournal of PPB/Editors|no associate editors]] and the social medias (FB & X accounts) for this specific WikiJournal do not exist [anymore?]. Is this WikiJournal still active and can editors be assigned to my paper once its ready for peer-review? Thank you & thank you to the team for all the work you guys do! —[[User:Atcovi|Atcovi]] [[User talk:Atcovi|(Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Atcovi|Contribs)]] 14:57, 8 May 2025 (UTC) :Hi, unfortunately I don't have any updates for WikiJournal of PPB on its launch date since the person in charge is on extended absence. I would recommend that you select either WikiJournal of Medicine (since it's mental health) or select another journal with compatible copyright license to publish. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 15:16, 8 May 2025 (UTC) ::I'll work on this paper through the WikiJournal of Medicine then, thanks! —[[User:Atcovi|Atcovi]] [[User talk:Atcovi|(Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Atcovi|Contribs)]] 19:51, 8 May 2025 (UTC) :::No problem. Thanks for your ongoing support of the journal. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 13:30, 9 May 2025 (UTC) == WikiJournal article nominations == Hi OhanaUnited. More than 5 months ago I have nominated the page [[w:Diffeology|Diffeology]] for submission at the Wikijournal of Science, adding a line at the bottome of the page [[w:Wikipedia:WikiJournal article nominations|Wikipedia:WikiJournal article nominations]]. Unfortunately, nobody has created the corresponding preprint at [[WikiJournal Preprints|Wikijournal Preprints]], hence I cannot proceed yet with the formal submission. Since I had already a very positive experience publishing another paper ([[WikiJournal of Science/Poisson manifold|Poisson manifold]]) in the Wikijournal of Science, in the past months I tried, without success, to contact by email the editors who took care of it. I am therefore trying to reach you here. As I wrote also to them, I noticed that at [[w:Wikipedia:WikiJournal article nominations|Wikipedia:WikiJournal article nominations]] there are links to several other wikipedia pages which have not been converted to a preprint, despite being many months old. I am therefore wondering if that page is still maintained and with which frequency. This issue was also discussed on [[Talk:WikiJournal User Group#Wikipedia:WikiJournal article nominations is dead]]. I understand that you and the rest of the editorial board has a lot to do and therefore it might be just a matter of waiting. As another user pointed out ([[User talk:OhanaUnited#Status of WikiJournals]]), if there is anything I could do in order to speed up the review process, e.g. creating the preprint page myself, please let me know. In that case (i.e. if the author is allowed to import the page directly from wikipedia), I would suggest to clarify it in [[WikiJournal User Group/Editorial guidelines#Importing from Wikipedia]], since these instructions do not specify exactly who is in charge of importing the page. Thanks a lot in advance! [[User:Francesco Cattafi|Francesco Cattafi]] ([[User talk:Francesco Cattafi|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Francesco Cattafi|contribs]]) 10:08, 16 September 2025 (UTC) :Hi, an update. @[[User:Marshallsumter|Marshallsumter]] has suggested me in the nomination page to proceed with the import myself. As per our discussion in [[wikipedia:User_talk:Marshallsumter#Importing_Wikipedia_articles_to_Wikipreprints|User_talk:Marshallsumter#Importing_Wikipedia_articles_to_Wikipreprints]], I did attempt to import the page manually at [[WikiJournal Preprints/Diffeology]] and filled in the Authorship declaration form (providing the authors information, suggesting reviewers, etc. and mentioning also that I did the import manually). :One issue is that [[Template:Convert links]] has been deactivated just a few days ago, preventing all the links to other Wikipedia pages to be automatically converted. Since this was the only method written in [[WikiJournal User Group/Editorial guidelines#Importing from Wikipedia]], do you know if there are some alternatives, in order to avoid to do it manually? Besides that, I'm also not sure how to make the line "Additional contributors: Wikipedia community" appear under the two names of the authors. :I would appreciate if you or somebody from the editorial board could have a look at these minor issues, so that the review process could start soon. Thanks again! [[User:Francesco Cattafi|Francesco Cattafi]] ([[User talk:Francesco Cattafi|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Francesco Cattafi|contribs]]) 22:41, 21 September 2025 (UTC) ::@[[User:Francesco Cattafi|Francesco Cattafi]] Sorry for the late reply. Did the {{tl|Convert links}} end up working again? I see that the links are present. These functions were created long before I joined so I wouldn't be able to troubleshoot them. Sometimes I find that the bugs end up being caused by the most innocent changes in the back end, just like what I encountered [[Wikiversity:Colloquium#Figure numbers are always 1|two weeks ago]]. In the future, if you have some templates or links that aren't working, post a message on [[Wikiversity:Colloquium]] and someone with more knowledge than me may have a solution ready. In related news, there are now two peer review comments which are posted on [[Talk:WikiJournal Preprints/Diffeology]]. I think {{u|Marshallsumter}} is still looking for at least one more peer reviewer. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 21:01, 9 January 2026 (UTC) :::Hi @[[User:OhanaUnited|OhanaUnited]], thanks for the reply, I didn't know about this Colloquium page. Anyways, the Convert link issue was fixed; I have simply asked the user who deleted that tool to undelete it ([[User_talk:Koavf#Deleting_all_unused_templates]]), so I could use it properly. :::In the coming weeks my coauthor and I will address the two reviewers' comment! [[User:Francesco Cattafi|Francesco Cattafi]] ([[User talk:Francesco Cattafi|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Francesco Cattafi|contribs]]) 15:53, 10 January 2026 (UTC) ::::Thanks for your diligence and troubleshoot why it didn't work! [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 22:12, 2 February 2026 (UTC) :::::Hi, just to let you know that we have addressed all three reviewers' comments. Please let us know if any further revisions are needed or if the article will proceed to the next stage of the editorial process. [[User:Francesco Cattafi|Francesco Cattafi]] ([[User talk:Francesco Cattafi|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Francesco Cattafi|contribs]]) 23:09, 3 March 2026 (UTC) ::::::In case you missed it, your article has been published last week and DOI has been issued. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 03:47, 28 April 2026 (UTC) == Found a potential reviewer == Hello @[[User:OhanaUnited|OhanaUnited]] I hope you are doing well. I write you because some weeks ago, I found a potential reviewer for [[WikiJournal Preprints/Kinematics of the cuboctahedron]] (as we talk about [[Talk:WikiJournal of Science#c-OhanaUnited-20260109204800-Regliste-20260106112200|here]]) and I sent you a mail about it. I'd like to be sure that you indeed received it.<br> On another topic, do you know if there is any progresses on [[WikiJournal Preprints/Pentagram map|my preprint]] ? Best regards, [[User:Regliste|Regliste]] ([[User talk:Regliste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Regliste|contribs]]) 16:51, 1 February 2026 (UTC) :Thanks for the reminder. I have emailed you about it. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 21:17, 2 February 2026 (UTC) ::Hello @[[User:OhanaUnited|OhanaUnited]], ::If you have the time, could you answer to my email about the subjects mentioned above, please ? ::Best regards, [[User:Regliste|Regliste]] ([[User talk:Regliste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Regliste|contribs]]) 17:21, 3 May 2026 (UTC) :::(Gentle reminder of my previous message.) [[User:Regliste|Regliste]] ([[User talk:Regliste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Regliste|contribs]]) 12:43, 15 May 2026 (UTC) ::::@[[User:Regliste|Regliste]] Only one reviewer accepted my invite to peer review Kinematics of the cuboctahedron. I will send another batch of review invitations later this week. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 14:55, 16 June 2026 (UTC) == Answered to reviewers == Hello @[[User:OhanaUnited|OhanaUnited]], just to inform you that I replied to the three reviewers comments. I don't know if other reviews are on the way, but in any case I remain available for the continuation of the editorial process {{=)}}. [[User:Regliste|Regliste]] ([[User talk:Regliste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Regliste|contribs]]) 14:46, 16 June 2026 (UTC) :I have one more review for Pentagram map that I'm expecting, but the review is not due for another 6 days. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 14:56, 16 June 2026 (UTC) ::Alright, there is no hurry at all. Thank you for the information. [[User:Regliste|Regliste]] ([[User talk:Regliste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Regliste|contribs]]) 14:58, 16 June 2026 (UTC) :::Hi {{ping|OhanaUnited}}, I'm the author of [[WikiJournal_of_Science/Affine_symmetric_group]], and have been thinking of submitting an article based on my recent work on [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperoctahedral_group]. It seems like you have a bit of a backlog, with two mathematics articles pending ([[Talk:WikiJournal_Preprints/Kinematics_of_the_cuboctahedron]] and [[Talk:WikiJournal_Preprints/Pentagram_map]]). Suppose I had a small amount of time to spend to help move one of those two articles towards resolution, so you aren't too over-burdened with math articles; what would be the best way to do that? [[User:JayBeeEll|Joel Brewster Lewis]] ([[User talk:JayBeeEll|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/JayBeeEll|contribs]]) 00:48, 21 July 2026 (UTC) ::::@[[User:JayBeeEll|JayBeeEll]] Thanks for the offer. I'm a climatologist so I love any help on the math submissions. We got 4 peer reviews for Pentagram map already so we should be ok on that (our normal # is 2 per submission). I just sent out a small batch of emails today for Kinematics of the cuboctahedron but I can definitely use some help to identify more potential peer reviewers that I can invite for this article's peer review. I haven't checked the submissions lately but I think I can use your help for math submissions (and maybe others too if you're down!) [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 20:41, 22 September 2026 (UTC) :::::Hi @[[User:OhanaUnited|OhanaUnited]], :::::Sorry to bother, but do you have any news on the advancement of the editorial board on [[WikiJournal Preprints/Pentagram map]] ? I confirmed that I have nothing to add on it. :::::Best, [[User:Regliste|Regliste]] ([[User talk:Regliste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Regliste|contribs]]) 12:25, 23 October 2026 (UTC) == Greetings! == Hi Andrew! I am OwlyKnight <!-- Also known as NikolasKHF --> We met at Wikimania 2026. I am who interested in developing [[betawikiversity:Halaman Utama|Indonesian Wikiversity]], and, hopefully next, Indonesian WikiJournals. Nice to meet you! [[User:OwlyKnight|OwlyKnight]] ([[User talk:OwlyKnight|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/OwlyKnight|contribs]]) 08:57, 25 July 2026 (UTC) :Hello, it was nice to meet you. Since it is easiest to find peer reviewers in English, we continue to support publication in English with additional languages like Indonesian if translated by the author. We can definitely support WikiJournal's presence in Indonesia such as recruiting more individuals to join the editorial boards, assist with peer review process, promote submission of high quality articles to WikiJournal. [[User:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: #0000FF;">OhanaUnited</span></b>]][[User talk:OhanaUnited|<b><span style="color: green;">^{Talk page}</span></b>]] 20:35, 22 September 2026 (UTC) cfe366ukq60avi42wl7j4jkyb7fay2a 0 65103 2842424 2555217 2026-10-24T10:29:47Z AnilRishiIndia 3113219 /* External links */ Added classical yoga philosophy and sadhana research reference 2842424 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Bangalore Shiva.jpg|thumb|400px|Shiva meditating ([[Yoga_oracle#Shiva_Meditation|Shiva Meditation]])]] Wikipedia: ''"[[w:Yoga|Yoga]] refers to traditional physical and mental disciplines originating in India. The word is associated with meditative practices in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. Major branches of yoga in Hindu philosophy include Raja Yoga (Patanjali, meditation and positive thinking), Karma Yoga (do good), Jnana Yoga (think about yourself), Bhakti Yoga (pray to God, the Guru or to your inner self), and Hatha Yoga (body exercises and meditation)."'' Before you opt for a particular style of yoga, you should consider what you're looking for. Do you want strenuous exercises (stretching, muscle building, bodystiling) or relaxation (stress reduction, health, peace)? you will find a athletic techniques with Power Yoga, Ashtanga Yoga, Iyengar Yoga and Kundalini Yoga. You can find relaxing techniques with Hatha Yoga and Vini Yoga. Try out what is good for you. Ultimately, every yoga teacher has a personal style. Every yoga teacher has weaknesses and strengths. Learn from any yoga teacher. Find your own way to practice yoga. Use what works for you and accept in any yoga class the things that are not effective for you. Above all, always stay on your path of truth and accuracy. Don´t give up on the door to spirituality. Ideal is a practice time of fifteen minutes. If you do yoga every day at a certain time for four weeks, your mind gets accustomed to your daily practice. Then Yoga becomes a simple way to preserve your health and your inner happiness. Yoga offers a variety of techniques for the body and the mind. We should practice each yoga exercise so that it works well for us. What hurts us, we omit. What is good for us, we do. We can vary all yoga exercises creatively. We always ask ourselves: "What do I need now and what's good for me? What works best to release my tensions?" Find your individual rhythm and your individual priorities. Do the breaks at the right moment and in the right track. If you do not want to spend much time with yoga, just do a little practice at the end of the (work) day. Yoga is an ongoing experiment. The way of the effective tension solution is not easy to find. We need to practice yoga with wisdom and inner feeling. A formal practice is not enough. We should first sense our inner tensions and then find the most effective techniques to resolve them. Over the years, you will dissolve one layer of tension after another until the light awakens in you and lasting happiness appears. On the way to self-realization, you will need many different yoga practices. There are specific techniques for each stage of our development. An important part of daily yoga practice is our motivation. We reflect on the benefits of a daily health and relaxation program. We design our daily yoga practice so that it brings us pleasure. An important aid is beautiful music. If we do the yoga exercises with beautiful music, they seem much easier. Our daily yoga practice has to be designed so that it meets our personal needs and we feel that it is effective and good for us. We can vary our yoga practice. We always do yoga in cooperation with two forces: endurance and joy. These two forces enable us to keep up our yoga path for a lifetime and to continue to grow until we live in the light. ==Yogi and Yogini== [[File:Nils grüßend.jpg|thumb|300px|Yogi Nils]] You are a yogi or a yogini, if you practice Yoga for health, beauty, strength, relaxation or healing. You are a yogi, if you practice Yoga for inner peace, happiness and enlightenment. You are a yogi, if you are enlightened. Enlightenment means to live in God, in the light, in cosmic consciousness. Modern Yoga teaches the unity of all religions. You can be a yogi and a Hindu, a Christian, a Muslim, a Buddhist or an atheist. The most important Christian yogis were the Desert Fathers and Mothers. Their enlightened master was the Holy Antonius. Many Buddhists live as yogis alone or in a cloister. Overall, most yogis are Hindu. More and more yogis also live in the west. The three great books of Yoga are the Yoga-Sutra from Patanjali, the Hatha-Yoga-Pradipika from Goraksha and the Bhagawad Gita from Krishna. The basic yoga techniques are positive thinking (Patanjali), meditation (Patanjali), body work (Goraksha), praying (Krishna) and loving all beings (Krishna). To get an initiation from an enlightened master can be very helpful. He or she opens the doors to your enlightenment energy (kundalini energy). Nevertheless, you have to practice Yoga and reach self realization on your own. Enlightenment will happen, when the time is right for you. Important modern Yoga masters are [[w:Swami_Sivananda|Swami Sivananda]], [[w:Anandamayi_Ma|Anandamayi Ma]], [[w:Sathya_Sai_Baba|Sai Baba]], [[w:Amritanandamayi|Amritanandamayi (Amma)]] and [[w:Mother_Meera|Mother Meera]]. They teach the basic paths of truth, peace, love, self discipline and happiness. ==Hatha Yoga== [[File:CrescentMoon2.JPG|thumb|300px|Hatha-Yoga.]] Wikipedia: ''"[[w:Hatha yoga|Hatha Yoga]] is a system of Yoga introduced by Yogi Swatmarama, a sage of 15th century India, and compiler of the Hatha Yoga Pradipika. In this treatise Swatmarama introduces Hatha Yoga as a way of physical purification that the body practices for higher meditation. The word Hatha is a compound of the words Ha and Tha meaning sun and moon. A Yogi has to join together sun (masculine, active) energy with the moon (feminine, receptive) energy, thus producing balance and enlightenment in an individual."'' Hatha Yoga is a strong practice done for healing and purification. Hatha Yoga is what most people in the Western world associate with the word "Yoga" and is most commonly practiced for mental and physical health. The most comprehensive text of Hatha Yoga is the Hatha Yoga Pradipika by Yogi Swatmarama. It includes information about shatkarma (purification), asana (postures), pranayama (subtle breath energy), chakras (centers of energy), kundalini (enlightenment energy), bandhas (energy control), kriyas (purification techniques), nadis (energy channels), and mudras (energy gestures). == Yoga for Beginners == [[File:Yoga for Beginners (18 min.).ogv|thumb|Yoga for Beginners (18 min.)]][[File:Yoga for Beginners.png|thumb|150px]] Get the benefits of yoga. Learn yoga from a video with beautiful music. Relax in a few minutes with an easy yoga series. Do it as it is good for you. If you cannot do something, don't do it. The first ten minutes we learn some basic yoga exercises and the last minutes we meditate with some mantras and the muscle relaxation. 1. We lie down on our back and relax. 2. We raise the outstreched right leg and hold it in the air. Then we raise the left leg in the air and hold it. 3. We raise both legs and the head in the air. We hold it as long as possible and breath relaxed in our belly. 4. We go into the candle, raise the butt and the legs to the sky. The hands strengthen our back. We move our feet and relax a minute in the candle. 5. We lie down again and rotate the spine. We turn the pelvis to the right and the head to the left. And the other way round. We twist the spine as far as possible. 6. We turn in the prone position and raise the right outstreched leg. We hold it and breath relaxed in our belly. Then we raise the left leg and hold it in the air. 7. We put our head backwards and bring our feet as far as possible to the head. The legs are in the air and the hands lie beside the body on the ground. They support the position. We hold the Cobra, breath relaxed into the belly and move the feet. 8. We lie the head on our hands, move our feet and relax. 9. We sit cross-legged or in the heel seat. The back is straight and the belly relaxed. 10. We lie down and make the muscle relaxation. We tense the muscles of the legs and feet. We relax. We tense the muscles of the arms and hands. We relax. We tense the muscles of the head and the face. We relax. We tense the muscles of the whole body. We relax. We move the feet. We relax completely for some minutes. We go peaceful and happy our way. ==Yoga with Positive Thinking== [[File:Yoga and positive thinking.ogv|thumb|Yoga with Positive Thinking, Video 10 min.]] [[File:Yoga with positive thinking.jpg|thumb]] Yoga with positive thinking is very helpful for many people. It allows one to quickly overcome negative tendencies and reach a happy and healthy life. Positive thinking and daily meditation are the two basic techniques of enlightenment. 1. Go = Jog on the spot, with your arms moving by your side. Visualize light, turn around and think, '''"I go the positive way."''' 2. Windmill = Straddle your legs apart, bow forward, turn like a windmill into the spinal column and think: '''"My goals are ...".''' 3. Frog = Bring your feet together. Bow your upper body forward. Push yourself up with your hands on the floor and move your buttocks down in a crouch and back up in the air. The head goes up to the sky and down to the earth. Practice the frog several times and think: '''"I have strength and endurance."''' 4. Arm-leg raising = Lie down on your stomach. Raise your left arm and right leg. Bring both back to the earth and lift the right arm and the left leg. Do this several times. Think, '''"I take things the way they are."''' 5. Upper body raising = Lie in the prone position, with your hands on the floor and repeatedly press the upper body up and down. The head goes to the neck and forward. While breathing in and out, think, '''"I let go of my false desires."''' 6. Pelvic rotation = In the prone position, turn your pelvis to the right and then to the left. Your head must lie on your hands. Think, '''"I am sad because ...".''' 7. Feet = Get your feet moving in the prone position. The head lies relaxed on your hands. Think, '''"I forgive... (my partner / parents / the cosmos / God), that he/she... I forgive me, that I ...".''' Whom do you want to forgive today? Think these words until a feeling of sadness arises in you, of letting go and forgiveness. 8. Cycling = Turn on your back, lift your head and move your arms and legs. Think, '''"My positive thought today is....".''' 9. Candle = Stretch your legs to the sky. Your hands support you at the back. Visualize the sky, move your feet and think many times the mantra '''"Heaven",''' until you feel the light coming down in your body. 10. Meditation = Roll from the candle into your meditation seat (cross-legged or heel seat). Put your hands in your lap. The back is straight and the stomach is relaxed. Move one hand and wrap them and think, '''"I send light to ... May all people be happy. May the world be happy."''' Stop all your thoughts for a minute. Relax. What is good in your life? ==Karma-Yoga== Wikipedia: ''"[[w:Karma Yoga|Karma Yoga]] or the "discipline of action" is based on the teachings of the Bhagavad Gita, a sacred Sanskrit scripture of Hinduism. Karma Yoga is an intrinsic part of many types of yoga. The word Karma is derived from the Sanskrit Kri, meaning 'to do'. Karma Yoga is the path of union (cosmic consciousness) through action. Karma Yoga is described as a way of acting, thinking and willing by which one orients oneself toward realization by acting in accordance with one's duty (dharma) without consideration of personal self-centered desires."'' Live in the rest (existence-unity-bliss) and act with love for the happiness of all beings. Follow the three principles of peace, wisdom and love. For some people it is important to live in the outer peace, to achieve the inner peace. Basically, the inner peace is the result of a calm mind. A calm mind we get when we focus in wisdom (Spirituality, God, Yoga) and work continually on our negative qualities, addictions, fears and aggressions. Everyone should find his personal balance of rest and action. Those who live in the inner balance, save their energy, their physical and mental health. Our mind grows into the light, if we strengthen not only the calmness, but also the positivity and the love in us. We should replace negative thoughts with positive thoughts. We should constantly practice positive thinking, positive speaking and positive doing. When we facilitate the desire for a happy world, then we grow further towards enlightenment. The secret to this wish is the connection from the inner to the outer world. We are not spiritually separated from other beings. Their happiness affects us. When we visualize other beings as happy, then we also feel happy. Those who encourage the goal to a happy world creates positivity within. When we send light to all beings, then one day light will come through to our souls. When we do something good for the world, the world will reward us with a positive psyche. There is a danger along the path of unconditional, all-encompassing love. We can overwhelm ourselves and work too hard and have no energy left for happiness. A karma yogi must practice rooted in inner peace. A karma yogi must take care of him or herself, as it is impossible to take care of others unless the self is cared for. Furthermore, a path of exhaustion only leads to burn-out, not enlightenment. Jesus said, “love God and love your neighbor.” (Meaning, practice spiritually balanced for the development of the self and for the happiness of others.) Swami Shivananda said, “love, serve, give, meditate, purify, and realize your true self.” The Dalai Lama explains, “live balanced by helping and by meditating.“ There are two great goals a human can have. He or she can seek enlightenment or work towards a happier world. At best, we combine the two. ==The Ten Ethic Principles of Patanjali== [[File:Yoga4Love Freedom Gratitude.jpg|thumb|300px]] Patanjali is the father of Indian yoga. He lived in the second century BC. In the Yoga Sutra, he grasped the essence of all yoga knowledge together in a few words. The two main sets of Patanjali are, "Yoga is the calming of the mind. Then the yogi lives in the light." To soothe the thoughts Patanjali recommends a two-step way. The first stage is the development of positive ethic qualities (the ten yoga principles). Without positive qualities in meditation inner peace will break through the chaos of the outside world again and again. The second stage of the yogic path is to practice meditation. In meditation we quiet our thoughts completely. We stay in inner peace. At some point we develop the ability to combine meditation and outer action. Then we can always stay in peace and happiness, and at the same time we can fulfill our external obligations. 1. '''Non-violence (ahimsa)''' = No killing other beings. Be meek. Be peaceful. 2. '''Truthfulness (Satya)''' = Live in the truth. Basically, be honest with yourself and others. Also no little lies of convenience. A lie is permissible only in well justified situations, for example, if you save with a lie the life of another human being. A Yogi is silent in doubt . Those who consistently lives in the truth radiate truth. Their fellow men trust them. 3. '''Righteousness (Asteya)''' = Not stealing, not cheating. A Yogi is in professional life generally honest. He does not seek unwarranted advantage, but he is looking for fair trade. 4. '''Wisdom (Brahmacharia)''' = Live in the spiritual focus (in the light/in God = Brahman). Do not serve the money (outer luck) but the inner happiness (God, Brahman, enlightenment). Be centered in your inner happiness and peace. 5.''' Simplicity (Aparigraha)''' = Be moderate in external enjoyment and consumption. A spiritual person lives modestly outwardly and inwardly rich. A Yogi uses his energy not in outer actions, but lives so peaceful that it turns inward and cleanse his body from the inside. One day, he lives permanently in the light (the cosmos energy). 6. '''Worship of the spiritual goal (Ishvara-Pranidhana)''' = Thus we do not lose our spiritual path, it is necessary that we remind ourselves again and again to our spiritual goal. We can worship an image (Goddess, Shiva, Patanjali), we can bow before a statue (Buddha, Jesus, Shiva) or speak a mantra (prayer). What is your spiritual goal? Send light to all beings, and wish a happy world. 7. '''Sacrifice the ego (Shaucha)''' = Purification / cleaning. The way into the light passes through the crucifixion of the ego. Without a crucifixion there is no enlightenment. True sacrifice is an art. He who sacrifices too much braced themselves internally. Who sacrifices too little, does not solves his tentions. How do you get inner peace today? "I let go of my false desires. I take things as they are. My sacrifice today is ... " 8. '''Selfdiscipline (Tapas)''' = A clear goal, a clear life plan and a clear way of practicing. Tapas means to lead a disciplined life. Follow your inner wisdom and you'll win on your spiritual path. 9. '''Reading (Svadhyaya)''' = The daily reading (mantra, meditation) keeps us on the spiritual path, cleanses our spirit, connects us with the enlightened masters and makes us to spiritual victors. 10. '''Contentment (Santosha)''' = Satisfied with what one has. Which idea will help you to get into the satisfaction with yourself and your life? "My thought of satisfaction is now ..." ==The Path to Inner Happiness== [[File:Kundalini Meditation.ogv|thumb|Kundalini Meditation. Video 10 min.]] Inner tension and inner conflict occur when people prevent themselves from being at peace and from experiencing true happiness at a deeper level. This inner tension and conflict takes energy, destroys any chance for contentment, and lower one’s overall spiritual positivity. A highly tense and conflicted person tends to have negative thoughts. Love for oneself and others is blocked mentally and spiritually. Inner conflict can mainly be traced to one’s childhood. In a conflicted society, where pressure to perform and competition is a daily reality ingrained upon its members, a tendency toward conflict and tension is passed on from parents to their children during their upbringing. Parents live out their worries, doubts, fears, aggressions, addictions, and thus influence the spiritual development of their children. Other childhood sources of learned conflict stem from television. Tension in turn then comes from professional stress, strained relationships, divorce, and more, as these children grow up to face similar challenges as their parents face or once faced. [[File:Briana Teresi standing on head.jpg|thumb|The King of All Kings of Asanas.]] The good news is, whenever this inner conflict builds up inside, it can also be eliminated. The bad news is this can take quite a while. Whenever tension builds over the course of several years, it will also take years to relieve. It is always worth the effort, however, to take on the challenge of curing oneself of such inner negativity. For example, illness later on in life can be avoided as a life full of peace, energy, and positivity is a healthier one. The amount of inner peace a person possesses correlates oppositely to the amount of tension in one’s body and spirit. The lower the tension, the more positive the life force present. Every person has the potential to find absolute peace and contentment. Everyone can achieve enlightenment. The only thing standing in the way of this goal is our own tension and negativity. Once these darker feelings subside, our inner positive energy grows. A good way to go about curing oneself of this life force robbing negativity is to practice several spiritual exercises every day. We have to live in a way that facilitates a gravitation towards the light, instead of the dark. Most people in today’s day and age are on a march in the opposite direction. They live day to day feeling egotistical and stressed out. They live their lives focused on creating more tension and end up burnt out, sick, negative, and depressed. Tension can reside in the body and the soul. The body and the soul are connected, and in order to relieve ourselves of inner tension, we should practice spiritual exercises for both elements. Inner happiness can manifest on a deeper level only when we cleanse ourselves of this inner tension. As people are very individual, no two have the same sorts of tension and negativity. Everyone should therefore experiment with said exercises to find what is best for him or her to direct one’s path in the appropriate way for him or herself to find inner happiness. True contentment can be found as one of the enlightened. The deeper purpose of life is to reach enlightenment. ==Overcome Fear, Sadness and Anger== In every life there is pain, loss, illness, loneliness and death. We have no claim to a long life still to be spared by fate. What is your pain today? 1. '''The problem:''' Describe briefly your situation and your problem. How exactly is your situation? What is the problem? Where is the center of the problem? 2. '''The Emotions:''' What are the feelings it in you? Fear, anger, addiction / desire, grief. What feeling is strongest? Where is the feeling sitting in your body? 3. '''The thoughts:''' What thoughts are connected with your feelings? Why are you sad, anxious, angry or longing? Count all your stressful thoughts down. (My thoughts are ...) 4. '''Thinking:''' What triggers your problem? What is the way out of your problem? What brings you to love, excitement, fulfillment, fortunately, satisfaction? Think about your problem for so long, until you find a solution. Think about different solutions. Collect all the information you need. 5. '''Implementation:''' Follow your positive thoughts. Fulfill your positive life plan. Avoid meaningless brooding. Now is the time to realize powerful. Go your way to victory and be content with you. What is now your positive duty? "My positive sentence is ...." ==See also== {{wikibooks|Yoga}}{{wikibooks|Yoga|Chair Yoga}} * [[Relaxation techniques]] * [[Laughter Yoga]] * [[Rune Yoga]] * [[Meditation]] * [[Aikido]] * [[Wikipedia: List of yoga postures]] ==External links== *[http://www.wikihow.com/Find-God-Through-the-Path-of-Enlightenment How to Find God Through the Path of Enlightenment] *[http://www.wikihow.com/Do-the-Yoga-of-Love How to Do the Yoga of Love] *[http://www.wikihow.com/Live-Permanently-in-Love How to Live Permanently in Love] *[http://mystiker2.wordpress.com/article/yoga-basic-knowledge-and-exercises-d0nwq0okqs4d-34/ Yoga Basic Knowledge and Exercises] *[http://nickclayton.hubpages.com/hub/Dr-Joseph-Michael-Levry "Dr. Joseph Michael Levry"] *[https://www.smashwords.com/books/view/245377 Download Wikibook Yoga with Yoga Oracle in various formats (PDF, Epub, Kindle)] *[http://www.smashwords.com/books/view/302226 Yoga and the dance of life (PDF, Epub, Kindle)] *[http://yogateachertraininggoa.com/what-is-yoga/ Yoga Teacher Training GOA: What is Yoga?] *[https://www.classicyoga.co.in Classical Yoga Studies: Yoga Upanishads, Gita, Yoga Sutra] *[https://www.omsetuyogashala.com/blog/what-is-yoga-benefits-of-yoga/ Classical Yoga Philosophy & Dimensions of Sadhana - Om Setu Yogashala Rishikesh] {{Healthy lifestyle}} [[Category:Yoga| ]] [[Category:Projects]] rjqli5syshx01johktzkvuvd51lkj87 2842428 2842424 2026-10-24T11:30:55Z AnilRishiIndia 3113219 /* Hatha Yoga */ Add illustrative asana practice photo from Commons 2842428 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Bangalore Shiva.jpg|thumb|400px|Shiva meditating ([[Yoga_oracle#Shiva_Meditation|Shiva Meditation]])]] Wikipedia: ''"[[w:Yoga|Yoga]] refers to traditional physical and mental disciplines originating in India. The word is associated with meditative practices in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. Major branches of yoga in Hindu philosophy include Raja Yoga (Patanjali, meditation and positive thinking), Karma Yoga (do good), Jnana Yoga (think about yourself), Bhakti Yoga (pray to God, the Guru or to your inner self), and Hatha Yoga (body exercises and meditation)."'' Before you opt for a particular style of yoga, you should consider what you're looking for. Do you want strenuous exercises (stretching, muscle building, bodystiling) or relaxation (stress reduction, health, peace)? you will find a athletic techniques with Power Yoga, Ashtanga Yoga, Iyengar Yoga and Kundalini Yoga. You can find relaxing techniques with Hatha Yoga and Vini Yoga. Try out what is good for you. Ultimately, every yoga teacher has a personal style. Every yoga teacher has weaknesses and strengths. Learn from any yoga teacher. Find your own way to practice yoga. Use what works for you and accept in any yoga class the things that are not effective for you. Above all, always stay on your path of truth and accuracy. Don´t give up on the door to spirituality. Ideal is a practice time of fifteen minutes. If you do yoga every day at a certain time for four weeks, your mind gets accustomed to your daily practice. Then Yoga becomes a simple way to preserve your health and your inner happiness. Yoga offers a variety of techniques for the body and the mind. We should practice each yoga exercise so that it works well for us. What hurts us, we omit. What is good for us, we do. We can vary all yoga exercises creatively. We always ask ourselves: "What do I need now and what's good for me? What works best to release my tensions?" Find your individual rhythm and your individual priorities. Do the breaks at the right moment and in the right track. If you do not want to spend much time with yoga, just do a little practice at the end of the (work) day. Yoga is an ongoing experiment. The way of the effective tension solution is not easy to find. We need to practice yoga with wisdom and inner feeling. A formal practice is not enough. We should first sense our inner tensions and then find the most effective techniques to resolve them. Over the years, you will dissolve one layer of tension after another until the light awakens in you and lasting happiness appears. On the way to self-realization, you will need many different yoga practices. There are specific techniques for each stage of our development. An important part of daily yoga practice is our motivation. We reflect on the benefits of a daily health and relaxation program. We design our daily yoga practice so that it brings us pleasure. An important aid is beautiful music. If we do the yoga exercises with beautiful music, they seem much easier. Our daily yoga practice has to be designed so that it meets our personal needs and we feel that it is effective and good for us. We can vary our yoga practice. We always do yoga in cooperation with two forces: endurance and joy. These two forces enable us to keep up our yoga path for a lifetime and to continue to grow until we live in the light. ==Yogi and Yogini== [[File:Nils grüßend.jpg|thumb|300px|Yogi Nils]] You are a yogi or a yogini, if you practice Yoga for health, beauty, strength, relaxation or healing. You are a yogi, if you practice Yoga for inner peace, happiness and enlightenment. You are a yogi, if you are enlightened. Enlightenment means to live in God, in the light, in cosmic consciousness. Modern Yoga teaches the unity of all religions. You can be a yogi and a Hindu, a Christian, a Muslim, a Buddhist or an atheist. The most important Christian yogis were the Desert Fathers and Mothers. Their enlightened master was the Holy Antonius. Many Buddhists live as yogis alone or in a cloister. Overall, most yogis are Hindu. More and more yogis also live in the west. The three great books of Yoga are the Yoga-Sutra from Patanjali, the Hatha-Yoga-Pradipika from Goraksha and the Bhagawad Gita from Krishna. The basic yoga techniques are positive thinking (Patanjali), meditation (Patanjali), body work (Goraksha), praying (Krishna) and loving all beings (Krishna). To get an initiation from an enlightened master can be very helpful. He or she opens the doors to your enlightenment energy (kundalini energy). Nevertheless, you have to practice Yoga and reach self realization on your own. Enlightenment will happen, when the time is right for you. Important modern Yoga masters are [[w:Swami_Sivananda|Swami Sivananda]], [[w:Anandamayi_Ma|Anandamayi Ma]], [[w:Sathya_Sai_Baba|Sai Baba]], [[w:Amritanandamayi|Amritanandamayi (Amma)]] and [[w:Mother_Meera|Mother Meera]]. They teach the basic paths of truth, peace, love, self discipline and happiness. ==Hatha Yoga== [[File:CrescentMoon2.JPG|thumb|300px|Hatha-Yoga.]] [[File:Om Setu Yogashala students practicing asana in Rishikesh yoga hall.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Students practicing classical Hatha Yoga asanas at Om Setu Yogashala in Rishikesh.]] Wikipedia: ''"[[w:Hatha yoga|Hatha Yoga]] is a system of Yoga introduced by Yogi Swatmarama, a sage of 15th century India, and compiler of the Hatha Yoga Pradipika. In this treatise Swatmarama introduces Hatha Yoga as a way of physical purification that the body practices for higher meditation. The word Hatha is a compound of the words Ha and Tha meaning sun and moon. A Yogi has to join together sun (masculine, active) energy with the moon (feminine, receptive) energy, thus producing balance and enlightenment in an individual."'' Hatha Yoga is a strong practice done for healing and purification. Hatha Yoga is what most people in the Western world associate with the word "Yoga" and is most commonly practiced for mental and physical health. The most comprehensive text of Hatha Yoga is the Hatha Yoga Pradipika by Yogi Swatmarama. It includes information about shatkarma (purification), asana (postures), pranayama (subtle breath energy), chakras (centers of energy), kundalini (enlightenment energy), bandhas (energy control), kriyas (purification techniques), nadis (energy channels), and mudras (energy gestures). == Yoga for Beginners == [[File:Yoga for Beginners (18 min.).ogv|thumb|Yoga for Beginners (18 min.)]][[File:Yoga for Beginners.png|thumb|150px]] Get the benefits of yoga. Learn yoga from a video with beautiful music. Relax in a few minutes with an easy yoga series. Do it as it is good for you. If you cannot do something, don't do it. The first ten minutes we learn some basic yoga exercises and the last minutes we meditate with some mantras and the muscle relaxation. 1. We lie down on our back and relax. 2. We raise the outstreched right leg and hold it in the air. Then we raise the left leg in the air and hold it. 3. We raise both legs and the head in the air. We hold it as long as possible and breath relaxed in our belly. 4. We go into the candle, raise the butt and the legs to the sky. The hands strengthen our back. We move our feet and relax a minute in the candle. 5. We lie down again and rotate the spine. We turn the pelvis to the right and the head to the left. And the other way round. We twist the spine as far as possible. 6. We turn in the prone position and raise the right outstreched leg. We hold it and breath relaxed in our belly. Then we raise the left leg and hold it in the air. 7. We put our head backwards and bring our feet as far as possible to the head. The legs are in the air and the hands lie beside the body on the ground. They support the position. We hold the Cobra, breath relaxed into the belly and move the feet. 8. We lie the head on our hands, move our feet and relax. 9. We sit cross-legged or in the heel seat. The back is straight and the belly relaxed. 10. We lie down and make the muscle relaxation. We tense the muscles of the legs and feet. We relax. We tense the muscles of the arms and hands. We relax. We tense the muscles of the head and the face. We relax. We tense the muscles of the whole body. We relax. We move the feet. We relax completely for some minutes. We go peaceful and happy our way. ==Yoga with Positive Thinking== [[File:Yoga and positive thinking.ogv|thumb|Yoga with Positive Thinking, Video 10 min.]] [[File:Yoga with positive thinking.jpg|thumb]] Yoga with positive thinking is very helpful for many people. It allows one to quickly overcome negative tendencies and reach a happy and healthy life. Positive thinking and daily meditation are the two basic techniques of enlightenment. 1. Go = Jog on the spot, with your arms moving by your side. Visualize light, turn around and think, '''"I go the positive way."''' 2. Windmill = Straddle your legs apart, bow forward, turn like a windmill into the spinal column and think: '''"My goals are ...".''' 3. Frog = Bring your feet together. Bow your upper body forward. Push yourself up with your hands on the floor and move your buttocks down in a crouch and back up in the air. The head goes up to the sky and down to the earth. Practice the frog several times and think: '''"I have strength and endurance."''' 4. Arm-leg raising = Lie down on your stomach. Raise your left arm and right leg. Bring both back to the earth and lift the right arm and the left leg. Do this several times. Think, '''"I take things the way they are."''' 5. Upper body raising = Lie in the prone position, with your hands on the floor and repeatedly press the upper body up and down. The head goes to the neck and forward. While breathing in and out, think, '''"I let go of my false desires."''' 6. Pelvic rotation = In the prone position, turn your pelvis to the right and then to the left. Your head must lie on your hands. Think, '''"I am sad because ...".''' 7. Feet = Get your feet moving in the prone position. The head lies relaxed on your hands. Think, '''"I forgive... (my partner / parents / the cosmos / God), that he/she... I forgive me, that I ...".''' Whom do you want to forgive today? Think these words until a feeling of sadness arises in you, of letting go and forgiveness. 8. Cycling = Turn on your back, lift your head and move your arms and legs. Think, '''"My positive thought today is....".''' 9. Candle = Stretch your legs to the sky. Your hands support you at the back. Visualize the sky, move your feet and think many times the mantra '''"Heaven",''' until you feel the light coming down in your body. 10. Meditation = Roll from the candle into your meditation seat (cross-legged or heel seat). Put your hands in your lap. The back is straight and the stomach is relaxed. Move one hand and wrap them and think, '''"I send light to ... May all people be happy. May the world be happy."''' Stop all your thoughts for a minute. Relax. What is good in your life? ==Karma-Yoga== Wikipedia: ''"[[w:Karma Yoga|Karma Yoga]] or the "discipline of action" is based on the teachings of the Bhagavad Gita, a sacred Sanskrit scripture of Hinduism. Karma Yoga is an intrinsic part of many types of yoga. The word Karma is derived from the Sanskrit Kri, meaning 'to do'. Karma Yoga is the path of union (cosmic consciousness) through action. Karma Yoga is described as a way of acting, thinking and willing by which one orients oneself toward realization by acting in accordance with one's duty (dharma) without consideration of personal self-centered desires."'' Live in the rest (existence-unity-bliss) and act with love for the happiness of all beings. Follow the three principles of peace, wisdom and love. For some people it is important to live in the outer peace, to achieve the inner peace. Basically, the inner peace is the result of a calm mind. A calm mind we get when we focus in wisdom (Spirituality, God, Yoga) and work continually on our negative qualities, addictions, fears and aggressions. Everyone should find his personal balance of rest and action. Those who live in the inner balance, save their energy, their physical and mental health. Our mind grows into the light, if we strengthen not only the calmness, but also the positivity and the love in us. We should replace negative thoughts with positive thoughts. We should constantly practice positive thinking, positive speaking and positive doing. When we facilitate the desire for a happy world, then we grow further towards enlightenment. The secret to this wish is the connection from the inner to the outer world. We are not spiritually separated from other beings. Their happiness affects us. When we visualize other beings as happy, then we also feel happy. Those who encourage the goal to a happy world creates positivity within. When we send light to all beings, then one day light will come through to our souls. When we do something good for the world, the world will reward us with a positive psyche. There is a danger along the path of unconditional, all-encompassing love. We can overwhelm ourselves and work too hard and have no energy left for happiness. A karma yogi must practice rooted in inner peace. A karma yogi must take care of him or herself, as it is impossible to take care of others unless the self is cared for. Furthermore, a path of exhaustion only leads to burn-out, not enlightenment. Jesus said, “love God and love your neighbor.” (Meaning, practice spiritually balanced for the development of the self and for the happiness of others.) Swami Shivananda said, “love, serve, give, meditate, purify, and realize your true self.” The Dalai Lama explains, “live balanced by helping and by meditating.“ There are two great goals a human can have. He or she can seek enlightenment or work towards a happier world. At best, we combine the two. ==The Ten Ethic Principles of Patanjali== [[File:Yoga4Love Freedom Gratitude.jpg|thumb|300px]] Patanjali is the father of Indian yoga. He lived in the second century BC. In the Yoga Sutra, he grasped the essence of all yoga knowledge together in a few words. The two main sets of Patanjali are, "Yoga is the calming of the mind. Then the yogi lives in the light." To soothe the thoughts Patanjali recommends a two-step way. The first stage is the development of positive ethic qualities (the ten yoga principles). Without positive qualities in meditation inner peace will break through the chaos of the outside world again and again. The second stage of the yogic path is to practice meditation. In meditation we quiet our thoughts completely. We stay in inner peace. At some point we develop the ability to combine meditation and outer action. Then we can always stay in peace and happiness, and at the same time we can fulfill our external obligations. 1. '''Non-violence (ahimsa)''' = No killing other beings. Be meek. Be peaceful. 2. '''Truthfulness (Satya)''' = Live in the truth. Basically, be honest with yourself and others. Also no little lies of convenience. A lie is permissible only in well justified situations, for example, if you save with a lie the life of another human being. A Yogi is silent in doubt . Those who consistently lives in the truth radiate truth. Their fellow men trust them. 3. '''Righteousness (Asteya)''' = Not stealing, not cheating. A Yogi is in professional life generally honest. He does not seek unwarranted advantage, but he is looking for fair trade. 4. '''Wisdom (Brahmacharia)''' = Live in the spiritual focus (in the light/in God = Brahman). Do not serve the money (outer luck) but the inner happiness (God, Brahman, enlightenment). Be centered in your inner happiness and peace. 5.''' Simplicity (Aparigraha)''' = Be moderate in external enjoyment and consumption. A spiritual person lives modestly outwardly and inwardly rich. A Yogi uses his energy not in outer actions, but lives so peaceful that it turns inward and cleanse his body from the inside. One day, he lives permanently in the light (the cosmos energy). 6. '''Worship of the spiritual goal (Ishvara-Pranidhana)''' = Thus we do not lose our spiritual path, it is necessary that we remind ourselves again and again to our spiritual goal. We can worship an image (Goddess, Shiva, Patanjali), we can bow before a statue (Buddha, Jesus, Shiva) or speak a mantra (prayer). What is your spiritual goal? Send light to all beings, and wish a happy world. 7. '''Sacrifice the ego (Shaucha)''' = Purification / cleaning. The way into the light passes through the crucifixion of the ego. Without a crucifixion there is no enlightenment. True sacrifice is an art. He who sacrifices too much braced themselves internally. Who sacrifices too little, does not solves his tentions. How do you get inner peace today? "I let go of my false desires. I take things as they are. My sacrifice today is ... " 8. '''Selfdiscipline (Tapas)''' = A clear goal, a clear life plan and a clear way of practicing. Tapas means to lead a disciplined life. Follow your inner wisdom and you'll win on your spiritual path. 9. '''Reading (Svadhyaya)''' = The daily reading (mantra, meditation) keeps us on the spiritual path, cleanses our spirit, connects us with the enlightened masters and makes us to spiritual victors. 10. '''Contentment (Santosha)''' = Satisfied with what one has. Which idea will help you to get into the satisfaction with yourself and your life? "My thought of satisfaction is now ..." ==The Path to Inner Happiness== [[File:Kundalini Meditation.ogv|thumb|Kundalini Meditation. Video 10 min.]] Inner tension and inner conflict occur when people prevent themselves from being at peace and from experiencing true happiness at a deeper level. This inner tension and conflict takes energy, destroys any chance for contentment, and lower one’s overall spiritual positivity. A highly tense and conflicted person tends to have negative thoughts. Love for oneself and others is blocked mentally and spiritually. Inner conflict can mainly be traced to one’s childhood. In a conflicted society, where pressure to perform and competition is a daily reality ingrained upon its members, a tendency toward conflict and tension is passed on from parents to their children during their upbringing. Parents live out their worries, doubts, fears, aggressions, addictions, and thus influence the spiritual development of their children. Other childhood sources of learned conflict stem from television. Tension in turn then comes from professional stress, strained relationships, divorce, and more, as these children grow up to face similar challenges as their parents face or once faced. [[File:Briana Teresi standing on head.jpg|thumb|The King of All Kings of Asanas.]] The good news is, whenever this inner conflict builds up inside, it can also be eliminated. The bad news is this can take quite a while. Whenever tension builds over the course of several years, it will also take years to relieve. It is always worth the effort, however, to take on the challenge of curing oneself of such inner negativity. For example, illness later on in life can be avoided as a life full of peace, energy, and positivity is a healthier one. The amount of inner peace a person possesses correlates oppositely to the amount of tension in one’s body and spirit. The lower the tension, the more positive the life force present. Every person has the potential to find absolute peace and contentment. Everyone can achieve enlightenment. The only thing standing in the way of this goal is our own tension and negativity. Once these darker feelings subside, our inner positive energy grows. A good way to go about curing oneself of this life force robbing negativity is to practice several spiritual exercises every day. We have to live in a way that facilitates a gravitation towards the light, instead of the dark. Most people in today’s day and age are on a march in the opposite direction. They live day to day feeling egotistical and stressed out. They live their lives focused on creating more tension and end up burnt out, sick, negative, and depressed. Tension can reside in the body and the soul. The body and the soul are connected, and in order to relieve ourselves of inner tension, we should practice spiritual exercises for both elements. Inner happiness can manifest on a deeper level only when we cleanse ourselves of this inner tension. As people are very individual, no two have the same sorts of tension and negativity. Everyone should therefore experiment with said exercises to find what is best for him or her to direct one’s path in the appropriate way for him or herself to find inner happiness. True contentment can be found as one of the enlightened. The deeper purpose of life is to reach enlightenment. ==Overcome Fear, Sadness and Anger== In every life there is pain, loss, illness, loneliness and death. We have no claim to a long life still to be spared by fate. What is your pain today? 1. '''The problem:''' Describe briefly your situation and your problem. How exactly is your situation? What is the problem? Where is the center of the problem? 2. '''The Emotions:''' What are the feelings it in you? Fear, anger, addiction / desire, grief. What feeling is strongest? Where is the feeling sitting in your body? 3. '''The thoughts:''' What thoughts are connected with your feelings? Why are you sad, anxious, angry or longing? Count all your stressful thoughts down. (My thoughts are ...) 4. '''Thinking:''' What triggers your problem? What is the way out of your problem? What brings you to love, excitement, fulfillment, fortunately, satisfaction? Think about your problem for so long, until you find a solution. Think about different solutions. Collect all the information you need. 5. '''Implementation:''' Follow your positive thoughts. Fulfill your positive life plan. Avoid meaningless brooding. Now is the time to realize powerful. Go your way to victory and be content with you. What is now your positive duty? "My positive sentence is ...." ==See also== {{wikibooks|Yoga}}{{wikibooks|Yoga|Chair Yoga}} * [[Relaxation techniques]] * [[Laughter Yoga]] * [[Rune Yoga]] * [[Meditation]] * [[Aikido]] * [[Wikipedia: List of yoga postures]] ==External links== *[http://www.wikihow.com/Find-God-Through-the-Path-of-Enlightenment How to Find God Through the Path of Enlightenment] *[http://www.wikihow.com/Do-the-Yoga-of-Love How to Do the Yoga of Love] *[http://www.wikihow.com/Live-Permanently-in-Love How to Live Permanently in Love] *[http://mystiker2.wordpress.com/article/yoga-basic-knowledge-and-exercises-d0nwq0okqs4d-34/ Yoga Basic Knowledge and Exercises] *[http://nickclayton.hubpages.com/hub/Dr-Joseph-Michael-Levry "Dr. Joseph Michael Levry"] *[https://www.smashwords.com/books/view/245377 Download Wikibook Yoga with Yoga Oracle in various formats (PDF, Epub, Kindle)] *[http://www.smashwords.com/books/view/302226 Yoga and the dance of life (PDF, Epub, Kindle)] *[http://yogateachertraininggoa.com/what-is-yoga/ Yoga Teacher Training GOA: What is Yoga?] *[https://www.classicyoga.co.in Classical Yoga Studies: Yoga Upanishads, Gita, Yoga Sutra] *[https://www.omsetuyogashala.com/blog/what-is-yoga-benefits-of-yoga/ Classical Yoga Philosophy & Dimensions of Sadhana - Om Setu Yogashala Rishikesh] {{Healthy lifestyle}} [[Category:Yoga| ]] [[Category:Projects]] tmp7ifdjd59htgs2thpok0435rbayij 0 119072 2842334 2580452 2026-10-23T17:52:50Z ~2026-56730-12 3113187 /* Summary */ 2842334 wikitext text/x-wiki https://mbcaulkingservices.com.au/ Caulking is an important part of home maintenance. It helps to seal cracks and gaps in your home’s exterior, preventing water damage, air leaks, and pests. However, caulking is not always easy to do correctly. It requires the right tools and materials, as well as the right skills. ===Problem Statement=== Construct/ build an internal combustion engine and a Stirling engine. ===Team Members=== Here is a list of links to the USER pages regarding the Engines project. ::[[User:BobFK/enes100/ARM|BK]] ::[[User:Criveros0248/enes100/Engines|CR]] ::[[User:palluri9407/enes100/Engines|PA]] ===Summary=== ====Week One==== * Debated which engine type to implement. Decided on Stirling Engines as our topic. Worked on the internal combustion engine model found in the engineering lab. Worked on documenting our team's progress into our wikiversity page. Researched our topic and reviewed past teams' documentation. Began collecting required materials. ====Week Two==== Continued working on [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sjB5yd4gTdA internal combustion engine model]. Gathered materials for Stirling engine model. Reviewed past team's documentation on Stirling engine model and found instructions and some documentation. Updated Wikiversity pages. ====Week Three==== [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8iaSBEFr_Y0 Completed ]the internal combustion engine model. Finished collecting all parts for Stirling engine project. ====Week Four==== Build Stirling engine model. Finished Wikiversity documentation. ===Poster=== Here is an interesting link we found to view a working model of the [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNSNhlqDrV8 Stirling Engine] [[File:SODA CAN STIRLING ENGINE.jpg|thumb|left|STIRLING ENGINE SODA CAN]] ===Story=== During the first three weeks of this project, we built an internal combustion engine we found at the engineering lab. We faced numerous challenges, such as trying to figure out the assembling instructions found on the manual and correcting the position of misplaced parts. During these three weeks, we also learned a lot about the internal combustion engine and decided we wanted to build a model of a Stirling engine. We did this during week four and managed to get it running until one of the pieces melted. ===Decision List=== Decided to assemble a model of an internal combustion engine. Chose the Stirling Engine project. Decided to collect materials for Stirling engine and build one. ===Material List=== *Engineering Notebooks *Internet capable Computers *Cans *Solid Wire *Caulking *Foam *Flywheel *Piston *Steel Cutters *Pliers ===Software List=== *Youtube (plugin) *Web Browser ===Time=== Estimated 3 to 5 hours per student per week. ===Tutorials=== See the link at the Poster for a series of Youtube videos detailing construction. [http://sites.google.com/site/reukpower/can-stirling/make-a-coke-can-stirling-engine Detailed instructions on how to make a Stirling engine using soda cans] ===Next Steps=== Use lighter and stronger materials. Measure the engine's performance and try to make it faster. Our model for instance increased its rpms if we increased the intensity of the heat source, and also if cold water was placed around the cylinder. [[Category:Howard_Community_College_fall2011]] rtiuh0lluwqo6q6wye3kb6jzz2rmw4p 0 171301 2842337 2833811 2026-10-23T20:09:53Z James500 297601 /* Toys */ Add 2842337 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Center top}}{{Resize|3em|'''Bibliotheca Universalis'''}}{{Center bottom}} {{Bibliography}} {{research}} If this resource is ever completed, it will be a universal bibliography.<ref>See [[w:Bibliography]].</ref> Until then, it will be an approximation of a universal bibliography. This bibliography is arranged as an index of topics. ==Index== *[[Universal Bibliography/Bibliography|Bibliography]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Libraries|Libraries]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Literature|Literature]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Languages|Languages]] *[[Universal Bibliography/SF|SF]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Music|Music]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Cinema|Cinema]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Television|Television]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Culture|Culture]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Publishers and imprints|Publishers and imprints]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Printing|Printing]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Printers|Printers]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Microform|Microform]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Periodicals|Periodicals]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Reference|Reference]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Gazetteers|Gazetteers]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Humanities|Humanities]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Law|Law]] *[[Universal Bibliography/History|History]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Archaeology|Archaeology]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Geography|Geography]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Continents|Continents]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Countries|Countries]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Architecture|Architecture]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Mathematics|Mathematics]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Computers|Computers]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Kites|Kites]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Nostalgia|Nostalgia]] *[[Universal Bibliography/Children's non-fiction|Children's non-fiction]] ===About=== *[[Universal Bibliography/About|About]] ==Online libraries== Swedish: *[[w:Swedish Literature Bank|Litteraturbanken]] (Swedish Literature Bank) *[[w:Project Runeberg|Projekt Runeberg]] (Project Runeberg) French *[[w:Persée (web portal)|Persée]] (persee.fr) Japanese *[[w:Aozora Bunko|Aozora Bunko]] (aozora.gr.jp) ==Biographical dictionaries etc== See [[w:Bibliography of encyclopedias: general biographies]] and [[w:List of biographical dictionaries]] *Fox. 'True Biographies of Nations?': The Cultural Journeys of Dictionaries of National Biography. ANU Press. 2019 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=siSbDwAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Arthur, "Biographical Dictionaries in the Digital Era". Advancing Digital Humanities: Research, Methods, Theories. 2014. Chapter 6. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=z7MaBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA83#v=onepage&q&f=false Page 83] et seq. Bibliographies, indexes, etc: *Wynar. ARBA Guide to Biographical Dictionaries. Libraries Unlimited. 1986 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=5FfgAAAAMAAJ] *Slocum, Robert B (ed). Biographical Dictionaries and Related Works. Gale Research Company. 2nd Ed: 1986 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=5uMpAQAAMAAJ] *Biographical Dictionaries Master Index. (Gale Biographical Index Series). [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ZEshAQAAMAAJ] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=pPAzAQAAIAAJ] see also [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=o_gPAQAAMAAJ] *Children's Authors and Illustrators: An Index to Biographical Dictionaries. (Gale Biographical Index Series). 2nd Ed: 1978,  3rd Ed: 1981, 4th Ed: 1987 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VIsWAQAAMAAJ] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=DFtGAQAAIAAJ] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=01wjAQAAIAAJ] *Index to the Wilson Authors Series [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=oNZkAAAAMAAJ] *Auchterlonie. Arabic Biographical Dictionaries: A Summary Guide and Bibliography. 1987 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=rW59QgAACAAJ] *Black Biographical Dictionaries, 1790-1950 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=laIUAQAAMAAJ] Particular works: *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography; [[w:Dictionary of National Biography|Dictionary of National Biography]] *Boase. Modern English Biography. ([http://www.google.com/search?q=editions%3Auzt3-qMuFcMC&btnG=Search+Books&bksoutput=html_text&tbm=bks&tbo=1 editions:uzt3-qMuFcMC]) *A & C Black's Who's Who *Who Was Who *The Academic Who's Who. A & C Black. 1st Ed: 1973 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=dnUWAQAAMAAJ] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=fXJmAAAAMAAJ]. 2nd Ed: 1975. Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7VyOANl2qxoC&pg=PA208&output=html_text]. GBooks: editions:INAP7GGD2gYC editions:tA0FkHC75FIC *Dictionary of Edwardian Biography (Pike's New Century Series) Works that comprise largely of biographies: *The Penguin Companion to Literature Theatres *A Biographical Dictionary of Actors, Actresses, Musicians, Dancers, Managers & Other Stage Personnel in London, 1660-1800. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=TGgS9VxWJ0oC vol 15] ==Dictionaries of dates== [https://archive.org/search.php?query=%22dictionary%20of%20dates%22 Archive.org] *Baxter Dictionary of Dates and Events. 1st Ed: 1963: Napier, M (ed). 2nd Ed: 1971: Sanders and Laffin. Commentary: 92 Library Journal 1819 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=CExVAAAAYAAJ] *Beeching, Cyril Leslie. A Dictionary of Dates. OUP. 1st Ed: 1993. 2nd Ed: 1997. [https://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=en&tbm=bks&q=editions:UGGp0EexZdcC editions:UGGp0EexZdcC] *Bolton, John. Bolton's Dictionary of Dates, arranged in alphabetical order. Foulsham. 1958. Review: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=awJPAAAAIAAJ 172] The Publisher 880 *[[w:William Darling (politician)|William Young Darling]]. A Book of Days: A Dictionary of Dates, a Chronology of Circumstance, the Face of Time. Richards Press. 1951. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=PLkfAAAAMAAJ] *Everyman's Dictionary of Dates. 1st Ed: 1911. 6th Ed: 1971. Review: (1971) 11 RQ 164 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/25824440] *Platt, Charles. Foulsham's Dictionary of Dates and General Information. 1930. *[[w:Haydn's Dictionary of Dates|Haydn's Dictionary of Dates]] *Hamlyn Dictionary of Dates and Anniversaries. Newnes Dictionary of Dates. *Williams, Henry Llewellyn. Hurst's Dictionary of Dates. 1891. [https://archive.org/details/hurstsdictionary00will] *Keller, Helen Rex. The Dictionary of Dates. Macmillan. 1934. Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Utcb32E7rsMC&pg=PA93&output=html_text] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=sAHfY6QbOEwC&pg=PA351&output=html_text] *Nelson's Dictionary of Dates. A Dictionary of Dates. (Nelson's Encyclopaedic Library). 1912 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Mp9lvwEACAAJ]. Reviews: (June 1912) Journal of Education, vol 34 (New Series), vol 44 (Old Series), p 392 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=QIRFAQAAMAAJ]; (1912) [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=9i4_AQAAIAAJ 108] The Spectator [http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/18th-may-1912/25/a-dictionary-of-dates-vol-i-and-english-idioms-nel 805] (18 May) *Pulman, George Palmer. The World's Progress: A Dictionary of Dates. New York. 1861. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?printsec=frontcover&id=k3dJAAAAYAAJ&output=html] *Urdang, Laurence. The World Almanac Dictionary of Dates. Longman. 1982. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=I4IRAQAAMAAJ] Review: (1982) 22 RQ 101 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/25826880] Australia *John Henniker Heaton. Australian Dictionary of Dates and Men of the Time. 1879. [https://archive.org/details/australiandicti00heatgoog] *John James Knight. In the Early Days; History and Incident of Pioneer Queensland, with Dictionary of Dates in Chronological Order. Sapsford & Co. Brisbane. 1895. America *Damon, Charles Ripley. The American Dictionary of Dates, 458-1920. R G Badger. 1921. ==Commodity dictionaries== *Statistical Classification of Domestic and Foreign Commodities Exported from the United States. Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=91GLhsJSBj8C&pg=PR22#v=onepage&q&f=false] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=RPwhAQAAMAAJ&pg=RA15-PA7#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Tovarnyi slovar'. (Commodity Dictionary). Reviews and commentary: Petrov, "Commodity Dictionary", Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, No 13, 30 October 1961, p 45; CDSP , 13 December 1961, p 46; (1962) [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=2vMRAAAAIAAJ 13] Current Digest of the Soviet Press 47; (1958) 15 Quarterly Journal of Current Acquisitions 210 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ZcvozpZAfpEC] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=S47qEIfyCr0C]; Fitzpatrick, Stalinism: New Directions, [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=rD5FzoKnTE0C&pg=PA182#v=onepage&q&f=false p 182] & 183 *Szilágyi. Commodity Dictionary in Five Languages. Budapest. Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó (Publishing House for Economics and Law). 1963 or 1964. Commentary: Books from Hungary, vols 4-6, pp 26 & 40 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6kMiAQAAMAAJ] *Dictionnaire des produits: appellations et caractéristiques des produits francais de consommation courante, 1960. Commentary: Walford (ed), Guide to Reference Material Supplement, 1963, p 106 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ej-9pHGR67oC] *Chūgoku Shōhin Jiten. (Chinese commodity dictionary). Tokyo. 1960. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Wc61lS0xj6AC&pg=PA78#v=onepage&q&f=false] ==Encyclopedias== See [[s:Category:Encyclopedias]], [[w:Bibliography of encyclopedias]] and [[w:Lists of encyclopedias]] *[[w:en:Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition|Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition]] *Paton, John (ed). Knowledge Encyclopedia: 1979, 1981, 1988. New Discovery Encyclopedia: 1990. *The Dorling Kindersley Illustrated Family Encyclopedia ==Almanacs== See [[s:Category:Almanacs]], [[s:Portal:Almanacs]], [[w:List of almanacs]], [[w:Category:Almanacs]]. *Year Book and Almanac of Newfoundland. **For 1896. 1895. [https://archive.org/details/yearbooknfld189600newfuoft] *Whiteley. On This Date: A Day-by-Day Listing of Holidays, Birthday and Historic Events, and Special Days, Weeks and Months. 2002. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=sKCfomKSa74C] ==Censuses== *Census of New Zealand and Labrador **1901 Census. Tables 2 and 3. 1903. [https://archive.org/details/censusnewfoundl00bondgoog] **1911 Census. Table 1. 1914. [https://archive.org/details/1911981911fnfldv11914eng] **1921 Census. Tables 4 and 5. 1923. [https://archive.org/details/1921981921fnfldv451923eng] ==Pilot guides== *[[w:United States Coast Pilot|United States Coast Pilot]] *American Coast Pilot [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=8GoDAAAAYAAJ&pg=PR1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Sailing Directions: Newfoundland. Canadian Hydrographic Service. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=A77fAAAAMAAJ] *Newfoundland Pilot. Canadian Hydrographic Service. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=z7zfAAAAMAAJ] *Maxwell. The Newfoundland Pilot. Hydrographic Office, Admiralty. London. 1878. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=vS4BAAAAQAAJ&pg=PR1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Newfoundland Pilot. HO No 73. Hydrographic Office. Governement Printing Office, Washington. 4th Ed: 1919: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=YGoDAAAAYAAJ&pg=PP7#v=onepage&q&f=false]. Sailing Directions for Newfoundland. 5th Ed: 1931: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=cMUiGo3JK9QC&pg=PP5#v=onepage&q&f=false] ==Books of facts== *The Reader's Digest Book of Facts. 1st Ed: 1985. Reprinted with amendments: 1987: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=B8PmM_5Zm1MC]. (Review: Library Journal, [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=EPDgAAAAMAAJ v 9], p 102, 1 Dec 1987, [http://www.bookverdict.com/details.xqy?uri=Product-94667328910921.xml Book Verdict].) 3rd Revised Ed: 1995: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=E5YhAQAAIAAJ]. GBooks: editions:nnJlLybWxbIC *Chambers Book of Facts *Crystal, David (ed). Penguin Book of Facts. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=k0sZAQAAIAAJ 2004]. 2nd Ed: 2008 *Handy Book of Facts: Things Everyone Should Know. C.S. Hammond & Company. 1914. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=h5wRAAAAIAAJ] ==Series of books== See [[w:Category:Series of books]] and [[w:Category:Monographic series]] *George M Sinkankas, "Series" in Kent, Lancour and Daily (eds).  Encyclopedia of Library and Information Science. Volume 27. Marcel Dekker. 1979. Pages [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=jU3fwyjqS5UC&pg=PA250#v=onepage&q&f=false 250] to 273. *"Publishing in Series, 1896-1916" in Eliot, Simon (ed). History of Oxford University Press. Louis,  Wm Roger (ed). Volume 3: 1896-1970. Oxford University Press. 2013. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=YbcJAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA539#v=onepage&q&f=false Page 539] et seq. *Spiers, John. The Culture of the Publisher’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan. 2011. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ASaHDAAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false vol 1]. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=XCl-DAAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false vol 2]. *Spiers, John. Serious about Series: American 'Cheap' Libraries, British 'Railway' Libraries and Some Literary Series of the 1890's. 2007. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=1hRXAAAAYAAJ] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=AS4yQwAACAAJ] *Rooney, Paul Raphael. Railway Reading and Late-Victorian Literary Series. Routledge. 2018. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=uX5aDwAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Khan. "Monographs in series". The Principles and Practice of Library Science. 1996. Pages [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=sAHfY6QbOEwC&pg=PA208#v=onepage&q&f=false 207] to 209. *Friskney. New Canadian Library: The Ross-McClelland Years, 1952-1978. Pages [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=jHIjCCXBX9kC&pg=PA6#v=onepage&q&f=false 6] and 7. *Books in Series. R R Bowker Company. Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=uQe04OSlA7YC&pg=PA11#v=onepage&q&f=false] **Books in Series in the United States, 1966-1975. R R Bowker. 1977. Review: (1977) 14 Choice [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=_e08AQAAIAAJ&pg=PA1190#v=onepage&q&f=false 1190] (No 8, November). Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=LYAhAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA53#v=onepage&q&f=false] ***Books in Series Supplement: A Supplement to Books in Series in the United States, 1966-1975. 1978. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=hOAaAQAAMAAJ] **Books in Series. 3rd Ed. 1980. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=d_kaAQAAMAAJ] **Books in Series, 1876-1949. R R Bowker Company. 1982. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=TngvAQAAIAAJ] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=iVIyAQAAMAAJ] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=R2AjAQAAIAAJ] **Books in Series, 1985-89. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=yEkxAQAAIAAJ] *Baer, Eleanora Agnes. Titles in Series: A Handbook for Librarians and Students. Scarecrow Press. Vol 1 (Books Published Prior to January 1953). 1953: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=GgAYAAAAMAAJ]. Vol 2 (Books Published Prior to January 1957). 1957: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=oqsXAAAAMAAJ] **2nd Ed: 1964. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=gWlAAAAAIAAJ Vol 1]. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=tWpAAAAAIAAJ Vol 2]. Supplement to the Second Edition. 1967: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=zGARAQAAMAAJ]. Second Supplement to the Second Edition. 1971: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=WwXhAAAAMAAJ] **3rd Ed: 1978. Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=h_wfYKnMfOkC&pg=PA63#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Ocran, Emmanuel Benjamin. Scientific & Technical Series: A Select Bibliography. 1973: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=oy0EAAAAMAAJ] Review: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=fTCw_DQH6zkC&pg=PA949#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Rosenberg and Nichols. Young People's Books in Series: Fiction and Non-fiction, 1975-1991. Libraries Unlimited. 1992. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=REHhAAAAMAAJ] *Young People's Literature in Series *Catalog of Reprints in Series. (sometimes called "Catalogue of Reprints in Series"). 1940 onwards. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=MSI4AAAAIAAJ] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6n1EAAAAMAAJ] Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=h_wfYKnMfOkC&pg=PA73#v=onepage&q&f=false] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=1RxuAAAAMAAJ] *Kuitert, Lisa. Het ene boek in vele delen. De Uitgave van Literaire Series in Nederland 1850-1900. Uitgeverij de Buitenkant. Amsterdam. 1993. Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=jSDnRo7YrWwC&pg=PA656#v=onepage&q&f=false] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=szBcAAAAMAAJ] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SVcVAQAAIAAJ] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=R8Pfs146nUAC&pg=PA367#v=onepage&q&f=false] ==Series of classics== *Penguin Classics (Penguin Modern Classics, Penguin English Library) *Oxford World Classics *Everyman's Library *Wordsworth Classics *Macmillan Collectors Library *Bantam Classics *Minster Classics *The Literary Heritage Collection (Heron Books, London. William Collins Sons & Co, Glasgow) *Chandos Classics *Temple Classics *Longmans Heritage of Literature Series Russian *Greatest Masterpieces of Russian Literature (Heron Books, London) SF *Corgi SF Collectors Library Children's and shorter classics etc *Shorter Classics. Ginn and Company. *Ladybird Children's Classics. *Mini Classics. Parragon Books. *Bonny Books. Peter Haddock Ltd. *A series published by Dean & Son Ltd ==Non-fiction general series== *[[w:Oxford Companions|Oxford Companions]] *[[w:Cambridge Companions|Cambridge Companions]] *Princeton Companions *Blackwell Companions. Wiley Blackwell Companions *Routledge Companions. Routledge Research Companions *Ashgate Companions. Ashgate Research Companions *Brill's Companions *Facts on File Companions *Guides to Information Sources. Bowker-Saur *Butterworths Guides to Information Sources. *Columbia Guides *Blackwell Guides *Edinburgh Critical Guides *Collins Reference Dictionaries *New Horizons. Thames and Hudson. ([[w:Découvertes Gallimard|Découvertes Gallimard]]) *Collins Gem (see [[w:List of Collins GEM books]]) *Concise Encyclopedias. Collins. *Time Life Books (see [[w:Time Life#Book series]]) *[[w:Teach Yourself|Teach Yourself Books]]. English Universities Press. *[[w:Teach Yourself|Teach Yourself Books]]. Hodder and Stoughton. *Made Simple Books. W H Allen. *Palgrave Master Series *Harrap's Mini Series *Shire Albums. Shire Publications. *Fax Pax: Knowledge in a Nutshell. Fax Pax Ltd. *The Wonderful World Books. Macdonald and Company *Harper's ABC series. Includes A-B-C of Housekeeping, A-B-C of Electricity, A-B-C of Gardening and A-B-C of Manners. *Hamlyn Pocket Guides *Oxford Monograph Series *Study Outline Series. H W Wilson. [[s:Page:Russian Literature - A Study Outline.djvu/61|(wikisource)]] *Helpmate Handbooks. Willow Books University *University Paperbacks. Meuthen & Co *World Student Series. Addison Wesley *Unibooks. Hodder and Stoughton *International Student Editions. Van Nostrand Reinhold *Hutchinson University Library Imprints *Pelican Books Pictorials *Salmon Cameracolour series *Pitkin Pictorials United Kingdom *Aspects of Britain. HMSO. Places *The Little Guides. Meuthen [[s:Page:Cornwall (Salmon).djvu/336|(wikisource)]] *G.W.R. Series of Travel Books [[s:Page:The Cornwall coast.djvu/391|(wikisource)]] Art *Movements in World Art. Meuthen. *Movements in Modern Art. Meuthen. *How to Draw and Paint. New Burlington. Film *BFI Companions Popular science *Contemporary Science Paperbacks. Oliver and Boyd. *Pan Piper Science Series Science and mathematics *Simon and Schuster Tech Outlines *Schaum's Outline Series Military *Illustrated Military Guides. Illustrated Guides. "An Illustrated Guide to ...". Salamander Books. *Combat Arms. Arco Military Books. Salamander Books. Prentice Hall Press. *Osprey Men-at-Arms *Jane's Pocket Books Communication *The Library of Communication Techniques. Focal Press. *John Fiske (ed). Studies in Culture and Communication. Routledge. *The Media. Wayland. Cookery *ABC series. Peter Pauper Press. Gardening *Pan Piper Small Gardens Series. Mythology *Series on mythology published by Southwater (imprint of Anness) ==History and Geography== See also [[Universal Bibliography/History|History]] and [[Universal Bibliography/Geography|Geography]]. *Baker. Geography and History: Bridging the Divide. 2003. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=e8yf5JcefpAC&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Darby. Relations of History and Geography: Studies in England, France and the United States. 2002. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Vl4ZfpnP7NwC&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] General series *Cambridge Studies in Historical Geography Atlases *The Times Atlas of World History *Philip's Atlas of World History History of geography: *Dunbar, Gary S. The History of Modern Geography: An Annotated Bibliography of Selected Works. Garland. 1985. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=FX4WAQAAIAAJ] ==Chronology== See also [[Universal Bibliography/History#Millennia, centuries and decades]] General *Chronology of World History. **Neville Williams. Chronology of the Modern World: 1763 to the present time. 1st Ed: 1966. (1763 to 1992). 2nd Ed: 1994. **Neville Williams. Chronology of the Expanding World 1492 to 1762. 1969. Reissued 1994. **Storey. Chronology of the Medieval World 800 to 1491. 1973. Reissued 1994. **Mellersh. Chronology of the Ancient World 10,000 BC to AD 799. Barrie and Jenkins. 1976. Helicon. Simon & Schuster. Reissued 1994. Centuries *Chronology of the 20th Century. Helicon. 1995. [https://books.google.com/books?id=pjsOAQAAMAAJ] *Brownstone and Franck. Timelines of the 20th Century. [https://books.google.com/books?id=IZ6SQgAACAAJ] *Beal. 20th Century Timeline. 1985. [https://books.google.com/books?id=cFrG7LBObGoC] *20th Century Day by Day [https://books.google.com/books?id=kyxaAAAAYAAJ] [https://books.google.com/books?id=WiOAAAAACAAJ] *Chronicle of the 20th Century [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=pt3DYbnZO8sC] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Gd1WPQAACAAJ] *Boyle. The Chronology of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. 1826. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=wDENAAAAYAAJ&pg=PP7#v=onepage&q&f=false] Decades *Series: **Day by Day. Facts on File. [https://books.google.com/books?id=WfClvwEACAAJ] [https://books.google.com/books?id=CWNvQgAACAAJ] Years *Brown, D Kinnear. History of the Year. (1884 to 1885). [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=DmRWAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA113#v=onepage&q&f=false Catalogue]. *The History of the Year: A Narrative of the Chief Events and Topics of Interest. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ljgIAAAAQAAJ&pg=PP7#v=onepage&q&f=false 1881 to 1882]. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=1DgIAAAAQAAJ&pg=PP7#v=onepage&q&f=false 1882 to 1883]. *James Mason. The History of the Year 1876. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6DoIAAAAQAAJ&pg=PP7#v=onepage&q&f=false] *[[w:The Annual Register|The Annual Register]]. [A View of the History Politics and Literature of the Year YYYY.] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SrJNAAAAcAAJ&pg=PR1#v=onepage&q&f=false 1821]. *Giusto Traina. 428AD: An Ordinary Year at the End of the Roman Empire. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=gLumDwAAQBAJ&pg=PR3#v=onepage&q&f=false] Ancient *Bickerman. Chronology of the Ancient World. 1968. *Smithsonian Timelines of the Ancient World: A Visual Chronology from the Origins of Life. Dorling Kindersley. 1st American Ed: 1993. ==Anniversaries== *Sian Facer (ed). On this Day: The History of the World in 366 Days. Octopus Illustrated Publishing, London. Crescent Books, New York and Avenel. 1992: [https://books.google.com/books?id=SYGQgwHTuE0C]. Other: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=W687MAEACAAJ] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7ujArQEACAAJ] *On this Day: A History of the World in 366 Days. DK. 2021. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=x4I5EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q&f=false] ==Egyptology== *Annual Egyptological Bibliography [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=8MoUAAAAIAAJ&pg=PR3#v=onepage&q&f=false] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=-eUUAAAAIAAJ&pg=PR3#v=onepage&q&f=false] ==Battlefields== *[[w:War Walks|War Walks]]. BBC2. 1996 to 1997. [Television series] *"The Times Guide to Battlefields of Britain". Day 1: The Times, 1 August 1994, p 8. Day 2: The Times, 2 August 1994, p 8. Day 3: The Times, 3 August 1994, p 6. Day 4: The Times, 4 August 1994, p 9. Day 5: The Times, 5 August 1994, p 9. Day 6: The Times, 6 August 1994, p 6. There was also a colour wall chart. ==Armed forces== Periodicals: *[[w:NATO Review|NATO Review]] Military *The Journal of Military History *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution [Google editions:lMJAgUvBWAEC editions:dcFNqS8JFjoC] *The Monthly Army List [Google editions:I0t2L4ElznEC] *The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal [Google editions:c7UjQ-q7SbUC] *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research [Google editions:9HZkbMTl6mcC] *The Royal Armoured Corps Journal [https://www.google.com/search?tbm=bks&q=editions:dEauCcI7kssC&biw=534&bih=736&dpr=1.5#sbfbu=1] *The Royal Tank Corps Journal *The Tank [https://www.google.com/search?sa=N&cs=0&tbm=bks&q=editions:Dv-RbpoM7acC&biw=534&bih=736&dpr=1.5#ip=1] Editorial office at the Royal Tank Regiment *The Cavalry Journal [https://www.google.com/search?sa=N&cs=0&tbm=bks&q=editions:cVQlfkRl6KUC&biw=534&bih=688&dpr=1.5#sbfbu=1] *The Journal of the Royal Artillery [https://www.google.com/search?tbm=bks&q=editions:liFy4uc0ggYC&biw=534&bih=736&dpr=1.5] *Minutes of Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution [Google editions:wdjZ588FbtMC] *The Royal Engineers Journal [https://www.google.com/search?tbm=bks&q=editions:8XobinXLbD0C&biw=534&bih=736&dpr=1.5] *Journal of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers [https://books.google.com/books?id=dz0cmA1jnv4C] *Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps [Google editions:FyUJx2dEWcQC] United States *Military Review *The Coast Artillery Journal [Google editions:nMCogSJ_rlkC] *Infantry Journal [Google editions:ULqoLmbUR5cC] *The Reserve Officer [Google editions:JQDRDrnD1QQC] Naval *[[w:Navy News|Navy News]] ==Armour== Armoured warfare; tank warfare *Harris and Toase. Armoured Warfare. 1990. [https://books.google.com/books?id=KYPfAAAAMAAJ] *Carver. The Apostles of Mobility: The Theory and Practice of Armoured Warfare. 1979. [https://books.google.com/books?id=8qcgAAAAMAAJ] *Fuller. Armoured Warfare: An Annotated Edition of Fifteen Lectures on Operations between Mechanized Forces. 1943. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=2E4tAQAAMAAJ] *Black. Tank Warfare. 2020. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=oFP5DwAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Jorgensen and Mann. Tank Warfare. 2001. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=0AghAQAAIAAJ] *Searle. Armoured Warfare: A Military, Political and Global History. 2017. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=HN4CDgAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Willey. Tanks: The History of Armoured Warfare. 2018. [https://books.google.com/books?id=AXTltAEACAAJ] *Perrett. Iron Fist: Classic Armoured Warfare Case Studies. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=pKGyeWqJcCEC]. Iron Fist: Classic Armoured Warfare. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=KKcKI4dG0VUC&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Tom Clancy. Armoured Warfare: Guided Tour of an Armoured Cavalry Regiment. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=UxhONAAACAAJ] Atlas *Stephen Hart (ed). Atlas of Armored Warfare: From 1916 to the Present Day. Metro Books. 2012. [https://search.worldcat.org/title/1391166759]. Atlas of Tank Warfare. [https://books.google.com/books?id=KWqppwAACAAJ] Armored forces *Ogorkiewicz. Armoured Forces: A History of Armoured Forces and Their Vehicles. 1970. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=qIHfAAAAMAAJ] ==Mesoamerica== *James. Aztecs & Maya: The Ancient Peoples of Middle America. Tempus. 2001. 2005. History Press. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=XOXNhTY6TCYC 2009]. Reviews: "Books Received" (2003) [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=3dozAQAAIAAJ 14] Minerva 57 (No 1); and "Overviews for the general reader" (2002) [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=qShmAAAAMAAJ 76] Antiquity 252. *Weaver. The Aztecs, Maya, and Their Predecessors. 1972. 2nd Ed: 1981: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=0mQkAQAAIAAJ] [https://books.google.com/books?id=OWQkAQAAIAAJ] ==Accounting== See [[s:Category:Accounting]] Periodicals *[[s:The Accountant|The Accountant]] (1874 onwards) *Accountant's Magazine (1897 onwards) Aberdeen ==Arts== *Murray (ed).The Hutchinson Dictionary of the Arts. Helicon Publishing. 1994. Paperback Ed: 1995. Reprinted 1997. ==Biography== *Parke. Biography: Writing Lives. 2002 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6bAz2K98MeYC&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Caine. Biography and History. (Theory and History). 1st Ed: 2010, 2nd Ed: 2019 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=h3dvDwAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] Periodicals *Biography. Biography: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly. 1978 onwards. Published by the University Press of Hawaii for the Biographical Research Center. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=s84ZAAAAYAAJ] *Biography News. 1974 to 1975. Gale Research Company. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=RRsXAQAAIAAJ] Yearbooks *Current Biography Yearbook [https://books.google.com/books?id=Zcml63jalMIC] *Dictionary of Literary Biography Yearbook [https://books.google.com/books?id=gNNlAAAAMAAJ] ==Information technology== *Haynes, David (ed). Information Sources in Information Technology. (Guides to Information Sources). Bowker Saur. 1990. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=0hYjAAAAQBAJ&pg=PR1#v=onepage&q&f=false] ==Economics== General series: *Dryden Press Series in Economics *Hurl, Bryan (ed). Studies in the UK Economy. Heinemann Educational *Nuffield Economics & Business. Nuffield Foundation. Longman. Other: *Bannock, Baxter and Davis. The Penguin Dictionary of Economics. Penguin Books. 4th Ed: 1987. Bannock, Baxter and Rees. 1972. 2nd Ed: 1978. 3rd Ed: 1984. *Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch. Economics. McGraw Hill. 1984. 2nd Ed: 1987. 3rd Ed: 1991. *Anderton, Alain. Economics. Causeway Press. 1991. *Maile, Roger. Economics. (Core Business Studies). Mitchell Beazly. 1983. *Maunder, Myers, Wall and Miller. Economics Explained. Collins Educational. 1987. 2nd Ed: 1991. *Tibbitt, Andrew. A guide to A Level Economics. Thomas Nelson and Sons. 1986. *Lipsey, Richard G. An Introduction to Positive Economics. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1963. 2nd Ed: 1966. 3rd Ed: 1971. 4th Ed: 1975. 5th Ed: 1979. 6th Ed: 1983. 7th Ed: 1989. *Nicolson, Walter. Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions. (Dryden Press Series in Economics). Dryden Press, Holt-Saunders. 3rd Ed: 1985.  *Caves and Jones. World Trade and Payments: An Introduction. Little, Brown and Company. 1973. 1977. 3rd Ed: 1981. *National Institute of Economic and Social Research. The UK economy. (Studies in the UK Economy). Heinemann Educational. 1990. *Smith, Charles. UK trade and sterling. (Studies in the UK Economy). Heinemann Educational. 1992. ==Games== Chess *Hooper and Whyld. The Oxford Companion to Chess. Oxford University Press. 1984. Paperback: 1987. *Golombek, Harry. The Game of Chess. 1954. 2nd Ed: 1963. 3rd Ed: 1980. *Pritchard, D. Brine. The Right Way to Play Chess. 1950. 8th Ed: 1971. 10th Ed: 1974. 11th Ed: 1977. *Horowitz, Al. From Morphy to Fischer: A history of the World Chess Championship. B T Batsford. 1973. The World Chess Championship: A History. Macmillan. 1973. General series *Batsford Chess Books **Discovering Chess Series. B T Batsford. Periodicals See [[Universal Bibliography/Periodicals#Chess|Periodicals, Chess]] *British Chess Magazine Othello *Goro Hasegawa with Maxine Brady. How to Win at Othello. (A Harvest/HBJ book). Jove Publications. 1977. ISBN 0-15-642215-8. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=mTdhlwVeyCcC] Wargames *Battleground. Tyne Tees. (ITV). 1978. [Television]. 6 episodes, with Edward Woodward. **Laurie Taylor. "Attila the Hun invades Tyne Tees". TV Times. 1978. pp 28 & 29. **Terry Wise. "Battleground". Battle for Wargamers. June 1978. pp 261 & 262. *[[w:Game of War|Game of War]]. Channel 4. 1997. [Television]. ==Toys== Periodicals *Games & Toys: The Leading Trade Journal for Home & Export. (H Richard Simmons Limited). [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=pMmbZ_JTnXYC] Google: editions:UO8GID_4Ck0C *Toys and Novelties. (Sporting Goods Pub Co). [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=zKdAAQAAMAAJ] [https://archive.org/details/toys-and-novelties-volume-9-1913/page/n53/mode/1up] (Toys and Novelties Publishing Company) [https://archive.org/details/toys-and-novelties-volume-19-issue-no.-1-6-january-june-1922/page/n173/mode/1up]. Cf. "Harcourt To Buy Journals From Haire Publishing Co" [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=J7hEAQAAIAAJ 194] Publishers Weekly 29 *[[w:Playthings (magazine)|Playthings: The National Magazine of the Toy Trade]]. (McCready Publishing Co) [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=eCQHzuYWDY4C] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=mnRO5WFXDfEC]. (Geyer-McAllister Publications). Cf. "Playthings bought by Geyer-McAllister" [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=itAaAQAAMAAJ 52] Industrial Marketing Capsule toys Gachapon *Tim Hornyak. [https://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2017/08/19/lifestyle/gachapon-tracing-evolution-japans-colorful-toy-capsules/ Gachapon: Tracing the evolution of Japan’s colorful toy capsules]. The Japan Times. 19 August 2017. ==Cricket== See [[w:Bibliography of cricket]] *Peter Arnold and Peter Wynne-Thomas. The Complete Encyclopedia of Cricket. 2006. 4th Ed: 2011: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=2R_pXwAACAAJ]. **Peter Arnold. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of World Cricket. *Morgan. The Encyclopedia of World Cricket. 2007. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=gFCbkgEACAAJ] Scores and biographies *Marylebone Club Cricket Scores and Biographies. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=dl8IAAAAQAAJ&pg=PR3#v=onepage&q&f=false] **See [[w:Arthur Haygarth]] and [[w:Fred Lillywhite]] Periodicals *[[w:Cricket: A Weekly Record of the Game|Cricket: A Weekly Record of the Game]]. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=eX9QAAAAYAAJ&pg=PP7#v=onepage&q&f=false]. Australia *Malcolm Andrews. The Encyclopaedia of Australian Cricket. 1980. [https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/1531463] *The Oxford Companion to Australian Cricket India *The Encyclopaedia of Indian Cricket, 1965. [https://books.google.com/books?id=CE4Joad6iwAC] [Includes biographies] Annuals *[[w:Indian Cricket (annual)|Indian Cricket]]. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ioRLAAAAYAAJ 1966]. ===Cricketers=== Cricketers, including biographical dictionaries and collections of biographies *[[w:ESPNcricinfo|ESPNcricinfo]] *[[w:CricketArchive|CricketArchive]] *John Arlott's Book of Cricketers. 1979. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=8-WBAAAAMAAJ] *World Cricketers: A Biographical Dictionary [https://books.google.com/books?id=IpBLAAAAYAAJ] *Carr's Dictionary of Extraordinary Cricketers. 1977. Aurum Press. 2005. [https://books.google.com/books?id=CfwsAAAACAAJ] *Sproat. Debrett's Cricketers' Who's Who. 1980. *S Canynge Caple. The Cricketer's Who's Who. Williams. Lincoln. 1934. *Cricket Who's Who: The Cricket Blue Book. 1909. [https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/119715]. 1912. Bibliography: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IjQyAQAAMAAJ] *Who's Who in Test Cricket: A Biographical Dictionary of Test Cricketers [https://books.google.com/books?id=5uF5PQAACAAJ] *Frindall. England Test Cricketers: The Complete Record from 1877. 1989. [https://books.google.com/books?id=2zHYLIW7h9UC] *Brooke. The Collins Who's Who of English First-Class Cricket, 1945-1984. 1985. [https://books.google.com/books?id=NGSPAAAACAAJ]. Review: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=iHMsAAAAYAAJ]. Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=wPg5AQAAIAAJ] Gloucestershire *Gloucestershire Cricketers, 1870-1979. (ACS Cricketers Series [https://archive.acscricket.com/cricketers_series/index.html]). The Association of Cricket Statisticians. Cleethorpes. 1979. [https://archive.acscricket.com/cricketers_series/gloucestershire_cricketers_1870-1979/index.html] *Rex Pogson. Gloucestershire Cricket and Cricketers, 1919-1939. Lytham St Annes. 1944. Catalogues: [https://catalogue.nla.gov.au/Record/850643] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=CS83vXlB1ZIC] [https://www.worldcat.org/title/504354999]. Also printed as microfilm: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=iqXeDTKUEl4C]. *Dean Hayes. Gloucestershire Cricketing Greats: 46 of the Best Cricketers for Gloucestershire. Tunbridge Wells. 1990. Catalogues: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=OmsqAQAAIAAJ] [https://www.worldcat.org/title/25202795] Australia *The A-Z of Australian Cricketers [https://books.google.com/books?id=w-0zAAAACAAJ] *Piesse. Encyclopedia of Australian Cricket Players. 2012. [https://books.google.com/books?id=Jsh4MAEACAAJ] *C P Moody. Australian Cricket and Cricketers 1856-1893-4. Melbourne. 1894. *Jack Pollard. Australian Cricket: The Game and the Players. Hodder and Stoughton. ABC Books. Sydney. Lane Cove, New South Wales. 1982. Angus & Robertson. London. North Ryde, New South Wales. Sydney. Revised Ed: 1988. Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=WotYAAAAYAAJ]. Review: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=KzNYAAAAMAAJ]. ==Geology== *Read and Watson. Introduction to Geology. Macmillan Education. 1962. 2nd Ed: 1968. Volume 1: Principles. Volume 2: Earth History. ==Mineralogy== *Bibliography of Mineralogy for 1886. Annual Report of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. Year Ending 30 June 1887. 1889. Pages [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=wDcWAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA473#v=onepage&q&f=false 473] to 476. *Battey, Maurice Hugh. Mineralogy for students. Oliver & Boyd. 1972. 2nd Ed. Longman. 1981. ==Paper== See [[s:Category:Paper]] *Surface. Bibliography of the Pulp and Paper Industries. Forest Service. Bulletin 123. 1913. [https://archive.org/details/bibliographyofpu12surf] *West. Reading List on Papermaking Materials. 1920 to 1921. [https://archive.org/details/readinglistonpa00westgoog] [https://archive.org/details/readinglistonpa01westgoog] ==Books== *British Book News [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=2oFTAAAAIAAJ] *Australasian Book News and Literary Journal. Australasian Book News and Library Journal. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=QVQPAQAAIAAJ] *Book News. 1882 to 1918. (John Wanamaker). Called "Book News Monthly" from 1906. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=KtwRAAAAYAAJ&pg=PP7#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Stechert-Hafner Book News [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=BmDqAAAAMAAJ] *U.S.A. Book News [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=36gVAQAAIAAJ] *Branch Library Book News. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=NM8aAAAAMAAJ] *Hungarian Book Review [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6U85AQAAIAAJ] *Soviet Book News. (Earl Browder). 1947 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=QrXQ6LYSOF4C] *Miniature Book News. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=MascAQAAMAAJ] Rare *Berger. Rare Books and Special Collections. American Library Association. 2014. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=IFUangEACAAJ] Printed *Annual Bibliography of the History of the Printed Book and Libraries. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=GLigoebhrd8C&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false vol 30] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=UBN-IUZlF4gC&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false vol 31] ==Paperback and Paperbound== *Swados, "Paper Books: What do they Promise?" (1953) [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=TwaJtQzwj1gC 173] The Nation 114 *Wagman, "The Paperbound Book Business" (1957) 9 Michigan Business Review [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=9pA8uolQjnkC&pg=RA4-PA9#v=onepage&q&f=false 9] (No 5, November) ==Science== *Lafferty and Rowe. The Hutchinson Dictionary of Science. Helicon Publishing. 1993. 2nd Ed: 1998. ==Entertainment== *The Directory (The Times, 1996 onwards) Commentary: [https://www.marketingweek.com/as-times-starts-listings-supplement/] ==Comedy and tragedy== *E H Mikhail. Comedy and Tragedy: A Bibliography of Critical Studies. 1972. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=5bgEAAAAMAAJ] ===Comedy=== *James E Evans. Comedy: An Annotated Bibliography of Theory and Criticism. 1987. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=s9ZgthAs1t8C&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Meghan Duffy (ed). Daniel Gerould (senior ed). Comedy: A Bibliography of Critical Studies in English on the Theory and Practice of Comedy in Drama, Theatre, and Performance. New York. 2006. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=fI0jAQAAIAAJ] *David Humphrey. The Time of Laughter: Comedy and the Media Cultures of Japan. University of Michigan Press. 2023. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=CkTLEAAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] ==Radio and television== *William E McCavitt. Radio and Television: A Selected Annotated Bibliography. Scarecrow Press. 1978. [https://books.google.com/books?id=DAQVAQAAIAAJ] *Gertrude G Broderick. Radio and Television Bibliography. Bulletin 1948 No 17. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=yIPP1dsmNtAC&pg=PP5#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Patricia Beall Hamill. Radio and Television: A Selected Bibliography. Bulletin 1960 No 25. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=AJhGAQAAMAAJ&pg=PP3#v=onepage&q&f=false] ==Film and television== *Jean Mitry. Bibliographie internationale du cinéma et de la télévision. 1966 onwards. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SC3gAAAAMAAJ] Commentary: A Reference Guide for English Studies, [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=h_wfYKnMfOkC&pg=PA439#v=onepage&q&f=false p 439]. ==Broadcasting== *Iwao Nakajima. The Broadcasting Industry in Japan: Its Historical, Legal and Economic Aspects. (International Studies of Broadcasting). NHK Radio and TV Culture Research Institute. 1971. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=uZ4vAQAAIAAJ] *50 Years of Japanese Broadcasting. NHK. 1977. [https://books.google.com/books?id=FoSKqY7tG-AC] *The History of Broadcasting in Japan. Nippon Hoso Kyokai. 1967. [https://books.google.com/books?id=I1IHAQAAIAAJ] *Hitoshi Mitomo and Mikio Kimura. Broadcasting in Japan: Challenges and Opportunities. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7hCcEAAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Broadcasting in Japan: Case-studies on Broadcasting Systems. 1978. 2011. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Ez5ZBwAAQBAJ&pg=PR4#v=onepage&q&f=false] *"World's First TV Stereo Broadcasts in Japan". Japan Report. (vol 25, no 3). 1 February 1979. p 4. *Broadcasting in Japan: A Historical Review [https://books.google.com/books?id=uDYlAAAAMAAJ] Annuals *[[w:ja:日本民間放送年鑑|日本民間放送年鑑]] (Japan Commercial Broadcasting Yearbook). コーケン出版. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=vh22AAAAIAAJ 1997]. ==Animation== *John Halas and Roger Manvell. The Technique of Film Animation. 4th Ed: 1976. Focal Press. ISBN 0240509005. *Clements and McCarthy. The Anime Encyclopedia. 3rd Rev Ed: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=E03KBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1958#v=onepage&q&f=false]. ==Colours== *Eiseman and Recker. Pantone: The 20th Century in Color. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=j3H7nSVS3UMC&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false]. Reviews: [https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/nov/13/pantone-20th-century-color-review][https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/11/pantone-100-years-of-color/249016/][https://eu.vvdailypress.com/story/lifestyle/health-fitness/2012/01/16/color-reel-20th-century-s/37119883007/] ==Bilateral== Britain and Japan *Pearse. Companion to Japanese Britain and Ireland. In Print. 1991. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=KtAxAAAAIAAJ] ==Prehistoric life== Prehistoric animals *[[w:Michael Benton|Michael Benton]]. Prehistoric Animals: An A-Z Guide. Kingfisher Books. 1989. Derrydale Books, New York. 1989. [Illustrations: Jim Channell and Kevin Maddison.] *Ellis Owen. Prehistoric Animals: The Extraordinary Story of Life before Man. Octopus Books Limited. London. 1975. [Sculptures: Arthur Hayward.] Review: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=II-B8R-8Ov8C 17] Wildlife 422. Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=aUbYAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA269#v=onepage&q&f=false] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=jFNBAAAAIBAJ&pg=PA5#v=onepage&q&f=false]. **Prehistorische dieren: de geschiedenis van het leven vóór de mens. Translated by JJ Hoedeman. In den Toren, Baarn. Westland, Schoten. 1977. Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ToVMAQAAIAAJ] **Les Animaux préhistoriques: l'extraordinaire histoire de la vie avant l'homme. Dinosaurs *Michael Benton. Dinosaurs: An A-Z Guide. Kingfisher Books. 1988. Derrydale Books, New York. 1988. [Illustrations: Jim Channell and Kevin Maddison.] ==Regions and other places== *JD Pearson. Oriental and Asian Bibliography: An Introduction with Some Reference to Africa. Archon Books. [https://books.google.com/books?id=P18ZAAAAMAAJ] *Theodore Besterman. A World Bibliography of Oriental Bibliographies. Revised by JD Pearson. Rowman and Littlefield. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=dvnfAAAAMAAJ] ==Culture and society== *Victoria Lyon Bestor, Theodore C Bestor and Akiko Yamagata (eds). Routledge Handbook of Japanese Culture and Society. 2011. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=0cBYffHp5L4C&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Josef Kreiner and Hans-Dieter Ölschleger (eds). Japanese Culture and Society: Models of Interpretation. 1996. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6skwAQAAIAAJ] *Dolores P Martinez. Modern Japanese Culture and Society. 2007. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=l6kMAQAAMAAJ vol 1] *C Andrew Gerstle. 18th Century Japan: Culture and Society. 1989. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ViglDwAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] Periodicals *Review of Japanese Culture and Society [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=W_o-AQAAIAAJ] ==Clothes== *John Marshall. Make Your Own Japanese Clothes: Patterns and Ideas for Modern Wear. Kodansha International. 1988. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ljOuuy0OO0UC&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] ==Fashion== *Toby Slade. Japanese Fashion: A Cultural History. 2009. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=AInI19E48QIC&pg=PP3#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Bonnie English. Japanese Fashion Designers: The Work and Influence of Issey Miyake, Yohji Yamamotom, and Rei Kawakubo. 2011. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6UMfAAAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Sadao Hibi. Japanese Detail Fashion. Chronicle Books. 1989. [https://books.google.com/books?id=G-kIAQAAMAAJ] **Nihon No Dento Iro To Katachi. Graphic-sha Publishing. 1987. Kimono *Sheila Cliffe. The Social Life of Kimono: Japanese Fashion Past and Present. 2017. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7G6xDQAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Anna Jackson (ed). Kimono: The Art and Evolution of Japanese Fashion. V&A Publishing. 2010. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=8gtMAQAAIAAJ]. Catalogue: [https://search.worldcat.org/title/kimono-the-art-and-evolution-of-japanese-fashion-the-khalili-collections/oclc/917375803]. ==See also== *[[Bibliography]] ==Notes== {{Reflist}} {{subpagesif}} [[Category:Bibliographies]] [[Category:Research]] lmcb60iaw9sgmcmpsn6i6yxjnocuel6 1 171302 2842427 2832319 2026-10-24T11:00:07Z James500 297601 /* */ Add 2842427 wikitext text/x-wiki Terms that sometimes appear in the titles of bibliographies, guides to literature/reference, etc: Bibliography, catalogue, guide, list, index, in print, books, literature, sources, works, material, titles, reference. [[User:James500|James500]] ([[User talk:James500|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/James500|contribs]]) 13:54, 14 November 2020 (UTC) For future use: *Non-fiction, art, fine arts, music, painting, sculpture, government, politics, philosophy, theology, religion, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining, manufacturing, technology, computer science, engineering, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, botany, natural history, prehistory, classics, anthropology, library science, librarianship, information studies, places, exploration, transport, Earth science, paleontology, official publications, universities, museums *Reprography, lithography, engraving *Bookbinding, early printed books, incunabula, manuscripts, papyri, papyrology *Languages, philology, ancient languages, medieval languages, dead languages, extinct languages *Writing, scripts, decipherment, alphabets, hieratic, demotic, hieroglyphic, figurative, ideographic, pictographic, cuneiform, inscriptions, stelae [stela], clay tablets, ostraka [ostrakon], papyrus, Minoan scripts, Linear A, Linear B *Indo-European languages; Italo-Celtic; Celtic languages *Latin, Greek, middle english, old english, anglo-norman [anglo-french], old french, old norse, old welsh, middle welsh, egyptian, hittite, luwian, lycian, akkadian, assyro-babylonian, elamite, amorite *Special libraries, national libraries, public libraries, university libraries, college libraries, school libraries, museum libraries *Archaeological theory, methodology, geology, stratigraphy etc. Field archaeology, behavioural archaeology *Tide tables *George Watson (ed). The Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature. Cambridge University Press. 1966. Volume 5. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ebM6AAAAIAAJ] *[[s:Page:Cornwall (Mitton).djvu/230|"Some Books on Cornwall"]] *[[s:Author:Richard Colt Hoare]] *Yorkshire literature *Catalogues régionaux des incunables des bibliothèques publiques de France. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=K38VcZrjrj0C&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q&f=false] (regional catalogues of incunabula in the public libraries of France) * [[User:James500|James500]] ([[User talk:James500|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/James500|contribs]]) 16:24, 24 November 2019 (UTC) For future use: *Palmer's Index to The Times **editions:2Faf22c-dSwC *Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies France: *Les Dictionnaires départementaux.  [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=FZEwAQAAMAAJ] (series includes departmental biographical dictionaries) Creuse: *Guide des archives de la Creuse. 1972 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=eEsCAAAAMAAJ] *Joanne. Géographie du département de la Creuse. 1895 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=izeVfoPbIc8C] *Jamain. Le département de la Creuse: ses origines et sa pérennité [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=kY-KMwcsJMEC&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Annuaire du Département de la Creuse [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=7wpBAAAAcAAJ&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Journal du département de la Creuse (1807-1819) Bibliography: *[[w:Fredson Bowers|Bowers, Fredson]]. Principles of Bibliographical Description. Princeton University Press. 1949. Russell & Russell, New York. 1962. St Paul's Bibliographies (No 15). 1986. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=hA7hAAAAMAAJ] Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Utcb32E7rsMC&pg=PA525#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Bowers, Fredson. Bibliography and Textual Criticism. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1964. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=zOFhNcQsihAC] Series: *Studies in Bibliography. Formerly "Papers in Bibliography". (Bibliographical Society of the University of Virginia). (1948 onwards) [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=HGEUAAAAIAAJ] Commentary: "A History of Studies in Bibliography: The First Fifty Volumes" in The First Fifty Years, p 125 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ZukVAQAAIAAJ] **Tanselle. Selected Studies in Bibliography. (Bibliographical Society of the University of Virginia) [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=OnktAQAAIAAJ] Commentary: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Utcb32E7rsMC&pg=PA526#v=onepage&q&f=false] Library associations: *IFLA. Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records: Final Report. Saur. 1998. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=YW8hAAAAQBAJ&pg=PP4#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Patrick Le Boeuf (ed). Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records (FRBR): Hype or Cure-All? Haworth Press. 2005. Routledge. 2013 [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Ka7hAQAAQBAJ&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Guidelines for Bibliographic Description of Reproductions. American Library Association. 1995. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=9zG6MGudKv8C&lpg=PP1&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false] Serials: *Serials Review Nostgia *Nostalgia cycles: [https://slate.com/culture/2012/04/the-golden-forty-year-rule-and-other-nostalgia-cycles-could-trends-possibly-return-every-40-years-20-years-and-12-15-years.html] [https://www.vice.com/en/article/how-the-20-year-trend-cycle-collapsed/] [https://www.npr.org/2022/03/01/1081115609/from-tumblrcore-to-2014core-the-nostalgia-loop-is-getting-smaller-and-faster] [https://www.theguardian.com/music/2023/apr/20/lets-go-round-again-the-ridiculous-rise-of-fifth-anniversary-vinyl-reissues] [https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/fashion/gen-z-fashion-trends-tumblr-aesthetic-b2042247.html] *Stuck in the Seventies: 113 Things from the 1970s that Screwed Up the Twentysomething Generation. 1991. 1995. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=bZ03g5ylsaEC]. Review: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6V4cAQAAMAAJ]. *1969: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=yuwjAAAAIBAJ&pg=PA25#v=onepage&q&f=false]. *Decade nostalgia [https://www.thetimes.com/uk/politics/article/rolling-back-the-years-qg8fs6sh06d] *[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=COhVAAAAIBAJ&pg=PA20#v=onepage&q&f=false] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Xf4rAAAAIBAJ&pg=PA3#v=onepage&q&f=false] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=nFtWAAAAIBAJ&pg=PA31#v=onepage&q&f=false] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=HqkfAAAAIBAJ&pg=PA27&article_id=4890,1282350#v=onepage&q&f=false] [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=_WZGAAAAIBAJ&pg=PA29#v=onepage&q&f=false][https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=bzpHAAAAIBAJ&pg=PA27#v=onepage&q&f=false][https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=s1MgAAAAIBAJ&pg=PA7#v=onepage&q&f=false] *1970s: [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=YT5QAAAAIBAJ&pg=PA8#v=onepage&q&f=false] *1990s Tamagotchi [https://www.nssmag.com/en/lifestyle/38204/tamagotchi-y2k-nostalgia] *[https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m002g6k5 90s Nostalgia]. BBC. Other *[[w:Haruko Ichikawa|Haruko Ichikawa]] (市河晴子 or 市川晴子) (1896-1943) **Japanese Lady in Europe. 1937. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=xi42AAAAMAAJ] (Japanese: 欧米の隅々) **Japanese Lady in America. First published 1938. [https://books.google.com/books?id=KQY7AQAAIAAJ] (Japanese: 米国の旅日本の旅) Search terms: *"press in japan" *"japanese press" *"press of japan" *"journalism of japan" *"journalism in japan" *"journalists in japan" *"japanese journalism" Generations *[https://www.vox.com/2018/8/15/17686668/millennials-explained Stop calling teenagers millennials]. Vox. 15 August 2018. Planet Earth *[[w:Encyclopedia of Earth|Encyclopedia of Earth]] Crime *The Concise Encyclopedia of Crime and Criminals [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=uGTQAAAAIAAJ] Showa era *懐かしの昭和・平成流行事典: 2001-1945. [[w:ja:新人物往来社|Shin-Jinbutsuoraisha]]. 2002. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=QCYyAQAAIAAJ] *少年ブーム～昭和レトロの流行もの. 串間努著. 2003. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=sK0nAQAAIAAJ] Shakespeare *Demmon (compiler). Catalogue of the Shakespearian Books and Pamphlets in the Joseph Crosby Library. 1885. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=GSZLAQAAMAAJ&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q&f=false]. *Shakespeare the Man and the Book. Part 2: Occasional Papers. 1881. [https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=gfUUAAAAYAAJ&pg=PP11#v=onepage&q&f=false] *Best films: [https://www.empireonline.com/movies/features/best-movies-of-all-time-us/] Survivability of past atmosphere *[https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2022/09/20/you-asked-dinosaurs-survived-when-co2-was-extremely-high-why-cant-humans/ You Asked: Dinosaurs Survived When CO2 Was Extremely High. Why Can’t Humans?] Columbia Climate School. 20 September 2022. *[https://www.sciencefocus.com/planet-earth/how-far-back-in-time-would-we-be-able-to-go-and-still-breathe-our-planets-air How far back in time would we be able to go and still breathe our planet's air?] BBC Science Focus. *[https://gizmodo.com/the-one-basic-fact-about-history-that-time-travelers-al-1652649190 The One Basic Fact About History That Time Travelers Always Forget]. io9. Gizmodo. 31 October 2014. [[User:James500|James500]] ([[User talk:James500|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/James500|contribs]]) 10:55, 26 October 2020 (UTC) 1dzdkp9wkgi0uwuog8lisgqn6ect37g 0 239710 2842382 2811182 2026-10-24T00:03:22Z KyleWii 3113193 2842382 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Environmental science}} {{secondary}} [[File:Grib skov.jpg|thumb|right|Ecology]] {{stub}} {{AP course revamp notice}} ==Introduction== This page is to document all the notes/some worksheets of my AP Environmental Class, a rigorous college-level class that aims to teach its pupils on the subjects of environmental science, which can range into many fields within this type of science (such as biology, dermatology, ecology, etc.). ==Contents== ;Fall 2018 *[[/Introduction/]] *[[/Ecology/]] *[[/Winds/]] *[[/Soil and Biomes/]] *[[/Climate Change/]] [[Category:AP Environmental Science]] [[Category:Advanced Placement Curriculum]] dv8r336i50himo8rt8oq58ra3rpo2g1 0 253863 2842380 2691861 2026-10-24T00:00:09Z KyleWii 3113193 2842380 wikitext text/x-wiki {{:{{PAGENAME}}/Sidebar}} {{AP course revamp notice}} Advanced Placement examinations (AP exams) are exams offered in United States by the College Board and are taken each May by students. The tests are the culmination of year-long Advanced Placement (AP) courses. AP exams (with few exceptions) have a multiple-choice section and a free-response section.<ref>[[Wikipedia: Advanced Placement exams]]</ref> The AP Psychology exam explores the ideas, theories, and methods of the scientific study of behavior and mental processes.<ref>[https://apstudents.collegeboard.org/courses/ap-psychology College Board: AP Psychology]</ref> == Outline == * [[/Introduction/]] * [[/Scientific Foundations of Psychology/]] * [[/Biological Bases of Behavior/]] * [[/Sensation and Perception/]] * [[/Learning/]] * [[/Cognitive Psychology/]] * [[/Developmental Psychology/]] * [[/Motivation, Emotion, and Personality/]] * [[/Clinical Psychology/]] * [[/Social Psychology/]] == See Also == * [[Wikipedia: Advanced Placement exams]] == Bibliography == * [https://openstax.org/details/books/psychology-2e OpenStax: Psychology 2nd Edition] == References == {{Reflist}} {{CourseCat}} dmm5n69sgoxpvnxa0peupm3k0a9r5bt 0 261167 2842343 2180910 2026-10-23T21:15:24Z KyleWii 3113193 2842343 wikitext text/x-wiki {{:{{PAGENAME}}/Sidebar}} {{AP course revamp notice}} Advanced Placement examinations (AP exams) are exams offered in United States by the College Board and are taken each May by students. The tests are the culmination of year-long Advanced Placement (AP) courses. AP exams (with few exceptions) have a multiple-choice section and a free-response section.<ref>[[Wikipedia: Advanced Placement exams]]</ref> The AP Biology exam studies the core scientific principles, theories, and processes that govern living organisms and biological systems, including hands-on laboratory work to investigate natural phenomena.<ref>[https://apstudents.collegeboard.org/courses/ap-biology College Board: AP Biology]</ref> == Outline == * [[/Chemistry of Life/]] * [[/Cell Structure and Function/]] * [[/Cellular Energetics/]] * [[/Cell Communication and Cell Cycle/]] * [[/Heredity/]] * [[/Gene Expression and Regulation/]] * [[/Natural Selection/]] * [[/Ecology/]] == See Also == * [[Wikipedia: Advanced Placement exams]] == Bibliography == * [https://openstax.org/details/books/biology-ap-courses OpenStax: Biology for AP Courses] == References == {{Reflist}} {{CourseCat}} o8v8jiqwwkz8hk88897mji9m6gr2s5l 2842347 2842343 2026-10-23T21:22:15Z KyleWii 3113193 2842347 wikitext text/x-wiki {{:{{PAGENAME}}/Sidebar}} {{AP course revamp notice}} Advanced Placement examinations (AP exams) are exams offered in United States by the College Board and are taken each May by students. The tests are the culmination of year-long Advanced Placement (AP) courses. AP exams (with few exceptions) have a multiple-choice section and a free-response section.<ref>[[Wikipedia: Advanced Placement exams]]</ref> The AP Biology exam studies the core scientific principles, theories, and processes that govern living organisms and biological systems, including hands-on laboratory work to investigate natural phenomena.<ref>[https://apstudents.collegeboard.org/courses/ap-biology College Board: AP Biology]</ref> == New Outline == # Chemistry of Life ## Structure of Water and Hydrogen Bonding ## Elements of Life ## Introduction to Biological Macromolecules ## Carbohydrates ## Lipids ## Nucleic Acids ## Proteins # Cell Structure and Function ## Cell Structure: Subcellular Components ## Cell Structure and Function ## Cell Size ## Plasma Membranes ## Membrane Permeability ## Membrane Transport ## Facilitated Diffusion ## Tonicity and Osmoregulation ## Mechanisms of Transport ## Cell Compartmentalization ## Origins of Cell Compartmentalization To be added. == (OLD!) Outline == This is necessary for easy access to the old notes, this will be deleted once its fully revamped. * [[/Chemistry of Life/]] * [[/Cell Structure and Function/]] * [[/Cellular Energetics/]] * [[/Cell Communication and Cell Cycle/]] * [[/Heredity/]] * [[/Gene Expression and Regulation/]] * [[/Natural Selection/]] * [[/Ecology/]] == See Also == * [[Wikipedia: Advanced Placement exams]] == Bibliography == * [https://openstax.org/details/books/biology-ap-courses OpenStax: Biology for AP Courses] == References == {{Reflist}} {{CourseCat}} 6kb5y8aczha6o2yvh09mk7djs23vonx 2 289273 2842324 2842200 2026-10-23T16:11:50Z Dc.samizdat 2856930 /* Boundaries */ 2842324 wikitext text/x-wiki {{align|center|David Brooks Christie}} {{align|center|dc@samizdat.org}} {{align|center|Draft in progress}} {{align|center|June 2023 - October 2026}} <blockquote>'''Abstract:''' The physical universe is properly visualized as real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are 4-polytopes, small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are 4-balls of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. We ourselves and the objects we observe near us are only 3-dimensional, but nonetheless we can see into four dimensions of space. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. Light from them reaches us directly, on straight lines through 4-space. This view of the observed universe is compatible with special and general relativity, and with quantum mechanics. It furnishes those theories with an explanatory geometric model.</blockquote> == Summary == We observe that: * Physical space has four perpendicular dimensions, not just three. * Atoms are [[W:4-polytope|4-polytopes]]. * The sun is a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]] that is round in four dimensions. * Everything of intermediate size between an atom and a star, including us and our planet, lies in a 3-dimensional manifold of ordinary space. * Our entire 3-space manifold is moving through Euclidean 4-space at the speed of light, in a direction perpendicular to its three interior dimensions. * Special relativity describes the linear motion of objects and light signals in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * General relativity describes the rotational motion of objects with mass in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * Quantum mechanics describes the symmetry group actions of elementary geometric objects (4-polytopes) in four-dimensional Euclidean space. == A theory of the Euclidean cosmos == The physical universe is properly visualized as [[w:Four-dimensional_space|real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>]] of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are [[w:4-polytope|4-polytopes]], small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are [[W:4-ball|4-balls]] of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. Objects intermediate in size between atoms and stars, including molecules, people, and planetery surfaces their surface, are so flat as to be essentially 3-dimensional, having only the thickness of an atom in the orthogonal fourth dimension. All objects with mass move inertially through Euclidean 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math> as long as they exist, and acceleration only varies their direction. Objects moving in the same direction are in the same inertial reference frame. Their direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> is their proper time dimension, simply because their direction and velocity of motion through time is the same as their direction and velocity of motion through space. A typical galaxy such as ours occupies a 4-ball of mostly empty space, with stars and other objects distributed non-uniformly within it. The galaxy's orbital center may be nothing: a smaller 4-ball of empty space they surround. The stars in our spiral galaxy appear from our accustomed point of view to occupy a disk-like region of 3-dimensional space, with a denser ball-like center, but they are not so confined: they are distributed within a region of 4-dimensional space. The disk and ball have thickness not only in the third dimension, but in the fourth spatial dimension as well. Light from stars and galaxies reaches us on straight lines through Euclidean 4-space, so from our viewpoint, in what we have always imagined to be a 3-space universe, we look into the surrounding 4-space. Although we are physically confined within a 3-dimensional hyperplane by the inertia of our motion through 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math>, light signals are not so confined, so we observe all the cosmological objects surrounding us, both in and above or below our hyperplane, without perceiving their separation in our fourth orthogonal dimension, the direction of our motion. We may perceive a galaxy as elliptical when it is actually spherical, because that is how its image projects from its 4-ball shape into a 3-ball region in our hyperplane, where we measure it with our 3-dimensional bodies. More generally, orbits are circular in 4-space, but elliptical in the 3-space of their elliptic hyperplane. The galaxy as a whole, or more properly its orbital barycenter, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, in a distinct direction orthogonal to all three dimensions of our ordinary proper 3-space. Stars within the galaxy are translating with it at the same velocity <math>c</math> in the same direction, but on spiral trajectories as they pursue their various orbits within the galaxy. The galaxy as a whole occupies a 4-ball within its proper inertial reference frame (that is, in the moving frame of reference in which the galaxy considers itself to be a stationary rotating 4-ball). Over time, the galaxy 4-ball occupies a 4-dimensional cylinder and progresses along the cylinder's axis at velocity <math>c</math>. In this more universal inertial reference frame, the stars in the galaxy follow helical geodesic paths through the 4-cylinder; their trajectories are screw-translations through 4-space, the compound of a simple rotation and a completely orthogonal linear translation. The gravitational force and the inertial tendency to follow a geodesic are the same phenomenon, by the equivalence principle. That said, they can be distinguished, and the galaxy is held together primarily by gravity as inertia, not by gravity as attraction to a central mass toward which objects fall in orbit. There is not enough mass in the galaxy to hold it together by attraction, there is just enough to bend the stars' trajectories toward each other, in helical orbits around the galaxy's barycentric axis of motion. It is the tremendous inertial force of stars in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> that holds the cylinder of motion together, not some invisible dark matter. The observed universe as a whole appears to be a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] expanding radially from a central origin point at velocity <math>c</math>, the invariant velocity of mass-carrying objects through 4-space, also the propagation speed of light relative to any moving 3-space manifold, as measured by all observers. A 3-sphere is a hypersphere in Euclidean 4-space, but the enclosing surface of a 3-sphere is a curved, finite 3-space, dimensionally analogous to the surface of the earth which is a curved, finite 2-space. This 3-sphere could be the domain of our visible cosmos, but of course we do not know for certain that all the cosmological objects we observe lie near the surface of our expanding 3-sphere, since it is only our assumption that they must all have originated in the same big bang long ago. Possibly some of the more distant objects we observe did not, and lie elsewhere, outside our big-bang's 3-sphere of outflying matter or even inside its 3-sphere, below its surface. We cannot assume that all objects in the 4-space universe lie near the surface of the same expanding 3-sphere. For all observers, the conjectured big-bang of their origin corresponds not only to a now-distant point in their proper time past, it also corresponds to a distinct now-distant point in 4-dimensional space: the same point in the same Euclidean 4-space for all observers with the same origin. Our big bang had a distinct origin point in real space as well as in real time. More generally, time and Euclidean 4-space can be measured independently, just as time and Euclidean 3-space were measured classically, without the necessity to combine them as spacetime. The same inertial force which holds the galactic cylinder of motion together also confines us physically to an exceedingly thin three-dimensional surface manifold moving through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. All objects in our solar system too small to have their own gravity lie entirely within this thinest three-dimensional manifold, and have only the thickness of an atom in their direction-of-motion fourth dimension. That is why we are 3-dimensional objects ourselves, and why we cannot construct more than three perpendiculars through a single point in our local 3-dimensional space. A spherical region of 4-space is called a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]]. The enclosing surface of a 4-ball of any size is a finite, curved (non-Euclidean) 3-dimensional space called a [[w:3-sphere|3-sphere]]. Our entire big-bang-origin universe appears to be the largest 3-sphere we observe, but each of the cosmological objects within it (including our galaxy and our sun) lies within a smaller 3-sphere shell which bounds it, lying (we assume) on the largest 3-sphere embedded in its surface, like a soap bubble on the surface of a larger soap bubble. All the 3-dimensional surfaces are expanding, as the largest 3-sphere inflates at radial velocity <math>c</math>. We ourselves live within such an expanding 3-dimensional surface, in an infinitesimally curved 3-manifold surface embedded in Euclidean 4-space. That surface is the ordinary 3-dimensional space we experience. The earth and all the planets lie on it. Our solar system is only a small patch on the surface of a dimensionally rounder space, although that surface is not infinite. It is curved, and finite, analogous to the way the 2-dimensional surface of the earth -- once thought to be flat -- is curved and finite. Our solar system occupies a small patch on a filmy 4-dimensional soap-bubble of galactic size rounded by gravity, that is thicker-skinned than the diameter of an atom only in the superdense interior of objects large enough to have significant gravity of their own. Our 3-manifold of ordinary space, as a surface within our moving 4-ball galaxy, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> with the galaxy, in a distinct direction orthogonal to the manifold's three orthogonal dimensions of interior space. At every material point in the manifold (at every atom), the translation through 4-space is following a geometric law of motion discovered by Coxeter, that governs the propagation of individual objects through Euclidean space by the actions of their symmetry groups. The solar system's atoms of mass are 4-polytopes that are simultaneously rotating and translating, and as they advance together they define a moving 3-dimensional manifold by their own collective inertia, also called gravity, the property of matter's ceaseless propagation through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate of causality at which quantum events occur, all objects move, and the universe evolves. Any moving 3-dimensional manifold such as ours is an evolving surface boundary that is empty in most places, occupied by single atoms in comparatively fewer places, and occupied by bound complexes of multiple atoms (molecules) in still fewer places. In all these places it is no thicker than one atom in the dimension corresponding to its direction of translation, because molecules are 3-dimensional complexes of atoms that add no thickness to the manifold. In fewer places still it is occupied by large lumps of matter which exert a significant gravitational attraction, such as planets and their satellites. These round gravitational objects are thicker than one atom in their fourth dimension, but not uniformly so. They are disk-like 4-dimensional objects, 3-balls that are flattish in the fourth dimension. They are typically only one atom thick at the 4-disk's sharp edge, but they may be much thicker in the center of the 4-disk, particularly if their gravity is strong enough to give them a core of superdense matter, like the earth's deep core. The moving surface manifold cannot be thicker than one atom at any point unless and until there is enough mass near that point for the force of gravity as attraction to overcome the force of gravity as inertia, allowing atoms to be "heaped up" into larger 4-dimensional objects that form a lump in its moving surface. We have only indirect experience of such 4-dimensional lumps of matter thicker than one atom, since they occur naturally in our vicinity only in regions of superdense matter, such as the core of the earth or the interior of the sun. Deep in the core of the earth under enormous gravitational pressure peculiar states of matter have been observed, defying our understanding of how 3-dimensional crystalline structures behave. That is because they are not 3-dimensional structures, they are 4-dimensional crystals. The earth is a disk-like 4-dimensional object that is thin at its edge but thicker at its sphere-like core, dimensionally analogous to a 3-dimensional flying saucer with a sharp circular edge. The earth's surface that we walk on is an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere), analogous to the circular edge of the flying saucer (a 1-sphere), and on that edge where we live every object we find (including our bodies) is 3-dimensional with only the thickness of an atom in the fourth dimension. We cannot walk on the top or bottom surface of the 4-disk flying saucer because those surfaces are 3-dimensional regions within the earth. The earth's deep core of superdense 4-dimensional matter occupies a spherical region of 4-dimensional space (a 4-ball). The sun is the only entirely spherical 4-ball occurring naturally in our solar system. We refer to the contents of such superdense 4-balls of matter as atomic plasma, and have little experimental knowledge of their internal geometry or processes. We know that the sun burns at its surface 3-sphere and emits radiation, and we know a good deal about those surface processes which are nuclear atomic processes, but we know very little about its interior 4-ball, a dimensionally rounder enclosed space whose existence we did not suspect. Every moving surface boundary of matter in the observed universe is evolving in four dimensions at velocity <math>c</math>. The current location in 4-space of any of its material objects corresponds to the present moment in the proper time of that object's inertial reference frame. The object's direction of movement at velocity <math>c</math> corresponds to its proper time dimension, which is a spiral over time, not a Euclidean (straight-line) dimension, since its direction is changing in its orbit. Objects with mass of all sizes, from subatomic particles to the largest objects observed in the cosmos, are perpetually in inertial rotational motion in some orbit, and simultaneously in inertial translational motion propagating themselves through 4-space, in two completely orthogonal inertial motions each at the constant universal rate of transformation <math>c</math>. Every object with mass moves relative to universal 4-coordinate Euclidean space on its own distinct geodesic spiral, a screw displacement trajectory that is the compound of its two completely orthogonal inertial motions, a rotation and a translation. Objects without mass such as photons lie off such moving surface boundaries of matter from which they were emitted, and their motion is of a different nature. They are in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> through all four dimensions concurrently, without any rotational component of motion, so they move through 4-space on straight lines at a compound velocity. The propagation speed of light measured on a straight line through Euclidean 4-space is <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, so we can see in four dimensions, even though we are physically confined to a 3-dimensional manifold that is moving at velocity <math>c</math>. For example, we can look across the center of the mostly-empty 4-ball containing our galaxy and see stars in the opposite sides of its concentric 3-sphere orbital surfaces. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. They move in the 4-space direction corresponding to their proper time, perpendicular to all three dimensions of their proper 3-space, and generally the farther they are from us the greater the divergence of their direction of motion from our direction of motion: the greater the relative motion between us, and the greater their Hubble redshift. Light from them reaches us directly, propagating on straight lines through 4-space at twice the velocity at which they, and we ourselves, are propagating through 4-space. This physical model of the observed universe is compatible with the theories of special and general relativity, and with the atomic theory of quantum mechanics. It explains those theories geometrically, as expressions of intrinsic symmetries in Euclidean space. == Symmetries == It is common to speak of nature as a web, and so it is, the great web of our physical experiences. Every web must have its root systems somewhere, and nature in this sense must be rooted in the symmetries which underlie physics and geometry, the [[W:Group (mathematics)|mathematics of groups]].{{Sfn|Conway, Burgiel & Goodman-Strauss|2008}} As I understand [[W:Noether's theorem|Noether's theorem]] (which is not mathematically), hers is the deepest meta-theory of nature yet, deeper than [[W:Theory of relativity|Einstein's relativity]] or [[W:Evolution|Darwin's evolution]] or [[W:Euclidean geometry|Euclid's geometry]]. It finds that all fundamental findings in physics are based on conservation laws which can be laid at the doors of distinct [[W:symmetry group |symmetry group]]s. Thus all fundamental systems in physics, as examples [[W:quantum chromodynamics|quantum chromodynamics]] (QCD) the theory of the strong force binding the atomic nucleus and [[W:quantum electrodynamics|quantum electrodynamics]] (QED) the theory of the electromagnetic force, each have a corresponding symmetry [[W:group theory|group theory]] of which they are an expression. [[W:Coxeter group|Coxeter's theory of symmetry groups]] generated by reflections did for geometry what Noether's theorem and Einstein's relativity did for physics. [[W:Coxeter|Coxeter]] showed that Euclidean geometry is based on conservation laws that correspond to distinct symmetry groups, and that their group actions express the principle of relativity. Here is Coxeter's formulation of the motions of objects (their congruent transformations) in an ''n''-dimensional Euclidean space, excerpted:{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|pp=217-218|loc=§12.2 Congruent transformations}} <blockquote>Let <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> denote a rotation, <math>\mathrm{R}</math> a reflection, <math>\mathrm{T}</math> a translation, and let <math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r\mathrm{T}</math> denote a product of several such transformations, all commutative with one another. Then <math>\mathrm{RT}</math> is a glide-reflection (in two or three dimensions), <math>\mathrm{QR}</math> is a rotary-reflection, <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is a screw-displacement, and <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is a double rotation (in four dimensions).<br> Every orthogonal transformation is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r \le n)</math>, the number of dimensions.<br> Transformations involving a translation are also expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + 1 \le n)</math>.<br> For <math>(n = 4)</math> in particular, every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> If we begin with this most elemental [[w:Kinematics|kinematics]] of Coxeter's, and also assume the [[W:Galilean relativity|Galilean principle of relativity]], every displacement in 4-space can be viewed as either a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> or a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, because we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> in a linearly moving (translating) reference frame. Therefore any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>. By the same principle, we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> as an isoclinic (equi-angled) <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> by proper choice of reference frame.{{Efn|[[W:Arthur Cayley|Cayley]] showed that any rotation in 4-space can be decomposed into two isoclinic rotations, which intuitively we might see follows from the fact that any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a [[W:SO(4)|rotation in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]].|name=Cayley's rotation factorization into two isoclinic reference frame transformations}} Coxeter's relation is thus a mathematical statement of the principle of relativity, on group-theoretic grounds. It correctly captures the limits to [[W:General relativity|general relativity]], in that we can only exchange the translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) for ''one'' of the two rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>). An observer in any inertial reference frame can always measure the presence, direction and velocity of ''one'' rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) up to uncertainty, and can always distinguish the direction of their own proper time translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>). As I understand Coxeter theory (which is not mathematically), the symmetry groups underlying physics seem to have an expression in a [[W:Euclidean space|Euclidean space]] of four [[W:dimension|dimension]]s, that is, they are [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|four-dimensional Euclidean geometry]]. Therefore as I understand that geometry (which is entirely by synthetic methods rather than by Clifford's algebraic methods), the [[W:Atom|atom]] seems to have a distinct Euclidean geometry, such that atoms and their constituent particles are four-dimensional geometric objects (4-polytopes), and nature can be understood in terms of their [[W:group action|group actions]], including centrally their group <math>SO(4)</math> [[W:rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space|rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]]. The distinct Coxeter symmetry groups have characteristic <math>SO(4)</math> rotational expressions as the [[W:Regular_4-polytope|regular 4-polytopes]]. Their discrete isoclinic rotations are distinguishing properties of fundamental objects in geometry, relativity and quantum mechanics. For example, atoms exhibit <math>SO(4)</math> symmetries of the discrete isoclinic (equi-angled) double rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>) of a set of regular 4-polytopes that is characteristic of their [[w:Atomic_number|atomic number]]. == Special relativity describes Euclidean 4-space == <blockquote>Our entire model of the universe is built on symmetries. Some, like isotropy (the laws are the same in all directions), homogeneity (same in all places), and time invariance (same at all times) seem natural enough. Even relativity, the Lorentz Invariance that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, has an elegance to it that makes it seem natural.<ref>{{Cite book|first=Dave|last=Goldberg|title=The Universe in the Rearview Mirror: How Hidden Symmetries Shape Reality|chapter=§10. Hidden Symmetries: Why some symmetries but not others?|year=2013|publisher=Dutton Penguin Group|isbn=978-0-525-95366-1|ref={{SfnRef|Goldberg|2013}}}}</ref></blockquote> Although the Minkowski spacetime of relativity is a non-Euclidean 4-dimensional space,{{Efn|Spacetime is a non-Euclidean (curved) 4-dimensional space because it consists of three orthogonal space dimensions and a time dimension. The time dimension is not orthogonal to the three spatial dimensions; the time coordinate has the opposite sign as the three space coordinates so spacetime is hyperbolic, not a Euclidean (flat) 4-space at all.}} it has been noticed that its 3-dimensional space component could be modeled as a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] embedded in 4-dimensional Euclidean (flat) space. That is, we could imagine that the ordinary 3-dimensional space we perceive is the curved 3-dimensional surface of a 4-dimensional ball (since the surface of a 4-ball is a curved 3-dimensional space called a 3-sphere, just as the surface of a 3-ball like the earth is a curved 2-dimensional space called a 2-sphere). This was [[#Origins of the theory|imagined by Einstein]] himself in 1921, as a thought experiment in which he carefully described his fourth orthogonal spatial dimension as merely a mathematical abstraction. Subsequently it was noticed by others (not mainstream physicists) that if physical space were really embedded in Euclidean 4-dimensional space (with our 3-dimensional space embedded in 4-space as some non-Euclidean 3-manifold, not necessarily a 3-sphere), then the Lorentz transformation effects of special relativity (spatial forshortenings and time dilations and so forth) could all be explained by ordinary perspective geometry in 4-dimensional Euclidean space. Special relativity reduces to classical vector space geometry (based on the 4-dimensional version of the Pythagorean theorem), but if and only if every observer is moving through 4-space at a universal constant velocity <math>c</math>, in some 4-space direction.{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} This counter-intuitive alternative geometric model of relativity, which has usually been called [[W:Formulations of special relativity#Euclidean relativity|Euclidean relativity]], is motivated by the fact that in every kind of relativity, but originally in Einstein's special relativity, each observer moves on a vector through a Euclidean four-dimensional space consisting of their three proper spatial dimensions and their proper time dimension, and the Pythagorean vector-sum of their motion through this kind of proper 4-space is always <math>c</math>, as measured by all observers from any inertial reference frame.{{Efn|Each observer is stationary in space in their own proper reference frame, while they move at maximum velocity {{Math|c}} through their own proper time. Observed from another reference frame in relative motion, they appear foreshortened in space in their direction of motion, and their clocks appear to be slowed to less than the maximum velocity {{Math|c}}.}} This is the Lorentz invariant, that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, regardless of their motion relative to the light source.{{Efn| ...cite Lewis Epstein's elegant explanation of the Lorentz Invariance as observers moving at constant velocity {{Math|c}} through space and proper time.}} But no physicists have taken the leap of claiming that therefore, our universe is physically [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|this kind of Euclidean 4-space]], and that observers are actually moving through it at velocity <math>c</math>. In physics as it has been universally understood, observers are not supposed to be able to move at velocity <math>c</math>. Their motion takes place in 3-space and in universal coordinate time (in Minkowski spacetime), and the cosmos is considered to be a non-Euclidean 3-space, generally a closed (finite) expanding 3-space, but with only three spatial dimensions, not four. In the Euclidean relativity alternative view, however, every observer is always moving at velocity <math>c</math> through the universe, which is real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. The direction in which they are moving is called their proper time axis.{{Efn|Time in spacetime is universal coordinate time, but there is another kind of time in relativity, the proper time in each inertial reference frame. Your proper time is the time you experience, and every observer has his own proper time; proper time runs at different rates in different inertial reference frames. It runs slower (compared to universal coordinate time) in a gravitational field (according to general relativity), and observers in motion with respect to each other view each other's clocks as running slower than their own clocks (according to special relativity).}} Their movement in time is not just modelled as movement in an abstract fourth dimension (as it is in Minkowski spacetime), their movement in time is isomorphic to their movement through physical space in a distinct direction at velocity <math>c</math>. Two observers' directions of movement through space may be different (or not, if they happen to be going in the same direction). Your proper time dimension is whichever direction you are moving. The other three directions perpendicular to your proper time axis are the three dimensions of your ordinary proper space, which again, will be different directions for you than for other observers moving in a different direction. There are four orthogonal spatial dimensions which we all share, but we share the same orthogonal proper time axis and ordinary proper 3-space axes only if we are at rest with respect to each other, actually moving in the same direction at velocity <math>c</math>, in the same inertial reference frame. Your proper 4-space coordinate system is rotated with respect to another observer's proper 4-space coordinate system, precisely as your vectors (directions of motion) are rotated in Euclidean 4-space with respect to each other, but there are no metric distortions (no Lorentz transformations) between your proper Euclidean 4-space coordinate systems; you are both embedded in the same Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. Lorentz transformations are required only to convert between your respective proper Minkowski spacetime coordinate systems. So in this novel alternate view of relativity, every mass in the universe must be perpetually in motion at velocity <math>c</math> through Euclidean 4-space, along with all the masses in its vicinity that are going in (nearly) the same direction. The entire solar system, for example, must be translating in the fourth dimension at the "speed of light" <math>c</math>, although we do not notice it, since we are all moving in that same direction together. Acceleration of an object varies its direction of motion through 4-space, but never its velocity, which is invariant for all objects with mass. Two objects which are in motion relative to each other are both actually in motion at the same velocity <math>c</math>, but in at least slightly different directions.{{Efn|The angular divergence between two observer's motion vectors is proportional to their relative velocity: the more they diverge, the greater their relative velocity, up to the maximum divergence possible in the space. In Euclidean relativity all observers are in motion at velocity {{Math|c}} relative to universal Cartesian 4-coordinate space, so the maximum relative velocity between two observers is {{Math|2c}} when they are moving in exactly opposite directions in 4-space. This is not a contradiction of special relativity, which limits the maximum relative velocity between two observers to {{Math|c}}, it is the same measurement in different units. Special relativity measures all velocities in Minkowski spacetime (in a non-Euclidean 3-space). Euclidean relativity measures all velocities in Euclidean 4-space.}} In Einstein's relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of light through 3-space. In Euclidean relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of matter through 4-space! The speed of light through 3-space is also perceived as <math>c</math> by all observers, because they are each living in a moving 3-manifold that is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. Despite their extreme differences in viewpoint, Einstein's relativity and Euclidean relativity are equivalent theories in complete agreement with each other, by definition. The two theories make exactly the same special relativity predictions of how observers in different inertial reference frames will perceive each other's motions in time and space. It is beyond the scope of this present paper to show how they also agree on the predictions of general relativity, but it is important to understand that our formulation of Euclidean relativity requires our acceptance of the experimentally verified findings of special relativity, general relativity and quantum mechanics. Our model and the standard model both describe the same geometric relations of space and time based on the same evidence, but as embedded in two very different universal host spaces: Euclidean 4-space versus Minkowski spacetime. In some instances our model provides a geometric explanation for physical phenomena where the standard model has none, as yet. An example is the two models' differing explanations for the gravitational coherence of galaxies: either their inertial motion at velocity <math>c</math>, or their possession of experimentally undetected dark matter. A more central example is our use of Coxeter's kinematics to explain the laws of relativistic motion geometrically. {{Efn|More generally, our model is concerned with group-theoretic properties of number elucidated by Coxeter and other geometers. ...cite Kappraff & Adamson's 2003 paper on The Relationship of the Cotangent Function to Special Relativity Theory, geometry and properties of number,{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2003|loc=Special Relativity Theory, Geometry and properties of number}} which shows how the Lorentz coefficient is a function of a deep geometric property of number{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2000|loc=A Fresh Look at Number}} discovered by Steinbach,{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997|loc=Golden Fields: A Case for the Heptagon}} by means of which the root formula of geometry in any Euclidean dimension, the Pythagorean theorem, may be derived solely in terms of the addition of polygon side lengths, without recourse to their products or squares. More generally, Steinbach found that in the relations among regular polytope chords, to add is to multiply; every chord is both the product (quotient) of a pair of chords and the sum (difference) of another pair of chords.}} Euclidean relativity is not even a fringe theory; no physicists or astronomers have adopted it. There are many good reasons why the revolutionary leap to a four orthogonal spatial dimensions viewpoint has not been taken, beginning with the universally observed fact that we can only construct three perpendiculars through a point in our immediate space, which appears to be resolutely 3-dimensional, not 4-dimensional. Euclidean relativity offers a nice geometric explanation of the reasons for the Lorentz transformations, but only at the cost of raising other mysteries, which have been difficult for its aficionados to explain. Another mystery is how light signals between observers in relative motion could "catch up" with the receiver moving on a diverging path through 4-space from the emitter. If both observers are already moving at <math>c</math> (on diverging paths), the propagation speed of light through 4-space between them would have to be greater than <math>c</math>. Euclidean relativity is a revolutionary theory indeed, in which <math>c</math> cannot possibly be the speed of light! We conclude that, for a theory of Euclidean 4-space to be physically viable (that is, for <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> to be our real space and not merely an abstract mathematical space), the speed of light through Euclidean 4-space must be <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, with massless photons translating through 4-space at twice the speed of mass-carrying objects. Photons must translate the diagonal distance through 4-space along the long diameter of a unit 4-hypercube, in the same time that massive particles translate inertially along the edge (or the radius) of a unit 4-hypercube. This is conceivable in Euclidean 4-space (and in no other Euclidean space of any dimensionality) because the long diagonal of the unit 4-hypercube is the natural number <math>\sqrt{4}</math>. == An object's motion in space is the product of its discrete self-reflections == Coxeter theory describes all the possible motions of an object in space as local functions of the object's discrete geometry (its shape). Coxeter observed that in a Euclidean space of any number of dimensions, any displacement of a geometric object from one place to another, and any rotation of the object from one orientation to another, can be broken down into the product of a number of discrete self-reflections. Any action of a polytope that transforms its position and orientation in space may be measured as a distinct sequence of self-reflections of the object in its own surfaces. Therefore any motion of the object whatsoever may be precisely described as the object propagating itself through space by a discrete sequence of local self-reflections. This is a purely kinematic description of motion which does not give any account of forces acting on the object that cause it to move. Coxeter found that both changes in position (translations) and changes in orientation (rotations) can be broken down into the simplest of all displacements (self-reflections). A translation occurs when an object self-reflects twice, in two distinct surfaces which are parallel to each other. A rotation also occurs when an object self-reflects twice, but in two distinct surfaces which intersect each other. When a object self-reflects once, it turns itself inside out (it reverses its chirality), but in translations and rotations it self-reflects twice, preserving its chirality. Coxeter's laws of kinematics are a geometric counterpart to Newton's algebraic laws of motion in three dimensional Euclidean space. They are helpful because they can be understood as geometric pictures, which may help us to visualize the relationships between translation and rotation in classic Newtonian physics problems, such as the [[W:Kepler problem|Kepler problem]] of the motion of the planets.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Feynman|first=Richard|title=Feynman's Lost Lecture: The Motion of Planets Around the Sun|date=1996|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0393039184}}</ref> But they are also a revolutionary advance beyond Newton's laws, because Coxeter formulated them in Euclidean spaces of any number of dimensions. In particular, they give us geometric pictures of all the possible motions of objects in 4-dimensional Euclidean space: <blockquote>Every orthogonal transformation in 4-space is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}^t</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + t \le 4)</math>. Every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> While this description should be understood as geometric pictures, some of the pictures may not be easy for us to visualize, since we have no physical experience in 4-dimensional space. Rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>), reflection (<math>\mathrm{R}</math>) and translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) are obvious analogues of what they are in three-dimensional space, but double rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>) is something new and unprecedented in our physical experience, because double rotations cannot occur until there are four or more dimensions of space in which to rotate. A point in 4-space may be in motion on two circles in two completely orthogonal rotation planes simultaneously. Nothing constrains the two circles to be of the same radius, or constrains either circle from being of infinite radius such that the point moves in a straight line within its rotation plane: a translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> rather than a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. The motion of a rigid object defined by multiple points is constrained by its rigidity, such that the radii of both circles may approach infinity, but only one of the two radii may actually reach infinity. For a rigid object, only one of the two rotations may actually be a translation. Four dimensional Euclidean space can accomodate no such thing as a <math>\mathrm{Q}^2\mathrm{T}</math>. A translating double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, like a translating simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>, is simply a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. That is the essence of the way the principle of relativity operates in Euclidean 4-space. An object which is double-rotating in its own proper inertial reference frame may be seen to be performing nothing more mysterious than a screw translation, when observed from an inertial reference frame from which the object is in relative translational motion. Of course, it is a screw translation in 4-space, which is more mysterious than a screw translation in our ordinary 3-space. In 3-space the orbit of a screw translation (or any <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) lies on a great circle of an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere). In 4-space the orbit of a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math> lies on a great circle of a hypersphere (a 3-sphere). Such 4-dimensional great circles are inherently more complex than the ordinary circles we experience in 3-space. They do not lie in a single plane, but bend through all four dimensions, in either a left or right hand direction of curvature. Unlike ordinary circles they are inherently chiral, and their circumference is not <math>2\pi r</math>, but like ordinary circles they are truly circular, geodesic circles. In 4-space they might even be said to be more circular than ordinary circles, which bend in only two dimensions. We refer to such 4-dimensional great circles as ''isoclines'', to distinguish them from ordinary 2-dimensional great circles in the plane. Their name comes from the fact that a point on a rigid 4-dimensional object undergoing [[W:SO(4)#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]] traverses an isocline circle. In a universe which is real Euclidean four-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>, wherein these motions occur only at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, there is a universal Cartesian 4-coordinate reference frame in which every rigid object in free fall is translating on a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> at velocity <math>c</math>. That universal inertial reference frame is not the proper reference frame of any object or observer, wherein the object or observer is stationary and double-rotating at the universal rate of quantum events <math>c</math>, but it is the common reference frame of all observers. == Light propagates through 4-space at twice its apparent velocity <math>c</math>== Coxeter's laws of kinematics in 4-dimensional Euclidean space apply to all objects with mass, but we find there is an additional kind of displacement which applies only to massless particles such as photons, considered as single point objects. Light quanta (photons) translate through 4-space by 4-dimensional reflection <math>\mathrm{R}^4</math>, which may be termed a double translation <math>\mathrm{T}^2</math>, a pure translation via two pairs of parallel reflections without any rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. Matter (atoms and all particles with mass) are perpetually rotating and translating through 4-space by <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, a screw translation of a rotating object, which is relativistically equivalent to a stationary isoclinic <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>, an isoclinically rotating object such as an atom. A simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> or simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> is a double reflection <math>\mathrm{R^2}</math>, so a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is an <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>, but not with the same group of reflection angles as a light signal <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>. A translation <math>\mathrm{T = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two parallel planes, and a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two intersecting planes, as in a <math>\mathrm{QT = R^4}</math> which is both at once. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is two double reflections in pairs of parallel planes at once, a reflection in four non-intersecting parallel planes; it is all translation and no rotation. In a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> all the motion goes to translation, so the translation goes twice as far as the simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is the opposite of a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q^2 = R^4}</math>, which is stationary but rotates twice as far as the simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. The product of the two translations in a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> is a diagonal 4-space translation over the long diameter of the unit 4-hypercube, exactly twice the distance of a simple <math>\mathrm{T}</math> over the edge length (or radius) of the unit 4-hypercube. The [[w:Tesseract|4-hypercube (also known as the 8-cell or tesseract)]] is ''radially equilateral'', which means its edge length is equal to its radius, like the hexagon, so its long diameter (twice its radius) is exactly twice its edge length. The photon moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions. By the four-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, each of those four distances is half the total distance the photon moves: one edge length (one radius) is half the total diagonal distance moved (the long diameter). That total movement is a double the unit-distance translation, but without any rotation component, so it cannot carry any mass with it. A <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> cannot reposition a 4-polytope the way a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> does, it can only reposition a quantum of energy that has no distinguishing rotational symmetry, such as a photon. That is the price light pays to move exactly twice as fast as matter.{{Efn| ...lensing of double translations <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> in more than two pairs of parallel planes at once...relationship to the frequency of light emitted and the coherence length of the wave packet...}} == Special relativity is Galilean relativity in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == {{Efn|...TAC suggests this section is needed sooner, i.e. in the preceding Special Relativity section, as it explains how Euclidean relativity reduces special relativity to 4D perspective geometry...it's misplaced (too late) here...}} Perspective effects known as the Lorentz transformations occur because each observer's proper 3-dimensional space is a moving curved manifold embedded in flat 4-dimensional Euclidean space. The curvature of their 3-space complicates sightline calculations for observers; they sometimes require Lorentz transformations to produce the actual 4-space Cartesian coordinates of objects in the scene being observed. But if all four spatial dimensions are considered, no Lorentz transformations are required (or permitted) in correct scene construction, except when an observer wants to calculate a projection, that is, the shadow of how things will appear to them from a three-dimensional viewpoint (not how they really are in 4-space).{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} Space really has four orthogonal dimensions, and space and time behave there just as they do in a classical vector space, only bigger by one dimension. It is not necessary to combine 4-space with time in a unified spacetime to explain 4-dimensional perspective effects at high relative velocities, because Euclidean 4-space is already 4-dimensional, and those effects fall out naturally from the 4-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, exactly as ordinary visual perspective does in three dimensions from the 3-dimensional Pythagorean theorem. Because one of the four spatial dimensions corresponds to an observer's direction of motion (in both space and proper time), and all observers and all scenes being observed are in motion (at constant velocity) in their respective proper time directions, we observe perspective foreshortenings in time as well as in a spatial dimension. In special relativity these perspective effects are reciprocal, precisely because they are only apparent, not actual, changes in size and duration. (However in general relativity, discussed below, the actual rate of physical processes varies from place to place, and reference frame differences predicted by the theory are neither reciprocal nor illusory.) None of these Lorentz effects are beyond geometric explanation or paradoxical. The universe is unexpectedly strange to us in precisely the ways the Euclidean fourth dimension is strange to us; but that does hold many surprises. Euclidean 4-space is much more interesting than Euclidean 3-space, analogous to the way 3-space is much more interesting and deeply explanatory to us than it would be if we experienced it only as a 2-space with many folds and curves, as perhaps an ant does. The emergent properties of 4-space are hard for us to visualize because they lie so wholly beyond our physical experience, just as it was hard for our ancestors to imagine the earth as round like a ball. However, Euclidean spaces of successive dimensions are analogous, and so higher dimensional spaces can be anticipated and explored: that is Schläfli's great discovery. Moreover dimensional analogy itself, like everything else in nature including all of physics, is an exact expression of intrinsic group-theoretic symmetries: that is Nother's great discovery. == General relativity is special relativity in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == The statement that the laws of special relativity hold to good approximation in freely falling (and non-rotating) reference frames is known as the [[W:Equivalence principle|Einstein equivalence principle]]. The weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a building on the surface of the earth is the same as the weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a spaceship in interstellar space accelerating at a rate of 32'/second/second. Both observers are experiencing an upwards acceleration at the same rate, which in their respective proper reference frames is measured as the weight of gravity, rather than as an accelerating motion (they are stationary in their proper reference frames). Einstein used this equivalence principle as the basis for his general theory of relativity, in much the same way he had used the constant velocity of light as the basis for his special theory of relativity. In general relativity the two accelerating observers occupy scenes which are relativistically equivalent, which means that although they can be distinguished (they have different measurements) in any reference frame from which they may both be observed, they have the same invariant geometry in all reference frames (they are the same phenomena), implying that there exists, for either scene, another reference frame from which it measures exactly like the other scene. Relativistically equivalent does not imply that there exists a single reference frame in which the two scenes are congruent (have the same measurements). It only means that they can be transformed into each other by a shift in point of view, because their invariant geometries (their measurements which are independent of point of view) are the same. Einstein's general theory of relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in spacetime. Our formulation of Euclidean relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. An observer standing on the surface of the earth is accelerated at the rate of 32'/second/second. The observer and the earth are both stationary in their proper inertial reference frames (which are similar except for the rotation of the earth), so the observer's acceleration cannot be perceived as motion in either proper reference frame; it is perceptible there instead as the force of gravity. It is only perceptible as motion in some other reference frame in which the earth and the observer are both in motion, such as the universal common reference frame of Euclidean 4-coordinate space in which they are both in motion at velocity <math>c</math> on their respective screw translations <math>QT</math>, which are distinct. In that universal common reference frame the observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is the rate of change in the direction of his vector of translation through 4-space. The velocity of his vector of translation <math>T</math> through 4-space remains the constant <math>c</math> throughout; only his direction is changing. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation <math>Q</math> of a translation <math>T</math>: a screw translation <math>QT</math>. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation which is an acceleration. We can be precise about the units of measurement of this acceleration at atomic scale. In Coxeter's kinematics rotations of geometric objects occur in discrete increments called rotational displacements, with each distinct kind of rotation performing a characteristic number of its characteristic rotational displacement during a full revolution that returns the object to its starting orientation. There are many distinct kinds of rotation, each with its characteristic rotational displacement and number of displacements per revolution. The general rotation in 4-space is a double rotation <math>Q^2</math> distinguished by two distinct completely orthogonal angles through which the object turns in each rotational displacement. The angles determine not only the distance through which the object turns, but the characteristic trajectory of each point on the surface of the rotating object, including the length of that trajectory before it closes into a circle when the object returns to its starting orientation. For any distinct kind of rotation, the circular trajectory is always an integer multiple of the characteristic rotational displacement, but the full circle may be greater than 360°. In 4-space rotational circles are not ordinary 2-dimensional circles that lie in the plane and have a 360° circumference. Many distinct 4-space rotations of interest have a circumference of 720°, and many are larger. In 4-space every object with mass moves on its distinct <math>QT</math> trajectory. Each rotational displacement <math>Q</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which intersect each other, at angles related to a distinct star polygon. Each translational displacement <math>T</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which lie parallel to each other. In both kinds of motion (rotation and translation) it is the rate at which these double-reflection displacements occur which is constant and which we measure as the velocity <math>c</math>. Every atom translates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing a large number of atomic scale translational displacements per second. Concurrently, the atom rotates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing the same large number of atomic scale rotational displacements per second. Although the number of displacements at atomic scale per unit time is the same universal constant <math>c</math> for all rotations and translations, distinct kinds of rotation revolve at distinct rates, because the number of rotational displacements per complete revolution and the circumference of the complete revolution are distinct characteristics of each kind of rotation. The velocity at which each point on the surface of a rotating object moves, and the frequency of its rotational circling, are functions of the distinct rotation it is performing. However, they are not simple functions of <math>c</math> and the two defining angle parameters of the rotation. Distinct rotations arise from distinct symmetry groups and each is its own mystery with a unique conservation law. The relationships between those distinct conservation laws are even more mysterious, and have been shown to be chaotic. Steinbach{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997}} discovered the Golden Fields family of ratios which govern distinct rotational displacements related to the regular star polygons at least up to the hendecagon {11}. Kappraff and Adamson{{Sfn|Kappraff|Adamson|2004}} further characterized the families of rotation functions and showed that they form an infinite number of periodic trajectories when operated on by the Mandelbrot operator. The inertial tendency of mass is to follow a geodesic. The inertial conservation law of gravity applies to all motions of objects with mass, rotations as well as translations. A translation <math>T</math> is the distinct simple rotation <math>Q</math> in which the characteristic angle of rotational displacement is zero. Inertia is the tendency of objects with mass to conserve their angles of rotational displacement. In 4-space each object has two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement which are characteristic of the distinct rotation the object is performing. Inertia is the conservation of this distinct double rotation. In 4-coordinate Euclidean space the acceleration of an object with mass is a rotation of the object, a change to its direction, not a change to its constant velocity. Because the rate of atomic scale displacements is the universal constant <math>c</math>, the rate of change of direction (the acceleration of the object) is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law. A observer standing on the surface of the earth is performing a distinct double rotation characterized by two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement. The observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law, and a measurement of the rate of change of the observer's direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. ... == Quantum mechanics is the atomic kinematics of Coxeter groups generated by reflections == ... == Dimensional relativity == The formulation of Euclidean relativity based on Coxeter's kinetic law of <math>n</math>-dimensional congruent transformations in Euclidean space may be called ''dimensional relativity'', since it captures the theories of special and general relativity, and has its roots in dimensional analogy. Dimensional analogy is the exploration of [[w:Hermann_Grassmann#Mathematician|Hermann Grassmann's vector space principle]], in which space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. The geometry of higher-dimensional space is accessible by reason of direct analogy, as [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] subsequently demonstrated, and by algebraic methods after [[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]]. By analogy to the surface of the earth, the bounding surface of a spherical region of <math>n</math>-dimensional Euclidean space is an <math>(n-1)</math>-sphere, a spherical space of one fewer dimensions than the <math>n</math>-ball of Euclidean space it surrounds. In dimensional relativity the sky is not a ceiling, but an infinite regress of alternating spherical and Euclidean <math>n</math>-spaces of increasing <math>n</math>, accessible from each observer's point of view. By dimensional analogy, each observer looks up into their own reference frame's regress of concentric alternating <math>n</math>-spaces. By the capacity for dimensional analogy which they possess, some observers see deeper into <math>n</math>-dimensional space than others. == Polycentric spherical relativity == An intelligent observer equipped with the principle of dimensional relativity may perceive the universe from any inertial reference frame, not only from their own proper stationary reference frame in the Euclidean <math>n</math>-space universe in which they physically locate themself. We see that every observer may also properly view themself as stationary and the universe as an <math>n</math>-sphere with themself at the center observing it, perceptually equidistant from all points on its <math>n</math>-space surface, including their own physical location which is one of those surface points, distinguished to them but moving on the surface, and not the center of anything. This ''polycentric model'' of the universe is a further restatement of the principle of relativity, and of the [[W:Copernican principle|Copernican principle]] that observation is democratic: observers occupy representative viewpoints, not privileged monocentric positions. The polycentric model is compatible with Galileo's relativity of uniformly moving objects in ordinary space, Einstein's special relativity of inertial reference frames in 4-dimensional spacetime, Einstein's general relativity of all reference frames in non-Euclidean spacetime, and Coxeter's dimensional relativity of orthogonal group actions in Euclidean and spherical spaces of any number of dimensions. The polycentric model should be known as Thoreau's principle of ''spherical relativity'', since the first precise written statement of it appears in 1849, contemporaneous with and independent of Schlafli's work: <blockquote>The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence.{{Sfn|Thoreau|1849|p=349|ps=; "The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence." [Contemporaneous and independent of [[W:Ludwig Schlafli|Ludwig Schlafli]]'s pioneering work enumerating the complete set of regular polyschemes in any number of dimensions.]}}</blockquote> == Revolutions == The original Copernican revolution in 1543 displaced the center of the universe from the center of the earth to a point farther away, the center of the sun, with the earth performing a ''revolution'' around the sun, and the stars remaining on a fixed 2-sphere around the sun instead of around the earth. But this led inevitably to the recognition that the sun must be a star itself, not equidistant from all the stars, and the center of but one of many spheres, no monotheistic center at all. In 1600 [[W:Giordano Bruno|Giordano Bruno]] who first openly advocated these views was burned at the stake in Rome's [[W:Campo de' Fiori|Campo de' Fiori]] by the Catholic inquisition. In such fashion the Euclidean four-dimensional revolution, emerging three to five centuries later, initially lends itself to the big bang theory of a single origin of the whole universe, but leads inevitably to the recognition that all the galaxies need not be equidistant from a single origin in time, any more than all the stars lie in the same galaxy, equidistant from a single center in space. The expanding sphere of matter on the surface of which we find ourselves living is likely to be one of many 3-spheres expanding at velocity <math>c</math>, with their big bang origins occurring at distinct times and places in the ''n''-dimensional universe. The most distant objects we see when we look up at night may not all have the same origin in space and time. As recently as Copernicus we believed all the stars lay on a single 2-sphere embedded in Euclidean 3-space, with our sun at its center. During the enlightenment observers beginning with Bruno dispersed those stars into an infinite Euclidean 3-space, and relinquished our privileged position at the center. Then Einstein showed that our 3-space could not be Euclidean, that it must be a 3-manifold curved in every place in obedience to Newton's inverse-square law of gravity; and in a geometry related to time, at least, it must be 4-dimensional. In the present work we propose a theory of ''n''-dimensional real space and how light travels in it, a theory which says we can see into four orthogonal dimensions of Euclidean space, and so when we look up at night we see cosmological objects distributed in at least four dimensions of space around us, rather than all located in our own local 3-space. Looking still deeper and farther out, the universe viewed as a 4-sphere might, or might not, be expanding, and the most distant objects we see when we look up at night may, or may not, lie in our 4-dimensional hyperplane. Real space has ''n'' dimensions as [[w:Hermann_Grassmann|Grassmann]] and [[w:Schläfli|Schläfli]] showed, and we do not know how many dimensions the most distant objects we see may be distributed in. They need not all lie within the four spatial dimensions in which we have now learned to observe them, any more than they all lie in our local 3-space. When we look up at the objects that surround us, we have no way of discerning how many dimensions beyond three the space we are looking into has. We know their distance from us primarily by virtue of how long it takes their light to reach us. We can measure their distribution around us in 3-space or 4-space, but that is simply how we choose to measure their positions, not an actual finding of how they are distributed. Even if it is now evident that they do not all lie in the same 3-space, how many more dimensions than three are needed to contain them? We observe that our 4-ball galaxy is embedded in Euclidean <math>n</math>-space as one of many 4-ball galaxies, each translating in a distinct direction through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, on more or less divergent paths from each other. But only closer observation will reveal evidence of whether everything we see lies in the same Euclidean 4-space, or if it is distributed in five or more dimensions, and how it is moving there. To remain in agreement with the theory of relativity, the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint requires that all mass-carrying objects be in motion in some distinct direction through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, although the relative velocity between nearby objects is much smaller since they move on similar vectors, aimed away from a common origin point in the past. It is natural to expect that objects moving at constant velocity away from a common origin will be distributed roughly on the surface of an expanding 3-sphere. Although their paths away from their origin are not straight lines but various helical isoclines (screw translation spirals), nearby objects must be translating radially at the same average velocity, since the objects in a system (such as our solar system or galaxy) do not separate rapidly over time but remain in orbital formation. Each system's screw translation has two [[w:Completely_orthogonal|completely orthogonal]] components of motion in 4-space, an orbital rotation (such as the earth's around our sun) and a linear translation of the entire system at velocity <math>c</math> in the direction of the original 3-sphere's radial expansion (along the system's proper time vector). Of course the view from our solar system does not suggest that the 3-sphere enclosing each galaxy is expanding at this great rate from its galactic center. The standard theory has been that the entire observable universe is expanding from a single big bang origin in time, with galaxies forming later. While the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint lends itself to that standard theory, it also supports theories which require no single origin point in space and time. These are the voyages of starship Earth, to boldly go where no one has gone before. We made the jump to light speed long ago, in whatever big bang our atoms emerged from, and have never slowed down since. == Origins of the theory == Einstein himself may have been the first to imagine the universe as the three-dimensional surface of a four-dimensional Euclidean 3-sphere, in what was narrowly the first written articulation of a Euclidean 4-space universe, contemporaneous with the teen-aged Coxeter's (quoted below).{{Efn|[[W:William Rowan Hamilton|Hamilton]]'s algebra '''H''' of [[W:Quaternions|quaternions]] introduces (in 1843) the notion of a [[W:Three-dimensional sphere|three-dimensional sphere]] embedded in a four-dimensional space, but Hamilton did not quite conceive of the quaternions as the Cartesian 4-coordinates of a Euclidean 4-space, and he did not describe our ordinary 3-space as embedded in Euclidean 4-space.}} Einstein did this as a [[W:Gedankenexperiment|gedankenexperiment]] in the context of investigating whether his equations of general relativity predicted an infinite or a finite universe, in his 1921 Princeton lecture.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/36276|title=The Meaning of Relativity|last=Einstein|first=Albert|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=1923|isbn=|location=|pages=110-111}}</ref> He invited us to imagine "A spherical manifold of three dimensions, embedded in a Euclidean continuum of four dimensions", but he was careful to disclaim parenthetically that "The aid of a fourth space dimension has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice." Informally, the Euclidean 4-dimensional theory of relativity may be given as a sort of reciprocal to that disclaimer of Einstein's: ''The Minkowski spacetime has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice, as an aid to understanding how things will appear to an observer from their perspective; the foreshortenings, clock desynchronizations and other Lorentz transformations it predicts are proper calculations of actual perspective effects; but real space is a flat, Euclidean continuum of four orthogonal spatial dimensions, and in it the ordinary laws of a flat vector space hold (such as the Pythagorean theorem), and all sightline calculations work classically, so long as you consider all four spatial dimensions.'' The Euclidean theory of relativity differs from the special theory of relativity in ascribing to the physical universe a geometry of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions, rather than the special theory's [[w:Minkowski spacetime|Minkowski spacetime]] geometry, in which three spatial dimensions and a time dimension comprise a unified non-Euclidean spacetime of four dimensions. Anco and Maghadam found that <math>SO(4)</math> breaks to <math>\mathbb{S}^3</math> (the 3-sphere) if the energy in a Kepler orbit is negative (an elliptical orbit), and to <math>H^3</math> (Minkowski spacetime) if the energy is positive (a hyperbolic orbit). Therefore the fact that the planets orbit on ellipses in our 3-space suggests that they orbit on a 3-sphere embedded in Euclidean 4-space. Thus we can conclude that <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> is the actual geometry of our physical universe, and Minkowski spacetime is an abstraction of it; the reciprocal of Einstein's disclaimer is the more direct physical model. Of course spacetime remains a true and useful abstraction, although it must relinquish its privileged position as our exclusive conception of our place in space.{{Efn| ...origins of the Euclidean 4-space insight in the observations of Fock, Atkinson, Moser and others.}} The invention of Euclidean geometry of more than three spatial dimensions preceded Einstein's theories by more than fifty years, when it was worked out originally by the Swiss mathematician [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] before 1853.{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|loc=§7. Ordinary Polytopes in Higher Space; §7.x. Historical remarks|pp=141-144|ps=; "Practically all the ideas in this chapter ... are due to Schläfli, who discovered them before 1853 — a time when Cayley, Grassmann and Möbius were the only other people who had ever conceived the possibility of geometry in more than three dimensions."}} Schläfli extended Euclid's geometry of one, two, and three dimensions in a direct way to four or more dimensions, generalizing the rules and terms of [[w:Euclidean geometry|Euclidean geometry]] to spaces of any number of dimensions. He coined the general term ''[[polyscheme]]'' to mean geometric forms of any number of dimensions, including two-dimensional [[w:polygon|polygons]], three-dimensional [[w:polyhedron|polyhedra]], four dimensional [[w:polychoron|polychora]], and so on, and in the process he found all of the [[w:Regular polytope|regular polyschemes]] that are possible in every dimension, including in particular the [[User:Dc.samizdat/Rotations#Sequence of regular 4-polytopes|six convex regular polychora]] which can be constructed in a Euclidean space of four dimensions (the set analogous to the five [[w:Platonic solid|Platonic solids]] the ancients found in three dimensional space). Thus Schläfli was the first to explore the fourth dimension, reveal its emergent geometric properties, and discover its astonishing regular objects. Because his work was only published posthumously in 1901, and remained almost completely unknown until Coxeter published [[w:Regular_Polytopes_(book)|Regular Polytopes]] in 1947, other researchers had more than fifty years to rediscover the regular polychora, and competing terms were coined; today [[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s word ''[[w:Polytope|polytope]]'' is the commonly used term for ''polyscheme.''{{Efn|[[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s German word ''polytop'' was introduced into English by [[W:Alicia Boole Stott|Alicia Boole Stott]], who like Hoppe and [[W:Thorold Gosset|Thorold Gosset]] rediscovered Schlafli's six regular convex 4-polytopes, with no knowledge of their prior discovery. Today Schläfli's original ''polyschem'', with its echo of ''schema'' as in the configurations of information structures, seems even more fitting in its generality than ''polytope'' -- perhaps analogously as information software (programming) is even more general than information hardware (computers).}} Because of this century-long lag in the dissemination of a scientific discovery, the regular 4-polytopes appear to have played no role at all, by any name, in the twentieth century discovery and evolution of the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics.{{Efn|One could argue that the higher-dimensional polytopes have barely influenced science or culture at all thus far. The physicist John Edward Huth's comprehensive deep dive through the history of cultural and scientific concepts of physical space, from ancient flatland models of the world through general relativity and quantum mechancs, shows exactly how we got to our present standard model of the universe, although it includes no mention of higher-dimensional Euclidean space.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Huth|first=John Edward|title=A Sense of Space: A local's guide to a flat earth, the edge of the cosmos, and other curious places|year=2025|publisher=University of Chicago Press}}</ref>}} == Boundaries == <blockquote>Ever since we discovered that Earth is round and turns like a mad-spinning top, we have understood that reality is not as it appears to us: every time we glimpse a new aspect of it, it is a deeply emotional experience. Another veil has fallen.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Carlo Rovelli|author-link=W:Carlo Rovelli|title=Seven Brief Lessons on Physics|publisher=Riverhead|year=2016|isbn=978-0399184413}}</ref></blockquote> Of course it is strange to consciously contemplate this world we inhabit, our planet, our solar system, our 3-sphere surface in our vast galaxy, as the merest film, a boundary no thicker in the places we inhabit than the diameter of an electron (though much thicker in some places we cannot inhabit, such as the planet's core and the interior of stars). But is not our unconscious traditional concept of the boundary of our world even stranger? Since the enlightenment we are accustomed to thinking that there is nothing beyond three dimensional space: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But anyone who knows the [[polyscheme]]s Schläfli discovered knows that space can have any number of dimensions, and that there are fundamental objects and motions to be discovered in four dimensions that are even more various and interesting than those we can discover in three. The strange thing, when we think about it that way, is that there ''is'' a boundary between three and four dimensional space. ''Why'' can't we move (or apparently, see) in more than three dimensions? Why is our physical world apparently only three dimensional? Why would it have just ''three'' dimensions, and not four, or five, or the ''n'' dimensions that Schläfli mapped? What is the nature of the boundary which confines us to just three dimensions? We know that in Euclidean geometry the boundary between three and four dimensions is itself a spherical three dimensional space, so we should suspect that we are materially confined within such a curved boundary surface. Light need not be confined with us within our three dimensional boundary space. We would look directly through four dimensional space in our natural way, by receiving light signals that travelled through it to us on straight lines. In that case the reason we do not observe a fourth spatial dimension in our vicinity is that there are no nearby objects in it, just off our hyperplane in the wild. The nearest 4-ball object we can see with our eyes is our sun, which lies equatorially in our own hyperplane, though it bulges out of it above and below. But when we look up at the heavens, every pinprick of light we observe is itself a four-dimensional object off our hyperplane, and they are distributed all around us in four-dimensional space through which we gaze. We are four-dimensionally sighted creatures, even though our bodies are three-dimensional objects, thin as an atom in the fourth dimension. But that should not perplex us: we can see into three dimensional space even though our retinas are two dimensional objects, thin as a photoreceptor cell. Our unconscious provincial concept is that there is nothing else outside our three dimensional world: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But Schläfli discovered something else: all the astonishing regular objects that exist in higher dimensions, which vastly extend our notions of the beauty and mystery of space itself, and the intrinsic spatial symmetries of our universe which geometry reveals. Space is more commodious than we thought it was, and permits previously unimagined objects and motions. So our provincial conception of our place in it now has the same kind of status as our idea that the sun rises in the east and passes overhead: it is mere appearance, not a true model and no longer a proper explanation. An inertial boundary is a proper explanation, be it ever so thin. And would a boundary of ''no'' thickness, a mere abstraction with no physical power to separate, be a more suitable explanation? We must look for a physically powerful explanation in the geometry of space itself, which general relativity properly associates with the gravitational or inertial force. <blockquote>The number of dimensions possessed by a figure is the number of straight lines each perpendicular to all the others which can be drawn on it. Thus a point has no dimensions, a straight line one, a plane surface two, and a solid three .... In space as we now know it only three lines can be imagined perpendicular to each other. A fourth line, perpendicular to all the other three would be quite invisible and unimaginable to us. We ourselves and all the material things around us probably possess a fourth dimension, of which we are quite unaware. If not, from a four-dimensional point of view we are mere geometrical abstractions, like geometrical surfaces, lines, and points are to us. But this thickness in the fourth dimension must be exceedingly minute, if it exists at all. That is, we could only draw an exceedingly small line perpendicular to our three perpendicular lines, length, breadth and thickness, so small that no microscope could ever perceive it. We can find out something about the conditions of the fourth and higher dimensions if they exist, without being certain that they do exist, by a process which I have termed "Dimensional Analogy."<ref>{{Citation|title=Dimensional Analogy|last=Coxeter|first=Donald|date=February 1923|publisher=Coxeter Fonds, University of Toronto Archives|authorlink=W:Harold Scott MacDonald Coxeter|series=|postscript=|work=}}</ref></blockquote> I believe, but I cannot prove, that we live in real space, which is Schläfli's Euclidean space of ''n'' analogous dimensions. As Grassmann showed first, space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. There will always be higher dimensions to discover, first in imagination and then to explore physically, each an astonishing new enlightenment.<ref>{{Cite book|first=T.S.|last=Eliot|title=Little Gidding|volume=Four Quartets|year=1943}}<blockquote> :We shall not cease from exploration :And the end of all our exploring :Will be to arrive where we started :And know the place for the first time. :Through the unknown, remembered gate :When the last of earth left to discover :Is that which was the beginning; :At the source of the longest river :The voice of the hidden waterfall :And the children in the apple-tree :Not known, because not looked for :But heard, half-heard, in the stillness :Between two waves of the sea. </blockquote></ref> Schläfli discovered every regular convex polytope that exists in any dimension, but that was only the beginning of the story of dimensional analogy, not its end or even the end of its beginning. That project is forever beginning anew. Coxeter discovered that Schläfli's Euclidean space is an expression of intrinsic symmetries, as Noether discovered all of physics is. Kappraff and Adamson discovered that even the sequences of humble regular polygons have fractal complexity, so symmetry itself is chaotic, always reachable but forever beyond our complete grasp. We are on a Wilderness Project, and just at its beginning, but already we observe a Euclidean space of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions in which all objects with mass move ceaselessly at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate at which everything moves, quantum events occur, and each of our proper times evolves. I believe these facts explain the experimentally verified theories of relativity and quantum mechanics, by revealing their unified polycentric geometry, the same way the facts about Copernicus's heliocentric solar system explained the observed motions of the planets, by revealing the geometry of gravity to Kepler. But others will have to do the math, work out the physics, and perform experiments to prove or disprove all of this, because I don't have the mathematics; entirely unlike Coxeter and Einstein, I am illiterate in those languages. <blockquote> ::::::BEECH :Where my imaginary line :Bends square in woods, an iron spine :And pile of real rocks have been founded. :And off this corner in the wild, :Where these are driven in and piled, :One tree, by being deeply wounded, :Has been impressed as Witness Tree :And made commit to memory :My proof of being not unbounded. :Thus truth's established and borne out, :Though circumstanced with dark and doubt— :Though by a world of doubt surrounded. :::::::—''The Moodie Forester''<ref>{{Cite book|title=A Witness Tree|last=Frost|first=Robert|year=1942|series=The Poetry of Robert Frost|publisher=Holt, Rinehart and Winston|edition=1969|}}</ref> </blockquote> == Appendix: Sequence of regular 4-polytopes == {{Regular convex 4-polytopes|wiki=W:|columns=7}} == ... == {{Efn|In a ''[[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]] displacement'', also known as an [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], all the Clifford parallel{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} invariant planes are displaced in four orthogonal directions (two completely orthogonal planes) at once: they are rotated by the same angle, and at the same time they are tilted ''sideways'' by that same angle. A [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|Clifford displacement]] is [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensionally diagonal]].{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} Every plane that is Clifford parallel to one of the completely orthogonal planes (including in this case an entire Clifford parallel bundle of 4 hexagons, but not all 16 hexagons) is invariant under the isoclinic rotation: all the points in the plane rotate in circles but remain in the plane, even as the whole plane tilts sideways. All 16 hexagons rotate by the same angle (though only 4 of them do so invariantly). All 16 hexagons are rotated by 60 degrees, and also displaced sideways by 60 degrees to a Clifford parallel hexagon. All of the other central polygons (e.g. squares) are also displaced to a Clifford parallel polygon 60 degrees away.|name=Clifford displacement}} {{Efn|It is not difficult to visualize four hexagonal planes intersecting at 60 degrees to each other, even in three dimensions. Four hexagonal central planes intersect at 60 degrees in the [[W:cuboctahedron|cuboctahedron]]. Four of the 24-cell's 16 hexagonal central planes (lying in the same 3-dimensional hyperplane) intersect at each of the 24-cell's vertices exactly the way they do at the center of a cuboctahedron. But the ''edges'' around the vertex do not meet as the radii do at the center of a cuboctahedron; the 24-cell has 8 edges around each vertex, not 12, so its vertex figure is the cube, not the cuboctahedron. The 8 edges meet exactly the way 8 edges do at the apex of a canonical [[W:cubic pyramid]|cubic pyramid]].{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}}|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} {{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} {{Efn|Eight {{sqrt|1}} edges converge in curved 3-dimensional space from the corners of the 24-cell's cubical vertex figure{{Efn|The [[W:vertex figure|vertex figure]] is the facet which is made by truncating a vertex; canonically, at the mid-edges incident to the vertex. But one can make similar vertex figures of different radii by truncating at any point along those edges, up to and including truncating at the adjacent vertices to make a ''full size'' vertex figure. Stillwell defines the vertex figure as "the convex hull of the neighbouring vertices of a given vertex".{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=17}} That is what serves the illustrative purpose here.|name=full size vertex figure}} and meet at its center (the vertex), where they form 4 straight lines which cross there. The 8 vertices of the cube are the eight nearest other vertices of the 24-cell. The straight lines are geodesics: two {{sqrt|1}}-length segments of an apparently straight line (in the 3-space of the 24-cell's curved surface) that is bent in the 4th dimension into a great circle hexagon (in 4-space). Imagined from inside this curved 3-space, the bends in the hexagons are invisible. From outside (if we could view the 24-cell in 4-space), the straight lines would be seen to bend in the 4th dimension at the cube centers, because the center is displaced outward in the 4th dimension, out of the hyperplane defined by the cube's vertices. Thus the vertex cube is actually a [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]]. Unlike a cube, it seems to be radially equilateral (like the tesseract and the 24-cell itself): its "radius" equals its edge length.{{Efn|The vertex cubic pyramid is not actually radially equilateral,{{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} because the edges radiating from its apex are not actually its radii: the apex of the [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]] is not actually its center, just one of its vertices.}}|name=24-cell vertex figure}} {{Efn|The hexagons are inclined (tilted) at 60 degrees with respect to the unit radius coordinate system's orthogonal planes. Each hexagonal plane contains only ''one'' of the 4 coordinate system axes.{{Efn|Each great hexagon of the 24-cell contains one axis (one pair of antipodal vertices) belonging to each of the three inscribed 16-cells. The 24-cell contains three disjoint inscribed 16-cells, rotated 60° isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other (so their corresponding vertices are 120° {{=}} {{radic|3}} apart). A [[16-cell#Coordinates|16-cell is an orthonormal ''basis'']] for a 4-dimensional coordinate system, because its 8 vertices define the four orthogonal axes. In any choice of a vertex-up coordinate system (such as the unit radius coordinates used in this article), one of the three inscribed 16-cells is the basis for the coordinate system, and each hexagon has only ''one'' axis which is a coordinate system axis.|name=three basis 16-cells}} The hexagon consists of 3 pairs of opposite vertices (three 24-cell diameters): one opposite pair of ''integer'' coordinate vertices (one of the four coordinate axes), and two opposite pairs of ''half-integer'' coordinate vertices (not coordinate axes). For example: {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}1,{{spaces|2}}0) {{indent|5}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|5}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,–1,{{spaces|2}}0)<br> is a hexagon on the ''y'' axis. Unlike the {{sqrt|2}} squares, the hexagons are actually made of 24-cell edges, so they are visible features of the 24-cell.|name=non-orthogonal hexagons|group=}} {{Efn|Visualize the three [[16-cell]]s inscribed in the 24-cell (left, right, and middle), and the rotation which takes them to each other. [[24-cell#Reciprocal constructions from 8-cell and 16-cell|The vertices of the middle 16-cell lie on the (w, x, y, z) coordinate axes]];{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} the other two are rotated 60° [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinically]] to its left and its right. The 24-vertex 24-cell is a compound of three 16-cells, whose three sets of 8 vertices are distributed around the 24-cell symmetrically; each vertex is surrounded by 8 others (in the 3-dimensional space of the 4-dimensional 24-cell's ''surface''), the way the vertices of a cube surround its center.{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}} The 8 surrounding vertices (the cube corners) lie in other 16-cells: 4 in the other 16-cell to the left, and 4 in the other 16-cell to the right. They are the vertices of two tetrahedra inscribed in the cube, one belonging (as a cell) to each 16-cell. If the 16-cell edges are {{radic|2}}, each vertex of the compound of three 16-cells is {{radic|1}} away from its 8 surrounding vertices in other 16-cells. Now visualize those {{radic|1}} distances as the edges of the 24-cell (while continuing to visualize the disjoint 16-cells). The {{radic|1}} edges form great hexagons of 6 vertices which run around the 24-cell in a central plane. ''Four'' hexagons cross at each vertex (and its antipodal vertex), inclined at 60° to each other.{{Efn|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} The [[24-cell#Hexagons|hexagons]] are not perpendicular to each other, or to the 16-cells' perpendicular [[24-cell#Squares|square central planes]].{{Efn|name=non-orthogonal hexagons}} The left and right 16-cells form a tesseract.{{Efn|Each pair of the three 16-cells inscribed in the 24-cell forms a 4-dimensional [[W:tesseract|hypercube (a tesseract or 8-cell)]], in [[24-cell#Relationships among interior polytopes|dimensional analogy]] to the way two tetrahedra form a cube: the two 8-vertex 16-cells are inscribed in the 16-vertex tesseract, occupying its alternate vertices. The third 16-cell does not lie within the tesseract; its 8 vertices protrude from the sides of the tesseract, forming a cubic pyramid on each of the tesseract's cubic cells. The three pairs of 16-cells form three tesseracts.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} The tesseracts share vertices, but the 16-cells are completely disjoint.{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}}|name=three 16-cells form three tesseracts}} Two 16-cells have vertex-pairs which are one {{radic|1}} edge (one hexagon edge) apart. But a [[24-cell#Simple rotations|''simple'' rotation]] of 60° will not take one whole 16-cell to another 16-cell, because their vertices are 60° apart in different directions, and a simple rotation has only one hexagonal plane of rotation. One 16-cell ''can'' be taken to another 16-cell by a 60° [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|''isoclinic'' rotation]], because an isoclinic rotation is [[3-sphere]] symmetric: four [[24-cell#Clifford parallel polytopes|Clifford parallel hexagonal planes]] rotate together, but in four different rotational directions,{{Efn|name=Clifford displacement}} taking each 16-cell to another 16-cell. But since an isoclinic 60° rotation is a ''diagonal'' rotation by 60° in ''two'' completely orthogonal directions at once,{{Efn|name=isoclinic geodesic}} the corresponding vertices of the 16-cell and the 16-cell it is taken to are 120° apart: ''two'' {{radic|1}} hexagon edges (or one {{radic|3}} hexagon chord) apart, not one {{radic|1}} edge (60°) apart as in a simple rotation.{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} By the [[W:chiral|chiral]] diagonal nature of isoclinic rotations, the 16-cell ''cannot'' reach the adjacent 16-cell by rotating toward it; it can only reach the 16-cell ''beyond'' it. But of course, the 16-cell beyond the 16-cell to its right is the 16-cell to its left. So a 60° isoclinic rotation ''will'' take every 16-cell to another 16-cell: a 60° ''right'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we may have originally visualized as the ''left'' 16-cell, and a 60° ''left'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we visualized as the ''right'' 16-cell. (If so, that was our error in visualization; the 16-cell to the "left" is in fact the one reached by the left isoclinic rotation, as that is the only sense in which the two 16-cells are left or right of each other.)|name=three isoclinic 16-cells}} {{Efn|In a double rotation each vertex can be said to move along two completely orthogonal great circles at the same time, but it does not stay within the central plane of either of those original great circles; rather, it moves along a helical geodesic that traverses diagonally between great circles. The two completely orthogonal planes of rotation are said to be ''invariant'' because the points in each stay in the plane ''as the plane moves'', tilting sideways by the same angle that the other plane rotates.|name=helical geodesic}} {{Efn|A point under isoclinic rotation traverses the diagonal{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} straight line of a single '''isoclinic geodesic''', reaching its destination directly, instead of the bent line of two successive '''simple geodesics'''. A '''[[W:geodesic|geodesic]]''' is the ''shortest path'' through a space (intuitively, a string pulled taught between two points). Simple geodesics are great circles lying in a central plane (the only kind of geodesics that occur in 3-space on the 2-sphere). Isoclinic geodesics are different: they do ''not'' lie in a single plane; they are 4-dimensional [[W:helix|spirals]] rather than simple 2-dimensional circles.{{Efn|name=helical geodesic}} But they are not like 3-dimensional [[W:screw threads|screw threads]] either, because they form a closed loop like any circle (after ''two'' revolutions). Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'', and they are just as circular as 2-dimensional circles: in fact, twice as circular, because they curve in a circle in two completely orthogonal directions at once.{{Efn|Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'' in the sense that they are 1-dimensional geodesic ''lines'' that curve in 4-space in two completely orthogonal planes at once. They should not be confused with ''great 2-spheres'',{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=24}} which are the 4-dimensional analogues of 2-dimensional great circles (great 1-spheres).}} These '''isoclines''' are geodesic 1-dimensional lines embedded in a 4-dimensional space. On the 3-sphere{{Efn|All isoclines are geodesics, and isoclines on the 3-sphere are circles (curving equally in each dimension), but not all isoclines on 3-manifolds in 4-space are circles.}} they always occur in [[W:chiral|chiral]] pairs and form a pair of [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]s on the [[W:Clifford torus|Clifford torus]],{{Efn|Isoclines on the 3-sphere occur in non-intersecting chiral pairs. A left and a right isocline form a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]] called the {1,1} torus knot{{Sfn|Dorst|2019|loc=§1. Villarceau Circles|p=44|ps=; "In mathematics, the path that the (1, 1) knot on the torus traces is also known as a [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]. Villarceau circles are usually introduced as two intersecting circles that are the cross-section of a torus by a well-chosen plane cutting it. Picking one such circle and rotating it around the torus axis, the resulting family of circles can be used to rule the torus. By nesting tori smartly, the collection of all such circles then form a [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fibration]].... we prefer to consider the Villarceau circle as the (1, 1) torus knot [a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]] rather than as a planar cut [two intersecting circles]."}} in which ''each'' of the two linked circles traverses all four dimensions.}} the paths of the left and the right [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Double rotations|isoclinic rotation]]. They are [[W:Helix|helices]] bent into a [[W:Möbius strip|Möbius loop]] in the fourth dimension, taking a diagonal [[W:Winding number|winding route]] twice around the 3-sphere through the non-adjacent vertices of a 4-polytope's [[W:Skew polygon#Regular skew polygons in four dimensions|skew polygon]].|name=isoclinic geodesic}} {{Efn|[[File:Hopf band wikipedia.png|thumb|150px|Two [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles spanned by a twisted [[W:Annulus (mathematics)|annulus]].]][[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]]s are non-intersecting curved lines that are parallel in the sense that the perpendicular (shortest) distance between them is the same at each point. A double helix is an example of Clifford parallelism in ordinary 3-dimensional Euclidean space. In 4-space Clifford parallels occur as geodesic great circles on the [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]].{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|pp=8-10|loc=Relations to Clifford Parallelism}} Whereas in 3-dimensional space, any two geodesic great circles on the [[W:2-sphere|2-sphere]] will always intersect at two antipodal points, in 4-dimensional space not all great circles intersect. In 4-polytopes various discrete sets of Clifford parallel non-intersecting geodesic great circles can be found on the 3-sphere. They spiral around each other in [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fiber bundles]] which visit all the vertices just once. The simplest example is that six mutually orthogonal great circles can be drawn on the 3-sphere, as three pairs of completely orthogonal great circles, intersecting at 8 points defining a [[16-cell]]. Each completely orthogonal pair of circles is Clifford parallel. They cannot intersect at all, because they lie in planes which intersect at only one point: the center of the 16-cell. Because they are perpendicular and share a common center, the two circles are obviously not parallel and separate in the usual way of parallel circles in 3 dimensions; rather they are connected like adjacent links in a chain, each passing through the other without intersecting at any points, forming a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]|name=Clifford parallels}} {{Efn|In the 24-cell each great square plane is completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to another great square plane, and each great hexagon plane is completely orthogonal to a plane which intersects only two vertices: a great [[W:digon|digon]] plane.|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} {{Efn|In an [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], each point anywhere in the 4-polytope moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions at once, on a [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensional diagonal]]. The point is displaced a total [[W:Pythagorean distance]] equal to the square root of four times the square of that distance. For example, when the unit-radius 24-cell rotates isoclinically 60° in a hexagon invariant plane and 60° in its completely orthogonal invariant plane,{{Efn|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} all vertices are displaced to a vertex two edge lengths away. Each vertex is displaced to another vertex {{radic|3}} (120°) away, moving {{radic|3/4}} in four orthogonal coordinate directions.|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} {{Efn|Each square plane is isoclinic (Clifford parallel) to five other square planes but completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to only one of them.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Every pair of completely orthogonal planes has Clifford parallel great circles, but not all Clifford parallel great circles are orthogonal (e.g., none of the hexagonal geodesics in the 24-cell are mutually orthogonal).|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}} {{Efn|In the [[16-cell#Rotations|16-cell]] the 6 orthogonal great squares form 3 pairs of completely orthogonal great circles; each pair is Clifford parallel. In the 24-cell, the 3 inscribed 16-cells lie rotated 60 degrees isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other; consequently their corresponding vertices are 120 degrees apart on a hexagonal great circle. Pairing their vertices which are 90 degrees apart reveals corresponding square great circles which are Clifford parallel. Each of the 18 square great circles is Clifford parallel not only to one other square great circle in the same 16-cell (the completely orthogonal one), but also to two square great circles (which are completely orthogonal to each other) in each of the other two 16-cells. (Completely orthogonal great circles are Clifford parallel, but not all Clifford parallels are orthogonal.{{Efn|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}}) A 60 degree isoclinic rotation of the 24-cell in hexagonal invariant planes takes each square great circle to a Clifford parallel (but non-orthogonal) square great circle in a different 16-cell.|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} {{Efn|In 4 dimensional space we can construct 4 perpendicular axes and 6 perpendicular planes through a point. Without loss of generality, we may take these to be the axes and orthogonal central planes of a (w, x, y, z) Cartesian coordinate system. In 4 dimensions we have the same 3 orthogonal planes (xy, xz, yz) that we have in 3 dimensions, and also 3 others (wx, wy, wz). Each of the 6 orthogonal planes shares an axis with 4 of the others, and is ''completely orthogonal'' to just one of the others: the only one with which it does not share an axis. Thus there are 3 pairs of completely orthogonal planes: xy and wz intersect only at the origin; xz and wy intersect only at the origin; yz and wx intersect only at the origin.|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} {{Efn|Two planes in 4-dimensional space can have four possible reciprocal positions: (1) they can coincide (be exactly the same plane); (2) they can be parallel (the only way they can fail to intersect at all); (3) they can intersect in a single line, as two non-parallel planes do in 3-dimensional space; or (4) '''they can intersect in a single point'''{{Efn|To visualize how two planes can intersect in a single point in a four dimensional space, consider the Euclidean space (w, x, y, z) and imagine that the w dimension represents time rather than a spatial dimension. The xy central plane (where w{{=}}0, z{{=}}0) shares no axis with the wz central plane (where x{{=}}0, y{{=}}0). The xy plane exists at only a single instant in time (w{{=}}0); the wz plane (and in particular the w axis) exists all the time. Thus their only moment and place of intersection is at the origin point (0,0,0,0).|name=how planes intersect at a single point}} (and they ''must'', if they are completely orthogonal).{{Efn|Two flat planes A and B of a Euclidean space of four dimensions are called ''completely orthogonal'' if and only if every line in A is orthogonal to every line in B. In that case the planes A and B intersect at a single point O, so that if a line in A intersects with a line in B, they intersect at O.{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}}|name=completely orthogonal planes}}|name=how planes intersect}} {{Efn|Polytopes are '''completely disjoint''' if all their ''element sets'' are disjoint: they do not share any vertices, edges, faces or cells. They may still overlap in space, sharing 4-content, volume, area, or lineage.|name=completely disjoint}} {{Efn|If the [[W:Euclidean distance|Pythagorean distance]] between any two vertices is {{sqrt|1}}, their geodesic distance is 1; they may be two adjacent vertices (in the curved 3-space of the surface), or a vertex and the center (in 4-space). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|2}}, their geodesic distance is 2 (whether via 3-space or 4-space, because the path along the edges is the same straight line with one 90^o bend in it as the path through the center). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|3}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 (whether on a hexagonal great circle past one 60^o bend, or as a straight line with one 60^o bend in it through the center). Finally, if their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|4}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 in 4-space (straight through the center), but it reaches 3 in 3-space (by going halfway around a hexagonal great circle).|name=Geodesic distance}} {{Efn|Two angles are required to fix the relative positions of two planes in 4-space.{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|p=7|loc=§6 Angles between two Planes in 4-Space|ps=; "In four (and higher) dimensions, we need two angles to fix the relative position between two planes. (More generally, ''k'' angles are defined between ''k''-dimensional subspaces.)"}} Since all planes in the same [[W:hyperplane|hyperplane]] are 0 degrees apart in one of the two angles, only one angle is required in 3-space. Great hexagons in different hyperplanes are 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles. Great squares in different hyperplanes are 90 degrees apart in ''both'' angles (completely orthogonal){{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} or 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles.{{Efn||name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Planes which are separated by two equal angles are called ''isoclinic''. Planes which are isoclinic have [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} A great square and a great hexagon in different hyperplanes are neither isoclinic nor Clifford parallel; they are separated by a 90 degree angle ''and'' a 60 degree angle.|name=two angles between central planes}} {{Efn|The 24-cell contains 3 distinct 8-cells (tesseracts), rotated 60° isoclinically with respect to each other. The corresponding vertices of two 8-cells are {{radic|3}} (120°) apart. Each 8-cell contains 8 cubical cells, and each cube contains four {{radic|3}} chords (its long diagonals). The 8-cells are not completely disjoint{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}} (they share vertices), but each cube and each {{radic|3}} chord belongs to just one 8-cell. The {{radic|3}} chords joining the corresponding vertices of two 8-cells belong to the third 8-cell.|name=three 8-cells}} {{Efn|Departing from any vertex V₀ in the original great hexagon plane of isoclinic rotation P₀, the first vertex reached V₁ is 120 degrees away along a {{radic|3}} chord lying in a different hexagonal plane P₁. P₁ is inclined to P₀ at a 60° angle.{{Efn|P₀ and P₁ lie in the same hyperplane (the same central cuboctahedron) so their other angle of separation is 0.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}}}} The second vertex reached V₂ is 120 degrees beyond V₁ along a second {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₂ that is Clifford parallel to P₀.{{Efn|P₀ and P₂ are 60° apart in ''both'' angles of separation.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}} Clifford parallel planes are isoclinic (which means they are separated by two equal angles), and their corresponding vertices are all the same distance apart. Although V₀ and V₂ are ''two'' {{radic|3}} chords apart{{Efn|V₀ and V₂ are two {{radic|3}} chords apart on the geodesic path of this rotational isocline, but that is not the shortest geodesic path between them. In the 24-cell, it is impossible for two vertices to be more distant than ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord, unless they are antipodal vertices {{radic|4}} apart.{{Efn|name=Geodesic distance}} V₀ and V₂ are ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord apart on some other isocline. More generally, isoclines are geodesics because the distance between their ''adjacent'' vertices is the shortest distance between those two vertices, but a path between two vertices along a geodesic is not always the shortest distance between them (even on ordinary great circle geodesics).}}, P₀ and P₂ are just one {{radic|1}} edge apart (at every pair of ''nearest'' vertices).}} (Notice that V₁ lies in both intersecting planes P₁ and P₂, as V₀ lies in both P₀ and P₁. But P₀ and P₂ have ''no'' vertices in common; they do not intersect.) The third vertex reached V₃ is 120 degrees beyond V₂ along a third {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₃ that is Clifford parallel to P₁. The three {{radic|3}} chords lie in different 8-cells.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} V₀ to V₃ is a 360° isoclinic rotation.|name=360 degree geodesic path visiting 3 hexagonal planes}} {{Sfn|Mamone, Pileio & Levitt|2010|loc=§4.5 Regular Convex 4-Polytopes|pp=1438-1439|ps=; the 24-cell has 1152 symmetry operations (rotations and reflections) as enumerated in Table 2, symmetry group 𝐹₄.}} ==Notes== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Notelist|wiki=W:}} ==Citations== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Reflist|wiki=W:}} ==References== {{Refbegin}} * {{Cite book|title=A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers|last=Thoreau|first=Henry David|author-link=W:Thoreau|publisher=James Munroe and Company|year=1849|isbn=|location=Boston|ref={{SfnRef|Thoreau|1849}}}} * {{Cite journal|title=Theoretical Evidence for Principles of Special Relativity Based on Isotropic and Uniform Four-Dimensional Space|first=Takuya|last=Yamashita|date=25 May 2023|doi= 10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|journal=Preprints|volume=2023|issue=2023051785|url=https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|ref={{SfnRef|Yamashita|2023}}}} * {{Cite_arXiv | arxiv=2512.02903v2 | date=2 January 2026 | title=Symmetry transformation group arising from the Laplace–Runge–Lenz vector | first1=Stephen C. | last1=Anco | first2=Mahdieh Gol Bashmani | last2=Moghadam | class=math-ph}} === [[Polyscheme|Polyschemes]] === {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Refs|wiki=W:}} {{Refend}} hze1oknm9bt73caa5cugzaqaokk8365 2842333 2842324 2026-10-23T17:16:03Z Dc.samizdat 2856930 /* Boundaries */ 2842333 wikitext text/x-wiki {{align|center|David Brooks Christie}} {{align|center|dc@samizdat.org}} {{align|center|Draft in progress}} {{align|center|June 2023 - October 2026}} <blockquote>'''Abstract:''' The physical universe is properly visualized as real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are 4-polytopes, small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are 4-balls of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. We ourselves and the objects we observe near us are only 3-dimensional, but nonetheless we can see into four dimensions of space. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. Light from them reaches us directly, on straight lines through 4-space. This view of the observed universe is compatible with special and general relativity, and with quantum mechanics. It furnishes those theories with an explanatory geometric model.</blockquote> == Summary == We observe that: * Physical space has four perpendicular dimensions, not just three. * Atoms are [[W:4-polytope|4-polytopes]]. * The sun is a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]] that is round in four dimensions. * Everything of intermediate size between an atom and a star, including us and our planet, lies in a 3-dimensional manifold of ordinary space. * Our entire 3-space manifold is moving through Euclidean 4-space at the speed of light, in a direction perpendicular to its three interior dimensions. * Special relativity describes the linear motion of objects and light signals in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * General relativity describes the rotational motion of objects with mass in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * Quantum mechanics describes the symmetry group actions of elementary geometric objects (4-polytopes) in four-dimensional Euclidean space. == A theory of the Euclidean cosmos == The physical universe is properly visualized as [[w:Four-dimensional_space|real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>]] of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are [[w:4-polytope|4-polytopes]], small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are [[W:4-ball|4-balls]] of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. Objects intermediate in size between atoms and stars, including molecules, people, and planetery surfaces their surface, are so flat as to be essentially 3-dimensional, having only the thickness of an atom in the orthogonal fourth dimension. All objects with mass move inertially through Euclidean 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math> as long as they exist, and acceleration only varies their direction. Objects moving in the same direction are in the same inertial reference frame. Their direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> is their proper time dimension, simply because their direction and velocity of motion through time is the same as their direction and velocity of motion through space. A typical galaxy such as ours occupies a 4-ball of mostly empty space, with stars and other objects distributed non-uniformly within it. The galaxy's orbital center may be nothing: a smaller 4-ball of empty space they surround. The stars in our spiral galaxy appear from our accustomed point of view to occupy a disk-like region of 3-dimensional space, with a denser ball-like center, but they are not so confined: they are distributed within a region of 4-dimensional space. The disk and ball have thickness not only in the third dimension, but in the fourth spatial dimension as well. Light from stars and galaxies reaches us on straight lines through Euclidean 4-space, so from our viewpoint, in what we have always imagined to be a 3-space universe, we look into the surrounding 4-space. Although we are physically confined within a 3-dimensional hyperplane by the inertia of our motion through 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math>, light signals are not so confined, so we observe all the cosmological objects surrounding us, both in and above or below our hyperplane, without perceiving their separation in our fourth orthogonal dimension, the direction of our motion. We may perceive a galaxy as elliptical when it is actually spherical, because that is how its image projects from its 4-ball shape into a 3-ball region in our hyperplane, where we measure it with our 3-dimensional bodies. More generally, orbits are circular in 4-space, but elliptical in the 3-space of their elliptic hyperplane. The galaxy as a whole, or more properly its orbital barycenter, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, in a distinct direction orthogonal to all three dimensions of our ordinary proper 3-space. Stars within the galaxy are translating with it at the same velocity <math>c</math> in the same direction, but on spiral trajectories as they pursue their various orbits within the galaxy. The galaxy as a whole occupies a 4-ball within its proper inertial reference frame (that is, in the moving frame of reference in which the galaxy considers itself to be a stationary rotating 4-ball). Over time, the galaxy 4-ball occupies a 4-dimensional cylinder and progresses along the cylinder's axis at velocity <math>c</math>. In this more universal inertial reference frame, the stars in the galaxy follow helical geodesic paths through the 4-cylinder; their trajectories are screw-translations through 4-space, the compound of a simple rotation and a completely orthogonal linear translation. The gravitational force and the inertial tendency to follow a geodesic are the same phenomenon, by the equivalence principle. That said, they can be distinguished, and the galaxy is held together primarily by gravity as inertia, not by gravity as attraction to a central mass toward which objects fall in orbit. There is not enough mass in the galaxy to hold it together by attraction, there is just enough to bend the stars' trajectories toward each other, in helical orbits around the galaxy's barycentric axis of motion. It is the tremendous inertial force of stars in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> that holds the cylinder of motion together, not some invisible dark matter. The observed universe as a whole appears to be a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] expanding radially from a central origin point at velocity <math>c</math>, the invariant velocity of mass-carrying objects through 4-space, also the propagation speed of light relative to any moving 3-space manifold, as measured by all observers. A 3-sphere is a hypersphere in Euclidean 4-space, but the enclosing surface of a 3-sphere is a curved, finite 3-space, dimensionally analogous to the surface of the earth which is a curved, finite 2-space. This 3-sphere could be the domain of our visible cosmos, but of course we do not know for certain that all the cosmological objects we observe lie near the surface of our expanding 3-sphere, since it is only our assumption that they must all have originated in the same big bang long ago. Possibly some of the more distant objects we observe did not, and lie elsewhere, outside our big-bang's 3-sphere of outflying matter or even inside its 3-sphere, below its surface. We cannot assume that all objects in the 4-space universe lie near the surface of the same expanding 3-sphere. For all observers, the conjectured big-bang of their origin corresponds not only to a now-distant point in their proper time past, it also corresponds to a distinct now-distant point in 4-dimensional space: the same point in the same Euclidean 4-space for all observers with the same origin. Our big bang had a distinct origin point in real space as well as in real time. More generally, time and Euclidean 4-space can be measured independently, just as time and Euclidean 3-space were measured classically, without the necessity to combine them as spacetime. The same inertial force which holds the galactic cylinder of motion together also confines us physically to an exceedingly thin three-dimensional surface manifold moving through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. All objects in our solar system too small to have their own gravity lie entirely within this thinest three-dimensional manifold, and have only the thickness of an atom in their direction-of-motion fourth dimension. That is why we are 3-dimensional objects ourselves, and why we cannot construct more than three perpendiculars through a single point in our local 3-dimensional space. A spherical region of 4-space is called a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]]. The enclosing surface of a 4-ball of any size is a finite, curved (non-Euclidean) 3-dimensional space called a [[w:3-sphere|3-sphere]]. Our entire big-bang-origin universe appears to be the largest 3-sphere we observe, but each of the cosmological objects within it (including our galaxy and our sun) lies within a smaller 3-sphere shell which bounds it, lying (we assume) on the largest 3-sphere embedded in its surface, like a soap bubble on the surface of a larger soap bubble. All the 3-dimensional surfaces are expanding, as the largest 3-sphere inflates at radial velocity <math>c</math>. We ourselves live within such an expanding 3-dimensional surface, in an infinitesimally curved 3-manifold surface embedded in Euclidean 4-space. That surface is the ordinary 3-dimensional space we experience. The earth and all the planets lie on it. Our solar system is only a small patch on the surface of a dimensionally rounder space, although that surface is not infinite. It is curved, and finite, analogous to the way the 2-dimensional surface of the earth -- once thought to be flat -- is curved and finite. Our solar system occupies a small patch on a filmy 4-dimensional soap-bubble of galactic size rounded by gravity, that is thicker-skinned than the diameter of an atom only in the superdense interior of objects large enough to have significant gravity of their own. Our 3-manifold of ordinary space, as a surface within our moving 4-ball galaxy, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> with the galaxy, in a distinct direction orthogonal to the manifold's three orthogonal dimensions of interior space. At every material point in the manifold (at every atom), the translation through 4-space is following a geometric law of motion discovered by Coxeter, that governs the propagation of individual objects through Euclidean space by the actions of their symmetry groups. The solar system's atoms of mass are 4-polytopes that are simultaneously rotating and translating, and as they advance together they define a moving 3-dimensional manifold by their own collective inertia, also called gravity, the property of matter's ceaseless propagation through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate of causality at which quantum events occur, all objects move, and the universe evolves. Any moving 3-dimensional manifold such as ours is an evolving surface boundary that is empty in most places, occupied by single atoms in comparatively fewer places, and occupied by bound complexes of multiple atoms (molecules) in still fewer places. In all these places it is no thicker than one atom in the dimension corresponding to its direction of translation, because molecules are 3-dimensional complexes of atoms that add no thickness to the manifold. In fewer places still it is occupied by large lumps of matter which exert a significant gravitational attraction, such as planets and their satellites. These round gravitational objects are thicker than one atom in their fourth dimension, but not uniformly so. They are disk-like 4-dimensional objects, 3-balls that are flattish in the fourth dimension. They are typically only one atom thick at the 4-disk's sharp edge, but they may be much thicker in the center of the 4-disk, particularly if their gravity is strong enough to give them a core of superdense matter, like the earth's deep core. The moving surface manifold cannot be thicker than one atom at any point unless and until there is enough mass near that point for the force of gravity as attraction to overcome the force of gravity as inertia, allowing atoms to be "heaped up" into larger 4-dimensional objects that form a lump in its moving surface. We have only indirect experience of such 4-dimensional lumps of matter thicker than one atom, since they occur naturally in our vicinity only in regions of superdense matter, such as the core of the earth or the interior of the sun. Deep in the core of the earth under enormous gravitational pressure peculiar states of matter have been observed, defying our understanding of how 3-dimensional crystalline structures behave. That is because they are not 3-dimensional structures, they are 4-dimensional crystals. The earth is a disk-like 4-dimensional object that is thin at its edge but thicker at its sphere-like core, dimensionally analogous to a 3-dimensional flying saucer with a sharp circular edge. The earth's surface that we walk on is an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere), analogous to the circular edge of the flying saucer (a 1-sphere), and on that edge where we live every object we find (including our bodies) is 3-dimensional with only the thickness of an atom in the fourth dimension. We cannot walk on the top or bottom surface of the 4-disk flying saucer because those surfaces are 3-dimensional regions within the earth. The earth's deep core of superdense 4-dimensional matter occupies a spherical region of 4-dimensional space (a 4-ball). The sun is the only entirely spherical 4-ball occurring naturally in our solar system. We refer to the contents of such superdense 4-balls of matter as atomic plasma, and have little experimental knowledge of their internal geometry or processes. We know that the sun burns at its surface 3-sphere and emits radiation, and we know a good deal about those surface processes which are nuclear atomic processes, but we know very little about its interior 4-ball, a dimensionally rounder enclosed space whose existence we did not suspect. Every moving surface boundary of matter in the observed universe is evolving in four dimensions at velocity <math>c</math>. The current location in 4-space of any of its material objects corresponds to the present moment in the proper time of that object's inertial reference frame. The object's direction of movement at velocity <math>c</math> corresponds to its proper time dimension, which is a spiral over time, not a Euclidean (straight-line) dimension, since its direction is changing in its orbit. Objects with mass of all sizes, from subatomic particles to the largest objects observed in the cosmos, are perpetually in inertial rotational motion in some orbit, and simultaneously in inertial translational motion propagating themselves through 4-space, in two completely orthogonal inertial motions each at the constant universal rate of transformation <math>c</math>. Every object with mass moves relative to universal 4-coordinate Euclidean space on its own distinct geodesic spiral, a screw displacement trajectory that is the compound of its two completely orthogonal inertial motions, a rotation and a translation. Objects without mass such as photons lie off such moving surface boundaries of matter from which they were emitted, and their motion is of a different nature. They are in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> through all four dimensions concurrently, without any rotational component of motion, so they move through 4-space on straight lines at a compound velocity. The propagation speed of light measured on a straight line through Euclidean 4-space is <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, so we can see in four dimensions, even though we are physically confined to a 3-dimensional manifold that is moving at velocity <math>c</math>. For example, we can look across the center of the mostly-empty 4-ball containing our galaxy and see stars in the opposite sides of its concentric 3-sphere orbital surfaces. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. They move in the 4-space direction corresponding to their proper time, perpendicular to all three dimensions of their proper 3-space, and generally the farther they are from us the greater the divergence of their direction of motion from our direction of motion: the greater the relative motion between us, and the greater their Hubble redshift. Light from them reaches us directly, propagating on straight lines through 4-space at twice the velocity at which they, and we ourselves, are propagating through 4-space. This physical model of the observed universe is compatible with the theories of special and general relativity, and with the atomic theory of quantum mechanics. It explains those theories geometrically, as expressions of intrinsic symmetries in Euclidean space. == Symmetries == It is common to speak of nature as a web, and so it is, the great web of our physical experiences. Every web must have its root systems somewhere, and nature in this sense must be rooted in the symmetries which underlie physics and geometry, the [[W:Group (mathematics)|mathematics of groups]].{{Sfn|Conway, Burgiel & Goodman-Strauss|2008}} As I understand [[W:Noether's theorem|Noether's theorem]] (which is not mathematically), hers is the deepest meta-theory of nature yet, deeper than [[W:Theory of relativity|Einstein's relativity]] or [[W:Evolution|Darwin's evolution]] or [[W:Euclidean geometry|Euclid's geometry]]. It finds that all fundamental findings in physics are based on conservation laws which can be laid at the doors of distinct [[W:symmetry group |symmetry group]]s. Thus all fundamental systems in physics, as examples [[W:quantum chromodynamics|quantum chromodynamics]] (QCD) the theory of the strong force binding the atomic nucleus and [[W:quantum electrodynamics|quantum electrodynamics]] (QED) the theory of the electromagnetic force, each have a corresponding symmetry [[W:group theory|group theory]] of which they are an expression. [[W:Coxeter group|Coxeter's theory of symmetry groups]] generated by reflections did for geometry what Noether's theorem and Einstein's relativity did for physics. [[W:Coxeter|Coxeter]] showed that Euclidean geometry is based on conservation laws that correspond to distinct symmetry groups, and that their group actions express the principle of relativity. Here is Coxeter's formulation of the motions of objects (their congruent transformations) in an ''n''-dimensional Euclidean space, excerpted:{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|pp=217-218|loc=§12.2 Congruent transformations}} <blockquote>Let <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> denote a rotation, <math>\mathrm{R}</math> a reflection, <math>\mathrm{T}</math> a translation, and let <math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r\mathrm{T}</math> denote a product of several such transformations, all commutative with one another. Then <math>\mathrm{RT}</math> is a glide-reflection (in two or three dimensions), <math>\mathrm{QR}</math> is a rotary-reflection, <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is a screw-displacement, and <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is a double rotation (in four dimensions).<br> Every orthogonal transformation is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r \le n)</math>, the number of dimensions.<br> Transformations involving a translation are also expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + 1 \le n)</math>.<br> For <math>(n = 4)</math> in particular, every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> If we begin with this most elemental [[w:Kinematics|kinematics]] of Coxeter's, and also assume the [[W:Galilean relativity|Galilean principle of relativity]], every displacement in 4-space can be viewed as either a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> or a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, because we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> in a linearly moving (translating) reference frame. Therefore any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>. By the same principle, we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> as an isoclinic (equi-angled) <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> by proper choice of reference frame.{{Efn|[[W:Arthur Cayley|Cayley]] showed that any rotation in 4-space can be decomposed into two isoclinic rotations, which intuitively we might see follows from the fact that any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a [[W:SO(4)|rotation in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]].|name=Cayley's rotation factorization into two isoclinic reference frame transformations}} Coxeter's relation is thus a mathematical statement of the principle of relativity, on group-theoretic grounds. It correctly captures the limits to [[W:General relativity|general relativity]], in that we can only exchange the translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) for ''one'' of the two rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>). An observer in any inertial reference frame can always measure the presence, direction and velocity of ''one'' rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) up to uncertainty, and can always distinguish the direction of their own proper time translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>). As I understand Coxeter theory (which is not mathematically), the symmetry groups underlying physics seem to have an expression in a [[W:Euclidean space|Euclidean space]] of four [[W:dimension|dimension]]s, that is, they are [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|four-dimensional Euclidean geometry]]. Therefore as I understand that geometry (which is entirely by synthetic methods rather than by Clifford's algebraic methods), the [[W:Atom|atom]] seems to have a distinct Euclidean geometry, such that atoms and their constituent particles are four-dimensional geometric objects (4-polytopes), and nature can be understood in terms of their [[W:group action|group actions]], including centrally their group <math>SO(4)</math> [[W:rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space|rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]]. The distinct Coxeter symmetry groups have characteristic <math>SO(4)</math> rotational expressions as the [[W:Regular_4-polytope|regular 4-polytopes]]. Their discrete isoclinic rotations are distinguishing properties of fundamental objects in geometry, relativity and quantum mechanics. For example, atoms exhibit <math>SO(4)</math> symmetries of the discrete isoclinic (equi-angled) double rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>) of a set of regular 4-polytopes that is characteristic of their [[w:Atomic_number|atomic number]]. == Special relativity describes Euclidean 4-space == <blockquote>Our entire model of the universe is built on symmetries. Some, like isotropy (the laws are the same in all directions), homogeneity (same in all places), and time invariance (same at all times) seem natural enough. Even relativity, the Lorentz Invariance that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, has an elegance to it that makes it seem natural.<ref>{{Cite book|first=Dave|last=Goldberg|title=The Universe in the Rearview Mirror: How Hidden Symmetries Shape Reality|chapter=§10. Hidden Symmetries: Why some symmetries but not others?|year=2013|publisher=Dutton Penguin Group|isbn=978-0-525-95366-1|ref={{SfnRef|Goldberg|2013}}}}</ref></blockquote> Although the Minkowski spacetime of relativity is a non-Euclidean 4-dimensional space,{{Efn|Spacetime is a non-Euclidean (curved) 4-dimensional space because it consists of three orthogonal space dimensions and a time dimension. The time dimension is not orthogonal to the three spatial dimensions; the time coordinate has the opposite sign as the three space coordinates so spacetime is hyperbolic, not a Euclidean (flat) 4-space at all.}} it has been noticed that its 3-dimensional space component could be modeled as a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] embedded in 4-dimensional Euclidean (flat) space. That is, we could imagine that the ordinary 3-dimensional space we perceive is the curved 3-dimensional surface of a 4-dimensional ball (since the surface of a 4-ball is a curved 3-dimensional space called a 3-sphere, just as the surface of a 3-ball like the earth is a curved 2-dimensional space called a 2-sphere). This was [[#Origins of the theory|imagined by Einstein]] himself in 1921, as a thought experiment in which he carefully described his fourth orthogonal spatial dimension as merely a mathematical abstraction. Subsequently it was noticed by others (not mainstream physicists) that if physical space were really embedded in Euclidean 4-dimensional space (with our 3-dimensional space embedded in 4-space as some non-Euclidean 3-manifold, not necessarily a 3-sphere), then the Lorentz transformation effects of special relativity (spatial forshortenings and time dilations and so forth) could all be explained by ordinary perspective geometry in 4-dimensional Euclidean space. Special relativity reduces to classical vector space geometry (based on the 4-dimensional version of the Pythagorean theorem), but if and only if every observer is moving through 4-space at a universal constant velocity <math>c</math>, in some 4-space direction.{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} This counter-intuitive alternative geometric model of relativity, which has usually been called [[W:Formulations of special relativity#Euclidean relativity|Euclidean relativity]], is motivated by the fact that in every kind of relativity, but originally in Einstein's special relativity, each observer moves on a vector through a Euclidean four-dimensional space consisting of their three proper spatial dimensions and their proper time dimension, and the Pythagorean vector-sum of their motion through this kind of proper 4-space is always <math>c</math>, as measured by all observers from any inertial reference frame.{{Efn|Each observer is stationary in space in their own proper reference frame, while they move at maximum velocity {{Math|c}} through their own proper time. Observed from another reference frame in relative motion, they appear foreshortened in space in their direction of motion, and their clocks appear to be slowed to less than the maximum velocity {{Math|c}}.}} This is the Lorentz invariant, that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, regardless of their motion relative to the light source.{{Efn| ...cite Lewis Epstein's elegant explanation of the Lorentz Invariance as observers moving at constant velocity {{Math|c}} through space and proper time.}} But no physicists have taken the leap of claiming that therefore, our universe is physically [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|this kind of Euclidean 4-space]], and that observers are actually moving through it at velocity <math>c</math>. In physics as it has been universally understood, observers are not supposed to be able to move at velocity <math>c</math>. Their motion takes place in 3-space and in universal coordinate time (in Minkowski spacetime), and the cosmos is considered to be a non-Euclidean 3-space, generally a closed (finite) expanding 3-space, but with only three spatial dimensions, not four. In the Euclidean relativity alternative view, however, every observer is always moving at velocity <math>c</math> through the universe, which is real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. The direction in which they are moving is called their proper time axis.{{Efn|Time in spacetime is universal coordinate time, but there is another kind of time in relativity, the proper time in each inertial reference frame. Your proper time is the time you experience, and every observer has his own proper time; proper time runs at different rates in different inertial reference frames. It runs slower (compared to universal coordinate time) in a gravitational field (according to general relativity), and observers in motion with respect to each other view each other's clocks as running slower than their own clocks (according to special relativity).}} Their movement in time is not just modelled as movement in an abstract fourth dimension (as it is in Minkowski spacetime), their movement in time is isomorphic to their movement through physical space in a distinct direction at velocity <math>c</math>. Two observers' directions of movement through space may be different (or not, if they happen to be going in the same direction). Your proper time dimension is whichever direction you are moving. The other three directions perpendicular to your proper time axis are the three dimensions of your ordinary proper space, which again, will be different directions for you than for other observers moving in a different direction. There are four orthogonal spatial dimensions which we all share, but we share the same orthogonal proper time axis and ordinary proper 3-space axes only if we are at rest with respect to each other, actually moving in the same direction at velocity <math>c</math>, in the same inertial reference frame. Your proper 4-space coordinate system is rotated with respect to another observer's proper 4-space coordinate system, precisely as your vectors (directions of motion) are rotated in Euclidean 4-space with respect to each other, but there are no metric distortions (no Lorentz transformations) between your proper Euclidean 4-space coordinate systems; you are both embedded in the same Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. Lorentz transformations are required only to convert between your respective proper Minkowski spacetime coordinate systems. So in this novel alternate view of relativity, every mass in the universe must be perpetually in motion at velocity <math>c</math> through Euclidean 4-space, along with all the masses in its vicinity that are going in (nearly) the same direction. The entire solar system, for example, must be translating in the fourth dimension at the "speed of light" <math>c</math>, although we do not notice it, since we are all moving in that same direction together. Acceleration of an object varies its direction of motion through 4-space, but never its velocity, which is invariant for all objects with mass. Two objects which are in motion relative to each other are both actually in motion at the same velocity <math>c</math>, but in at least slightly different directions.{{Efn|The angular divergence between two observer's motion vectors is proportional to their relative velocity: the more they diverge, the greater their relative velocity, up to the maximum divergence possible in the space. In Euclidean relativity all observers are in motion at velocity {{Math|c}} relative to universal Cartesian 4-coordinate space, so the maximum relative velocity between two observers is {{Math|2c}} when they are moving in exactly opposite directions in 4-space. This is not a contradiction of special relativity, which limits the maximum relative velocity between two observers to {{Math|c}}, it is the same measurement in different units. Special relativity measures all velocities in Minkowski spacetime (in a non-Euclidean 3-space). Euclidean relativity measures all velocities in Euclidean 4-space.}} In Einstein's relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of light through 3-space. In Euclidean relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of matter through 4-space! The speed of light through 3-space is also perceived as <math>c</math> by all observers, because they are each living in a moving 3-manifold that is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. Despite their extreme differences in viewpoint, Einstein's relativity and Euclidean relativity are equivalent theories in complete agreement with each other, by definition. The two theories make exactly the same special relativity predictions of how observers in different inertial reference frames will perceive each other's motions in time and space. It is beyond the scope of this present paper to show how they also agree on the predictions of general relativity, but it is important to understand that our formulation of Euclidean relativity requires our acceptance of the experimentally verified findings of special relativity, general relativity and quantum mechanics. Our model and the standard model both describe the same geometric relations of space and time based on the same evidence, but as embedded in two very different universal host spaces: Euclidean 4-space versus Minkowski spacetime. In some instances our model provides a geometric explanation for physical phenomena where the standard model has none, as yet. An example is the two models' differing explanations for the gravitational coherence of galaxies: either their inertial motion at velocity <math>c</math>, or their possession of experimentally undetected dark matter. A more central example is our use of Coxeter's kinematics to explain the laws of relativistic motion geometrically. {{Efn|More generally, our model is concerned with group-theoretic properties of number elucidated by Coxeter and other geometers. ...cite Kappraff & Adamson's 2003 paper on The Relationship of the Cotangent Function to Special Relativity Theory, geometry and properties of number,{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2003|loc=Special Relativity Theory, Geometry and properties of number}} which shows how the Lorentz coefficient is a function of a deep geometric property of number{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2000|loc=A Fresh Look at Number}} discovered by Steinbach,{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997|loc=Golden Fields: A Case for the Heptagon}} by means of which the root formula of geometry in any Euclidean dimension, the Pythagorean theorem, may be derived solely in terms of the addition of polygon side lengths, without recourse to their products or squares. More generally, Steinbach found that in the relations among regular polytope chords, to add is to multiply; every chord is both the product (quotient) of a pair of chords and the sum (difference) of another pair of chords.}} Euclidean relativity is not even a fringe theory; no physicists or astronomers have adopted it. There are many good reasons why the revolutionary leap to a four orthogonal spatial dimensions viewpoint has not been taken, beginning with the universally observed fact that we can only construct three perpendiculars through a point in our immediate space, which appears to be resolutely 3-dimensional, not 4-dimensional. Euclidean relativity offers a nice geometric explanation of the reasons for the Lorentz transformations, but only at the cost of raising other mysteries, which have been difficult for its aficionados to explain. Another mystery is how light signals between observers in relative motion could "catch up" with the receiver moving on a diverging path through 4-space from the emitter. If both observers are already moving at <math>c</math> (on diverging paths), the propagation speed of light through 4-space between them would have to be greater than <math>c</math>. Euclidean relativity is a revolutionary theory indeed, in which <math>c</math> cannot possibly be the speed of light! We conclude that, for a theory of Euclidean 4-space to be physically viable (that is, for <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> to be our real space and not merely an abstract mathematical space), the speed of light through Euclidean 4-space must be <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, with massless photons translating through 4-space at twice the speed of mass-carrying objects. Photons must translate the diagonal distance through 4-space along the long diameter of a unit 4-hypercube, in the same time that massive particles translate inertially along the edge (or the radius) of a unit 4-hypercube. This is conceivable in Euclidean 4-space (and in no other Euclidean space of any dimensionality) because the long diagonal of the unit 4-hypercube is the natural number <math>\sqrt{4}</math>. == An object's motion in space is the product of its discrete self-reflections == Coxeter theory describes all the possible motions of an object in space as local functions of the object's discrete geometry (its shape). Coxeter observed that in a Euclidean space of any number of dimensions, any displacement of a geometric object from one place to another, and any rotation of the object from one orientation to another, can be broken down into the product of a number of discrete self-reflections. Any action of a polytope that transforms its position and orientation in space may be measured as a distinct sequence of self-reflections of the object in its own surfaces. Therefore any motion of the object whatsoever may be precisely described as the object propagating itself through space by a discrete sequence of local self-reflections. This is a purely kinematic description of motion which does not give any account of forces acting on the object that cause it to move. Coxeter found that both changes in position (translations) and changes in orientation (rotations) can be broken down into the simplest of all displacements (self-reflections). A translation occurs when an object self-reflects twice, in two distinct surfaces which are parallel to each other. A rotation also occurs when an object self-reflects twice, but in two distinct surfaces which intersect each other. When a object self-reflects once, it turns itself inside out (it reverses its chirality), but in translations and rotations it self-reflects twice, preserving its chirality. Coxeter's laws of kinematics are a geometric counterpart to Newton's algebraic laws of motion in three dimensional Euclidean space. They are helpful because they can be understood as geometric pictures, which may help us to visualize the relationships between translation and rotation in classic Newtonian physics problems, such as the [[W:Kepler problem|Kepler problem]] of the motion of the planets.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Feynman|first=Richard|title=Feynman's Lost Lecture: The Motion of Planets Around the Sun|date=1996|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0393039184}}</ref> But they are also a revolutionary advance beyond Newton's laws, because Coxeter formulated them in Euclidean spaces of any number of dimensions. In particular, they give us geometric pictures of all the possible motions of objects in 4-dimensional Euclidean space: <blockquote>Every orthogonal transformation in 4-space is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}^t</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + t \le 4)</math>. Every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> While this description should be understood as geometric pictures, some of the pictures may not be easy for us to visualize, since we have no physical experience in 4-dimensional space. Rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>), reflection (<math>\mathrm{R}</math>) and translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) are obvious analogues of what they are in three-dimensional space, but double rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>) is something new and unprecedented in our physical experience, because double rotations cannot occur until there are four or more dimensions of space in which to rotate. A point in 4-space may be in motion on two circles in two completely orthogonal rotation planes simultaneously. Nothing constrains the two circles to be of the same radius, or constrains either circle from being of infinite radius such that the point moves in a straight line within its rotation plane: a translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> rather than a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. The motion of a rigid object defined by multiple points is constrained by its rigidity, such that the radii of both circles may approach infinity, but only one of the two radii may actually reach infinity. For a rigid object, only one of the two rotations may actually be a translation. Four dimensional Euclidean space can accomodate no such thing as a <math>\mathrm{Q}^2\mathrm{T}</math>. A translating double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, like a translating simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>, is simply a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. That is the essence of the way the principle of relativity operates in Euclidean 4-space. An object which is double-rotating in its own proper inertial reference frame may be seen to be performing nothing more mysterious than a screw translation, when observed from an inertial reference frame from which the object is in relative translational motion. Of course, it is a screw translation in 4-space, which is more mysterious than a screw translation in our ordinary 3-space. In 3-space the orbit of a screw translation (or any <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) lies on a great circle of an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere). In 4-space the orbit of a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math> lies on a great circle of a hypersphere (a 3-sphere). Such 4-dimensional great circles are inherently more complex than the ordinary circles we experience in 3-space. They do not lie in a single plane, but bend through all four dimensions, in either a left or right hand direction of curvature. Unlike ordinary circles they are inherently chiral, and their circumference is not <math>2\pi r</math>, but like ordinary circles they are truly circular, geodesic circles. In 4-space they might even be said to be more circular than ordinary circles, which bend in only two dimensions. We refer to such 4-dimensional great circles as ''isoclines'', to distinguish them from ordinary 2-dimensional great circles in the plane. Their name comes from the fact that a point on a rigid 4-dimensional object undergoing [[W:SO(4)#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]] traverses an isocline circle. In a universe which is real Euclidean four-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>, wherein these motions occur only at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, there is a universal Cartesian 4-coordinate reference frame in which every rigid object in free fall is translating on a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> at velocity <math>c</math>. That universal inertial reference frame is not the proper reference frame of any object or observer, wherein the object or observer is stationary and double-rotating at the universal rate of quantum events <math>c</math>, but it is the common reference frame of all observers. == Light propagates through 4-space at twice its apparent velocity <math>c</math>== Coxeter's laws of kinematics in 4-dimensional Euclidean space apply to all objects with mass, but we find there is an additional kind of displacement which applies only to massless particles such as photons, considered as single point objects. Light quanta (photons) translate through 4-space by 4-dimensional reflection <math>\mathrm{R}^4</math>, which may be termed a double translation <math>\mathrm{T}^2</math>, a pure translation via two pairs of parallel reflections without any rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. Matter (atoms and all particles with mass) are perpetually rotating and translating through 4-space by <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, a screw translation of a rotating object, which is relativistically equivalent to a stationary isoclinic <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>, an isoclinically rotating object such as an atom. A simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> or simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> is a double reflection <math>\mathrm{R^2}</math>, so a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is an <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>, but not with the same group of reflection angles as a light signal <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>. A translation <math>\mathrm{T = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two parallel planes, and a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two intersecting planes, as in a <math>\mathrm{QT = R^4}</math> which is both at once. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is two double reflections in pairs of parallel planes at once, a reflection in four non-intersecting parallel planes; it is all translation and no rotation. In a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> all the motion goes to translation, so the translation goes twice as far as the simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is the opposite of a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q^2 = R^4}</math>, which is stationary but rotates twice as far as the simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. The product of the two translations in a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> is a diagonal 4-space translation over the long diameter of the unit 4-hypercube, exactly twice the distance of a simple <math>\mathrm{T}</math> over the edge length (or radius) of the unit 4-hypercube. The [[w:Tesseract|4-hypercube (also known as the 8-cell or tesseract)]] is ''radially equilateral'', which means its edge length is equal to its radius, like the hexagon, so its long diameter (twice its radius) is exactly twice its edge length. The photon moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions. By the four-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, each of those four distances is half the total distance the photon moves: one edge length (one radius) is half the total diagonal distance moved (the long diameter). That total movement is a double the unit-distance translation, but without any rotation component, so it cannot carry any mass with it. A <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> cannot reposition a 4-polytope the way a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> does, it can only reposition a quantum of energy that has no distinguishing rotational symmetry, such as a photon. That is the price light pays to move exactly twice as fast as matter.{{Efn| ...lensing of double translations <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> in more than two pairs of parallel planes at once...relationship to the frequency of light emitted and the coherence length of the wave packet...}} == Special relativity is Galilean relativity in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == {{Efn|...TAC suggests this section is needed sooner, i.e. in the preceding Special Relativity section, as it explains how Euclidean relativity reduces special relativity to 4D perspective geometry...it's misplaced (too late) here...}} Perspective effects known as the Lorentz transformations occur because each observer's proper 3-dimensional space is a moving curved manifold embedded in flat 4-dimensional Euclidean space. The curvature of their 3-space complicates sightline calculations for observers; they sometimes require Lorentz transformations to produce the actual 4-space Cartesian coordinates of objects in the scene being observed. But if all four spatial dimensions are considered, no Lorentz transformations are required (or permitted) in correct scene construction, except when an observer wants to calculate a projection, that is, the shadow of how things will appear to them from a three-dimensional viewpoint (not how they really are in 4-space).{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} Space really has four orthogonal dimensions, and space and time behave there just as they do in a classical vector space, only bigger by one dimension. It is not necessary to combine 4-space with time in a unified spacetime to explain 4-dimensional perspective effects at high relative velocities, because Euclidean 4-space is already 4-dimensional, and those effects fall out naturally from the 4-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, exactly as ordinary visual perspective does in three dimensions from the 3-dimensional Pythagorean theorem. Because one of the four spatial dimensions corresponds to an observer's direction of motion (in both space and proper time), and all observers and all scenes being observed are in motion (at constant velocity) in their respective proper time directions, we observe perspective foreshortenings in time as well as in a spatial dimension. In special relativity these perspective effects are reciprocal, precisely because they are only apparent, not actual, changes in size and duration. (However in general relativity, discussed below, the actual rate of physical processes varies from place to place, and reference frame differences predicted by the theory are neither reciprocal nor illusory.) None of these Lorentz effects are beyond geometric explanation or paradoxical. The universe is unexpectedly strange to us in precisely the ways the Euclidean fourth dimension is strange to us; but that does hold many surprises. Euclidean 4-space is much more interesting than Euclidean 3-space, analogous to the way 3-space is much more interesting and deeply explanatory to us than it would be if we experienced it only as a 2-space with many folds and curves, as perhaps an ant does. The emergent properties of 4-space are hard for us to visualize because they lie so wholly beyond our physical experience, just as it was hard for our ancestors to imagine the earth as round like a ball. However, Euclidean spaces of successive dimensions are analogous, and so higher dimensional spaces can be anticipated and explored: that is Schläfli's great discovery. Moreover dimensional analogy itself, like everything else in nature including all of physics, is an exact expression of intrinsic group-theoretic symmetries: that is Nother's great discovery. == General relativity is special relativity in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == The statement that the laws of special relativity hold to good approximation in freely falling (and non-rotating) reference frames is known as the [[W:Equivalence principle|Einstein equivalence principle]]. The weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a building on the surface of the earth is the same as the weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a spaceship in interstellar space accelerating at a rate of 32'/second/second. Both observers are experiencing an upwards acceleration at the same rate, which in their respective proper reference frames is measured as the weight of gravity, rather than as an accelerating motion (they are stationary in their proper reference frames). Einstein used this equivalence principle as the basis for his general theory of relativity, in much the same way he had used the constant velocity of light as the basis for his special theory of relativity. In general relativity the two accelerating observers occupy scenes which are relativistically equivalent, which means that although they can be distinguished (they have different measurements) in any reference frame from which they may both be observed, they have the same invariant geometry in all reference frames (they are the same phenomena), implying that there exists, for either scene, another reference frame from which it measures exactly like the other scene. Relativistically equivalent does not imply that there exists a single reference frame in which the two scenes are congruent (have the same measurements). It only means that they can be transformed into each other by a shift in point of view, because their invariant geometries (their measurements which are independent of point of view) are the same. Einstein's general theory of relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in spacetime. Our formulation of Euclidean relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. An observer standing on the surface of the earth is accelerated at the rate of 32'/second/second. The observer and the earth are both stationary in their proper inertial reference frames (which are similar except for the rotation of the earth), so the observer's acceleration cannot be perceived as motion in either proper reference frame; it is perceptible there instead as the force of gravity. It is only perceptible as motion in some other reference frame in which the earth and the observer are both in motion, such as the universal common reference frame of Euclidean 4-coordinate space in which they are both in motion at velocity <math>c</math> on their respective screw translations <math>QT</math>, which are distinct. In that universal common reference frame the observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is the rate of change in the direction of his vector of translation through 4-space. The velocity of his vector of translation <math>T</math> through 4-space remains the constant <math>c</math> throughout; only his direction is changing. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation <math>Q</math> of a translation <math>T</math>: a screw translation <math>QT</math>. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation which is an acceleration. We can be precise about the units of measurement of this acceleration at atomic scale. In Coxeter's kinematics rotations of geometric objects occur in discrete increments called rotational displacements, with each distinct kind of rotation performing a characteristic number of its characteristic rotational displacement during a full revolution that returns the object to its starting orientation. There are many distinct kinds of rotation, each with its characteristic rotational displacement and number of displacements per revolution. The general rotation in 4-space is a double rotation <math>Q^2</math> distinguished by two distinct completely orthogonal angles through which the object turns in each rotational displacement. The angles determine not only the distance through which the object turns, but the characteristic trajectory of each point on the surface of the rotating object, including the length of that trajectory before it closes into a circle when the object returns to its starting orientation. For any distinct kind of rotation, the circular trajectory is always an integer multiple of the characteristic rotational displacement, but the full circle may be greater than 360°. In 4-space rotational circles are not ordinary 2-dimensional circles that lie in the plane and have a 360° circumference. Many distinct 4-space rotations of interest have a circumference of 720°, and many are larger. In 4-space every object with mass moves on its distinct <math>QT</math> trajectory. Each rotational displacement <math>Q</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which intersect each other, at angles related to a distinct star polygon. Each translational displacement <math>T</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which lie parallel to each other. In both kinds of motion (rotation and translation) it is the rate at which these double-reflection displacements occur which is constant and which we measure as the velocity <math>c</math>. Every atom translates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing a large number of atomic scale translational displacements per second. Concurrently, the atom rotates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing the same large number of atomic scale rotational displacements per second. Although the number of displacements at atomic scale per unit time is the same universal constant <math>c</math> for all rotations and translations, distinct kinds of rotation revolve at distinct rates, because the number of rotational displacements per complete revolution and the circumference of the complete revolution are distinct characteristics of each kind of rotation. The velocity at which each point on the surface of a rotating object moves, and the frequency of its rotational circling, are functions of the distinct rotation it is performing. However, they are not simple functions of <math>c</math> and the two defining angle parameters of the rotation. Distinct rotations arise from distinct symmetry groups and each is its own mystery with a unique conservation law. The relationships between those distinct conservation laws are even more mysterious, and have been shown to be chaotic. Steinbach{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997}} discovered the Golden Fields family of ratios which govern distinct rotational displacements related to the regular star polygons at least up to the hendecagon {11}. Kappraff and Adamson{{Sfn|Kappraff|Adamson|2004}} further characterized the families of rotation functions and showed that they form an infinite number of periodic trajectories when operated on by the Mandelbrot operator. The inertial tendency of mass is to follow a geodesic. The inertial conservation law of gravity applies to all motions of objects with mass, rotations as well as translations. A translation <math>T</math> is the distinct simple rotation <math>Q</math> in which the characteristic angle of rotational displacement is zero. Inertia is the tendency of objects with mass to conserve their angles of rotational displacement. In 4-space each object has two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement which are characteristic of the distinct rotation the object is performing. Inertia is the conservation of this distinct double rotation. In 4-coordinate Euclidean space the acceleration of an object with mass is a rotation of the object, a change to its direction, not a change to its constant velocity. Because the rate of atomic scale displacements is the universal constant <math>c</math>, the rate of change of direction (the acceleration of the object) is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law. A observer standing on the surface of the earth is performing a distinct double rotation characterized by two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement. The observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law, and a measurement of the rate of change of the observer's direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. ... == Quantum mechanics is the atomic kinematics of Coxeter groups generated by reflections == ... == Dimensional relativity == The formulation of Euclidean relativity based on Coxeter's kinetic law of <math>n</math>-dimensional congruent transformations in Euclidean space may be called ''dimensional relativity'', since it captures the theories of special and general relativity, and has its roots in dimensional analogy. Dimensional analogy is the exploration of [[w:Hermann_Grassmann#Mathematician|Hermann Grassmann's vector space principle]], in which space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. The geometry of higher-dimensional space is accessible by reason of direct analogy, as [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] subsequently demonstrated, and by algebraic methods after [[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]]. By analogy to the surface of the earth, the bounding surface of a spherical region of <math>n</math>-dimensional Euclidean space is an <math>(n-1)</math>-sphere, a spherical space of one fewer dimensions than the <math>n</math>-ball of Euclidean space it surrounds. In dimensional relativity the sky is not a ceiling, but an infinite regress of alternating spherical and Euclidean <math>n</math>-spaces of increasing <math>n</math>, accessible from each observer's point of view. By dimensional analogy, each observer looks up into their own reference frame's regress of concentric alternating <math>n</math>-spaces. By the capacity for dimensional analogy which they possess, some observers see deeper into <math>n</math>-dimensional space than others. == Polycentric spherical relativity == An intelligent observer equipped with the principle of dimensional relativity may perceive the universe from any inertial reference frame, not only from their own proper stationary reference frame in the Euclidean <math>n</math>-space universe in which they physically locate themself. We see that every observer may also properly view themself as stationary and the universe as an <math>n</math>-sphere with themself at the center observing it, perceptually equidistant from all points on its <math>n</math>-space surface, including their own physical location which is one of those surface points, distinguished to them but moving on the surface, and not the center of anything. This ''polycentric model'' of the universe is a further restatement of the principle of relativity, and of the [[W:Copernican principle|Copernican principle]] that observation is democratic: observers occupy representative viewpoints, not privileged monocentric positions. The polycentric model is compatible with Galileo's relativity of uniformly moving objects in ordinary space, Einstein's special relativity of inertial reference frames in 4-dimensional spacetime, Einstein's general relativity of all reference frames in non-Euclidean spacetime, and Coxeter's dimensional relativity of orthogonal group actions in Euclidean and spherical spaces of any number of dimensions. The polycentric model should be known as Thoreau's principle of ''spherical relativity'', since the first precise written statement of it appears in 1849, contemporaneous with and independent of Schlafli's work: <blockquote>The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence.{{Sfn|Thoreau|1849|p=349|ps=; "The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence." [Contemporaneous and independent of [[W:Ludwig Schlafli|Ludwig Schlafli]]'s pioneering work enumerating the complete set of regular polyschemes in any number of dimensions.]}}</blockquote> == Revolutions == The original Copernican revolution in 1543 displaced the center of the universe from the center of the earth to a point farther away, the center of the sun, with the earth performing a ''revolution'' around the sun, and the stars remaining on a fixed 2-sphere around the sun instead of around the earth. But this led inevitably to the recognition that the sun must be a star itself, not equidistant from all the stars, and the center of but one of many spheres, no monotheistic center at all. In 1600 [[W:Giordano Bruno|Giordano Bruno]] who first openly advocated these views was burned at the stake in Rome's [[W:Campo de' Fiori|Campo de' Fiori]] by the Catholic inquisition. In such fashion the Euclidean four-dimensional revolution, emerging three to five centuries later, initially lends itself to the big bang theory of a single origin of the whole universe, but leads inevitably to the recognition that all the galaxies need not be equidistant from a single origin in time, any more than all the stars lie in the same galaxy, equidistant from a single center in space. The expanding sphere of matter on the surface of which we find ourselves living is likely to be one of many 3-spheres expanding at velocity <math>c</math>, with their big bang origins occurring at distinct times and places in the ''n''-dimensional universe. The most distant objects we see when we look up at night may not all have the same origin in space and time. As recently as Copernicus we believed all the stars lay on a single 2-sphere embedded in Euclidean 3-space, with our sun at its center. During the enlightenment observers beginning with Bruno dispersed those stars into an infinite Euclidean 3-space, and relinquished our privileged position at the center. Then Einstein showed that our 3-space could not be Euclidean, that it must be a 3-manifold curved in every place in obedience to Newton's inverse-square law of gravity; and in a geometry related to time, at least, it must be 4-dimensional. In the present work we propose a theory of ''n''-dimensional real space and how light travels in it, a theory which says we can see into four orthogonal dimensions of Euclidean space, and so when we look up at night we see cosmological objects distributed in at least four dimensions of space around us, rather than all located in our own local 3-space. Looking still deeper and farther out, the universe viewed as a 4-sphere might, or might not, be expanding, and the most distant objects we see when we look up at night may, or may not, lie in our 4-dimensional hyperplane. Real space has ''n'' dimensions as [[w:Hermann_Grassmann|Grassmann]] and [[w:Schläfli|Schläfli]] showed, and we do not know how many dimensions the most distant objects we see may be distributed in. They need not all lie within the four spatial dimensions in which we have now learned to observe them, any more than they all lie in our local 3-space. When we look up at the objects that surround us, we have no way of discerning how many dimensions beyond three the space we are looking into has. We know their distance from us primarily by virtue of how long it takes their light to reach us. We can measure their distribution around us in 3-space or 4-space, but that is simply how we choose to measure their positions, not an actual finding of how they are distributed. Even if it is now evident that they do not all lie in the same 3-space, how many more dimensions than three are needed to contain them? We observe that our 4-ball galaxy is embedded in Euclidean <math>n</math>-space as one of many 4-ball galaxies, each translating in a distinct direction through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, on more or less divergent paths from each other. But only closer observation will reveal evidence of whether everything we see lies in the same Euclidean 4-space, or if it is distributed in five or more dimensions, and how it is moving there. To remain in agreement with the theory of relativity, the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint requires that all mass-carrying objects be in motion in some distinct direction through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, although the relative velocity between nearby objects is much smaller since they move on similar vectors, aimed away from a common origin point in the past. It is natural to expect that objects moving at constant velocity away from a common origin will be distributed roughly on the surface of an expanding 3-sphere. Although their paths away from their origin are not straight lines but various helical isoclines (screw translation spirals), nearby objects must be translating radially at the same average velocity, since the objects in a system (such as our solar system or galaxy) do not separate rapidly over time but remain in orbital formation. Each system's screw translation has two [[w:Completely_orthogonal|completely orthogonal]] components of motion in 4-space, an orbital rotation (such as the earth's around our sun) and a linear translation of the entire system at velocity <math>c</math> in the direction of the original 3-sphere's radial expansion (along the system's proper time vector). Of course the view from our solar system does not suggest that the 3-sphere enclosing each galaxy is expanding at this great rate from its galactic center. The standard theory has been that the entire observable universe is expanding from a single big bang origin in time, with galaxies forming later. While the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint lends itself to that standard theory, it also supports theories which require no single origin point in space and time. These are the voyages of starship Earth, to boldly go where no one has gone before. We made the jump to light speed long ago, in whatever big bang our atoms emerged from, and have never slowed down since. == Origins of the theory == Einstein himself may have been the first to imagine the universe as the three-dimensional surface of a four-dimensional Euclidean 3-sphere, in what was narrowly the first written articulation of a Euclidean 4-space universe, contemporaneous with the teen-aged Coxeter's (quoted below).{{Efn|[[W:William Rowan Hamilton|Hamilton]]'s algebra '''H''' of [[W:Quaternions|quaternions]] introduces (in 1843) the notion of a [[W:Three-dimensional sphere|three-dimensional sphere]] embedded in a four-dimensional space, but Hamilton did not quite conceive of the quaternions as the Cartesian 4-coordinates of a Euclidean 4-space, and he did not describe our ordinary 3-space as embedded in Euclidean 4-space.}} Einstein did this as a [[W:Gedankenexperiment|gedankenexperiment]] in the context of investigating whether his equations of general relativity predicted an infinite or a finite universe, in his 1921 Princeton lecture.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/36276|title=The Meaning of Relativity|last=Einstein|first=Albert|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=1923|isbn=|location=|pages=110-111}}</ref> He invited us to imagine "A spherical manifold of three dimensions, embedded in a Euclidean continuum of four dimensions", but he was careful to disclaim parenthetically that "The aid of a fourth space dimension has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice." Informally, the Euclidean 4-dimensional theory of relativity may be given as a sort of reciprocal to that disclaimer of Einstein's: ''The Minkowski spacetime has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice, as an aid to understanding how things will appear to an observer from their perspective; the foreshortenings, clock desynchronizations and other Lorentz transformations it predicts are proper calculations of actual perspective effects; but real space is a flat, Euclidean continuum of four orthogonal spatial dimensions, and in it the ordinary laws of a flat vector space hold (such as the Pythagorean theorem), and all sightline calculations work classically, so long as you consider all four spatial dimensions.'' The Euclidean theory of relativity differs from the special theory of relativity in ascribing to the physical universe a geometry of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions, rather than the special theory's [[w:Minkowski spacetime|Minkowski spacetime]] geometry, in which three spatial dimensions and a time dimension comprise a unified non-Euclidean spacetime of four dimensions. Anco and Maghadam found that <math>SO(4)</math> breaks to <math>\mathbb{S}^3</math> (the 3-sphere) if the energy in a Kepler orbit is negative (an elliptical orbit), and to <math>H^3</math> (Minkowski spacetime) if the energy is positive (a hyperbolic orbit). Therefore the fact that the planets orbit on ellipses in our 3-space suggests that they orbit on a 3-sphere embedded in Euclidean 4-space. Thus we can conclude that <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> is the actual geometry of our physical universe, and Minkowski spacetime is an abstraction of it; the reciprocal of Einstein's disclaimer is the more direct physical model. Of course spacetime remains a true and useful abstraction, although it must relinquish its privileged position as our exclusive conception of our place in space.{{Efn| ...origins of the Euclidean 4-space insight in the observations of Fock, Atkinson, Moser and others.}} The invention of Euclidean geometry of more than three spatial dimensions preceded Einstein's theories by more than fifty years, when it was worked out originally by the Swiss mathematician [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] before 1853.{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|loc=§7. Ordinary Polytopes in Higher Space; §7.x. Historical remarks|pp=141-144|ps=; "Practically all the ideas in this chapter ... are due to Schläfli, who discovered them before 1853 — a time when Cayley, Grassmann and Möbius were the only other people who had ever conceived the possibility of geometry in more than three dimensions."}} Schläfli extended Euclid's geometry of one, two, and three dimensions in a direct way to four or more dimensions, generalizing the rules and terms of [[w:Euclidean geometry|Euclidean geometry]] to spaces of any number of dimensions. He coined the general term ''[[polyscheme]]'' to mean geometric forms of any number of dimensions, including two-dimensional [[w:polygon|polygons]], three-dimensional [[w:polyhedron|polyhedra]], four dimensional [[w:polychoron|polychora]], and so on, and in the process he found all of the [[w:Regular polytope|regular polyschemes]] that are possible in every dimension, including in particular the [[User:Dc.samizdat/Rotations#Sequence of regular 4-polytopes|six convex regular polychora]] which can be constructed in a Euclidean space of four dimensions (the set analogous to the five [[w:Platonic solid|Platonic solids]] the ancients found in three dimensional space). Thus Schläfli was the first to explore the fourth dimension, reveal its emergent geometric properties, and discover its astonishing regular objects. Because his work was only published posthumously in 1901, and remained almost completely unknown until Coxeter published [[w:Regular_Polytopes_(book)|Regular Polytopes]] in 1947, other researchers had more than fifty years to rediscover the regular polychora, and competing terms were coined; today [[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s word ''[[w:Polytope|polytope]]'' is the commonly used term for ''polyscheme.''{{Efn|[[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s German word ''polytop'' was introduced into English by [[W:Alicia Boole Stott|Alicia Boole Stott]], who like Hoppe and [[W:Thorold Gosset|Thorold Gosset]] rediscovered Schlafli's six regular convex 4-polytopes, with no knowledge of their prior discovery. Today Schläfli's original ''polyschem'', with its echo of ''schema'' as in the configurations of information structures, seems even more fitting in its generality than ''polytope'' -- perhaps analogously as information software (programming) is even more general than information hardware (computers).}} Because of this century-long lag in the dissemination of a scientific discovery, the regular 4-polytopes appear to have played no role at all, by any name, in the twentieth century discovery and evolution of the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics.{{Efn|One could argue that the higher-dimensional polytopes have barely influenced science or culture at all thus far. The physicist John Edward Huth's comprehensive deep dive through the history of cultural and scientific concepts of physical space, from ancient flatland models of the world through general relativity and quantum mechancs, shows exactly how we got to our present standard model of the universe, although it includes no mention of higher-dimensional Euclidean space.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Huth|first=John Edward|title=A Sense of Space: A local's guide to a flat earth, the edge of the cosmos, and other curious places|year=2025|publisher=University of Chicago Press}}</ref>}} == Boundaries == <blockquote>Ever since we discovered that Earth is round and turns like a mad-spinning top, we have understood that reality is not as it appears to us: every time we glimpse a new aspect of it, it is a deeply emotional experience. Another veil has fallen.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Carlo Rovelli|author-link=W:Carlo Rovelli|title=Seven Brief Lessons on Physics|publisher=Riverhead|year=2016|isbn=978-0399184413}}</ref></blockquote> Of course it is strange to consciously contemplate this world we inhabit, our planet, our solar system, our 3-sphere surface in our vast galaxy, as the merest film, a boundary no thicker in the places we inhabit than the diameter of an electron (though much thicker in some places we cannot inhabit, such as the planet's core and the interior of stars). But is not our unconscious traditional concept of the boundary of our world even stranger? Since the enlightenment we are accustomed to thinking that there is nothing beyond three dimensional space: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But anyone who knows the [[polyscheme]]s Schläfli discovered knows that space can have any number of dimensions, and that there are fundamental objects and motions to be discovered in four dimensions that are even more various and interesting than those we can discover in three. The strange thing, when we think about it that way, is that there ''is'' a boundary between three and four dimensional space. ''Why'' can't we move (or apparently, see) in more than three dimensions? Why is our physical world apparently only three dimensional? Why would it have just ''three'' dimensions, and not four, or five, or the ''n'' dimensions that Schläfli mapped? What is the nature of the boundary which confines us to just three dimensions? We know that in Euclidean geometry the boundary between three and four dimensions is itself a spherical three dimensional space, so we should suspect that we are materially confined within such a curved boundary surface. Light need not be confined with us within our three dimensional boundary space. We would look directly through four dimensional space in our natural way, by receiving light signals that travelled through it to us on straight lines. In that case the reason we do not observe a fourth spatial dimension in our vicinity is that there are no nearby objects in it, just off our hyperplane in the wild. The nearest 4-ball object we can see with our eyes is our sun, which lies equatorially in our own hyperplane, though it bulges out of it above and below. But when we look up at the heavens, every pinprick of light we observe is itself a four-dimensional object off our hyperplane, and they are distributed all around us in four-dimensional space through which we gaze. We are four-dimensionally sighted creatures, even though our bodies are three-dimensional objects, thin as an atom in the fourth dimension. But that should not perplex us: we can see into three dimensional space even though our retinas are two dimensional objects, thin as a photoreceptor cell. Our unconscious provincial concept is that there is nothing else outside our three dimensional world: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But Schläfli discovered something else: all the astonishing regular objects that exist in higher dimensions, which vastly extend our notions of the beauty and mystery of space itself, and the intrinsic spatial symmetries of our universe which geometry reveals. Space is more commodious than we thought it was, and permits previously unimagined objects and motions. So our provincial conception of our place in it now has the same kind of status as our idea that the sun rises in the east and passes overhead: it is mere appearance, not a true model and no longer a proper explanation. An inertial boundary is a proper explanation, be it ever so thin. And would a boundary of ''no'' thickness, a mere abstraction with no physical power to separate, be a more suitable explanation? We must look for a physically powerful explanation in the geometry of space itself, which general relativity properly associates with the gravitational or inertial force. <blockquote>The number of dimensions possessed by a figure is the number of straight lines each perpendicular to all the others which can be drawn on it. Thus a point has no dimensions, a straight line one, a plane surface two, and a solid three .... In space as we now know it only three lines can be imagined perpendicular to each other. A fourth line, perpendicular to all the other three would be quite invisible and unimaginable to us. We ourselves and all the material things around us probably possess a fourth dimension, of which we are quite unaware. If not, from a four-dimensional point of view we are mere geometrical abstractions, like geometrical surfaces, lines, and points are to us. But this thickness in the fourth dimension must be exceedingly minute, if it exists at all. That is, we could only draw an exceedingly small line perpendicular to our three perpendicular lines, length, breadth and thickness, so small that no microscope could ever perceive it. We can find out something about the conditions of the fourth and higher dimensions if they exist, without being certain that they do exist, by a process which I have termed "Dimensional Analogy."<ref>{{Citation|title=Dimensional Analogy|last=Coxeter|first=Donald|date=February 1923|publisher=Coxeter Fonds, University of Toronto Archives|authorlink=W:Harold Scott MacDonald Coxeter|series=|postscript=|work=}}</ref></blockquote> I believe, but I cannot prove, that we live in real space, which is Schläfli's Euclidean space of ''n'' analogous dimensions. As Grassmann showed first, space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. There will always be higher dimensions to discover, first in imagination and then to explore physically, each an astonishing new enlightenment.<ref>{{Cite book|first=T.S.|last=Eliot|title=Little Gidding|volume=Four Quartets|year=1943}}<blockquote> :We shall not cease from exploration :And the end of all our exploring :Will be to arrive where we started :And know the place for the first time. :Through the unknown, remembered gate :When the last of earth left to discover :Is that which was the beginning; :At the source of the longest river :The voice of the hidden waterfall :And the children in the apple-tree :Not known, because not looked for :But heard, half-heard, in the stillness :Between two waves of the sea. </blockquote></ref> Schläfli discovered every regular convex polytope that exists in any dimension, but that was only the beginning of the story of dimensional analogy, not its end or even the end of its beginning. That project is forever beginning anew. Coxeter discovered that Schläfli's Euclidean space is an expression of intrinsic symmetries, as Noether discovered all of physics is. Kappraff and Adamson discovered that even the sequences of humble regular polygons have fractal complexity, so symmetry itself is chaotic, always reachable but forever beyond our complete grasp. We are on a wilderness project, and just at its beginning, but already we observe a Euclidean space of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions in which all objects with mass move ceaselessly at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate at which everything moves, quantum events occur, and each of our proper times evolves. I believe these facts explain the experimentally verified theories of relativity and quantum mechanics, by revealing their unified polycentric geometry, the same way the facts about Copernicus's heliocentric solar system explained the observed motions of the planets, by revealing the geometry of gravity to Kepler. But others will have to do the math, work out the physics, and perform experiments to prove or disprove all of this, because I don't have the mathematics; entirely unlike Coxeter and Einstein, I am illiterate in those languages. <blockquote> ::::::BEECH :Where my imaginary line :Bends square in woods, an iron spine :And pile of real rocks have been founded. :And off this corner in the wild, :Where these are driven in and piled, :One tree, by being deeply wounded, :Has been impressed as Witness Tree :And made commit to memory :My proof of being not unbounded. :Thus truth's established and borne out, :Though circumstanced with dark and doubt— :Though by a world of doubt surrounded. :::::::—''The Moodie Forester''<ref>{{Cite book|title=A Witness Tree|last=Frost|first=Robert|year=1942|series=The Poetry of Robert Frost|publisher=Holt, Rinehart and Winston|edition=1969|}}</ref> </blockquote> == Appendix: Sequence of regular 4-polytopes == {{Regular convex 4-polytopes|wiki=W:|columns=7}} == ... == {{Efn|In a ''[[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]] displacement'', also known as an [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], all the Clifford parallel{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} invariant planes are displaced in four orthogonal directions (two completely orthogonal planes) at once: they are rotated by the same angle, and at the same time they are tilted ''sideways'' by that same angle. A [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|Clifford displacement]] is [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensionally diagonal]].{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} Every plane that is Clifford parallel to one of the completely orthogonal planes (including in this case an entire Clifford parallel bundle of 4 hexagons, but not all 16 hexagons) is invariant under the isoclinic rotation: all the points in the plane rotate in circles but remain in the plane, even as the whole plane tilts sideways. All 16 hexagons rotate by the same angle (though only 4 of them do so invariantly). All 16 hexagons are rotated by 60 degrees, and also displaced sideways by 60 degrees to a Clifford parallel hexagon. All of the other central polygons (e.g. squares) are also displaced to a Clifford parallel polygon 60 degrees away.|name=Clifford displacement}} {{Efn|It is not difficult to visualize four hexagonal planes intersecting at 60 degrees to each other, even in three dimensions. Four hexagonal central planes intersect at 60 degrees in the [[W:cuboctahedron|cuboctahedron]]. Four of the 24-cell's 16 hexagonal central planes (lying in the same 3-dimensional hyperplane) intersect at each of the 24-cell's vertices exactly the way they do at the center of a cuboctahedron. But the ''edges'' around the vertex do not meet as the radii do at the center of a cuboctahedron; the 24-cell has 8 edges around each vertex, not 12, so its vertex figure is the cube, not the cuboctahedron. The 8 edges meet exactly the way 8 edges do at the apex of a canonical [[W:cubic pyramid]|cubic pyramid]].{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}}|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} {{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} {{Efn|Eight {{sqrt|1}} edges converge in curved 3-dimensional space from the corners of the 24-cell's cubical vertex figure{{Efn|The [[W:vertex figure|vertex figure]] is the facet which is made by truncating a vertex; canonically, at the mid-edges incident to the vertex. But one can make similar vertex figures of different radii by truncating at any point along those edges, up to and including truncating at the adjacent vertices to make a ''full size'' vertex figure. Stillwell defines the vertex figure as "the convex hull of the neighbouring vertices of a given vertex".{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=17}} That is what serves the illustrative purpose here.|name=full size vertex figure}} and meet at its center (the vertex), where they form 4 straight lines which cross there. The 8 vertices of the cube are the eight nearest other vertices of the 24-cell. The straight lines are geodesics: two {{sqrt|1}}-length segments of an apparently straight line (in the 3-space of the 24-cell's curved surface) that is bent in the 4th dimension into a great circle hexagon (in 4-space). Imagined from inside this curved 3-space, the bends in the hexagons are invisible. From outside (if we could view the 24-cell in 4-space), the straight lines would be seen to bend in the 4th dimension at the cube centers, because the center is displaced outward in the 4th dimension, out of the hyperplane defined by the cube's vertices. Thus the vertex cube is actually a [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]]. Unlike a cube, it seems to be radially equilateral (like the tesseract and the 24-cell itself): its "radius" equals its edge length.{{Efn|The vertex cubic pyramid is not actually radially equilateral,{{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} because the edges radiating from its apex are not actually its radii: the apex of the [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]] is not actually its center, just one of its vertices.}}|name=24-cell vertex figure}} {{Efn|The hexagons are inclined (tilted) at 60 degrees with respect to the unit radius coordinate system's orthogonal planes. Each hexagonal plane contains only ''one'' of the 4 coordinate system axes.{{Efn|Each great hexagon of the 24-cell contains one axis (one pair of antipodal vertices) belonging to each of the three inscribed 16-cells. The 24-cell contains three disjoint inscribed 16-cells, rotated 60° isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other (so their corresponding vertices are 120° {{=}} {{radic|3}} apart). A [[16-cell#Coordinates|16-cell is an orthonormal ''basis'']] for a 4-dimensional coordinate system, because its 8 vertices define the four orthogonal axes. In any choice of a vertex-up coordinate system (such as the unit radius coordinates used in this article), one of the three inscribed 16-cells is the basis for the coordinate system, and each hexagon has only ''one'' axis which is a coordinate system axis.|name=three basis 16-cells}} The hexagon consists of 3 pairs of opposite vertices (three 24-cell diameters): one opposite pair of ''integer'' coordinate vertices (one of the four coordinate axes), and two opposite pairs of ''half-integer'' coordinate vertices (not coordinate axes). For example: {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}1,{{spaces|2}}0) {{indent|5}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|5}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,–1,{{spaces|2}}0)<br> is a hexagon on the ''y'' axis. Unlike the {{sqrt|2}} squares, the hexagons are actually made of 24-cell edges, so they are visible features of the 24-cell.|name=non-orthogonal hexagons|group=}} {{Efn|Visualize the three [[16-cell]]s inscribed in the 24-cell (left, right, and middle), and the rotation which takes them to each other. [[24-cell#Reciprocal constructions from 8-cell and 16-cell|The vertices of the middle 16-cell lie on the (w, x, y, z) coordinate axes]];{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} the other two are rotated 60° [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinically]] to its left and its right. The 24-vertex 24-cell is a compound of three 16-cells, whose three sets of 8 vertices are distributed around the 24-cell symmetrically; each vertex is surrounded by 8 others (in the 3-dimensional space of the 4-dimensional 24-cell's ''surface''), the way the vertices of a cube surround its center.{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}} The 8 surrounding vertices (the cube corners) lie in other 16-cells: 4 in the other 16-cell to the left, and 4 in the other 16-cell to the right. They are the vertices of two tetrahedra inscribed in the cube, one belonging (as a cell) to each 16-cell. If the 16-cell edges are {{radic|2}}, each vertex of the compound of three 16-cells is {{radic|1}} away from its 8 surrounding vertices in other 16-cells. Now visualize those {{radic|1}} distances as the edges of the 24-cell (while continuing to visualize the disjoint 16-cells). The {{radic|1}} edges form great hexagons of 6 vertices which run around the 24-cell in a central plane. ''Four'' hexagons cross at each vertex (and its antipodal vertex), inclined at 60° to each other.{{Efn|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} The [[24-cell#Hexagons|hexagons]] are not perpendicular to each other, or to the 16-cells' perpendicular [[24-cell#Squares|square central planes]].{{Efn|name=non-orthogonal hexagons}} The left and right 16-cells form a tesseract.{{Efn|Each pair of the three 16-cells inscribed in the 24-cell forms a 4-dimensional [[W:tesseract|hypercube (a tesseract or 8-cell)]], in [[24-cell#Relationships among interior polytopes|dimensional analogy]] to the way two tetrahedra form a cube: the two 8-vertex 16-cells are inscribed in the 16-vertex tesseract, occupying its alternate vertices. The third 16-cell does not lie within the tesseract; its 8 vertices protrude from the sides of the tesseract, forming a cubic pyramid on each of the tesseract's cubic cells. The three pairs of 16-cells form three tesseracts.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} The tesseracts share vertices, but the 16-cells are completely disjoint.{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}}|name=three 16-cells form three tesseracts}} Two 16-cells have vertex-pairs which are one {{radic|1}} edge (one hexagon edge) apart. But a [[24-cell#Simple rotations|''simple'' rotation]] of 60° will not take one whole 16-cell to another 16-cell, because their vertices are 60° apart in different directions, and a simple rotation has only one hexagonal plane of rotation. One 16-cell ''can'' be taken to another 16-cell by a 60° [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|''isoclinic'' rotation]], because an isoclinic rotation is [[3-sphere]] symmetric: four [[24-cell#Clifford parallel polytopes|Clifford parallel hexagonal planes]] rotate together, but in four different rotational directions,{{Efn|name=Clifford displacement}} taking each 16-cell to another 16-cell. But since an isoclinic 60° rotation is a ''diagonal'' rotation by 60° in ''two'' completely orthogonal directions at once,{{Efn|name=isoclinic geodesic}} the corresponding vertices of the 16-cell and the 16-cell it is taken to are 120° apart: ''two'' {{radic|1}} hexagon edges (or one {{radic|3}} hexagon chord) apart, not one {{radic|1}} edge (60°) apart as in a simple rotation.{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} By the [[W:chiral|chiral]] diagonal nature of isoclinic rotations, the 16-cell ''cannot'' reach the adjacent 16-cell by rotating toward it; it can only reach the 16-cell ''beyond'' it. But of course, the 16-cell beyond the 16-cell to its right is the 16-cell to its left. So a 60° isoclinic rotation ''will'' take every 16-cell to another 16-cell: a 60° ''right'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we may have originally visualized as the ''left'' 16-cell, and a 60° ''left'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we visualized as the ''right'' 16-cell. (If so, that was our error in visualization; the 16-cell to the "left" is in fact the one reached by the left isoclinic rotation, as that is the only sense in which the two 16-cells are left or right of each other.)|name=three isoclinic 16-cells}} {{Efn|In a double rotation each vertex can be said to move along two completely orthogonal great circles at the same time, but it does not stay within the central plane of either of those original great circles; rather, it moves along a helical geodesic that traverses diagonally between great circles. The two completely orthogonal planes of rotation are said to be ''invariant'' because the points in each stay in the plane ''as the plane moves'', tilting sideways by the same angle that the other plane rotates.|name=helical geodesic}} {{Efn|A point under isoclinic rotation traverses the diagonal{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} straight line of a single '''isoclinic geodesic''', reaching its destination directly, instead of the bent line of two successive '''simple geodesics'''. A '''[[W:geodesic|geodesic]]''' is the ''shortest path'' through a space (intuitively, a string pulled taught between two points). Simple geodesics are great circles lying in a central plane (the only kind of geodesics that occur in 3-space on the 2-sphere). Isoclinic geodesics are different: they do ''not'' lie in a single plane; they are 4-dimensional [[W:helix|spirals]] rather than simple 2-dimensional circles.{{Efn|name=helical geodesic}} But they are not like 3-dimensional [[W:screw threads|screw threads]] either, because they form a closed loop like any circle (after ''two'' revolutions). Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'', and they are just as circular as 2-dimensional circles: in fact, twice as circular, because they curve in a circle in two completely orthogonal directions at once.{{Efn|Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'' in the sense that they are 1-dimensional geodesic ''lines'' that curve in 4-space in two completely orthogonal planes at once. They should not be confused with ''great 2-spheres'',{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=24}} which are the 4-dimensional analogues of 2-dimensional great circles (great 1-spheres).}} These '''isoclines''' are geodesic 1-dimensional lines embedded in a 4-dimensional space. On the 3-sphere{{Efn|All isoclines are geodesics, and isoclines on the 3-sphere are circles (curving equally in each dimension), but not all isoclines on 3-manifolds in 4-space are circles.}} they always occur in [[W:chiral|chiral]] pairs and form a pair of [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]s on the [[W:Clifford torus|Clifford torus]],{{Efn|Isoclines on the 3-sphere occur in non-intersecting chiral pairs. A left and a right isocline form a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]] called the {1,1} torus knot{{Sfn|Dorst|2019|loc=§1. Villarceau Circles|p=44|ps=; "In mathematics, the path that the (1, 1) knot on the torus traces is also known as a [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]. Villarceau circles are usually introduced as two intersecting circles that are the cross-section of a torus by a well-chosen plane cutting it. Picking one such circle and rotating it around the torus axis, the resulting family of circles can be used to rule the torus. By nesting tori smartly, the collection of all such circles then form a [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fibration]].... we prefer to consider the Villarceau circle as the (1, 1) torus knot [a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]] rather than as a planar cut [two intersecting circles]."}} in which ''each'' of the two linked circles traverses all four dimensions.}} the paths of the left and the right [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Double rotations|isoclinic rotation]]. They are [[W:Helix|helices]] bent into a [[W:Möbius strip|Möbius loop]] in the fourth dimension, taking a diagonal [[W:Winding number|winding route]] twice around the 3-sphere through the non-adjacent vertices of a 4-polytope's [[W:Skew polygon#Regular skew polygons in four dimensions|skew polygon]].|name=isoclinic geodesic}} {{Efn|[[File:Hopf band wikipedia.png|thumb|150px|Two [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles spanned by a twisted [[W:Annulus (mathematics)|annulus]].]][[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]]s are non-intersecting curved lines that are parallel in the sense that the perpendicular (shortest) distance between them is the same at each point. A double helix is an example of Clifford parallelism in ordinary 3-dimensional Euclidean space. In 4-space Clifford parallels occur as geodesic great circles on the [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]].{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|pp=8-10|loc=Relations to Clifford Parallelism}} Whereas in 3-dimensional space, any two geodesic great circles on the [[W:2-sphere|2-sphere]] will always intersect at two antipodal points, in 4-dimensional space not all great circles intersect. In 4-polytopes various discrete sets of Clifford parallel non-intersecting geodesic great circles can be found on the 3-sphere. They spiral around each other in [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fiber bundles]] which visit all the vertices just once. The simplest example is that six mutually orthogonal great circles can be drawn on the 3-sphere, as three pairs of completely orthogonal great circles, intersecting at 8 points defining a [[16-cell]]. Each completely orthogonal pair of circles is Clifford parallel. They cannot intersect at all, because they lie in planes which intersect at only one point: the center of the 16-cell. Because they are perpendicular and share a common center, the two circles are obviously not parallel and separate in the usual way of parallel circles in 3 dimensions; rather they are connected like adjacent links in a chain, each passing through the other without intersecting at any points, forming a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]|name=Clifford parallels}} {{Efn|In the 24-cell each great square plane is completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to another great square plane, and each great hexagon plane is completely orthogonal to a plane which intersects only two vertices: a great [[W:digon|digon]] plane.|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} {{Efn|In an [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], each point anywhere in the 4-polytope moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions at once, on a [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensional diagonal]]. The point is displaced a total [[W:Pythagorean distance]] equal to the square root of four times the square of that distance. For example, when the unit-radius 24-cell rotates isoclinically 60° in a hexagon invariant plane and 60° in its completely orthogonal invariant plane,{{Efn|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} all vertices are displaced to a vertex two edge lengths away. Each vertex is displaced to another vertex {{radic|3}} (120°) away, moving {{radic|3/4}} in four orthogonal coordinate directions.|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} {{Efn|Each square plane is isoclinic (Clifford parallel) to five other square planes but completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to only one of them.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Every pair of completely orthogonal planes has Clifford parallel great circles, but not all Clifford parallel great circles are orthogonal (e.g., none of the hexagonal geodesics in the 24-cell are mutually orthogonal).|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}} {{Efn|In the [[16-cell#Rotations|16-cell]] the 6 orthogonal great squares form 3 pairs of completely orthogonal great circles; each pair is Clifford parallel. In the 24-cell, the 3 inscribed 16-cells lie rotated 60 degrees isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other; consequently their corresponding vertices are 120 degrees apart on a hexagonal great circle. Pairing their vertices which are 90 degrees apart reveals corresponding square great circles which are Clifford parallel. Each of the 18 square great circles is Clifford parallel not only to one other square great circle in the same 16-cell (the completely orthogonal one), but also to two square great circles (which are completely orthogonal to each other) in each of the other two 16-cells. (Completely orthogonal great circles are Clifford parallel, but not all Clifford parallels are orthogonal.{{Efn|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}}) A 60 degree isoclinic rotation of the 24-cell in hexagonal invariant planes takes each square great circle to a Clifford parallel (but non-orthogonal) square great circle in a different 16-cell.|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} {{Efn|In 4 dimensional space we can construct 4 perpendicular axes and 6 perpendicular planes through a point. Without loss of generality, we may take these to be the axes and orthogonal central planes of a (w, x, y, z) Cartesian coordinate system. In 4 dimensions we have the same 3 orthogonal planes (xy, xz, yz) that we have in 3 dimensions, and also 3 others (wx, wy, wz). Each of the 6 orthogonal planes shares an axis with 4 of the others, and is ''completely orthogonal'' to just one of the others: the only one with which it does not share an axis. Thus there are 3 pairs of completely orthogonal planes: xy and wz intersect only at the origin; xz and wy intersect only at the origin; yz and wx intersect only at the origin.|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} {{Efn|Two planes in 4-dimensional space can have four possible reciprocal positions: (1) they can coincide (be exactly the same plane); (2) they can be parallel (the only way they can fail to intersect at all); (3) they can intersect in a single line, as two non-parallel planes do in 3-dimensional space; or (4) '''they can intersect in a single point'''{{Efn|To visualize how two planes can intersect in a single point in a four dimensional space, consider the Euclidean space (w, x, y, z) and imagine that the w dimension represents time rather than a spatial dimension. The xy central plane (where w{{=}}0, z{{=}}0) shares no axis with the wz central plane (where x{{=}}0, y{{=}}0). The xy plane exists at only a single instant in time (w{{=}}0); the wz plane (and in particular the w axis) exists all the time. Thus their only moment and place of intersection is at the origin point (0,0,0,0).|name=how planes intersect at a single point}} (and they ''must'', if they are completely orthogonal).{{Efn|Two flat planes A and B of a Euclidean space of four dimensions are called ''completely orthogonal'' if and only if every line in A is orthogonal to every line in B. In that case the planes A and B intersect at a single point O, so that if a line in A intersects with a line in B, they intersect at O.{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}}|name=completely orthogonal planes}}|name=how planes intersect}} {{Efn|Polytopes are '''completely disjoint''' if all their ''element sets'' are disjoint: they do not share any vertices, edges, faces or cells. They may still overlap in space, sharing 4-content, volume, area, or lineage.|name=completely disjoint}} {{Efn|If the [[W:Euclidean distance|Pythagorean distance]] between any two vertices is {{sqrt|1}}, their geodesic distance is 1; they may be two adjacent vertices (in the curved 3-space of the surface), or a vertex and the center (in 4-space). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|2}}, their geodesic distance is 2 (whether via 3-space or 4-space, because the path along the edges is the same straight line with one 90^o bend in it as the path through the center). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|3}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 (whether on a hexagonal great circle past one 60^o bend, or as a straight line with one 60^o bend in it through the center). Finally, if their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|4}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 in 4-space (straight through the center), but it reaches 3 in 3-space (by going halfway around a hexagonal great circle).|name=Geodesic distance}} {{Efn|Two angles are required to fix the relative positions of two planes in 4-space.{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|p=7|loc=§6 Angles between two Planes in 4-Space|ps=; "In four (and higher) dimensions, we need two angles to fix the relative position between two planes. (More generally, ''k'' angles are defined between ''k''-dimensional subspaces.)"}} Since all planes in the same [[W:hyperplane|hyperplane]] are 0 degrees apart in one of the two angles, only one angle is required in 3-space. Great hexagons in different hyperplanes are 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles. Great squares in different hyperplanes are 90 degrees apart in ''both'' angles (completely orthogonal){{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} or 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles.{{Efn||name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Planes which are separated by two equal angles are called ''isoclinic''. Planes which are isoclinic have [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} A great square and a great hexagon in different hyperplanes are neither isoclinic nor Clifford parallel; they are separated by a 90 degree angle ''and'' a 60 degree angle.|name=two angles between central planes}} {{Efn|The 24-cell contains 3 distinct 8-cells (tesseracts), rotated 60° isoclinically with respect to each other. The corresponding vertices of two 8-cells are {{radic|3}} (120°) apart. Each 8-cell contains 8 cubical cells, and each cube contains four {{radic|3}} chords (its long diagonals). The 8-cells are not completely disjoint{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}} (they share vertices), but each cube and each {{radic|3}} chord belongs to just one 8-cell. The {{radic|3}} chords joining the corresponding vertices of two 8-cells belong to the third 8-cell.|name=three 8-cells}} {{Efn|Departing from any vertex V₀ in the original great hexagon plane of isoclinic rotation P₀, the first vertex reached V₁ is 120 degrees away along a {{radic|3}} chord lying in a different hexagonal plane P₁. P₁ is inclined to P₀ at a 60° angle.{{Efn|P₀ and P₁ lie in the same hyperplane (the same central cuboctahedron) so their other angle of separation is 0.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}}}} The second vertex reached V₂ is 120 degrees beyond V₁ along a second {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₂ that is Clifford parallel to P₀.{{Efn|P₀ and P₂ are 60° apart in ''both'' angles of separation.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}} Clifford parallel planes are isoclinic (which means they are separated by two equal angles), and their corresponding vertices are all the same distance apart. Although V₀ and V₂ are ''two'' {{radic|3}} chords apart{{Efn|V₀ and V₂ are two {{radic|3}} chords apart on the geodesic path of this rotational isocline, but that is not the shortest geodesic path between them. In the 24-cell, it is impossible for two vertices to be more distant than ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord, unless they are antipodal vertices {{radic|4}} apart.{{Efn|name=Geodesic distance}} V₀ and V₂ are ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord apart on some other isocline. More generally, isoclines are geodesics because the distance between their ''adjacent'' vertices is the shortest distance between those two vertices, but a path between two vertices along a geodesic is not always the shortest distance between them (even on ordinary great circle geodesics).}}, P₀ and P₂ are just one {{radic|1}} edge apart (at every pair of ''nearest'' vertices).}} (Notice that V₁ lies in both intersecting planes P₁ and P₂, as V₀ lies in both P₀ and P₁. But P₀ and P₂ have ''no'' vertices in common; they do not intersect.) The third vertex reached V₃ is 120 degrees beyond V₂ along a third {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₃ that is Clifford parallel to P₁. The three {{radic|3}} chords lie in different 8-cells.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} V₀ to V₃ is a 360° isoclinic rotation.|name=360 degree geodesic path visiting 3 hexagonal planes}} {{Sfn|Mamone, Pileio & Levitt|2010|loc=§4.5 Regular Convex 4-Polytopes|pp=1438-1439|ps=; the 24-cell has 1152 symmetry operations (rotations and reflections) as enumerated in Table 2, symmetry group 𝐹₄.}} ==Notes== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Notelist|wiki=W:}} ==Citations== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Reflist|wiki=W:}} ==References== {{Refbegin}} * {{Cite book|title=A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers|last=Thoreau|first=Henry David|author-link=W:Thoreau|publisher=James Munroe and Company|year=1849|isbn=|location=Boston|ref={{SfnRef|Thoreau|1849}}}} * {{Cite journal|title=Theoretical Evidence for Principles of Special Relativity Based on Isotropic and Uniform Four-Dimensional Space|first=Takuya|last=Yamashita|date=25 May 2023|doi= 10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|journal=Preprints|volume=2023|issue=2023051785|url=https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|ref={{SfnRef|Yamashita|2023}}}} * {{Cite_arXiv | arxiv=2512.02903v2 | date=2 January 2026 | title=Symmetry transformation group arising from the Laplace–Runge–Lenz vector | first1=Stephen C. | last1=Anco | first2=Mahdieh Gol Bashmani | last2=Moghadam | class=math-ph}} === [[Polyscheme|Polyschemes]] === {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Refs|wiki=W:}} {{Refend}} rdf1pjlbsmkb76b6x7d67kfatn7oew1 2842388 2842333 2026-10-24T00:13:57Z Dc.samizdat 2856930 /* Quantum mechanics is the atomic kinematics of Coxeter groups generated by reflections in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions */ 2842388 wikitext text/x-wiki {{align|center|David Brooks Christie}} {{align|center|dc@samizdat.org}} {{align|center|Draft in progress}} {{align|center|June 2023 - October 2026}} <blockquote>'''Abstract:''' The physical universe is properly visualized as real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are 4-polytopes, small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are 4-balls of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. We ourselves and the objects we observe near us are only 3-dimensional, but nonetheless we can see into four dimensions of space. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. Light from them reaches us directly, on straight lines through 4-space. This view of the observed universe is compatible with special and general relativity, and with quantum mechanics. It furnishes those theories with an explanatory geometric model.</blockquote> == Summary == We observe that: * Physical space has four perpendicular dimensions, not just three. * Atoms are [[W:4-polytope|4-polytopes]]. * The sun is a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]] that is round in four dimensions. * Everything of intermediate size between an atom and a star, including us and our planet, lies in a 3-dimensional manifold of ordinary space. * Our entire 3-space manifold is moving through Euclidean 4-space at the speed of light, in a direction perpendicular to its three interior dimensions. * Special relativity describes the linear motion of objects and light signals in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * General relativity describes the rotational motion of objects with mass in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * Quantum mechanics describes the symmetry group actions of elementary geometric objects (4-polytopes) in four-dimensional Euclidean space. == A theory of the Euclidean cosmos == The physical universe is properly visualized as [[w:Four-dimensional_space|real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>]] of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are [[w:4-polytope|4-polytopes]], small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are [[W:4-ball|4-balls]] of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. Objects intermediate in size between atoms and stars, including molecules, people, and planetery surfaces their surface, are so flat as to be essentially 3-dimensional, having only the thickness of an atom in the orthogonal fourth dimension. All objects with mass move inertially through Euclidean 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math> as long as they exist, and acceleration only varies their direction. Objects moving in the same direction are in the same inertial reference frame. Their direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> is their proper time dimension, simply because their direction and velocity of motion through time is the same as their direction and velocity of motion through space. A typical galaxy such as ours occupies a 4-ball of mostly empty space, with stars and other objects distributed non-uniformly within it. The galaxy's orbital center may be nothing: a smaller 4-ball of empty space they surround. The stars in our spiral galaxy appear from our accustomed point of view to occupy a disk-like region of 3-dimensional space, with a denser ball-like center, but they are not so confined: they are distributed within a region of 4-dimensional space. The disk and ball have thickness not only in the third dimension, but in the fourth spatial dimension as well. Light from stars and galaxies reaches us on straight lines through Euclidean 4-space, so from our viewpoint, in what we have always imagined to be a 3-space universe, we look into the surrounding 4-space. Although we are physically confined within a 3-dimensional hyperplane by the inertia of our motion through 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math>, light signals are not so confined, so we observe all the cosmological objects surrounding us, both in and above or below our hyperplane, without perceiving their separation in our fourth orthogonal dimension, the direction of our motion. We may perceive a galaxy as elliptical when it is actually spherical, because that is how its image projects from its 4-ball shape into a 3-ball region in our hyperplane, where we measure it with our 3-dimensional bodies. More generally, orbits are circular in 4-space, but elliptical in the 3-space of their elliptic hyperplane. The galaxy as a whole, or more properly its orbital barycenter, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, in a distinct direction orthogonal to all three dimensions of our ordinary proper 3-space. Stars within the galaxy are translating with it at the same velocity <math>c</math> in the same direction, but on spiral trajectories as they pursue their various orbits within the galaxy. The galaxy as a whole occupies a 4-ball within its proper inertial reference frame (that is, in the moving frame of reference in which the galaxy considers itself to be a stationary rotating 4-ball). Over time, the galaxy 4-ball occupies a 4-dimensional cylinder and progresses along the cylinder's axis at velocity <math>c</math>. In this more universal inertial reference frame, the stars in the galaxy follow helical geodesic paths through the 4-cylinder; their trajectories are screw-translations through 4-space, the compound of a simple rotation and a completely orthogonal linear translation. The gravitational force and the inertial tendency to follow a geodesic are the same phenomenon, by the equivalence principle. That said, they can be distinguished, and the galaxy is held together primarily by gravity as inertia, not by gravity as attraction to a central mass toward which objects fall in orbit. There is not enough mass in the galaxy to hold it together by attraction, there is just enough to bend the stars' trajectories toward each other, in helical orbits around the galaxy's barycentric axis of motion. It is the tremendous inertial force of stars in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> that holds the cylinder of motion together, not some invisible dark matter. The observed universe as a whole appears to be a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] expanding radially from a central origin point at velocity <math>c</math>, the invariant velocity of mass-carrying objects through 4-space, also the propagation speed of light relative to any moving 3-space manifold, as measured by all observers. A 3-sphere is a hypersphere in Euclidean 4-space, but the enclosing surface of a 3-sphere is a curved, finite 3-space, dimensionally analogous to the surface of the earth which is a curved, finite 2-space. This 3-sphere could be the domain of our visible cosmos, but of course we do not know for certain that all the cosmological objects we observe lie near the surface of our expanding 3-sphere, since it is only our assumption that they must all have originated in the same big bang long ago. Possibly some of the more distant objects we observe did not, and lie elsewhere, outside our big-bang's 3-sphere of outflying matter or even inside its 3-sphere, below its surface. We cannot assume that all objects in the 4-space universe lie near the surface of the same expanding 3-sphere. For all observers, the conjectured big-bang of their origin corresponds not only to a now-distant point in their proper time past, it also corresponds to a distinct now-distant point in 4-dimensional space: the same point in the same Euclidean 4-space for all observers with the same origin. Our big bang had a distinct origin point in real space as well as in real time. More generally, time and Euclidean 4-space can be measured independently, just as time and Euclidean 3-space were measured classically, without the necessity to combine them as spacetime. The same inertial force which holds the galactic cylinder of motion together also confines us physically to an exceedingly thin three-dimensional surface manifold moving through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. All objects in our solar system too small to have their own gravity lie entirely within this thinest three-dimensional manifold, and have only the thickness of an atom in their direction-of-motion fourth dimension. That is why we are 3-dimensional objects ourselves, and why we cannot construct more than three perpendiculars through a single point in our local 3-dimensional space. A spherical region of 4-space is called a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]]. The enclosing surface of a 4-ball of any size is a finite, curved (non-Euclidean) 3-dimensional space called a [[w:3-sphere|3-sphere]]. Our entire big-bang-origin universe appears to be the largest 3-sphere we observe, but each of the cosmological objects within it (including our galaxy and our sun) lies within a smaller 3-sphere shell which bounds it, lying (we assume) on the largest 3-sphere embedded in its surface, like a soap bubble on the surface of a larger soap bubble. All the 3-dimensional surfaces are expanding, as the largest 3-sphere inflates at radial velocity <math>c</math>. We ourselves live within such an expanding 3-dimensional surface, in an infinitesimally curved 3-manifold surface embedded in Euclidean 4-space. That surface is the ordinary 3-dimensional space we experience. The earth and all the planets lie on it. Our solar system is only a small patch on the surface of a dimensionally rounder space, although that surface is not infinite. It is curved, and finite, analogous to the way the 2-dimensional surface of the earth -- once thought to be flat -- is curved and finite. Our solar system occupies a small patch on a filmy 4-dimensional soap-bubble of galactic size rounded by gravity, that is thicker-skinned than the diameter of an atom only in the superdense interior of objects large enough to have significant gravity of their own. Our 3-manifold of ordinary space, as a surface within our moving 4-ball galaxy, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> with the galaxy, in a distinct direction orthogonal to the manifold's three orthogonal dimensions of interior space. At every material point in the manifold (at every atom), the translation through 4-space is following a geometric law of motion discovered by Coxeter, that governs the propagation of individual objects through Euclidean space by the actions of their symmetry groups. The solar system's atoms of mass are 4-polytopes that are simultaneously rotating and translating, and as they advance together they define a moving 3-dimensional manifold by their own collective inertia, also called gravity, the property of matter's ceaseless propagation through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate of causality at which quantum events occur, all objects move, and the universe evolves. Any moving 3-dimensional manifold such as ours is an evolving surface boundary that is empty in most places, occupied by single atoms in comparatively fewer places, and occupied by bound complexes of multiple atoms (molecules) in still fewer places. In all these places it is no thicker than one atom in the dimension corresponding to its direction of translation, because molecules are 3-dimensional complexes of atoms that add no thickness to the manifold. In fewer places still it is occupied by large lumps of matter which exert a significant gravitational attraction, such as planets and their satellites. These round gravitational objects are thicker than one atom in their fourth dimension, but not uniformly so. They are disk-like 4-dimensional objects, 3-balls that are flattish in the fourth dimension. They are typically only one atom thick at the 4-disk's sharp edge, but they may be much thicker in the center of the 4-disk, particularly if their gravity is strong enough to give them a core of superdense matter, like the earth's deep core. The moving surface manifold cannot be thicker than one atom at any point unless and until there is enough mass near that point for the force of gravity as attraction to overcome the force of gravity as inertia, allowing atoms to be "heaped up" into larger 4-dimensional objects that form a lump in its moving surface. We have only indirect experience of such 4-dimensional lumps of matter thicker than one atom, since they occur naturally in our vicinity only in regions of superdense matter, such as the core of the earth or the interior of the sun. Deep in the core of the earth under enormous gravitational pressure peculiar states of matter have been observed, defying our understanding of how 3-dimensional crystalline structures behave. That is because they are not 3-dimensional structures, they are 4-dimensional crystals. The earth is a disk-like 4-dimensional object that is thin at its edge but thicker at its sphere-like core, dimensionally analogous to a 3-dimensional flying saucer with a sharp circular edge. The earth's surface that we walk on is an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere), analogous to the circular edge of the flying saucer (a 1-sphere), and on that edge where we live every object we find (including our bodies) is 3-dimensional with only the thickness of an atom in the fourth dimension. We cannot walk on the top or bottom surface of the 4-disk flying saucer because those surfaces are 3-dimensional regions within the earth. The earth's deep core of superdense 4-dimensional matter occupies a spherical region of 4-dimensional space (a 4-ball). The sun is the only entirely spherical 4-ball occurring naturally in our solar system. We refer to the contents of such superdense 4-balls of matter as atomic plasma, and have little experimental knowledge of their internal geometry or processes. We know that the sun burns at its surface 3-sphere and emits radiation, and we know a good deal about those surface processes which are nuclear atomic processes, but we know very little about its interior 4-ball, a dimensionally rounder enclosed space whose existence we did not suspect. Every moving surface boundary of matter in the observed universe is evolving in four dimensions at velocity <math>c</math>. The current location in 4-space of any of its material objects corresponds to the present moment in the proper time of that object's inertial reference frame. The object's direction of movement at velocity <math>c</math> corresponds to its proper time dimension, which is a spiral over time, not a Euclidean (straight-line) dimension, since its direction is changing in its orbit. Objects with mass of all sizes, from subatomic particles to the largest objects observed in the cosmos, are perpetually in inertial rotational motion in some orbit, and simultaneously in inertial translational motion propagating themselves through 4-space, in two completely orthogonal inertial motions each at the constant universal rate of transformation <math>c</math>. Every object with mass moves relative to universal 4-coordinate Euclidean space on its own distinct geodesic spiral, a screw displacement trajectory that is the compound of its two completely orthogonal inertial motions, a rotation and a translation. Objects without mass such as photons lie off such moving surface boundaries of matter from which they were emitted, and their motion is of a different nature. They are in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> through all four dimensions concurrently, without any rotational component of motion, so they move through 4-space on straight lines at a compound velocity. The propagation speed of light measured on a straight line through Euclidean 4-space is <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, so we can see in four dimensions, even though we are physically confined to a 3-dimensional manifold that is moving at velocity <math>c</math>. For example, we can look across the center of the mostly-empty 4-ball containing our galaxy and see stars in the opposite sides of its concentric 3-sphere orbital surfaces. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. They move in the 4-space direction corresponding to their proper time, perpendicular to all three dimensions of their proper 3-space, and generally the farther they are from us the greater the divergence of their direction of motion from our direction of motion: the greater the relative motion between us, and the greater their Hubble redshift. Light from them reaches us directly, propagating on straight lines through 4-space at twice the velocity at which they, and we ourselves, are propagating through 4-space. This physical model of the observed universe is compatible with the theories of special and general relativity, and with the atomic theory of quantum mechanics. It explains those theories geometrically, as expressions of intrinsic symmetries in Euclidean space. == Symmetries == It is common to speak of nature as a web, and so it is, the great web of our physical experiences. Every web must have its root systems somewhere, and nature in this sense must be rooted in the symmetries which underlie physics and geometry, the [[W:Group (mathematics)|mathematics of groups]].{{Sfn|Conway, Burgiel & Goodman-Strauss|2008}} As I understand [[W:Noether's theorem|Noether's theorem]] (which is not mathematically), hers is the deepest meta-theory of nature yet, deeper than [[W:Theory of relativity|Einstein's relativity]] or [[W:Evolution|Darwin's evolution]] or [[W:Euclidean geometry|Euclid's geometry]]. It finds that all fundamental findings in physics are based on conservation laws which can be laid at the doors of distinct [[W:symmetry group |symmetry group]]s. Thus all fundamental systems in physics, as examples [[W:quantum chromodynamics|quantum chromodynamics]] (QCD) the theory of the strong force binding the atomic nucleus and [[W:quantum electrodynamics|quantum electrodynamics]] (QED) the theory of the electromagnetic force, each have a corresponding symmetry [[W:group theory|group theory]] of which they are an expression. [[W:Coxeter group|Coxeter's theory of symmetry groups]] generated by reflections did for geometry what Noether's theorem and Einstein's relativity did for physics. [[W:Coxeter|Coxeter]] showed that Euclidean geometry is based on conservation laws that correspond to distinct symmetry groups, and that their group actions express the principle of relativity. Here is Coxeter's formulation of the motions of objects (their congruent transformations) in an ''n''-dimensional Euclidean space, excerpted:{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|pp=217-218|loc=§12.2 Congruent transformations}} <blockquote>Let <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> denote a rotation, <math>\mathrm{R}</math> a reflection, <math>\mathrm{T}</math> a translation, and let <math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r\mathrm{T}</math> denote a product of several such transformations, all commutative with one another. Then <math>\mathrm{RT}</math> is a glide-reflection (in two or three dimensions), <math>\mathrm{QR}</math> is a rotary-reflection, <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is a screw-displacement, and <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is a double rotation (in four dimensions).<br> Every orthogonal transformation is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r \le n)</math>, the number of dimensions.<br> Transformations involving a translation are also expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + 1 \le n)</math>.<br> For <math>(n = 4)</math> in particular, every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> If we begin with this most elemental [[w:Kinematics|kinematics]] of Coxeter's, and also assume the [[W:Galilean relativity|Galilean principle of relativity]], every displacement in 4-space can be viewed as either a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> or a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, because we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> in a linearly moving (translating) reference frame. Therefore any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>. By the same principle, we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> as an isoclinic (equi-angled) <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> by proper choice of reference frame.{{Efn|[[W:Arthur Cayley|Cayley]] showed that any rotation in 4-space can be decomposed into two isoclinic rotations, which intuitively we might see follows from the fact that any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a [[W:SO(4)|rotation in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]].|name=Cayley's rotation factorization into two isoclinic reference frame transformations}} Coxeter's relation is thus a mathematical statement of the principle of relativity, on group-theoretic grounds. It correctly captures the limits to [[W:General relativity|general relativity]], in that we can only exchange the translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) for ''one'' of the two rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>). An observer in any inertial reference frame can always measure the presence, direction and velocity of ''one'' rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) up to uncertainty, and can always distinguish the direction of their own proper time translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>). As I understand Coxeter theory (which is not mathematically), the symmetry groups underlying physics seem to have an expression in a [[W:Euclidean space|Euclidean space]] of four [[W:dimension|dimension]]s, that is, they are [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|four-dimensional Euclidean geometry]]. Therefore as I understand that geometry (which is entirely by synthetic methods rather than by Clifford's algebraic methods), the [[W:Atom|atom]] seems to have a distinct Euclidean geometry, such that atoms and their constituent particles are four-dimensional geometric objects (4-polytopes), and nature can be understood in terms of their [[W:group action|group actions]], including centrally their group <math>SO(4)</math> [[W:rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space|rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]]. The distinct Coxeter symmetry groups have characteristic <math>SO(4)</math> rotational expressions as the [[W:Regular_4-polytope|regular 4-polytopes]]. Their discrete isoclinic rotations are distinguishing properties of fundamental objects in geometry, relativity and quantum mechanics. For example, atoms exhibit <math>SO(4)</math> symmetries of the discrete isoclinic (equi-angled) double rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>) of a set of regular 4-polytopes that is characteristic of their [[w:Atomic_number|atomic number]]. == Special relativity describes Euclidean 4-space == <blockquote>Our entire model of the universe is built on symmetries. Some, like isotropy (the laws are the same in all directions), homogeneity (same in all places), and time invariance (same at all times) seem natural enough. Even relativity, the Lorentz Invariance that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, has an elegance to it that makes it seem natural.<ref>{{Cite book|first=Dave|last=Goldberg|title=The Universe in the Rearview Mirror: How Hidden Symmetries Shape Reality|chapter=§10. Hidden Symmetries: Why some symmetries but not others?|year=2013|publisher=Dutton Penguin Group|isbn=978-0-525-95366-1|ref={{SfnRef|Goldberg|2013}}}}</ref></blockquote> Although the Minkowski spacetime of relativity is a non-Euclidean 4-dimensional space,{{Efn|Spacetime is a non-Euclidean (curved) 4-dimensional space because it consists of three orthogonal space dimensions and a time dimension. The time dimension is not orthogonal to the three spatial dimensions; the time coordinate has the opposite sign as the three space coordinates so spacetime is hyperbolic, not a Euclidean (flat) 4-space at all.}} it has been noticed that its 3-dimensional space component could be modeled as a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] embedded in 4-dimensional Euclidean (flat) space. That is, we could imagine that the ordinary 3-dimensional space we perceive is the curved 3-dimensional surface of a 4-dimensional ball (since the surface of a 4-ball is a curved 3-dimensional space called a 3-sphere, just as the surface of a 3-ball like the earth is a curved 2-dimensional space called a 2-sphere). This was [[#Origins of the theory|imagined by Einstein]] himself in 1921, as a thought experiment in which he carefully described his fourth orthogonal spatial dimension as merely a mathematical abstraction. Subsequently it was noticed by others (not mainstream physicists) that if physical space were really embedded in Euclidean 4-dimensional space (with our 3-dimensional space embedded in 4-space as some non-Euclidean 3-manifold, not necessarily a 3-sphere), then the Lorentz transformation effects of special relativity (spatial forshortenings and time dilations and so forth) could all be explained by ordinary perspective geometry in 4-dimensional Euclidean space. Special relativity reduces to classical vector space geometry (based on the 4-dimensional version of the Pythagorean theorem), but if and only if every observer is moving through 4-space at a universal constant velocity <math>c</math>, in some 4-space direction.{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} This counter-intuitive alternative geometric model of relativity, which has usually been called [[W:Formulations of special relativity#Euclidean relativity|Euclidean relativity]], is motivated by the fact that in every kind of relativity, but originally in Einstein's special relativity, each observer moves on a vector through a Euclidean four-dimensional space consisting of their three proper spatial dimensions and their proper time dimension, and the Pythagorean vector-sum of their motion through this kind of proper 4-space is always <math>c</math>, as measured by all observers from any inertial reference frame.{{Efn|Each observer is stationary in space in their own proper reference frame, while they move at maximum velocity {{Math|c}} through their own proper time. Observed from another reference frame in relative motion, they appear foreshortened in space in their direction of motion, and their clocks appear to be slowed to less than the maximum velocity {{Math|c}}.}} This is the Lorentz invariant, that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, regardless of their motion relative to the light source.{{Efn| ...cite Lewis Epstein's elegant explanation of the Lorentz Invariance as observers moving at constant velocity {{Math|c}} through space and proper time.}} But no physicists have taken the leap of claiming that therefore, our universe is physically [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|this kind of Euclidean 4-space]], and that observers are actually moving through it at velocity <math>c</math>. In physics as it has been universally understood, observers are not supposed to be able to move at velocity <math>c</math>. Their motion takes place in 3-space and in universal coordinate time (in Minkowski spacetime), and the cosmos is considered to be a non-Euclidean 3-space, generally a closed (finite) expanding 3-space, but with only three spatial dimensions, not four. In the Euclidean relativity alternative view, however, every observer is always moving at velocity <math>c</math> through the universe, which is real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. The direction in which they are moving is called their proper time axis.{{Efn|Time in spacetime is universal coordinate time, but there is another kind of time in relativity, the proper time in each inertial reference frame. Your proper time is the time you experience, and every observer has his own proper time; proper time runs at different rates in different inertial reference frames. It runs slower (compared to universal coordinate time) in a gravitational field (according to general relativity), and observers in motion with respect to each other view each other's clocks as running slower than their own clocks (according to special relativity).}} Their movement in time is not just modelled as movement in an abstract fourth dimension (as it is in Minkowski spacetime), their movement in time is isomorphic to their movement through physical space in a distinct direction at velocity <math>c</math>. Two observers' directions of movement through space may be different (or not, if they happen to be going in the same direction). Your proper time dimension is whichever direction you are moving. The other three directions perpendicular to your proper time axis are the three dimensions of your ordinary proper space, which again, will be different directions for you than for other observers moving in a different direction. There are four orthogonal spatial dimensions which we all share, but we share the same orthogonal proper time axis and ordinary proper 3-space axes only if we are at rest with respect to each other, actually moving in the same direction at velocity <math>c</math>, in the same inertial reference frame. Your proper 4-space coordinate system is rotated with respect to another observer's proper 4-space coordinate system, precisely as your vectors (directions of motion) are rotated in Euclidean 4-space with respect to each other, but there are no metric distortions (no Lorentz transformations) between your proper Euclidean 4-space coordinate systems; you are both embedded in the same Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. Lorentz transformations are required only to convert between your respective proper Minkowski spacetime coordinate systems. So in this novel alternate view of relativity, every mass in the universe must be perpetually in motion at velocity <math>c</math> through Euclidean 4-space, along with all the masses in its vicinity that are going in (nearly) the same direction. The entire solar system, for example, must be translating in the fourth dimension at the "speed of light" <math>c</math>, although we do not notice it, since we are all moving in that same direction together. Acceleration of an object varies its direction of motion through 4-space, but never its velocity, which is invariant for all objects with mass. Two objects which are in motion relative to each other are both actually in motion at the same velocity <math>c</math>, but in at least slightly different directions.{{Efn|The angular divergence between two observer's motion vectors is proportional to their relative velocity: the more they diverge, the greater their relative velocity, up to the maximum divergence possible in the space. In Euclidean relativity all observers are in motion at velocity {{Math|c}} relative to universal Cartesian 4-coordinate space, so the maximum relative velocity between two observers is {{Math|2c}} when they are moving in exactly opposite directions in 4-space. This is not a contradiction of special relativity, which limits the maximum relative velocity between two observers to {{Math|c}}, it is the same measurement in different units. Special relativity measures all velocities in Minkowski spacetime (in a non-Euclidean 3-space). Euclidean relativity measures all velocities in Euclidean 4-space.}} In Einstein's relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of light through 3-space. In Euclidean relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of matter through 4-space! The speed of light through 3-space is also perceived as <math>c</math> by all observers, because they are each living in a moving 3-manifold that is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. Despite their extreme differences in viewpoint, Einstein's relativity and Euclidean relativity are equivalent theories in complete agreement with each other, by definition. The two theories make exactly the same special relativity predictions of how observers in different inertial reference frames will perceive each other's motions in time and space. It is beyond the scope of this present paper to show how they also agree on the predictions of general relativity, but it is important to understand that our formulation of Euclidean relativity requires our acceptance of the experimentally verified findings of special relativity, general relativity and quantum mechanics. Our model and the standard model both describe the same geometric relations of space and time based on the same evidence, but as embedded in two very different universal host spaces: Euclidean 4-space versus Minkowski spacetime. In some instances our model provides a geometric explanation for physical phenomena where the standard model has none, as yet. An example is the two models' differing explanations for the gravitational coherence of galaxies: either their inertial motion at velocity <math>c</math>, or their possession of experimentally undetected dark matter. A more central example is our use of Coxeter's kinematics to explain the laws of relativistic motion geometrically. {{Efn|More generally, our model is concerned with group-theoretic properties of number elucidated by Coxeter and other geometers. ...cite Kappraff & Adamson's 2003 paper on The Relationship of the Cotangent Function to Special Relativity Theory, geometry and properties of number,{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2003|loc=Special Relativity Theory, Geometry and properties of number}} which shows how the Lorentz coefficient is a function of a deep geometric property of number{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2000|loc=A Fresh Look at Number}} discovered by Steinbach,{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997|loc=Golden Fields: A Case for the Heptagon}} by means of which the root formula of geometry in any Euclidean dimension, the Pythagorean theorem, may be derived solely in terms of the addition of polygon side lengths, without recourse to their products or squares. More generally, Steinbach found that in the relations among regular polytope chords, to add is to multiply; every chord is both the product (quotient) of a pair of chords and the sum (difference) of another pair of chords.}} Euclidean relativity is not even a fringe theory; no physicists or astronomers have adopted it. There are many good reasons why the revolutionary leap to a four orthogonal spatial dimensions viewpoint has not been taken, beginning with the universally observed fact that we can only construct three perpendiculars through a point in our immediate space, which appears to be resolutely 3-dimensional, not 4-dimensional. Euclidean relativity offers a nice geometric explanation of the reasons for the Lorentz transformations, but only at the cost of raising other mysteries, which have been difficult for its aficionados to explain. Another mystery is how light signals between observers in relative motion could "catch up" with the receiver moving on a diverging path through 4-space from the emitter. If both observers are already moving at <math>c</math> (on diverging paths), the propagation speed of light through 4-space between them would have to be greater than <math>c</math>. Euclidean relativity is a revolutionary theory indeed, in which <math>c</math> cannot possibly be the speed of light! We conclude that, for a theory of Euclidean 4-space to be physically viable (that is, for <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> to be our real space and not merely an abstract mathematical space), the speed of light through Euclidean 4-space must be <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, with massless photons translating through 4-space at twice the speed of mass-carrying objects. Photons must translate the diagonal distance through 4-space along the long diameter of a unit 4-hypercube, in the same time that massive particles translate inertially along the edge (or the radius) of a unit 4-hypercube. This is conceivable in Euclidean 4-space (and in no other Euclidean space of any dimensionality) because the long diagonal of the unit 4-hypercube is the natural number <math>\sqrt{4}</math>. == An object's motion in space is the product of its discrete self-reflections == Coxeter theory describes all the possible motions of an object in space as local functions of the object's discrete geometry (its shape). Coxeter observed that in a Euclidean space of any number of dimensions, any displacement of a geometric object from one place to another, and any rotation of the object from one orientation to another, can be broken down into the product of a number of discrete self-reflections. Any action of a polytope that transforms its position and orientation in space may be measured as a distinct sequence of self-reflections of the object in its own surfaces. Therefore any motion of the object whatsoever may be precisely described as the object propagating itself through space by a discrete sequence of local self-reflections. This is a purely kinematic description of motion which does not give any account of forces acting on the object that cause it to move. Coxeter found that both changes in position (translations) and changes in orientation (rotations) can be broken down into the simplest of all displacements (self-reflections). A translation occurs when an object self-reflects twice, in two distinct surfaces which are parallel to each other. A rotation also occurs when an object self-reflects twice, but in two distinct surfaces which intersect each other. When a object self-reflects once, it turns itself inside out (it reverses its chirality), but in translations and rotations it self-reflects twice, preserving its chirality. Coxeter's laws of kinematics are a geometric counterpart to Newton's algebraic laws of motion in three dimensional Euclidean space. They are helpful because they can be understood as geometric pictures, which may help us to visualize the relationships between translation and rotation in classic Newtonian physics problems, such as the [[W:Kepler problem|Kepler problem]] of the motion of the planets.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Feynman|first=Richard|title=Feynman's Lost Lecture: The Motion of Planets Around the Sun|date=1996|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0393039184}}</ref> But they are also a revolutionary advance beyond Newton's laws, because Coxeter formulated them in Euclidean spaces of any number of dimensions. In particular, they give us geometric pictures of all the possible motions of objects in 4-dimensional Euclidean space: <blockquote>Every orthogonal transformation in 4-space is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}^t</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + t \le 4)</math>. Every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> While this description should be understood as geometric pictures, some of the pictures may not be easy for us to visualize, since we have no physical experience in 4-dimensional space. Rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>), reflection (<math>\mathrm{R}</math>) and translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) are obvious analogues of what they are in three-dimensional space, but double rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>) is something new and unprecedented in our physical experience, because double rotations cannot occur until there are four or more dimensions of space in which to rotate. A point in 4-space may be in motion on two circles in two completely orthogonal rotation planes simultaneously. Nothing constrains the two circles to be of the same radius, or constrains either circle from being of infinite radius such that the point moves in a straight line within its rotation plane: a translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> rather than a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. The motion of a rigid object defined by multiple points is constrained by its rigidity, such that the radii of both circles may approach infinity, but only one of the two radii may actually reach infinity. For a rigid object, only one of the two rotations may actually be a translation. Four dimensional Euclidean space can accomodate no such thing as a <math>\mathrm{Q}^2\mathrm{T}</math>. A translating double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, like a translating simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>, is simply a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. That is the essence of the way the principle of relativity operates in Euclidean 4-space. An object which is double-rotating in its own proper inertial reference frame may be seen to be performing nothing more mysterious than a screw translation, when observed from an inertial reference frame from which the object is in relative translational motion. Of course, it is a screw translation in 4-space, which is more mysterious than a screw translation in our ordinary 3-space. In 3-space the orbit of a screw translation (or any <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) lies on a great circle of an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere). In 4-space the orbit of a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math> lies on a great circle of a hypersphere (a 3-sphere). Such 4-dimensional great circles are inherently more complex than the ordinary circles we experience in 3-space. They do not lie in a single plane, but bend through all four dimensions, in either a left or right hand direction of curvature. Unlike ordinary circles they are inherently chiral, and their circumference is not <math>2\pi r</math>, but like ordinary circles they are truly circular, geodesic circles. In 4-space they might even be said to be more circular than ordinary circles, which bend in only two dimensions. We refer to such 4-dimensional great circles as ''isoclines'', to distinguish them from ordinary 2-dimensional great circles in the plane. Their name comes from the fact that a point on a rigid 4-dimensional object undergoing [[W:SO(4)#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]] traverses an isocline circle. In a universe which is real Euclidean four-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>, wherein these motions occur only at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, there is a universal Cartesian 4-coordinate reference frame in which every rigid object in free fall is translating on a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> at velocity <math>c</math>. That universal inertial reference frame is not the proper reference frame of any object or observer, wherein the object or observer is stationary and double-rotating at the universal rate of quantum events <math>c</math>, but it is the common reference frame of all observers. == Light propagates through 4-space at twice its apparent velocity <math>c</math>== Coxeter's laws of kinematics in 4-dimensional Euclidean space apply to all objects with mass, but we find there is an additional kind of displacement which applies only to massless particles such as photons, considered as single point objects. Light quanta (photons) translate through 4-space by 4-dimensional reflection <math>\mathrm{R}^4</math>, which may be termed a double translation <math>\mathrm{T}^2</math>, a pure translation via two pairs of parallel reflections without any rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. Matter (atoms and all particles with mass) are perpetually rotating and translating through 4-space by <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, a screw translation of a rotating object, which is relativistically equivalent to a stationary isoclinic <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>, an isoclinically rotating object such as an atom. A simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> or simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> is a double reflection <math>\mathrm{R^2}</math>, so a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is an <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>, but not with the same group of reflection angles as a light signal <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>. A translation <math>\mathrm{T = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two parallel planes, and a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two intersecting planes, as in a <math>\mathrm{QT = R^4}</math> which is both at once. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is two double reflections in pairs of parallel planes at once, a reflection in four non-intersecting parallel planes; it is all translation and no rotation. In a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> all the motion goes to translation, so the translation goes twice as far as the simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is the opposite of a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q^2 = R^4}</math>, which is stationary but rotates twice as far as the simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. The product of the two translations in a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> is a diagonal 4-space translation over the long diameter of the unit 4-hypercube, exactly twice the distance of a simple <math>\mathrm{T}</math> over the edge length (or radius) of the unit 4-hypercube. The [[w:Tesseract|4-hypercube (also known as the 8-cell or tesseract)]] is ''radially equilateral'', which means its edge length is equal to its radius, like the hexagon, so its long diameter (twice its radius) is exactly twice its edge length. The photon moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions. By the four-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, each of those four distances is half the total distance the photon moves: one edge length (one radius) is half the total diagonal distance moved (the long diameter). That total movement is a double the unit-distance translation, but without any rotation component, so it cannot carry any mass with it. A <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> cannot reposition a 4-polytope the way a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> does, it can only reposition a quantum of energy that has no distinguishing rotational symmetry, such as a photon. That is the price light pays to move exactly twice as fast as matter.{{Efn| ...lensing of double translations <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> in more than two pairs of parallel planes at once...relationship to the frequency of light emitted and the coherence length of the wave packet...}} == Special relativity is Galilean relativity in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == {{Efn|...TAC suggests this section is needed sooner, i.e. in the preceding Special Relativity section, as it explains how Euclidean relativity reduces special relativity to 4D perspective geometry...it's misplaced (too late) here...}} Perspective effects known as the Lorentz transformations occur because each observer's proper 3-dimensional space is a moving curved manifold embedded in flat 4-dimensional Euclidean space. The curvature of their 3-space complicates sightline calculations for observers; they sometimes require Lorentz transformations to produce the actual 4-space Cartesian coordinates of objects in the scene being observed. But if all four spatial dimensions are considered, no Lorentz transformations are required (or permitted) in correct scene construction, except when an observer wants to calculate a projection, that is, the shadow of how things will appear to them from a three-dimensional viewpoint (not how they really are in 4-space).{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} Space really has four orthogonal dimensions, and space and time behave there just as they do in a classical vector space, only bigger by one dimension. It is not necessary to combine 4-space with time in a unified spacetime to explain 4-dimensional perspective effects at high relative velocities, because Euclidean 4-space is already 4-dimensional, and those effects fall out naturally from the 4-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, exactly as ordinary visual perspective does in three dimensions from the 3-dimensional Pythagorean theorem. Because one of the four spatial dimensions corresponds to an observer's direction of motion (in both space and proper time), and all observers and all scenes being observed are in motion (at constant velocity) in their respective proper time directions, we observe perspective foreshortenings in time as well as in a spatial dimension. In special relativity these perspective effects are reciprocal, precisely because they are only apparent, not actual, changes in size and duration. (However in general relativity, discussed below, the actual rate of physical processes varies from place to place, and reference frame differences predicted by the theory are neither reciprocal nor illusory.) None of these Lorentz effects are beyond geometric explanation or paradoxical. The universe is unexpectedly strange to us in precisely the ways the Euclidean fourth dimension is strange to us; but that does hold many surprises. Euclidean 4-space is much more interesting than Euclidean 3-space, analogous to the way 3-space is much more interesting and deeply explanatory to us than it would be if we experienced it only as a 2-space with many folds and curves, as perhaps an ant does. The emergent properties of 4-space are hard for us to visualize because they lie so wholly beyond our physical experience, just as it was hard for our ancestors to imagine the earth as round like a ball. However, Euclidean spaces of successive dimensions are analogous, and so higher dimensional spaces can be anticipated and explored: that is Schläfli's great discovery. Moreover dimensional analogy itself, like everything else in nature including all of physics, is an exact expression of intrinsic group-theoretic symmetries: that is Nother's great discovery. == General relativity is special relativity in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == The statement that the laws of special relativity hold to good approximation in freely falling (and non-rotating) reference frames is known as the [[W:Equivalence principle|Einstein equivalence principle]]. The weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a building on the surface of the earth is the same as the weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a spaceship in interstellar space accelerating at a rate of 32'/second/second. Both observers are experiencing an upwards acceleration at the same rate, which in their respective proper reference frames is measured as the weight of gravity, rather than as an accelerating motion (they are stationary in their proper reference frames). Einstein used this equivalence principle as the basis for his general theory of relativity, in much the same way he had used the constant velocity of light as the basis for his special theory of relativity. In general relativity the two accelerating observers occupy scenes which are relativistically equivalent, which means that although they can be distinguished (they have different measurements) in any reference frame from which they may both be observed, they have the same invariant geometry in all reference frames (they are the same phenomena), implying that there exists, for either scene, another reference frame from which it measures exactly like the other scene. Relativistically equivalent does not imply that there exists a single reference frame in which the two scenes are congruent (have the same measurements). It only means that they can be transformed into each other by a shift in point of view, because their invariant geometries (their measurements which are independent of point of view) are the same. Einstein's general theory of relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in spacetime. Our formulation of Euclidean relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. An observer standing on the surface of the earth is accelerated at the rate of 32'/second/second. The observer and the earth are both stationary in their proper inertial reference frames (which are similar except for the rotation of the earth), so the observer's acceleration cannot be perceived as motion in either proper reference frame; it is perceptible there instead as the force of gravity. It is only perceptible as motion in some other reference frame in which the earth and the observer are both in motion, such as the universal common reference frame of Euclidean 4-coordinate space in which they are both in motion at velocity <math>c</math> on their respective screw translations <math>QT</math>, which are distinct. In that universal common reference frame the observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is the rate of change in the direction of his vector of translation through 4-space. The velocity of his vector of translation <math>T</math> through 4-space remains the constant <math>c</math> throughout; only his direction is changing. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation <math>Q</math> of a translation <math>T</math>: a screw translation <math>QT</math>. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation which is an acceleration. We can be precise about the units of measurement of this acceleration at atomic scale. In Coxeter's kinematics rotations of geometric objects occur in discrete increments called rotational displacements, with each distinct kind of rotation performing a characteristic number of its characteristic rotational displacement during a full revolution that returns the object to its starting orientation. There are many distinct kinds of rotation, each with its characteristic rotational displacement and number of displacements per revolution. The general rotation in 4-space is a double rotation <math>Q^2</math> distinguished by two distinct completely orthogonal angles through which the object turns in each rotational displacement. The angles determine not only the distance through which the object turns, but the characteristic trajectory of each point on the surface of the rotating object, including the length of that trajectory before it closes into a circle when the object returns to its starting orientation. For any distinct kind of rotation, the circular trajectory is always an integer multiple of the characteristic rotational displacement, but the full circle may be greater than 360°. In 4-space rotational circles are not ordinary 2-dimensional circles that lie in the plane and have a 360° circumference. Many distinct 4-space rotations of interest have a circumference of 720°, and many are larger. In 4-space every object with mass moves on its distinct <math>QT</math> trajectory. Each rotational displacement <math>Q</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which intersect each other, at angles related to a distinct star polygon. Each translational displacement <math>T</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which lie parallel to each other. In both kinds of motion (rotation and translation) it is the rate at which these double-reflection displacements occur which is constant and which we measure as the velocity <math>c</math>. Every atom translates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing a large number of atomic scale translational displacements per second. Concurrently, the atom rotates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing the same large number of atomic scale rotational displacements per second. Although the number of displacements at atomic scale per unit time is the same universal constant <math>c</math> for all rotations and translations, distinct kinds of rotation revolve at distinct rates, because the number of rotational displacements per complete revolution and the circumference of the complete revolution are distinct characteristics of each kind of rotation. The velocity at which each point on the surface of a rotating object moves, and the frequency of its rotational circling, are functions of the distinct rotation it is performing. However, they are not simple functions of <math>c</math> and the two defining angle parameters of the rotation. Distinct rotations arise from distinct symmetry groups and each is its own mystery with a unique conservation law. The relationships between those distinct conservation laws are even more mysterious, and have been shown to be chaotic. Steinbach{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997}} discovered the Golden Fields family of ratios which govern distinct rotational displacements related to the regular star polygons at least up to the hendecagon {11}. Kappraff and Adamson{{Sfn|Kappraff|Adamson|2004}} further characterized the families of rotation functions and showed that they form an infinite number of periodic trajectories when operated on by the Mandelbrot operator. The inertial tendency of mass is to follow a geodesic. The inertial conservation law of gravity applies to all motions of objects with mass, rotations as well as translations. A translation <math>T</math> is the distinct simple rotation <math>Q</math> in which the characteristic angle of rotational displacement is zero. Inertia is the tendency of objects with mass to conserve their angles of rotational displacement. In 4-space each object has two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement which are characteristic of the distinct rotation the object is performing. Inertia is the conservation of this distinct double rotation. In 4-coordinate Euclidean space the acceleration of an object with mass is a rotation of the object, a change to its direction, not a change to its constant velocity. Because the rate of atomic scale displacements is the universal constant <math>c</math>, the rate of change of direction (the acceleration of the object) is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law. A observer standing on the surface of the earth is performing a distinct double rotation characterized by two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement. The observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law, and a measurement of the rate of change of the observer's direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. ... == Quantum mechanics is the atomic kinematics of Coxeter groups generated by reflections in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == ... == Dimensional relativity == The formulation of Euclidean relativity based on Coxeter's kinetic law of <math>n</math>-dimensional congruent transformations in Euclidean space may be called ''dimensional relativity'', since it captures the theories of special and general relativity, and has its roots in dimensional analogy. Dimensional analogy is the exploration of [[w:Hermann_Grassmann#Mathematician|Hermann Grassmann's vector space principle]], in which space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. The geometry of higher-dimensional space is accessible by reason of direct analogy, as [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] subsequently demonstrated, and by algebraic methods after [[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]]. By analogy to the surface of the earth, the bounding surface of a spherical region of <math>n</math>-dimensional Euclidean space is an <math>(n-1)</math>-sphere, a spherical space of one fewer dimensions than the <math>n</math>-ball of Euclidean space it surrounds. In dimensional relativity the sky is not a ceiling, but an infinite regress of alternating spherical and Euclidean <math>n</math>-spaces of increasing <math>n</math>, accessible from each observer's point of view. By dimensional analogy, each observer looks up into their own reference frame's regress of concentric alternating <math>n</math>-spaces. By the capacity for dimensional analogy which they possess, some observers see deeper into <math>n</math>-dimensional space than others. == Polycentric spherical relativity == An intelligent observer equipped with the principle of dimensional relativity may perceive the universe from any inertial reference frame, not only from their own proper stationary reference frame in the Euclidean <math>n</math>-space universe in which they physically locate themself. We see that every observer may also properly view themself as stationary and the universe as an <math>n</math>-sphere with themself at the center observing it, perceptually equidistant from all points on its <math>n</math>-space surface, including their own physical location which is one of those surface points, distinguished to them but moving on the surface, and not the center of anything. This ''polycentric model'' of the universe is a further restatement of the principle of relativity, and of the [[W:Copernican principle|Copernican principle]] that observation is democratic: observers occupy representative viewpoints, not privileged monocentric positions. The polycentric model is compatible with Galileo's relativity of uniformly moving objects in ordinary space, Einstein's special relativity of inertial reference frames in 4-dimensional spacetime, Einstein's general relativity of all reference frames in non-Euclidean spacetime, and Coxeter's dimensional relativity of orthogonal group actions in Euclidean and spherical spaces of any number of dimensions. The polycentric model should be known as Thoreau's principle of ''spherical relativity'', since the first precise written statement of it appears in 1849, contemporaneous with and independent of Schlafli's work: <blockquote>The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence.{{Sfn|Thoreau|1849|p=349|ps=; "The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence." [Contemporaneous and independent of [[W:Ludwig Schlafli|Ludwig Schlafli]]'s pioneering work enumerating the complete set of regular polyschemes in any number of dimensions.]}}</blockquote> == Revolutions == The original Copernican revolution in 1543 displaced the center of the universe from the center of the earth to a point farther away, the center of the sun, with the earth performing a ''revolution'' around the sun, and the stars remaining on a fixed 2-sphere around the sun instead of around the earth. But this led inevitably to the recognition that the sun must be a star itself, not equidistant from all the stars, and the center of but one of many spheres, no monotheistic center at all. In 1600 [[W:Giordano Bruno|Giordano Bruno]] who first openly advocated these views was burned at the stake in Rome's [[W:Campo de' Fiori|Campo de' Fiori]] by the Catholic inquisition. In such fashion the Euclidean four-dimensional revolution, emerging three to five centuries later, initially lends itself to the big bang theory of a single origin of the whole universe, but leads inevitably to the recognition that all the galaxies need not be equidistant from a single origin in time, any more than all the stars lie in the same galaxy, equidistant from a single center in space. The expanding sphere of matter on the surface of which we find ourselves living is likely to be one of many 3-spheres expanding at velocity <math>c</math>, with their big bang origins occurring at distinct times and places in the ''n''-dimensional universe. The most distant objects we see when we look up at night may not all have the same origin in space and time. As recently as Copernicus we believed all the stars lay on a single 2-sphere embedded in Euclidean 3-space, with our sun at its center. During the enlightenment observers beginning with Bruno dispersed those stars into an infinite Euclidean 3-space, and relinquished our privileged position at the center. Then Einstein showed that our 3-space could not be Euclidean, that it must be a 3-manifold curved in every place in obedience to Newton's inverse-square law of gravity; and in a geometry related to time, at least, it must be 4-dimensional. In the present work we propose a theory of ''n''-dimensional real space and how light travels in it, a theory which says we can see into four orthogonal dimensions of Euclidean space, and so when we look up at night we see cosmological objects distributed in at least four dimensions of space around us, rather than all located in our own local 3-space. Looking still deeper and farther out, the universe viewed as a 4-sphere might, or might not, be expanding, and the most distant objects we see when we look up at night may, or may not, lie in our 4-dimensional hyperplane. Real space has ''n'' dimensions as [[w:Hermann_Grassmann|Grassmann]] and [[w:Schläfli|Schläfli]] showed, and we do not know how many dimensions the most distant objects we see may be distributed in. They need not all lie within the four spatial dimensions in which we have now learned to observe them, any more than they all lie in our local 3-space. When we look up at the objects that surround us, we have no way of discerning how many dimensions beyond three the space we are looking into has. We know their distance from us primarily by virtue of how long it takes their light to reach us. We can measure their distribution around us in 3-space or 4-space, but that is simply how we choose to measure their positions, not an actual finding of how they are distributed. Even if it is now evident that they do not all lie in the same 3-space, how many more dimensions than three are needed to contain them? We observe that our 4-ball galaxy is embedded in Euclidean <math>n</math>-space as one of many 4-ball galaxies, each translating in a distinct direction through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, on more or less divergent paths from each other. But only closer observation will reveal evidence of whether everything we see lies in the same Euclidean 4-space, or if it is distributed in five or more dimensions, and how it is moving there. To remain in agreement with the theory of relativity, the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint requires that all mass-carrying objects be in motion in some distinct direction through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, although the relative velocity between nearby objects is much smaller since they move on similar vectors, aimed away from a common origin point in the past. It is natural to expect that objects moving at constant velocity away from a common origin will be distributed roughly on the surface of an expanding 3-sphere. Although their paths away from their origin are not straight lines but various helical isoclines (screw translation spirals), nearby objects must be translating radially at the same average velocity, since the objects in a system (such as our solar system or galaxy) do not separate rapidly over time but remain in orbital formation. Each system's screw translation has two [[w:Completely_orthogonal|completely orthogonal]] components of motion in 4-space, an orbital rotation (such as the earth's around our sun) and a linear translation of the entire system at velocity <math>c</math> in the direction of the original 3-sphere's radial expansion (along the system's proper time vector). Of course the view from our solar system does not suggest that the 3-sphere enclosing each galaxy is expanding at this great rate from its galactic center. The standard theory has been that the entire observable universe is expanding from a single big bang origin in time, with galaxies forming later. While the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint lends itself to that standard theory, it also supports theories which require no single origin point in space and time. These are the voyages of starship Earth, to boldly go where no one has gone before. We made the jump to light speed long ago, in whatever big bang our atoms emerged from, and have never slowed down since. == Origins of the theory == Einstein himself may have been the first to imagine the universe as the three-dimensional surface of a four-dimensional Euclidean 3-sphere, in what was narrowly the first written articulation of a Euclidean 4-space universe, contemporaneous with the teen-aged Coxeter's (quoted below).{{Efn|[[W:William Rowan Hamilton|Hamilton]]'s algebra '''H''' of [[W:Quaternions|quaternions]] introduces (in 1843) the notion of a [[W:Three-dimensional sphere|three-dimensional sphere]] embedded in a four-dimensional space, but Hamilton did not quite conceive of the quaternions as the Cartesian 4-coordinates of a Euclidean 4-space, and he did not describe our ordinary 3-space as embedded in Euclidean 4-space.}} Einstein did this as a [[W:Gedankenexperiment|gedankenexperiment]] in the context of investigating whether his equations of general relativity predicted an infinite or a finite universe, in his 1921 Princeton lecture.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/36276|title=The Meaning of Relativity|last=Einstein|first=Albert|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=1923|isbn=|location=|pages=110-111}}</ref> He invited us to imagine "A spherical manifold of three dimensions, embedded in a Euclidean continuum of four dimensions", but he was careful to disclaim parenthetically that "The aid of a fourth space dimension has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice." Informally, the Euclidean 4-dimensional theory of relativity may be given as a sort of reciprocal to that disclaimer of Einstein's: ''The Minkowski spacetime has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice, as an aid to understanding how things will appear to an observer from their perspective; the foreshortenings, clock desynchronizations and other Lorentz transformations it predicts are proper calculations of actual perspective effects; but real space is a flat, Euclidean continuum of four orthogonal spatial dimensions, and in it the ordinary laws of a flat vector space hold (such as the Pythagorean theorem), and all sightline calculations work classically, so long as you consider all four spatial dimensions.'' The Euclidean theory of relativity differs from the special theory of relativity in ascribing to the physical universe a geometry of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions, rather than the special theory's [[w:Minkowski spacetime|Minkowski spacetime]] geometry, in which three spatial dimensions and a time dimension comprise a unified non-Euclidean spacetime of four dimensions. Anco and Maghadam found that <math>SO(4)</math> breaks to <math>\mathbb{S}^3</math> (the 3-sphere) if the energy in a Kepler orbit is negative (an elliptical orbit), and to <math>H^3</math> (Minkowski spacetime) if the energy is positive (a hyperbolic orbit). Therefore the fact that the planets orbit on ellipses in our 3-space suggests that they orbit on a 3-sphere embedded in Euclidean 4-space. Thus we can conclude that <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> is the actual geometry of our physical universe, and Minkowski spacetime is an abstraction of it; the reciprocal of Einstein's disclaimer is the more direct physical model. Of course spacetime remains a true and useful abstraction, although it must relinquish its privileged position as our exclusive conception of our place in space.{{Efn| ...origins of the Euclidean 4-space insight in the observations of Fock, Atkinson, Moser and others.}} The invention of Euclidean geometry of more than three spatial dimensions preceded Einstein's theories by more than fifty years, when it was worked out originally by the Swiss mathematician [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] before 1853.{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|loc=§7. Ordinary Polytopes in Higher Space; §7.x. Historical remarks|pp=141-144|ps=; "Practically all the ideas in this chapter ... are due to Schläfli, who discovered them before 1853 — a time when Cayley, Grassmann and Möbius were the only other people who had ever conceived the possibility of geometry in more than three dimensions."}} Schläfli extended Euclid's geometry of one, two, and three dimensions in a direct way to four or more dimensions, generalizing the rules and terms of [[w:Euclidean geometry|Euclidean geometry]] to spaces of any number of dimensions. He coined the general term ''[[polyscheme]]'' to mean geometric forms of any number of dimensions, including two-dimensional [[w:polygon|polygons]], three-dimensional [[w:polyhedron|polyhedra]], four dimensional [[w:polychoron|polychora]], and so on, and in the process he found all of the [[w:Regular polytope|regular polyschemes]] that are possible in every dimension, including in particular the [[User:Dc.samizdat/Rotations#Sequence of regular 4-polytopes|six convex regular polychora]] which can be constructed in a Euclidean space of four dimensions (the set analogous to the five [[w:Platonic solid|Platonic solids]] the ancients found in three dimensional space). Thus Schläfli was the first to explore the fourth dimension, reveal its emergent geometric properties, and discover its astonishing regular objects. Because his work was only published posthumously in 1901, and remained almost completely unknown until Coxeter published [[w:Regular_Polytopes_(book)|Regular Polytopes]] in 1947, other researchers had more than fifty years to rediscover the regular polychora, and competing terms were coined; today [[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s word ''[[w:Polytope|polytope]]'' is the commonly used term for ''polyscheme.''{{Efn|[[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s German word ''polytop'' was introduced into English by [[W:Alicia Boole Stott|Alicia Boole Stott]], who like Hoppe and [[W:Thorold Gosset|Thorold Gosset]] rediscovered Schlafli's six regular convex 4-polytopes, with no knowledge of their prior discovery. Today Schläfli's original ''polyschem'', with its echo of ''schema'' as in the configurations of information structures, seems even more fitting in its generality than ''polytope'' -- perhaps analogously as information software (programming) is even more general than information hardware (computers).}} Because of this century-long lag in the dissemination of a scientific discovery, the regular 4-polytopes appear to have played no role at all, by any name, in the twentieth century discovery and evolution of the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics.{{Efn|One could argue that the higher-dimensional polytopes have barely influenced science or culture at all thus far. The physicist John Edward Huth's comprehensive deep dive through the history of cultural and scientific concepts of physical space, from ancient flatland models of the world through general relativity and quantum mechancs, shows exactly how we got to our present standard model of the universe, although it includes no mention of higher-dimensional Euclidean space.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Huth|first=John Edward|title=A Sense of Space: A local's guide to a flat earth, the edge of the cosmos, and other curious places|year=2025|publisher=University of Chicago Press}}</ref>}} == Boundaries == <blockquote>Ever since we discovered that Earth is round and turns like a mad-spinning top, we have understood that reality is not as it appears to us: every time we glimpse a new aspect of it, it is a deeply emotional experience. Another veil has fallen.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Carlo Rovelli|author-link=W:Carlo Rovelli|title=Seven Brief Lessons on Physics|publisher=Riverhead|year=2016|isbn=978-0399184413}}</ref></blockquote> Of course it is strange to consciously contemplate this world we inhabit, our planet, our solar system, our 3-sphere surface in our vast galaxy, as the merest film, a boundary no thicker in the places we inhabit than the diameter of an electron (though much thicker in some places we cannot inhabit, such as the planet's core and the interior of stars). But is not our unconscious traditional concept of the boundary of our world even stranger? Since the enlightenment we are accustomed to thinking that there is nothing beyond three dimensional space: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But anyone who knows the [[polyscheme]]s Schläfli discovered knows that space can have any number of dimensions, and that there are fundamental objects and motions to be discovered in four dimensions that are even more various and interesting than those we can discover in three. The strange thing, when we think about it that way, is that there ''is'' a boundary between three and four dimensional space. ''Why'' can't we move (or apparently, see) in more than three dimensions? Why is our physical world apparently only three dimensional? Why would it have just ''three'' dimensions, and not four, or five, or the ''n'' dimensions that Schläfli mapped? What is the nature of the boundary which confines us to just three dimensions? We know that in Euclidean geometry the boundary between three and four dimensions is itself a spherical three dimensional space, so we should suspect that we are materially confined within such a curved boundary surface. Light need not be confined with us within our three dimensional boundary space. We would look directly through four dimensional space in our natural way, by receiving light signals that travelled through it to us on straight lines. In that case the reason we do not observe a fourth spatial dimension in our vicinity is that there are no nearby objects in it, just off our hyperplane in the wild. The nearest 4-ball object we can see with our eyes is our sun, which lies equatorially in our own hyperplane, though it bulges out of it above and below. But when we look up at the heavens, every pinprick of light we observe is itself a four-dimensional object off our hyperplane, and they are distributed all around us in four-dimensional space through which we gaze. We are four-dimensionally sighted creatures, even though our bodies are three-dimensional objects, thin as an atom in the fourth dimension. But that should not perplex us: we can see into three dimensional space even though our retinas are two dimensional objects, thin as a photoreceptor cell. Our unconscious provincial concept is that there is nothing else outside our three dimensional world: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But Schläfli discovered something else: all the astonishing regular objects that exist in higher dimensions, which vastly extend our notions of the beauty and mystery of space itself, and the intrinsic spatial symmetries of our universe which geometry reveals. Space is more commodious than we thought it was, and permits previously unimagined objects and motions. So our provincial conception of our place in it now has the same kind of status as our idea that the sun rises in the east and passes overhead: it is mere appearance, not a true model and no longer a proper explanation. An inertial boundary is a proper explanation, be it ever so thin. And would a boundary of ''no'' thickness, a mere abstraction with no physical power to separate, be a more suitable explanation? We must look for a physically powerful explanation in the geometry of space itself, which general relativity properly associates with the gravitational or inertial force. <blockquote>The number of dimensions possessed by a figure is the number of straight lines each perpendicular to all the others which can be drawn on it. Thus a point has no dimensions, a straight line one, a plane surface two, and a solid three .... In space as we now know it only three lines can be imagined perpendicular to each other. A fourth line, perpendicular to all the other three would be quite invisible and unimaginable to us. We ourselves and all the material things around us probably possess a fourth dimension, of which we are quite unaware. If not, from a four-dimensional point of view we are mere geometrical abstractions, like geometrical surfaces, lines, and points are to us. But this thickness in the fourth dimension must be exceedingly minute, if it exists at all. That is, we could only draw an exceedingly small line perpendicular to our three perpendicular lines, length, breadth and thickness, so small that no microscope could ever perceive it. We can find out something about the conditions of the fourth and higher dimensions if they exist, without being certain that they do exist, by a process which I have termed "Dimensional Analogy."<ref>{{Citation|title=Dimensional Analogy|last=Coxeter|first=Donald|date=February 1923|publisher=Coxeter Fonds, University of Toronto Archives|authorlink=W:Harold Scott MacDonald Coxeter|series=|postscript=|work=}}</ref></blockquote> I believe, but I cannot prove, that we live in real space, which is Schläfli's Euclidean space of ''n'' analogous dimensions. As Grassmann showed first, space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. There will always be higher dimensions to discover, first in imagination and then to explore physically, each an astonishing new enlightenment.<ref>{{Cite book|first=T.S.|last=Eliot|title=Little Gidding|volume=Four Quartets|year=1943}}<blockquote> :We shall not cease from exploration :And the end of all our exploring :Will be to arrive where we started :And know the place for the first time. :Through the unknown, remembered gate :When the last of earth left to discover :Is that which was the beginning; :At the source of the longest river :The voice of the hidden waterfall :And the children in the apple-tree :Not known, because not looked for :But heard, half-heard, in the stillness :Between two waves of the sea. </blockquote></ref> Schläfli discovered every regular convex polytope that exists in any dimension, but that was only the beginning of the story of dimensional analogy, not its end or even the end of its beginning. That project is forever beginning anew. Coxeter discovered that Schläfli's Euclidean space is an expression of intrinsic symmetries, as Noether discovered all of physics is. Kappraff and Adamson discovered that even the sequences of humble regular polygons have fractal complexity, so symmetry itself is chaotic, always reachable but forever beyond our complete grasp. We are on a wilderness project, and just at its beginning, but already we observe a Euclidean space of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions in which all objects with mass move ceaselessly at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate at which everything moves, quantum events occur, and each of our proper times evolves. I believe these facts explain the experimentally verified theories of relativity and quantum mechanics, by revealing their unified polycentric geometry, the same way the facts about Copernicus's heliocentric solar system explained the observed motions of the planets, by revealing the geometry of gravity to Kepler. But others will have to do the math, work out the physics, and perform experiments to prove or disprove all of this, because I don't have the mathematics; entirely unlike Coxeter and Einstein, I am illiterate in those languages. <blockquote> ::::::BEECH :Where my imaginary line :Bends square in woods, an iron spine :And pile of real rocks have been founded. :And off this corner in the wild, :Where these are driven in and piled, :One tree, by being deeply wounded, :Has been impressed as Witness Tree :And made commit to memory :My proof of being not unbounded. :Thus truth's established and borne out, :Though circumstanced with dark and doubt— :Though by a world of doubt surrounded. :::::::—''The Moodie Forester''<ref>{{Cite book|title=A Witness Tree|last=Frost|first=Robert|year=1942|series=The Poetry of Robert Frost|publisher=Holt, Rinehart and Winston|edition=1969|}}</ref> </blockquote> == Appendix: Sequence of regular 4-polytopes == {{Regular convex 4-polytopes|wiki=W:|columns=7}} == ... == {{Efn|In a ''[[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]] displacement'', also known as an [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], all the Clifford parallel{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} invariant planes are displaced in four orthogonal directions (two completely orthogonal planes) at once: they are rotated by the same angle, and at the same time they are tilted ''sideways'' by that same angle. A [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|Clifford displacement]] is [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensionally diagonal]].{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} Every plane that is Clifford parallel to one of the completely orthogonal planes (including in this case an entire Clifford parallel bundle of 4 hexagons, but not all 16 hexagons) is invariant under the isoclinic rotation: all the points in the plane rotate in circles but remain in the plane, even as the whole plane tilts sideways. All 16 hexagons rotate by the same angle (though only 4 of them do so invariantly). All 16 hexagons are rotated by 60 degrees, and also displaced sideways by 60 degrees to a Clifford parallel hexagon. All of the other central polygons (e.g. squares) are also displaced to a Clifford parallel polygon 60 degrees away.|name=Clifford displacement}} {{Efn|It is not difficult to visualize four hexagonal planes intersecting at 60 degrees to each other, even in three dimensions. Four hexagonal central planes intersect at 60 degrees in the [[W:cuboctahedron|cuboctahedron]]. Four of the 24-cell's 16 hexagonal central planes (lying in the same 3-dimensional hyperplane) intersect at each of the 24-cell's vertices exactly the way they do at the center of a cuboctahedron. But the ''edges'' around the vertex do not meet as the radii do at the center of a cuboctahedron; the 24-cell has 8 edges around each vertex, not 12, so its vertex figure is the cube, not the cuboctahedron. The 8 edges meet exactly the way 8 edges do at the apex of a canonical [[W:cubic pyramid]|cubic pyramid]].{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}}|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} {{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} {{Efn|Eight {{sqrt|1}} edges converge in curved 3-dimensional space from the corners of the 24-cell's cubical vertex figure{{Efn|The [[W:vertex figure|vertex figure]] is the facet which is made by truncating a vertex; canonically, at the mid-edges incident to the vertex. But one can make similar vertex figures of different radii by truncating at any point along those edges, up to and including truncating at the adjacent vertices to make a ''full size'' vertex figure. Stillwell defines the vertex figure as "the convex hull of the neighbouring vertices of a given vertex".{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=17}} That is what serves the illustrative purpose here.|name=full size vertex figure}} and meet at its center (the vertex), where they form 4 straight lines which cross there. The 8 vertices of the cube are the eight nearest other vertices of the 24-cell. The straight lines are geodesics: two {{sqrt|1}}-length segments of an apparently straight line (in the 3-space of the 24-cell's curved surface) that is bent in the 4th dimension into a great circle hexagon (in 4-space). Imagined from inside this curved 3-space, the bends in the hexagons are invisible. From outside (if we could view the 24-cell in 4-space), the straight lines would be seen to bend in the 4th dimension at the cube centers, because the center is displaced outward in the 4th dimension, out of the hyperplane defined by the cube's vertices. Thus the vertex cube is actually a [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]]. Unlike a cube, it seems to be radially equilateral (like the tesseract and the 24-cell itself): its "radius" equals its edge length.{{Efn|The vertex cubic pyramid is not actually radially equilateral,{{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} because the edges radiating from its apex are not actually its radii: the apex of the [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]] is not actually its center, just one of its vertices.}}|name=24-cell vertex figure}} {{Efn|The hexagons are inclined (tilted) at 60 degrees with respect to the unit radius coordinate system's orthogonal planes. Each hexagonal plane contains only ''one'' of the 4 coordinate system axes.{{Efn|Each great hexagon of the 24-cell contains one axis (one pair of antipodal vertices) belonging to each of the three inscribed 16-cells. The 24-cell contains three disjoint inscribed 16-cells, rotated 60° isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other (so their corresponding vertices are 120° {{=}} {{radic|3}} apart). A [[16-cell#Coordinates|16-cell is an orthonormal ''basis'']] for a 4-dimensional coordinate system, because its 8 vertices define the four orthogonal axes. In any choice of a vertex-up coordinate system (such as the unit radius coordinates used in this article), one of the three inscribed 16-cells is the basis for the coordinate system, and each hexagon has only ''one'' axis which is a coordinate system axis.|name=three basis 16-cells}} The hexagon consists of 3 pairs of opposite vertices (three 24-cell diameters): one opposite pair of ''integer'' coordinate vertices (one of the four coordinate axes), and two opposite pairs of ''half-integer'' coordinate vertices (not coordinate axes). For example: {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}1,{{spaces|2}}0) {{indent|5}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|5}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,–1,{{spaces|2}}0)<br> is a hexagon on the ''y'' axis. Unlike the {{sqrt|2}} squares, the hexagons are actually made of 24-cell edges, so they are visible features of the 24-cell.|name=non-orthogonal hexagons|group=}} {{Efn|Visualize the three [[16-cell]]s inscribed in the 24-cell (left, right, and middle), and the rotation which takes them to each other. [[24-cell#Reciprocal constructions from 8-cell and 16-cell|The vertices of the middle 16-cell lie on the (w, x, y, z) coordinate axes]];{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} the other two are rotated 60° [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinically]] to its left and its right. The 24-vertex 24-cell is a compound of three 16-cells, whose three sets of 8 vertices are distributed around the 24-cell symmetrically; each vertex is surrounded by 8 others (in the 3-dimensional space of the 4-dimensional 24-cell's ''surface''), the way the vertices of a cube surround its center.{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}} The 8 surrounding vertices (the cube corners) lie in other 16-cells: 4 in the other 16-cell to the left, and 4 in the other 16-cell to the right. They are the vertices of two tetrahedra inscribed in the cube, one belonging (as a cell) to each 16-cell. If the 16-cell edges are {{radic|2}}, each vertex of the compound of three 16-cells is {{radic|1}} away from its 8 surrounding vertices in other 16-cells. Now visualize those {{radic|1}} distances as the edges of the 24-cell (while continuing to visualize the disjoint 16-cells). The {{radic|1}} edges form great hexagons of 6 vertices which run around the 24-cell in a central plane. ''Four'' hexagons cross at each vertex (and its antipodal vertex), inclined at 60° to each other.{{Efn|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} The [[24-cell#Hexagons|hexagons]] are not perpendicular to each other, or to the 16-cells' perpendicular [[24-cell#Squares|square central planes]].{{Efn|name=non-orthogonal hexagons}} The left and right 16-cells form a tesseract.{{Efn|Each pair of the three 16-cells inscribed in the 24-cell forms a 4-dimensional [[W:tesseract|hypercube (a tesseract or 8-cell)]], in [[24-cell#Relationships among interior polytopes|dimensional analogy]] to the way two tetrahedra form a cube: the two 8-vertex 16-cells are inscribed in the 16-vertex tesseract, occupying its alternate vertices. The third 16-cell does not lie within the tesseract; its 8 vertices protrude from the sides of the tesseract, forming a cubic pyramid on each of the tesseract's cubic cells. The three pairs of 16-cells form three tesseracts.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} The tesseracts share vertices, but the 16-cells are completely disjoint.{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}}|name=three 16-cells form three tesseracts}} Two 16-cells have vertex-pairs which are one {{radic|1}} edge (one hexagon edge) apart. But a [[24-cell#Simple rotations|''simple'' rotation]] of 60° will not take one whole 16-cell to another 16-cell, because their vertices are 60° apart in different directions, and a simple rotation has only one hexagonal plane of rotation. One 16-cell ''can'' be taken to another 16-cell by a 60° [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|''isoclinic'' rotation]], because an isoclinic rotation is [[3-sphere]] symmetric: four [[24-cell#Clifford parallel polytopes|Clifford parallel hexagonal planes]] rotate together, but in four different rotational directions,{{Efn|name=Clifford displacement}} taking each 16-cell to another 16-cell. But since an isoclinic 60° rotation is a ''diagonal'' rotation by 60° in ''two'' completely orthogonal directions at once,{{Efn|name=isoclinic geodesic}} the corresponding vertices of the 16-cell and the 16-cell it is taken to are 120° apart: ''two'' {{radic|1}} hexagon edges (or one {{radic|3}} hexagon chord) apart, not one {{radic|1}} edge (60°) apart as in a simple rotation.{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} By the [[W:chiral|chiral]] diagonal nature of isoclinic rotations, the 16-cell ''cannot'' reach the adjacent 16-cell by rotating toward it; it can only reach the 16-cell ''beyond'' it. But of course, the 16-cell beyond the 16-cell to its right is the 16-cell to its left. So a 60° isoclinic rotation ''will'' take every 16-cell to another 16-cell: a 60° ''right'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we may have originally visualized as the ''left'' 16-cell, and a 60° ''left'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we visualized as the ''right'' 16-cell. (If so, that was our error in visualization; the 16-cell to the "left" is in fact the one reached by the left isoclinic rotation, as that is the only sense in which the two 16-cells are left or right of each other.)|name=three isoclinic 16-cells}} {{Efn|In a double rotation each vertex can be said to move along two completely orthogonal great circles at the same time, but it does not stay within the central plane of either of those original great circles; rather, it moves along a helical geodesic that traverses diagonally between great circles. The two completely orthogonal planes of rotation are said to be ''invariant'' because the points in each stay in the plane ''as the plane moves'', tilting sideways by the same angle that the other plane rotates.|name=helical geodesic}} {{Efn|A point under isoclinic rotation traverses the diagonal{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} straight line of a single '''isoclinic geodesic''', reaching its destination directly, instead of the bent line of two successive '''simple geodesics'''. A '''[[W:geodesic|geodesic]]''' is the ''shortest path'' through a space (intuitively, a string pulled taught between two points). Simple geodesics are great circles lying in a central plane (the only kind of geodesics that occur in 3-space on the 2-sphere). Isoclinic geodesics are different: they do ''not'' lie in a single plane; they are 4-dimensional [[W:helix|spirals]] rather than simple 2-dimensional circles.{{Efn|name=helical geodesic}} But they are not like 3-dimensional [[W:screw threads|screw threads]] either, because they form a closed loop like any circle (after ''two'' revolutions). Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'', and they are just as circular as 2-dimensional circles: in fact, twice as circular, because they curve in a circle in two completely orthogonal directions at once.{{Efn|Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'' in the sense that they are 1-dimensional geodesic ''lines'' that curve in 4-space in two completely orthogonal planes at once. They should not be confused with ''great 2-spheres'',{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=24}} which are the 4-dimensional analogues of 2-dimensional great circles (great 1-spheres).}} These '''isoclines''' are geodesic 1-dimensional lines embedded in a 4-dimensional space. On the 3-sphere{{Efn|All isoclines are geodesics, and isoclines on the 3-sphere are circles (curving equally in each dimension), but not all isoclines on 3-manifolds in 4-space are circles.}} they always occur in [[W:chiral|chiral]] pairs and form a pair of [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]s on the [[W:Clifford torus|Clifford torus]],{{Efn|Isoclines on the 3-sphere occur in non-intersecting chiral pairs. A left and a right isocline form a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]] called the {1,1} torus knot{{Sfn|Dorst|2019|loc=§1. Villarceau Circles|p=44|ps=; "In mathematics, the path that the (1, 1) knot on the torus traces is also known as a [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]. Villarceau circles are usually introduced as two intersecting circles that are the cross-section of a torus by a well-chosen plane cutting it. Picking one such circle and rotating it around the torus axis, the resulting family of circles can be used to rule the torus. By nesting tori smartly, the collection of all such circles then form a [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fibration]].... we prefer to consider the Villarceau circle as the (1, 1) torus knot [a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]] rather than as a planar cut [two intersecting circles]."}} in which ''each'' of the two linked circles traverses all four dimensions.}} the paths of the left and the right [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Double rotations|isoclinic rotation]]. They are [[W:Helix|helices]] bent into a [[W:Möbius strip|Möbius loop]] in the fourth dimension, taking a diagonal [[W:Winding number|winding route]] twice around the 3-sphere through the non-adjacent vertices of a 4-polytope's [[W:Skew polygon#Regular skew polygons in four dimensions|skew polygon]].|name=isoclinic geodesic}} {{Efn|[[File:Hopf band wikipedia.png|thumb|150px|Two [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles spanned by a twisted [[W:Annulus (mathematics)|annulus]].]][[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]]s are non-intersecting curved lines that are parallel in the sense that the perpendicular (shortest) distance between them is the same at each point. A double helix is an example of Clifford parallelism in ordinary 3-dimensional Euclidean space. In 4-space Clifford parallels occur as geodesic great circles on the [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]].{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|pp=8-10|loc=Relations to Clifford Parallelism}} Whereas in 3-dimensional space, any two geodesic great circles on the [[W:2-sphere|2-sphere]] will always intersect at two antipodal points, in 4-dimensional space not all great circles intersect. In 4-polytopes various discrete sets of Clifford parallel non-intersecting geodesic great circles can be found on the 3-sphere. They spiral around each other in [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fiber bundles]] which visit all the vertices just once. The simplest example is that six mutually orthogonal great circles can be drawn on the 3-sphere, as three pairs of completely orthogonal great circles, intersecting at 8 points defining a [[16-cell]]. Each completely orthogonal pair of circles is Clifford parallel. They cannot intersect at all, because they lie in planes which intersect at only one point: the center of the 16-cell. Because they are perpendicular and share a common center, the two circles are obviously not parallel and separate in the usual way of parallel circles in 3 dimensions; rather they are connected like adjacent links in a chain, each passing through the other without intersecting at any points, forming a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]|name=Clifford parallels}} {{Efn|In the 24-cell each great square plane is completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to another great square plane, and each great hexagon plane is completely orthogonal to a plane which intersects only two vertices: a great [[W:digon|digon]] plane.|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} {{Efn|In an [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], each point anywhere in the 4-polytope moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions at once, on a [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensional diagonal]]. The point is displaced a total [[W:Pythagorean distance]] equal to the square root of four times the square of that distance. For example, when the unit-radius 24-cell rotates isoclinically 60° in a hexagon invariant plane and 60° in its completely orthogonal invariant plane,{{Efn|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} all vertices are displaced to a vertex two edge lengths away. Each vertex is displaced to another vertex {{radic|3}} (120°) away, moving {{radic|3/4}} in four orthogonal coordinate directions.|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} {{Efn|Each square plane is isoclinic (Clifford parallel) to five other square planes but completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to only one of them.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Every pair of completely orthogonal planes has Clifford parallel great circles, but not all Clifford parallel great circles are orthogonal (e.g., none of the hexagonal geodesics in the 24-cell are mutually orthogonal).|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}} {{Efn|In the [[16-cell#Rotations|16-cell]] the 6 orthogonal great squares form 3 pairs of completely orthogonal great circles; each pair is Clifford parallel. In the 24-cell, the 3 inscribed 16-cells lie rotated 60 degrees isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other; consequently their corresponding vertices are 120 degrees apart on a hexagonal great circle. Pairing their vertices which are 90 degrees apart reveals corresponding square great circles which are Clifford parallel. Each of the 18 square great circles is Clifford parallel not only to one other square great circle in the same 16-cell (the completely orthogonal one), but also to two square great circles (which are completely orthogonal to each other) in each of the other two 16-cells. (Completely orthogonal great circles are Clifford parallel, but not all Clifford parallels are orthogonal.{{Efn|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}}) A 60 degree isoclinic rotation of the 24-cell in hexagonal invariant planes takes each square great circle to a Clifford parallel (but non-orthogonal) square great circle in a different 16-cell.|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} {{Efn|In 4 dimensional space we can construct 4 perpendicular axes and 6 perpendicular planes through a point. Without loss of generality, we may take these to be the axes and orthogonal central planes of a (w, x, y, z) Cartesian coordinate system. In 4 dimensions we have the same 3 orthogonal planes (xy, xz, yz) that we have in 3 dimensions, and also 3 others (wx, wy, wz). Each of the 6 orthogonal planes shares an axis with 4 of the others, and is ''completely orthogonal'' to just one of the others: the only one with which it does not share an axis. Thus there are 3 pairs of completely orthogonal planes: xy and wz intersect only at the origin; xz and wy intersect only at the origin; yz and wx intersect only at the origin.|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} {{Efn|Two planes in 4-dimensional space can have four possible reciprocal positions: (1) they can coincide (be exactly the same plane); (2) they can be parallel (the only way they can fail to intersect at all); (3) they can intersect in a single line, as two non-parallel planes do in 3-dimensional space; or (4) '''they can intersect in a single point'''{{Efn|To visualize how two planes can intersect in a single point in a four dimensional space, consider the Euclidean space (w, x, y, z) and imagine that the w dimension represents time rather than a spatial dimension. The xy central plane (where w{{=}}0, z{{=}}0) shares no axis with the wz central plane (where x{{=}}0, y{{=}}0). The xy plane exists at only a single instant in time (w{{=}}0); the wz plane (and in particular the w axis) exists all the time. Thus their only moment and place of intersection is at the origin point (0,0,0,0).|name=how planes intersect at a single point}} (and they ''must'', if they are completely orthogonal).{{Efn|Two flat planes A and B of a Euclidean space of four dimensions are called ''completely orthogonal'' if and only if every line in A is orthogonal to every line in B. In that case the planes A and B intersect at a single point O, so that if a line in A intersects with a line in B, they intersect at O.{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}}|name=completely orthogonal planes}}|name=how planes intersect}} {{Efn|Polytopes are '''completely disjoint''' if all their ''element sets'' are disjoint: they do not share any vertices, edges, faces or cells. They may still overlap in space, sharing 4-content, volume, area, or lineage.|name=completely disjoint}} {{Efn|If the [[W:Euclidean distance|Pythagorean distance]] between any two vertices is {{sqrt|1}}, their geodesic distance is 1; they may be two adjacent vertices (in the curved 3-space of the surface), or a vertex and the center (in 4-space). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|2}}, their geodesic distance is 2 (whether via 3-space or 4-space, because the path along the edges is the same straight line with one 90^o bend in it as the path through the center). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|3}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 (whether on a hexagonal great circle past one 60^o bend, or as a straight line with one 60^o bend in it through the center). Finally, if their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|4}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 in 4-space (straight through the center), but it reaches 3 in 3-space (by going halfway around a hexagonal great circle).|name=Geodesic distance}} {{Efn|Two angles are required to fix the relative positions of two planes in 4-space.{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|p=7|loc=§6 Angles between two Planes in 4-Space|ps=; "In four (and higher) dimensions, we need two angles to fix the relative position between two planes. (More generally, ''k'' angles are defined between ''k''-dimensional subspaces.)"}} Since all planes in the same [[W:hyperplane|hyperplane]] are 0 degrees apart in one of the two angles, only one angle is required in 3-space. Great hexagons in different hyperplanes are 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles. Great squares in different hyperplanes are 90 degrees apart in ''both'' angles (completely orthogonal){{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} or 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles.{{Efn||name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Planes which are separated by two equal angles are called ''isoclinic''. Planes which are isoclinic have [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} A great square and a great hexagon in different hyperplanes are neither isoclinic nor Clifford parallel; they are separated by a 90 degree angle ''and'' a 60 degree angle.|name=two angles between central planes}} {{Efn|The 24-cell contains 3 distinct 8-cells (tesseracts), rotated 60° isoclinically with respect to each other. The corresponding vertices of two 8-cells are {{radic|3}} (120°) apart. Each 8-cell contains 8 cubical cells, and each cube contains four {{radic|3}} chords (its long diagonals). The 8-cells are not completely disjoint{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}} (they share vertices), but each cube and each {{radic|3}} chord belongs to just one 8-cell. The {{radic|3}} chords joining the corresponding vertices of two 8-cells belong to the third 8-cell.|name=three 8-cells}} {{Efn|Departing from any vertex V₀ in the original great hexagon plane of isoclinic rotation P₀, the first vertex reached V₁ is 120 degrees away along a {{radic|3}} chord lying in a different hexagonal plane P₁. P₁ is inclined to P₀ at a 60° angle.{{Efn|P₀ and P₁ lie in the same hyperplane (the same central cuboctahedron) so their other angle of separation is 0.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}}}} The second vertex reached V₂ is 120 degrees beyond V₁ along a second {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₂ that is Clifford parallel to P₀.{{Efn|P₀ and P₂ are 60° apart in ''both'' angles of separation.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}} Clifford parallel planes are isoclinic (which means they are separated by two equal angles), and their corresponding vertices are all the same distance apart. Although V₀ and V₂ are ''two'' {{radic|3}} chords apart{{Efn|V₀ and V₂ are two {{radic|3}} chords apart on the geodesic path of this rotational isocline, but that is not the shortest geodesic path between them. In the 24-cell, it is impossible for two vertices to be more distant than ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord, unless they are antipodal vertices {{radic|4}} apart.{{Efn|name=Geodesic distance}} V₀ and V₂ are ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord apart on some other isocline. More generally, isoclines are geodesics because the distance between their ''adjacent'' vertices is the shortest distance between those two vertices, but a path between two vertices along a geodesic is not always the shortest distance between them (even on ordinary great circle geodesics).}}, P₀ and P₂ are just one {{radic|1}} edge apart (at every pair of ''nearest'' vertices).}} (Notice that V₁ lies in both intersecting planes P₁ and P₂, as V₀ lies in both P₀ and P₁. But P₀ and P₂ have ''no'' vertices in common; they do not intersect.) The third vertex reached V₃ is 120 degrees beyond V₂ along a third {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₃ that is Clifford parallel to P₁. The three {{radic|3}} chords lie in different 8-cells.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} V₀ to V₃ is a 360° isoclinic rotation.|name=360 degree geodesic path visiting 3 hexagonal planes}} {{Sfn|Mamone, Pileio & Levitt|2010|loc=§4.5 Regular Convex 4-Polytopes|pp=1438-1439|ps=; the 24-cell has 1152 symmetry operations (rotations and reflections) as enumerated in Table 2, symmetry group 𝐹₄.}} ==Notes== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Notelist|wiki=W:}} ==Citations== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Reflist|wiki=W:}} ==References== {{Refbegin}} * {{Cite book|title=A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers|last=Thoreau|first=Henry David|author-link=W:Thoreau|publisher=James Munroe and Company|year=1849|isbn=|location=Boston|ref={{SfnRef|Thoreau|1849}}}} * {{Cite journal|title=Theoretical Evidence for Principles of Special Relativity Based on Isotropic and Uniform Four-Dimensional Space|first=Takuya|last=Yamashita|date=25 May 2023|doi= 10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|journal=Preprints|volume=2023|issue=2023051785|url=https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|ref={{SfnRef|Yamashita|2023}}}} * {{Cite_arXiv | arxiv=2512.02903v2 | date=2 January 2026 | title=Symmetry transformation group arising from the Laplace–Runge–Lenz vector | first1=Stephen C. | last1=Anco | first2=Mahdieh Gol Bashmani | last2=Moghadam | class=math-ph}} === [[Polyscheme|Polyschemes]] === {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Refs|wiki=W:}} {{Refend}} 65pmd62nxyjdncqf7mgu6kkg8djnzg8 2842391 2842388 2026-10-24T00:20:25Z Dc.samizdat 2856930 /* Quantum mechanics is general relativity of Coxeter groups generated by reflections in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions */ 2842391 wikitext text/x-wiki {{align|center|David Brooks Christie}} {{align|center|dc@samizdat.org}} {{align|center|Draft in progress}} {{align|center|June 2023 - October 2026}} <blockquote>'''Abstract:''' The physical universe is properly visualized as real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are 4-polytopes, small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are 4-balls of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. We ourselves and the objects we observe near us are only 3-dimensional, but nonetheless we can see into four dimensions of space. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. Light from them reaches us directly, on straight lines through 4-space. This view of the observed universe is compatible with special and general relativity, and with quantum mechanics. It furnishes those theories with an explanatory geometric model.</blockquote> == Summary == We observe that: * Physical space has four perpendicular dimensions, not just three. * Atoms are [[W:4-polytope|4-polytopes]]. * The sun is a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]] that is round in four dimensions. * Everything of intermediate size between an atom and a star, including us and our planet, lies in a 3-dimensional manifold of ordinary space. * Our entire 3-space manifold is moving through Euclidean 4-space at the speed of light, in a direction perpendicular to its three interior dimensions. * Special relativity describes the linear motion of objects and light signals in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * General relativity describes the rotational motion of objects with mass in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * Quantum mechanics describes the symmetry group actions of elementary geometric objects (4-polytopes) in four-dimensional Euclidean space. == A theory of the Euclidean cosmos == The physical universe is properly visualized as [[w:Four-dimensional_space|real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>]] of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are [[w:4-polytope|4-polytopes]], small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are [[W:4-ball|4-balls]] of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. Objects intermediate in size between atoms and stars, including molecules, people, and planetery surfaces their surface, are so flat as to be essentially 3-dimensional, having only the thickness of an atom in the orthogonal fourth dimension. All objects with mass move inertially through Euclidean 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math> as long as they exist, and acceleration only varies their direction. Objects moving in the same direction are in the same inertial reference frame. Their direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> is their proper time dimension, simply because their direction and velocity of motion through time is the same as their direction and velocity of motion through space. A typical galaxy such as ours occupies a 4-ball of mostly empty space, with stars and other objects distributed non-uniformly within it. The galaxy's orbital center may be nothing: a smaller 4-ball of empty space they surround. The stars in our spiral galaxy appear from our accustomed point of view to occupy a disk-like region of 3-dimensional space, with a denser ball-like center, but they are not so confined: they are distributed within a region of 4-dimensional space. The disk and ball have thickness not only in the third dimension, but in the fourth spatial dimension as well. Light from stars and galaxies reaches us on straight lines through Euclidean 4-space, so from our viewpoint, in what we have always imagined to be a 3-space universe, we look into the surrounding 4-space. Although we are physically confined within a 3-dimensional hyperplane by the inertia of our motion through 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math>, light signals are not so confined, so we observe all the cosmological objects surrounding us, both in and above or below our hyperplane, without perceiving their separation in our fourth orthogonal dimension, the direction of our motion. We may perceive a galaxy as elliptical when it is actually spherical, because that is how its image projects from its 4-ball shape into a 3-ball region in our hyperplane, where we measure it with our 3-dimensional bodies. More generally, orbits are circular in 4-space, but elliptical in the 3-space of their elliptic hyperplane. The galaxy as a whole, or more properly its orbital barycenter, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, in a distinct direction orthogonal to all three dimensions of our ordinary proper 3-space. Stars within the galaxy are translating with it at the same velocity <math>c</math> in the same direction, but on spiral trajectories as they pursue their various orbits within the galaxy. The galaxy as a whole occupies a 4-ball within its proper inertial reference frame (that is, in the moving frame of reference in which the galaxy considers itself to be a stationary rotating 4-ball). Over time, the galaxy 4-ball occupies a 4-dimensional cylinder and progresses along the cylinder's axis at velocity <math>c</math>. In this more universal inertial reference frame, the stars in the galaxy follow helical geodesic paths through the 4-cylinder; their trajectories are screw-translations through 4-space, the compound of a simple rotation and a completely orthogonal linear translation. The gravitational force and the inertial tendency to follow a geodesic are the same phenomenon, by the equivalence principle. That said, they can be distinguished, and the galaxy is held together primarily by gravity as inertia, not by gravity as attraction to a central mass toward which objects fall in orbit. There is not enough mass in the galaxy to hold it together by attraction, there is just enough to bend the stars' trajectories toward each other, in helical orbits around the galaxy's barycentric axis of motion. It is the tremendous inertial force of stars in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> that holds the cylinder of motion together, not some invisible dark matter. The observed universe as a whole appears to be a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] expanding radially from a central origin point at velocity <math>c</math>, the invariant velocity of mass-carrying objects through 4-space, also the propagation speed of light relative to any moving 3-space manifold, as measured by all observers. A 3-sphere is a hypersphere in Euclidean 4-space, but the enclosing surface of a 3-sphere is a curved, finite 3-space, dimensionally analogous to the surface of the earth which is a curved, finite 2-space. This 3-sphere could be the domain of our visible cosmos, but of course we do not know for certain that all the cosmological objects we observe lie near the surface of our expanding 3-sphere, since it is only our assumption that they must all have originated in the same big bang long ago. Possibly some of the more distant objects we observe did not, and lie elsewhere, outside our big-bang's 3-sphere of outflying matter or even inside its 3-sphere, below its surface. We cannot assume that all objects in the 4-space universe lie near the surface of the same expanding 3-sphere. For all observers, the conjectured big-bang of their origin corresponds not only to a now-distant point in their proper time past, it also corresponds to a distinct now-distant point in 4-dimensional space: the same point in the same Euclidean 4-space for all observers with the same origin. Our big bang had a distinct origin point in real space as well as in real time. More generally, time and Euclidean 4-space can be measured independently, just as time and Euclidean 3-space were measured classically, without the necessity to combine them as spacetime. The same inertial force which holds the galactic cylinder of motion together also confines us physically to an exceedingly thin three-dimensional surface manifold moving through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. All objects in our solar system too small to have their own gravity lie entirely within this thinest three-dimensional manifold, and have only the thickness of an atom in their direction-of-motion fourth dimension. That is why we are 3-dimensional objects ourselves, and why we cannot construct more than three perpendiculars through a single point in our local 3-dimensional space. A spherical region of 4-space is called a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]]. The enclosing surface of a 4-ball of any size is a finite, curved (non-Euclidean) 3-dimensional space called a [[w:3-sphere|3-sphere]]. Our entire big-bang-origin universe appears to be the largest 3-sphere we observe, but each of the cosmological objects within it (including our galaxy and our sun) lies within a smaller 3-sphere shell which bounds it, lying (we assume) on the largest 3-sphere embedded in its surface, like a soap bubble on the surface of a larger soap bubble. All the 3-dimensional surfaces are expanding, as the largest 3-sphere inflates at radial velocity <math>c</math>. We ourselves live within such an expanding 3-dimensional surface, in an infinitesimally curved 3-manifold surface embedded in Euclidean 4-space. That surface is the ordinary 3-dimensional space we experience. The earth and all the planets lie on it. Our solar system is only a small patch on the surface of a dimensionally rounder space, although that surface is not infinite. It is curved, and finite, analogous to the way the 2-dimensional surface of the earth -- once thought to be flat -- is curved and finite. Our solar system occupies a small patch on a filmy 4-dimensional soap-bubble of galactic size rounded by gravity, that is thicker-skinned than the diameter of an atom only in the superdense interior of objects large enough to have significant gravity of their own. Our 3-manifold of ordinary space, as a surface within our moving 4-ball galaxy, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> with the galaxy, in a distinct direction orthogonal to the manifold's three orthogonal dimensions of interior space. At every material point in the manifold (at every atom), the translation through 4-space is following a geometric law of motion discovered by Coxeter, that governs the propagation of individual objects through Euclidean space by the actions of their symmetry groups. The solar system's atoms of mass are 4-polytopes that are simultaneously rotating and translating, and as they advance together they define a moving 3-dimensional manifold by their own collective inertia, also called gravity, the property of matter's ceaseless propagation through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate of causality at which quantum events occur, all objects move, and the universe evolves. Any moving 3-dimensional manifold such as ours is an evolving surface boundary that is empty in most places, occupied by single atoms in comparatively fewer places, and occupied by bound complexes of multiple atoms (molecules) in still fewer places. In all these places it is no thicker than one atom in the dimension corresponding to its direction of translation, because molecules are 3-dimensional complexes of atoms that add no thickness to the manifold. In fewer places still it is occupied by large lumps of matter which exert a significant gravitational attraction, such as planets and their satellites. These round gravitational objects are thicker than one atom in their fourth dimension, but not uniformly so. They are disk-like 4-dimensional objects, 3-balls that are flattish in the fourth dimension. They are typically only one atom thick at the 4-disk's sharp edge, but they may be much thicker in the center of the 4-disk, particularly if their gravity is strong enough to give them a core of superdense matter, like the earth's deep core. The moving surface manifold cannot be thicker than one atom at any point unless and until there is enough mass near that point for the force of gravity as attraction to overcome the force of gravity as inertia, allowing atoms to be "heaped up" into larger 4-dimensional objects that form a lump in its moving surface. We have only indirect experience of such 4-dimensional lumps of matter thicker than one atom, since they occur naturally in our vicinity only in regions of superdense matter, such as the core of the earth or the interior of the sun. Deep in the core of the earth under enormous gravitational pressure peculiar states of matter have been observed, defying our understanding of how 3-dimensional crystalline structures behave. That is because they are not 3-dimensional structures, they are 4-dimensional crystals. The earth is a disk-like 4-dimensional object that is thin at its edge but thicker at its sphere-like core, dimensionally analogous to a 3-dimensional flying saucer with a sharp circular edge. The earth's surface that we walk on is an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere), analogous to the circular edge of the flying saucer (a 1-sphere), and on that edge where we live every object we find (including our bodies) is 3-dimensional with only the thickness of an atom in the fourth dimension. We cannot walk on the top or bottom surface of the 4-disk flying saucer because those surfaces are 3-dimensional regions within the earth. The earth's deep core of superdense 4-dimensional matter occupies a spherical region of 4-dimensional space (a 4-ball). The sun is the only entirely spherical 4-ball occurring naturally in our solar system. We refer to the contents of such superdense 4-balls of matter as atomic plasma, and have little experimental knowledge of their internal geometry or processes. We know that the sun burns at its surface 3-sphere and emits radiation, and we know a good deal about those surface processes which are nuclear atomic processes, but we know very little about its interior 4-ball, a dimensionally rounder enclosed space whose existence we did not suspect. Every moving surface boundary of matter in the observed universe is evolving in four dimensions at velocity <math>c</math>. The current location in 4-space of any of its material objects corresponds to the present moment in the proper time of that object's inertial reference frame. The object's direction of movement at velocity <math>c</math> corresponds to its proper time dimension, which is a spiral over time, not a Euclidean (straight-line) dimension, since its direction is changing in its orbit. Objects with mass of all sizes, from subatomic particles to the largest objects observed in the cosmos, are perpetually in inertial rotational motion in some orbit, and simultaneously in inertial translational motion propagating themselves through 4-space, in two completely orthogonal inertial motions each at the constant universal rate of transformation <math>c</math>. Every object with mass moves relative to universal 4-coordinate Euclidean space on its own distinct geodesic spiral, a screw displacement trajectory that is the compound of its two completely orthogonal inertial motions, a rotation and a translation. Objects without mass such as photons lie off such moving surface boundaries of matter from which they were emitted, and their motion is of a different nature. They are in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> through all four dimensions concurrently, without any rotational component of motion, so they move through 4-space on straight lines at a compound velocity. The propagation speed of light measured on a straight line through Euclidean 4-space is <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, so we can see in four dimensions, even though we are physically confined to a 3-dimensional manifold that is moving at velocity <math>c</math>. For example, we can look across the center of the mostly-empty 4-ball containing our galaxy and see stars in the opposite sides of its concentric 3-sphere orbital surfaces. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. They move in the 4-space direction corresponding to their proper time, perpendicular to all three dimensions of their proper 3-space, and generally the farther they are from us the greater the divergence of their direction of motion from our direction of motion: the greater the relative motion between us, and the greater their Hubble redshift. Light from them reaches us directly, propagating on straight lines through 4-space at twice the velocity at which they, and we ourselves, are propagating through 4-space. This physical model of the observed universe is compatible with the theories of special and general relativity, and with the atomic theory of quantum mechanics. It explains those theories geometrically, as expressions of intrinsic symmetries in Euclidean space. == Symmetries == It is common to speak of nature as a web, and so it is, the great web of our physical experiences. Every web must have its root systems somewhere, and nature in this sense must be rooted in the symmetries which underlie physics and geometry, the [[W:Group (mathematics)|mathematics of groups]].{{Sfn|Conway, Burgiel & Goodman-Strauss|2008}} As I understand [[W:Noether's theorem|Noether's theorem]] (which is not mathematically), hers is the deepest meta-theory of nature yet, deeper than [[W:Theory of relativity|Einstein's relativity]] or [[W:Evolution|Darwin's evolution]] or [[W:Euclidean geometry|Euclid's geometry]]. It finds that all fundamental findings in physics are based on conservation laws which can be laid at the doors of distinct [[W:symmetry group |symmetry group]]s. Thus all fundamental systems in physics, as examples [[W:quantum chromodynamics|quantum chromodynamics]] (QCD) the theory of the strong force binding the atomic nucleus and [[W:quantum electrodynamics|quantum electrodynamics]] (QED) the theory of the electromagnetic force, each have a corresponding symmetry [[W:group theory|group theory]] of which they are an expression. [[W:Coxeter group|Coxeter's theory of symmetry groups]] generated by reflections did for geometry what Noether's theorem and Einstein's relativity did for physics. [[W:Coxeter|Coxeter]] showed that Euclidean geometry is based on conservation laws that correspond to distinct symmetry groups, and that their group actions express the principle of relativity. Here is Coxeter's formulation of the motions of objects (their congruent transformations) in an ''n''-dimensional Euclidean space, excerpted:{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|pp=217-218|loc=§12.2 Congruent transformations}} <blockquote>Let <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> denote a rotation, <math>\mathrm{R}</math> a reflection, <math>\mathrm{T}</math> a translation, and let <math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r\mathrm{T}</math> denote a product of several such transformations, all commutative with one another. Then <math>\mathrm{RT}</math> is a glide-reflection (in two or three dimensions), <math>\mathrm{QR}</math> is a rotary-reflection, <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is a screw-displacement, and <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is a double rotation (in four dimensions).<br> Every orthogonal transformation is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r \le n)</math>, the number of dimensions.<br> Transformations involving a translation are also expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + 1 \le n)</math>.<br> For <math>(n = 4)</math> in particular, every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> If we begin with this most elemental [[w:Kinematics|kinematics]] of Coxeter's, and also assume the [[W:Galilean relativity|Galilean principle of relativity]], every displacement in 4-space can be viewed as either a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> or a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, because we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> in a linearly moving (translating) reference frame. Therefore any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>. By the same principle, we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> as an isoclinic (equi-angled) <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> by proper choice of reference frame.{{Efn|[[W:Arthur Cayley|Cayley]] showed that any rotation in 4-space can be decomposed into two isoclinic rotations, which intuitively we might see follows from the fact that any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a [[W:SO(4)|rotation in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]].|name=Cayley's rotation factorization into two isoclinic reference frame transformations}} Coxeter's relation is thus a mathematical statement of the principle of relativity, on group-theoretic grounds. It correctly captures the limits to [[W:General relativity|general relativity]], in that we can only exchange the translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) for ''one'' of the two rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>). An observer in any inertial reference frame can always measure the presence, direction and velocity of ''one'' rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) up to uncertainty, and can always distinguish the direction of their own proper time translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>). As I understand Coxeter theory (which is not mathematically), the symmetry groups underlying physics seem to have an expression in a [[W:Euclidean space|Euclidean space]] of four [[W:dimension|dimension]]s, that is, they are [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|four-dimensional Euclidean geometry]]. Therefore as I understand that geometry (which is entirely by synthetic methods rather than by Clifford's algebraic methods), the [[W:Atom|atom]] seems to have a distinct Euclidean geometry, such that atoms and their constituent particles are four-dimensional geometric objects (4-polytopes), and nature can be understood in terms of their [[W:group action|group actions]], including centrally their group <math>SO(4)</math> [[W:rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space|rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]]. The distinct Coxeter symmetry groups have characteristic <math>SO(4)</math> rotational expressions as the [[W:Regular_4-polytope|regular 4-polytopes]]. Their discrete isoclinic rotations are distinguishing properties of fundamental objects in geometry, relativity and quantum mechanics. For example, atoms exhibit <math>SO(4)</math> symmetries of the discrete isoclinic (equi-angled) double rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>) of a set of regular 4-polytopes that is characteristic of their [[w:Atomic_number|atomic number]]. == Special relativity describes Euclidean 4-space == <blockquote>Our entire model of the universe is built on symmetries. Some, like isotropy (the laws are the same in all directions), homogeneity (same in all places), and time invariance (same at all times) seem natural enough. Even relativity, the Lorentz Invariance that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, has an elegance to it that makes it seem natural.<ref>{{Cite book|first=Dave|last=Goldberg|title=The Universe in the Rearview Mirror: How Hidden Symmetries Shape Reality|chapter=§10. Hidden Symmetries: Why some symmetries but not others?|year=2013|publisher=Dutton Penguin Group|isbn=978-0-525-95366-1|ref={{SfnRef|Goldberg|2013}}}}</ref></blockquote> Although the Minkowski spacetime of relativity is a non-Euclidean 4-dimensional space,{{Efn|Spacetime is a non-Euclidean (curved) 4-dimensional space because it consists of three orthogonal space dimensions and a time dimension. The time dimension is not orthogonal to the three spatial dimensions; the time coordinate has the opposite sign as the three space coordinates so spacetime is hyperbolic, not a Euclidean (flat) 4-space at all.}} it has been noticed that its 3-dimensional space component could be modeled as a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] embedded in 4-dimensional Euclidean (flat) space. That is, we could imagine that the ordinary 3-dimensional space we perceive is the curved 3-dimensional surface of a 4-dimensional ball (since the surface of a 4-ball is a curved 3-dimensional space called a 3-sphere, just as the surface of a 3-ball like the earth is a curved 2-dimensional space called a 2-sphere). This was [[#Origins of the theory|imagined by Einstein]] himself in 1921, as a thought experiment in which he carefully described his fourth orthogonal spatial dimension as merely a mathematical abstraction. Subsequently it was noticed by others (not mainstream physicists) that if physical space were really embedded in Euclidean 4-dimensional space (with our 3-dimensional space embedded in 4-space as some non-Euclidean 3-manifold, not necessarily a 3-sphere), then the Lorentz transformation effects of special relativity (spatial forshortenings and time dilations and so forth) could all be explained by ordinary perspective geometry in 4-dimensional Euclidean space. Special relativity reduces to classical vector space geometry (based on the 4-dimensional version of the Pythagorean theorem), but if and only if every observer is moving through 4-space at a universal constant velocity <math>c</math>, in some 4-space direction.{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} This counter-intuitive alternative geometric model of relativity, which has usually been called [[W:Formulations of special relativity#Euclidean relativity|Euclidean relativity]], is motivated by the fact that in every kind of relativity, but originally in Einstein's special relativity, each observer moves on a vector through a Euclidean four-dimensional space consisting of their three proper spatial dimensions and their proper time dimension, and the Pythagorean vector-sum of their motion through this kind of proper 4-space is always <math>c</math>, as measured by all observers from any inertial reference frame.{{Efn|Each observer is stationary in space in their own proper reference frame, while they move at maximum velocity {{Math|c}} through their own proper time. Observed from another reference frame in relative motion, they appear foreshortened in space in their direction of motion, and their clocks appear to be slowed to less than the maximum velocity {{Math|c}}.}} This is the Lorentz invariant, that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, regardless of their motion relative to the light source.{{Efn| ...cite Lewis Epstein's elegant explanation of the Lorentz Invariance as observers moving at constant velocity {{Math|c}} through space and proper time.}} But no physicists have taken the leap of claiming that therefore, our universe is physically [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|this kind of Euclidean 4-space]], and that observers are actually moving through it at velocity <math>c</math>. In physics as it has been universally understood, observers are not supposed to be able to move at velocity <math>c</math>. Their motion takes place in 3-space and in universal coordinate time (in Minkowski spacetime), and the cosmos is considered to be a non-Euclidean 3-space, generally a closed (finite) expanding 3-space, but with only three spatial dimensions, not four. In the Euclidean relativity alternative view, however, every observer is always moving at velocity <math>c</math> through the universe, which is real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. The direction in which they are moving is called their proper time axis.{{Efn|Time in spacetime is universal coordinate time, but there is another kind of time in relativity, the proper time in each inertial reference frame. Your proper time is the time you experience, and every observer has his own proper time; proper time runs at different rates in different inertial reference frames. It runs slower (compared to universal coordinate time) in a gravitational field (according to general relativity), and observers in motion with respect to each other view each other's clocks as running slower than their own clocks (according to special relativity).}} Their movement in time is not just modelled as movement in an abstract fourth dimension (as it is in Minkowski spacetime), their movement in time is isomorphic to their movement through physical space in a distinct direction at velocity <math>c</math>. Two observers' directions of movement through space may be different (or not, if they happen to be going in the same direction). Your proper time dimension is whichever direction you are moving. The other three directions perpendicular to your proper time axis are the three dimensions of your ordinary proper space, which again, will be different directions for you than for other observers moving in a different direction. There are four orthogonal spatial dimensions which we all share, but we share the same orthogonal proper time axis and ordinary proper 3-space axes only if we are at rest with respect to each other, actually moving in the same direction at velocity <math>c</math>, in the same inertial reference frame. Your proper 4-space coordinate system is rotated with respect to another observer's proper 4-space coordinate system, precisely as your vectors (directions of motion) are rotated in Euclidean 4-space with respect to each other, but there are no metric distortions (no Lorentz transformations) between your proper Euclidean 4-space coordinate systems; you are both embedded in the same Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. Lorentz transformations are required only to convert between your respective proper Minkowski spacetime coordinate systems. So in this novel alternate view of relativity, every mass in the universe must be perpetually in motion at velocity <math>c</math> through Euclidean 4-space, along with all the masses in its vicinity that are going in (nearly) the same direction. The entire solar system, for example, must be translating in the fourth dimension at the "speed of light" <math>c</math>, although we do not notice it, since we are all moving in that same direction together. Acceleration of an object varies its direction of motion through 4-space, but never its velocity, which is invariant for all objects with mass. Two objects which are in motion relative to each other are both actually in motion at the same velocity <math>c</math>, but in at least slightly different directions.{{Efn|The angular divergence between two observer's motion vectors is proportional to their relative velocity: the more they diverge, the greater their relative velocity, up to the maximum divergence possible in the space. In Euclidean relativity all observers are in motion at velocity {{Math|c}} relative to universal Cartesian 4-coordinate space, so the maximum relative velocity between two observers is {{Math|2c}} when they are moving in exactly opposite directions in 4-space. This is not a contradiction of special relativity, which limits the maximum relative velocity between two observers to {{Math|c}}, it is the same measurement in different units. Special relativity measures all velocities in Minkowski spacetime (in a non-Euclidean 3-space). Euclidean relativity measures all velocities in Euclidean 4-space.}} In Einstein's relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of light through 3-space. In Euclidean relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of matter through 4-space! The speed of light through 3-space is also perceived as <math>c</math> by all observers, because they are each living in a moving 3-manifold that is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. Despite their extreme differences in viewpoint, Einstein's relativity and Euclidean relativity are equivalent theories in complete agreement with each other, by definition. The two theories make exactly the same special relativity predictions of how observers in different inertial reference frames will perceive each other's motions in time and space. It is beyond the scope of this present paper to show how they also agree on the predictions of general relativity, but it is important to understand that our formulation of Euclidean relativity requires our acceptance of the experimentally verified findings of special relativity, general relativity and quantum mechanics. Our model and the standard model both describe the same geometric relations of space and time based on the same evidence, but as embedded in two very different universal host spaces: Euclidean 4-space versus Minkowski spacetime. In some instances our model provides a geometric explanation for physical phenomena where the standard model has none, as yet. An example is the two models' differing explanations for the gravitational coherence of galaxies: either their inertial motion at velocity <math>c</math>, or their possession of experimentally undetected dark matter. A more central example is our use of Coxeter's kinematics to explain the laws of relativistic motion geometrically. {{Efn|More generally, our model is concerned with group-theoretic properties of number elucidated by Coxeter and other geometers. ...cite Kappraff & Adamson's 2003 paper on The Relationship of the Cotangent Function to Special Relativity Theory, geometry and properties of number,{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2003|loc=Special Relativity Theory, Geometry and properties of number}} which shows how the Lorentz coefficient is a function of a deep geometric property of number{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2000|loc=A Fresh Look at Number}} discovered by Steinbach,{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997|loc=Golden Fields: A Case for the Heptagon}} by means of which the root formula of geometry in any Euclidean dimension, the Pythagorean theorem, may be derived solely in terms of the addition of polygon side lengths, without recourse to their products or squares. More generally, Steinbach found that in the relations among regular polytope chords, to add is to multiply; every chord is both the product (quotient) of a pair of chords and the sum (difference) of another pair of chords.}} Euclidean relativity is not even a fringe theory; no physicists or astronomers have adopted it. There are many good reasons why the revolutionary leap to a four orthogonal spatial dimensions viewpoint has not been taken, beginning with the universally observed fact that we can only construct three perpendiculars through a point in our immediate space, which appears to be resolutely 3-dimensional, not 4-dimensional. Euclidean relativity offers a nice geometric explanation of the reasons for the Lorentz transformations, but only at the cost of raising other mysteries, which have been difficult for its aficionados to explain. Another mystery is how light signals between observers in relative motion could "catch up" with the receiver moving on a diverging path through 4-space from the emitter. If both observers are already moving at <math>c</math> (on diverging paths), the propagation speed of light through 4-space between them would have to be greater than <math>c</math>. Euclidean relativity is a revolutionary theory indeed, in which <math>c</math> cannot possibly be the speed of light! We conclude that, for a theory of Euclidean 4-space to be physically viable (that is, for <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> to be our real space and not merely an abstract mathematical space), the speed of light through Euclidean 4-space must be <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, with massless photons translating through 4-space at twice the speed of mass-carrying objects. Photons must translate the diagonal distance through 4-space along the long diameter of a unit 4-hypercube, in the same time that massive particles translate inertially along the edge (or the radius) of a unit 4-hypercube. This is conceivable in Euclidean 4-space (and in no other Euclidean space of any dimensionality) because the long diagonal of the unit 4-hypercube is the natural number <math>\sqrt{4}</math>. == An object's motion in space is the product of its discrete self-reflections == Coxeter theory describes all the possible motions of an object in space as local functions of the object's discrete geometry (its shape). Coxeter observed that in a Euclidean space of any number of dimensions, any displacement of a geometric object from one place to another, and any rotation of the object from one orientation to another, can be broken down into the product of a number of discrete self-reflections. Any action of a polytope that transforms its position and orientation in space may be measured as a distinct sequence of self-reflections of the object in its own surfaces. Therefore any motion of the object whatsoever may be precisely described as the object propagating itself through space by a discrete sequence of local self-reflections. This is a purely kinematic description of motion which does not give any account of forces acting on the object that cause it to move. Coxeter found that both changes in position (translations) and changes in orientation (rotations) can be broken down into the simplest of all displacements (self-reflections). A translation occurs when an object self-reflects twice, in two distinct surfaces which are parallel to each other. A rotation also occurs when an object self-reflects twice, but in two distinct surfaces which intersect each other. When a object self-reflects once, it turns itself inside out (it reverses its chirality), but in translations and rotations it self-reflects twice, preserving its chirality. Coxeter's laws of kinematics are a geometric counterpart to Newton's algebraic laws of motion in three dimensional Euclidean space. They are helpful because they can be understood as geometric pictures, which may help us to visualize the relationships between translation and rotation in classic Newtonian physics problems, such as the [[W:Kepler problem|Kepler problem]] of the motion of the planets.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Feynman|first=Richard|title=Feynman's Lost Lecture: The Motion of Planets Around the Sun|date=1996|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0393039184}}</ref> But they are also a revolutionary advance beyond Newton's laws, because Coxeter formulated them in Euclidean spaces of any number of dimensions. In particular, they give us geometric pictures of all the possible motions of objects in 4-dimensional Euclidean space: <blockquote>Every orthogonal transformation in 4-space is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}^t</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + t \le 4)</math>. Every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> While this description should be understood as geometric pictures, some of the pictures may not be easy for us to visualize, since we have no physical experience in 4-dimensional space. Rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>), reflection (<math>\mathrm{R}</math>) and translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) are obvious analogues of what they are in three-dimensional space, but double rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>) is something new and unprecedented in our physical experience, because double rotations cannot occur until there are four or more dimensions of space in which to rotate. A point in 4-space may be in motion on two circles in two completely orthogonal rotation planes simultaneously. Nothing constrains the two circles to be of the same radius, or constrains either circle from being of infinite radius such that the point moves in a straight line within its rotation plane: a translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> rather than a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. The motion of a rigid object defined by multiple points is constrained by its rigidity, such that the radii of both circles may approach infinity, but only one of the two radii may actually reach infinity. For a rigid object, only one of the two rotations may actually be a translation. Four dimensional Euclidean space can accomodate no such thing as a <math>\mathrm{Q}^2\mathrm{T}</math>. A translating double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, like a translating simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>, is simply a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. That is the essence of the way the principle of relativity operates in Euclidean 4-space. An object which is double-rotating in its own proper inertial reference frame may be seen to be performing nothing more mysterious than a screw translation, when observed from an inertial reference frame from which the object is in relative translational motion. Of course, it is a screw translation in 4-space, which is more mysterious than a screw translation in our ordinary 3-space. In 3-space the orbit of a screw translation (or any <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) lies on a great circle of an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere). In 4-space the orbit of a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math> lies on a great circle of a hypersphere (a 3-sphere). Such 4-dimensional great circles are inherently more complex than the ordinary circles we experience in 3-space. They do not lie in a single plane, but bend through all four dimensions, in either a left or right hand direction of curvature. Unlike ordinary circles they are inherently chiral, and their circumference is not <math>2\pi r</math>, but like ordinary circles they are truly circular, geodesic circles. In 4-space they might even be said to be more circular than ordinary circles, which bend in only two dimensions. We refer to such 4-dimensional great circles as ''isoclines'', to distinguish them from ordinary 2-dimensional great circles in the plane. Their name comes from the fact that a point on a rigid 4-dimensional object undergoing [[W:SO(4)#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]] traverses an isocline circle. In a universe which is real Euclidean four-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>, wherein these motions occur only at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, there is a universal Cartesian 4-coordinate reference frame in which every rigid object in free fall is translating on a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> at velocity <math>c</math>. That universal inertial reference frame is not the proper reference frame of any object or observer, wherein the object or observer is stationary and double-rotating at the universal rate of quantum events <math>c</math>, but it is the common reference frame of all observers. == Light propagates through 4-space at twice its apparent velocity <math>c</math>== Coxeter's laws of kinematics in 4-dimensional Euclidean space apply to all objects with mass, but we find there is an additional kind of displacement which applies only to massless particles such as photons, considered as single point objects. Light quanta (photons) translate through 4-space by 4-dimensional reflection <math>\mathrm{R}^4</math>, which may be termed a double translation <math>\mathrm{T}^2</math>, a pure translation via two pairs of parallel reflections without any rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. Matter (atoms and all particles with mass) are perpetually rotating and translating through 4-space by <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, a screw translation of a rotating object, which is relativistically equivalent to a stationary isoclinic <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>, an isoclinically rotating object such as an atom. A simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> or simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> is a double reflection <math>\mathrm{R^2}</math>, so a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is an <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>, but not with the same group of reflection angles as a light signal <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>. A translation <math>\mathrm{T = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two parallel planes, and a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two intersecting planes, as in a <math>\mathrm{QT = R^4}</math> which is both at once. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is two double reflections in pairs of parallel planes at once, a reflection in four non-intersecting parallel planes; it is all translation and no rotation. In a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> all the motion goes to translation, so the translation goes twice as far as the simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is the opposite of a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q^2 = R^4}</math>, which is stationary but rotates twice as far as the simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. The product of the two translations in a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> is a diagonal 4-space translation over the long diameter of the unit 4-hypercube, exactly twice the distance of a simple <math>\mathrm{T}</math> over the edge length (or radius) of the unit 4-hypercube. The [[w:Tesseract|4-hypercube (also known as the 8-cell or tesseract)]] is ''radially equilateral'', which means its edge length is equal to its radius, like the hexagon, so its long diameter (twice its radius) is exactly twice its edge length. The photon moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions. By the four-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, each of those four distances is half the total distance the photon moves: one edge length (one radius) is half the total diagonal distance moved (the long diameter). That total movement is a double the unit-distance translation, but without any rotation component, so it cannot carry any mass with it. A <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> cannot reposition a 4-polytope the way a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> does, it can only reposition a quantum of energy that has no distinguishing rotational symmetry, such as a photon. That is the price light pays to move exactly twice as fast as matter.{{Efn| ...lensing of double translations <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> in more than two pairs of parallel planes at once...relationship to the frequency of light emitted and the coherence length of the wave packet...}} == Special relativity is Galilean relativity in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == {{Efn|...TAC suggests this section is needed sooner, i.e. in the preceding Special Relativity section, as it explains how Euclidean relativity reduces special relativity to 4D perspective geometry...it's misplaced (too late) here...}} Perspective effects known as the Lorentz transformations occur because each observer's proper 3-dimensional space is a moving curved manifold embedded in flat 4-dimensional Euclidean space. The curvature of their 3-space complicates sightline calculations for observers; they sometimes require Lorentz transformations to produce the actual 4-space Cartesian coordinates of objects in the scene being observed. But if all four spatial dimensions are considered, no Lorentz transformations are required (or permitted) in correct scene construction, except when an observer wants to calculate a projection, that is, the shadow of how things will appear to them from a three-dimensional viewpoint (not how they really are in 4-space).{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} Space really has four orthogonal dimensions, and space and time behave there just as they do in a classical vector space, only bigger by one dimension. It is not necessary to combine 4-space with time in a unified spacetime to explain 4-dimensional perspective effects at high relative velocities, because Euclidean 4-space is already 4-dimensional, and those effects fall out naturally from the 4-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, exactly as ordinary visual perspective does in three dimensions from the 3-dimensional Pythagorean theorem. Because one of the four spatial dimensions corresponds to an observer's direction of motion (in both space and proper time), and all observers and all scenes being observed are in motion (at constant velocity) in their respective proper time directions, we observe perspective foreshortenings in time as well as in a spatial dimension. In special relativity these perspective effects are reciprocal, precisely because they are only apparent, not actual, changes in size and duration. (However in general relativity, discussed below, the actual rate of physical processes varies from place to place, and reference frame differences predicted by the theory are neither reciprocal nor illusory.) None of these Lorentz effects are beyond geometric explanation or paradoxical. The universe is unexpectedly strange to us in precisely the ways the Euclidean fourth dimension is strange to us; but that does hold many surprises. Euclidean 4-space is much more interesting than Euclidean 3-space, analogous to the way 3-space is much more interesting and deeply explanatory to us than it would be if we experienced it only as a 2-space with many folds and curves, as perhaps an ant does. The emergent properties of 4-space are hard for us to visualize because they lie so wholly beyond our physical experience, just as it was hard for our ancestors to imagine the earth as round like a ball. However, Euclidean spaces of successive dimensions are analogous, and so higher dimensional spaces can be anticipated and explored: that is Schläfli's great discovery. Moreover dimensional analogy itself, like everything else in nature including all of physics, is an exact expression of intrinsic group-theoretic symmetries: that is Nother's great discovery. == General relativity is special relativity in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == The statement that the laws of special relativity hold to good approximation in freely falling (and non-rotating) reference frames is known as the [[W:Equivalence principle|Einstein equivalence principle]]. The weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a building on the surface of the earth is the same as the weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a spaceship in interstellar space accelerating at a rate of 32'/second/second. Both observers are experiencing an upwards acceleration at the same rate, which in their respective proper reference frames is measured as the weight of gravity, rather than as an accelerating motion (they are stationary in their proper reference frames). Einstein used this equivalence principle as the basis for his general theory of relativity, in much the same way he had used the constant velocity of light as the basis for his special theory of relativity. In general relativity the two accelerating observers occupy scenes which are relativistically equivalent, which means that although they can be distinguished (they have different measurements) in any reference frame from which they may both be observed, they have the same invariant geometry in all reference frames (they are the same phenomena), implying that there exists, for either scene, another reference frame from which it measures exactly like the other scene. Relativistically equivalent does not imply that there exists a single reference frame in which the two scenes are congruent (have the same measurements). It only means that they can be transformed into each other by a shift in point of view, because their invariant geometries (their measurements which are independent of point of view) are the same. Einstein's general theory of relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in spacetime. Our formulation of Euclidean relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. An observer standing on the surface of the earth is accelerated at the rate of 32'/second/second. The observer and the earth are both stationary in their proper inertial reference frames (which are similar except for the rotation of the earth), so the observer's acceleration cannot be perceived as motion in either proper reference frame; it is perceptible there instead as the force of gravity. It is only perceptible as motion in some other reference frame in which the earth and the observer are both in motion, such as the universal common reference frame of Euclidean 4-coordinate space in which they are both in motion at velocity <math>c</math> on their respective screw translations <math>QT</math>, which are distinct. In that universal common reference frame the observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is the rate of change in the direction of his vector of translation through 4-space. The velocity of his vector of translation <math>T</math> through 4-space remains the constant <math>c</math> throughout; only his direction is changing. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation <math>Q</math> of a translation <math>T</math>: a screw translation <math>QT</math>. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation which is an acceleration. We can be precise about the units of measurement of this acceleration at atomic scale. In Coxeter's kinematics rotations of geometric objects occur in discrete increments called rotational displacements, with each distinct kind of rotation performing a characteristic number of its characteristic rotational displacement during a full revolution that returns the object to its starting orientation. There are many distinct kinds of rotation, each with its characteristic rotational displacement and number of displacements per revolution. The general rotation in 4-space is a double rotation <math>Q^2</math> distinguished by two distinct completely orthogonal angles through which the object turns in each rotational displacement. The angles determine not only the distance through which the object turns, but the characteristic trajectory of each point on the surface of the rotating object, including the length of that trajectory before it closes into a circle when the object returns to its starting orientation. For any distinct kind of rotation, the circular trajectory is always an integer multiple of the characteristic rotational displacement, but the full circle may be greater than 360°. In 4-space rotational circles are not ordinary 2-dimensional circles that lie in the plane and have a 360° circumference. Many distinct 4-space rotations of interest have a circumference of 720°, and many are larger. In 4-space every object with mass moves on its distinct <math>QT</math> trajectory. Each rotational displacement <math>Q</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which intersect each other, at angles related to a distinct star polygon. Each translational displacement <math>T</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which lie parallel to each other. In both kinds of motion (rotation and translation) it is the rate at which these double-reflection displacements occur which is constant and which we measure as the velocity <math>c</math>. Every atom translates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing a large number of atomic scale translational displacements per second. Concurrently, the atom rotates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing the same large number of atomic scale rotational displacements per second. Although the number of displacements at atomic scale per unit time is the same universal constant <math>c</math> for all rotations and translations, distinct kinds of rotation revolve at distinct rates, because the number of rotational displacements per complete revolution and the circumference of the complete revolution are distinct characteristics of each kind of rotation. The velocity at which each point on the surface of a rotating object moves, and the frequency of its rotational circling, are functions of the distinct rotation it is performing. However, they are not simple functions of <math>c</math> and the two defining angle parameters of the rotation. Distinct rotations arise from distinct symmetry groups and each is its own mystery with a unique conservation law. The relationships between those distinct conservation laws are even more mysterious, and have been shown to be chaotic. Steinbach{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997}} discovered the Golden Fields family of ratios which govern distinct rotational displacements related to the regular star polygons at least up to the hendecagon {11}. Kappraff and Adamson{{Sfn|Kappraff|Adamson|2004}} further characterized the families of rotation functions and showed that they form an infinite number of periodic trajectories when operated on by the Mandelbrot operator. The inertial tendency of mass is to follow a geodesic. The inertial conservation law of gravity applies to all motions of objects with mass, rotations as well as translations. A translation <math>T</math> is the distinct simple rotation <math>Q</math> in which the characteristic angle of rotational displacement is zero. Inertia is the tendency of objects with mass to conserve their angles of rotational displacement. In 4-space each object has two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement which are characteristic of the distinct rotation the object is performing. Inertia is the conservation of this distinct double rotation. In 4-coordinate Euclidean space the acceleration of an object with mass is a rotation of the object, a change to its direction, not a change to its constant velocity. Because the rate of atomic scale displacements is the universal constant <math>c</math>, the rate of change of direction (the acceleration of the object) is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law. A observer standing on the surface of the earth is performing a distinct double rotation characterized by two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement. The observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law, and a measurement of the rate of change of the observer's direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. ... == Quantum mechanics is general relativity of Coxeter groups generated by reflections in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == ... == Dimensional relativity == The formulation of Euclidean relativity based on Coxeter's kinetic law of <math>n</math>-dimensional congruent transformations in Euclidean space may be called ''dimensional relativity'', since it captures the theories of special and general relativity, and has its roots in dimensional analogy. Dimensional analogy is the exploration of [[w:Hermann_Grassmann#Mathematician|Hermann Grassmann's vector space principle]], in which space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. The geometry of higher-dimensional space is accessible by reason of direct analogy, as [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] subsequently demonstrated, and by algebraic methods after [[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]]. By analogy to the surface of the earth, the bounding surface of a spherical region of <math>n</math>-dimensional Euclidean space is an <math>(n-1)</math>-sphere, a spherical space of one fewer dimensions than the <math>n</math>-ball of Euclidean space it surrounds. In dimensional relativity the sky is not a ceiling, but an infinite regress of alternating spherical and Euclidean <math>n</math>-spaces of increasing <math>n</math>, accessible from each observer's point of view. By dimensional analogy, each observer looks up into their own reference frame's regress of concentric alternating <math>n</math>-spaces. By the capacity for dimensional analogy which they possess, some observers see deeper into <math>n</math>-dimensional space than others. == Polycentric spherical relativity == An intelligent observer equipped with the principle of dimensional relativity may perceive the universe from any inertial reference frame, not only from their own proper stationary reference frame in the Euclidean <math>n</math>-space universe in which they physically locate themself. We see that every observer may also properly view themself as stationary and the universe as an <math>n</math>-sphere with themself at the center observing it, perceptually equidistant from all points on its <math>n</math>-space surface, including their own physical location which is one of those surface points, distinguished to them but moving on the surface, and not the center of anything. This ''polycentric model'' of the universe is a further restatement of the principle of relativity, and of the [[W:Copernican principle|Copernican principle]] that observation is democratic: observers occupy representative viewpoints, not privileged monocentric positions. The polycentric model is compatible with Galileo's relativity of uniformly moving objects in ordinary space, Einstein's special relativity of inertial reference frames in 4-dimensional spacetime, Einstein's general relativity of all reference frames in non-Euclidean spacetime, and Coxeter's dimensional relativity of orthogonal group actions in Euclidean and spherical spaces of any number of dimensions. The polycentric model should be known as Thoreau's principle of ''spherical relativity'', since the first precise written statement of it appears in 1849, contemporaneous with and independent of Schlafli's work: <blockquote>The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence.{{Sfn|Thoreau|1849|p=349|ps=; "The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence." [Contemporaneous and independent of [[W:Ludwig Schlafli|Ludwig Schlafli]]'s pioneering work enumerating the complete set of regular polyschemes in any number of dimensions.]}}</blockquote> == Revolutions == The original Copernican revolution in 1543 displaced the center of the universe from the center of the earth to a point farther away, the center of the sun, with the earth performing a ''revolution'' around the sun, and the stars remaining on a fixed 2-sphere around the sun instead of around the earth. But this led inevitably to the recognition that the sun must be a star itself, not equidistant from all the stars, and the center of but one of many spheres, no monotheistic center at all. In 1600 [[W:Giordano Bruno|Giordano Bruno]] who first openly advocated these views was burned at the stake in Rome's [[W:Campo de' Fiori|Campo de' Fiori]] by the Catholic inquisition. In such fashion the Euclidean four-dimensional revolution, emerging three to five centuries later, initially lends itself to the big bang theory of a single origin of the whole universe, but leads inevitably to the recognition that all the galaxies need not be equidistant from a single origin in time, any more than all the stars lie in the same galaxy, equidistant from a single center in space. The expanding sphere of matter on the surface of which we find ourselves living is likely to be one of many 3-spheres expanding at velocity <math>c</math>, with their big bang origins occurring at distinct times and places in the ''n''-dimensional universe. The most distant objects we see when we look up at night may not all have the same origin in space and time. As recently as Copernicus we believed all the stars lay on a single 2-sphere embedded in Euclidean 3-space, with our sun at its center. During the enlightenment observers beginning with Bruno dispersed those stars into an infinite Euclidean 3-space, and relinquished our privileged position at the center. Then Einstein showed that our 3-space could not be Euclidean, that it must be a 3-manifold curved in every place in obedience to Newton's inverse-square law of gravity; and in a geometry related to time, at least, it must be 4-dimensional. In the present work we propose a theory of ''n''-dimensional real space and how light travels in it, a theory which says we can see into four orthogonal dimensions of Euclidean space, and so when we look up at night we see cosmological objects distributed in at least four dimensions of space around us, rather than all located in our own local 3-space. Looking still deeper and farther out, the universe viewed as a 4-sphere might, or might not, be expanding, and the most distant objects we see when we look up at night may, or may not, lie in our 4-dimensional hyperplane. Real space has ''n'' dimensions as [[w:Hermann_Grassmann|Grassmann]] and [[w:Schläfli|Schläfli]] showed, and we do not know how many dimensions the most distant objects we see may be distributed in. They need not all lie within the four spatial dimensions in which we have now learned to observe them, any more than they all lie in our local 3-space. When we look up at the objects that surround us, we have no way of discerning how many dimensions beyond three the space we are looking into has. We know their distance from us primarily by virtue of how long it takes their light to reach us. We can measure their distribution around us in 3-space or 4-space, but that is simply how we choose to measure their positions, not an actual finding of how they are distributed. Even if it is now evident that they do not all lie in the same 3-space, how many more dimensions than three are needed to contain them? We observe that our 4-ball galaxy is embedded in Euclidean <math>n</math>-space as one of many 4-ball galaxies, each translating in a distinct direction through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, on more or less divergent paths from each other. But only closer observation will reveal evidence of whether everything we see lies in the same Euclidean 4-space, or if it is distributed in five or more dimensions, and how it is moving there. To remain in agreement with the theory of relativity, the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint requires that all mass-carrying objects be in motion in some distinct direction through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, although the relative velocity between nearby objects is much smaller since they move on similar vectors, aimed away from a common origin point in the past. It is natural to expect that objects moving at constant velocity away from a common origin will be distributed roughly on the surface of an expanding 3-sphere. Although their paths away from their origin are not straight lines but various helical isoclines (screw translation spirals), nearby objects must be translating radially at the same average velocity, since the objects in a system (such as our solar system or galaxy) do not separate rapidly over time but remain in orbital formation. Each system's screw translation has two [[w:Completely_orthogonal|completely orthogonal]] components of motion in 4-space, an orbital rotation (such as the earth's around our sun) and a linear translation of the entire system at velocity <math>c</math> in the direction of the original 3-sphere's radial expansion (along the system's proper time vector). Of course the view from our solar system does not suggest that the 3-sphere enclosing each galaxy is expanding at this great rate from its galactic center. The standard theory has been that the entire observable universe is expanding from a single big bang origin in time, with galaxies forming later. While the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint lends itself to that standard theory, it also supports theories which require no single origin point in space and time. These are the voyages of starship Earth, to boldly go where no one has gone before. We made the jump to light speed long ago, in whatever big bang our atoms emerged from, and have never slowed down since. == Origins of the theory == Einstein himself may have been the first to imagine the universe as the three-dimensional surface of a four-dimensional Euclidean 3-sphere, in what was narrowly the first written articulation of a Euclidean 4-space universe, contemporaneous with the teen-aged Coxeter's (quoted below).{{Efn|[[W:William Rowan Hamilton|Hamilton]]'s algebra '''H''' of [[W:Quaternions|quaternions]] introduces (in 1843) the notion of a [[W:Three-dimensional sphere|three-dimensional sphere]] embedded in a four-dimensional space, but Hamilton did not quite conceive of the quaternions as the Cartesian 4-coordinates of a Euclidean 4-space, and he did not describe our ordinary 3-space as embedded in Euclidean 4-space.}} Einstein did this as a [[W:Gedankenexperiment|gedankenexperiment]] in the context of investigating whether his equations of general relativity predicted an infinite or a finite universe, in his 1921 Princeton lecture.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/36276|title=The Meaning of Relativity|last=Einstein|first=Albert|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=1923|isbn=|location=|pages=110-111}}</ref> He invited us to imagine "A spherical manifold of three dimensions, embedded in a Euclidean continuum of four dimensions", but he was careful to disclaim parenthetically that "The aid of a fourth space dimension has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice." Informally, the Euclidean 4-dimensional theory of relativity may be given as a sort of reciprocal to that disclaimer of Einstein's: ''The Minkowski spacetime has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice, as an aid to understanding how things will appear to an observer from their perspective; the foreshortenings, clock desynchronizations and other Lorentz transformations it predicts are proper calculations of actual perspective effects; but real space is a flat, Euclidean continuum of four orthogonal spatial dimensions, and in it the ordinary laws of a flat vector space hold (such as the Pythagorean theorem), and all sightline calculations work classically, so long as you consider all four spatial dimensions.'' The Euclidean theory of relativity differs from the special theory of relativity in ascribing to the physical universe a geometry of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions, rather than the special theory's [[w:Minkowski spacetime|Minkowski spacetime]] geometry, in which three spatial dimensions and a time dimension comprise a unified non-Euclidean spacetime of four dimensions. Anco and Maghadam found that <math>SO(4)</math> breaks to <math>\mathbb{S}^3</math> (the 3-sphere) if the energy in a Kepler orbit is negative (an elliptical orbit), and to <math>H^3</math> (Minkowski spacetime) if the energy is positive (a hyperbolic orbit). Therefore the fact that the planets orbit on ellipses in our 3-space suggests that they orbit on a 3-sphere embedded in Euclidean 4-space. Thus we can conclude that <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> is the actual geometry of our physical universe, and Minkowski spacetime is an abstraction of it; the reciprocal of Einstein's disclaimer is the more direct physical model. Of course spacetime remains a true and useful abstraction, although it must relinquish its privileged position as our exclusive conception of our place in space.{{Efn| ...origins of the Euclidean 4-space insight in the observations of Fock, Atkinson, Moser and others.}} The invention of Euclidean geometry of more than three spatial dimensions preceded Einstein's theories by more than fifty years, when it was worked out originally by the Swiss mathematician [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] before 1853.{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|loc=§7. Ordinary Polytopes in Higher Space; §7.x. Historical remarks|pp=141-144|ps=; "Practically all the ideas in this chapter ... are due to Schläfli, who discovered them before 1853 — a time when Cayley, Grassmann and Möbius were the only other people who had ever conceived the possibility of geometry in more than three dimensions."}} Schläfli extended Euclid's geometry of one, two, and three dimensions in a direct way to four or more dimensions, generalizing the rules and terms of [[w:Euclidean geometry|Euclidean geometry]] to spaces of any number of dimensions. He coined the general term ''[[polyscheme]]'' to mean geometric forms of any number of dimensions, including two-dimensional [[w:polygon|polygons]], three-dimensional [[w:polyhedron|polyhedra]], four dimensional [[w:polychoron|polychora]], and so on, and in the process he found all of the [[w:Regular polytope|regular polyschemes]] that are possible in every dimension, including in particular the [[User:Dc.samizdat/Rotations#Sequence of regular 4-polytopes|six convex regular polychora]] which can be constructed in a Euclidean space of four dimensions (the set analogous to the five [[w:Platonic solid|Platonic solids]] the ancients found in three dimensional space). Thus Schläfli was the first to explore the fourth dimension, reveal its emergent geometric properties, and discover its astonishing regular objects. Because his work was only published posthumously in 1901, and remained almost completely unknown until Coxeter published [[w:Regular_Polytopes_(book)|Regular Polytopes]] in 1947, other researchers had more than fifty years to rediscover the regular polychora, and competing terms were coined; today [[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s word ''[[w:Polytope|polytope]]'' is the commonly used term for ''polyscheme.''{{Efn|[[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s German word ''polytop'' was introduced into English by [[W:Alicia Boole Stott|Alicia Boole Stott]], who like Hoppe and [[W:Thorold Gosset|Thorold Gosset]] rediscovered Schlafli's six regular convex 4-polytopes, with no knowledge of their prior discovery. Today Schläfli's original ''polyschem'', with its echo of ''schema'' as in the configurations of information structures, seems even more fitting in its generality than ''polytope'' -- perhaps analogously as information software (programming) is even more general than information hardware (computers).}} Because of this century-long lag in the dissemination of a scientific discovery, the regular 4-polytopes appear to have played no role at all, by any name, in the twentieth century discovery and evolution of the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics.{{Efn|One could argue that the higher-dimensional polytopes have barely influenced science or culture at all thus far. The physicist John Edward Huth's comprehensive deep dive through the history of cultural and scientific concepts of physical space, from ancient flatland models of the world through general relativity and quantum mechancs, shows exactly how we got to our present standard model of the universe, although it includes no mention of higher-dimensional Euclidean space.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Huth|first=John Edward|title=A Sense of Space: A local's guide to a flat earth, the edge of the cosmos, and other curious places|year=2025|publisher=University of Chicago Press}}</ref>}} == Boundaries == <blockquote>Ever since we discovered that Earth is round and turns like a mad-spinning top, we have understood that reality is not as it appears to us: every time we glimpse a new aspect of it, it is a deeply emotional experience. Another veil has fallen.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Carlo Rovelli|author-link=W:Carlo Rovelli|title=Seven Brief Lessons on Physics|publisher=Riverhead|year=2016|isbn=978-0399184413}}</ref></blockquote> Of course it is strange to consciously contemplate this world we inhabit, our planet, our solar system, our 3-sphere surface in our vast galaxy, as the merest film, a boundary no thicker in the places we inhabit than the diameter of an electron (though much thicker in some places we cannot inhabit, such as the planet's core and the interior of stars). But is not our unconscious traditional concept of the boundary of our world even stranger? Since the enlightenment we are accustomed to thinking that there is nothing beyond three dimensional space: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But anyone who knows the [[polyscheme]]s Schläfli discovered knows that space can have any number of dimensions, and that there are fundamental objects and motions to be discovered in four dimensions that are even more various and interesting than those we can discover in three. The strange thing, when we think about it that way, is that there ''is'' a boundary between three and four dimensional space. ''Why'' can't we move (or apparently, see) in more than three dimensions? Why is our physical world apparently only three dimensional? Why would it have just ''three'' dimensions, and not four, or five, or the ''n'' dimensions that Schläfli mapped? What is the nature of the boundary which confines us to just three dimensions? We know that in Euclidean geometry the boundary between three and four dimensions is itself a spherical three dimensional space, so we should suspect that we are materially confined within such a curved boundary surface. Light need not be confined with us within our three dimensional boundary space. We would look directly through four dimensional space in our natural way, by receiving light signals that travelled through it to us on straight lines. In that case the reason we do not observe a fourth spatial dimension in our vicinity is that there are no nearby objects in it, just off our hyperplane in the wild. The nearest 4-ball object we can see with our eyes is our sun, which lies equatorially in our own hyperplane, though it bulges out of it above and below. But when we look up at the heavens, every pinprick of light we observe is itself a four-dimensional object off our hyperplane, and they are distributed all around us in four-dimensional space through which we gaze. We are four-dimensionally sighted creatures, even though our bodies are three-dimensional objects, thin as an atom in the fourth dimension. But that should not perplex us: we can see into three dimensional space even though our retinas are two dimensional objects, thin as a photoreceptor cell. Our unconscious provincial concept is that there is nothing else outside our three dimensional world: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But Schläfli discovered something else: all the astonishing regular objects that exist in higher dimensions, which vastly extend our notions of the beauty and mystery of space itself, and the intrinsic spatial symmetries of our universe which geometry reveals. Space is more commodious than we thought it was, and permits previously unimagined objects and motions. So our provincial conception of our place in it now has the same kind of status as our idea that the sun rises in the east and passes overhead: it is mere appearance, not a true model and no longer a proper explanation. An inertial boundary is a proper explanation, be it ever so thin. And would a boundary of ''no'' thickness, a mere abstraction with no physical power to separate, be a more suitable explanation? We must look for a physically powerful explanation in the geometry of space itself, which general relativity properly associates with the gravitational or inertial force. <blockquote>The number of dimensions possessed by a figure is the number of straight lines each perpendicular to all the others which can be drawn on it. Thus a point has no dimensions, a straight line one, a plane surface two, and a solid three .... In space as we now know it only three lines can be imagined perpendicular to each other. A fourth line, perpendicular to all the other three would be quite invisible and unimaginable to us. We ourselves and all the material things around us probably possess a fourth dimension, of which we are quite unaware. If not, from a four-dimensional point of view we are mere geometrical abstractions, like geometrical surfaces, lines, and points are to us. But this thickness in the fourth dimension must be exceedingly minute, if it exists at all. That is, we could only draw an exceedingly small line perpendicular to our three perpendicular lines, length, breadth and thickness, so small that no microscope could ever perceive it. We can find out something about the conditions of the fourth and higher dimensions if they exist, without being certain that they do exist, by a process which I have termed "Dimensional Analogy."<ref>{{Citation|title=Dimensional Analogy|last=Coxeter|first=Donald|date=February 1923|publisher=Coxeter Fonds, University of Toronto Archives|authorlink=W:Harold Scott MacDonald Coxeter|series=|postscript=|work=}}</ref></blockquote> I believe, but I cannot prove, that we live in real space, which is Schläfli's Euclidean space of ''n'' analogous dimensions. As Grassmann showed first, space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. There will always be higher dimensions to discover, first in imagination and then to explore physically, each an astonishing new enlightenment.<ref>{{Cite book|first=T.S.|last=Eliot|title=Little Gidding|volume=Four Quartets|year=1943}}<blockquote> :We shall not cease from exploration :And the end of all our exploring :Will be to arrive where we started :And know the place for the first time. :Through the unknown, remembered gate :When the last of earth left to discover :Is that which was the beginning; :At the source of the longest river :The voice of the hidden waterfall :And the children in the apple-tree :Not known, because not looked for :But heard, half-heard, in the stillness :Between two waves of the sea. </blockquote></ref> Schläfli discovered every regular convex polytope that exists in any dimension, but that was only the beginning of the story of dimensional analogy, not its end or even the end of its beginning. That project is forever beginning anew. Coxeter discovered that Schläfli's Euclidean space is an expression of intrinsic symmetries, as Noether discovered all of physics is. Kappraff and Adamson discovered that even the sequences of humble regular polygons have fractal complexity, so symmetry itself is chaotic, always reachable but forever beyond our complete grasp. We are on a wilderness project, and just at its beginning, but already we observe a Euclidean space of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions in which all objects with mass move ceaselessly at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate at which everything moves, quantum events occur, and each of our proper times evolves. I believe these facts explain the experimentally verified theories of relativity and quantum mechanics, by revealing their unified polycentric geometry, the same way the facts about Copernicus's heliocentric solar system explained the observed motions of the planets, by revealing the geometry of gravity to Kepler. But others will have to do the math, work out the physics, and perform experiments to prove or disprove all of this, because I don't have the mathematics; entirely unlike Coxeter and Einstein, I am illiterate in those languages. <blockquote> ::::::BEECH :Where my imaginary line :Bends square in woods, an iron spine :And pile of real rocks have been founded. :And off this corner in the wild, :Where these are driven in and piled, :One tree, by being deeply wounded, :Has been impressed as Witness Tree :And made commit to memory :My proof of being not unbounded. :Thus truth's established and borne out, :Though circumstanced with dark and doubt— :Though by a world of doubt surrounded. :::::::—''The Moodie Forester''<ref>{{Cite book|title=A Witness Tree|last=Frost|first=Robert|year=1942|series=The Poetry of Robert Frost|publisher=Holt, Rinehart and Winston|edition=1969|}}</ref> </blockquote> == Appendix: Sequence of regular 4-polytopes == {{Regular convex 4-polytopes|wiki=W:|columns=7}} == ... == {{Efn|In a ''[[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]] displacement'', also known as an [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], all the Clifford parallel{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} invariant planes are displaced in four orthogonal directions (two completely orthogonal planes) at once: they are rotated by the same angle, and at the same time they are tilted ''sideways'' by that same angle. A [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|Clifford displacement]] is [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensionally diagonal]].{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} Every plane that is Clifford parallel to one of the completely orthogonal planes (including in this case an entire Clifford parallel bundle of 4 hexagons, but not all 16 hexagons) is invariant under the isoclinic rotation: all the points in the plane rotate in circles but remain in the plane, even as the whole plane tilts sideways. All 16 hexagons rotate by the same angle (though only 4 of them do so invariantly). All 16 hexagons are rotated by 60 degrees, and also displaced sideways by 60 degrees to a Clifford parallel hexagon. All of the other central polygons (e.g. squares) are also displaced to a Clifford parallel polygon 60 degrees away.|name=Clifford displacement}} {{Efn|It is not difficult to visualize four hexagonal planes intersecting at 60 degrees to each other, even in three dimensions. Four hexagonal central planes intersect at 60 degrees in the [[W:cuboctahedron|cuboctahedron]]. Four of the 24-cell's 16 hexagonal central planes (lying in the same 3-dimensional hyperplane) intersect at each of the 24-cell's vertices exactly the way they do at the center of a cuboctahedron. But the ''edges'' around the vertex do not meet as the radii do at the center of a cuboctahedron; the 24-cell has 8 edges around each vertex, not 12, so its vertex figure is the cube, not the cuboctahedron. The 8 edges meet exactly the way 8 edges do at the apex of a canonical [[W:cubic pyramid]|cubic pyramid]].{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}}|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} {{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} {{Efn|Eight {{sqrt|1}} edges converge in curved 3-dimensional space from the corners of the 24-cell's cubical vertex figure{{Efn|The [[W:vertex figure|vertex figure]] is the facet which is made by truncating a vertex; canonically, at the mid-edges incident to the vertex. But one can make similar vertex figures of different radii by truncating at any point along those edges, up to and including truncating at the adjacent vertices to make a ''full size'' vertex figure. Stillwell defines the vertex figure as "the convex hull of the neighbouring vertices of a given vertex".{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=17}} That is what serves the illustrative purpose here.|name=full size vertex figure}} and meet at its center (the vertex), where they form 4 straight lines which cross there. The 8 vertices of the cube are the eight nearest other vertices of the 24-cell. The straight lines are geodesics: two {{sqrt|1}}-length segments of an apparently straight line (in the 3-space of the 24-cell's curved surface) that is bent in the 4th dimension into a great circle hexagon (in 4-space). Imagined from inside this curved 3-space, the bends in the hexagons are invisible. From outside (if we could view the 24-cell in 4-space), the straight lines would be seen to bend in the 4th dimension at the cube centers, because the center is displaced outward in the 4th dimension, out of the hyperplane defined by the cube's vertices. Thus the vertex cube is actually a [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]]. Unlike a cube, it seems to be radially equilateral (like the tesseract and the 24-cell itself): its "radius" equals its edge length.{{Efn|The vertex cubic pyramid is not actually radially equilateral,{{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} because the edges radiating from its apex are not actually its radii: the apex of the [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]] is not actually its center, just one of its vertices.}}|name=24-cell vertex figure}} {{Efn|The hexagons are inclined (tilted) at 60 degrees with respect to the unit radius coordinate system's orthogonal planes. Each hexagonal plane contains only ''one'' of the 4 coordinate system axes.{{Efn|Each great hexagon of the 24-cell contains one axis (one pair of antipodal vertices) belonging to each of the three inscribed 16-cells. The 24-cell contains three disjoint inscribed 16-cells, rotated 60° isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other (so their corresponding vertices are 120° {{=}} {{radic|3}} apart). A [[16-cell#Coordinates|16-cell is an orthonormal ''basis'']] for a 4-dimensional coordinate system, because its 8 vertices define the four orthogonal axes. In any choice of a vertex-up coordinate system (such as the unit radius coordinates used in this article), one of the three inscribed 16-cells is the basis for the coordinate system, and each hexagon has only ''one'' axis which is a coordinate system axis.|name=three basis 16-cells}} The hexagon consists of 3 pairs of opposite vertices (three 24-cell diameters): one opposite pair of ''integer'' coordinate vertices (one of the four coordinate axes), and two opposite pairs of ''half-integer'' coordinate vertices (not coordinate axes). For example: {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}1,{{spaces|2}}0) {{indent|5}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|5}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,–1,{{spaces|2}}0)<br> is a hexagon on the ''y'' axis. Unlike the {{sqrt|2}} squares, the hexagons are actually made of 24-cell edges, so they are visible features of the 24-cell.|name=non-orthogonal hexagons|group=}} {{Efn|Visualize the three [[16-cell]]s inscribed in the 24-cell (left, right, and middle), and the rotation which takes them to each other. [[24-cell#Reciprocal constructions from 8-cell and 16-cell|The vertices of the middle 16-cell lie on the (w, x, y, z) coordinate axes]];{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} the other two are rotated 60° [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinically]] to its left and its right. The 24-vertex 24-cell is a compound of three 16-cells, whose three sets of 8 vertices are distributed around the 24-cell symmetrically; each vertex is surrounded by 8 others (in the 3-dimensional space of the 4-dimensional 24-cell's ''surface''), the way the vertices of a cube surround its center.{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}} The 8 surrounding vertices (the cube corners) lie in other 16-cells: 4 in the other 16-cell to the left, and 4 in the other 16-cell to the right. They are the vertices of two tetrahedra inscribed in the cube, one belonging (as a cell) to each 16-cell. If the 16-cell edges are {{radic|2}}, each vertex of the compound of three 16-cells is {{radic|1}} away from its 8 surrounding vertices in other 16-cells. Now visualize those {{radic|1}} distances as the edges of the 24-cell (while continuing to visualize the disjoint 16-cells). The {{radic|1}} edges form great hexagons of 6 vertices which run around the 24-cell in a central plane. ''Four'' hexagons cross at each vertex (and its antipodal vertex), inclined at 60° to each other.{{Efn|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} The [[24-cell#Hexagons|hexagons]] are not perpendicular to each other, or to the 16-cells' perpendicular [[24-cell#Squares|square central planes]].{{Efn|name=non-orthogonal hexagons}} The left and right 16-cells form a tesseract.{{Efn|Each pair of the three 16-cells inscribed in the 24-cell forms a 4-dimensional [[W:tesseract|hypercube (a tesseract or 8-cell)]], in [[24-cell#Relationships among interior polytopes|dimensional analogy]] to the way two tetrahedra form a cube: the two 8-vertex 16-cells are inscribed in the 16-vertex tesseract, occupying its alternate vertices. The third 16-cell does not lie within the tesseract; its 8 vertices protrude from the sides of the tesseract, forming a cubic pyramid on each of the tesseract's cubic cells. The three pairs of 16-cells form three tesseracts.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} The tesseracts share vertices, but the 16-cells are completely disjoint.{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}}|name=three 16-cells form three tesseracts}} Two 16-cells have vertex-pairs which are one {{radic|1}} edge (one hexagon edge) apart. But a [[24-cell#Simple rotations|''simple'' rotation]] of 60° will not take one whole 16-cell to another 16-cell, because their vertices are 60° apart in different directions, and a simple rotation has only one hexagonal plane of rotation. One 16-cell ''can'' be taken to another 16-cell by a 60° [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|''isoclinic'' rotation]], because an isoclinic rotation is [[3-sphere]] symmetric: four [[24-cell#Clifford parallel polytopes|Clifford parallel hexagonal planes]] rotate together, but in four different rotational directions,{{Efn|name=Clifford displacement}} taking each 16-cell to another 16-cell. But since an isoclinic 60° rotation is a ''diagonal'' rotation by 60° in ''two'' completely orthogonal directions at once,{{Efn|name=isoclinic geodesic}} the corresponding vertices of the 16-cell and the 16-cell it is taken to are 120° apart: ''two'' {{radic|1}} hexagon edges (or one {{radic|3}} hexagon chord) apart, not one {{radic|1}} edge (60°) apart as in a simple rotation.{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} By the [[W:chiral|chiral]] diagonal nature of isoclinic rotations, the 16-cell ''cannot'' reach the adjacent 16-cell by rotating toward it; it can only reach the 16-cell ''beyond'' it. But of course, the 16-cell beyond the 16-cell to its right is the 16-cell to its left. So a 60° isoclinic rotation ''will'' take every 16-cell to another 16-cell: a 60° ''right'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we may have originally visualized as the ''left'' 16-cell, and a 60° ''left'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we visualized as the ''right'' 16-cell. (If so, that was our error in visualization; the 16-cell to the "left" is in fact the one reached by the left isoclinic rotation, as that is the only sense in which the two 16-cells are left or right of each other.)|name=three isoclinic 16-cells}} {{Efn|In a double rotation each vertex can be said to move along two completely orthogonal great circles at the same time, but it does not stay within the central plane of either of those original great circles; rather, it moves along a helical geodesic that traverses diagonally between great circles. The two completely orthogonal planes of rotation are said to be ''invariant'' because the points in each stay in the plane ''as the plane moves'', tilting sideways by the same angle that the other plane rotates.|name=helical geodesic}} {{Efn|A point under isoclinic rotation traverses the diagonal{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} straight line of a single '''isoclinic geodesic''', reaching its destination directly, instead of the bent line of two successive '''simple geodesics'''. A '''[[W:geodesic|geodesic]]''' is the ''shortest path'' through a space (intuitively, a string pulled taught between two points). Simple geodesics are great circles lying in a central plane (the only kind of geodesics that occur in 3-space on the 2-sphere). Isoclinic geodesics are different: they do ''not'' lie in a single plane; they are 4-dimensional [[W:helix|spirals]] rather than simple 2-dimensional circles.{{Efn|name=helical geodesic}} But they are not like 3-dimensional [[W:screw threads|screw threads]] either, because they form a closed loop like any circle (after ''two'' revolutions). Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'', and they are just as circular as 2-dimensional circles: in fact, twice as circular, because they curve in a circle in two completely orthogonal directions at once.{{Efn|Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'' in the sense that they are 1-dimensional geodesic ''lines'' that curve in 4-space in two completely orthogonal planes at once. They should not be confused with ''great 2-spheres'',{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=24}} which are the 4-dimensional analogues of 2-dimensional great circles (great 1-spheres).}} These '''isoclines''' are geodesic 1-dimensional lines embedded in a 4-dimensional space. On the 3-sphere{{Efn|All isoclines are geodesics, and isoclines on the 3-sphere are circles (curving equally in each dimension), but not all isoclines on 3-manifolds in 4-space are circles.}} they always occur in [[W:chiral|chiral]] pairs and form a pair of [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]s on the [[W:Clifford torus|Clifford torus]],{{Efn|Isoclines on the 3-sphere occur in non-intersecting chiral pairs. A left and a right isocline form a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]] called the {1,1} torus knot{{Sfn|Dorst|2019|loc=§1. Villarceau Circles|p=44|ps=; "In mathematics, the path that the (1, 1) knot on the torus traces is also known as a [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]. Villarceau circles are usually introduced as two intersecting circles that are the cross-section of a torus by a well-chosen plane cutting it. Picking one such circle and rotating it around the torus axis, the resulting family of circles can be used to rule the torus. By nesting tori smartly, the collection of all such circles then form a [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fibration]].... we prefer to consider the Villarceau circle as the (1, 1) torus knot [a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]] rather than as a planar cut [two intersecting circles]."}} in which ''each'' of the two linked circles traverses all four dimensions.}} the paths of the left and the right [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Double rotations|isoclinic rotation]]. They are [[W:Helix|helices]] bent into a [[W:Möbius strip|Möbius loop]] in the fourth dimension, taking a diagonal [[W:Winding number|winding route]] twice around the 3-sphere through the non-adjacent vertices of a 4-polytope's [[W:Skew polygon#Regular skew polygons in four dimensions|skew polygon]].|name=isoclinic geodesic}} {{Efn|[[File:Hopf band wikipedia.png|thumb|150px|Two [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles spanned by a twisted [[W:Annulus (mathematics)|annulus]].]][[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]]s are non-intersecting curved lines that are parallel in the sense that the perpendicular (shortest) distance between them is the same at each point. A double helix is an example of Clifford parallelism in ordinary 3-dimensional Euclidean space. In 4-space Clifford parallels occur as geodesic great circles on the [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]].{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|pp=8-10|loc=Relations to Clifford Parallelism}} Whereas in 3-dimensional space, any two geodesic great circles on the [[W:2-sphere|2-sphere]] will always intersect at two antipodal points, in 4-dimensional space not all great circles intersect. In 4-polytopes various discrete sets of Clifford parallel non-intersecting geodesic great circles can be found on the 3-sphere. They spiral around each other in [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fiber bundles]] which visit all the vertices just once. The simplest example is that six mutually orthogonal great circles can be drawn on the 3-sphere, as three pairs of completely orthogonal great circles, intersecting at 8 points defining a [[16-cell]]. Each completely orthogonal pair of circles is Clifford parallel. They cannot intersect at all, because they lie in planes which intersect at only one point: the center of the 16-cell. Because they are perpendicular and share a common center, the two circles are obviously not parallel and separate in the usual way of parallel circles in 3 dimensions; rather they are connected like adjacent links in a chain, each passing through the other without intersecting at any points, forming a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]|name=Clifford parallels}} {{Efn|In the 24-cell each great square plane is completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to another great square plane, and each great hexagon plane is completely orthogonal to a plane which intersects only two vertices: a great [[W:digon|digon]] plane.|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} {{Efn|In an [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], each point anywhere in the 4-polytope moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions at once, on a [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensional diagonal]]. The point is displaced a total [[W:Pythagorean distance]] equal to the square root of four times the square of that distance. For example, when the unit-radius 24-cell rotates isoclinically 60° in a hexagon invariant plane and 60° in its completely orthogonal invariant plane,{{Efn|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} all vertices are displaced to a vertex two edge lengths away. Each vertex is displaced to another vertex {{radic|3}} (120°) away, moving {{radic|3/4}} in four orthogonal coordinate directions.|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} {{Efn|Each square plane is isoclinic (Clifford parallel) to five other square planes but completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to only one of them.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Every pair of completely orthogonal planes has Clifford parallel great circles, but not all Clifford parallel great circles are orthogonal (e.g., none of the hexagonal geodesics in the 24-cell are mutually orthogonal).|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}} {{Efn|In the [[16-cell#Rotations|16-cell]] the 6 orthogonal great squares form 3 pairs of completely orthogonal great circles; each pair is Clifford parallel. In the 24-cell, the 3 inscribed 16-cells lie rotated 60 degrees isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other; consequently their corresponding vertices are 120 degrees apart on a hexagonal great circle. Pairing their vertices which are 90 degrees apart reveals corresponding square great circles which are Clifford parallel. Each of the 18 square great circles is Clifford parallel not only to one other square great circle in the same 16-cell (the completely orthogonal one), but also to two square great circles (which are completely orthogonal to each other) in each of the other two 16-cells. (Completely orthogonal great circles are Clifford parallel, but not all Clifford parallels are orthogonal.{{Efn|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}}) A 60 degree isoclinic rotation of the 24-cell in hexagonal invariant planes takes each square great circle to a Clifford parallel (but non-orthogonal) square great circle in a different 16-cell.|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} {{Efn|In 4 dimensional space we can construct 4 perpendicular axes and 6 perpendicular planes through a point. Without loss of generality, we may take these to be the axes and orthogonal central planes of a (w, x, y, z) Cartesian coordinate system. In 4 dimensions we have the same 3 orthogonal planes (xy, xz, yz) that we have in 3 dimensions, and also 3 others (wx, wy, wz). Each of the 6 orthogonal planes shares an axis with 4 of the others, and is ''completely orthogonal'' to just one of the others: the only one with which it does not share an axis. Thus there are 3 pairs of completely orthogonal planes: xy and wz intersect only at the origin; xz and wy intersect only at the origin; yz and wx intersect only at the origin.|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} {{Efn|Two planes in 4-dimensional space can have four possible reciprocal positions: (1) they can coincide (be exactly the same plane); (2) they can be parallel (the only way they can fail to intersect at all); (3) they can intersect in a single line, as two non-parallel planes do in 3-dimensional space; or (4) '''they can intersect in a single point'''{{Efn|To visualize how two planes can intersect in a single point in a four dimensional space, consider the Euclidean space (w, x, y, z) and imagine that the w dimension represents time rather than a spatial dimension. The xy central plane (where w{{=}}0, z{{=}}0) shares no axis with the wz central plane (where x{{=}}0, y{{=}}0). The xy plane exists at only a single instant in time (w{{=}}0); the wz plane (and in particular the w axis) exists all the time. Thus their only moment and place of intersection is at the origin point (0,0,0,0).|name=how planes intersect at a single point}} (and they ''must'', if they are completely orthogonal).{{Efn|Two flat planes A and B of a Euclidean space of four dimensions are called ''completely orthogonal'' if and only if every line in A is orthogonal to every line in B. In that case the planes A and B intersect at a single point O, so that if a line in A intersects with a line in B, they intersect at O.{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}}|name=completely orthogonal planes}}|name=how planes intersect}} {{Efn|Polytopes are '''completely disjoint''' if all their ''element sets'' are disjoint: they do not share any vertices, edges, faces or cells. They may still overlap in space, sharing 4-content, volume, area, or lineage.|name=completely disjoint}} {{Efn|If the [[W:Euclidean distance|Pythagorean distance]] between any two vertices is {{sqrt|1}}, their geodesic distance is 1; they may be two adjacent vertices (in the curved 3-space of the surface), or a vertex and the center (in 4-space). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|2}}, their geodesic distance is 2 (whether via 3-space or 4-space, because the path along the edges is the same straight line with one 90^o bend in it as the path through the center). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|3}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 (whether on a hexagonal great circle past one 60^o bend, or as a straight line with one 60^o bend in it through the center). Finally, if their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|4}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 in 4-space (straight through the center), but it reaches 3 in 3-space (by going halfway around a hexagonal great circle).|name=Geodesic distance}} {{Efn|Two angles are required to fix the relative positions of two planes in 4-space.{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|p=7|loc=§6 Angles between two Planes in 4-Space|ps=; "In four (and higher) dimensions, we need two angles to fix the relative position between two planes. (More generally, ''k'' angles are defined between ''k''-dimensional subspaces.)"}} Since all planes in the same [[W:hyperplane|hyperplane]] are 0 degrees apart in one of the two angles, only one angle is required in 3-space. Great hexagons in different hyperplanes are 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles. Great squares in different hyperplanes are 90 degrees apart in ''both'' angles (completely orthogonal){{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} or 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles.{{Efn||name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Planes which are separated by two equal angles are called ''isoclinic''. Planes which are isoclinic have [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} A great square and a great hexagon in different hyperplanes are neither isoclinic nor Clifford parallel; they are separated by a 90 degree angle ''and'' a 60 degree angle.|name=two angles between central planes}} {{Efn|The 24-cell contains 3 distinct 8-cells (tesseracts), rotated 60° isoclinically with respect to each other. The corresponding vertices of two 8-cells are {{radic|3}} (120°) apart. Each 8-cell contains 8 cubical cells, and each cube contains four {{radic|3}} chords (its long diagonals). The 8-cells are not completely disjoint{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}} (they share vertices), but each cube and each {{radic|3}} chord belongs to just one 8-cell. The {{radic|3}} chords joining the corresponding vertices of two 8-cells belong to the third 8-cell.|name=three 8-cells}} {{Efn|Departing from any vertex V₀ in the original great hexagon plane of isoclinic rotation P₀, the first vertex reached V₁ is 120 degrees away along a {{radic|3}} chord lying in a different hexagonal plane P₁. P₁ is inclined to P₀ at a 60° angle.{{Efn|P₀ and P₁ lie in the same hyperplane (the same central cuboctahedron) so their other angle of separation is 0.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}}}} The second vertex reached V₂ is 120 degrees beyond V₁ along a second {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₂ that is Clifford parallel to P₀.{{Efn|P₀ and P₂ are 60° apart in ''both'' angles of separation.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}} Clifford parallel planes are isoclinic (which means they are separated by two equal angles), and their corresponding vertices are all the same distance apart. Although V₀ and V₂ are ''two'' {{radic|3}} chords apart{{Efn|V₀ and V₂ are two {{radic|3}} chords apart on the geodesic path of this rotational isocline, but that is not the shortest geodesic path between them. In the 24-cell, it is impossible for two vertices to be more distant than ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord, unless they are antipodal vertices {{radic|4}} apart.{{Efn|name=Geodesic distance}} V₀ and V₂ are ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord apart on some other isocline. More generally, isoclines are geodesics because the distance between their ''adjacent'' vertices is the shortest distance between those two vertices, but a path between two vertices along a geodesic is not always the shortest distance between them (even on ordinary great circle geodesics).}}, P₀ and P₂ are just one {{radic|1}} edge apart (at every pair of ''nearest'' vertices).}} (Notice that V₁ lies in both intersecting planes P₁ and P₂, as V₀ lies in both P₀ and P₁. But P₀ and P₂ have ''no'' vertices in common; they do not intersect.) The third vertex reached V₃ is 120 degrees beyond V₂ along a third {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₃ that is Clifford parallel to P₁. The three {{radic|3}} chords lie in different 8-cells.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} V₀ to V₃ is a 360° isoclinic rotation.|name=360 degree geodesic path visiting 3 hexagonal planes}} {{Sfn|Mamone, Pileio & Levitt|2010|loc=§4.5 Regular Convex 4-Polytopes|pp=1438-1439|ps=; the 24-cell has 1152 symmetry operations (rotations and reflections) as enumerated in Table 2, symmetry group 𝐹₄.}} ==Notes== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Notelist|wiki=W:}} ==Citations== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Reflist|wiki=W:}} ==References== {{Refbegin}} * {{Cite book|title=A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers|last=Thoreau|first=Henry David|author-link=W:Thoreau|publisher=James Munroe and Company|year=1849|isbn=|location=Boston|ref={{SfnRef|Thoreau|1849}}}} * {{Cite journal|title=Theoretical Evidence for Principles of Special Relativity Based on Isotropic and Uniform Four-Dimensional Space|first=Takuya|last=Yamashita|date=25 May 2023|doi= 10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|journal=Preprints|volume=2023|issue=2023051785|url=https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|ref={{SfnRef|Yamashita|2023}}}} * {{Cite_arXiv | arxiv=2512.02903v2 | date=2 January 2026 | title=Symmetry transformation group arising from the Laplace–Runge–Lenz vector | first1=Stephen C. | last1=Anco | first2=Mahdieh Gol Bashmani | last2=Moghadam | class=math-ph}} === [[Polyscheme|Polyschemes]] === {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Refs|wiki=W:}} {{Refend}} 3u7l5a6jf7b1d8fwrnu5zsl6f6dwkmw 2842392 2842391 2026-10-24T00:20:58Z Dc.samizdat 2856930 /* Quantum mechanics is general relativity of Coxeter groups in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions */ 2842392 wikitext text/x-wiki {{align|center|David Brooks Christie}} {{align|center|dc@samizdat.org}} {{align|center|Draft in progress}} {{align|center|June 2023 - October 2026}} <blockquote>'''Abstract:''' The physical universe is properly visualized as real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are 4-polytopes, small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are 4-balls of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. We ourselves and the objects we observe near us are only 3-dimensional, but nonetheless we can see into four dimensions of space. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. Light from them reaches us directly, on straight lines through 4-space. This view of the observed universe is compatible with special and general relativity, and with quantum mechanics. It furnishes those theories with an explanatory geometric model.</blockquote> == Summary == We observe that: * Physical space has four perpendicular dimensions, not just three. * Atoms are [[W:4-polytope|4-polytopes]]. * The sun is a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]] that is round in four dimensions. * Everything of intermediate size between an atom and a star, including us and our planet, lies in a 3-dimensional manifold of ordinary space. * Our entire 3-space manifold is moving through Euclidean 4-space at the speed of light, in a direction perpendicular to its three interior dimensions. * Special relativity describes the linear motion of objects and light signals in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * General relativity describes the rotational motion of objects with mass in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * Quantum mechanics describes the symmetry group actions of elementary geometric objects (4-polytopes) in four-dimensional Euclidean space. == A theory of the Euclidean cosmos == The physical universe is properly visualized as [[w:Four-dimensional_space|real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>]] of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are [[w:4-polytope|4-polytopes]], small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are [[W:4-ball|4-balls]] of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. Objects intermediate in size between atoms and stars, including molecules, people, and planetery surfaces their surface, are so flat as to be essentially 3-dimensional, having only the thickness of an atom in the orthogonal fourth dimension. All objects with mass move inertially through Euclidean 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math> as long as they exist, and acceleration only varies their direction. Objects moving in the same direction are in the same inertial reference frame. Their direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> is their proper time dimension, simply because their direction and velocity of motion through time is the same as their direction and velocity of motion through space. A typical galaxy such as ours occupies a 4-ball of mostly empty space, with stars and other objects distributed non-uniformly within it. The galaxy's orbital center may be nothing: a smaller 4-ball of empty space they surround. The stars in our spiral galaxy appear from our accustomed point of view to occupy a disk-like region of 3-dimensional space, with a denser ball-like center, but they are not so confined: they are distributed within a region of 4-dimensional space. The disk and ball have thickness not only in the third dimension, but in the fourth spatial dimension as well. Light from stars and galaxies reaches us on straight lines through Euclidean 4-space, so from our viewpoint, in what we have always imagined to be a 3-space universe, we look into the surrounding 4-space. Although we are physically confined within a 3-dimensional hyperplane by the inertia of our motion through 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math>, light signals are not so confined, so we observe all the cosmological objects surrounding us, both in and above or below our hyperplane, without perceiving their separation in our fourth orthogonal dimension, the direction of our motion. We may perceive a galaxy as elliptical when it is actually spherical, because that is how its image projects from its 4-ball shape into a 3-ball region in our hyperplane, where we measure it with our 3-dimensional bodies. More generally, orbits are circular in 4-space, but elliptical in the 3-space of their elliptic hyperplane. The galaxy as a whole, or more properly its orbital barycenter, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, in a distinct direction orthogonal to all three dimensions of our ordinary proper 3-space. Stars within the galaxy are translating with it at the same velocity <math>c</math> in the same direction, but on spiral trajectories as they pursue their various orbits within the galaxy. The galaxy as a whole occupies a 4-ball within its proper inertial reference frame (that is, in the moving frame of reference in which the galaxy considers itself to be a stationary rotating 4-ball). Over time, the galaxy 4-ball occupies a 4-dimensional cylinder and progresses along the cylinder's axis at velocity <math>c</math>. In this more universal inertial reference frame, the stars in the galaxy follow helical geodesic paths through the 4-cylinder; their trajectories are screw-translations through 4-space, the compound of a simple rotation and a completely orthogonal linear translation. The gravitational force and the inertial tendency to follow a geodesic are the same phenomenon, by the equivalence principle. That said, they can be distinguished, and the galaxy is held together primarily by gravity as inertia, not by gravity as attraction to a central mass toward which objects fall in orbit. There is not enough mass in the galaxy to hold it together by attraction, there is just enough to bend the stars' trajectories toward each other, in helical orbits around the galaxy's barycentric axis of motion. It is the tremendous inertial force of stars in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> that holds the cylinder of motion together, not some invisible dark matter. The observed universe as a whole appears to be a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] expanding radially from a central origin point at velocity <math>c</math>, the invariant velocity of mass-carrying objects through 4-space, also the propagation speed of light relative to any moving 3-space manifold, as measured by all observers. A 3-sphere is a hypersphere in Euclidean 4-space, but the enclosing surface of a 3-sphere is a curved, finite 3-space, dimensionally analogous to the surface of the earth which is a curved, finite 2-space. This 3-sphere could be the domain of our visible cosmos, but of course we do not know for certain that all the cosmological objects we observe lie near the surface of our expanding 3-sphere, since it is only our assumption that they must all have originated in the same big bang long ago. Possibly some of the more distant objects we observe did not, and lie elsewhere, outside our big-bang's 3-sphere of outflying matter or even inside its 3-sphere, below its surface. We cannot assume that all objects in the 4-space universe lie near the surface of the same expanding 3-sphere. For all observers, the conjectured big-bang of their origin corresponds not only to a now-distant point in their proper time past, it also corresponds to a distinct now-distant point in 4-dimensional space: the same point in the same Euclidean 4-space for all observers with the same origin. Our big bang had a distinct origin point in real space as well as in real time. More generally, time and Euclidean 4-space can be measured independently, just as time and Euclidean 3-space were measured classically, without the necessity to combine them as spacetime. The same inertial force which holds the galactic cylinder of motion together also confines us physically to an exceedingly thin three-dimensional surface manifold moving through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. All objects in our solar system too small to have their own gravity lie entirely within this thinest three-dimensional manifold, and have only the thickness of an atom in their direction-of-motion fourth dimension. That is why we are 3-dimensional objects ourselves, and why we cannot construct more than three perpendiculars through a single point in our local 3-dimensional space. A spherical region of 4-space is called a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]]. The enclosing surface of a 4-ball of any size is a finite, curved (non-Euclidean) 3-dimensional space called a [[w:3-sphere|3-sphere]]. Our entire big-bang-origin universe appears to be the largest 3-sphere we observe, but each of the cosmological objects within it (including our galaxy and our sun) lies within a smaller 3-sphere shell which bounds it, lying (we assume) on the largest 3-sphere embedded in its surface, like a soap bubble on the surface of a larger soap bubble. All the 3-dimensional surfaces are expanding, as the largest 3-sphere inflates at radial velocity <math>c</math>. We ourselves live within such an expanding 3-dimensional surface, in an infinitesimally curved 3-manifold surface embedded in Euclidean 4-space. That surface is the ordinary 3-dimensional space we experience. The earth and all the planets lie on it. Our solar system is only a small patch on the surface of a dimensionally rounder space, although that surface is not infinite. It is curved, and finite, analogous to the way the 2-dimensional surface of the earth -- once thought to be flat -- is curved and finite. Our solar system occupies a small patch on a filmy 4-dimensional soap-bubble of galactic size rounded by gravity, that is thicker-skinned than the diameter of an atom only in the superdense interior of objects large enough to have significant gravity of their own. Our 3-manifold of ordinary space, as a surface within our moving 4-ball galaxy, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> with the galaxy, in a distinct direction orthogonal to the manifold's three orthogonal dimensions of interior space. At every material point in the manifold (at every atom), the translation through 4-space is following a geometric law of motion discovered by Coxeter, that governs the propagation of individual objects through Euclidean space by the actions of their symmetry groups. The solar system's atoms of mass are 4-polytopes that are simultaneously rotating and translating, and as they advance together they define a moving 3-dimensional manifold by their own collective inertia, also called gravity, the property of matter's ceaseless propagation through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate of causality at which quantum events occur, all objects move, and the universe evolves. Any moving 3-dimensional manifold such as ours is an evolving surface boundary that is empty in most places, occupied by single atoms in comparatively fewer places, and occupied by bound complexes of multiple atoms (molecules) in still fewer places. In all these places it is no thicker than one atom in the dimension corresponding to its direction of translation, because molecules are 3-dimensional complexes of atoms that add no thickness to the manifold. In fewer places still it is occupied by large lumps of matter which exert a significant gravitational attraction, such as planets and their satellites. These round gravitational objects are thicker than one atom in their fourth dimension, but not uniformly so. They are disk-like 4-dimensional objects, 3-balls that are flattish in the fourth dimension. They are typically only one atom thick at the 4-disk's sharp edge, but they may be much thicker in the center of the 4-disk, particularly if their gravity is strong enough to give them a core of superdense matter, like the earth's deep core. The moving surface manifold cannot be thicker than one atom at any point unless and until there is enough mass near that point for the force of gravity as attraction to overcome the force of gravity as inertia, allowing atoms to be "heaped up" into larger 4-dimensional objects that form a lump in its moving surface. We have only indirect experience of such 4-dimensional lumps of matter thicker than one atom, since they occur naturally in our vicinity only in regions of superdense matter, such as the core of the earth or the interior of the sun. Deep in the core of the earth under enormous gravitational pressure peculiar states of matter have been observed, defying our understanding of how 3-dimensional crystalline structures behave. That is because they are not 3-dimensional structures, they are 4-dimensional crystals. The earth is a disk-like 4-dimensional object that is thin at its edge but thicker at its sphere-like core, dimensionally analogous to a 3-dimensional flying saucer with a sharp circular edge. The earth's surface that we walk on is an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere), analogous to the circular edge of the flying saucer (a 1-sphere), and on that edge where we live every object we find (including our bodies) is 3-dimensional with only the thickness of an atom in the fourth dimension. We cannot walk on the top or bottom surface of the 4-disk flying saucer because those surfaces are 3-dimensional regions within the earth. The earth's deep core of superdense 4-dimensional matter occupies a spherical region of 4-dimensional space (a 4-ball). The sun is the only entirely spherical 4-ball occurring naturally in our solar system. We refer to the contents of such superdense 4-balls of matter as atomic plasma, and have little experimental knowledge of their internal geometry or processes. We know that the sun burns at its surface 3-sphere and emits radiation, and we know a good deal about those surface processes which are nuclear atomic processes, but we know very little about its interior 4-ball, a dimensionally rounder enclosed space whose existence we did not suspect. Every moving surface boundary of matter in the observed universe is evolving in four dimensions at velocity <math>c</math>. The current location in 4-space of any of its material objects corresponds to the present moment in the proper time of that object's inertial reference frame. The object's direction of movement at velocity <math>c</math> corresponds to its proper time dimension, which is a spiral over time, not a Euclidean (straight-line) dimension, since its direction is changing in its orbit. Objects with mass of all sizes, from subatomic particles to the largest objects observed in the cosmos, are perpetually in inertial rotational motion in some orbit, and simultaneously in inertial translational motion propagating themselves through 4-space, in two completely orthogonal inertial motions each at the constant universal rate of transformation <math>c</math>. Every object with mass moves relative to universal 4-coordinate Euclidean space on its own distinct geodesic spiral, a screw displacement trajectory that is the compound of its two completely orthogonal inertial motions, a rotation and a translation. Objects without mass such as photons lie off such moving surface boundaries of matter from which they were emitted, and their motion is of a different nature. They are in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> through all four dimensions concurrently, without any rotational component of motion, so they move through 4-space on straight lines at a compound velocity. The propagation speed of light measured on a straight line through Euclidean 4-space is <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, so we can see in four dimensions, even though we are physically confined to a 3-dimensional manifold that is moving at velocity <math>c</math>. For example, we can look across the center of the mostly-empty 4-ball containing our galaxy and see stars in the opposite sides of its concentric 3-sphere orbital surfaces. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. They move in the 4-space direction corresponding to their proper time, perpendicular to all three dimensions of their proper 3-space, and generally the farther they are from us the greater the divergence of their direction of motion from our direction of motion: the greater the relative motion between us, and the greater their Hubble redshift. Light from them reaches us directly, propagating on straight lines through 4-space at twice the velocity at which they, and we ourselves, are propagating through 4-space. This physical model of the observed universe is compatible with the theories of special and general relativity, and with the atomic theory of quantum mechanics. It explains those theories geometrically, as expressions of intrinsic symmetries in Euclidean space. == Symmetries == It is common to speak of nature as a web, and so it is, the great web of our physical experiences. Every web must have its root systems somewhere, and nature in this sense must be rooted in the symmetries which underlie physics and geometry, the [[W:Group (mathematics)|mathematics of groups]].{{Sfn|Conway, Burgiel & Goodman-Strauss|2008}} As I understand [[W:Noether's theorem|Noether's theorem]] (which is not mathematically), hers is the deepest meta-theory of nature yet, deeper than [[W:Theory of relativity|Einstein's relativity]] or [[W:Evolution|Darwin's evolution]] or [[W:Euclidean geometry|Euclid's geometry]]. It finds that all fundamental findings in physics are based on conservation laws which can be laid at the doors of distinct [[W:symmetry group |symmetry group]]s. Thus all fundamental systems in physics, as examples [[W:quantum chromodynamics|quantum chromodynamics]] (QCD) the theory of the strong force binding the atomic nucleus and [[W:quantum electrodynamics|quantum electrodynamics]] (QED) the theory of the electromagnetic force, each have a corresponding symmetry [[W:group theory|group theory]] of which they are an expression. [[W:Coxeter group|Coxeter's theory of symmetry groups]] generated by reflections did for geometry what Noether's theorem and Einstein's relativity did for physics. [[W:Coxeter|Coxeter]] showed that Euclidean geometry is based on conservation laws that correspond to distinct symmetry groups, and that their group actions express the principle of relativity. Here is Coxeter's formulation of the motions of objects (their congruent transformations) in an ''n''-dimensional Euclidean space, excerpted:{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|pp=217-218|loc=§12.2 Congruent transformations}} <blockquote>Let <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> denote a rotation, <math>\mathrm{R}</math> a reflection, <math>\mathrm{T}</math> a translation, and let <math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r\mathrm{T}</math> denote a product of several such transformations, all commutative with one another. Then <math>\mathrm{RT}</math> is a glide-reflection (in two or three dimensions), <math>\mathrm{QR}</math> is a rotary-reflection, <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is a screw-displacement, and <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is a double rotation (in four dimensions).<br> Every orthogonal transformation is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r \le n)</math>, the number of dimensions.<br> Transformations involving a translation are also expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + 1 \le n)</math>.<br> For <math>(n = 4)</math> in particular, every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> If we begin with this most elemental [[w:Kinematics|kinematics]] of Coxeter's, and also assume the [[W:Galilean relativity|Galilean principle of relativity]], every displacement in 4-space can be viewed as either a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> or a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, because we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> in a linearly moving (translating) reference frame. Therefore any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>. By the same principle, we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> as an isoclinic (equi-angled) <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> by proper choice of reference frame.{{Efn|[[W:Arthur Cayley|Cayley]] showed that any rotation in 4-space can be decomposed into two isoclinic rotations, which intuitively we might see follows from the fact that any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a [[W:SO(4)|rotation in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]].|name=Cayley's rotation factorization into two isoclinic reference frame transformations}} Coxeter's relation is thus a mathematical statement of the principle of relativity, on group-theoretic grounds. It correctly captures the limits to [[W:General relativity|general relativity]], in that we can only exchange the translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) for ''one'' of the two rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>). An observer in any inertial reference frame can always measure the presence, direction and velocity of ''one'' rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) up to uncertainty, and can always distinguish the direction of their own proper time translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>). As I understand Coxeter theory (which is not mathematically), the symmetry groups underlying physics seem to have an expression in a [[W:Euclidean space|Euclidean space]] of four [[W:dimension|dimension]]s, that is, they are [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|four-dimensional Euclidean geometry]]. Therefore as I understand that geometry (which is entirely by synthetic methods rather than by Clifford's algebraic methods), the [[W:Atom|atom]] seems to have a distinct Euclidean geometry, such that atoms and their constituent particles are four-dimensional geometric objects (4-polytopes), and nature can be understood in terms of their [[W:group action|group actions]], including centrally their group <math>SO(4)</math> [[W:rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space|rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]]. The distinct Coxeter symmetry groups have characteristic <math>SO(4)</math> rotational expressions as the [[W:Regular_4-polytope|regular 4-polytopes]]. Their discrete isoclinic rotations are distinguishing properties of fundamental objects in geometry, relativity and quantum mechanics. For example, atoms exhibit <math>SO(4)</math> symmetries of the discrete isoclinic (equi-angled) double rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>) of a set of regular 4-polytopes that is characteristic of their [[w:Atomic_number|atomic number]]. == Special relativity describes Euclidean 4-space == <blockquote>Our entire model of the universe is built on symmetries. Some, like isotropy (the laws are the same in all directions), homogeneity (same in all places), and time invariance (same at all times) seem natural enough. Even relativity, the Lorentz Invariance that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, has an elegance to it that makes it seem natural.<ref>{{Cite book|first=Dave|last=Goldberg|title=The Universe in the Rearview Mirror: How Hidden Symmetries Shape Reality|chapter=§10. Hidden Symmetries: Why some symmetries but not others?|year=2013|publisher=Dutton Penguin Group|isbn=978-0-525-95366-1|ref={{SfnRef|Goldberg|2013}}}}</ref></blockquote> Although the Minkowski spacetime of relativity is a non-Euclidean 4-dimensional space,{{Efn|Spacetime is a non-Euclidean (curved) 4-dimensional space because it consists of three orthogonal space dimensions and a time dimension. The time dimension is not orthogonal to the three spatial dimensions; the time coordinate has the opposite sign as the three space coordinates so spacetime is hyperbolic, not a Euclidean (flat) 4-space at all.}} it has been noticed that its 3-dimensional space component could be modeled as a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] embedded in 4-dimensional Euclidean (flat) space. That is, we could imagine that the ordinary 3-dimensional space we perceive is the curved 3-dimensional surface of a 4-dimensional ball (since the surface of a 4-ball is a curved 3-dimensional space called a 3-sphere, just as the surface of a 3-ball like the earth is a curved 2-dimensional space called a 2-sphere). This was [[#Origins of the theory|imagined by Einstein]] himself in 1921, as a thought experiment in which he carefully described his fourth orthogonal spatial dimension as merely a mathematical abstraction. Subsequently it was noticed by others (not mainstream physicists) that if physical space were really embedded in Euclidean 4-dimensional space (with our 3-dimensional space embedded in 4-space as some non-Euclidean 3-manifold, not necessarily a 3-sphere), then the Lorentz transformation effects of special relativity (spatial forshortenings and time dilations and so forth) could all be explained by ordinary perspective geometry in 4-dimensional Euclidean space. Special relativity reduces to classical vector space geometry (based on the 4-dimensional version of the Pythagorean theorem), but if and only if every observer is moving through 4-space at a universal constant velocity <math>c</math>, in some 4-space direction.{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} This counter-intuitive alternative geometric model of relativity, which has usually been called [[W:Formulations of special relativity#Euclidean relativity|Euclidean relativity]], is motivated by the fact that in every kind of relativity, but originally in Einstein's special relativity, each observer moves on a vector through a Euclidean four-dimensional space consisting of their three proper spatial dimensions and their proper time dimension, and the Pythagorean vector-sum of their motion through this kind of proper 4-space is always <math>c</math>, as measured by all observers from any inertial reference frame.{{Efn|Each observer is stationary in space in their own proper reference frame, while they move at maximum velocity {{Math|c}} through their own proper time. Observed from another reference frame in relative motion, they appear foreshortened in space in their direction of motion, and their clocks appear to be slowed to less than the maximum velocity {{Math|c}}.}} This is the Lorentz invariant, that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, regardless of their motion relative to the light source.{{Efn| ...cite Lewis Epstein's elegant explanation of the Lorentz Invariance as observers moving at constant velocity {{Math|c}} through space and proper time.}} But no physicists have taken the leap of claiming that therefore, our universe is physically [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|this kind of Euclidean 4-space]], and that observers are actually moving through it at velocity <math>c</math>. In physics as it has been universally understood, observers are not supposed to be able to move at velocity <math>c</math>. Their motion takes place in 3-space and in universal coordinate time (in Minkowski spacetime), and the cosmos is considered to be a non-Euclidean 3-space, generally a closed (finite) expanding 3-space, but with only three spatial dimensions, not four. In the Euclidean relativity alternative view, however, every observer is always moving at velocity <math>c</math> through the universe, which is real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. The direction in which they are moving is called their proper time axis.{{Efn|Time in spacetime is universal coordinate time, but there is another kind of time in relativity, the proper time in each inertial reference frame. Your proper time is the time you experience, and every observer has his own proper time; proper time runs at different rates in different inertial reference frames. It runs slower (compared to universal coordinate time) in a gravitational field (according to general relativity), and observers in motion with respect to each other view each other's clocks as running slower than their own clocks (according to special relativity).}} Their movement in time is not just modelled as movement in an abstract fourth dimension (as it is in Minkowski spacetime), their movement in time is isomorphic to their movement through physical space in a distinct direction at velocity <math>c</math>. Two observers' directions of movement through space may be different (or not, if they happen to be going in the same direction). Your proper time dimension is whichever direction you are moving. The other three directions perpendicular to your proper time axis are the three dimensions of your ordinary proper space, which again, will be different directions for you than for other observers moving in a different direction. There are four orthogonal spatial dimensions which we all share, but we share the same orthogonal proper time axis and ordinary proper 3-space axes only if we are at rest with respect to each other, actually moving in the same direction at velocity <math>c</math>, in the same inertial reference frame. Your proper 4-space coordinate system is rotated with respect to another observer's proper 4-space coordinate system, precisely as your vectors (directions of motion) are rotated in Euclidean 4-space with respect to each other, but there are no metric distortions (no Lorentz transformations) between your proper Euclidean 4-space coordinate systems; you are both embedded in the same Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. Lorentz transformations are required only to convert between your respective proper Minkowski spacetime coordinate systems. So in this novel alternate view of relativity, every mass in the universe must be perpetually in motion at velocity <math>c</math> through Euclidean 4-space, along with all the masses in its vicinity that are going in (nearly) the same direction. The entire solar system, for example, must be translating in the fourth dimension at the "speed of light" <math>c</math>, although we do not notice it, since we are all moving in that same direction together. Acceleration of an object varies its direction of motion through 4-space, but never its velocity, which is invariant for all objects with mass. Two objects which are in motion relative to each other are both actually in motion at the same velocity <math>c</math>, but in at least slightly different directions.{{Efn|The angular divergence between two observer's motion vectors is proportional to their relative velocity: the more they diverge, the greater their relative velocity, up to the maximum divergence possible in the space. In Euclidean relativity all observers are in motion at velocity {{Math|c}} relative to universal Cartesian 4-coordinate space, so the maximum relative velocity between two observers is {{Math|2c}} when they are moving in exactly opposite directions in 4-space. This is not a contradiction of special relativity, which limits the maximum relative velocity between two observers to {{Math|c}}, it is the same measurement in different units. Special relativity measures all velocities in Minkowski spacetime (in a non-Euclidean 3-space). Euclidean relativity measures all velocities in Euclidean 4-space.}} In Einstein's relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of light through 3-space. In Euclidean relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of matter through 4-space! The speed of light through 3-space is also perceived as <math>c</math> by all observers, because they are each living in a moving 3-manifold that is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. Despite their extreme differences in viewpoint, Einstein's relativity and Euclidean relativity are equivalent theories in complete agreement with each other, by definition. The two theories make exactly the same special relativity predictions of how observers in different inertial reference frames will perceive each other's motions in time and space. It is beyond the scope of this present paper to show how they also agree on the predictions of general relativity, but it is important to understand that our formulation of Euclidean relativity requires our acceptance of the experimentally verified findings of special relativity, general relativity and quantum mechanics. Our model and the standard model both describe the same geometric relations of space and time based on the same evidence, but as embedded in two very different universal host spaces: Euclidean 4-space versus Minkowski spacetime. In some instances our model provides a geometric explanation for physical phenomena where the standard model has none, as yet. An example is the two models' differing explanations for the gravitational coherence of galaxies: either their inertial motion at velocity <math>c</math>, or their possession of experimentally undetected dark matter. A more central example is our use of Coxeter's kinematics to explain the laws of relativistic motion geometrically. {{Efn|More generally, our model is concerned with group-theoretic properties of number elucidated by Coxeter and other geometers. ...cite Kappraff & Adamson's 2003 paper on The Relationship of the Cotangent Function to Special Relativity Theory, geometry and properties of number,{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2003|loc=Special Relativity Theory, Geometry and properties of number}} which shows how the Lorentz coefficient is a function of a deep geometric property of number{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2000|loc=A Fresh Look at Number}} discovered by Steinbach,{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997|loc=Golden Fields: A Case for the Heptagon}} by means of which the root formula of geometry in any Euclidean dimension, the Pythagorean theorem, may be derived solely in terms of the addition of polygon side lengths, without recourse to their products or squares. More generally, Steinbach found that in the relations among regular polytope chords, to add is to multiply; every chord is both the product (quotient) of a pair of chords and the sum (difference) of another pair of chords.}} Euclidean relativity is not even a fringe theory; no physicists or astronomers have adopted it. There are many good reasons why the revolutionary leap to a four orthogonal spatial dimensions viewpoint has not been taken, beginning with the universally observed fact that we can only construct three perpendiculars through a point in our immediate space, which appears to be resolutely 3-dimensional, not 4-dimensional. Euclidean relativity offers a nice geometric explanation of the reasons for the Lorentz transformations, but only at the cost of raising other mysteries, which have been difficult for its aficionados to explain. Another mystery is how light signals between observers in relative motion could "catch up" with the receiver moving on a diverging path through 4-space from the emitter. If both observers are already moving at <math>c</math> (on diverging paths), the propagation speed of light through 4-space between them would have to be greater than <math>c</math>. Euclidean relativity is a revolutionary theory indeed, in which <math>c</math> cannot possibly be the speed of light! We conclude that, for a theory of Euclidean 4-space to be physically viable (that is, for <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> to be our real space and not merely an abstract mathematical space), the speed of light through Euclidean 4-space must be <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, with massless photons translating through 4-space at twice the speed of mass-carrying objects. Photons must translate the diagonal distance through 4-space along the long diameter of a unit 4-hypercube, in the same time that massive particles translate inertially along the edge (or the radius) of a unit 4-hypercube. This is conceivable in Euclidean 4-space (and in no other Euclidean space of any dimensionality) because the long diagonal of the unit 4-hypercube is the natural number <math>\sqrt{4}</math>. == An object's motion in space is the product of its discrete self-reflections == Coxeter theory describes all the possible motions of an object in space as local functions of the object's discrete geometry (its shape). Coxeter observed that in a Euclidean space of any number of dimensions, any displacement of a geometric object from one place to another, and any rotation of the object from one orientation to another, can be broken down into the product of a number of discrete self-reflections. Any action of a polytope that transforms its position and orientation in space may be measured as a distinct sequence of self-reflections of the object in its own surfaces. Therefore any motion of the object whatsoever may be precisely described as the object propagating itself through space by a discrete sequence of local self-reflections. This is a purely kinematic description of motion which does not give any account of forces acting on the object that cause it to move. Coxeter found that both changes in position (translations) and changes in orientation (rotations) can be broken down into the simplest of all displacements (self-reflections). A translation occurs when an object self-reflects twice, in two distinct surfaces which are parallel to each other. A rotation also occurs when an object self-reflects twice, but in two distinct surfaces which intersect each other. When a object self-reflects once, it turns itself inside out (it reverses its chirality), but in translations and rotations it self-reflects twice, preserving its chirality. Coxeter's laws of kinematics are a geometric counterpart to Newton's algebraic laws of motion in three dimensional Euclidean space. They are helpful because they can be understood as geometric pictures, which may help us to visualize the relationships between translation and rotation in classic Newtonian physics problems, such as the [[W:Kepler problem|Kepler problem]] of the motion of the planets.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Feynman|first=Richard|title=Feynman's Lost Lecture: The Motion of Planets Around the Sun|date=1996|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0393039184}}</ref> But they are also a revolutionary advance beyond Newton's laws, because Coxeter formulated them in Euclidean spaces of any number of dimensions. In particular, they give us geometric pictures of all the possible motions of objects in 4-dimensional Euclidean space: <blockquote>Every orthogonal transformation in 4-space is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}^t</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + t \le 4)</math>. Every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> While this description should be understood as geometric pictures, some of the pictures may not be easy for us to visualize, since we have no physical experience in 4-dimensional space. Rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>), reflection (<math>\mathrm{R}</math>) and translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) are obvious analogues of what they are in three-dimensional space, but double rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>) is something new and unprecedented in our physical experience, because double rotations cannot occur until there are four or more dimensions of space in which to rotate. A point in 4-space may be in motion on two circles in two completely orthogonal rotation planes simultaneously. Nothing constrains the two circles to be of the same radius, or constrains either circle from being of infinite radius such that the point moves in a straight line within its rotation plane: a translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> rather than a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. The motion of a rigid object defined by multiple points is constrained by its rigidity, such that the radii of both circles may approach infinity, but only one of the two radii may actually reach infinity. For a rigid object, only one of the two rotations may actually be a translation. Four dimensional Euclidean space can accomodate no such thing as a <math>\mathrm{Q}^2\mathrm{T}</math>. A translating double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, like a translating simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>, is simply a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. That is the essence of the way the principle of relativity operates in Euclidean 4-space. An object which is double-rotating in its own proper inertial reference frame may be seen to be performing nothing more mysterious than a screw translation, when observed from an inertial reference frame from which the object is in relative translational motion. Of course, it is a screw translation in 4-space, which is more mysterious than a screw translation in our ordinary 3-space. In 3-space the orbit of a screw translation (or any <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) lies on a great circle of an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere). In 4-space the orbit of a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math> lies on a great circle of a hypersphere (a 3-sphere). Such 4-dimensional great circles are inherently more complex than the ordinary circles we experience in 3-space. They do not lie in a single plane, but bend through all four dimensions, in either a left or right hand direction of curvature. Unlike ordinary circles they are inherently chiral, and their circumference is not <math>2\pi r</math>, but like ordinary circles they are truly circular, geodesic circles. In 4-space they might even be said to be more circular than ordinary circles, which bend in only two dimensions. We refer to such 4-dimensional great circles as ''isoclines'', to distinguish them from ordinary 2-dimensional great circles in the plane. Their name comes from the fact that a point on a rigid 4-dimensional object undergoing [[W:SO(4)#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]] traverses an isocline circle. In a universe which is real Euclidean four-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>, wherein these motions occur only at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, there is a universal Cartesian 4-coordinate reference frame in which every rigid object in free fall is translating on a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> at velocity <math>c</math>. That universal inertial reference frame is not the proper reference frame of any object or observer, wherein the object or observer is stationary and double-rotating at the universal rate of quantum events <math>c</math>, but it is the common reference frame of all observers. == Light propagates through 4-space at twice its apparent velocity <math>c</math>== Coxeter's laws of kinematics in 4-dimensional Euclidean space apply to all objects with mass, but we find there is an additional kind of displacement which applies only to massless particles such as photons, considered as single point objects. Light quanta (photons) translate through 4-space by 4-dimensional reflection <math>\mathrm{R}^4</math>, which may be termed a double translation <math>\mathrm{T}^2</math>, a pure translation via two pairs of parallel reflections without any rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. Matter (atoms and all particles with mass) are perpetually rotating and translating through 4-space by <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, a screw translation of a rotating object, which is relativistically equivalent to a stationary isoclinic <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>, an isoclinically rotating object such as an atom. A simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> or simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> is a double reflection <math>\mathrm{R^2}</math>, so a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is an <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>, but not with the same group of reflection angles as a light signal <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>. A translation <math>\mathrm{T = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two parallel planes, and a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two intersecting planes, as in a <math>\mathrm{QT = R^4}</math> which is both at once. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is two double reflections in pairs of parallel planes at once, a reflection in four non-intersecting parallel planes; it is all translation and no rotation. In a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> all the motion goes to translation, so the translation goes twice as far as the simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is the opposite of a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q^2 = R^4}</math>, which is stationary but rotates twice as far as the simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. The product of the two translations in a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> is a diagonal 4-space translation over the long diameter of the unit 4-hypercube, exactly twice the distance of a simple <math>\mathrm{T}</math> over the edge length (or radius) of the unit 4-hypercube. The [[w:Tesseract|4-hypercube (also known as the 8-cell or tesseract)]] is ''radially equilateral'', which means its edge length is equal to its radius, like the hexagon, so its long diameter (twice its radius) is exactly twice its edge length. The photon moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions. By the four-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, each of those four distances is half the total distance the photon moves: one edge length (one radius) is half the total diagonal distance moved (the long diameter). That total movement is a double the unit-distance translation, but without any rotation component, so it cannot carry any mass with it. A <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> cannot reposition a 4-polytope the way a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> does, it can only reposition a quantum of energy that has no distinguishing rotational symmetry, such as a photon. That is the price light pays to move exactly twice as fast as matter.{{Efn| ...lensing of double translations <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> in more than two pairs of parallel planes at once...relationship to the frequency of light emitted and the coherence length of the wave packet...}} == Special relativity is Galilean relativity in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == {{Efn|...TAC suggests this section is needed sooner, i.e. in the preceding Special Relativity section, as it explains how Euclidean relativity reduces special relativity to 4D perspective geometry...it's misplaced (too late) here...}} Perspective effects known as the Lorentz transformations occur because each observer's proper 3-dimensional space is a moving curved manifold embedded in flat 4-dimensional Euclidean space. The curvature of their 3-space complicates sightline calculations for observers; they sometimes require Lorentz transformations to produce the actual 4-space Cartesian coordinates of objects in the scene being observed. But if all four spatial dimensions are considered, no Lorentz transformations are required (or permitted) in correct scene construction, except when an observer wants to calculate a projection, that is, the shadow of how things will appear to them from a three-dimensional viewpoint (not how they really are in 4-space).{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} Space really has four orthogonal dimensions, and space and time behave there just as they do in a classical vector space, only bigger by one dimension. It is not necessary to combine 4-space with time in a unified spacetime to explain 4-dimensional perspective effects at high relative velocities, because Euclidean 4-space is already 4-dimensional, and those effects fall out naturally from the 4-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, exactly as ordinary visual perspective does in three dimensions from the 3-dimensional Pythagorean theorem. Because one of the four spatial dimensions corresponds to an observer's direction of motion (in both space and proper time), and all observers and all scenes being observed are in motion (at constant velocity) in their respective proper time directions, we observe perspective foreshortenings in time as well as in a spatial dimension. In special relativity these perspective effects are reciprocal, precisely because they are only apparent, not actual, changes in size and duration. (However in general relativity, discussed below, the actual rate of physical processes varies from place to place, and reference frame differences predicted by the theory are neither reciprocal nor illusory.) None of these Lorentz effects are beyond geometric explanation or paradoxical. The universe is unexpectedly strange to us in precisely the ways the Euclidean fourth dimension is strange to us; but that does hold many surprises. Euclidean 4-space is much more interesting than Euclidean 3-space, analogous to the way 3-space is much more interesting and deeply explanatory to us than it would be if we experienced it only as a 2-space with many folds and curves, as perhaps an ant does. The emergent properties of 4-space are hard for us to visualize because they lie so wholly beyond our physical experience, just as it was hard for our ancestors to imagine the earth as round like a ball. However, Euclidean spaces of successive dimensions are analogous, and so higher dimensional spaces can be anticipated and explored: that is Schläfli's great discovery. Moreover dimensional analogy itself, like everything else in nature including all of physics, is an exact expression of intrinsic group-theoretic symmetries: that is Nother's great discovery. == General relativity is special relativity in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == The statement that the laws of special relativity hold to good approximation in freely falling (and non-rotating) reference frames is known as the [[W:Equivalence principle|Einstein equivalence principle]]. The weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a building on the surface of the earth is the same as the weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a spaceship in interstellar space accelerating at a rate of 32'/second/second. Both observers are experiencing an upwards acceleration at the same rate, which in their respective proper reference frames is measured as the weight of gravity, rather than as an accelerating motion (they are stationary in their proper reference frames). Einstein used this equivalence principle as the basis for his general theory of relativity, in much the same way he had used the constant velocity of light as the basis for his special theory of relativity. In general relativity the two accelerating observers occupy scenes which are relativistically equivalent, which means that although they can be distinguished (they have different measurements) in any reference frame from which they may both be observed, they have the same invariant geometry in all reference frames (they are the same phenomena), implying that there exists, for either scene, another reference frame from which it measures exactly like the other scene. Relativistically equivalent does not imply that there exists a single reference frame in which the two scenes are congruent (have the same measurements). It only means that they can be transformed into each other by a shift in point of view, because their invariant geometries (their measurements which are independent of point of view) are the same. Einstein's general theory of relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in spacetime. Our formulation of Euclidean relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. An observer standing on the surface of the earth is accelerated at the rate of 32'/second/second. The observer and the earth are both stationary in their proper inertial reference frames (which are similar except for the rotation of the earth), so the observer's acceleration cannot be perceived as motion in either proper reference frame; it is perceptible there instead as the force of gravity. It is only perceptible as motion in some other reference frame in which the earth and the observer are both in motion, such as the universal common reference frame of Euclidean 4-coordinate space in which they are both in motion at velocity <math>c</math> on their respective screw translations <math>QT</math>, which are distinct. In that universal common reference frame the observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is the rate of change in the direction of his vector of translation through 4-space. The velocity of his vector of translation <math>T</math> through 4-space remains the constant <math>c</math> throughout; only his direction is changing. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation <math>Q</math> of a translation <math>T</math>: a screw translation <math>QT</math>. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation which is an acceleration. We can be precise about the units of measurement of this acceleration at atomic scale. In Coxeter's kinematics rotations of geometric objects occur in discrete increments called rotational displacements, with each distinct kind of rotation performing a characteristic number of its characteristic rotational displacement during a full revolution that returns the object to its starting orientation. There are many distinct kinds of rotation, each with its characteristic rotational displacement and number of displacements per revolution. The general rotation in 4-space is a double rotation <math>Q^2</math> distinguished by two distinct completely orthogonal angles through which the object turns in each rotational displacement. The angles determine not only the distance through which the object turns, but the characteristic trajectory of each point on the surface of the rotating object, including the length of that trajectory before it closes into a circle when the object returns to its starting orientation. For any distinct kind of rotation, the circular trajectory is always an integer multiple of the characteristic rotational displacement, but the full circle may be greater than 360°. In 4-space rotational circles are not ordinary 2-dimensional circles that lie in the plane and have a 360° circumference. Many distinct 4-space rotations of interest have a circumference of 720°, and many are larger. In 4-space every object with mass moves on its distinct <math>QT</math> trajectory. Each rotational displacement <math>Q</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which intersect each other, at angles related to a distinct star polygon. Each translational displacement <math>T</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which lie parallel to each other. In both kinds of motion (rotation and translation) it is the rate at which these double-reflection displacements occur which is constant and which we measure as the velocity <math>c</math>. Every atom translates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing a large number of atomic scale translational displacements per second. Concurrently, the atom rotates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing the same large number of atomic scale rotational displacements per second. Although the number of displacements at atomic scale per unit time is the same universal constant <math>c</math> for all rotations and translations, distinct kinds of rotation revolve at distinct rates, because the number of rotational displacements per complete revolution and the circumference of the complete revolution are distinct characteristics of each kind of rotation. The velocity at which each point on the surface of a rotating object moves, and the frequency of its rotational circling, are functions of the distinct rotation it is performing. However, they are not simple functions of <math>c</math> and the two defining angle parameters of the rotation. Distinct rotations arise from distinct symmetry groups and each is its own mystery with a unique conservation law. The relationships between those distinct conservation laws are even more mysterious, and have been shown to be chaotic. Steinbach{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997}} discovered the Golden Fields family of ratios which govern distinct rotational displacements related to the regular star polygons at least up to the hendecagon {11}. Kappraff and Adamson{{Sfn|Kappraff|Adamson|2004}} further characterized the families of rotation functions and showed that they form an infinite number of periodic trajectories when operated on by the Mandelbrot operator. The inertial tendency of mass is to follow a geodesic. The inertial conservation law of gravity applies to all motions of objects with mass, rotations as well as translations. A translation <math>T</math> is the distinct simple rotation <math>Q</math> in which the characteristic angle of rotational displacement is zero. Inertia is the tendency of objects with mass to conserve their angles of rotational displacement. In 4-space each object has two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement which are characteristic of the distinct rotation the object is performing. Inertia is the conservation of this distinct double rotation. In 4-coordinate Euclidean space the acceleration of an object with mass is a rotation of the object, a change to its direction, not a change to its constant velocity. Because the rate of atomic scale displacements is the universal constant <math>c</math>, the rate of change of direction (the acceleration of the object) is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law. A observer standing on the surface of the earth is performing a distinct double rotation characterized by two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement. The observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law, and a measurement of the rate of change of the observer's direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. ... == Quantum mechanics is general relativity of Coxeter groups in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == ... == Dimensional relativity == The formulation of Euclidean relativity based on Coxeter's kinetic law of <math>n</math>-dimensional congruent transformations in Euclidean space may be called ''dimensional relativity'', since it captures the theories of special and general relativity, and has its roots in dimensional analogy. Dimensional analogy is the exploration of [[w:Hermann_Grassmann#Mathematician|Hermann Grassmann's vector space principle]], in which space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. The geometry of higher-dimensional space is accessible by reason of direct analogy, as [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] subsequently demonstrated, and by algebraic methods after [[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]]. By analogy to the surface of the earth, the bounding surface of a spherical region of <math>n</math>-dimensional Euclidean space is an <math>(n-1)</math>-sphere, a spherical space of one fewer dimensions than the <math>n</math>-ball of Euclidean space it surrounds. In dimensional relativity the sky is not a ceiling, but an infinite regress of alternating spherical and Euclidean <math>n</math>-spaces of increasing <math>n</math>, accessible from each observer's point of view. By dimensional analogy, each observer looks up into their own reference frame's regress of concentric alternating <math>n</math>-spaces. By the capacity for dimensional analogy which they possess, some observers see deeper into <math>n</math>-dimensional space than others. == Polycentric spherical relativity == An intelligent observer equipped with the principle of dimensional relativity may perceive the universe from any inertial reference frame, not only from their own proper stationary reference frame in the Euclidean <math>n</math>-space universe in which they physically locate themself. We see that every observer may also properly view themself as stationary and the universe as an <math>n</math>-sphere with themself at the center observing it, perceptually equidistant from all points on its <math>n</math>-space surface, including their own physical location which is one of those surface points, distinguished to them but moving on the surface, and not the center of anything. This ''polycentric model'' of the universe is a further restatement of the principle of relativity, and of the [[W:Copernican principle|Copernican principle]] that observation is democratic: observers occupy representative viewpoints, not privileged monocentric positions. The polycentric model is compatible with Galileo's relativity of uniformly moving objects in ordinary space, Einstein's special relativity of inertial reference frames in 4-dimensional spacetime, Einstein's general relativity of all reference frames in non-Euclidean spacetime, and Coxeter's dimensional relativity of orthogonal group actions in Euclidean and spherical spaces of any number of dimensions. The polycentric model should be known as Thoreau's principle of ''spherical relativity'', since the first precise written statement of it appears in 1849, contemporaneous with and independent of Schlafli's work: <blockquote>The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence.{{Sfn|Thoreau|1849|p=349|ps=; "The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence." [Contemporaneous and independent of [[W:Ludwig Schlafli|Ludwig Schlafli]]'s pioneering work enumerating the complete set of regular polyschemes in any number of dimensions.]}}</blockquote> == Revolutions == The original Copernican revolution in 1543 displaced the center of the universe from the center of the earth to a point farther away, the center of the sun, with the earth performing a ''revolution'' around the sun, and the stars remaining on a fixed 2-sphere around the sun instead of around the earth. But this led inevitably to the recognition that the sun must be a star itself, not equidistant from all the stars, and the center of but one of many spheres, no monotheistic center at all. In 1600 [[W:Giordano Bruno|Giordano Bruno]] who first openly advocated these views was burned at the stake in Rome's [[W:Campo de' Fiori|Campo de' Fiori]] by the Catholic inquisition. In such fashion the Euclidean four-dimensional revolution, emerging three to five centuries later, initially lends itself to the big bang theory of a single origin of the whole universe, but leads inevitably to the recognition that all the galaxies need not be equidistant from a single origin in time, any more than all the stars lie in the same galaxy, equidistant from a single center in space. The expanding sphere of matter on the surface of which we find ourselves living is likely to be one of many 3-spheres expanding at velocity <math>c</math>, with their big bang origins occurring at distinct times and places in the ''n''-dimensional universe. The most distant objects we see when we look up at night may not all have the same origin in space and time. As recently as Copernicus we believed all the stars lay on a single 2-sphere embedded in Euclidean 3-space, with our sun at its center. During the enlightenment observers beginning with Bruno dispersed those stars into an infinite Euclidean 3-space, and relinquished our privileged position at the center. Then Einstein showed that our 3-space could not be Euclidean, that it must be a 3-manifold curved in every place in obedience to Newton's inverse-square law of gravity; and in a geometry related to time, at least, it must be 4-dimensional. In the present work we propose a theory of ''n''-dimensional real space and how light travels in it, a theory which says we can see into four orthogonal dimensions of Euclidean space, and so when we look up at night we see cosmological objects distributed in at least four dimensions of space around us, rather than all located in our own local 3-space. Looking still deeper and farther out, the universe viewed as a 4-sphere might, or might not, be expanding, and the most distant objects we see when we look up at night may, or may not, lie in our 4-dimensional hyperplane. Real space has ''n'' dimensions as [[w:Hermann_Grassmann|Grassmann]] and [[w:Schläfli|Schläfli]] showed, and we do not know how many dimensions the most distant objects we see may be distributed in. They need not all lie within the four spatial dimensions in which we have now learned to observe them, any more than they all lie in our local 3-space. When we look up at the objects that surround us, we have no way of discerning how many dimensions beyond three the space we are looking into has. We know their distance from us primarily by virtue of how long it takes their light to reach us. We can measure their distribution around us in 3-space or 4-space, but that is simply how we choose to measure their positions, not an actual finding of how they are distributed. Even if it is now evident that they do not all lie in the same 3-space, how many more dimensions than three are needed to contain them? We observe that our 4-ball galaxy is embedded in Euclidean <math>n</math>-space as one of many 4-ball galaxies, each translating in a distinct direction through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, on more or less divergent paths from each other. But only closer observation will reveal evidence of whether everything we see lies in the same Euclidean 4-space, or if it is distributed in five or more dimensions, and how it is moving there. To remain in agreement with the theory of relativity, the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint requires that all mass-carrying objects be in motion in some distinct direction through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, although the relative velocity between nearby objects is much smaller since they move on similar vectors, aimed away from a common origin point in the past. It is natural to expect that objects moving at constant velocity away from a common origin will be distributed roughly on the surface of an expanding 3-sphere. Although their paths away from their origin are not straight lines but various helical isoclines (screw translation spirals), nearby objects must be translating radially at the same average velocity, since the objects in a system (such as our solar system or galaxy) do not separate rapidly over time but remain in orbital formation. Each system's screw translation has two [[w:Completely_orthogonal|completely orthogonal]] components of motion in 4-space, an orbital rotation (such as the earth's around our sun) and a linear translation of the entire system at velocity <math>c</math> in the direction of the original 3-sphere's radial expansion (along the system's proper time vector). Of course the view from our solar system does not suggest that the 3-sphere enclosing each galaxy is expanding at this great rate from its galactic center. The standard theory has been that the entire observable universe is expanding from a single big bang origin in time, with galaxies forming later. While the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint lends itself to that standard theory, it also supports theories which require no single origin point in space and time. These are the voyages of starship Earth, to boldly go where no one has gone before. We made the jump to light speed long ago, in whatever big bang our atoms emerged from, and have never slowed down since. == Origins of the theory == Einstein himself may have been the first to imagine the universe as the three-dimensional surface of a four-dimensional Euclidean 3-sphere, in what was narrowly the first written articulation of a Euclidean 4-space universe, contemporaneous with the teen-aged Coxeter's (quoted below).{{Efn|[[W:William Rowan Hamilton|Hamilton]]'s algebra '''H''' of [[W:Quaternions|quaternions]] introduces (in 1843) the notion of a [[W:Three-dimensional sphere|three-dimensional sphere]] embedded in a four-dimensional space, but Hamilton did not quite conceive of the quaternions as the Cartesian 4-coordinates of a Euclidean 4-space, and he did not describe our ordinary 3-space as embedded in Euclidean 4-space.}} Einstein did this as a [[W:Gedankenexperiment|gedankenexperiment]] in the context of investigating whether his equations of general relativity predicted an infinite or a finite universe, in his 1921 Princeton lecture.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/36276|title=The Meaning of Relativity|last=Einstein|first=Albert|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=1923|isbn=|location=|pages=110-111}}</ref> He invited us to imagine "A spherical manifold of three dimensions, embedded in a Euclidean continuum of four dimensions", but he was careful to disclaim parenthetically that "The aid of a fourth space dimension has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice." Informally, the Euclidean 4-dimensional theory of relativity may be given as a sort of reciprocal to that disclaimer of Einstein's: ''The Minkowski spacetime has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice, as an aid to understanding how things will appear to an observer from their perspective; the foreshortenings, clock desynchronizations and other Lorentz transformations it predicts are proper calculations of actual perspective effects; but real space is a flat, Euclidean continuum of four orthogonal spatial dimensions, and in it the ordinary laws of a flat vector space hold (such as the Pythagorean theorem), and all sightline calculations work classically, so long as you consider all four spatial dimensions.'' The Euclidean theory of relativity differs from the special theory of relativity in ascribing to the physical universe a geometry of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions, rather than the special theory's [[w:Minkowski spacetime|Minkowski spacetime]] geometry, in which three spatial dimensions and a time dimension comprise a unified non-Euclidean spacetime of four dimensions. Anco and Maghadam found that <math>SO(4)</math> breaks to <math>\mathbb{S}^3</math> (the 3-sphere) if the energy in a Kepler orbit is negative (an elliptical orbit), and to <math>H^3</math> (Minkowski spacetime) if the energy is positive (a hyperbolic orbit). Therefore the fact that the planets orbit on ellipses in our 3-space suggests that they orbit on a 3-sphere embedded in Euclidean 4-space. Thus we can conclude that <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> is the actual geometry of our physical universe, and Minkowski spacetime is an abstraction of it; the reciprocal of Einstein's disclaimer is the more direct physical model. Of course spacetime remains a true and useful abstraction, although it must relinquish its privileged position as our exclusive conception of our place in space.{{Efn| ...origins of the Euclidean 4-space insight in the observations of Fock, Atkinson, Moser and others.}} The invention of Euclidean geometry of more than three spatial dimensions preceded Einstein's theories by more than fifty years, when it was worked out originally by the Swiss mathematician [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] before 1853.{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|loc=§7. Ordinary Polytopes in Higher Space; §7.x. Historical remarks|pp=141-144|ps=; "Practically all the ideas in this chapter ... are due to Schläfli, who discovered them before 1853 — a time when Cayley, Grassmann and Möbius were the only other people who had ever conceived the possibility of geometry in more than three dimensions."}} Schläfli extended Euclid's geometry of one, two, and three dimensions in a direct way to four or more dimensions, generalizing the rules and terms of [[w:Euclidean geometry|Euclidean geometry]] to spaces of any number of dimensions. He coined the general term ''[[polyscheme]]'' to mean geometric forms of any number of dimensions, including two-dimensional [[w:polygon|polygons]], three-dimensional [[w:polyhedron|polyhedra]], four dimensional [[w:polychoron|polychora]], and so on, and in the process he found all of the [[w:Regular polytope|regular polyschemes]] that are possible in every dimension, including in particular the [[User:Dc.samizdat/Rotations#Sequence of regular 4-polytopes|six convex regular polychora]] which can be constructed in a Euclidean space of four dimensions (the set analogous to the five [[w:Platonic solid|Platonic solids]] the ancients found in three dimensional space). Thus Schläfli was the first to explore the fourth dimension, reveal its emergent geometric properties, and discover its astonishing regular objects. Because his work was only published posthumously in 1901, and remained almost completely unknown until Coxeter published [[w:Regular_Polytopes_(book)|Regular Polytopes]] in 1947, other researchers had more than fifty years to rediscover the regular polychora, and competing terms were coined; today [[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s word ''[[w:Polytope|polytope]]'' is the commonly used term for ''polyscheme.''{{Efn|[[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s German word ''polytop'' was introduced into English by [[W:Alicia Boole Stott|Alicia Boole Stott]], who like Hoppe and [[W:Thorold Gosset|Thorold Gosset]] rediscovered Schlafli's six regular convex 4-polytopes, with no knowledge of their prior discovery. Today Schläfli's original ''polyschem'', with its echo of ''schema'' as in the configurations of information structures, seems even more fitting in its generality than ''polytope'' -- perhaps analogously as information software (programming) is even more general than information hardware (computers).}} Because of this century-long lag in the dissemination of a scientific discovery, the regular 4-polytopes appear to have played no role at all, by any name, in the twentieth century discovery and evolution of the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics.{{Efn|One could argue that the higher-dimensional polytopes have barely influenced science or culture at all thus far. The physicist John Edward Huth's comprehensive deep dive through the history of cultural and scientific concepts of physical space, from ancient flatland models of the world through general relativity and quantum mechancs, shows exactly how we got to our present standard model of the universe, although it includes no mention of higher-dimensional Euclidean space.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Huth|first=John Edward|title=A Sense of Space: A local's guide to a flat earth, the edge of the cosmos, and other curious places|year=2025|publisher=University of Chicago Press}}</ref>}} == Boundaries == <blockquote>Ever since we discovered that Earth is round and turns like a mad-spinning top, we have understood that reality is not as it appears to us: every time we glimpse a new aspect of it, it is a deeply emotional experience. Another veil has fallen.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Carlo Rovelli|author-link=W:Carlo Rovelli|title=Seven Brief Lessons on Physics|publisher=Riverhead|year=2016|isbn=978-0399184413}}</ref></blockquote> Of course it is strange to consciously contemplate this world we inhabit, our planet, our solar system, our 3-sphere surface in our vast galaxy, as the merest film, a boundary no thicker in the places we inhabit than the diameter of an electron (though much thicker in some places we cannot inhabit, such as the planet's core and the interior of stars). But is not our unconscious traditional concept of the boundary of our world even stranger? Since the enlightenment we are accustomed to thinking that there is nothing beyond three dimensional space: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But anyone who knows the [[polyscheme]]s Schläfli discovered knows that space can have any number of dimensions, and that there are fundamental objects and motions to be discovered in four dimensions that are even more various and interesting than those we can discover in three. The strange thing, when we think about it that way, is that there ''is'' a boundary between three and four dimensional space. ''Why'' can't we move (or apparently, see) in more than three dimensions? Why is our physical world apparently only three dimensional? Why would it have just ''three'' dimensions, and not four, or five, or the ''n'' dimensions that Schläfli mapped? What is the nature of the boundary which confines us to just three dimensions? We know that in Euclidean geometry the boundary between three and four dimensions is itself a spherical three dimensional space, so we should suspect that we are materially confined within such a curved boundary surface. Light need not be confined with us within our three dimensional boundary space. We would look directly through four dimensional space in our natural way, by receiving light signals that travelled through it to us on straight lines. In that case the reason we do not observe a fourth spatial dimension in our vicinity is that there are no nearby objects in it, just off our hyperplane in the wild. The nearest 4-ball object we can see with our eyes is our sun, which lies equatorially in our own hyperplane, though it bulges out of it above and below. But when we look up at the heavens, every pinprick of light we observe is itself a four-dimensional object off our hyperplane, and they are distributed all around us in four-dimensional space through which we gaze. We are four-dimensionally sighted creatures, even though our bodies are three-dimensional objects, thin as an atom in the fourth dimension. But that should not perplex us: we can see into three dimensional space even though our retinas are two dimensional objects, thin as a photoreceptor cell. Our unconscious provincial concept is that there is nothing else outside our three dimensional world: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But Schläfli discovered something else: all the astonishing regular objects that exist in higher dimensions, which vastly extend our notions of the beauty and mystery of space itself, and the intrinsic spatial symmetries of our universe which geometry reveals. Space is more commodious than we thought it was, and permits previously unimagined objects and motions. So our provincial conception of our place in it now has the same kind of status as our idea that the sun rises in the east and passes overhead: it is mere appearance, not a true model and no longer a proper explanation. An inertial boundary is a proper explanation, be it ever so thin. And would a boundary of ''no'' thickness, a mere abstraction with no physical power to separate, be a more suitable explanation? We must look for a physically powerful explanation in the geometry of space itself, which general relativity properly associates with the gravitational or inertial force. <blockquote>The number of dimensions possessed by a figure is the number of straight lines each perpendicular to all the others which can be drawn on it. Thus a point has no dimensions, a straight line one, a plane surface two, and a solid three .... In space as we now know it only three lines can be imagined perpendicular to each other. A fourth line, perpendicular to all the other three would be quite invisible and unimaginable to us. We ourselves and all the material things around us probably possess a fourth dimension, of which we are quite unaware. If not, from a four-dimensional point of view we are mere geometrical abstractions, like geometrical surfaces, lines, and points are to us. But this thickness in the fourth dimension must be exceedingly minute, if it exists at all. That is, we could only draw an exceedingly small line perpendicular to our three perpendicular lines, length, breadth and thickness, so small that no microscope could ever perceive it. We can find out something about the conditions of the fourth and higher dimensions if they exist, without being certain that they do exist, by a process which I have termed "Dimensional Analogy."<ref>{{Citation|title=Dimensional Analogy|last=Coxeter|first=Donald|date=February 1923|publisher=Coxeter Fonds, University of Toronto Archives|authorlink=W:Harold Scott MacDonald Coxeter|series=|postscript=|work=}}</ref></blockquote> I believe, but I cannot prove, that we live in real space, which is Schläfli's Euclidean space of ''n'' analogous dimensions. As Grassmann showed first, space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. There will always be higher dimensions to discover, first in imagination and then to explore physically, each an astonishing new enlightenment.<ref>{{Cite book|first=T.S.|last=Eliot|title=Little Gidding|volume=Four Quartets|year=1943}}<blockquote> :We shall not cease from exploration :And the end of all our exploring :Will be to arrive where we started :And know the place for the first time. :Through the unknown, remembered gate :When the last of earth left to discover :Is that which was the beginning; :At the source of the longest river :The voice of the hidden waterfall :And the children in the apple-tree :Not known, because not looked for :But heard, half-heard, in the stillness :Between two waves of the sea. </blockquote></ref> Schläfli discovered every regular convex polytope that exists in any dimension, but that was only the beginning of the story of dimensional analogy, not its end or even the end of its beginning. That project is forever beginning anew. Coxeter discovered that Schläfli's Euclidean space is an expression of intrinsic symmetries, as Noether discovered all of physics is. Kappraff and Adamson discovered that even the sequences of humble regular polygons have fractal complexity, so symmetry itself is chaotic, always reachable but forever beyond our complete grasp. We are on a wilderness project, and just at its beginning, but already we observe a Euclidean space of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions in which all objects with mass move ceaselessly at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate at which everything moves, quantum events occur, and each of our proper times evolves. I believe these facts explain the experimentally verified theories of relativity and quantum mechanics, by revealing their unified polycentric geometry, the same way the facts about Copernicus's heliocentric solar system explained the observed motions of the planets, by revealing the geometry of gravity to Kepler. But others will have to do the math, work out the physics, and perform experiments to prove or disprove all of this, because I don't have the mathematics; entirely unlike Coxeter and Einstein, I am illiterate in those languages. <blockquote> ::::::BEECH :Where my imaginary line :Bends square in woods, an iron spine :And pile of real rocks have been founded. :And off this corner in the wild, :Where these are driven in and piled, :One tree, by being deeply wounded, :Has been impressed as Witness Tree :And made commit to memory :My proof of being not unbounded. :Thus truth's established and borne out, :Though circumstanced with dark and doubt— :Though by a world of doubt surrounded. :::::::—''The Moodie Forester''<ref>{{Cite book|title=A Witness Tree|last=Frost|first=Robert|year=1942|series=The Poetry of Robert Frost|publisher=Holt, Rinehart and Winston|edition=1969|}}</ref> </blockquote> == Appendix: Sequence of regular 4-polytopes == {{Regular convex 4-polytopes|wiki=W:|columns=7}} == ... == {{Efn|In a ''[[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]] displacement'', also known as an [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], all the Clifford parallel{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} invariant planes are displaced in four orthogonal directions (two completely orthogonal planes) at once: they are rotated by the same angle, and at the same time they are tilted ''sideways'' by that same angle. A [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|Clifford displacement]] is [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensionally diagonal]].{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} Every plane that is Clifford parallel to one of the completely orthogonal planes (including in this case an entire Clifford parallel bundle of 4 hexagons, but not all 16 hexagons) is invariant under the isoclinic rotation: all the points in the plane rotate in circles but remain in the plane, even as the whole plane tilts sideways. All 16 hexagons rotate by the same angle (though only 4 of them do so invariantly). All 16 hexagons are rotated by 60 degrees, and also displaced sideways by 60 degrees to a Clifford parallel hexagon. All of the other central polygons (e.g. squares) are also displaced to a Clifford parallel polygon 60 degrees away.|name=Clifford displacement}} {{Efn|It is not difficult to visualize four hexagonal planes intersecting at 60 degrees to each other, even in three dimensions. Four hexagonal central planes intersect at 60 degrees in the [[W:cuboctahedron|cuboctahedron]]. Four of the 24-cell's 16 hexagonal central planes (lying in the same 3-dimensional hyperplane) intersect at each of the 24-cell's vertices exactly the way they do at the center of a cuboctahedron. But the ''edges'' around the vertex do not meet as the radii do at the center of a cuboctahedron; the 24-cell has 8 edges around each vertex, not 12, so its vertex figure is the cube, not the cuboctahedron. The 8 edges meet exactly the way 8 edges do at the apex of a canonical [[W:cubic pyramid]|cubic pyramid]].{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}}|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} {{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} {{Efn|Eight {{sqrt|1}} edges converge in curved 3-dimensional space from the corners of the 24-cell's cubical vertex figure{{Efn|The [[W:vertex figure|vertex figure]] is the facet which is made by truncating a vertex; canonically, at the mid-edges incident to the vertex. But one can make similar vertex figures of different radii by truncating at any point along those edges, up to and including truncating at the adjacent vertices to make a ''full size'' vertex figure. Stillwell defines the vertex figure as "the convex hull of the neighbouring vertices of a given vertex".{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=17}} That is what serves the illustrative purpose here.|name=full size vertex figure}} and meet at its center (the vertex), where they form 4 straight lines which cross there. The 8 vertices of the cube are the eight nearest other vertices of the 24-cell. The straight lines are geodesics: two {{sqrt|1}}-length segments of an apparently straight line (in the 3-space of the 24-cell's curved surface) that is bent in the 4th dimension into a great circle hexagon (in 4-space). Imagined from inside this curved 3-space, the bends in the hexagons are invisible. From outside (if we could view the 24-cell in 4-space), the straight lines would be seen to bend in the 4th dimension at the cube centers, because the center is displaced outward in the 4th dimension, out of the hyperplane defined by the cube's vertices. Thus the vertex cube is actually a [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]]. Unlike a cube, it seems to be radially equilateral (like the tesseract and the 24-cell itself): its "radius" equals its edge length.{{Efn|The vertex cubic pyramid is not actually radially equilateral,{{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} because the edges radiating from its apex are not actually its radii: the apex of the [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]] is not actually its center, just one of its vertices.}}|name=24-cell vertex figure}} {{Efn|The hexagons are inclined (tilted) at 60 degrees with respect to the unit radius coordinate system's orthogonal planes. Each hexagonal plane contains only ''one'' of the 4 coordinate system axes.{{Efn|Each great hexagon of the 24-cell contains one axis (one pair of antipodal vertices) belonging to each of the three inscribed 16-cells. The 24-cell contains three disjoint inscribed 16-cells, rotated 60° isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other (so their corresponding vertices are 120° {{=}} {{radic|3}} apart). A [[16-cell#Coordinates|16-cell is an orthonormal ''basis'']] for a 4-dimensional coordinate system, because its 8 vertices define the four orthogonal axes. In any choice of a vertex-up coordinate system (such as the unit radius coordinates used in this article), one of the three inscribed 16-cells is the basis for the coordinate system, and each hexagon has only ''one'' axis which is a coordinate system axis.|name=three basis 16-cells}} The hexagon consists of 3 pairs of opposite vertices (three 24-cell diameters): one opposite pair of ''integer'' coordinate vertices (one of the four coordinate axes), and two opposite pairs of ''half-integer'' coordinate vertices (not coordinate axes). For example: {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}1,{{spaces|2}}0) {{indent|5}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|5}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,–1,{{spaces|2}}0)<br> is a hexagon on the ''y'' axis. Unlike the {{sqrt|2}} squares, the hexagons are actually made of 24-cell edges, so they are visible features of the 24-cell.|name=non-orthogonal hexagons|group=}} {{Efn|Visualize the three [[16-cell]]s inscribed in the 24-cell (left, right, and middle), and the rotation which takes them to each other. [[24-cell#Reciprocal constructions from 8-cell and 16-cell|The vertices of the middle 16-cell lie on the (w, x, y, z) coordinate axes]];{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} the other two are rotated 60° [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinically]] to its left and its right. The 24-vertex 24-cell is a compound of three 16-cells, whose three sets of 8 vertices are distributed around the 24-cell symmetrically; each vertex is surrounded by 8 others (in the 3-dimensional space of the 4-dimensional 24-cell's ''surface''), the way the vertices of a cube surround its center.{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}} The 8 surrounding vertices (the cube corners) lie in other 16-cells: 4 in the other 16-cell to the left, and 4 in the other 16-cell to the right. They are the vertices of two tetrahedra inscribed in the cube, one belonging (as a cell) to each 16-cell. If the 16-cell edges are {{radic|2}}, each vertex of the compound of three 16-cells is {{radic|1}} away from its 8 surrounding vertices in other 16-cells. Now visualize those {{radic|1}} distances as the edges of the 24-cell (while continuing to visualize the disjoint 16-cells). The {{radic|1}} edges form great hexagons of 6 vertices which run around the 24-cell in a central plane. ''Four'' hexagons cross at each vertex (and its antipodal vertex), inclined at 60° to each other.{{Efn|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} The [[24-cell#Hexagons|hexagons]] are not perpendicular to each other, or to the 16-cells' perpendicular [[24-cell#Squares|square central planes]].{{Efn|name=non-orthogonal hexagons}} The left and right 16-cells form a tesseract.{{Efn|Each pair of the three 16-cells inscribed in the 24-cell forms a 4-dimensional [[W:tesseract|hypercube (a tesseract or 8-cell)]], in [[24-cell#Relationships among interior polytopes|dimensional analogy]] to the way two tetrahedra form a cube: the two 8-vertex 16-cells are inscribed in the 16-vertex tesseract, occupying its alternate vertices. The third 16-cell does not lie within the tesseract; its 8 vertices protrude from the sides of the tesseract, forming a cubic pyramid on each of the tesseract's cubic cells. The three pairs of 16-cells form three tesseracts.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} The tesseracts share vertices, but the 16-cells are completely disjoint.{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}}|name=three 16-cells form three tesseracts}} Two 16-cells have vertex-pairs which are one {{radic|1}} edge (one hexagon edge) apart. But a [[24-cell#Simple rotations|''simple'' rotation]] of 60° will not take one whole 16-cell to another 16-cell, because their vertices are 60° apart in different directions, and a simple rotation has only one hexagonal plane of rotation. One 16-cell ''can'' be taken to another 16-cell by a 60° [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|''isoclinic'' rotation]], because an isoclinic rotation is [[3-sphere]] symmetric: four [[24-cell#Clifford parallel polytopes|Clifford parallel hexagonal planes]] rotate together, but in four different rotational directions,{{Efn|name=Clifford displacement}} taking each 16-cell to another 16-cell. But since an isoclinic 60° rotation is a ''diagonal'' rotation by 60° in ''two'' completely orthogonal directions at once,{{Efn|name=isoclinic geodesic}} the corresponding vertices of the 16-cell and the 16-cell it is taken to are 120° apart: ''two'' {{radic|1}} hexagon edges (or one {{radic|3}} hexagon chord) apart, not one {{radic|1}} edge (60°) apart as in a simple rotation.{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} By the [[W:chiral|chiral]] diagonal nature of isoclinic rotations, the 16-cell ''cannot'' reach the adjacent 16-cell by rotating toward it; it can only reach the 16-cell ''beyond'' it. But of course, the 16-cell beyond the 16-cell to its right is the 16-cell to its left. So a 60° isoclinic rotation ''will'' take every 16-cell to another 16-cell: a 60° ''right'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we may have originally visualized as the ''left'' 16-cell, and a 60° ''left'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we visualized as the ''right'' 16-cell. (If so, that was our error in visualization; the 16-cell to the "left" is in fact the one reached by the left isoclinic rotation, as that is the only sense in which the two 16-cells are left or right of each other.)|name=three isoclinic 16-cells}} {{Efn|In a double rotation each vertex can be said to move along two completely orthogonal great circles at the same time, but it does not stay within the central plane of either of those original great circles; rather, it moves along a helical geodesic that traverses diagonally between great circles. The two completely orthogonal planes of rotation are said to be ''invariant'' because the points in each stay in the plane ''as the plane moves'', tilting sideways by the same angle that the other plane rotates.|name=helical geodesic}} {{Efn|A point under isoclinic rotation traverses the diagonal{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} straight line of a single '''isoclinic geodesic''', reaching its destination directly, instead of the bent line of two successive '''simple geodesics'''. A '''[[W:geodesic|geodesic]]''' is the ''shortest path'' through a space (intuitively, a string pulled taught between two points). Simple geodesics are great circles lying in a central plane (the only kind of geodesics that occur in 3-space on the 2-sphere). Isoclinic geodesics are different: they do ''not'' lie in a single plane; they are 4-dimensional [[W:helix|spirals]] rather than simple 2-dimensional circles.{{Efn|name=helical geodesic}} But they are not like 3-dimensional [[W:screw threads|screw threads]] either, because they form a closed loop like any circle (after ''two'' revolutions). Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'', and they are just as circular as 2-dimensional circles: in fact, twice as circular, because they curve in a circle in two completely orthogonal directions at once.{{Efn|Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'' in the sense that they are 1-dimensional geodesic ''lines'' that curve in 4-space in two completely orthogonal planes at once. They should not be confused with ''great 2-spheres'',{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=24}} which are the 4-dimensional analogues of 2-dimensional great circles (great 1-spheres).}} These '''isoclines''' are geodesic 1-dimensional lines embedded in a 4-dimensional space. On the 3-sphere{{Efn|All isoclines are geodesics, and isoclines on the 3-sphere are circles (curving equally in each dimension), but not all isoclines on 3-manifolds in 4-space are circles.}} they always occur in [[W:chiral|chiral]] pairs and form a pair of [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]s on the [[W:Clifford torus|Clifford torus]],{{Efn|Isoclines on the 3-sphere occur in non-intersecting chiral pairs. A left and a right isocline form a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]] called the {1,1} torus knot{{Sfn|Dorst|2019|loc=§1. Villarceau Circles|p=44|ps=; "In mathematics, the path that the (1, 1) knot on the torus traces is also known as a [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]. Villarceau circles are usually introduced as two intersecting circles that are the cross-section of a torus by a well-chosen plane cutting it. Picking one such circle and rotating it around the torus axis, the resulting family of circles can be used to rule the torus. By nesting tori smartly, the collection of all such circles then form a [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fibration]].... we prefer to consider the Villarceau circle as the (1, 1) torus knot [a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]] rather than as a planar cut [two intersecting circles]."}} in which ''each'' of the two linked circles traverses all four dimensions.}} the paths of the left and the right [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Double rotations|isoclinic rotation]]. They are [[W:Helix|helices]] bent into a [[W:Möbius strip|Möbius loop]] in the fourth dimension, taking a diagonal [[W:Winding number|winding route]] twice around the 3-sphere through the non-adjacent vertices of a 4-polytope's [[W:Skew polygon#Regular skew polygons in four dimensions|skew polygon]].|name=isoclinic geodesic}} {{Efn|[[File:Hopf band wikipedia.png|thumb|150px|Two [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles spanned by a twisted [[W:Annulus (mathematics)|annulus]].]][[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]]s are non-intersecting curved lines that are parallel in the sense that the perpendicular (shortest) distance between them is the same at each point. A double helix is an example of Clifford parallelism in ordinary 3-dimensional Euclidean space. In 4-space Clifford parallels occur as geodesic great circles on the [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]].{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|pp=8-10|loc=Relations to Clifford Parallelism}} Whereas in 3-dimensional space, any two geodesic great circles on the [[W:2-sphere|2-sphere]] will always intersect at two antipodal points, in 4-dimensional space not all great circles intersect. In 4-polytopes various discrete sets of Clifford parallel non-intersecting geodesic great circles can be found on the 3-sphere. They spiral around each other in [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fiber bundles]] which visit all the vertices just once. The simplest example is that six mutually orthogonal great circles can be drawn on the 3-sphere, as three pairs of completely orthogonal great circles, intersecting at 8 points defining a [[16-cell]]. Each completely orthogonal pair of circles is Clifford parallel. They cannot intersect at all, because they lie in planes which intersect at only one point: the center of the 16-cell. Because they are perpendicular and share a common center, the two circles are obviously not parallel and separate in the usual way of parallel circles in 3 dimensions; rather they are connected like adjacent links in a chain, each passing through the other without intersecting at any points, forming a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]|name=Clifford parallels}} {{Efn|In the 24-cell each great square plane is completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to another great square plane, and each great hexagon plane is completely orthogonal to a plane which intersects only two vertices: a great [[W:digon|digon]] plane.|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} {{Efn|In an [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], each point anywhere in the 4-polytope moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions at once, on a [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensional diagonal]]. The point is displaced a total [[W:Pythagorean distance]] equal to the square root of four times the square of that distance. For example, when the unit-radius 24-cell rotates isoclinically 60° in a hexagon invariant plane and 60° in its completely orthogonal invariant plane,{{Efn|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} all vertices are displaced to a vertex two edge lengths away. Each vertex is displaced to another vertex {{radic|3}} (120°) away, moving {{radic|3/4}} in four orthogonal coordinate directions.|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} {{Efn|Each square plane is isoclinic (Clifford parallel) to five other square planes but completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to only one of them.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Every pair of completely orthogonal planes has Clifford parallel great circles, but not all Clifford parallel great circles are orthogonal (e.g., none of the hexagonal geodesics in the 24-cell are mutually orthogonal).|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}} {{Efn|In the [[16-cell#Rotations|16-cell]] the 6 orthogonal great squares form 3 pairs of completely orthogonal great circles; each pair is Clifford parallel. In the 24-cell, the 3 inscribed 16-cells lie rotated 60 degrees isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other; consequently their corresponding vertices are 120 degrees apart on a hexagonal great circle. Pairing their vertices which are 90 degrees apart reveals corresponding square great circles which are Clifford parallel. Each of the 18 square great circles is Clifford parallel not only to one other square great circle in the same 16-cell (the completely orthogonal one), but also to two square great circles (which are completely orthogonal to each other) in each of the other two 16-cells. (Completely orthogonal great circles are Clifford parallel, but not all Clifford parallels are orthogonal.{{Efn|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}}) A 60 degree isoclinic rotation of the 24-cell in hexagonal invariant planes takes each square great circle to a Clifford parallel (but non-orthogonal) square great circle in a different 16-cell.|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} {{Efn|In 4 dimensional space we can construct 4 perpendicular axes and 6 perpendicular planes through a point. Without loss of generality, we may take these to be the axes and orthogonal central planes of a (w, x, y, z) Cartesian coordinate system. In 4 dimensions we have the same 3 orthogonal planes (xy, xz, yz) that we have in 3 dimensions, and also 3 others (wx, wy, wz). Each of the 6 orthogonal planes shares an axis with 4 of the others, and is ''completely orthogonal'' to just one of the others: the only one with which it does not share an axis. Thus there are 3 pairs of completely orthogonal planes: xy and wz intersect only at the origin; xz and wy intersect only at the origin; yz and wx intersect only at the origin.|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} {{Efn|Two planes in 4-dimensional space can have four possible reciprocal positions: (1) they can coincide (be exactly the same plane); (2) they can be parallel (the only way they can fail to intersect at all); (3) they can intersect in a single line, as two non-parallel planes do in 3-dimensional space; or (4) '''they can intersect in a single point'''{{Efn|To visualize how two planes can intersect in a single point in a four dimensional space, consider the Euclidean space (w, x, y, z) and imagine that the w dimension represents time rather than a spatial dimension. The xy central plane (where w{{=}}0, z{{=}}0) shares no axis with the wz central plane (where x{{=}}0, y{{=}}0). The xy plane exists at only a single instant in time (w{{=}}0); the wz plane (and in particular the w axis) exists all the time. Thus their only moment and place of intersection is at the origin point (0,0,0,0).|name=how planes intersect at a single point}} (and they ''must'', if they are completely orthogonal).{{Efn|Two flat planes A and B of a Euclidean space of four dimensions are called ''completely orthogonal'' if and only if every line in A is orthogonal to every line in B. In that case the planes A and B intersect at a single point O, so that if a line in A intersects with a line in B, they intersect at O.{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}}|name=completely orthogonal planes}}|name=how planes intersect}} {{Efn|Polytopes are '''completely disjoint''' if all their ''element sets'' are disjoint: they do not share any vertices, edges, faces or cells. They may still overlap in space, sharing 4-content, volume, area, or lineage.|name=completely disjoint}} {{Efn|If the [[W:Euclidean distance|Pythagorean distance]] between any two vertices is {{sqrt|1}}, their geodesic distance is 1; they may be two adjacent vertices (in the curved 3-space of the surface), or a vertex and the center (in 4-space). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|2}}, their geodesic distance is 2 (whether via 3-space or 4-space, because the path along the edges is the same straight line with one 90^o bend in it as the path through the center). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|3}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 (whether on a hexagonal great circle past one 60^o bend, or as a straight line with one 60^o bend in it through the center). Finally, if their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|4}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 in 4-space (straight through the center), but it reaches 3 in 3-space (by going halfway around a hexagonal great circle).|name=Geodesic distance}} {{Efn|Two angles are required to fix the relative positions of two planes in 4-space.{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|p=7|loc=§6 Angles between two Planes in 4-Space|ps=; "In four (and higher) dimensions, we need two angles to fix the relative position between two planes. (More generally, ''k'' angles are defined between ''k''-dimensional subspaces.)"}} Since all planes in the same [[W:hyperplane|hyperplane]] are 0 degrees apart in one of the two angles, only one angle is required in 3-space. Great hexagons in different hyperplanes are 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles. Great squares in different hyperplanes are 90 degrees apart in ''both'' angles (completely orthogonal){{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} or 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles.{{Efn||name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Planes which are separated by two equal angles are called ''isoclinic''. Planes which are isoclinic have [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} A great square and a great hexagon in different hyperplanes are neither isoclinic nor Clifford parallel; they are separated by a 90 degree angle ''and'' a 60 degree angle.|name=two angles between central planes}} {{Efn|The 24-cell contains 3 distinct 8-cells (tesseracts), rotated 60° isoclinically with respect to each other. The corresponding vertices of two 8-cells are {{radic|3}} (120°) apart. Each 8-cell contains 8 cubical cells, and each cube contains four {{radic|3}} chords (its long diagonals). The 8-cells are not completely disjoint{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}} (they share vertices), but each cube and each {{radic|3}} chord belongs to just one 8-cell. The {{radic|3}} chords joining the corresponding vertices of two 8-cells belong to the third 8-cell.|name=three 8-cells}} {{Efn|Departing from any vertex V₀ in the original great hexagon plane of isoclinic rotation P₀, the first vertex reached V₁ is 120 degrees away along a {{radic|3}} chord lying in a different hexagonal plane P₁. P₁ is inclined to P₀ at a 60° angle.{{Efn|P₀ and P₁ lie in the same hyperplane (the same central cuboctahedron) so their other angle of separation is 0.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}}}} The second vertex reached V₂ is 120 degrees beyond V₁ along a second {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₂ that is Clifford parallel to P₀.{{Efn|P₀ and P₂ are 60° apart in ''both'' angles of separation.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}} Clifford parallel planes are isoclinic (which means they are separated by two equal angles), and their corresponding vertices are all the same distance apart. Although V₀ and V₂ are ''two'' {{radic|3}} chords apart{{Efn|V₀ and V₂ are two {{radic|3}} chords apart on the geodesic path of this rotational isocline, but that is not the shortest geodesic path between them. In the 24-cell, it is impossible for two vertices to be more distant than ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord, unless they are antipodal vertices {{radic|4}} apart.{{Efn|name=Geodesic distance}} V₀ and V₂ are ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord apart on some other isocline. More generally, isoclines are geodesics because the distance between their ''adjacent'' vertices is the shortest distance between those two vertices, but a path between two vertices along a geodesic is not always the shortest distance between them (even on ordinary great circle geodesics).}}, P₀ and P₂ are just one {{radic|1}} edge apart (at every pair of ''nearest'' vertices).}} (Notice that V₁ lies in both intersecting planes P₁ and P₂, as V₀ lies in both P₀ and P₁. But P₀ and P₂ have ''no'' vertices in common; they do not intersect.) The third vertex reached V₃ is 120 degrees beyond V₂ along a third {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₃ that is Clifford parallel to P₁. The three {{radic|3}} chords lie in different 8-cells.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} V₀ to V₃ is a 360° isoclinic rotation.|name=360 degree geodesic path visiting 3 hexagonal planes}} {{Sfn|Mamone, Pileio & Levitt|2010|loc=§4.5 Regular Convex 4-Polytopes|pp=1438-1439|ps=; the 24-cell has 1152 symmetry operations (rotations and reflections) as enumerated in Table 2, symmetry group 𝐹₄.}} ==Notes== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Notelist|wiki=W:}} ==Citations== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Reflist|wiki=W:}} ==References== {{Refbegin}} * {{Cite book|title=A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers|last=Thoreau|first=Henry David|author-link=W:Thoreau|publisher=James Munroe and Company|year=1849|isbn=|location=Boston|ref={{SfnRef|Thoreau|1849}}}} * {{Cite journal|title=Theoretical Evidence for Principles of Special Relativity Based on Isotropic and Uniform Four-Dimensional Space|first=Takuya|last=Yamashita|date=25 May 2023|doi= 10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|journal=Preprints|volume=2023|issue=2023051785|url=https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|ref={{SfnRef|Yamashita|2023}}}} * {{Cite_arXiv | arxiv=2512.02903v2 | date=2 January 2026 | title=Symmetry transformation group arising from the Laplace–Runge–Lenz vector | first1=Stephen C. | last1=Anco | first2=Mahdieh Gol Bashmani | last2=Moghadam | class=math-ph}} === [[Polyscheme|Polyschemes]] === {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Refs|wiki=W:}} {{Refend}} fohbtxqs3jehqwtutw1snfddvmwm3y4 2842394 2842392 2026-10-24T00:26:37Z Dc.samizdat 2856930 /* General relativity is rotations in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions */ 2842394 wikitext text/x-wiki {{align|center|David Brooks Christie}} {{align|center|dc@samizdat.org}} {{align|center|Draft in progress}} {{align|center|June 2023 - October 2026}} <blockquote>'''Abstract:''' The physical universe is properly visualized as real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are 4-polytopes, small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are 4-balls of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. We ourselves and the objects we observe near us are only 3-dimensional, but nonetheless we can see into four dimensions of space. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. Light from them reaches us directly, on straight lines through 4-space. This view of the observed universe is compatible with special and general relativity, and with quantum mechanics. It furnishes those theories with an explanatory geometric model.</blockquote> == Summary == We observe that: * Physical space has four perpendicular dimensions, not just three. * Atoms are [[W:4-polytope|4-polytopes]]. * The sun is a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]] that is round in four dimensions. * Everything of intermediate size between an atom and a star, including us and our planet, lies in a 3-dimensional manifold of ordinary space. * Our entire 3-space manifold is moving through Euclidean 4-space at the speed of light, in a direction perpendicular to its three interior dimensions. * Special relativity describes the linear motion of objects and light signals in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * General relativity describes the rotational motion of objects with mass in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * Quantum mechanics describes the symmetry group actions of elementary geometric objects (4-polytopes) in four-dimensional Euclidean space. == A theory of the Euclidean cosmos == The physical universe is properly visualized as [[w:Four-dimensional_space|real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>]] of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are [[w:4-polytope|4-polytopes]], small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are [[W:4-ball|4-balls]] of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. Objects intermediate in size between atoms and stars, including molecules, people, and planetery surfaces their surface, are so flat as to be essentially 3-dimensional, having only the thickness of an atom in the orthogonal fourth dimension. All objects with mass move inertially through Euclidean 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math> as long as they exist, and acceleration only varies their direction. Objects moving in the same direction are in the same inertial reference frame. Their direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> is their proper time dimension, simply because their direction and velocity of motion through time is the same as their direction and velocity of motion through space. A typical galaxy such as ours occupies a 4-ball of mostly empty space, with stars and other objects distributed non-uniformly within it. The galaxy's orbital center may be nothing: a smaller 4-ball of empty space they surround. The stars in our spiral galaxy appear from our accustomed point of view to occupy a disk-like region of 3-dimensional space, with a denser ball-like center, but they are not so confined: they are distributed within a region of 4-dimensional space. The disk and ball have thickness not only in the third dimension, but in the fourth spatial dimension as well. Light from stars and galaxies reaches us on straight lines through Euclidean 4-space, so from our viewpoint, in what we have always imagined to be a 3-space universe, we look into the surrounding 4-space. Although we are physically confined within a 3-dimensional hyperplane by the inertia of our motion through 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math>, light signals are not so confined, so we observe all the cosmological objects surrounding us, both in and above or below our hyperplane, without perceiving their separation in our fourth orthogonal dimension, the direction of our motion. We may perceive a galaxy as elliptical when it is actually spherical, because that is how its image projects from its 4-ball shape into a 3-ball region in our hyperplane, where we measure it with our 3-dimensional bodies. More generally, orbits are circular in 4-space, but elliptical in the 3-space of their elliptic hyperplane. The galaxy as a whole, or more properly its orbital barycenter, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, in a distinct direction orthogonal to all three dimensions of our ordinary proper 3-space. Stars within the galaxy are translating with it at the same velocity <math>c</math> in the same direction, but on spiral trajectories as they pursue their various orbits within the galaxy. The galaxy as a whole occupies a 4-ball within its proper inertial reference frame (that is, in the moving frame of reference in which the galaxy considers itself to be a stationary rotating 4-ball). Over time, the galaxy 4-ball occupies a 4-dimensional cylinder and progresses along the cylinder's axis at velocity <math>c</math>. In this more universal inertial reference frame, the stars in the galaxy follow helical geodesic paths through the 4-cylinder; their trajectories are screw-translations through 4-space, the compound of a simple rotation and a completely orthogonal linear translation. The gravitational force and the inertial tendency to follow a geodesic are the same phenomenon, by the equivalence principle. That said, they can be distinguished, and the galaxy is held together primarily by gravity as inertia, not by gravity as attraction to a central mass toward which objects fall in orbit. There is not enough mass in the galaxy to hold it together by attraction, there is just enough to bend the stars' trajectories toward each other, in helical orbits around the galaxy's barycentric axis of motion. It is the tremendous inertial force of stars in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> that holds the cylinder of motion together, not some invisible dark matter. The observed universe as a whole appears to be a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] expanding radially from a central origin point at velocity <math>c</math>, the invariant velocity of mass-carrying objects through 4-space, also the propagation speed of light relative to any moving 3-space manifold, as measured by all observers. A 3-sphere is a hypersphere in Euclidean 4-space, but the enclosing surface of a 3-sphere is a curved, finite 3-space, dimensionally analogous to the surface of the earth which is a curved, finite 2-space. This 3-sphere could be the domain of our visible cosmos, but of course we do not know for certain that all the cosmological objects we observe lie near the surface of our expanding 3-sphere, since it is only our assumption that they must all have originated in the same big bang long ago. Possibly some of the more distant objects we observe did not, and lie elsewhere, outside our big-bang's 3-sphere of outflying matter or even inside its 3-sphere, below its surface. We cannot assume that all objects in the 4-space universe lie near the surface of the same expanding 3-sphere. For all observers, the conjectured big-bang of their origin corresponds not only to a now-distant point in their proper time past, it also corresponds to a distinct now-distant point in 4-dimensional space: the same point in the same Euclidean 4-space for all observers with the same origin. Our big bang had a distinct origin point in real space as well as in real time. More generally, time and Euclidean 4-space can be measured independently, just as time and Euclidean 3-space were measured classically, without the necessity to combine them as spacetime. The same inertial force which holds the galactic cylinder of motion together also confines us physically to an exceedingly thin three-dimensional surface manifold moving through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. All objects in our solar system too small to have their own gravity lie entirely within this thinest three-dimensional manifold, and have only the thickness of an atom in their direction-of-motion fourth dimension. That is why we are 3-dimensional objects ourselves, and why we cannot construct more than three perpendiculars through a single point in our local 3-dimensional space. A spherical region of 4-space is called a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]]. The enclosing surface of a 4-ball of any size is a finite, curved (non-Euclidean) 3-dimensional space called a [[w:3-sphere|3-sphere]]. Our entire big-bang-origin universe appears to be the largest 3-sphere we observe, but each of the cosmological objects within it (including our galaxy and our sun) lies within a smaller 3-sphere shell which bounds it, lying (we assume) on the largest 3-sphere embedded in its surface, like a soap bubble on the surface of a larger soap bubble. All the 3-dimensional surfaces are expanding, as the largest 3-sphere inflates at radial velocity <math>c</math>. We ourselves live within such an expanding 3-dimensional surface, in an infinitesimally curved 3-manifold surface embedded in Euclidean 4-space. That surface is the ordinary 3-dimensional space we experience. The earth and all the planets lie on it. Our solar system is only a small patch on the surface of a dimensionally rounder space, although that surface is not infinite. It is curved, and finite, analogous to the way the 2-dimensional surface of the earth -- once thought to be flat -- is curved and finite. Our solar system occupies a small patch on a filmy 4-dimensional soap-bubble of galactic size rounded by gravity, that is thicker-skinned than the diameter of an atom only in the superdense interior of objects large enough to have significant gravity of their own. Our 3-manifold of ordinary space, as a surface within our moving 4-ball galaxy, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> with the galaxy, in a distinct direction orthogonal to the manifold's three orthogonal dimensions of interior space. At every material point in the manifold (at every atom), the translation through 4-space is following a geometric law of motion discovered by Coxeter, that governs the propagation of individual objects through Euclidean space by the actions of their symmetry groups. The solar system's atoms of mass are 4-polytopes that are simultaneously rotating and translating, and as they advance together they define a moving 3-dimensional manifold by their own collective inertia, also called gravity, the property of matter's ceaseless propagation through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate of causality at which quantum events occur, all objects move, and the universe evolves. Any moving 3-dimensional manifold such as ours is an evolving surface boundary that is empty in most places, occupied by single atoms in comparatively fewer places, and occupied by bound complexes of multiple atoms (molecules) in still fewer places. In all these places it is no thicker than one atom in the dimension corresponding to its direction of translation, because molecules are 3-dimensional complexes of atoms that add no thickness to the manifold. In fewer places still it is occupied by large lumps of matter which exert a significant gravitational attraction, such as planets and their satellites. These round gravitational objects are thicker than one atom in their fourth dimension, but not uniformly so. They are disk-like 4-dimensional objects, 3-balls that are flattish in the fourth dimension. They are typically only one atom thick at the 4-disk's sharp edge, but they may be much thicker in the center of the 4-disk, particularly if their gravity is strong enough to give them a core of superdense matter, like the earth's deep core. The moving surface manifold cannot be thicker than one atom at any point unless and until there is enough mass near that point for the force of gravity as attraction to overcome the force of gravity as inertia, allowing atoms to be "heaped up" into larger 4-dimensional objects that form a lump in its moving surface. We have only indirect experience of such 4-dimensional lumps of matter thicker than one atom, since they occur naturally in our vicinity only in regions of superdense matter, such as the core of the earth or the interior of the sun. Deep in the core of the earth under enormous gravitational pressure peculiar states of matter have been observed, defying our understanding of how 3-dimensional crystalline structures behave. That is because they are not 3-dimensional structures, they are 4-dimensional crystals. The earth is a disk-like 4-dimensional object that is thin at its edge but thicker at its sphere-like core, dimensionally analogous to a 3-dimensional flying saucer with a sharp circular edge. The earth's surface that we walk on is an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere), analogous to the circular edge of the flying saucer (a 1-sphere), and on that edge where we live every object we find (including our bodies) is 3-dimensional with only the thickness of an atom in the fourth dimension. We cannot walk on the top or bottom surface of the 4-disk flying saucer because those surfaces are 3-dimensional regions within the earth. The earth's deep core of superdense 4-dimensional matter occupies a spherical region of 4-dimensional space (a 4-ball). The sun is the only entirely spherical 4-ball occurring naturally in our solar system. We refer to the contents of such superdense 4-balls of matter as atomic plasma, and have little experimental knowledge of their internal geometry or processes. We know that the sun burns at its surface 3-sphere and emits radiation, and we know a good deal about those surface processes which are nuclear atomic processes, but we know very little about its interior 4-ball, a dimensionally rounder enclosed space whose existence we did not suspect. Every moving surface boundary of matter in the observed universe is evolving in four dimensions at velocity <math>c</math>. The current location in 4-space of any of its material objects corresponds to the present moment in the proper time of that object's inertial reference frame. The object's direction of movement at velocity <math>c</math> corresponds to its proper time dimension, which is a spiral over time, not a Euclidean (straight-line) dimension, since its direction is changing in its orbit. Objects with mass of all sizes, from subatomic particles to the largest objects observed in the cosmos, are perpetually in inertial rotational motion in some orbit, and simultaneously in inertial translational motion propagating themselves through 4-space, in two completely orthogonal inertial motions each at the constant universal rate of transformation <math>c</math>. Every object with mass moves relative to universal 4-coordinate Euclidean space on its own distinct geodesic spiral, a screw displacement trajectory that is the compound of its two completely orthogonal inertial motions, a rotation and a translation. Objects without mass such as photons lie off such moving surface boundaries of matter from which they were emitted, and their motion is of a different nature. They are in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> through all four dimensions concurrently, without any rotational component of motion, so they move through 4-space on straight lines at a compound velocity. The propagation speed of light measured on a straight line through Euclidean 4-space is <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, so we can see in four dimensions, even though we are physically confined to a 3-dimensional manifold that is moving at velocity <math>c</math>. For example, we can look across the center of the mostly-empty 4-ball containing our galaxy and see stars in the opposite sides of its concentric 3-sphere orbital surfaces. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. They move in the 4-space direction corresponding to their proper time, perpendicular to all three dimensions of their proper 3-space, and generally the farther they are from us the greater the divergence of their direction of motion from our direction of motion: the greater the relative motion between us, and the greater their Hubble redshift. Light from them reaches us directly, propagating on straight lines through 4-space at twice the velocity at which they, and we ourselves, are propagating through 4-space. This physical model of the observed universe is compatible with the theories of special and general relativity, and with the atomic theory of quantum mechanics. It explains those theories geometrically, as expressions of intrinsic symmetries in Euclidean space. == Symmetries == It is common to speak of nature as a web, and so it is, the great web of our physical experiences. Every web must have its root systems somewhere, and nature in this sense must be rooted in the symmetries which underlie physics and geometry, the [[W:Group (mathematics)|mathematics of groups]].{{Sfn|Conway, Burgiel & Goodman-Strauss|2008}} As I understand [[W:Noether's theorem|Noether's theorem]] (which is not mathematically), hers is the deepest meta-theory of nature yet, deeper than [[W:Theory of relativity|Einstein's relativity]] or [[W:Evolution|Darwin's evolution]] or [[W:Euclidean geometry|Euclid's geometry]]. It finds that all fundamental findings in physics are based on conservation laws which can be laid at the doors of distinct [[W:symmetry group |symmetry group]]s. Thus all fundamental systems in physics, as examples [[W:quantum chromodynamics|quantum chromodynamics]] (QCD) the theory of the strong force binding the atomic nucleus and [[W:quantum electrodynamics|quantum electrodynamics]] (QED) the theory of the electromagnetic force, each have a corresponding symmetry [[W:group theory|group theory]] of which they are an expression. [[W:Coxeter group|Coxeter's theory of symmetry groups]] generated by reflections did for geometry what Noether's theorem and Einstein's relativity did for physics. [[W:Coxeter|Coxeter]] showed that Euclidean geometry is based on conservation laws that correspond to distinct symmetry groups, and that their group actions express the principle of relativity. Here is Coxeter's formulation of the motions of objects (their congruent transformations) in an ''n''-dimensional Euclidean space, excerpted:{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|pp=217-218|loc=§12.2 Congruent transformations}} <blockquote>Let <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> denote a rotation, <math>\mathrm{R}</math> a reflection, <math>\mathrm{T}</math> a translation, and let <math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r\mathrm{T}</math> denote a product of several such transformations, all commutative with one another. Then <math>\mathrm{RT}</math> is a glide-reflection (in two or three dimensions), <math>\mathrm{QR}</math> is a rotary-reflection, <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is a screw-displacement, and <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is a double rotation (in four dimensions).<br> Every orthogonal transformation is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r \le n)</math>, the number of dimensions.<br> Transformations involving a translation are also expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + 1 \le n)</math>.<br> For <math>(n = 4)</math> in particular, every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> If we begin with this most elemental [[w:Kinematics|kinematics]] of Coxeter's, and also assume the [[W:Galilean relativity|Galilean principle of relativity]], every displacement in 4-space can be viewed as either a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> or a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, because we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> in a linearly moving (translating) reference frame. Therefore any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>. By the same principle, we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> as an isoclinic (equi-angled) <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> by proper choice of reference frame.{{Efn|[[W:Arthur Cayley|Cayley]] showed that any rotation in 4-space can be decomposed into two isoclinic rotations, which intuitively we might see follows from the fact that any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a [[W:SO(4)|rotation in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]].|name=Cayley's rotation factorization into two isoclinic reference frame transformations}} Coxeter's relation is thus a mathematical statement of the principle of relativity, on group-theoretic grounds. It correctly captures the limits to [[W:General relativity|general relativity]], in that we can only exchange the translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) for ''one'' of the two rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>). An observer in any inertial reference frame can always measure the presence, direction and velocity of ''one'' rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) up to uncertainty, and can always distinguish the direction of their own proper time translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>). As I understand Coxeter theory (which is not mathematically), the symmetry groups underlying physics seem to have an expression in a [[W:Euclidean space|Euclidean space]] of four [[W:dimension|dimension]]s, that is, they are [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|four-dimensional Euclidean geometry]]. Therefore as I understand that geometry (which is entirely by synthetic methods rather than by Clifford's algebraic methods), the [[W:Atom|atom]] seems to have a distinct Euclidean geometry, such that atoms and their constituent particles are four-dimensional geometric objects (4-polytopes), and nature can be understood in terms of their [[W:group action|group actions]], including centrally their group <math>SO(4)</math> [[W:rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space|rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]]. The distinct Coxeter symmetry groups have characteristic <math>SO(4)</math> rotational expressions as the [[W:Regular_4-polytope|regular 4-polytopes]]. Their discrete isoclinic rotations are distinguishing properties of fundamental objects in geometry, relativity and quantum mechanics. For example, atoms exhibit <math>SO(4)</math> symmetries of the discrete isoclinic (equi-angled) double rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>) of a set of regular 4-polytopes that is characteristic of their [[w:Atomic_number|atomic number]]. == Special relativity describes Euclidean 4-space == <blockquote>Our entire model of the universe is built on symmetries. Some, like isotropy (the laws are the same in all directions), homogeneity (same in all places), and time invariance (same at all times) seem natural enough. Even relativity, the Lorentz Invariance that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, has an elegance to it that makes it seem natural.<ref>{{Cite book|first=Dave|last=Goldberg|title=The Universe in the Rearview Mirror: How Hidden Symmetries Shape Reality|chapter=§10. Hidden Symmetries: Why some symmetries but not others?|year=2013|publisher=Dutton Penguin Group|isbn=978-0-525-95366-1|ref={{SfnRef|Goldberg|2013}}}}</ref></blockquote> Although the Minkowski spacetime of relativity is a non-Euclidean 4-dimensional space,{{Efn|Spacetime is a non-Euclidean (curved) 4-dimensional space because it consists of three orthogonal space dimensions and a time dimension. The time dimension is not orthogonal to the three spatial dimensions; the time coordinate has the opposite sign as the three space coordinates so spacetime is hyperbolic, not a Euclidean (flat) 4-space at all.}} it has been noticed that its 3-dimensional space component could be modeled as a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] embedded in 4-dimensional Euclidean (flat) space. That is, we could imagine that the ordinary 3-dimensional space we perceive is the curved 3-dimensional surface of a 4-dimensional ball (since the surface of a 4-ball is a curved 3-dimensional space called a 3-sphere, just as the surface of a 3-ball like the earth is a curved 2-dimensional space called a 2-sphere). This was [[#Origins of the theory|imagined by Einstein]] himself in 1921, as a thought experiment in which he carefully described his fourth orthogonal spatial dimension as merely a mathematical abstraction. Subsequently it was noticed by others (not mainstream physicists) that if physical space were really embedded in Euclidean 4-dimensional space (with our 3-dimensional space embedded in 4-space as some non-Euclidean 3-manifold, not necessarily a 3-sphere), then the Lorentz transformation effects of special relativity (spatial forshortenings and time dilations and so forth) could all be explained by ordinary perspective geometry in 4-dimensional Euclidean space. Special relativity reduces to classical vector space geometry (based on the 4-dimensional version of the Pythagorean theorem), but if and only if every observer is moving through 4-space at a universal constant velocity <math>c</math>, in some 4-space direction.{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} This counter-intuitive alternative geometric model of relativity, which has usually been called [[W:Formulations of special relativity#Euclidean relativity|Euclidean relativity]], is motivated by the fact that in every kind of relativity, but originally in Einstein's special relativity, each observer moves on a vector through a Euclidean four-dimensional space consisting of their three proper spatial dimensions and their proper time dimension, and the Pythagorean vector-sum of their motion through this kind of proper 4-space is always <math>c</math>, as measured by all observers from any inertial reference frame.{{Efn|Each observer is stationary in space in their own proper reference frame, while they move at maximum velocity {{Math|c}} through their own proper time. Observed from another reference frame in relative motion, they appear foreshortened in space in their direction of motion, and their clocks appear to be slowed to less than the maximum velocity {{Math|c}}.}} This is the Lorentz invariant, that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, regardless of their motion relative to the light source.{{Efn| ...cite Lewis Epstein's elegant explanation of the Lorentz Invariance as observers moving at constant velocity {{Math|c}} through space and proper time.}} But no physicists have taken the leap of claiming that therefore, our universe is physically [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|this kind of Euclidean 4-space]], and that observers are actually moving through it at velocity <math>c</math>. In physics as it has been universally understood, observers are not supposed to be able to move at velocity <math>c</math>. Their motion takes place in 3-space and in universal coordinate time (in Minkowski spacetime), and the cosmos is considered to be a non-Euclidean 3-space, generally a closed (finite) expanding 3-space, but with only three spatial dimensions, not four. In the Euclidean relativity alternative view, however, every observer is always moving at velocity <math>c</math> through the universe, which is real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. The direction in which they are moving is called their proper time axis.{{Efn|Time in spacetime is universal coordinate time, but there is another kind of time in relativity, the proper time in each inertial reference frame. Your proper time is the time you experience, and every observer has his own proper time; proper time runs at different rates in different inertial reference frames. It runs slower (compared to universal coordinate time) in a gravitational field (according to general relativity), and observers in motion with respect to each other view each other's clocks as running slower than their own clocks (according to special relativity).}} Their movement in time is not just modelled as movement in an abstract fourth dimension (as it is in Minkowski spacetime), their movement in time is isomorphic to their movement through physical space in a distinct direction at velocity <math>c</math>. Two observers' directions of movement through space may be different (or not, if they happen to be going in the same direction). Your proper time dimension is whichever direction you are moving. The other three directions perpendicular to your proper time axis are the three dimensions of your ordinary proper space, which again, will be different directions for you than for other observers moving in a different direction. There are four orthogonal spatial dimensions which we all share, but we share the same orthogonal proper time axis and ordinary proper 3-space axes only if we are at rest with respect to each other, actually moving in the same direction at velocity <math>c</math>, in the same inertial reference frame. Your proper 4-space coordinate system is rotated with respect to another observer's proper 4-space coordinate system, precisely as your vectors (directions of motion) are rotated in Euclidean 4-space with respect to each other, but there are no metric distortions (no Lorentz transformations) between your proper Euclidean 4-space coordinate systems; you are both embedded in the same Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. Lorentz transformations are required only to convert between your respective proper Minkowski spacetime coordinate systems. So in this novel alternate view of relativity, every mass in the universe must be perpetually in motion at velocity <math>c</math> through Euclidean 4-space, along with all the masses in its vicinity that are going in (nearly) the same direction. The entire solar system, for example, must be translating in the fourth dimension at the "speed of light" <math>c</math>, although we do not notice it, since we are all moving in that same direction together. Acceleration of an object varies its direction of motion through 4-space, but never its velocity, which is invariant for all objects with mass. Two objects which are in motion relative to each other are both actually in motion at the same velocity <math>c</math>, but in at least slightly different directions.{{Efn|The angular divergence between two observer's motion vectors is proportional to their relative velocity: the more they diverge, the greater their relative velocity, up to the maximum divergence possible in the space. In Euclidean relativity all observers are in motion at velocity {{Math|c}} relative to universal Cartesian 4-coordinate space, so the maximum relative velocity between two observers is {{Math|2c}} when they are moving in exactly opposite directions in 4-space. This is not a contradiction of special relativity, which limits the maximum relative velocity between two observers to {{Math|c}}, it is the same measurement in different units. Special relativity measures all velocities in Minkowski spacetime (in a non-Euclidean 3-space). Euclidean relativity measures all velocities in Euclidean 4-space.}} In Einstein's relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of light through 3-space. In Euclidean relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of matter through 4-space! The speed of light through 3-space is also perceived as <math>c</math> by all observers, because they are each living in a moving 3-manifold that is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. Despite their extreme differences in viewpoint, Einstein's relativity and Euclidean relativity are equivalent theories in complete agreement with each other, by definition. The two theories make exactly the same special relativity predictions of how observers in different inertial reference frames will perceive each other's motions in time and space. It is beyond the scope of this present paper to show how they also agree on the predictions of general relativity, but it is important to understand that our formulation of Euclidean relativity requires our acceptance of the experimentally verified findings of special relativity, general relativity and quantum mechanics. Our model and the standard model both describe the same geometric relations of space and time based on the same evidence, but as embedded in two very different universal host spaces: Euclidean 4-space versus Minkowski spacetime. In some instances our model provides a geometric explanation for physical phenomena where the standard model has none, as yet. An example is the two models' differing explanations for the gravitational coherence of galaxies: either their inertial motion at velocity <math>c</math>, or their possession of experimentally undetected dark matter. A more central example is our use of Coxeter's kinematics to explain the laws of relativistic motion geometrically. {{Efn|More generally, our model is concerned with group-theoretic properties of number elucidated by Coxeter and other geometers. ...cite Kappraff & Adamson's 2003 paper on The Relationship of the Cotangent Function to Special Relativity Theory, geometry and properties of number,{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2003|loc=Special Relativity Theory, Geometry and properties of number}} which shows how the Lorentz coefficient is a function of a deep geometric property of number{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2000|loc=A Fresh Look at Number}} discovered by Steinbach,{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997|loc=Golden Fields: A Case for the Heptagon}} by means of which the root formula of geometry in any Euclidean dimension, the Pythagorean theorem, may be derived solely in terms of the addition of polygon side lengths, without recourse to their products or squares. More generally, Steinbach found that in the relations among regular polytope chords, to add is to multiply; every chord is both the product (quotient) of a pair of chords and the sum (difference) of another pair of chords.}} Euclidean relativity is not even a fringe theory; no physicists or astronomers have adopted it. There are many good reasons why the revolutionary leap to a four orthogonal spatial dimensions viewpoint has not been taken, beginning with the universally observed fact that we can only construct three perpendiculars through a point in our immediate space, which appears to be resolutely 3-dimensional, not 4-dimensional. Euclidean relativity offers a nice geometric explanation of the reasons for the Lorentz transformations, but only at the cost of raising other mysteries, which have been difficult for its aficionados to explain. Another mystery is how light signals between observers in relative motion could "catch up" with the receiver moving on a diverging path through 4-space from the emitter. If both observers are already moving at <math>c</math> (on diverging paths), the propagation speed of light through 4-space between them would have to be greater than <math>c</math>. Euclidean relativity is a revolutionary theory indeed, in which <math>c</math> cannot possibly be the speed of light! We conclude that, for a theory of Euclidean 4-space to be physically viable (that is, for <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> to be our real space and not merely an abstract mathematical space), the speed of light through Euclidean 4-space must be <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, with massless photons translating through 4-space at twice the speed of mass-carrying objects. Photons must translate the diagonal distance through 4-space along the long diameter of a unit 4-hypercube, in the same time that massive particles translate inertially along the edge (or the radius) of a unit 4-hypercube. This is conceivable in Euclidean 4-space (and in no other Euclidean space of any dimensionality) because the long diagonal of the unit 4-hypercube is the natural number <math>\sqrt{4}</math>. == An object's motion in space is the product of its discrete self-reflections == Coxeter theory describes all the possible motions of an object in space as local functions of the object's discrete geometry (its shape). Coxeter observed that in a Euclidean space of any number of dimensions, any displacement of a geometric object from one place to another, and any rotation of the object from one orientation to another, can be broken down into the product of a number of discrete self-reflections. Any action of a polytope that transforms its position and orientation in space may be measured as a distinct sequence of self-reflections of the object in its own surfaces. Therefore any motion of the object whatsoever may be precisely described as the object propagating itself through space by a discrete sequence of local self-reflections. This is a purely kinematic description of motion which does not give any account of forces acting on the object that cause it to move. Coxeter found that both changes in position (translations) and changes in orientation (rotations) can be broken down into the simplest of all displacements (self-reflections). A translation occurs when an object self-reflects twice, in two distinct surfaces which are parallel to each other. A rotation also occurs when an object self-reflects twice, but in two distinct surfaces which intersect each other. When a object self-reflects once, it turns itself inside out (it reverses its chirality), but in translations and rotations it self-reflects twice, preserving its chirality. Coxeter's laws of kinematics are a geometric counterpart to Newton's algebraic laws of motion in three dimensional Euclidean space. They are helpful because they can be understood as geometric pictures, which may help us to visualize the relationships between translation and rotation in classic Newtonian physics problems, such as the [[W:Kepler problem|Kepler problem]] of the motion of the planets.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Feynman|first=Richard|title=Feynman's Lost Lecture: The Motion of Planets Around the Sun|date=1996|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0393039184}}</ref> But they are also a revolutionary advance beyond Newton's laws, because Coxeter formulated them in Euclidean spaces of any number of dimensions. In particular, they give us geometric pictures of all the possible motions of objects in 4-dimensional Euclidean space: <blockquote>Every orthogonal transformation in 4-space is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}^t</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + t \le 4)</math>. Every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> While this description should be understood as geometric pictures, some of the pictures may not be easy for us to visualize, since we have no physical experience in 4-dimensional space. Rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>), reflection (<math>\mathrm{R}</math>) and translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) are obvious analogues of what they are in three-dimensional space, but double rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>) is something new and unprecedented in our physical experience, because double rotations cannot occur until there are four or more dimensions of space in which to rotate. A point in 4-space may be in motion on two circles in two completely orthogonal rotation planes simultaneously. Nothing constrains the two circles to be of the same radius, or constrains either circle from being of infinite radius such that the point moves in a straight line within its rotation plane: a translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> rather than a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. The motion of a rigid object defined by multiple points is constrained by its rigidity, such that the radii of both circles may approach infinity, but only one of the two radii may actually reach infinity. For a rigid object, only one of the two rotations may actually be a translation. Four dimensional Euclidean space can accomodate no such thing as a <math>\mathrm{Q}^2\mathrm{T}</math>. A translating double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, like a translating simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>, is simply a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. That is the essence of the way the principle of relativity operates in Euclidean 4-space. An object which is double-rotating in its own proper inertial reference frame may be seen to be performing nothing more mysterious than a screw translation, when observed from an inertial reference frame from which the object is in relative translational motion. Of course, it is a screw translation in 4-space, which is more mysterious than a screw translation in our ordinary 3-space. In 3-space the orbit of a screw translation (or any <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) lies on a great circle of an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere). In 4-space the orbit of a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math> lies on a great circle of a hypersphere (a 3-sphere). Such 4-dimensional great circles are inherently more complex than the ordinary circles we experience in 3-space. They do not lie in a single plane, but bend through all four dimensions, in either a left or right hand direction of curvature. Unlike ordinary circles they are inherently chiral, and their circumference is not <math>2\pi r</math>, but like ordinary circles they are truly circular, geodesic circles. In 4-space they might even be said to be more circular than ordinary circles, which bend in only two dimensions. We refer to such 4-dimensional great circles as ''isoclines'', to distinguish them from ordinary 2-dimensional great circles in the plane. Their name comes from the fact that a point on a rigid 4-dimensional object undergoing [[W:SO(4)#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]] traverses an isocline circle. In a universe which is real Euclidean four-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>, wherein these motions occur only at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, there is a universal Cartesian 4-coordinate reference frame in which every rigid object in free fall is translating on a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> at velocity <math>c</math>. That universal inertial reference frame is not the proper reference frame of any object or observer, wherein the object or observer is stationary and double-rotating at the universal rate of quantum events <math>c</math>, but it is the common reference frame of all observers. == Light propagates through 4-space at twice its apparent velocity <math>c</math>== Coxeter's laws of kinematics in 4-dimensional Euclidean space apply to all objects with mass, but we find there is an additional kind of displacement which applies only to massless particles such as photons, considered as single point objects. Light quanta (photons) translate through 4-space by 4-dimensional reflection <math>\mathrm{R}^4</math>, which may be termed a double translation <math>\mathrm{T}^2</math>, a pure translation via two pairs of parallel reflections without any rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. Matter (atoms and all particles with mass) are perpetually rotating and translating through 4-space by <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, a screw translation of a rotating object, which is relativistically equivalent to a stationary isoclinic <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>, an isoclinically rotating object such as an atom. A simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> or simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> is a double reflection <math>\mathrm{R^2}</math>, so a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is an <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>, but not with the same group of reflection angles as a light signal <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>. A translation <math>\mathrm{T = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two parallel planes, and a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two intersecting planes, as in a <math>\mathrm{QT = R^4}</math> which is both at once. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is two double reflections in pairs of parallel planes at once, a reflection in four non-intersecting parallel planes; it is all translation and no rotation. In a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> all the motion goes to translation, so the translation goes twice as far as the simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is the opposite of a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q^2 = R^4}</math>, which is stationary but rotates twice as far as the simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. The product of the two translations in a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> is a diagonal 4-space translation over the long diameter of the unit 4-hypercube, exactly twice the distance of a simple <math>\mathrm{T}</math> over the edge length (or radius) of the unit 4-hypercube. The [[w:Tesseract|4-hypercube (also known as the 8-cell or tesseract)]] is ''radially equilateral'', which means its edge length is equal to its radius, like the hexagon, so its long diameter (twice its radius) is exactly twice its edge length. The photon moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions. By the four-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, each of those four distances is half the total distance the photon moves: one edge length (one radius) is half the total diagonal distance moved (the long diameter). That total movement is a double the unit-distance translation, but without any rotation component, so it cannot carry any mass with it. A <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> cannot reposition a 4-polytope the way a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> does, it can only reposition a quantum of energy that has no distinguishing rotational symmetry, such as a photon. That is the price light pays to move exactly twice as fast as matter.{{Efn| ...lensing of double translations <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> in more than two pairs of parallel planes at once...relationship to the frequency of light emitted and the coherence length of the wave packet...}} == Special relativity is Galilean relativity in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == {{Efn|...TAC suggests this section is needed sooner, i.e. in the preceding Special Relativity section, as it explains how Euclidean relativity reduces special relativity to 4D perspective geometry...it's misplaced (too late) here...}} Perspective effects known as the Lorentz transformations occur because each observer's proper 3-dimensional space is a moving curved manifold embedded in flat 4-dimensional Euclidean space. The curvature of their 3-space complicates sightline calculations for observers; they sometimes require Lorentz transformations to produce the actual 4-space Cartesian coordinates of objects in the scene being observed. But if all four spatial dimensions are considered, no Lorentz transformations are required (or permitted) in correct scene construction, except when an observer wants to calculate a projection, that is, the shadow of how things will appear to them from a three-dimensional viewpoint (not how they really are in 4-space).{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} Space really has four orthogonal dimensions, and space and time behave there just as they do in a classical vector space, only bigger by one dimension. It is not necessary to combine 4-space with time in a unified spacetime to explain 4-dimensional perspective effects at high relative velocities, because Euclidean 4-space is already 4-dimensional, and those effects fall out naturally from the 4-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, exactly as ordinary visual perspective does in three dimensions from the 3-dimensional Pythagorean theorem. Because one of the four spatial dimensions corresponds to an observer's direction of motion (in both space and proper time), and all observers and all scenes being observed are in motion (at constant velocity) in their respective proper time directions, we observe perspective foreshortenings in time as well as in a spatial dimension. In special relativity these perspective effects are reciprocal, precisely because they are only apparent, not actual, changes in size and duration. (However in general relativity, discussed below, the actual rate of physical processes varies from place to place, and reference frame differences predicted by the theory are neither reciprocal nor illusory.) None of these Lorentz effects are beyond geometric explanation or paradoxical. The universe is unexpectedly strange to us in precisely the ways the Euclidean fourth dimension is strange to us; but that does hold many surprises. Euclidean 4-space is much more interesting than Euclidean 3-space, analogous to the way 3-space is much more interesting and deeply explanatory to us than it would be if we experienced it only as a 2-space with many folds and curves, as perhaps an ant does. The emergent properties of 4-space are hard for us to visualize because they lie so wholly beyond our physical experience, just as it was hard for our ancestors to imagine the earth as round like a ball. However, Euclidean spaces of successive dimensions are analogous, and so higher dimensional spaces can be anticipated and explored: that is Schläfli's great discovery. Moreover dimensional analogy itself, like everything else in nature including all of physics, is an exact expression of intrinsic group-theoretic symmetries: that is Nother's great discovery. == General relativity is rotations in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == The statement that the laws of special relativity hold to good approximation in freely falling (and non-rotating) reference frames is known as the [[W:Equivalence principle|Einstein equivalence principle]]. The weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a building on the surface of the earth is the same as the weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a spaceship in interstellar space accelerating at a rate of 32'/second/second. Both observers are experiencing an upwards acceleration at the same rate, which in their respective proper reference frames is measured as the weight of gravity, rather than as an accelerating motion (they are stationary in their proper reference frames). Einstein used this equivalence principle as the basis for his general theory of relativity, in much the same way he had used the constant velocity of light as the basis for his special theory of relativity. In general relativity the two accelerating observers occupy scenes which are relativistically equivalent, which means that although they can be distinguished (they have different measurements) in any reference frame from which they may both be observed, they have the same invariant geometry in all reference frames (they are the same phenomena), implying that there exists, for either scene, another reference frame from which it measures exactly like the other scene. Relativistically equivalent does not imply that there exists a single reference frame in which the two scenes are congruent (have the same measurements). It only means that they can be transformed into each other by a shift in point of view, because their invariant geometries (their measurements which are independent of point of view) are the same. Einstein's general theory of relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in spacetime. Our formulation of Euclidean relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. An observer standing on the surface of the earth is accelerated at the rate of 32'/second/second. The observer and the earth are both stationary in their proper inertial reference frames (which are similar except for the rotation of the earth), so the observer's acceleration cannot be perceived as motion in either proper reference frame; it is perceptible there instead as the force of gravity. It is only perceptible as motion in some other reference frame in which the earth and the observer are both in motion, such as the universal common reference frame of Euclidean 4-coordinate space in which they are both in motion at velocity <math>c</math> on their respective screw translations <math>QT</math>, which are distinct. In that universal common reference frame the observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is the rate of change in the direction of his vector of translation through 4-space. The velocity of his vector of translation <math>T</math> through 4-space remains the constant <math>c</math> throughout; only his direction is changing. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation <math>Q</math> of a translation <math>T</math>: a screw translation <math>QT</math>. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation which is an acceleration. We can be precise about the units of measurement of this acceleration at atomic scale. In Coxeter's kinematics rotations of geometric objects occur in discrete increments called rotational displacements, with each distinct kind of rotation performing a characteristic number of its characteristic rotational displacement during a full revolution that returns the object to its starting orientation. There are many distinct kinds of rotation, each with its characteristic rotational displacement and number of displacements per revolution. The general rotation in 4-space is a double rotation <math>Q^2</math> distinguished by two distinct completely orthogonal angles through which the object turns in each rotational displacement. The angles determine not only the distance through which the object turns, but the characteristic trajectory of each point on the surface of the rotating object, including the length of that trajectory before it closes into a circle when the object returns to its starting orientation. For any distinct kind of rotation, the circular trajectory is always an integer multiple of the characteristic rotational displacement, but the full circle may be greater than 360°. In 4-space rotational circles are not ordinary 2-dimensional circles that lie in the plane and have a 360° circumference. Many distinct 4-space rotations of interest have a circumference of 720°, and many are larger. In 4-space every object with mass moves on its distinct <math>QT</math> trajectory. Each rotational displacement <math>Q</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which intersect each other, at angles related to a distinct star polygon. Each translational displacement <math>T</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which lie parallel to each other. In both kinds of motion (rotation and translation) it is the rate at which these double-reflection displacements occur which is constant and which we measure as the velocity <math>c</math>. Every atom translates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing a large number of atomic scale translational displacements per second. Concurrently, the atom rotates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing the same large number of atomic scale rotational displacements per second. Although the number of displacements at atomic scale per unit time is the same universal constant <math>c</math> for all rotations and translations, distinct kinds of rotation revolve at distinct rates, because the number of rotational displacements per complete revolution and the circumference of the complete revolution are distinct characteristics of each kind of rotation. The velocity at which each point on the surface of a rotating object moves, and the frequency of its rotational circling, are functions of the distinct rotation it is performing. However, they are not simple functions of <math>c</math> and the two defining angle parameters of the rotation. Distinct rotations arise from distinct symmetry groups and each is its own mystery with a unique conservation law. The relationships between those distinct conservation laws are even more mysterious, and have been shown to be chaotic. Steinbach{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997}} discovered the Golden Fields family of ratios which govern distinct rotational displacements related to the regular star polygons at least up to the hendecagon {11}. Kappraff and Adamson{{Sfn|Kappraff|Adamson|2004}} further characterized the families of rotation functions and showed that they form an infinite number of periodic trajectories when operated on by the Mandelbrot operator. The inertial tendency of mass is to follow a geodesic. The inertial conservation law of gravity applies to all motions of objects with mass, rotations as well as translations. A translation <math>T</math> is the distinct simple rotation <math>Q</math> in which the characteristic angle of rotational displacement is zero. Inertia is the tendency of objects with mass to conserve their angles of rotational displacement. In 4-space each object has two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement which are characteristic of the distinct rotation the object is performing. Inertia is the conservation of this distinct double rotation. In 4-coordinate Euclidean space the acceleration of an object with mass is a rotation of the object, a change to its direction, not a change to its constant velocity. Because the rate of atomic scale displacements is the universal constant <math>c</math>, the rate of change of direction (the acceleration of the object) is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law. A observer standing on the surface of the earth is performing a distinct double rotation characterized by two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement. The observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law, and a measurement of the rate of change of the observer's direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. ... == Quantum mechanics is general relativity of Coxeter groups in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == ... == Dimensional relativity == The formulation of Euclidean relativity based on Coxeter's kinetic law of <math>n</math>-dimensional congruent transformations in Euclidean space may be called ''dimensional relativity'', since it captures the theories of special and general relativity, and has its roots in dimensional analogy. Dimensional analogy is the exploration of [[w:Hermann_Grassmann#Mathematician|Hermann Grassmann's vector space principle]], in which space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. The geometry of higher-dimensional space is accessible by reason of direct analogy, as [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] subsequently demonstrated, and by algebraic methods after [[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]]. By analogy to the surface of the earth, the bounding surface of a spherical region of <math>n</math>-dimensional Euclidean space is an <math>(n-1)</math>-sphere, a spherical space of one fewer dimensions than the <math>n</math>-ball of Euclidean space it surrounds. In dimensional relativity the sky is not a ceiling, but an infinite regress of alternating spherical and Euclidean <math>n</math>-spaces of increasing <math>n</math>, accessible from each observer's point of view. By dimensional analogy, each observer looks up into their own reference frame's regress of concentric alternating <math>n</math>-spaces. By the capacity for dimensional analogy which they possess, some observers see deeper into <math>n</math>-dimensional space than others. == Polycentric spherical relativity == An intelligent observer equipped with the principle of dimensional relativity may perceive the universe from any inertial reference frame, not only from their own proper stationary reference frame in the Euclidean <math>n</math>-space universe in which they physically locate themself. We see that every observer may also properly view themself as stationary and the universe as an <math>n</math>-sphere with themself at the center observing it, perceptually equidistant from all points on its <math>n</math>-space surface, including their own physical location which is one of those surface points, distinguished to them but moving on the surface, and not the center of anything. This ''polycentric model'' of the universe is a further restatement of the principle of relativity, and of the [[W:Copernican principle|Copernican principle]] that observation is democratic: observers occupy representative viewpoints, not privileged monocentric positions. The polycentric model is compatible with Galileo's relativity of uniformly moving objects in ordinary space, Einstein's special relativity of inertial reference frames in 4-dimensional spacetime, Einstein's general relativity of all reference frames in non-Euclidean spacetime, and Coxeter's dimensional relativity of orthogonal group actions in Euclidean and spherical spaces of any number of dimensions. The polycentric model should be known as Thoreau's principle of ''spherical relativity'', since the first precise written statement of it appears in 1849, contemporaneous with and independent of Schlafli's work: <blockquote>The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence.{{Sfn|Thoreau|1849|p=349|ps=; "The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence." [Contemporaneous and independent of [[W:Ludwig Schlafli|Ludwig Schlafli]]'s pioneering work enumerating the complete set of regular polyschemes in any number of dimensions.]}}</blockquote> == Revolutions == The original Copernican revolution in 1543 displaced the center of the universe from the center of the earth to a point farther away, the center of the sun, with the earth performing a ''revolution'' around the sun, and the stars remaining on a fixed 2-sphere around the sun instead of around the earth. But this led inevitably to the recognition that the sun must be a star itself, not equidistant from all the stars, and the center of but one of many spheres, no monotheistic center at all. In 1600 [[W:Giordano Bruno|Giordano Bruno]] who first openly advocated these views was burned at the stake in Rome's [[W:Campo de' Fiori|Campo de' Fiori]] by the Catholic inquisition. In such fashion the Euclidean four-dimensional revolution, emerging three to five centuries later, initially lends itself to the big bang theory of a single origin of the whole universe, but leads inevitably to the recognition that all the galaxies need not be equidistant from a single origin in time, any more than all the stars lie in the same galaxy, equidistant from a single center in space. The expanding sphere of matter on the surface of which we find ourselves living is likely to be one of many 3-spheres expanding at velocity <math>c</math>, with their big bang origins occurring at distinct times and places in the ''n''-dimensional universe. The most distant objects we see when we look up at night may not all have the same origin in space and time. As recently as Copernicus we believed all the stars lay on a single 2-sphere embedded in Euclidean 3-space, with our sun at its center. During the enlightenment observers beginning with Bruno dispersed those stars into an infinite Euclidean 3-space, and relinquished our privileged position at the center. Then Einstein showed that our 3-space could not be Euclidean, that it must be a 3-manifold curved in every place in obedience to Newton's inverse-square law of gravity; and in a geometry related to time, at least, it must be 4-dimensional. In the present work we propose a theory of ''n''-dimensional real space and how light travels in it, a theory which says we can see into four orthogonal dimensions of Euclidean space, and so when we look up at night we see cosmological objects distributed in at least four dimensions of space around us, rather than all located in our own local 3-space. Looking still deeper and farther out, the universe viewed as a 4-sphere might, or might not, be expanding, and the most distant objects we see when we look up at night may, or may not, lie in our 4-dimensional hyperplane. Real space has ''n'' dimensions as [[w:Hermann_Grassmann|Grassmann]] and [[w:Schläfli|Schläfli]] showed, and we do not know how many dimensions the most distant objects we see may be distributed in. They need not all lie within the four spatial dimensions in which we have now learned to observe them, any more than they all lie in our local 3-space. When we look up at the objects that surround us, we have no way of discerning how many dimensions beyond three the space we are looking into has. We know their distance from us primarily by virtue of how long it takes their light to reach us. We can measure their distribution around us in 3-space or 4-space, but that is simply how we choose to measure their positions, not an actual finding of how they are distributed. Even if it is now evident that they do not all lie in the same 3-space, how many more dimensions than three are needed to contain them? We observe that our 4-ball galaxy is embedded in Euclidean <math>n</math>-space as one of many 4-ball galaxies, each translating in a distinct direction through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, on more or less divergent paths from each other. But only closer observation will reveal evidence of whether everything we see lies in the same Euclidean 4-space, or if it is distributed in five or more dimensions, and how it is moving there. To remain in agreement with the theory of relativity, the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint requires that all mass-carrying objects be in motion in some distinct direction through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, although the relative velocity between nearby objects is much smaller since they move on similar vectors, aimed away from a common origin point in the past. It is natural to expect that objects moving at constant velocity away from a common origin will be distributed roughly on the surface of an expanding 3-sphere. Although their paths away from their origin are not straight lines but various helical isoclines (screw translation spirals), nearby objects must be translating radially at the same average velocity, since the objects in a system (such as our solar system or galaxy) do not separate rapidly over time but remain in orbital formation. Each system's screw translation has two [[w:Completely_orthogonal|completely orthogonal]] components of motion in 4-space, an orbital rotation (such as the earth's around our sun) and a linear translation of the entire system at velocity <math>c</math> in the direction of the original 3-sphere's radial expansion (along the system's proper time vector). Of course the view from our solar system does not suggest that the 3-sphere enclosing each galaxy is expanding at this great rate from its galactic center. The standard theory has been that the entire observable universe is expanding from a single big bang origin in time, with galaxies forming later. While the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint lends itself to that standard theory, it also supports theories which require no single origin point in space and time. These are the voyages of starship Earth, to boldly go where no one has gone before. We made the jump to light speed long ago, in whatever big bang our atoms emerged from, and have never slowed down since. == Origins of the theory == Einstein himself may have been the first to imagine the universe as the three-dimensional surface of a four-dimensional Euclidean 3-sphere, in what was narrowly the first written articulation of a Euclidean 4-space universe, contemporaneous with the teen-aged Coxeter's (quoted below).{{Efn|[[W:William Rowan Hamilton|Hamilton]]'s algebra '''H''' of [[W:Quaternions|quaternions]] introduces (in 1843) the notion of a [[W:Three-dimensional sphere|three-dimensional sphere]] embedded in a four-dimensional space, but Hamilton did not quite conceive of the quaternions as the Cartesian 4-coordinates of a Euclidean 4-space, and he did not describe our ordinary 3-space as embedded in Euclidean 4-space.}} Einstein did this as a [[W:Gedankenexperiment|gedankenexperiment]] in the context of investigating whether his equations of general relativity predicted an infinite or a finite universe, in his 1921 Princeton lecture.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/36276|title=The Meaning of Relativity|last=Einstein|first=Albert|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=1923|isbn=|location=|pages=110-111}}</ref> He invited us to imagine "A spherical manifold of three dimensions, embedded in a Euclidean continuum of four dimensions", but he was careful to disclaim parenthetically that "The aid of a fourth space dimension has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice." Informally, the Euclidean 4-dimensional theory of relativity may be given as a sort of reciprocal to that disclaimer of Einstein's: ''The Minkowski spacetime has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice, as an aid to understanding how things will appear to an observer from their perspective; the foreshortenings, clock desynchronizations and other Lorentz transformations it predicts are proper calculations of actual perspective effects; but real space is a flat, Euclidean continuum of four orthogonal spatial dimensions, and in it the ordinary laws of a flat vector space hold (such as the Pythagorean theorem), and all sightline calculations work classically, so long as you consider all four spatial dimensions.'' The Euclidean theory of relativity differs from the special theory of relativity in ascribing to the physical universe a geometry of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions, rather than the special theory's [[w:Minkowski spacetime|Minkowski spacetime]] geometry, in which three spatial dimensions and a time dimension comprise a unified non-Euclidean spacetime of four dimensions. Anco and Maghadam found that <math>SO(4)</math> breaks to <math>\mathbb{S}^3</math> (the 3-sphere) if the energy in a Kepler orbit is negative (an elliptical orbit), and to <math>H^3</math> (Minkowski spacetime) if the energy is positive (a hyperbolic orbit). Therefore the fact that the planets orbit on ellipses in our 3-space suggests that they orbit on a 3-sphere embedded in Euclidean 4-space. Thus we can conclude that <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> is the actual geometry of our physical universe, and Minkowski spacetime is an abstraction of it; the reciprocal of Einstein's disclaimer is the more direct physical model. Of course spacetime remains a true and useful abstraction, although it must relinquish its privileged position as our exclusive conception of our place in space.{{Efn| ...origins of the Euclidean 4-space insight in the observations of Fock, Atkinson, Moser and others.}} The invention of Euclidean geometry of more than three spatial dimensions preceded Einstein's theories by more than fifty years, when it was worked out originally by the Swiss mathematician [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] before 1853.{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|loc=§7. Ordinary Polytopes in Higher Space; §7.x. Historical remarks|pp=141-144|ps=; "Practically all the ideas in this chapter ... are due to Schläfli, who discovered them before 1853 — a time when Cayley, Grassmann and Möbius were the only other people who had ever conceived the possibility of geometry in more than three dimensions."}} Schläfli extended Euclid's geometry of one, two, and three dimensions in a direct way to four or more dimensions, generalizing the rules and terms of [[w:Euclidean geometry|Euclidean geometry]] to spaces of any number of dimensions. He coined the general term ''[[polyscheme]]'' to mean geometric forms of any number of dimensions, including two-dimensional [[w:polygon|polygons]], three-dimensional [[w:polyhedron|polyhedra]], four dimensional [[w:polychoron|polychora]], and so on, and in the process he found all of the [[w:Regular polytope|regular polyschemes]] that are possible in every dimension, including in particular the [[User:Dc.samizdat/Rotations#Sequence of regular 4-polytopes|six convex regular polychora]] which can be constructed in a Euclidean space of four dimensions (the set analogous to the five [[w:Platonic solid|Platonic solids]] the ancients found in three dimensional space). Thus Schläfli was the first to explore the fourth dimension, reveal its emergent geometric properties, and discover its astonishing regular objects. Because his work was only published posthumously in 1901, and remained almost completely unknown until Coxeter published [[w:Regular_Polytopes_(book)|Regular Polytopes]] in 1947, other researchers had more than fifty years to rediscover the regular polychora, and competing terms were coined; today [[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s word ''[[w:Polytope|polytope]]'' is the commonly used term for ''polyscheme.''{{Efn|[[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s German word ''polytop'' was introduced into English by [[W:Alicia Boole Stott|Alicia Boole Stott]], who like Hoppe and [[W:Thorold Gosset|Thorold Gosset]] rediscovered Schlafli's six regular convex 4-polytopes, with no knowledge of their prior discovery. Today Schläfli's original ''polyschem'', with its echo of ''schema'' as in the configurations of information structures, seems even more fitting in its generality than ''polytope'' -- perhaps analogously as information software (programming) is even more general than information hardware (computers).}} Because of this century-long lag in the dissemination of a scientific discovery, the regular 4-polytopes appear to have played no role at all, by any name, in the twentieth century discovery and evolution of the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics.{{Efn|One could argue that the higher-dimensional polytopes have barely influenced science or culture at all thus far. The physicist John Edward Huth's comprehensive deep dive through the history of cultural and scientific concepts of physical space, from ancient flatland models of the world through general relativity and quantum mechancs, shows exactly how we got to our present standard model of the universe, although it includes no mention of higher-dimensional Euclidean space.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Huth|first=John Edward|title=A Sense of Space: A local's guide to a flat earth, the edge of the cosmos, and other curious places|year=2025|publisher=University of Chicago Press}}</ref>}} == Boundaries == <blockquote>Ever since we discovered that Earth is round and turns like a mad-spinning top, we have understood that reality is not as it appears to us: every time we glimpse a new aspect of it, it is a deeply emotional experience. Another veil has fallen.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Carlo Rovelli|author-link=W:Carlo Rovelli|title=Seven Brief Lessons on Physics|publisher=Riverhead|year=2016|isbn=978-0399184413}}</ref></blockquote> Of course it is strange to consciously contemplate this world we inhabit, our planet, our solar system, our 3-sphere surface in our vast galaxy, as the merest film, a boundary no thicker in the places we inhabit than the diameter of an electron (though much thicker in some places we cannot inhabit, such as the planet's core and the interior of stars). But is not our unconscious traditional concept of the boundary of our world even stranger? Since the enlightenment we are accustomed to thinking that there is nothing beyond three dimensional space: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But anyone who knows the [[polyscheme]]s Schläfli discovered knows that space can have any number of dimensions, and that there are fundamental objects and motions to be discovered in four dimensions that are even more various and interesting than those we can discover in three. The strange thing, when we think about it that way, is that there ''is'' a boundary between three and four dimensional space. ''Why'' can't we move (or apparently, see) in more than three dimensions? Why is our physical world apparently only three dimensional? Why would it have just ''three'' dimensions, and not four, or five, or the ''n'' dimensions that Schläfli mapped? What is the nature of the boundary which confines us to just three dimensions? We know that in Euclidean geometry the boundary between three and four dimensions is itself a spherical three dimensional space, so we should suspect that we are materially confined within such a curved boundary surface. Light need not be confined with us within our three dimensional boundary space. We would look directly through four dimensional space in our natural way, by receiving light signals that travelled through it to us on straight lines. In that case the reason we do not observe a fourth spatial dimension in our vicinity is that there are no nearby objects in it, just off our hyperplane in the wild. The nearest 4-ball object we can see with our eyes is our sun, which lies equatorially in our own hyperplane, though it bulges out of it above and below. But when we look up at the heavens, every pinprick of light we observe is itself a four-dimensional object off our hyperplane, and they are distributed all around us in four-dimensional space through which we gaze. We are four-dimensionally sighted creatures, even though our bodies are three-dimensional objects, thin as an atom in the fourth dimension. But that should not perplex us: we can see into three dimensional space even though our retinas are two dimensional objects, thin as a photoreceptor cell. Our unconscious provincial concept is that there is nothing else outside our three dimensional world: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But Schläfli discovered something else: all the astonishing regular objects that exist in higher dimensions, which vastly extend our notions of the beauty and mystery of space itself, and the intrinsic spatial symmetries of our universe which geometry reveals. Space is more commodious than we thought it was, and permits previously unimagined objects and motions. So our provincial conception of our place in it now has the same kind of status as our idea that the sun rises in the east and passes overhead: it is mere appearance, not a true model and no longer a proper explanation. An inertial boundary is a proper explanation, be it ever so thin. And would a boundary of ''no'' thickness, a mere abstraction with no physical power to separate, be a more suitable explanation? We must look for a physically powerful explanation in the geometry of space itself, which general relativity properly associates with the gravitational or inertial force. <blockquote>The number of dimensions possessed by a figure is the number of straight lines each perpendicular to all the others which can be drawn on it. Thus a point has no dimensions, a straight line one, a plane surface two, and a solid three .... In space as we now know it only three lines can be imagined perpendicular to each other. A fourth line, perpendicular to all the other three would be quite invisible and unimaginable to us. We ourselves and all the material things around us probably possess a fourth dimension, of which we are quite unaware. If not, from a four-dimensional point of view we are mere geometrical abstractions, like geometrical surfaces, lines, and points are to us. But this thickness in the fourth dimension must be exceedingly minute, if it exists at all. That is, we could only draw an exceedingly small line perpendicular to our three perpendicular lines, length, breadth and thickness, so small that no microscope could ever perceive it. We can find out something about the conditions of the fourth and higher dimensions if they exist, without being certain that they do exist, by a process which I have termed "Dimensional Analogy."<ref>{{Citation|title=Dimensional Analogy|last=Coxeter|first=Donald|date=February 1923|publisher=Coxeter Fonds, University of Toronto Archives|authorlink=W:Harold Scott MacDonald Coxeter|series=|postscript=|work=}}</ref></blockquote> I believe, but I cannot prove, that we live in real space, which is Schläfli's Euclidean space of ''n'' analogous dimensions. As Grassmann showed first, space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. There will always be higher dimensions to discover, first in imagination and then to explore physically, each an astonishing new enlightenment.<ref>{{Cite book|first=T.S.|last=Eliot|title=Little Gidding|volume=Four Quartets|year=1943}}<blockquote> :We shall not cease from exploration :And the end of all our exploring :Will be to arrive where we started :And know the place for the first time. :Through the unknown, remembered gate :When the last of earth left to discover :Is that which was the beginning; :At the source of the longest river :The voice of the hidden waterfall :And the children in the apple-tree :Not known, because not looked for :But heard, half-heard, in the stillness :Between two waves of the sea. </blockquote></ref> Schläfli discovered every regular convex polytope that exists in any dimension, but that was only the beginning of the story of dimensional analogy, not its end or even the end of its beginning. That project is forever beginning anew. Coxeter discovered that Schläfli's Euclidean space is an expression of intrinsic symmetries, as Noether discovered all of physics is. Kappraff and Adamson discovered that even the sequences of humble regular polygons have fractal complexity, so symmetry itself is chaotic, always reachable but forever beyond our complete grasp. We are on a wilderness project, and just at its beginning, but already we observe a Euclidean space of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions in which all objects with mass move ceaselessly at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate at which everything moves, quantum events occur, and each of our proper times evolves. I believe these facts explain the experimentally verified theories of relativity and quantum mechanics, by revealing their unified polycentric geometry, the same way the facts about Copernicus's heliocentric solar system explained the observed motions of the planets, by revealing the geometry of gravity to Kepler. But others will have to do the math, work out the physics, and perform experiments to prove or disprove all of this, because I don't have the mathematics; entirely unlike Coxeter and Einstein, I am illiterate in those languages. <blockquote> ::::::BEECH :Where my imaginary line :Bends square in woods, an iron spine :And pile of real rocks have been founded. :And off this corner in the wild, :Where these are driven in and piled, :One tree, by being deeply wounded, :Has been impressed as Witness Tree :And made commit to memory :My proof of being not unbounded. :Thus truth's established and borne out, :Though circumstanced with dark and doubt— :Though by a world of doubt surrounded. :::::::—''The Moodie Forester''<ref>{{Cite book|title=A Witness Tree|last=Frost|first=Robert|year=1942|series=The Poetry of Robert Frost|publisher=Holt, Rinehart and Winston|edition=1969|}}</ref> </blockquote> == Appendix: Sequence of regular 4-polytopes == {{Regular convex 4-polytopes|wiki=W:|columns=7}} == ... == {{Efn|In a ''[[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]] displacement'', also known as an [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], all the Clifford parallel{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} invariant planes are displaced in four orthogonal directions (two completely orthogonal planes) at once: they are rotated by the same angle, and at the same time they are tilted ''sideways'' by that same angle. A [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|Clifford displacement]] is [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensionally diagonal]].{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} Every plane that is Clifford parallel to one of the completely orthogonal planes (including in this case an entire Clifford parallel bundle of 4 hexagons, but not all 16 hexagons) is invariant under the isoclinic rotation: all the points in the plane rotate in circles but remain in the plane, even as the whole plane tilts sideways. All 16 hexagons rotate by the same angle (though only 4 of them do so invariantly). All 16 hexagons are rotated by 60 degrees, and also displaced sideways by 60 degrees to a Clifford parallel hexagon. All of the other central polygons (e.g. squares) are also displaced to a Clifford parallel polygon 60 degrees away.|name=Clifford displacement}} {{Efn|It is not difficult to visualize four hexagonal planes intersecting at 60 degrees to each other, even in three dimensions. Four hexagonal central planes intersect at 60 degrees in the [[W:cuboctahedron|cuboctahedron]]. Four of the 24-cell's 16 hexagonal central planes (lying in the same 3-dimensional hyperplane) intersect at each of the 24-cell's vertices exactly the way they do at the center of a cuboctahedron. But the ''edges'' around the vertex do not meet as the radii do at the center of a cuboctahedron; the 24-cell has 8 edges around each vertex, not 12, so its vertex figure is the cube, not the cuboctahedron. The 8 edges meet exactly the way 8 edges do at the apex of a canonical [[W:cubic pyramid]|cubic pyramid]].{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}}|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} {{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} {{Efn|Eight {{sqrt|1}} edges converge in curved 3-dimensional space from the corners of the 24-cell's cubical vertex figure{{Efn|The [[W:vertex figure|vertex figure]] is the facet which is made by truncating a vertex; canonically, at the mid-edges incident to the vertex. But one can make similar vertex figures of different radii by truncating at any point along those edges, up to and including truncating at the adjacent vertices to make a ''full size'' vertex figure. Stillwell defines the vertex figure as "the convex hull of the neighbouring vertices of a given vertex".{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=17}} That is what serves the illustrative purpose here.|name=full size vertex figure}} and meet at its center (the vertex), where they form 4 straight lines which cross there. The 8 vertices of the cube are the eight nearest other vertices of the 24-cell. The straight lines are geodesics: two {{sqrt|1}}-length segments of an apparently straight line (in the 3-space of the 24-cell's curved surface) that is bent in the 4th dimension into a great circle hexagon (in 4-space). Imagined from inside this curved 3-space, the bends in the hexagons are invisible. From outside (if we could view the 24-cell in 4-space), the straight lines would be seen to bend in the 4th dimension at the cube centers, because the center is displaced outward in the 4th dimension, out of the hyperplane defined by the cube's vertices. Thus the vertex cube is actually a [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]]. Unlike a cube, it seems to be radially equilateral (like the tesseract and the 24-cell itself): its "radius" equals its edge length.{{Efn|The vertex cubic pyramid is not actually radially equilateral,{{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} because the edges radiating from its apex are not actually its radii: the apex of the [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]] is not actually its center, just one of its vertices.}}|name=24-cell vertex figure}} {{Efn|The hexagons are inclined (tilted) at 60 degrees with respect to the unit radius coordinate system's orthogonal planes. Each hexagonal plane contains only ''one'' of the 4 coordinate system axes.{{Efn|Each great hexagon of the 24-cell contains one axis (one pair of antipodal vertices) belonging to each of the three inscribed 16-cells. The 24-cell contains three disjoint inscribed 16-cells, rotated 60° isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other (so their corresponding vertices are 120° {{=}} {{radic|3}} apart). A [[16-cell#Coordinates|16-cell is an orthonormal ''basis'']] for a 4-dimensional coordinate system, because its 8 vertices define the four orthogonal axes. In any choice of a vertex-up coordinate system (such as the unit radius coordinates used in this article), one of the three inscribed 16-cells is the basis for the coordinate system, and each hexagon has only ''one'' axis which is a coordinate system axis.|name=three basis 16-cells}} The hexagon consists of 3 pairs of opposite vertices (three 24-cell diameters): one opposite pair of ''integer'' coordinate vertices (one of the four coordinate axes), and two opposite pairs of ''half-integer'' coordinate vertices (not coordinate axes). For example: {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}1,{{spaces|2}}0) {{indent|5}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|5}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,–1,{{spaces|2}}0)<br> is a hexagon on the ''y'' axis. Unlike the {{sqrt|2}} squares, the hexagons are actually made of 24-cell edges, so they are visible features of the 24-cell.|name=non-orthogonal hexagons|group=}} {{Efn|Visualize the three [[16-cell]]s inscribed in the 24-cell (left, right, and middle), and the rotation which takes them to each other. [[24-cell#Reciprocal constructions from 8-cell and 16-cell|The vertices of the middle 16-cell lie on the (w, x, y, z) coordinate axes]];{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} the other two are rotated 60° [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinically]] to its left and its right. The 24-vertex 24-cell is a compound of three 16-cells, whose three sets of 8 vertices are distributed around the 24-cell symmetrically; each vertex is surrounded by 8 others (in the 3-dimensional space of the 4-dimensional 24-cell's ''surface''), the way the vertices of a cube surround its center.{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}} The 8 surrounding vertices (the cube corners) lie in other 16-cells: 4 in the other 16-cell to the left, and 4 in the other 16-cell to the right. They are the vertices of two tetrahedra inscribed in the cube, one belonging (as a cell) to each 16-cell. If the 16-cell edges are {{radic|2}}, each vertex of the compound of three 16-cells is {{radic|1}} away from its 8 surrounding vertices in other 16-cells. Now visualize those {{radic|1}} distances as the edges of the 24-cell (while continuing to visualize the disjoint 16-cells). The {{radic|1}} edges form great hexagons of 6 vertices which run around the 24-cell in a central plane. ''Four'' hexagons cross at each vertex (and its antipodal vertex), inclined at 60° to each other.{{Efn|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} The [[24-cell#Hexagons|hexagons]] are not perpendicular to each other, or to the 16-cells' perpendicular [[24-cell#Squares|square central planes]].{{Efn|name=non-orthogonal hexagons}} The left and right 16-cells form a tesseract.{{Efn|Each pair of the three 16-cells inscribed in the 24-cell forms a 4-dimensional [[W:tesseract|hypercube (a tesseract or 8-cell)]], in [[24-cell#Relationships among interior polytopes|dimensional analogy]] to the way two tetrahedra form a cube: the two 8-vertex 16-cells are inscribed in the 16-vertex tesseract, occupying its alternate vertices. The third 16-cell does not lie within the tesseract; its 8 vertices protrude from the sides of the tesseract, forming a cubic pyramid on each of the tesseract's cubic cells. The three pairs of 16-cells form three tesseracts.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} The tesseracts share vertices, but the 16-cells are completely disjoint.{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}}|name=three 16-cells form three tesseracts}} Two 16-cells have vertex-pairs which are one {{radic|1}} edge (one hexagon edge) apart. But a [[24-cell#Simple rotations|''simple'' rotation]] of 60° will not take one whole 16-cell to another 16-cell, because their vertices are 60° apart in different directions, and a simple rotation has only one hexagonal plane of rotation. One 16-cell ''can'' be taken to another 16-cell by a 60° [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|''isoclinic'' rotation]], because an isoclinic rotation is [[3-sphere]] symmetric: four [[24-cell#Clifford parallel polytopes|Clifford parallel hexagonal planes]] rotate together, but in four different rotational directions,{{Efn|name=Clifford displacement}} taking each 16-cell to another 16-cell. But since an isoclinic 60° rotation is a ''diagonal'' rotation by 60° in ''two'' completely orthogonal directions at once,{{Efn|name=isoclinic geodesic}} the corresponding vertices of the 16-cell and the 16-cell it is taken to are 120° apart: ''two'' {{radic|1}} hexagon edges (or one {{radic|3}} hexagon chord) apart, not one {{radic|1}} edge (60°) apart as in a simple rotation.{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} By the [[W:chiral|chiral]] diagonal nature of isoclinic rotations, the 16-cell ''cannot'' reach the adjacent 16-cell by rotating toward it; it can only reach the 16-cell ''beyond'' it. But of course, the 16-cell beyond the 16-cell to its right is the 16-cell to its left. So a 60° isoclinic rotation ''will'' take every 16-cell to another 16-cell: a 60° ''right'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we may have originally visualized as the ''left'' 16-cell, and a 60° ''left'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we visualized as the ''right'' 16-cell. (If so, that was our error in visualization; the 16-cell to the "left" is in fact the one reached by the left isoclinic rotation, as that is the only sense in which the two 16-cells are left or right of each other.)|name=three isoclinic 16-cells}} {{Efn|In a double rotation each vertex can be said to move along two completely orthogonal great circles at the same time, but it does not stay within the central plane of either of those original great circles; rather, it moves along a helical geodesic that traverses diagonally between great circles. The two completely orthogonal planes of rotation are said to be ''invariant'' because the points in each stay in the plane ''as the plane moves'', tilting sideways by the same angle that the other plane rotates.|name=helical geodesic}} {{Efn|A point under isoclinic rotation traverses the diagonal{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} straight line of a single '''isoclinic geodesic''', reaching its destination directly, instead of the bent line of two successive '''simple geodesics'''. A '''[[W:geodesic|geodesic]]''' is the ''shortest path'' through a space (intuitively, a string pulled taught between two points). Simple geodesics are great circles lying in a central plane (the only kind of geodesics that occur in 3-space on the 2-sphere). Isoclinic geodesics are different: they do ''not'' lie in a single plane; they are 4-dimensional [[W:helix|spirals]] rather than simple 2-dimensional circles.{{Efn|name=helical geodesic}} But they are not like 3-dimensional [[W:screw threads|screw threads]] either, because they form a closed loop like any circle (after ''two'' revolutions). Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'', and they are just as circular as 2-dimensional circles: in fact, twice as circular, because they curve in a circle in two completely orthogonal directions at once.{{Efn|Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'' in the sense that they are 1-dimensional geodesic ''lines'' that curve in 4-space in two completely orthogonal planes at once. They should not be confused with ''great 2-spheres'',{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=24}} which are the 4-dimensional analogues of 2-dimensional great circles (great 1-spheres).}} These '''isoclines''' are geodesic 1-dimensional lines embedded in a 4-dimensional space. On the 3-sphere{{Efn|All isoclines are geodesics, and isoclines on the 3-sphere are circles (curving equally in each dimension), but not all isoclines on 3-manifolds in 4-space are circles.}} they always occur in [[W:chiral|chiral]] pairs and form a pair of [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]s on the [[W:Clifford torus|Clifford torus]],{{Efn|Isoclines on the 3-sphere occur in non-intersecting chiral pairs. A left and a right isocline form a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]] called the {1,1} torus knot{{Sfn|Dorst|2019|loc=§1. Villarceau Circles|p=44|ps=; "In mathematics, the path that the (1, 1) knot on the torus traces is also known as a [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]. Villarceau circles are usually introduced as two intersecting circles that are the cross-section of a torus by a well-chosen plane cutting it. Picking one such circle and rotating it around the torus axis, the resulting family of circles can be used to rule the torus. By nesting tori smartly, the collection of all such circles then form a [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fibration]].... we prefer to consider the Villarceau circle as the (1, 1) torus knot [a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]] rather than as a planar cut [two intersecting circles]."}} in which ''each'' of the two linked circles traverses all four dimensions.}} the paths of the left and the right [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Double rotations|isoclinic rotation]]. They are [[W:Helix|helices]] bent into a [[W:Möbius strip|Möbius loop]] in the fourth dimension, taking a diagonal [[W:Winding number|winding route]] twice around the 3-sphere through the non-adjacent vertices of a 4-polytope's [[W:Skew polygon#Regular skew polygons in four dimensions|skew polygon]].|name=isoclinic geodesic}} {{Efn|[[File:Hopf band wikipedia.png|thumb|150px|Two [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles spanned by a twisted [[W:Annulus (mathematics)|annulus]].]][[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]]s are non-intersecting curved lines that are parallel in the sense that the perpendicular (shortest) distance between them is the same at each point. A double helix is an example of Clifford parallelism in ordinary 3-dimensional Euclidean space. In 4-space Clifford parallels occur as geodesic great circles on the [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]].{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|pp=8-10|loc=Relations to Clifford Parallelism}} Whereas in 3-dimensional space, any two geodesic great circles on the [[W:2-sphere|2-sphere]] will always intersect at two antipodal points, in 4-dimensional space not all great circles intersect. In 4-polytopes various discrete sets of Clifford parallel non-intersecting geodesic great circles can be found on the 3-sphere. They spiral around each other in [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fiber bundles]] which visit all the vertices just once. The simplest example is that six mutually orthogonal great circles can be drawn on the 3-sphere, as three pairs of completely orthogonal great circles, intersecting at 8 points defining a [[16-cell]]. Each completely orthogonal pair of circles is Clifford parallel. They cannot intersect at all, because they lie in planes which intersect at only one point: the center of the 16-cell. Because they are perpendicular and share a common center, the two circles are obviously not parallel and separate in the usual way of parallel circles in 3 dimensions; rather they are connected like adjacent links in a chain, each passing through the other without intersecting at any points, forming a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]|name=Clifford parallels}} {{Efn|In the 24-cell each great square plane is completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to another great square plane, and each great hexagon plane is completely orthogonal to a plane which intersects only two vertices: a great [[W:digon|digon]] plane.|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} {{Efn|In an [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], each point anywhere in the 4-polytope moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions at once, on a [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensional diagonal]]. The point is displaced a total [[W:Pythagorean distance]] equal to the square root of four times the square of that distance. For example, when the unit-radius 24-cell rotates isoclinically 60° in a hexagon invariant plane and 60° in its completely orthogonal invariant plane,{{Efn|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} all vertices are displaced to a vertex two edge lengths away. Each vertex is displaced to another vertex {{radic|3}} (120°) away, moving {{radic|3/4}} in four orthogonal coordinate directions.|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} {{Efn|Each square plane is isoclinic (Clifford parallel) to five other square planes but completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to only one of them.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Every pair of completely orthogonal planes has Clifford parallel great circles, but not all Clifford parallel great circles are orthogonal (e.g., none of the hexagonal geodesics in the 24-cell are mutually orthogonal).|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}} {{Efn|In the [[16-cell#Rotations|16-cell]] the 6 orthogonal great squares form 3 pairs of completely orthogonal great circles; each pair is Clifford parallel. In the 24-cell, the 3 inscribed 16-cells lie rotated 60 degrees isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other; consequently their corresponding vertices are 120 degrees apart on a hexagonal great circle. Pairing their vertices which are 90 degrees apart reveals corresponding square great circles which are Clifford parallel. Each of the 18 square great circles is Clifford parallel not only to one other square great circle in the same 16-cell (the completely orthogonal one), but also to two square great circles (which are completely orthogonal to each other) in each of the other two 16-cells. (Completely orthogonal great circles are Clifford parallel, but not all Clifford parallels are orthogonal.{{Efn|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}}) A 60 degree isoclinic rotation of the 24-cell in hexagonal invariant planes takes each square great circle to a Clifford parallel (but non-orthogonal) square great circle in a different 16-cell.|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} {{Efn|In 4 dimensional space we can construct 4 perpendicular axes and 6 perpendicular planes through a point. Without loss of generality, we may take these to be the axes and orthogonal central planes of a (w, x, y, z) Cartesian coordinate system. In 4 dimensions we have the same 3 orthogonal planes (xy, xz, yz) that we have in 3 dimensions, and also 3 others (wx, wy, wz). Each of the 6 orthogonal planes shares an axis with 4 of the others, and is ''completely orthogonal'' to just one of the others: the only one with which it does not share an axis. Thus there are 3 pairs of completely orthogonal planes: xy and wz intersect only at the origin; xz and wy intersect only at the origin; yz and wx intersect only at the origin.|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} {{Efn|Two planes in 4-dimensional space can have four possible reciprocal positions: (1) they can coincide (be exactly the same plane); (2) they can be parallel (the only way they can fail to intersect at all); (3) they can intersect in a single line, as two non-parallel planes do in 3-dimensional space; or (4) '''they can intersect in a single point'''{{Efn|To visualize how two planes can intersect in a single point in a four dimensional space, consider the Euclidean space (w, x, y, z) and imagine that the w dimension represents time rather than a spatial dimension. The xy central plane (where w{{=}}0, z{{=}}0) shares no axis with the wz central plane (where x{{=}}0, y{{=}}0). The xy plane exists at only a single instant in time (w{{=}}0); the wz plane (and in particular the w axis) exists all the time. Thus their only moment and place of intersection is at the origin point (0,0,0,0).|name=how planes intersect at a single point}} (and they ''must'', if they are completely orthogonal).{{Efn|Two flat planes A and B of a Euclidean space of four dimensions are called ''completely orthogonal'' if and only if every line in A is orthogonal to every line in B. In that case the planes A and B intersect at a single point O, so that if a line in A intersects with a line in B, they intersect at O.{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}}|name=completely orthogonal planes}}|name=how planes intersect}} {{Efn|Polytopes are '''completely disjoint''' if all their ''element sets'' are disjoint: they do not share any vertices, edges, faces or cells. They may still overlap in space, sharing 4-content, volume, area, or lineage.|name=completely disjoint}} {{Efn|If the [[W:Euclidean distance|Pythagorean distance]] between any two vertices is {{sqrt|1}}, their geodesic distance is 1; they may be two adjacent vertices (in the curved 3-space of the surface), or a vertex and the center (in 4-space). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|2}}, their geodesic distance is 2 (whether via 3-space or 4-space, because the path along the edges is the same straight line with one 90^o bend in it as the path through the center). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|3}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 (whether on a hexagonal great circle past one 60^o bend, or as a straight line with one 60^o bend in it through the center). Finally, if their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|4}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 in 4-space (straight through the center), but it reaches 3 in 3-space (by going halfway around a hexagonal great circle).|name=Geodesic distance}} {{Efn|Two angles are required to fix the relative positions of two planes in 4-space.{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|p=7|loc=§6 Angles between two Planes in 4-Space|ps=; "In four (and higher) dimensions, we need two angles to fix the relative position between two planes. (More generally, ''k'' angles are defined between ''k''-dimensional subspaces.)"}} Since all planes in the same [[W:hyperplane|hyperplane]] are 0 degrees apart in one of the two angles, only one angle is required in 3-space. Great hexagons in different hyperplanes are 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles. Great squares in different hyperplanes are 90 degrees apart in ''both'' angles (completely orthogonal){{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} or 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles.{{Efn||name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Planes which are separated by two equal angles are called ''isoclinic''. Planes which are isoclinic have [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} A great square and a great hexagon in different hyperplanes are neither isoclinic nor Clifford parallel; they are separated by a 90 degree angle ''and'' a 60 degree angle.|name=two angles between central planes}} {{Efn|The 24-cell contains 3 distinct 8-cells (tesseracts), rotated 60° isoclinically with respect to each other. The corresponding vertices of two 8-cells are {{radic|3}} (120°) apart. Each 8-cell contains 8 cubical cells, and each cube contains four {{radic|3}} chords (its long diagonals). The 8-cells are not completely disjoint{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}} (they share vertices), but each cube and each {{radic|3}} chord belongs to just one 8-cell. The {{radic|3}} chords joining the corresponding vertices of two 8-cells belong to the third 8-cell.|name=three 8-cells}} {{Efn|Departing from any vertex V₀ in the original great hexagon plane of isoclinic rotation P₀, the first vertex reached V₁ is 120 degrees away along a {{radic|3}} chord lying in a different hexagonal plane P₁. P₁ is inclined to P₀ at a 60° angle.{{Efn|P₀ and P₁ lie in the same hyperplane (the same central cuboctahedron) so their other angle of separation is 0.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}}}} The second vertex reached V₂ is 120 degrees beyond V₁ along a second {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₂ that is Clifford parallel to P₀.{{Efn|P₀ and P₂ are 60° apart in ''both'' angles of separation.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}} Clifford parallel planes are isoclinic (which means they are separated by two equal angles), and their corresponding vertices are all the same distance apart. Although V₀ and V₂ are ''two'' {{radic|3}} chords apart{{Efn|V₀ and V₂ are two {{radic|3}} chords apart on the geodesic path of this rotational isocline, but that is not the shortest geodesic path between them. In the 24-cell, it is impossible for two vertices to be more distant than ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord, unless they are antipodal vertices {{radic|4}} apart.{{Efn|name=Geodesic distance}} V₀ and V₂ are ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord apart on some other isocline. More generally, isoclines are geodesics because the distance between their ''adjacent'' vertices is the shortest distance between those two vertices, but a path between two vertices along a geodesic is not always the shortest distance between them (even on ordinary great circle geodesics).}}, P₀ and P₂ are just one {{radic|1}} edge apart (at every pair of ''nearest'' vertices).}} (Notice that V₁ lies in both intersecting planes P₁ and P₂, as V₀ lies in both P₀ and P₁. But P₀ and P₂ have ''no'' vertices in common; they do not intersect.) The third vertex reached V₃ is 120 degrees beyond V₂ along a third {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₃ that is Clifford parallel to P₁. The three {{radic|3}} chords lie in different 8-cells.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} V₀ to V₃ is a 360° isoclinic rotation.|name=360 degree geodesic path visiting 3 hexagonal planes}} {{Sfn|Mamone, Pileio & Levitt|2010|loc=§4.5 Regular Convex 4-Polytopes|pp=1438-1439|ps=; the 24-cell has 1152 symmetry operations (rotations and reflections) as enumerated in Table 2, symmetry group 𝐹₄.}} ==Notes== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Notelist|wiki=W:}} ==Citations== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Reflist|wiki=W:}} ==References== {{Refbegin}} * {{Cite book|title=A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers|last=Thoreau|first=Henry David|author-link=W:Thoreau|publisher=James Munroe and Company|year=1849|isbn=|location=Boston|ref={{SfnRef|Thoreau|1849}}}} * {{Cite journal|title=Theoretical Evidence for Principles of Special Relativity Based on Isotropic and Uniform Four-Dimensional Space|first=Takuya|last=Yamashita|date=25 May 2023|doi= 10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|journal=Preprints|volume=2023|issue=2023051785|url=https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|ref={{SfnRef|Yamashita|2023}}}} * {{Cite_arXiv | arxiv=2512.02903v2 | date=2 January 2026 | title=Symmetry transformation group arising from the Laplace–Runge–Lenz vector | first1=Stephen C. | last1=Anco | first2=Mahdieh Gol Bashmani | last2=Moghadam | class=math-ph}} === [[Polyscheme|Polyschemes]] === {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Refs|wiki=W:}} {{Refend}} l2fm0ba0xlmlve49kd44hq0bhx6436u 2842416 2842394 2026-10-24T04:54:16Z Dc.samizdat 2856930 /* Quantum mechanics is the atomic rotational kinematics of Coxeter groups */ 2842416 wikitext text/x-wiki {{align|center|David Brooks Christie}} {{align|center|dc@samizdat.org}} {{align|center|Draft in progress}} {{align|center|June 2023 - October 2026}} <blockquote>'''Abstract:''' The physical universe is properly visualized as real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are 4-polytopes, small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are 4-balls of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. We ourselves and the objects we observe near us are only 3-dimensional, but nonetheless we can see into four dimensions of space. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. Light from them reaches us directly, on straight lines through 4-space. This view of the observed universe is compatible with special and general relativity, and with quantum mechanics. It furnishes those theories with an explanatory geometric model.</blockquote> == Summary == We observe that: * Physical space has four perpendicular dimensions, not just three. * Atoms are [[W:4-polytope|4-polytopes]]. * The sun is a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]] that is round in four dimensions. * Everything of intermediate size between an atom and a star, including us and our planet, lies in a 3-dimensional manifold of ordinary space. * Our entire 3-space manifold is moving through Euclidean 4-space at the speed of light, in a direction perpendicular to its three interior dimensions. * Special relativity describes the linear motion of objects and light signals in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * General relativity describes the rotational motion of objects with mass in four-dimensional Euclidean space. * Quantum mechanics describes the symmetry group actions of elementary geometric objects (4-polytopes) in four-dimensional Euclidean space. == A theory of the Euclidean cosmos == The physical universe is properly visualized as [[w:Four-dimensional_space|real Euclidean space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>]] of four orthogonal spatial dimensions. Space itself has a fourth perpendicular dimension, of which we are unaware in ordinary life. Atoms are [[w:4-polytope|4-polytopes]], small round 4-dimensional objects, and stars are [[W:4-ball|4-balls]] of atomic plasma, large round 4-dimensional objects. Objects intermediate in size between atoms and stars, including molecules, people, and planetery surfaces their surface, are so flat as to be essentially 3-dimensional, having only the thickness of an atom in the orthogonal fourth dimension. All objects with mass move inertially through Euclidean 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math> as long as they exist, and acceleration only varies their direction. Objects moving in the same direction are in the same inertial reference frame. Their direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> is their proper time dimension, simply because their direction and velocity of motion through time is the same as their direction and velocity of motion through space. A typical galaxy such as ours occupies a 4-ball of mostly empty space, with stars and other objects distributed non-uniformly within it. The galaxy's orbital center may be nothing: a smaller 4-ball of empty space they surround. The stars in our spiral galaxy appear from our accustomed point of view to occupy a disk-like region of 3-dimensional space, with a denser ball-like center, but they are not so confined: they are distributed within a region of 4-dimensional space. The disk and ball have thickness not only in the third dimension, but in the fourth spatial dimension as well. Light from stars and galaxies reaches us on straight lines through Euclidean 4-space, so from our viewpoint, in what we have always imagined to be a 3-space universe, we look into the surrounding 4-space. Although we are physically confined within a 3-dimensional hyperplane by the inertia of our motion through 4-space at constant velocity <math>c</math>, light signals are not so confined, so we observe all the cosmological objects surrounding us, both in and above or below our hyperplane, without perceiving their separation in our fourth orthogonal dimension, the direction of our motion. We may perceive a galaxy as elliptical when it is actually spherical, because that is how its image projects from its 4-ball shape into a 3-ball region in our hyperplane, where we measure it with our 3-dimensional bodies. More generally, orbits are circular in 4-space, but elliptical in the 3-space of their elliptic hyperplane. The galaxy as a whole, or more properly its orbital barycenter, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, in a distinct direction orthogonal to all three dimensions of our ordinary proper 3-space. Stars within the galaxy are translating with it at the same velocity <math>c</math> in the same direction, but on spiral trajectories as they pursue their various orbits within the galaxy. The galaxy as a whole occupies a 4-ball within its proper inertial reference frame (that is, in the moving frame of reference in which the galaxy considers itself to be a stationary rotating 4-ball). Over time, the galaxy 4-ball occupies a 4-dimensional cylinder and progresses along the cylinder's axis at velocity <math>c</math>. In this more universal inertial reference frame, the stars in the galaxy follow helical geodesic paths through the 4-cylinder; their trajectories are screw-translations through 4-space, the compound of a simple rotation and a completely orthogonal linear translation. The gravitational force and the inertial tendency to follow a geodesic are the same phenomenon, by the equivalence principle. That said, they can be distinguished, and the galaxy is held together primarily by gravity as inertia, not by gravity as attraction to a central mass toward which objects fall in orbit. There is not enough mass in the galaxy to hold it together by attraction, there is just enough to bend the stars' trajectories toward each other, in helical orbits around the galaxy's barycentric axis of motion. It is the tremendous inertial force of stars in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> that holds the cylinder of motion together, not some invisible dark matter. The observed universe as a whole appears to be a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] expanding radially from a central origin point at velocity <math>c</math>, the invariant velocity of mass-carrying objects through 4-space, also the propagation speed of light relative to any moving 3-space manifold, as measured by all observers. A 3-sphere is a hypersphere in Euclidean 4-space, but the enclosing surface of a 3-sphere is a curved, finite 3-space, dimensionally analogous to the surface of the earth which is a curved, finite 2-space. This 3-sphere could be the domain of our visible cosmos, but of course we do not know for certain that all the cosmological objects we observe lie near the surface of our expanding 3-sphere, since it is only our assumption that they must all have originated in the same big bang long ago. Possibly some of the more distant objects we observe did not, and lie elsewhere, outside our big-bang's 3-sphere of outflying matter or even inside its 3-sphere, below its surface. We cannot assume that all objects in the 4-space universe lie near the surface of the same expanding 3-sphere. For all observers, the conjectured big-bang of their origin corresponds not only to a now-distant point in their proper time past, it also corresponds to a distinct now-distant point in 4-dimensional space: the same point in the same Euclidean 4-space for all observers with the same origin. Our big bang had a distinct origin point in real space as well as in real time. More generally, time and Euclidean 4-space can be measured independently, just as time and Euclidean 3-space were measured classically, without the necessity to combine them as spacetime. The same inertial force which holds the galactic cylinder of motion together also confines us physically to an exceedingly thin three-dimensional surface manifold moving through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. All objects in our solar system too small to have their own gravity lie entirely within this thinest three-dimensional manifold, and have only the thickness of an atom in their direction-of-motion fourth dimension. That is why we are 3-dimensional objects ourselves, and why we cannot construct more than three perpendiculars through a single point in our local 3-dimensional space. A spherical region of 4-space is called a [[W:4-ball|4-ball]]. The enclosing surface of a 4-ball of any size is a finite, curved (non-Euclidean) 3-dimensional space called a [[w:3-sphere|3-sphere]]. Our entire big-bang-origin universe appears to be the largest 3-sphere we observe, but each of the cosmological objects within it (including our galaxy and our sun) lies within a smaller 3-sphere shell which bounds it, lying (we assume) on the largest 3-sphere embedded in its surface, like a soap bubble on the surface of a larger soap bubble. All the 3-dimensional surfaces are expanding, as the largest 3-sphere inflates at radial velocity <math>c</math>. We ourselves live within such an expanding 3-dimensional surface, in an infinitesimally curved 3-manifold surface embedded in Euclidean 4-space. That surface is the ordinary 3-dimensional space we experience. The earth and all the planets lie on it. Our solar system is only a small patch on the surface of a dimensionally rounder space, although that surface is not infinite. It is curved, and finite, analogous to the way the 2-dimensional surface of the earth -- once thought to be flat -- is curved and finite. Our solar system occupies a small patch on a filmy 4-dimensional soap-bubble of galactic size rounded by gravity, that is thicker-skinned than the diameter of an atom only in the superdense interior of objects large enough to have significant gravity of their own. Our 3-manifold of ordinary space, as a surface within our moving 4-ball galaxy, is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math> with the galaxy, in a distinct direction orthogonal to the manifold's three orthogonal dimensions of interior space. At every material point in the manifold (at every atom), the translation through 4-space is following a geometric law of motion discovered by Coxeter, that governs the propagation of individual objects through Euclidean space by the actions of their symmetry groups. The solar system's atoms of mass are 4-polytopes that are simultaneously rotating and translating, and as they advance together they define a moving 3-dimensional manifold by their own collective inertia, also called gravity, the property of matter's ceaseless propagation through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate of causality at which quantum events occur, all objects move, and the universe evolves. Any moving 3-dimensional manifold such as ours is an evolving surface boundary that is empty in most places, occupied by single atoms in comparatively fewer places, and occupied by bound complexes of multiple atoms (molecules) in still fewer places. In all these places it is no thicker than one atom in the dimension corresponding to its direction of translation, because molecules are 3-dimensional complexes of atoms that add no thickness to the manifold. In fewer places still it is occupied by large lumps of matter which exert a significant gravitational attraction, such as planets and their satellites. These round gravitational objects are thicker than one atom in their fourth dimension, but not uniformly so. They are disk-like 4-dimensional objects, 3-balls that are flattish in the fourth dimension. They are typically only one atom thick at the 4-disk's sharp edge, but they may be much thicker in the center of the 4-disk, particularly if their gravity is strong enough to give them a core of superdense matter, like the earth's deep core. The moving surface manifold cannot be thicker than one atom at any point unless and until there is enough mass near that point for the force of gravity as attraction to overcome the force of gravity as inertia, allowing atoms to be "heaped up" into larger 4-dimensional objects that form a lump in its moving surface. We have only indirect experience of such 4-dimensional lumps of matter thicker than one atom, since they occur naturally in our vicinity only in regions of superdense matter, such as the core of the earth or the interior of the sun. Deep in the core of the earth under enormous gravitational pressure peculiar states of matter have been observed, defying our understanding of how 3-dimensional crystalline structures behave. That is because they are not 3-dimensional structures, they are 4-dimensional crystals. The earth is a disk-like 4-dimensional object that is thin at its edge but thicker at its sphere-like core, dimensionally analogous to a 3-dimensional flying saucer with a sharp circular edge. The earth's surface that we walk on is an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere), analogous to the circular edge of the flying saucer (a 1-sphere), and on that edge where we live every object we find (including our bodies) is 3-dimensional with only the thickness of an atom in the fourth dimension. We cannot walk on the top or bottom surface of the 4-disk flying saucer because those surfaces are 3-dimensional regions within the earth. The earth's deep core of superdense 4-dimensional matter occupies a spherical region of 4-dimensional space (a 4-ball). The sun is the only entirely spherical 4-ball occurring naturally in our solar system. We refer to the contents of such superdense 4-balls of matter as atomic plasma, and have little experimental knowledge of their internal geometry or processes. We know that the sun burns at its surface 3-sphere and emits radiation, and we know a good deal about those surface processes which are nuclear atomic processes, but we know very little about its interior 4-ball, a dimensionally rounder enclosed space whose existence we did not suspect. Every moving surface boundary of matter in the observed universe is evolving in four dimensions at velocity <math>c</math>. The current location in 4-space of any of its material objects corresponds to the present moment in the proper time of that object's inertial reference frame. The object's direction of movement at velocity <math>c</math> corresponds to its proper time dimension, which is a spiral over time, not a Euclidean (straight-line) dimension, since its direction is changing in its orbit. Objects with mass of all sizes, from subatomic particles to the largest objects observed in the cosmos, are perpetually in inertial rotational motion in some orbit, and simultaneously in inertial translational motion propagating themselves through 4-space, in two completely orthogonal inertial motions each at the constant universal rate of transformation <math>c</math>. Every object with mass moves relative to universal 4-coordinate Euclidean space on its own distinct geodesic spiral, a screw displacement trajectory that is the compound of its two completely orthogonal inertial motions, a rotation and a translation. Objects without mass such as photons lie off such moving surface boundaries of matter from which they were emitted, and their motion is of a different nature. They are in translational motion at velocity <math>c</math> through all four dimensions concurrently, without any rotational component of motion, so they move through 4-space on straight lines at a compound velocity. The propagation speed of light measured on a straight line through Euclidean 4-space is <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, so we can see in four dimensions, even though we are physically confined to a 3-dimensional manifold that is moving at velocity <math>c</math>. For example, we can look across the center of the mostly-empty 4-ball containing our galaxy and see stars in the opposite sides of its concentric 3-sphere orbital surfaces. We have been unaware that when we look up at night we see stars and galaxies, themselves large 4-dimensional objects, distributed all around us in 4-dimensional Euclidean space, and moving through it, like us, at the constant velocity <math>c</math>. They move in the 4-space direction corresponding to their proper time, perpendicular to all three dimensions of their proper 3-space, and generally the farther they are from us the greater the divergence of their direction of motion from our direction of motion: the greater the relative motion between us, and the greater their Hubble redshift. Light from them reaches us directly, propagating on straight lines through 4-space at twice the velocity at which they, and we ourselves, are propagating through 4-space. This physical model of the observed universe is compatible with the theories of special and general relativity, and with the atomic theory of quantum mechanics. It explains those theories geometrically, as expressions of intrinsic symmetries in Euclidean space. == Symmetries == It is common to speak of nature as a web, and so it is, the great web of our physical experiences. Every web must have its root systems somewhere, and nature in this sense must be rooted in the symmetries which underlie physics and geometry, the [[W:Group (mathematics)|mathematics of groups]].{{Sfn|Conway, Burgiel & Goodman-Strauss|2008}} As I understand [[W:Noether's theorem|Noether's theorem]] (which is not mathematically), hers is the deepest meta-theory of nature yet, deeper than [[W:Theory of relativity|Einstein's relativity]] or [[W:Evolution|Darwin's evolution]] or [[W:Euclidean geometry|Euclid's geometry]]. It finds that all fundamental findings in physics are based on conservation laws which can be laid at the doors of distinct [[W:symmetry group |symmetry group]]s. Thus all fundamental systems in physics, as examples [[W:quantum chromodynamics|quantum chromodynamics]] (QCD) the theory of the strong force binding the atomic nucleus and [[W:quantum electrodynamics|quantum electrodynamics]] (QED) the theory of the electromagnetic force, each have a corresponding symmetry [[W:group theory|group theory]] of which they are an expression. [[W:Coxeter group|Coxeter's theory of symmetry groups]] generated by reflections did for geometry what Noether's theorem and Einstein's relativity did for physics. [[W:Coxeter|Coxeter]] showed that Euclidean geometry is based on conservation laws that correspond to distinct symmetry groups, and that their group actions express the principle of relativity. Here is Coxeter's formulation of the motions of objects (their congruent transformations) in an ''n''-dimensional Euclidean space, excerpted:{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|pp=217-218|loc=§12.2 Congruent transformations}} <blockquote>Let <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> denote a rotation, <math>\mathrm{R}</math> a reflection, <math>\mathrm{T}</math> a translation, and let <math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r\mathrm{T}</math> denote a product of several such transformations, all commutative with one another. Then <math>\mathrm{RT}</math> is a glide-reflection (in two or three dimensions), <math>\mathrm{QR}</math> is a rotary-reflection, <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is a screw-displacement, and <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is a double rotation (in four dimensions).<br> Every orthogonal transformation is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r \le n)</math>, the number of dimensions.<br> Transformations involving a translation are also expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + 1 \le n)</math>.<br> For <math>(n = 4)</math> in particular, every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> If we begin with this most elemental [[w:Kinematics|kinematics]] of Coxeter's, and also assume the [[W:Galilean relativity|Galilean principle of relativity]], every displacement in 4-space can be viewed as either a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> or a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, because we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> in a linearly moving (translating) reference frame. Therefore any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>. By the same principle, we can view any <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> as an isoclinic (equi-angled) <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> by proper choice of reference frame.{{Efn|[[W:Arthur Cayley|Cayley]] showed that any rotation in 4-space can be decomposed into two isoclinic rotations, which intuitively we might see follows from the fact that any transformation from one inertial reference frame to another is expressable as a [[W:SO(4)|rotation in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]].|name=Cayley's rotation factorization into two isoclinic reference frame transformations}} Coxeter's relation is thus a mathematical statement of the principle of relativity, on group-theoretic grounds. It correctly captures the limits to [[W:General relativity|general relativity]], in that we can only exchange the translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) for ''one'' of the two rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>). An observer in any inertial reference frame can always measure the presence, direction and velocity of ''one'' rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) up to uncertainty, and can always distinguish the direction of their own proper time translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>). As I understand Coxeter theory (which is not mathematically), the symmetry groups underlying physics seem to have an expression in a [[W:Euclidean space|Euclidean space]] of four [[W:dimension|dimension]]s, that is, they are [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|four-dimensional Euclidean geometry]]. Therefore as I understand that geometry (which is entirely by synthetic methods rather than by Clifford's algebraic methods), the [[W:Atom|atom]] seems to have a distinct Euclidean geometry, such that atoms and their constituent particles are four-dimensional geometric objects (4-polytopes), and nature can be understood in terms of their [[W:group action|group actions]], including centrally their group <math>SO(4)</math> [[W:rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space|rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space]]. The distinct Coxeter symmetry groups have characteristic <math>SO(4)</math> rotational expressions as the [[W:Regular_4-polytope|regular 4-polytopes]]. Their discrete isoclinic rotations are distinguishing properties of fundamental objects in geometry, relativity and quantum mechanics. For example, atoms exhibit <math>SO(4)</math> symmetries of the discrete isoclinic (equi-angled) double rotations (<math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>) of a set of regular 4-polytopes that is characteristic of their [[w:Atomic_number|atomic number]]. == Special relativity describes Euclidean 4-space == <blockquote>Our entire model of the universe is built on symmetries. Some, like isotropy (the laws are the same in all directions), homogeneity (same in all places), and time invariance (same at all times) seem natural enough. Even relativity, the Lorentz Invariance that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, has an elegance to it that makes it seem natural.<ref>{{Cite book|first=Dave|last=Goldberg|title=The Universe in the Rearview Mirror: How Hidden Symmetries Shape Reality|chapter=§10. Hidden Symmetries: Why some symmetries but not others?|year=2013|publisher=Dutton Penguin Group|isbn=978-0-525-95366-1|ref={{SfnRef|Goldberg|2013}}}}</ref></blockquote> Although the Minkowski spacetime of relativity is a non-Euclidean 4-dimensional space,{{Efn|Spacetime is a non-Euclidean (curved) 4-dimensional space because it consists of three orthogonal space dimensions and a time dimension. The time dimension is not orthogonal to the three spatial dimensions; the time coordinate has the opposite sign as the three space coordinates so spacetime is hyperbolic, not a Euclidean (flat) 4-space at all.}} it has been noticed that its 3-dimensional space component could be modeled as a [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]] embedded in 4-dimensional Euclidean (flat) space. That is, we could imagine that the ordinary 3-dimensional space we perceive is the curved 3-dimensional surface of a 4-dimensional ball (since the surface of a 4-ball is a curved 3-dimensional space called a 3-sphere, just as the surface of a 3-ball like the earth is a curved 2-dimensional space called a 2-sphere). This was [[#Origins of the theory|imagined by Einstein]] himself in 1921, as a thought experiment in which he carefully described his fourth orthogonal spatial dimension as merely a mathematical abstraction. Subsequently it was noticed by others (not mainstream physicists) that if physical space were really embedded in Euclidean 4-dimensional space (with our 3-dimensional space embedded in 4-space as some non-Euclidean 3-manifold, not necessarily a 3-sphere), then the Lorentz transformation effects of special relativity (spatial forshortenings and time dilations and so forth) could all be explained by ordinary perspective geometry in 4-dimensional Euclidean space. Special relativity reduces to classical vector space geometry (based on the 4-dimensional version of the Pythagorean theorem), but if and only if every observer is moving through 4-space at a universal constant velocity <math>c</math>, in some 4-space direction.{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} This counter-intuitive alternative geometric model of relativity, which has usually been called [[W:Formulations of special relativity#Euclidean relativity|Euclidean relativity]], is motivated by the fact that in every kind of relativity, but originally in Einstein's special relativity, each observer moves on a vector through a Euclidean four-dimensional space consisting of their three proper spatial dimensions and their proper time dimension, and the Pythagorean vector-sum of their motion through this kind of proper 4-space is always <math>c</math>, as measured by all observers from any inertial reference frame.{{Efn|Each observer is stationary in space in their own proper reference frame, while they move at maximum velocity {{Math|c}} through their own proper time. Observed from another reference frame in relative motion, they appear foreshortened in space in their direction of motion, and their clocks appear to be slowed to less than the maximum velocity {{Math|c}}.}} This is the Lorentz invariant, that allows everyone to observe a constant speed of light, regardless of their motion relative to the light source.{{Efn| ...cite Lewis Epstein's elegant explanation of the Lorentz Invariance as observers moving at constant velocity {{Math|c}} through space and proper time.}} But no physicists have taken the leap of claiming that therefore, our universe is physically [[W:Euclidean geometry#Higher dimensions|this kind of Euclidean 4-space]], and that observers are actually moving through it at velocity <math>c</math>. In physics as it has been universally understood, observers are not supposed to be able to move at velocity <math>c</math>. Their motion takes place in 3-space and in universal coordinate time (in Minkowski spacetime), and the cosmos is considered to be a non-Euclidean 3-space, generally a closed (finite) expanding 3-space, but with only three spatial dimensions, not four. In the Euclidean relativity alternative view, however, every observer is always moving at velocity <math>c</math> through the universe, which is real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. The direction in which they are moving is called their proper time axis.{{Efn|Time in spacetime is universal coordinate time, but there is another kind of time in relativity, the proper time in each inertial reference frame. Your proper time is the time you experience, and every observer has his own proper time; proper time runs at different rates in different inertial reference frames. It runs slower (compared to universal coordinate time) in a gravitational field (according to general relativity), and observers in motion with respect to each other view each other's clocks as running slower than their own clocks (according to special relativity).}} Their movement in time is not just modelled as movement in an abstract fourth dimension (as it is in Minkowski spacetime), their movement in time is isomorphic to their movement through physical space in a distinct direction at velocity <math>c</math>. Two observers' directions of movement through space may be different (or not, if they happen to be going in the same direction). Your proper time dimension is whichever direction you are moving. The other three directions perpendicular to your proper time axis are the three dimensions of your ordinary proper space, which again, will be different directions for you than for other observers moving in a different direction. There are four orthogonal spatial dimensions which we all share, but we share the same orthogonal proper time axis and ordinary proper 3-space axes only if we are at rest with respect to each other, actually moving in the same direction at velocity <math>c</math>, in the same inertial reference frame. Your proper 4-space coordinate system is rotated with respect to another observer's proper 4-space coordinate system, precisely as your vectors (directions of motion) are rotated in Euclidean 4-space with respect to each other, but there are no metric distortions (no Lorentz transformations) between your proper Euclidean 4-space coordinate systems; you are both embedded in the same Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. Lorentz transformations are required only to convert between your respective proper Minkowski spacetime coordinate systems. So in this novel alternate view of relativity, every mass in the universe must be perpetually in motion at velocity <math>c</math> through Euclidean 4-space, along with all the masses in its vicinity that are going in (nearly) the same direction. The entire solar system, for example, must be translating in the fourth dimension at the "speed of light" <math>c</math>, although we do not notice it, since we are all moving in that same direction together. Acceleration of an object varies its direction of motion through 4-space, but never its velocity, which is invariant for all objects with mass. Two objects which are in motion relative to each other are both actually in motion at the same velocity <math>c</math>, but in at least slightly different directions.{{Efn|The angular divergence between two observer's motion vectors is proportional to their relative velocity: the more they diverge, the greater their relative velocity, up to the maximum divergence possible in the space. In Euclidean relativity all observers are in motion at velocity {{Math|c}} relative to universal Cartesian 4-coordinate space, so the maximum relative velocity between two observers is {{Math|2c}} when they are moving in exactly opposite directions in 4-space. This is not a contradiction of special relativity, which limits the maximum relative velocity between two observers to {{Math|c}}, it is the same measurement in different units. Special relativity measures all velocities in Minkowski spacetime (in a non-Euclidean 3-space). Euclidean relativity measures all velocities in Euclidean 4-space.}} In Einstein's relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of light through 3-space. In Euclidean relativity, the invariant <math>c</math> is the speed of matter through 4-space! The speed of light through 3-space is also perceived as <math>c</math> by all observers, because they are each living in a moving 3-manifold that is translating through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. Despite their extreme differences in viewpoint, Einstein's relativity and Euclidean relativity are equivalent theories in complete agreement with each other, by definition. The two theories make exactly the same special relativity predictions of how observers in different inertial reference frames will perceive each other's motions in time and space. It is beyond the scope of this present paper to show how they also agree on the predictions of general relativity, but it is important to understand that our formulation of Euclidean relativity requires our acceptance of the experimentally verified findings of special relativity, general relativity and quantum mechanics. Our model and the standard model both describe the same geometric relations of space and time based on the same evidence, but as embedded in two very different universal host spaces: Euclidean 4-space versus Minkowski spacetime. In some instances our model provides a geometric explanation for physical phenomena where the standard model has none, as yet. An example is the two models' differing explanations for the gravitational coherence of galaxies: either their inertial motion at velocity <math>c</math>, or their possession of experimentally undetected dark matter. A more central example is our use of Coxeter's kinematics to explain the laws of relativistic motion geometrically. {{Efn|More generally, our model is concerned with group-theoretic properties of number elucidated by Coxeter and other geometers. ...cite Kappraff & Adamson's 2003 paper on The Relationship of the Cotangent Function to Special Relativity Theory, geometry and properties of number,{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2003|loc=Special Relativity Theory, Geometry and properties of number}} which shows how the Lorentz coefficient is a function of a deep geometric property of number{{Sfn|Kappraff & Adamson|2000|loc=A Fresh Look at Number}} discovered by Steinbach,{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997|loc=Golden Fields: A Case for the Heptagon}} by means of which the root formula of geometry in any Euclidean dimension, the Pythagorean theorem, may be derived solely in terms of the addition of polygon side lengths, without recourse to their products or squares. More generally, Steinbach found that in the relations among regular polytope chords, to add is to multiply; every chord is both the product (quotient) of a pair of chords and the sum (difference) of another pair of chords.}} Euclidean relativity is not even a fringe theory; no physicists or astronomers have adopted it. There are many good reasons why the revolutionary leap to a four orthogonal spatial dimensions viewpoint has not been taken, beginning with the universally observed fact that we can only construct three perpendiculars through a point in our immediate space, which appears to be resolutely 3-dimensional, not 4-dimensional. Euclidean relativity offers a nice geometric explanation of the reasons for the Lorentz transformations, but only at the cost of raising other mysteries, which have been difficult for its aficionados to explain. Another mystery is how light signals between observers in relative motion could "catch up" with the receiver moving on a diverging path through 4-space from the emitter. If both observers are already moving at <math>c</math> (on diverging paths), the propagation speed of light through 4-space between them would have to be greater than <math>c</math>. Euclidean relativity is a revolutionary theory indeed, in which <math>c</math> cannot possibly be the speed of light! We conclude that, for a theory of Euclidean 4-space to be physically viable (that is, for <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> to be our real space and not merely an abstract mathematical space), the speed of light through Euclidean 4-space must be <math>c\prime = 2c</math>, with massless photons translating through 4-space at twice the speed of mass-carrying objects. Photons must translate the diagonal distance through 4-space along the long diameter of a unit 4-hypercube, in the same time that massive particles translate inertially along the edge (or the radius) of a unit 4-hypercube. This is conceivable in Euclidean 4-space (and in no other Euclidean space of any dimensionality) because the long diagonal of the unit 4-hypercube is the natural number <math>\sqrt{4}</math>. == An object's motion in space is the product of its discrete self-reflections == Coxeter theory describes all the possible motions of an object in space as local functions of the object's discrete geometry (its shape). Coxeter observed that in a Euclidean space of any number of dimensions, any displacement of a geometric object from one place to another, and any rotation of the object from one orientation to another, can be broken down into the product of a number of discrete self-reflections. Any action of a polytope that transforms its position and orientation in space may be measured as a distinct sequence of self-reflections of the object in its own surfaces. Therefore any motion of the object whatsoever may be precisely described as the object propagating itself through space by a discrete sequence of local self-reflections. This is a purely kinematic description of motion which does not give any account of forces acting on the object that cause it to move. Coxeter found that both changes in position (translations) and changes in orientation (rotations) can be broken down into the simplest of all displacements (self-reflections). A translation occurs when an object self-reflects twice, in two distinct surfaces which are parallel to each other. A rotation also occurs when an object self-reflects twice, but in two distinct surfaces which intersect each other. When a object self-reflects once, it turns itself inside out (it reverses its chirality), but in translations and rotations it self-reflects twice, preserving its chirality. Coxeter's laws of kinematics are a geometric counterpart to Newton's algebraic laws of motion in three dimensional Euclidean space. They are helpful because they can be understood as geometric pictures, which may help us to visualize the relationships between translation and rotation in classic Newtonian physics problems, such as the [[W:Kepler problem|Kepler problem]] of the motion of the planets.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Feynman|first=Richard|title=Feynman's Lost Lecture: The Motion of Planets Around the Sun|date=1996|publisher=W. W. Norton & Company|isbn=978-0393039184}}</ref> But they are also a revolutionary advance beyond Newton's laws, because Coxeter formulated them in Euclidean spaces of any number of dimensions. In particular, they give us geometric pictures of all the possible motions of objects in 4-dimensional Euclidean space: <blockquote>Every orthogonal transformation in 4-space is expressible as:<br> :<math>\mathrm{Q}^q \mathrm{R}^r \mathrm{T}^t</math><br> where <math>(2^q + r + t \le 4)</math>. Every displacement is either a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, or a screw-displacement <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> [where the rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> is a simple rotation, but the <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> is chiral like a <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>]. Every enantiomorphous transformation in 4-space (reversing chirality) is a <math>\mathrm{QRT}</math>.</blockquote> While this description should be understood as geometric pictures, some of the pictures may not be easy for us to visualize, since we have no physical experience in 4-dimensional space. Rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}</math>), reflection (<math>\mathrm{R}</math>) and translation (<math>\mathrm{T}</math>) are obvious analogues of what they are in three-dimensional space, but double rotation (<math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>) is something new and unprecedented in our physical experience, because double rotations cannot occur until there are four or more dimensions of space in which to rotate. A point in 4-space may be in motion on two circles in two completely orthogonal rotation planes simultaneously. Nothing constrains the two circles to be of the same radius, or constrains either circle from being of infinite radius such that the point moves in a straight line within its rotation plane: a translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> rather than a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. The motion of a rigid object defined by multiple points is constrained by its rigidity, such that the radii of both circles may approach infinity, but only one of the two radii may actually reach infinity. For a rigid object, only one of the two rotations may actually be a translation. Four dimensional Euclidean space can accomodate no such thing as a <math>\mathrm{Q}^2\mathrm{T}</math>. A translating double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math>, like a translating simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>, is simply a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. That is the essence of the way the principle of relativity operates in Euclidean 4-space. An object which is double-rotating in its own proper inertial reference frame may be seen to be performing nothing more mysterious than a screw translation, when observed from an inertial reference frame from which the object is in relative translational motion. Of course, it is a screw translation in 4-space, which is more mysterious than a screw translation in our ordinary 3-space. In 3-space the orbit of a screw translation (or any <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>) lies on a great circle of an ordinary sphere (a 2-sphere). In 4-space the orbit of a screw translation <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}^2</math> lies on a great circle of a hypersphere (a 3-sphere). Such 4-dimensional great circles are inherently more complex than the ordinary circles we experience in 3-space. They do not lie in a single plane, but bend through all four dimensions, in either a left or right hand direction of curvature. Unlike ordinary circles they are inherently chiral, and their circumference is not <math>2\pi r</math>, but like ordinary circles they are truly circular, geodesic circles. In 4-space they might even be said to be more circular than ordinary circles, which bend in only two dimensions. We refer to such 4-dimensional great circles as ''isoclines'', to distinguish them from ordinary 2-dimensional great circles in the plane. Their name comes from the fact that a point on a rigid 4-dimensional object undergoing [[W:SO(4)#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]] traverses an isocline circle. In a universe which is real Euclidean four-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>, wherein these motions occur only at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, there is a universal Cartesian 4-coordinate reference frame in which every rigid object in free fall is translating on a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> at velocity <math>c</math>. That universal inertial reference frame is not the proper reference frame of any object or observer, wherein the object or observer is stationary and double-rotating at the universal rate of quantum events <math>c</math>, but it is the common reference frame of all observers. == Light propagates through 4-space at twice its apparent velocity <math>c</math>== Coxeter's laws of kinematics in 4-dimensional Euclidean space apply to all objects with mass, but we find there is an additional kind of displacement which applies only to massless particles such as photons, considered as single point objects. Light quanta (photons) translate through 4-space by 4-dimensional reflection <math>\mathrm{R}^4</math>, which may be termed a double translation <math>\mathrm{T}^2</math>, a pure translation via two pairs of parallel reflections without any rotation component <math>\mathrm{Q}</math>. Matter (atoms and all particles with mass) are perpetually rotating and translating through 4-space by <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>, a screw translation of a rotating object, which is relativistically equivalent to a stationary isoclinic <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math>, an isoclinically rotating object such as an atom. A simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> or simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> is a double reflection <math>\mathrm{R^2}</math>, so a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> or <math>\mathrm{Q^2}</math> is an <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>, but not with the same group of reflection angles as a light signal <math>\mathrm{R^4}</math>. A translation <math>\mathrm{T = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two parallel planes, and a rotation <math>\mathrm{Q = R^2}</math> is a double reflection in two intersecting planes, as in a <math>\mathrm{QT = R^4}</math> which is both at once. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is two double reflections in pairs of parallel planes at once, a reflection in four non-intersecting parallel planes; it is all translation and no rotation. In a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> all the motion goes to translation, so the translation goes twice as far as the simple translation <math>\mathrm{T}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. A double translation <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> is the opposite of a double rotation <math>\mathrm{Q^2 = R^4}</math>, which is stationary but rotates twice as far as the simple rotation <math>\mathrm{Q}</math> in a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math>. The product of the two translations in a <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> is a diagonal 4-space translation over the long diameter of the unit 4-hypercube, exactly twice the distance of a simple <math>\mathrm{T}</math> over the edge length (or radius) of the unit 4-hypercube. The [[w:Tesseract|4-hypercube (also known as the 8-cell or tesseract)]] is ''radially equilateral'', which means its edge length is equal to its radius, like the hexagon, so its long diameter (twice its radius) is exactly twice its edge length. The photon moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions. By the four-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, each of those four distances is half the total distance the photon moves: one edge length (one radius) is half the total diagonal distance moved (the long diameter). That total movement is a double the unit-distance translation, but without any rotation component, so it cannot carry any mass with it. A <math>\mathrm{T^2}</math> cannot reposition a 4-polytope the way a <math>\mathrm{QT}</math> does, it can only reposition a quantum of energy that has no distinguishing rotational symmetry, such as a photon. That is the price light pays to move exactly twice as fast as matter.{{Efn| ...lensing of double translations <math>\mathrm{T^2 = R^4}</math> in more than two pairs of parallel planes at once...relationship to the frequency of light emitted and the coherence length of the wave packet...}} == Special relativity is Galilean relativity in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == {{Efn|...TAC suggests this section is needed sooner, i.e. in the preceding Special Relativity section, as it explains how Euclidean relativity reduces special relativity to 4D perspective geometry...it's misplaced (too late) here...}} Perspective effects known as the Lorentz transformations occur because each observer's proper 3-dimensional space is a moving curved manifold embedded in flat 4-dimensional Euclidean space. The curvature of their 3-space complicates sightline calculations for observers; they sometimes require Lorentz transformations to produce the actual 4-space Cartesian coordinates of objects in the scene being observed. But if all four spatial dimensions are considered, no Lorentz transformations are required (or permitted) in correct scene construction, except when an observer wants to calculate a projection, that is, the shadow of how things will appear to them from a three-dimensional viewpoint (not how they really are in 4-space).{{Sfn|Yamashita|2023}} Space really has four orthogonal dimensions, and space and time behave there just as they do in a classical vector space, only bigger by one dimension. It is not necessary to combine 4-space with time in a unified spacetime to explain 4-dimensional perspective effects at high relative velocities, because Euclidean 4-space is already 4-dimensional, and those effects fall out naturally from the 4-dimensional Pythagorean theorem, exactly as ordinary visual perspective does in three dimensions from the 3-dimensional Pythagorean theorem. Because one of the four spatial dimensions corresponds to an observer's direction of motion (in both space and proper time), and all observers and all scenes being observed are in motion (at constant velocity) in their respective proper time directions, we observe perspective foreshortenings in time as well as in a spatial dimension. In special relativity these perspective effects are reciprocal, precisely because they are only apparent, not actual, changes in size and duration. (However in general relativity, discussed below, the actual rate of physical processes varies from place to place, and reference frame differences predicted by the theory are neither reciprocal nor illusory.) None of these Lorentz effects are beyond geometric explanation or paradoxical. The universe is unexpectedly strange to us in precisely the ways the Euclidean fourth dimension is strange to us; but that does hold many surprises. Euclidean 4-space is much more interesting than Euclidean 3-space, analogous to the way 3-space is much more interesting and deeply explanatory to us than it would be if we experienced it only as a 2-space with many folds and curves, as perhaps an ant does. The emergent properties of 4-space are hard for us to visualize because they lie so wholly beyond our physical experience, just as it was hard for our ancestors to imagine the earth as round like a ball. However, Euclidean spaces of successive dimensions are analogous, and so higher dimensional spaces can be anticipated and explored: that is Schläfli's great discovery. Moreover dimensional analogy itself, like everything else in nature including all of physics, is an exact expression of intrinsic group-theoretic symmetries: that is Nother's great discovery. == General relativity is rotations in a Euclidean space of four orthogonal dimensions == The statement that the laws of special relativity hold to good approximation in freely falling (and non-rotating) reference frames is known as the [[W:Equivalence principle|Einstein equivalence principle]]. The weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a building on the surface of the earth is the same as the weight experienced by an observer standing on the floor in a spaceship in interstellar space accelerating at a rate of 32'/second/second. Both observers are experiencing an upwards acceleration at the same rate, which in their respective proper reference frames is measured as the weight of gravity, rather than as an accelerating motion (they are stationary in their proper reference frames). Einstein used this equivalence principle as the basis for his general theory of relativity, in much the same way he had used the constant velocity of light as the basis for his special theory of relativity. In general relativity the two accelerating observers occupy scenes which are relativistically equivalent, which means that although they can be distinguished (they have different measurements) in any reference frame from which they may both be observed, they have the same invariant geometry in all reference frames (they are the same phenomena), implying that there exists, for either scene, another reference frame from which it measures exactly like the other scene. Relativistically equivalent does not imply that there exists a single reference frame in which the two scenes are congruent (have the same measurements). It only means that they can be transformed into each other by a shift in point of view, because their invariant geometries (their measurements which are independent of point of view) are the same. Einstein's general theory of relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in spacetime. Our formulation of Euclidean relativity describes that invariant geometry, for scenes in general, in real Euclidean 4-dimensional space <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math>. An observer standing on the surface of the earth is accelerated at the rate of 32'/second/second. The observer and the earth are both stationary in their proper inertial reference frames (which are similar except for the rotation of the earth), so the observer's acceleration cannot be perceived as motion in either proper reference frame; it is perceptible there instead as the force of gravity. It is only perceptible as motion in some other reference frame in which the earth and the observer are both in motion, such as the universal common reference frame of Euclidean 4-coordinate space in which they are both in motion at velocity <math>c</math> on their respective screw translations <math>QT</math>, which are distinct. In that universal common reference frame the observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is the rate of change in the direction of his vector of translation through 4-space. The velocity of his vector of translation <math>T</math> through 4-space remains the constant <math>c</math> throughout; only his direction is changing. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation <math>Q</math> of a translation <math>T</math>: a screw translation <math>QT</math>. A change in the direction of a vector is a rotation which is an acceleration. We can be precise about the units of measurement of this acceleration at atomic scale. In Coxeter's kinematics rotations of geometric objects occur in discrete increments called rotational displacements, with each distinct kind of rotation performing a characteristic number of its characteristic rotational displacement during a full revolution that returns the object to its starting orientation. There are many distinct kinds of rotation, each with its characteristic rotational displacement and number of displacements per revolution. The general rotation in 4-space is a double rotation <math>Q^2</math> distinguished by two distinct completely orthogonal angles through which the object turns in each rotational displacement. The angles determine not only the distance through which the object turns, but the characteristic trajectory of each point on the surface of the rotating object, including the length of that trajectory before it closes into a circle when the object returns to its starting orientation. For any distinct kind of rotation, the circular trajectory is always an integer multiple of the characteristic rotational displacement, but the full circle may be greater than 360°. In 4-space rotational circles are not ordinary 2-dimensional circles that lie in the plane and have a 360° circumference. Many distinct 4-space rotations of interest have a circumference of 720°, and many are larger. In 4-space every object with mass moves on its distinct <math>QT</math> trajectory. Each rotational displacement <math>Q</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which intersect each other, at angles related to a distinct star polygon. Each translational displacement <math>T</math> is equivalent to a pair of reflection displacements in two surfaces which lie parallel to each other. In both kinds of motion (rotation and translation) it is the rate at which these double-reflection displacements occur which is constant and which we measure as the velocity <math>c</math>. Every atom translates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing a large number of atomic scale translational displacements per second. Concurrently, the atom rotates at velocity <math>c</math>, performing the same large number of atomic scale rotational displacements per second. Although the number of displacements at atomic scale per unit time is the same universal constant <math>c</math> for all rotations and translations, distinct kinds of rotation revolve at distinct rates, because the number of rotational displacements per complete revolution and the circumference of the complete revolution are distinct characteristics of each kind of rotation. The velocity at which each point on the surface of a rotating object moves, and the frequency of its rotational circling, are functions of the distinct rotation it is performing. However, they are not simple functions of <math>c</math> and the two defining angle parameters of the rotation. Distinct rotations arise from distinct symmetry groups and each is its own mystery with a unique conservation law. The relationships between those distinct conservation laws are even more mysterious, and have been shown to be chaotic. Steinbach{{Sfn|Steinbach|1997}} discovered the Golden Fields family of ratios which govern distinct rotational displacements related to the regular star polygons at least up to the hendecagon {11}. Kappraff and Adamson{{Sfn|Kappraff|Adamson|2004}} further characterized the families of rotation functions and showed that they form an infinite number of periodic trajectories when operated on by the Mandelbrot operator. The inertial tendency of mass is to follow a geodesic. The inertial conservation law of gravity applies to all motions of objects with mass, rotations as well as translations. A translation <math>T</math> is the distinct simple rotation <math>Q</math> in which the characteristic angle of rotational displacement is zero. Inertia is the tendency of objects with mass to conserve their angles of rotational displacement. In 4-space each object has two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement which are characteristic of the distinct rotation the object is performing. Inertia is the conservation of this distinct double rotation. In 4-coordinate Euclidean space the acceleration of an object with mass is a rotation of the object, a change to its direction, not a change to its constant velocity. Because the rate of atomic scale displacements is the universal constant <math>c</math>, the rate of change of direction (the acceleration of the object) is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law. A observer standing on the surface of the earth is performing a distinct double rotation characterized by two completely orthogonal angles of rotational displacement. The observer's acceleration of 32'/second/second is a function of <math>c</math> and the distinct rotation's conservation law, and a measurement of the rate of change of the observer's direction of motion through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>. ... == Quantum mechanics is the atomic rotational kinematics of Coxeter groups == ... == Dimensional relativity == The formulation of Euclidean relativity based on Coxeter's kinetic law of <math>n</math>-dimensional congruent transformations in Euclidean space may be called ''dimensional relativity'', since it captures the theories of special and general relativity, and has its roots in dimensional analogy. Dimensional analogy is the exploration of [[w:Hermann_Grassmann#Mathematician|Hermann Grassmann's vector space principle]], in which space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. The geometry of higher-dimensional space is accessible by reason of direct analogy, as [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] subsequently demonstrated, and by algebraic methods after [[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]]. By analogy to the surface of the earth, the bounding surface of a spherical region of <math>n</math>-dimensional Euclidean space is an <math>(n-1)</math>-sphere, a spherical space of one fewer dimensions than the <math>n</math>-ball of Euclidean space it surrounds. In dimensional relativity the sky is not a ceiling, but an infinite regress of alternating spherical and Euclidean <math>n</math>-spaces of increasing <math>n</math>, accessible from each observer's point of view. By dimensional analogy, each observer looks up into their own reference frame's regress of concentric alternating <math>n</math>-spaces. By the capacity for dimensional analogy which they possess, some observers see deeper into <math>n</math>-dimensional space than others. == Polycentric spherical relativity == An intelligent observer equipped with the principle of dimensional relativity may perceive the universe from any inertial reference frame, not only from their own proper stationary reference frame in the Euclidean <math>n</math>-space universe in which they physically locate themself. We see that every observer may also properly view themself as stationary and the universe as an <math>n</math>-sphere with themself at the center observing it, perceptually equidistant from all points on its <math>n</math>-space surface, including their own physical location which is one of those surface points, distinguished to them but moving on the surface, and not the center of anything. This ''polycentric model'' of the universe is a further restatement of the principle of relativity, and of the [[W:Copernican principle|Copernican principle]] that observation is democratic: observers occupy representative viewpoints, not privileged monocentric positions. The polycentric model is compatible with Galileo's relativity of uniformly moving objects in ordinary space, Einstein's special relativity of inertial reference frames in 4-dimensional spacetime, Einstein's general relativity of all reference frames in non-Euclidean spacetime, and Coxeter's dimensional relativity of orthogonal group actions in Euclidean and spherical spaces of any number of dimensions. The polycentric model should be known as Thoreau's principle of ''spherical relativity'', since the first precise written statement of it appears in 1849, contemporaneous with and independent of Schlafli's work: <blockquote>The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence.{{Sfn|Thoreau|1849|p=349|ps=; "The universe is a sphere whose center is wherever there is intelligence." [Contemporaneous and independent of [[W:Ludwig Schlafli|Ludwig Schlafli]]'s pioneering work enumerating the complete set of regular polyschemes in any number of dimensions.]}}</blockquote> == Revolutions == The original Copernican revolution in 1543 displaced the center of the universe from the center of the earth to a point farther away, the center of the sun, with the earth performing a ''revolution'' around the sun, and the stars remaining on a fixed 2-sphere around the sun instead of around the earth. But this led inevitably to the recognition that the sun must be a star itself, not equidistant from all the stars, and the center of but one of many spheres, no monotheistic center at all. In 1600 [[W:Giordano Bruno|Giordano Bruno]] who first openly advocated these views was burned at the stake in Rome's [[W:Campo de' Fiori|Campo de' Fiori]] by the Catholic inquisition. In such fashion the Euclidean four-dimensional revolution, emerging three to five centuries later, initially lends itself to the big bang theory of a single origin of the whole universe, but leads inevitably to the recognition that all the galaxies need not be equidistant from a single origin in time, any more than all the stars lie in the same galaxy, equidistant from a single center in space. The expanding sphere of matter on the surface of which we find ourselves living is likely to be one of many 3-spheres expanding at velocity <math>c</math>, with their big bang origins occurring at distinct times and places in the ''n''-dimensional universe. The most distant objects we see when we look up at night may not all have the same origin in space and time. As recently as Copernicus we believed all the stars lay on a single 2-sphere embedded in Euclidean 3-space, with our sun at its center. During the enlightenment observers beginning with Bruno dispersed those stars into an infinite Euclidean 3-space, and relinquished our privileged position at the center. Then Einstein showed that our 3-space could not be Euclidean, that it must be a 3-manifold curved in every place in obedience to Newton's inverse-square law of gravity; and in a geometry related to time, at least, it must be 4-dimensional. In the present work we propose a theory of ''n''-dimensional real space and how light travels in it, a theory which says we can see into four orthogonal dimensions of Euclidean space, and so when we look up at night we see cosmological objects distributed in at least four dimensions of space around us, rather than all located in our own local 3-space. Looking still deeper and farther out, the universe viewed as a 4-sphere might, or might not, be expanding, and the most distant objects we see when we look up at night may, or may not, lie in our 4-dimensional hyperplane. Real space has ''n'' dimensions as [[w:Hermann_Grassmann|Grassmann]] and [[w:Schläfli|Schläfli]] showed, and we do not know how many dimensions the most distant objects we see may be distributed in. They need not all lie within the four spatial dimensions in which we have now learned to observe them, any more than they all lie in our local 3-space. When we look up at the objects that surround us, we have no way of discerning how many dimensions beyond three the space we are looking into has. We know their distance from us primarily by virtue of how long it takes their light to reach us. We can measure their distribution around us in 3-space or 4-space, but that is simply how we choose to measure their positions, not an actual finding of how they are distributed. Even if it is now evident that they do not all lie in the same 3-space, how many more dimensions than three are needed to contain them? We observe that our 4-ball galaxy is embedded in Euclidean <math>n</math>-space as one of many 4-ball galaxies, each translating in a distinct direction through 4-space at velocity <math>c</math>, on more or less divergent paths from each other. But only closer observation will reveal evidence of whether everything we see lies in the same Euclidean 4-space, or if it is distributed in five or more dimensions, and how it is moving there. To remain in agreement with the theory of relativity, the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint requires that all mass-carrying objects be in motion in some distinct direction through 4-space at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, although the relative velocity between nearby objects is much smaller since they move on similar vectors, aimed away from a common origin point in the past. It is natural to expect that objects moving at constant velocity away from a common origin will be distributed roughly on the surface of an expanding 3-sphere. Although their paths away from their origin are not straight lines but various helical isoclines (screw translation spirals), nearby objects must be translating radially at the same average velocity, since the objects in a system (such as our solar system or galaxy) do not separate rapidly over time but remain in orbital formation. Each system's screw translation has two [[w:Completely_orthogonal|completely orthogonal]] components of motion in 4-space, an orbital rotation (such as the earth's around our sun) and a linear translation of the entire system at velocity <math>c</math> in the direction of the original 3-sphere's radial expansion (along the system's proper time vector). Of course the view from our solar system does not suggest that the 3-sphere enclosing each galaxy is expanding at this great rate from its galactic center. The standard theory has been that the entire observable universe is expanding from a single big bang origin in time, with galaxies forming later. While the Euclidean four-dimensional viewpoint lends itself to that standard theory, it also supports theories which require no single origin point in space and time. These are the voyages of starship Earth, to boldly go where no one has gone before. We made the jump to light speed long ago, in whatever big bang our atoms emerged from, and have never slowed down since. == Origins of the theory == Einstein himself may have been the first to imagine the universe as the three-dimensional surface of a four-dimensional Euclidean 3-sphere, in what was narrowly the first written articulation of a Euclidean 4-space universe, contemporaneous with the teen-aged Coxeter's (quoted below).{{Efn|[[W:William Rowan Hamilton|Hamilton]]'s algebra '''H''' of [[W:Quaternions|quaternions]] introduces (in 1843) the notion of a [[W:Three-dimensional sphere|three-dimensional sphere]] embedded in a four-dimensional space, but Hamilton did not quite conceive of the quaternions as the Cartesian 4-coordinates of a Euclidean 4-space, and he did not describe our ordinary 3-space as embedded in Euclidean 4-space.}} Einstein did this as a [[W:Gedankenexperiment|gedankenexperiment]] in the context of investigating whether his equations of general relativity predicted an infinite or a finite universe, in his 1921 Princeton lecture.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/36276|title=The Meaning of Relativity|last=Einstein|first=Albert|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=1923|isbn=|location=|pages=110-111}}</ref> He invited us to imagine "A spherical manifold of three dimensions, embedded in a Euclidean continuum of four dimensions", but he was careful to disclaim parenthetically that "The aid of a fourth space dimension has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice." Informally, the Euclidean 4-dimensional theory of relativity may be given as a sort of reciprocal to that disclaimer of Einstein's: ''The Minkowski spacetime has naturally no significance except that of a mathematical artifice, as an aid to understanding how things will appear to an observer from their perspective; the foreshortenings, clock desynchronizations and other Lorentz transformations it predicts are proper calculations of actual perspective effects; but real space is a flat, Euclidean continuum of four orthogonal spatial dimensions, and in it the ordinary laws of a flat vector space hold (such as the Pythagorean theorem), and all sightline calculations work classically, so long as you consider all four spatial dimensions.'' The Euclidean theory of relativity differs from the special theory of relativity in ascribing to the physical universe a geometry of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions, rather than the special theory's [[w:Minkowski spacetime|Minkowski spacetime]] geometry, in which three spatial dimensions and a time dimension comprise a unified non-Euclidean spacetime of four dimensions. Anco and Maghadam found that <math>SO(4)</math> breaks to <math>\mathbb{S}^3</math> (the 3-sphere) if the energy in a Kepler orbit is negative (an elliptical orbit), and to <math>H^3</math> (Minkowski spacetime) if the energy is positive (a hyperbolic orbit). Therefore the fact that the planets orbit on ellipses in our 3-space suggests that they orbit on a 3-sphere embedded in Euclidean 4-space. Thus we can conclude that <math>\mathbb{R}^4</math> is the actual geometry of our physical universe, and Minkowski spacetime is an abstraction of it; the reciprocal of Einstein's disclaimer is the more direct physical model. Of course spacetime remains a true and useful abstraction, although it must relinquish its privileged position as our exclusive conception of our place in space.{{Efn| ...origins of the Euclidean 4-space insight in the observations of Fock, Atkinson, Moser and others.}} The invention of Euclidean geometry of more than three spatial dimensions preceded Einstein's theories by more than fifty years, when it was worked out originally by the Swiss mathematician [[w:Ludwig Schläfli|Ludwig Schläfli]] before 1853.{{Sfn|Coxeter|1973|loc=§7. Ordinary Polytopes in Higher Space; §7.x. Historical remarks|pp=141-144|ps=; "Practically all the ideas in this chapter ... are due to Schläfli, who discovered them before 1853 — a time when Cayley, Grassmann and Möbius were the only other people who had ever conceived the possibility of geometry in more than three dimensions."}} Schläfli extended Euclid's geometry of one, two, and three dimensions in a direct way to four or more dimensions, generalizing the rules and terms of [[w:Euclidean geometry|Euclidean geometry]] to spaces of any number of dimensions. He coined the general term ''[[polyscheme]]'' to mean geometric forms of any number of dimensions, including two-dimensional [[w:polygon|polygons]], three-dimensional [[w:polyhedron|polyhedra]], four dimensional [[w:polychoron|polychora]], and so on, and in the process he found all of the [[w:Regular polytope|regular polyschemes]] that are possible in every dimension, including in particular the [[User:Dc.samizdat/Rotations#Sequence of regular 4-polytopes|six convex regular polychora]] which can be constructed in a Euclidean space of four dimensions (the set analogous to the five [[w:Platonic solid|Platonic solids]] the ancients found in three dimensional space). Thus Schläfli was the first to explore the fourth dimension, reveal its emergent geometric properties, and discover its astonishing regular objects. Because his work was only published posthumously in 1901, and remained almost completely unknown until Coxeter published [[w:Regular_Polytopes_(book)|Regular Polytopes]] in 1947, other researchers had more than fifty years to rediscover the regular polychora, and competing terms were coined; today [[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s word ''[[w:Polytope|polytope]]'' is the commonly used term for ''polyscheme.''{{Efn|[[w:Reinhold_Hoppe|Reinhold Hoppe]]'s German word ''polytop'' was introduced into English by [[W:Alicia Boole Stott|Alicia Boole Stott]], who like Hoppe and [[W:Thorold Gosset|Thorold Gosset]] rediscovered Schlafli's six regular convex 4-polytopes, with no knowledge of their prior discovery. Today Schläfli's original ''polyschem'', with its echo of ''schema'' as in the configurations of information structures, seems even more fitting in its generality than ''polytope'' -- perhaps analogously as information software (programming) is even more general than information hardware (computers).}} Because of this century-long lag in the dissemination of a scientific discovery, the regular 4-polytopes appear to have played no role at all, by any name, in the twentieth century discovery and evolution of the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics.{{Efn|One could argue that the higher-dimensional polytopes have barely influenced science or culture at all thus far. The physicist John Edward Huth's comprehensive deep dive through the history of cultural and scientific concepts of physical space, from ancient flatland models of the world through general relativity and quantum mechancs, shows exactly how we got to our present standard model of the universe, although it includes no mention of higher-dimensional Euclidean space.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Huth|first=John Edward|title=A Sense of Space: A local's guide to a flat earth, the edge of the cosmos, and other curious places|year=2025|publisher=University of Chicago Press}}</ref>}} == Boundaries == <blockquote>Ever since we discovered that Earth is round and turns like a mad-spinning top, we have understood that reality is not as it appears to us: every time we glimpse a new aspect of it, it is a deeply emotional experience. Another veil has fallen.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Carlo Rovelli|author-link=W:Carlo Rovelli|title=Seven Brief Lessons on Physics|publisher=Riverhead|year=2016|isbn=978-0399184413}}</ref></blockquote> Of course it is strange to consciously contemplate this world we inhabit, our planet, our solar system, our 3-sphere surface in our vast galaxy, as the merest film, a boundary no thicker in the places we inhabit than the diameter of an electron (though much thicker in some places we cannot inhabit, such as the planet's core and the interior of stars). But is not our unconscious traditional concept of the boundary of our world even stranger? Since the enlightenment we are accustomed to thinking that there is nothing beyond three dimensional space: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But anyone who knows the [[polyscheme]]s Schläfli discovered knows that space can have any number of dimensions, and that there are fundamental objects and motions to be discovered in four dimensions that are even more various and interesting than those we can discover in three. The strange thing, when we think about it that way, is that there ''is'' a boundary between three and four dimensional space. ''Why'' can't we move (or apparently, see) in more than three dimensions? Why is our physical world apparently only three dimensional? Why would it have just ''three'' dimensions, and not four, or five, or the ''n'' dimensions that Schläfli mapped? What is the nature of the boundary which confines us to just three dimensions? We know that in Euclidean geometry the boundary between three and four dimensions is itself a spherical three dimensional space, so we should suspect that we are materially confined within such a curved boundary surface. Light need not be confined with us within our three dimensional boundary space. We would look directly through four dimensional space in our natural way, by receiving light signals that travelled through it to us on straight lines. In that case the reason we do not observe a fourth spatial dimension in our vicinity is that there are no nearby objects in it, just off our hyperplane in the wild. The nearest 4-ball object we can see with our eyes is our sun, which lies equatorially in our own hyperplane, though it bulges out of it above and below. But when we look up at the heavens, every pinprick of light we observe is itself a four-dimensional object off our hyperplane, and they are distributed all around us in four-dimensional space through which we gaze. We are four-dimensionally sighted creatures, even though our bodies are three-dimensional objects, thin as an atom in the fourth dimension. But that should not perplex us: we can see into three dimensional space even though our retinas are two dimensional objects, thin as a photoreceptor cell. Our unconscious provincial concept is that there is nothing else outside our three dimensional world: no boundary, because there is nothing else to separate us from. But Schläfli discovered something else: all the astonishing regular objects that exist in higher dimensions, which vastly extend our notions of the beauty and mystery of space itself, and the intrinsic spatial symmetries of our universe which geometry reveals. Space is more commodious than we thought it was, and permits previously unimagined objects and motions. So our provincial conception of our place in it now has the same kind of status as our idea that the sun rises in the east and passes overhead: it is mere appearance, not a true model and no longer a proper explanation. An inertial boundary is a proper explanation, be it ever so thin. And would a boundary of ''no'' thickness, a mere abstraction with no physical power to separate, be a more suitable explanation? We must look for a physically powerful explanation in the geometry of space itself, which general relativity properly associates with the gravitational or inertial force. <blockquote>The number of dimensions possessed by a figure is the number of straight lines each perpendicular to all the others which can be drawn on it. Thus a point has no dimensions, a straight line one, a plane surface two, and a solid three .... In space as we now know it only three lines can be imagined perpendicular to each other. A fourth line, perpendicular to all the other three would be quite invisible and unimaginable to us. We ourselves and all the material things around us probably possess a fourth dimension, of which we are quite unaware. If not, from a four-dimensional point of view we are mere geometrical abstractions, like geometrical surfaces, lines, and points are to us. But this thickness in the fourth dimension must be exceedingly minute, if it exists at all. That is, we could only draw an exceedingly small line perpendicular to our three perpendicular lines, length, breadth and thickness, so small that no microscope could ever perceive it. We can find out something about the conditions of the fourth and higher dimensions if they exist, without being certain that they do exist, by a process which I have termed "Dimensional Analogy."<ref>{{Citation|title=Dimensional Analogy|last=Coxeter|first=Donald|date=February 1923|publisher=Coxeter Fonds, University of Toronto Archives|authorlink=W:Harold Scott MacDonald Coxeter|series=|postscript=|work=}}</ref></blockquote> I believe, but I cannot prove, that we live in real space, which is Schläfli's Euclidean space of ''n'' analogous dimensions. As Grassmann showed first, space cannot be limited to any finite number of dimensions. There will always be higher dimensions to discover, first in imagination and then to explore physically, each an astonishing new enlightenment.<ref>{{Cite book|first=T.S.|last=Eliot|title=Little Gidding|volume=Four Quartets|year=1943}}<blockquote> :We shall not cease from exploration :And the end of all our exploring :Will be to arrive where we started :And know the place for the first time. :Through the unknown, remembered gate :When the last of earth left to discover :Is that which was the beginning; :At the source of the longest river :The voice of the hidden waterfall :And the children in the apple-tree :Not known, because not looked for :But heard, half-heard, in the stillness :Between two waves of the sea. </blockquote></ref> Schläfli discovered every regular convex polytope that exists in any dimension, but that was only the beginning of the story of dimensional analogy, not its end or even the end of its beginning. That project is forever beginning anew. Coxeter discovered that Schläfli's Euclidean space is an expression of intrinsic symmetries, as Noether discovered all of physics is. Kappraff and Adamson discovered that even the sequences of humble regular polygons have fractal complexity, so symmetry itself is chaotic, always reachable but forever beyond our complete grasp. We are on a wilderness project, and just at its beginning, but already we observe a Euclidean space of four or more orthogonal spatial dimensions in which all objects with mass move ceaselessly at the constant velocity <math>c</math>, the universal rate at which everything moves, quantum events occur, and each of our proper times evolves. I believe these facts explain the experimentally verified theories of relativity and quantum mechanics, by revealing their unified polycentric geometry, the same way the facts about Copernicus's heliocentric solar system explained the observed motions of the planets, by revealing the geometry of gravity to Kepler. But others will have to do the math, work out the physics, and perform experiments to prove or disprove all of this, because I don't have the mathematics; entirely unlike Coxeter and Einstein, I am illiterate in those languages. <blockquote> ::::::BEECH :Where my imaginary line :Bends square in woods, an iron spine :And pile of real rocks have been founded. :And off this corner in the wild, :Where these are driven in and piled, :One tree, by being deeply wounded, :Has been impressed as Witness Tree :And made commit to memory :My proof of being not unbounded. :Thus truth's established and borne out, :Though circumstanced with dark and doubt— :Though by a world of doubt surrounded. :::::::—''The Moodie Forester''<ref>{{Cite book|title=A Witness Tree|last=Frost|first=Robert|year=1942|series=The Poetry of Robert Frost|publisher=Holt, Rinehart and Winston|edition=1969|}}</ref> </blockquote> == Appendix: Sequence of regular 4-polytopes == {{Regular convex 4-polytopes|wiki=W:|columns=7}} == ... == {{Efn|In a ''[[W:William Kingdon Clifford|Clifford]] displacement'', also known as an [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], all the Clifford parallel{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} invariant planes are displaced in four orthogonal directions (two completely orthogonal planes) at once: they are rotated by the same angle, and at the same time they are tilted ''sideways'' by that same angle. A [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|Clifford displacement]] is [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensionally diagonal]].{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} Every plane that is Clifford parallel to one of the completely orthogonal planes (including in this case an entire Clifford parallel bundle of 4 hexagons, but not all 16 hexagons) is invariant under the isoclinic rotation: all the points in the plane rotate in circles but remain in the plane, even as the whole plane tilts sideways. All 16 hexagons rotate by the same angle (though only 4 of them do so invariantly). All 16 hexagons are rotated by 60 degrees, and also displaced sideways by 60 degrees to a Clifford parallel hexagon. All of the other central polygons (e.g. squares) are also displaced to a Clifford parallel polygon 60 degrees away.|name=Clifford displacement}} {{Efn|It is not difficult to visualize four hexagonal planes intersecting at 60 degrees to each other, even in three dimensions. Four hexagonal central planes intersect at 60 degrees in the [[W:cuboctahedron|cuboctahedron]]. Four of the 24-cell's 16 hexagonal central planes (lying in the same 3-dimensional hyperplane) intersect at each of the 24-cell's vertices exactly the way they do at the center of a cuboctahedron. But the ''edges'' around the vertex do not meet as the radii do at the center of a cuboctahedron; the 24-cell has 8 edges around each vertex, not 12, so its vertex figure is the cube, not the cuboctahedron. The 8 edges meet exactly the way 8 edges do at the apex of a canonical [[W:cubic pyramid]|cubic pyramid]].{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}}|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} {{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} {{Efn|Eight {{sqrt|1}} edges converge in curved 3-dimensional space from the corners of the 24-cell's cubical vertex figure{{Efn|The [[W:vertex figure|vertex figure]] is the facet which is made by truncating a vertex; canonically, at the mid-edges incident to the vertex. But one can make similar vertex figures of different radii by truncating at any point along those edges, up to and including truncating at the adjacent vertices to make a ''full size'' vertex figure. Stillwell defines the vertex figure as "the convex hull of the neighbouring vertices of a given vertex".{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=17}} That is what serves the illustrative purpose here.|name=full size vertex figure}} and meet at its center (the vertex), where they form 4 straight lines which cross there. The 8 vertices of the cube are the eight nearest other vertices of the 24-cell. The straight lines are geodesics: two {{sqrt|1}}-length segments of an apparently straight line (in the 3-space of the 24-cell's curved surface) that is bent in the 4th dimension into a great circle hexagon (in 4-space). Imagined from inside this curved 3-space, the bends in the hexagons are invisible. From outside (if we could view the 24-cell in 4-space), the straight lines would be seen to bend in the 4th dimension at the cube centers, because the center is displaced outward in the 4th dimension, out of the hyperplane defined by the cube's vertices. Thus the vertex cube is actually a [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]]. Unlike a cube, it seems to be radially equilateral (like the tesseract and the 24-cell itself): its "radius" equals its edge length.{{Efn|The vertex cubic pyramid is not actually radially equilateral,{{Efn|name=radially equilateral}} because the edges radiating from its apex are not actually its radii: the apex of the [[W:cubic pyramid|cubic pyramid]] is not actually its center, just one of its vertices.}}|name=24-cell vertex figure}} {{Efn|The hexagons are inclined (tilted) at 60 degrees with respect to the unit radius coordinate system's orthogonal planes. Each hexagonal plane contains only ''one'' of the 4 coordinate system axes.{{Efn|Each great hexagon of the 24-cell contains one axis (one pair of antipodal vertices) belonging to each of the three inscribed 16-cells. The 24-cell contains three disjoint inscribed 16-cells, rotated 60° isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other (so their corresponding vertices are 120° {{=}} {{radic|3}} apart). A [[16-cell#Coordinates|16-cell is an orthonormal ''basis'']] for a 4-dimensional coordinate system, because its 8 vertices define the four orthogonal axes. In any choice of a vertex-up coordinate system (such as the unit radius coordinates used in this article), one of the three inscribed 16-cells is the basis for the coordinate system, and each hexagon has only ''one'' axis which is a coordinate system axis.|name=three basis 16-cells}} The hexagon consists of 3 pairs of opposite vertices (three 24-cell diameters): one opposite pair of ''integer'' coordinate vertices (one of the four coordinate axes), and two opposite pairs of ''half-integer'' coordinate vertices (not coordinate axes). For example: {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}1,{{spaces|2}}0) {{indent|5}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}({{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|5}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}}){{spaces|3}}(–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}},–{{sfrac|1|2}},{{spaces|2}}{{sfrac|1|2}}) {{indent|17}}({{spaces|2}}0,{{spaces|2}}0,–1,{{spaces|2}}0)<br> is a hexagon on the ''y'' axis. Unlike the {{sqrt|2}} squares, the hexagons are actually made of 24-cell edges, so they are visible features of the 24-cell.|name=non-orthogonal hexagons|group=}} {{Efn|Visualize the three [[16-cell]]s inscribed in the 24-cell (left, right, and middle), and the rotation which takes them to each other. [[24-cell#Reciprocal constructions from 8-cell and 16-cell|The vertices of the middle 16-cell lie on the (w, x, y, z) coordinate axes]];{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} the other two are rotated 60° [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinically]] to its left and its right. The 24-vertex 24-cell is a compound of three 16-cells, whose three sets of 8 vertices are distributed around the 24-cell symmetrically; each vertex is surrounded by 8 others (in the 3-dimensional space of the 4-dimensional 24-cell's ''surface''), the way the vertices of a cube surround its center.{{Efn|name=24-cell vertex figure}} The 8 surrounding vertices (the cube corners) lie in other 16-cells: 4 in the other 16-cell to the left, and 4 in the other 16-cell to the right. They are the vertices of two tetrahedra inscribed in the cube, one belonging (as a cell) to each 16-cell. If the 16-cell edges are {{radic|2}}, each vertex of the compound of three 16-cells is {{radic|1}} away from its 8 surrounding vertices in other 16-cells. Now visualize those {{radic|1}} distances as the edges of the 24-cell (while continuing to visualize the disjoint 16-cells). The {{radic|1}} edges form great hexagons of 6 vertices which run around the 24-cell in a central plane. ''Four'' hexagons cross at each vertex (and its antipodal vertex), inclined at 60° to each other.{{Efn|name=cuboctahedral hexagons}} The [[24-cell#Hexagons|hexagons]] are not perpendicular to each other, or to the 16-cells' perpendicular [[24-cell#Squares|square central planes]].{{Efn|name=non-orthogonal hexagons}} The left and right 16-cells form a tesseract.{{Efn|Each pair of the three 16-cells inscribed in the 24-cell forms a 4-dimensional [[W:tesseract|hypercube (a tesseract or 8-cell)]], in [[24-cell#Relationships among interior polytopes|dimensional analogy]] to the way two tetrahedra form a cube: the two 8-vertex 16-cells are inscribed in the 16-vertex tesseract, occupying its alternate vertices. The third 16-cell does not lie within the tesseract; its 8 vertices protrude from the sides of the tesseract, forming a cubic pyramid on each of the tesseract's cubic cells. The three pairs of 16-cells form three tesseracts.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} The tesseracts share vertices, but the 16-cells are completely disjoint.{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}}|name=three 16-cells form three tesseracts}} Two 16-cells have vertex-pairs which are one {{radic|1}} edge (one hexagon edge) apart. But a [[24-cell#Simple rotations|''simple'' rotation]] of 60° will not take one whole 16-cell to another 16-cell, because their vertices are 60° apart in different directions, and a simple rotation has only one hexagonal plane of rotation. One 16-cell ''can'' be taken to another 16-cell by a 60° [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|''isoclinic'' rotation]], because an isoclinic rotation is [[3-sphere]] symmetric: four [[24-cell#Clifford parallel polytopes|Clifford parallel hexagonal planes]] rotate together, but in four different rotational directions,{{Efn|name=Clifford displacement}} taking each 16-cell to another 16-cell. But since an isoclinic 60° rotation is a ''diagonal'' rotation by 60° in ''two'' completely orthogonal directions at once,{{Efn|name=isoclinic geodesic}} the corresponding vertices of the 16-cell and the 16-cell it is taken to are 120° apart: ''two'' {{radic|1}} hexagon edges (or one {{radic|3}} hexagon chord) apart, not one {{radic|1}} edge (60°) apart as in a simple rotation.{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} By the [[W:chiral|chiral]] diagonal nature of isoclinic rotations, the 16-cell ''cannot'' reach the adjacent 16-cell by rotating toward it; it can only reach the 16-cell ''beyond'' it. But of course, the 16-cell beyond the 16-cell to its right is the 16-cell to its left. So a 60° isoclinic rotation ''will'' take every 16-cell to another 16-cell: a 60° ''right'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we may have originally visualized as the ''left'' 16-cell, and a 60° ''left'' isoclinic rotation will take the middle 16-cell to the 16-cell we visualized as the ''right'' 16-cell. (If so, that was our error in visualization; the 16-cell to the "left" is in fact the one reached by the left isoclinic rotation, as that is the only sense in which the two 16-cells are left or right of each other.)|name=three isoclinic 16-cells}} {{Efn|In a double rotation each vertex can be said to move along two completely orthogonal great circles at the same time, but it does not stay within the central plane of either of those original great circles; rather, it moves along a helical geodesic that traverses diagonally between great circles. The two completely orthogonal planes of rotation are said to be ''invariant'' because the points in each stay in the plane ''as the plane moves'', tilting sideways by the same angle that the other plane rotates.|name=helical geodesic}} {{Efn|A point under isoclinic rotation traverses the diagonal{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} straight line of a single '''isoclinic geodesic''', reaching its destination directly, instead of the bent line of two successive '''simple geodesics'''. A '''[[W:geodesic|geodesic]]''' is the ''shortest path'' through a space (intuitively, a string pulled taught between two points). Simple geodesics are great circles lying in a central plane (the only kind of geodesics that occur in 3-space on the 2-sphere). Isoclinic geodesics are different: they do ''not'' lie in a single plane; they are 4-dimensional [[W:helix|spirals]] rather than simple 2-dimensional circles.{{Efn|name=helical geodesic}} But they are not like 3-dimensional [[W:screw threads|screw threads]] either, because they form a closed loop like any circle (after ''two'' revolutions). Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'', and they are just as circular as 2-dimensional circles: in fact, twice as circular, because they curve in a circle in two completely orthogonal directions at once.{{Efn|Isoclinic geodesics are ''4-dimensional great circles'' in the sense that they are 1-dimensional geodesic ''lines'' that curve in 4-space in two completely orthogonal planes at once. They should not be confused with ''great 2-spheres'',{{Sfn|Stillwell|2001|p=24}} which are the 4-dimensional analogues of 2-dimensional great circles (great 1-spheres).}} These '''isoclines''' are geodesic 1-dimensional lines embedded in a 4-dimensional space. On the 3-sphere{{Efn|All isoclines are geodesics, and isoclines on the 3-sphere are circles (curving equally in each dimension), but not all isoclines on 3-manifolds in 4-space are circles.}} they always occur in [[W:chiral|chiral]] pairs and form a pair of [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]s on the [[W:Clifford torus|Clifford torus]],{{Efn|Isoclines on the 3-sphere occur in non-intersecting chiral pairs. A left and a right isocline form a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]] called the {1,1} torus knot{{Sfn|Dorst|2019|loc=§1. Villarceau Circles|p=44|ps=; "In mathematics, the path that the (1, 1) knot on the torus traces is also known as a [[W:Villarceau circle|Villarceau circle]]. Villarceau circles are usually introduced as two intersecting circles that are the cross-section of a torus by a well-chosen plane cutting it. Picking one such circle and rotating it around the torus axis, the resulting family of circles can be used to rule the torus. By nesting tori smartly, the collection of all such circles then form a [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fibration]].... we prefer to consider the Villarceau circle as the (1, 1) torus knot [a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]] rather than as a planar cut [two intersecting circles]."}} in which ''each'' of the two linked circles traverses all four dimensions.}} the paths of the left and the right [[W:Rotations in 4-dimensional Euclidean space#Double rotations|isoclinic rotation]]. They are [[W:Helix|helices]] bent into a [[W:Möbius strip|Möbius loop]] in the fourth dimension, taking a diagonal [[W:Winding number|winding route]] twice around the 3-sphere through the non-adjacent vertices of a 4-polytope's [[W:Skew polygon#Regular skew polygons in four dimensions|skew polygon]].|name=isoclinic geodesic}} {{Efn|[[File:Hopf band wikipedia.png|thumb|150px|Two [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles spanned by a twisted [[W:Annulus (mathematics)|annulus]].]][[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]]s are non-intersecting curved lines that are parallel in the sense that the perpendicular (shortest) distance between them is the same at each point. A double helix is an example of Clifford parallelism in ordinary 3-dimensional Euclidean space. In 4-space Clifford parallels occur as geodesic great circles on the [[W:3-sphere|3-sphere]].{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|pp=8-10|loc=Relations to Clifford Parallelism}} Whereas in 3-dimensional space, any two geodesic great circles on the [[W:2-sphere|2-sphere]] will always intersect at two antipodal points, in 4-dimensional space not all great circles intersect. In 4-polytopes various discrete sets of Clifford parallel non-intersecting geodesic great circles can be found on the 3-sphere. They spiral around each other in [[W:Hopf fibration|Hopf fiber bundles]] which visit all the vertices just once. The simplest example is that six mutually orthogonal great circles can be drawn on the 3-sphere, as three pairs of completely orthogonal great circles, intersecting at 8 points defining a [[16-cell]]. Each completely orthogonal pair of circles is Clifford parallel. They cannot intersect at all, because they lie in planes which intersect at only one point: the center of the 16-cell. Because they are perpendicular and share a common center, the two circles are obviously not parallel and separate in the usual way of parallel circles in 3 dimensions; rather they are connected like adjacent links in a chain, each passing through the other without intersecting at any points, forming a [[W:Hopf link|Hopf link]]|name=Clifford parallels}} {{Efn|In the 24-cell each great square plane is completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to another great square plane, and each great hexagon plane is completely orthogonal to a plane which intersects only two vertices: a great [[W:digon|digon]] plane.|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} {{Efn|In an [[24-cell#Isoclinic rotations|isoclinic rotation]], each point anywhere in the 4-polytope moves an equal distance in four orthogonal directions at once, on a [[W:8-cell#Radial equilateral symmetry|4-dimensional diagonal]]. The point is displaced a total [[W:Pythagorean distance]] equal to the square root of four times the square of that distance. For example, when the unit-radius 24-cell rotates isoclinically 60° in a hexagon invariant plane and 60° in its completely orthogonal invariant plane,{{Efn|name=pairs of completely orthogonal planes}} all vertices are displaced to a vertex two edge lengths away. Each vertex is displaced to another vertex {{radic|3}} (120°) away, moving {{radic|3/4}} in four orthogonal coordinate directions.|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} {{Efn|Each square plane is isoclinic (Clifford parallel) to five other square planes but completely orthogonal{{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} to only one of them.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Every pair of completely orthogonal planes has Clifford parallel great circles, but not all Clifford parallel great circles are orthogonal (e.g., none of the hexagonal geodesics in the 24-cell are mutually orthogonal).|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}} {{Efn|In the [[16-cell#Rotations|16-cell]] the 6 orthogonal great squares form 3 pairs of completely orthogonal great circles; each pair is Clifford parallel. In the 24-cell, the 3 inscribed 16-cells lie rotated 60 degrees isoclinically{{Efn|name=isoclinic 4-dimensional diagonal}} with respect to each other; consequently their corresponding vertices are 120 degrees apart on a hexagonal great circle. Pairing their vertices which are 90 degrees apart reveals corresponding square great circles which are Clifford parallel. Each of the 18 square great circles is Clifford parallel not only to one other square great circle in the same 16-cell (the completely orthogonal one), but also to two square great circles (which are completely orthogonal to each other) in each of the other two 16-cells. (Completely orthogonal great circles are Clifford parallel, but not all Clifford parallels are orthogonal.{{Efn|name=only some Clifford parallels are orthogonal}}) A 60 degree isoclinic rotation of the 24-cell in hexagonal invariant planes takes each square great circle to a Clifford parallel (but non-orthogonal) square great circle in a different 16-cell.|name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} {{Efn|In 4 dimensional space we can construct 4 perpendicular axes and 6 perpendicular planes through a point. Without loss of generality, we may take these to be the axes and orthogonal central planes of a (w, x, y, z) Cartesian coordinate system. In 4 dimensions we have the same 3 orthogonal planes (xy, xz, yz) that we have in 3 dimensions, and also 3 others (wx, wy, wz). Each of the 6 orthogonal planes shares an axis with 4 of the others, and is ''completely orthogonal'' to just one of the others: the only one with which it does not share an axis. Thus there are 3 pairs of completely orthogonal planes: xy and wz intersect only at the origin; xz and wy intersect only at the origin; yz and wx intersect only at the origin.|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}} {{Efn|Two planes in 4-dimensional space can have four possible reciprocal positions: (1) they can coincide (be exactly the same plane); (2) they can be parallel (the only way they can fail to intersect at all); (3) they can intersect in a single line, as two non-parallel planes do in 3-dimensional space; or (4) '''they can intersect in a single point'''{{Efn|To visualize how two planes can intersect in a single point in a four dimensional space, consider the Euclidean space (w, x, y, z) and imagine that the w dimension represents time rather than a spatial dimension. The xy central plane (where w{{=}}0, z{{=}}0) shares no axis with the wz central plane (where x{{=}}0, y{{=}}0). The xy plane exists at only a single instant in time (w{{=}}0); the wz plane (and in particular the w axis) exists all the time. Thus their only moment and place of intersection is at the origin point (0,0,0,0).|name=how planes intersect at a single point}} (and they ''must'', if they are completely orthogonal).{{Efn|Two flat planes A and B of a Euclidean space of four dimensions are called ''completely orthogonal'' if and only if every line in A is orthogonal to every line in B. In that case the planes A and B intersect at a single point O, so that if a line in A intersects with a line in B, they intersect at O.{{Efn|name=six orthogonal planes of the Cartesian basis}}|name=completely orthogonal planes}}|name=how planes intersect}} {{Efn|Polytopes are '''completely disjoint''' if all their ''element sets'' are disjoint: they do not share any vertices, edges, faces or cells. They may still overlap in space, sharing 4-content, volume, area, or lineage.|name=completely disjoint}} {{Efn|If the [[W:Euclidean distance|Pythagorean distance]] between any two vertices is {{sqrt|1}}, their geodesic distance is 1; they may be two adjacent vertices (in the curved 3-space of the surface), or a vertex and the center (in 4-space). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|2}}, their geodesic distance is 2 (whether via 3-space or 4-space, because the path along the edges is the same straight line with one 90^o bend in it as the path through the center). If their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|3}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 (whether on a hexagonal great circle past one 60^o bend, or as a straight line with one 60^o bend in it through the center). Finally, if their Pythagorean distance is {{sqrt|4}}, their geodesic distance is still 2 in 4-space (straight through the center), but it reaches 3 in 3-space (by going halfway around a hexagonal great circle).|name=Geodesic distance}} {{Efn|Two angles are required to fix the relative positions of two planes in 4-space.{{Sfn|Kim|Rote|2016|p=7|loc=§6 Angles between two Planes in 4-Space|ps=; "In four (and higher) dimensions, we need two angles to fix the relative position between two planes. (More generally, ''k'' angles are defined between ''k''-dimensional subspaces.)"}} Since all planes in the same [[W:hyperplane|hyperplane]] are 0 degrees apart in one of the two angles, only one angle is required in 3-space. Great hexagons in different hyperplanes are 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles. Great squares in different hyperplanes are 90 degrees apart in ''both'' angles (completely orthogonal){{Efn|name=completely orthogonal planes}} or 60 degrees apart in ''both'' angles.{{Efn||name=Clifford parallel squares in the 16-cell and 24-cell}} Planes which are separated by two equal angles are called ''isoclinic''. Planes which are isoclinic have [[W:Clifford parallel|Clifford parallel]] great circles.{{Efn|name=Clifford parallels}} A great square and a great hexagon in different hyperplanes are neither isoclinic nor Clifford parallel; they are separated by a 90 degree angle ''and'' a 60 degree angle.|name=two angles between central planes}} {{Efn|The 24-cell contains 3 distinct 8-cells (tesseracts), rotated 60° isoclinically with respect to each other. The corresponding vertices of two 8-cells are {{radic|3}} (120°) apart. Each 8-cell contains 8 cubical cells, and each cube contains four {{radic|3}} chords (its long diagonals). The 8-cells are not completely disjoint{{Efn|name=completely disjoint}} (they share vertices), but each cube and each {{radic|3}} chord belongs to just one 8-cell. The {{radic|3}} chords joining the corresponding vertices of two 8-cells belong to the third 8-cell.|name=three 8-cells}} {{Efn|Departing from any vertex V₀ in the original great hexagon plane of isoclinic rotation P₀, the first vertex reached V₁ is 120 degrees away along a {{radic|3}} chord lying in a different hexagonal plane P₁. P₁ is inclined to P₀ at a 60° angle.{{Efn|P₀ and P₁ lie in the same hyperplane (the same central cuboctahedron) so their other angle of separation is 0.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}}}} The second vertex reached V₂ is 120 degrees beyond V₁ along a second {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₂ that is Clifford parallel to P₀.{{Efn|P₀ and P₂ are 60° apart in ''both'' angles of separation.{{Efn|name=two angles between central planes}} Clifford parallel planes are isoclinic (which means they are separated by two equal angles), and their corresponding vertices are all the same distance apart. Although V₀ and V₂ are ''two'' {{radic|3}} chords apart{{Efn|V₀ and V₂ are two {{radic|3}} chords apart on the geodesic path of this rotational isocline, but that is not the shortest geodesic path between them. In the 24-cell, it is impossible for two vertices to be more distant than ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord, unless they are antipodal vertices {{radic|4}} apart.{{Efn|name=Geodesic distance}} V₀ and V₂ are ''one'' {{radic|3}} chord apart on some other isocline. More generally, isoclines are geodesics because the distance between their ''adjacent'' vertices is the shortest distance between those two vertices, but a path between two vertices along a geodesic is not always the shortest distance between them (even on ordinary great circle geodesics).}}, P₀ and P₂ are just one {{radic|1}} edge apart (at every pair of ''nearest'' vertices).}} (Notice that V₁ lies in both intersecting planes P₁ and P₂, as V₀ lies in both P₀ and P₁. But P₀ and P₂ have ''no'' vertices in common; they do not intersect.) The third vertex reached V₃ is 120 degrees beyond V₂ along a third {{radic|3}} chord lying in another hexagonal plane P₃ that is Clifford parallel to P₁. The three {{radic|3}} chords lie in different 8-cells.{{Efn|name=three 8-cells}} V₀ to V₃ is a 360° isoclinic rotation.|name=360 degree geodesic path visiting 3 hexagonal planes}} {{Sfn|Mamone, Pileio & Levitt|2010|loc=§4.5 Regular Convex 4-Polytopes|pp=1438-1439|ps=; the 24-cell has 1152 symmetry operations (rotations and reflections) as enumerated in Table 2, symmetry group 𝐹₄.}} ==Notes== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Notelist|wiki=W:}} ==Citations== {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Reflist|wiki=W:}} ==References== {{Refbegin}} * {{Cite book|title=A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers|last=Thoreau|first=Henry David|author-link=W:Thoreau|publisher=James Munroe and Company|year=1849|isbn=|location=Boston|ref={{SfnRef|Thoreau|1849}}}} * {{Cite journal|title=Theoretical Evidence for Principles of Special Relativity Based on Isotropic and Uniform Four-Dimensional Space|first=Takuya|last=Yamashita|date=25 May 2023|doi= 10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|journal=Preprints|volume=2023|issue=2023051785|url=https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202305.1785.v1|ref={{SfnRef|Yamashita|2023}}}} * {{Cite_arXiv | arxiv=2512.02903v2 | date=2 January 2026 | title=Symmetry transformation group arising from the Laplace–Runge–Lenz vector | first1=Stephen C. | last1=Anco | first2=Mahdieh Gol Bashmani | last2=Moghadam | class=math-ph}} === [[Polyscheme|Polyschemes]] === {{Regular convex 4-polytopes Refs|wiki=W:}} {{Refend}} p636ckbox9wv15p4cr3t2yd4zhvr8dv 3 303304 2842322 2842251 2026-10-23T15:12:47Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* FYI */ reply ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842322 wikitext text/x-wiki ==Welcome== {{Robelbox|theme=9|title='''[[Wikiversity:Welcome|Welcome]] to [[Wikiversity:What is Wikiversity|Wikiversity]], Codename Noreste!'''|width=100%}} <div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> You can [[Wikiversity:Contact|contact us]] with [[Wikiversity:Questions|questions]] at the [[Wikiversity:Colloquium|colloquium]] or get in touch with [[User talk:Jtneill|me personally]] if you would like some [[Help:Contents|help]]. 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See you around Wikiversity! ---- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 12:39, 24 March 2026 (UTC)</div> <!-- Template:Welcome --> {{Robelbox/close}} == [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Custodianship/Codename Noreste]] == I have closed this as successful. Please reach out if you have any questions. Congrats! —[[User:Atcovi|Atcovi]] [[User talk:Atcovi|(Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Atcovi|Contribs)]] 18:47, 31 March 2026 (UTC) Congratulations. Please add yourself to [[Wikiversity:Staff]]. Sincerely, James -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 01:29, 1 April 2026 (UTC) :@[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]], {{done|[[Special:Diff/2802052|done]]}}. [[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 02:59, 1 April 2026 (UTC) Congratulations. I've added you as custodian. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 16:57, 21 May 2026 (UTC) : Congrats. Welcome aboard. Let me know if I can do anything as mentor as you go along. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:14, 22 May 2026 (UTC) : You're welcome, y'all. [[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 00:49, 22 May 2026 (UTC) == Abusefilters == Thanks for pointing me to abuse filters. Now I can see, that they bring whole new agenda. [[User:Juandev|Juandev]] ([[User talk:Juandev|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Juandev|contribs]]) 17:58, 1 April 2026 (UTC) :Yes, custodians can see local private abuse filters, and I am a global abuse filter helper, so I can teach you about abuse filters, if needed [[User:Juandev|Juandev]]. Thanks. [[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 18:16, 1 April 2026 (UTC) == Hi == Hi, I'm from Wikibooks. I was just wondering how the draft on my [[User:2005-Fan|userpage]] for a Pokemon-based project on here (and potentially more video games) since I want stable resources to contribute gaming knowledge, and I was informed of this website. Admittedly I used Anthropic to help make the draft., but I just wanted to see what the policies and your opinion is. [[User:2005-Fan|2005-Fan]] ([[User talk:2005-Fan|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/2005-Fan|contribs]]) 16:09, 13 April 2026 (UTC) : Hello, I believe MathXplore has responded to your question(s) per [[User talk:MathXplore#c-MathXplore-20260414121900-2005-Fan-20260413234100]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 16:13, 14 April 2026 (UTC) ==Interface administrator== You are now an [[Wikiversity:Interface administrators]] for 120 days. Thanks for your willingness to improve the English Wikiversity interface. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 22:39, 12 May 2026 (UTC) == Curator rights == You have removed curator flag from [[Wikiversity:Bureaucratship]]. My point in the discussion was, that non of the pages is mentioning that they can give curator flag. So if it is technically posible for admins, that information, should probably be placed in [[Wikiversity:Custodianship]]. I am not doing that, because I dont know if it is a habit on en.wv. [[User:Juandev|Juandev]] ([[User talk:Juandev|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Juandev|contribs]]) 12:14, 13 May 2026 (UTC) : See [[Special:Diff/2808912]]. Bold change, but I added information about which permissions custodians can grant and remove, but which permissions they cannot do. [[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 15:05, 13 May 2026 (UTC) ::Yes, if you can improve the accuracy, clarity, and consistency of information on the curator, custodian, and bureaucrat policy/proposed policy pages, especially about user rights, please go ahead and do so. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:01, 13 May 2026 (UTC) == Wikinews == I want to write @[[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]], @[[User:Koavf|Koavf]] [[User:BigKrow|BigKrow]] ([[User talk:BigKrow|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BigKrow|contribs]]) 21:32, 13 May 2026 (UTC) :I encourage you to start working with the [[:Category:Journalism|existing journalism resources]] and propose general new-writing at [[Wikiversity:Colloquium]]. I would support the idea of en masse allowing Wikinews to be continued here, including a new namespace. I think that it's a valid continuing learning activity to see citizen journalism in practice. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 21:54, 13 May 2026 (UTC) == This message is 100% human written. Somebody tried to reach out to me. == Hello. I got 2 notifications kinda recently and I don't want to lose my "momentum" as I'm worried that whomever was not making constructive edits but perhaps had a reason to "vent" and the place they chose to "vent" may have just been English Wikiversity I'm hanging out here https://etherpad.wikimedia.org/p/letstalk which is a 100% sort of "monitored" place considering all edit history is saved in real time which is why I love Etherpad so much. I feel I am strong enough that regardless of whatever that user wanted to throw my way I can handle it. The strength of etherpad is that everything is documented automatically but it's also a great brainstorming tool and I think I could turn whatever is being thrown my way into "a positive and creative way". I'm not asking you to do anything. Perhaps just me posting this may encourage some interaction with another human being and I'm ok with people not agreeing with me or even wanting to throw abuse my way to vent(as a special exception just for the next 24 hours) I hope this was written in a constructive way. If it was not feel free to remove this message completely along with its edit history. If you have any questions feel free to ask them. Thank you for making English Wikiversity a better place! [[User:ThinkingScience|ThinkingScience]] ([[User talk:ThinkingScience|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/ThinkingScience|contribs]]) 03:02, 5 July 2026 (UTC) == Notice of expiration of your interface-admin right == <div dir="ltr">Hi, as part of [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Global reminder bot|Global reminder bot]], this is an automated reminder to let you know that your permission "interface-admin" (Interface administrators) will expire on 2026-09-09 22:33:42. Please renew this right if you would like to continue using it. <i>In other languages: [[:m:Special:MyLanguage/Global reminder bot/Messages/default|click here]]</i> [[User:Leaderbot|Leaderbot]] ([[User talk:Leaderbot|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Leaderbot|contribs]]) 19:41, 3 September 2026 (UTC)</div> == FYI == I just wanted to let you know that I am greatly appreciate of your efforts at [[phab:T442057]]. I am also very supportive of your productive work as an interface administrator. I just want to insure that we grant rights based on accepted policy. I value your contributions to wv. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 06:02, 23 October 2026 (UTC) : Thank you, [[User:Mu301|Mu301]]. If [[Wikiversity:Colloquium#Interface administrators policy]] passes, I am willing to have a one year extension of my IA rights, but only after [[User:Koavf|Koavf]]'s request at [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Interface Adminship]] passes, as he already stated that he is willing to run for IA. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:12, 23 October 2026 (UTC) 5shxmjoirizodiyb9ywt72k1q56o29v 0 322589 2842383 2839021 2026-10-24T00:04:31Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Addressed all the spelling and grammar flags and improve readability in some areas 2842383 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|E-cigarette use motivation:<br>What motivates starting and continuing vaping of nicotine e-cigarettes?}} == Overview == {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:2023 E-papieros Argus XT i Requiem RTA.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. Example of an e-cigarette]] ;Case study Imagine a 19-year-old female with a childhood history of seizures, presented at a hospital for worsening shortness of breath. She had admitted to vaping for two years but denied that she had used any drugs. After tests for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and rapid influenza came back negative, doctors performed a lung biopsy on the lower part of her left lung. Her condition gradually improved, and she was discharged after 15 days. At a one-month follow-up appointment, her symptoms had resolved and repeat chest imaging showed that the cloudy areas in her lungs had improved (Pourshahid et al., 2022). However, within a few days after hearing her condition was improving, she resumed vaping. What factors could have led her to continue vaping even after experiencing its negative health consequences? {{RoundBoxBottom}} <ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pourshahid|first=Seyedmohammad|last2=Khademolhosseini|first2=Sara|last3=Hussain|first3=Shahzad|last4=Le|first4=Susanti R.|last5=Cirino-Marcano|first5=Maria Del Mar|last6=Aziz|first6=Sameh|last7=Biscardi|first7=Frank|last8=Foroozesh|first8=Mahtab|date=May 2022|title=A Case Series of E-cigarette or Vaping-Associated Lung Injury With a Review of Pathological and Radiological Findings|url=https://doi.org/10.7759/cureus.24822|journal=Cureus|volume=14|issue=5|pages=1-2}}</ref> [[wikipedia:Electronic_cigarette|Electronic cigarettes]] (e-cigarettes) are a device often designed to replicate a standard cigarette used to consume vapours that can contain nicotine, flavours, propylene glycol, and vegetable glycerin.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/electronic+cigarette|title=Definition of ELECTRONIC CIGARETTE|date=2025-06-22|website=www.merriam-webster.com|language=en|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Gotts|first=Jeffrey E|author-link=https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l5275#aff-1|last2=Jordt|first2=Sven-Eric|author-link2=https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l5275#aff-2|last3=McConnell|first3=Rob|author-link3=https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l5275#aff-4|last4=Tarran|first4=Robett|author-link4=https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l5275#aff-5|date=30-10-2019|title=What are the Respiratory effects of e-cigarettes?|url=https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.l5275|journal=BMJ|volume=366}}</ref> The first documented appearance of electronic cigarettes was in the early 20th century in the state of [[wikipedia:New_York_(state)|New York]] in a patent filed by Joseph Robinson in 1927.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-vaping-who-invented-e-cigs-2019-10|title=The wild history of vaping, from a 1927 'electric vaporizer' to today's mysterious lung injury crisis|last=Brueck|first=Hilary|website=Business Insider|language=en-US|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> However, despite the fact that a patent for e-cigarettes was filed in the early 20th century it was not until the early twenty-first century that e-cigarettes were popularised with the introduction of the "Ruyan" in China manufactured in 2004 and patented by [[w:Hon_Lik|Hon Lik]] in 2003.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/we-asked-the-inventor-of-the-e-cigarette-what-he-thinks-about-vape-regulations-5886b747f672c2456363054c/|title=We Asked the Inventor of the E-Cigarette What He Thinks About Vape Regulations|last=Rogers|first=Kaleigh|date=2016-07-18|website=VICE|language=en-US|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> Since 2003 e-cigarette use has increased dramatically with the Australian Bureau of Statistics reporting that one in seven adults have used e-cigarettes with men being more likely to consume e-cigarettes than women and at almost double the rate.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/health/health-conditions-and-risks/smoking-and-vaping/latest-release|title=Smoking and vaping, 2022 {{!}} Australian Bureau of Statistics|date=2023-12-15|website=www.abs.gov.au|language=en|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> In 2018 the estimated number of people who vaped was 58.1 million people by 2023 it was estimated that 114 million people globally had vaped, an increase of 55.9 million people over a 5 year period.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://gsthr.org/resources/global-state-of-thr-2024/estimated-global-number-of-vapers-2024/|title=Estimated global number of vapers (2024)|website=Global State of Tobacco Harm Reduction|language=en|access-date=2025-09-28}}</ref> [[File:Cigarette-key.svg|thumb|'''Figure 2'''. Conventional Cigarette <ref>{{Citation|title=English: Scheme of a cigarette.|url=https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cigarette-key.svg|date=2007-11-01|accessdate=2025-09-27|last=Sémhur}}</ref>]] == History of e-cigarettes == Whilst e-cigarettes can be traced back to the early 20th century, they have only been popularised recently with the release of the modern e-cigarette occurring in 2003. ==== First Documented Mentions of E-cigarettes ==== The first documented mention of e-cigarettes was in a patent filed in New York state by Joseph Robinson in 1927, although the product was not introduced commercially. In the 1960s, there was another attempt to take e-cigarettes to the commercial market by Herbert Gilbert who is credited with having invented the e-cigarette that most closely resembles the modern cigarette. Although Gilbert created multiple prototypes, he was unable to secure any funding and was unable to commercialise his inventions.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://casaa.org/education/vaping/historical-timeline-of-electronic-cigarettes/|title=The History of Vaping|website=CASAA|language=en-US|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> ==== Introduction of The Modern E-cigarette ==== The creation of the modern e-cigarette that is widely available today is largely credited to [[w:Hon_Lik|Hon Lik]] who filed for a patent in [[w:China|China]], the [[w:European_Union|European Union]], and the [[w:United_States|United States]] in 2003 and was manufactured in 2004. After releasing the e-cigarette in [[w:China|China]] [[wikipedia:Hon_Lik|Hon Lik]] received such positive feedback he felt empowered enough to release e-cigarettes in to the [[w:European_Union|European Union]].<ref name=":0" /> Although e-cigarettes have been found to be more healthy than conventional cigarettes, there have been health consequences associated with using e-cigarettes. Some common motivations for using e-cigarettes are socio-economic status, perceptions on the healthiness of e-cigarettes, and attempting to quit smoking conventional cigarettes. == E-cigarette use over time == [[File:Reasons for initiating e-cigarette use (EU 2018).jpg|thumb|'''Figure 3'''. Provided motivations for why people started to use E-cigarettes (EU 2018).]] {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} ==== General E-cigarette Use Over Time ==== According to Euromonitor International since 2011 the adult smoking population of vapour products has risen from seven million people to forty-two million people in 2018 (see Figure 2).<ref name=":1">{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44295336|title=Vaping: How popular are e-cigarettes?|date=2018-05-30|access-date=2025-08-14|language=en-GB}}</ref> An indicator of growing e-cigarette use if the prevalence of specialised vaping and tobacco shops opening. An example being in the United Kingdom where vaping and tobacco shops were the sixth most common new store opening, ahead of convenience stores and sports & health clubs.<ref name=":1" /> ==== E-cigarette use by age demographic ==== E-cigarette use has increased over time with more young people using e-cigarettes than [[wikipedia:Cigarette|traditional cigarettes.]] <small>''[why are young people using them more?]''</small> The estimated global prevalence of e-cigarette use among young people is that 16.8% of young people have used an e-cigarette at least once and 4.8% of young people constantly used e-cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Salari|first=Nader|last2=Rahimi|first2=Sahel|last3=Darvishi|first3=Niloofar|last4=Abdolmaleki|first4=Amir|last5=Mohammadi|first5=Masoud|date=2024-06-01|title=The global prevalence of E-cigarettes in youth: A comprehensive systematic review and meta-analysis|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666535224000430|journal=Public Health in Practice|volume=7|pages=100506|doi=10.1016/j.puhip.2024.100506|issn=2666-5352}}</ref> Between 2014 and 2018 the increased use of e-cigarettes among young people has led to the conclusion that e-cigarettes are an initiation to nicotine whereas older people are more likely to be near quitters.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bandi|first=Priti|last2=Cahn|first2=Zachary|last3=Goding Sauer|first3=Ann|last4=Douglas|first4=Clifford E.|last5=Drope|first5=Jeffrey|last6=Jemal|first6=Ahmedin|last7=Fedewa|first7=Stacey A.|date=2021-02-01|title=Trends in E-Cigarette Use by Age Group and Combustible Cigarette Smoking Histories, U.S. Adults, 2014–2018|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379720303809|journal=American Journal of Preventive Medicine|volume=60|issue=2|pages=151–158|doi=10.1016/j.amepre.2020.07.026|issn=0749-3797}}</ref> Although people over the age of 60 are more likely to have used e-cigarettes within the last 30 days.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/smoking/young-peoples-vapes-e-cigarettes|title=Young people’s use of vapes and e-cigarettes|date=29 Feb 2024|website=Australian Institute of Health and Welfare|access-date=14/08/2025}}</ref> <quiz display="simple"> {The 60+ age group is more likely to have used e-cigarettes in the last 30 days than 40-49. |type="[]"} + True - False </quiz> == Motivation for e-cigarette use == The most self-reported and well researched motivations for e-cigarette use are an individual's socio-economic status, their perception on the health consequences of e-cigarette use, attempting to quit smoking traditional cigarettes, and the taste and flavours that e-cigarettes have that are not available with more traditional cigarettes. The common reasons as to why individuals continue to regularly use e-cigarettes after having them the first time is the chemical reaction induced from using e-cigarettes that contain nicotine, an addictive substance that overtime requires more nicotine in order to feel the effects of dopamine. <small>''[why do people continue to use e-cigarettes once they start?]''</small>{{f}} ==== Socio-economic Situation ==== Adolescent individuals who live in low-income households are more likely to be exposed to cigarettes and cigarette use.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Simon|first=Patricia|last2=Camenga|first2=Deepa R.|last3=Morean|first3=Meghan E.|last4=Kong|first4=Grace|last5=Bold|first5=Krysten W.|last6=Cavallo|first6=Dana A.|last7=Krishnan-Sarin|first7=Suchitra|date=2018-07|title=Socioeconomic status and adolescent e-cigarette use: The mediating role of e-cigarette advertisement exposure|url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6007030/|journal=Preventive Medicine|volume=112|pages=193–198|doi=10.1016/j.ypmed.2018.04.019|issn=1096-0260|pmc=6007030|pmid=29673887}}</ref> Which leads to Adolescents in low-income households to be more likely to consume e-cigarettes. Those living in disadvantaged areas according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics were more likely to smoke than those who did not, 18.1% in disadvantaged areas and 5.4% not disadvantaged areas.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/health/health-conditions-and-risks/smoking-and-vaping/latest-release|title=Smoking and vaping, 2022 {{!}} Australian Bureau of Statistics|date=2023-12-15|website=www.abs.gov.au|language=en|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> ==== Perceptions on the Health Consequences of E-cigarette Use ==== It has been found that younger people not only believe that e-cigarettes are healthier{{sp}} than conventional cigarettes, but also believe they are healthy in the general sense.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Anand|first=Vivek|last2=McGinty|first2=Kaye L.|last3=O'Brien|first3=Kevin|last4=Guenthner|first4=Gregory|last5=Hahn|first5=Ellen|last6=Martin|first6=Catherine A.|date=2015-07|title=E-cigarette Use and Beliefs Among Urban Public High School Students in North Carolina|url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26095408|journal=The Journal of Adolescent Health: Official Publication of the Society for Adolescent Medicine|volume=57|issue=1|pages=46–51|doi=10.1016/j.jadohealth.2015.03.018|issn=1879-1972|pmid=26095408}}</ref> However, although younger people, especially in high income countries, tend to have more positive perceptions of e-cigarettes than traditional cigarettes. {{g}} The primary reason for this has not been concluded with too many clashes of perspective in advertising, health advice, and personal advice for researchers to be able to conclusively determine what the primary cause of the positive perception relative to traditional cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sharma|first=Anupriya|last2=McCausland|first2=Kahlia|last3=Jancey|first3=Jonine|date=2021-05-01|title=Adolescents' Health Perceptions of E-Cigarettes: A Systematic Review|url=https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797(21)00065-9/abstract|journal=American Journal of Preventive Medicine|language=English|volume=60|issue=5|pages=716–725|doi=10.1016/j.amepre.2020.12.013|issn=0749-3797|pmid=33775514}}</ref> It has been found that when people are questioned on whether or not there was less harmful chemicals within an e-cigarette compared to a conventional cigarette 20% percent of respondents replied they viewed the chemicals in e-cigarettes as less harmful than conventional cigarettes and another ==== Attempting to Quit Smoking Traditional Cigarettes ==== As shown in Figure 2, {{g}} the primary reason for using e-cigarettes among respondents in 2018 was to{{sp}} quit smoking traditional cigarettes. However, this has since been disputed as the primary motivation of e-cigarette use, at least among Australian adolescents, young adults, and adults, with curiosity being the main motivation for e-cigarette use among those who had never tried cigarettes and the taste and flavour of e-cigarettes being the main motivation for those who continue to use e-cigarettes and flavours were also the primary motivation of individuals who smoke traditional cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Thoonen|first=Karlijn A. H. J.|last2=Jongenelis|first2=Michelle I.|date=2024-01-01|title=Motivators of e-cigarette use among Australian adolescents, young adults, and adults|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953623007682|journal=Social Science & Medicine|volume=340|pages=116411|doi=10.1016/j.socscimed.2023.116411|issn=0277-9536}}</ref> While a significant number of people cite using e-cigarettes and [https://www.vapestore.pk/ pod kit MTL vape] with [https://vipvapestore.pk/ nicotine salt flavor] as an attempt to quit smoking comparisons attempting to discern whether e-cigarette use has been more effective than no help at all. In attempting to quit, people found that e-cigarettes were five times more likely to help individuals stop smoking after a monthly follow-up of 1 month{{sp}} of e-cigarette use.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=McDermott|first=Máirtín S.|last2=East|first2=Katherine A.|last3=Brose|first3=Leonie S.|last4=McNeill|first4=Ann|last5=Hitchman|first5=Sara C.|last6=Partos|first6=Timea R.|date=2021|title=The effectiveness of using e-cigarettes for quitting smoking compared to other cessation methods among adults in the United Kingdom|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/add.15474|journal=Addiction|language=en|volume=116|issue=10|pages=2825–2836|doi=10.1111/add.15474|issn=1360-0443}}</ref> However, health advice from the American Centre for Disease Control (CDC) recommend that when using e-cigarettes in an attempt to quit smoking they should switch from conventional cigarettes to e-cigarettes immediately as extended periods of dual use delays quitting smoking completely.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://archive.cdc.gov/#/details?url=https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/severe-lung-disease.html|title=Outbreak of Lung Injury Associated with the Use of E-Cigarette, or Vaping, Products|date=3/8/2021|website=Centers for Disease Control and Prevention|archive-url=https://archive.cdc.gov/www_cdc_gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/severe-lung-disease.html|archive-date=21/6/2024}}</ref> ==== Taste and Flavour of E-cigarettes ==== Unlike traditional cigarettes, e-cigarettes are able to contain flavours and tastes that are often found to be more appealing and help to incentivise younger customers who may be hesitant to use traditional cigarettes due to the well-known health consequences. The flavours that e-cigarettes contain such as [https://ecigarettereviewed.com/best-e-juice-flavors/ Boosted, No.32, and Fuji Apple Strawberry Nectarine] are also widely cited as one of the reasons younger people especially children are more attracted to e-cigarettes than traditional cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Cotti|first=Chad|last2=Courtemanche|first2=Charles|last3=Liang|first3=Yang|last4=Maclean|first4=Johanna Catherine|last5=Nesson|first5=Erik|last6=Sabia|first6=Joseph J.|date=2025-08-01|title=The effect of e-cigarette flavor bans on tobacco use|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629625000487|journal=Journal of Health Economics|volume=102|pages=103013|doi=10.1016/j.jhealeco.2025.103013|issn=0167-6296}}</ref> In America e-cigarettes are available in all types of shapes and sizes, with more than 400 brands and an estimated 15,500 flavours.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hsu|first=Greta|last2=Sun|first2=Jessica Y.|last3=Zhu|first3=Shu-Hong|date=2018-03-12|title=Evolution of Electronic Cigarette Brands From 2013-2014 to 2016-2017: Analysis of Brand Websites|url=https://www.jmir.org/2018/3/e80|journal=Journal of Medical Internet Research|language=EN|volume=20|issue=3|pages=e8550|doi=10.2196/jmir.8550|pmc=5869180|pmid=29530840}}</ref> == Motivations for the regular use of e-cigarettes == {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} ==== Nicotine ==== [[File:Nicotine 3D Model.png|thumb|'''Figure 4'''. 3D Model of Nicotine<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nicotine_3D_Model.png|title=File:Nicotine 3D Model.png - Wikimedia Commons|website=commons.wikimedia.org|language=en|access-date=2025-09-28}}</ref>]] Nicotine is a highly addictive chemical that causes your brain to release dopamine, commonly referred to as a feel-good chemical. The longer an individual has been smoking the more nicotine they need for the extra dopamine their brain craves.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web|url=https://www.health.gov.au/topics/smoking-vaping-and-tobacco/about-smoking/effects|title=Effects of Smoking and Tobacco|date=8-5-2024|website=Department of Health, Disability and Ageing}}</ref> Once a person develops a dependency for nicotine they begin to start feeling withdrawal symptoms which can cause people to be irritable, nervous, and anxious often driving individuals to smoke.<ref name=":3" /> Nicotine initiates addiction by latching on to neural circuitry which functions as a way to reinforce behaviours that lead to rewarding goals. There are many brain structures that help this reward system function but one particular system, mesocorticolimbic dopamine (DA), plays a particularly important role in the adoption of behaviours that are inappropriately reinforced by psychostimulant drugs such as nicotine<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=De Biasi|first=Mariella|last2=Dani|first2=John A.|date=2011|title=Reward, Addiction, Withdrawal to Nicotine|url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4542051/pdf/nihms-671027.pdf|journal=The Neuropharmacology of Nicotine Dependence|volume=34|pages=105-139|via=NIH Public Access}}</ref>. Nicotine increases the firing activity and phasic burst activity of midbrain DA neurons and elevates DA in other targets, this is what underlies nicotine's ability to enhance rewards from brain stimulation, reinforce conditioned preferences, and support self-administration.<ref name=":4" /> ==== Social Influences ==== [[File:Social media collection 2020s.png|thumb|'''Figure 5'''. Social Media Networks<ref>{{Citation|title=English: Social media collection icons in 2020s|url=https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Social_media_collection_2020s.png|date=2024-08-06|accessdate=2025-09-28|last=Ibrahim.ID}}</ref>]] There has been a substantial amount of research done on the influence that social factors such as social interactions, social norms, and advertising. Social media itself within the research is considered a conduit for these social factors. While there are substantial gaps in the research, advertising played a significant role when it came to what social factors were influencing people to use e-cigarettes, people who reported seeing advertising for e-cigarettes had an increased intention to use e-cigarettes<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Amon|first=Samia|last2=Dunn|first2=Adam G.|last3=Laranjo|first3=Liliana|date=January 2020|title=Social Influence in the Uptake and Use of Electronic Cigarettes: A Systematic Review|url=https://doi-org.ezproxy.canberra.edu.au/10.1016/j.amepre.2019.08.023|journal=American Journal of Preventative Medicine|volume=58|issue=1|pages=129-141}}</ref>. Advertising conducted through social media had the same effect. A study conducted attempting to see how many people were exposed to advertising e-cigarettes found that across four countries, Australia, China, India and the UK, 85% of respondents had been exposed to e-cigarette advertising through advertisement in real life as well as advertisement through popular social media platforms.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pettigrew|first=Simone|last2=Santos|first2=Joseph A|last3=Pinho-Gomes|first3=Ana-Catarina|last4=Li|first4=Yuan|last5=Jones|first5=Alexandra|date=October 2023|title=Exposure to e-cigarette advertising and young people's use of e-cigarettes: A four-country study|url=https://doi.org/10.18332/tid/172414|journal=Tobacco induced diseases|volume=21|pages=141}}</ref> People who may have already used an e-cigarette containing nicotine and are experiencing withdrawal would be more likely to use e-cigarettes again if exposed to advertising for e-cigarettes. The World Health Organisation has recommended that countries ban all forms of advertisements, sponsorship, and promotion of e-cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240032095|title=WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2021: addressing new and emerging products|last=World Health Oganisation|date=July 2021|website=World Health Organization}}</ref> ==== Coping with Mental Health Challenges ==== [[File:Mental Health Message.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 6'''. Mental Health Display<ref>{{Citation|title=English: Mental Health Wellness Psychology Mind.|url=https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mental_Health_Message.jpg|date=2017-01-29|accessdate=2025-09-28|first=Wokandapix at|last=Pixabay}}</ref>]] In a survey conducted of youth and young adults {{where}}, people aged 15-24 years of age, the most common reason for using e-cigarettes was coping with mental health challenges{{f}}. The people who{{g}} cited coping with mental health challenges as their reason for using e-cigarettes most common response when asked why that the e-cigarettes helped them relax, help them feel calm or less anxious, and that it helps them stay focused.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Do|first=Elizabeth K.|last2=Koris|first2=Kristiann|last3=Minter|first3=Tyler|last4=Esayed|first4=Suad|last5=Hair|first5=Elizabeth C.|date=July 2025|title=Reasons for E-cigarette Use and Their Associations With Frequency, Dependence, and Quit Intentions: Findings From a Youth and Young Adult Sample|url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2025.03.009|journal=American Journal of Preventative Medicine|volume=69|issue=1}}</ref> The perceived ability of e-cigarettes to help youth and young people feel calm or more relaxed is likely associated with the nicotine content that can be found in many e-cigarettes and initiate a process that reinforces conditioned process in the form of using e-cigarettes{{f}}. ==== Sensation Seeking ==== Sensation seeking has also been found to be a popular reason for youth and young adults to engage with e-cigarettes. When asked about why they were using e-cigarettes the replies consisted of responses such as they gave me a good buzz, they came in flavours that I liked, just to try, and just curious.<ref name=":5" /> These responses hint at a lack of knowledge on the health consequences of using e-cigarettes whether they contain nicotine or not. == Health consequences of e-cigarette use == {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} ==== Lung damage ==== E-cigarettes containing vitamin e acetate have been associated with life-threatening acute pulmonary illness, this is specifically distinct from typical health consequences associated with the long term use of e-cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Amjad|first=Mohammad Asim|last2=Ocazionez Trujillo|first2=Daniel|last3=Estrada-Y-Martin|first3=Rosa M.|last4=Cherian|first4=Sujith V.|date=2025-05-17|title=E-Cigarette or Vaping Product Use-Associated Lung Injury: A Comprehensive Review|url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12111167/|journal=International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health|volume=22|issue=5|pages=792|doi=10.3390/ijerph22050792|issn=1660-4601|pmc=12111167|pmid=40427906}}</ref> E-cigarette use has also been associated with inflaming conditions such as bronchitis, asthma, and respiratory tract irritation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hamann|first=Stephen L.|last2=Kungskulniti|first2=Nipapun|last3=Charoenca|first3=Naowarut|last4=Kasemsup|first4=Vijj|last5=Ruangkanchanasetr|first5=Suwanna|last6=Jongkhajornpong|first6=Passara|date=2023-09-22|title=Electronic Cigarette Harms: Aggregate Evidence Shows Damage to Biological Systems|url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10572885/|journal=International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health|volume=20|issue=19|pages=6808|doi=10.3390/ijerph20196808|issn=1660-4601|pmc=10572885|pmid=37835078}}</ref> A review of toxicological analyses of non-nicotine e-cigarettes found that of the identified 243 unique chemicals thirty-eight were listed as poisons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Banks|first=E|last2=Yazidjoglou|first2=A|last3=brown|first3=S|last4=Nguyen|first4=M|last5=Martin|first5=M|last6=Beckwith|first6=K|last7=Daluwatta|first7=A|last8=Campbell|first8=S|last9=Joshy|first9=G|date=4-2022|title=Summary Brief: Review of Global Evidence on The Health Effects of Electronic Cigarettes|url=https://nceph.anu.edu.au/files/E-cigarettes%20health%20outcomes%20review%20summary%20brief%202022.pdf|journal=National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health}}</ref> ==== Developmental consequences ==== E-cigarette use among children has been linked to adverse physical and mental health outcomes such as acute lung injury, reported cough, dyspnea (shortness of breath), cracked teeth, mouth/cheek pain, and constitutional problems.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://login.ezproxy.canberra.edu.au/login?qurl=https://doi.org%2f10.1016%2fj.pedn.2022.01.006|title=Shibboleth Authentication Request|website=login.ezproxy.canberra.edu.au|doi=10.1016/j.pedn.2022.01.006|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> However there is a deficit in the research on what affect e-cigarette use has on an adolescents development. A study also found that adolescents who had used e-cigarettes within the last year had 29% higher odds of reporting sleep-related complaints, and the association was found to be statistically significant and adolescents who had reported dual-product use within the last year had 57% higher odds of reporting sleep-related complaints.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Riehm|first=Kira E.|last2=Rojo-Wissar|first2=Darlynn M.|last3=Feder|first3=Kenneth A.|last4=Mojtabai|first4=Ramin|last5=Spira|first5=Adam P.|last6=Thrul|first6=Johannes|last7=Crum|first7=Rosa M.|date=March 2019|title=E-cigarette use and sleep-related complaints among youth|url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2019.08.009|journal=Journal of Adolescence|volume=76|pages=48-54}}</ref> ==== Cardiovascular health consequences ==== Acute exposure to e-cigarettes has been associated with increased blood pressure and an increase in heart rate compared to those who do not use e-cigarettes.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Kundu|first=Anasua|last2=Feore|first2=Anna|last3=Sanchez|first3=Sherald|last4=Abu-Zarour|first4=Nada|last5=Sutton|first5=Megan|last6=Sachdeva|first6=Kyran|last7=Seth|first7=Siddharth|last8=Schwartz|first8=Robert|last9=Chaiton|first9=Michael|date=2025-06-13|title=Cardiovascular health effects of vaping e-cigarettes: a systematic review and meta-analysis|url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/40010935|journal=Heart (British Cardiac Society)|volume=111|issue=13|pages=599–608|doi=10.1136/heartjnl-2024-325030|issn=1468-201X|pmid=40010935}}</ref> Lower resting heart rate and lower diastolic BP compared to those who have not use e-cigarettes.<ref name=":2" /> However, because of how recent the e-cigarette trend is, there has not been a lot of longitudinal research examining the effects that sustained use of e-cigarettes can have on an individual's cardiovascular health. == Conclusion == A significant amount of people that regularly use e-cigarettes use them to attempt quitting conventional cigarettes and the nicotine within e-cigarettes is the most significant reason as to why they continue to use e-cigarettes. E-cigarettes in comparison to conventional cigarettes are not as restricted when it comes to their ability to market the product. E-cigarettes come in a variety of different colours, shapes, sizes, and flavours that attract the attention of children and provide greater incentives to give e-cigarettes a try. Knowledge of the long-term health consequences of e-cigarettes is largely unknown given how recently e-cigarettes have been popularised there has not been an opportunity to conduct longitudinal studies on the health consequences of regular e-cigarette use over time. Many e-cigarettes also contain nicotine which can lead to addiction and reinforces the behaviour of using e-cigarettes while long term use also leads to larger doses of nicotine to feel the induced effects, as well as withdrawal symptoms when attempting to quit using e-cigarettes. While some e-cigarettes do not contain nicotine, they can contain dangerous chemicals that can cause serious damage to vital organs. The e-cigarette industry has taken off since its introduction in the early 2000s and has become especially popular with children and young adults, although there is research suggesting that certain types of e-cigarettes are healthier than conventional cigarettes, there has not been an opportunity to examine the long-term health consequences of regular e-cigarette use. ==See also== * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2024/E-cigarette use motivation|E-cigarette use motivation]] (Book chapter, 2024) == References == <references /> == External links == [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Drugs/Nicotine]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Motivation]] etg4ep28xle63qjna8n3eucmivokg7l 2842402 2842383 2026-10-24T02:19:04Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Perceptions on the Health Consequences of E-cigarette Use */ removed spelling grammar tags 2842402 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|E-cigarette use motivation:<br>What motivates starting and continuing vaping of nicotine e-cigarettes?}} == Overview == {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:2023 E-papieros Argus XT i Requiem RTA.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. Example of an e-cigarette]] ;Case study Imagine a 19-year-old female with a childhood history of seizures, presented at a hospital for worsening shortness of breath. She had admitted to vaping for two years but denied that she had used any drugs. After tests for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and rapid influenza came back negative, doctors performed a lung biopsy on the lower part of her left lung. Her condition gradually improved, and she was discharged after 15 days. At a one-month follow-up appointment, her symptoms had resolved and repeat chest imaging showed that the cloudy areas in her lungs had improved (Pourshahid et al., 2022). However, within a few days after hearing her condition was improving, she resumed vaping. What factors could have led her to continue vaping even after experiencing its negative health consequences? {{RoundBoxBottom}} <ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pourshahid|first=Seyedmohammad|last2=Khademolhosseini|first2=Sara|last3=Hussain|first3=Shahzad|last4=Le|first4=Susanti R.|last5=Cirino-Marcano|first5=Maria Del Mar|last6=Aziz|first6=Sameh|last7=Biscardi|first7=Frank|last8=Foroozesh|first8=Mahtab|date=May 2022|title=A Case Series of E-cigarette or Vaping-Associated Lung Injury With a Review of Pathological and Radiological Findings|url=https://doi.org/10.7759/cureus.24822|journal=Cureus|volume=14|issue=5|pages=1-2}}</ref> [[wikipedia:Electronic_cigarette|Electronic cigarettes]] (e-cigarettes) are a device often designed to replicate a standard cigarette used to consume vapours that can contain nicotine, flavours, propylene glycol, and vegetable glycerin.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/electronic+cigarette|title=Definition of ELECTRONIC CIGARETTE|date=2025-06-22|website=www.merriam-webster.com|language=en|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Gotts|first=Jeffrey E|author-link=https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l5275#aff-1|last2=Jordt|first2=Sven-Eric|author-link2=https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l5275#aff-2|last3=McConnell|first3=Rob|author-link3=https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l5275#aff-4|last4=Tarran|first4=Robett|author-link4=https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l5275#aff-5|date=30-10-2019|title=What are the Respiratory effects of e-cigarettes?|url=https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.l5275|journal=BMJ|volume=366}}</ref> The first documented appearance of electronic cigarettes was in the early 20th century in the state of [[wikipedia:New_York_(state)|New York]] in a patent filed by Joseph Robinson in 1927.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-vaping-who-invented-e-cigs-2019-10|title=The wild history of vaping, from a 1927 'electric vaporizer' to today's mysterious lung injury crisis|last=Brueck|first=Hilary|website=Business Insider|language=en-US|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> However, despite the fact that a patent for e-cigarettes was filed in the early 20th century it was not until the early twenty-first century that e-cigarettes were popularised with the introduction of the "Ruyan" in China manufactured in 2004 and patented by [[w:Hon_Lik|Hon Lik]] in 2003.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/we-asked-the-inventor-of-the-e-cigarette-what-he-thinks-about-vape-regulations-5886b747f672c2456363054c/|title=We Asked the Inventor of the E-Cigarette What He Thinks About Vape Regulations|last=Rogers|first=Kaleigh|date=2016-07-18|website=VICE|language=en-US|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> Since 2003 e-cigarette use has increased dramatically with the Australian Bureau of Statistics reporting that one in seven adults have used e-cigarettes with men being more likely to consume e-cigarettes than women and at almost double the rate.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/health/health-conditions-and-risks/smoking-and-vaping/latest-release|title=Smoking and vaping, 2022 {{!}} Australian Bureau of Statistics|date=2023-12-15|website=www.abs.gov.au|language=en|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> In 2018 the estimated number of people who vaped was 58.1 million people by 2023 it was estimated that 114 million people globally had vaped, an increase of 55.9 million people over a 5 year period.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://gsthr.org/resources/global-state-of-thr-2024/estimated-global-number-of-vapers-2024/|title=Estimated global number of vapers (2024)|website=Global State of Tobacco Harm Reduction|language=en|access-date=2025-09-28}}</ref> [[File:Cigarette-key.svg|thumb|'''Figure 2'''. Conventional Cigarette <ref>{{Citation|title=English: Scheme of a cigarette.|url=https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cigarette-key.svg|date=2007-11-01|accessdate=2025-09-27|last=Sémhur}}</ref>]] == History of e-cigarettes == Whilst e-cigarettes can be traced back to the early 20th century, they have only been popularised recently with the release of the modern e-cigarette occurring in 2003. ==== First Documented Mentions of E-cigarettes ==== The first documented mention of e-cigarettes was in a patent filed in New York state by Joseph Robinson in 1927, although the product was not introduced commercially. In the 1960s, there was another attempt to take e-cigarettes to the commercial market by Herbert Gilbert who is credited with having invented the e-cigarette that most closely resembles the modern cigarette. Although Gilbert created multiple prototypes, he was unable to secure any funding and was unable to commercialise his inventions.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://casaa.org/education/vaping/historical-timeline-of-electronic-cigarettes/|title=The History of Vaping|website=CASAA|language=en-US|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> ==== Introduction of The Modern E-cigarette ==== The creation of the modern e-cigarette that is widely available today is largely credited to [[w:Hon_Lik|Hon Lik]] who filed for a patent in [[w:China|China]], the [[w:European_Union|European Union]], and the [[w:United_States|United States]] in 2003 and was manufactured in 2004. After releasing the e-cigarette in [[w:China|China]] [[wikipedia:Hon_Lik|Hon Lik]] received such positive feedback he felt empowered enough to release e-cigarettes in to the [[w:European_Union|European Union]].<ref name=":0" /> Although e-cigarettes have been found to be more healthy than conventional cigarettes, there have been health consequences associated with using e-cigarettes. Some common motivations for using e-cigarettes are socio-economic status, perceptions on the healthiness of e-cigarettes, and attempting to quit smoking conventional cigarettes. == E-cigarette use over time == [[File:Reasons for initiating e-cigarette use (EU 2018).jpg|thumb|'''Figure 3'''. Provided motivations for why people started to use E-cigarettes (EU 2018).]] {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} ==== General E-cigarette Use Over Time ==== According to Euromonitor International since 2011 the adult smoking population of vapour products has risen from seven million people to forty-two million people in 2018 (see Figure 2).<ref name=":1">{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44295336|title=Vaping: How popular are e-cigarettes?|date=2018-05-30|access-date=2025-08-14|language=en-GB}}</ref> An indicator of growing e-cigarette use if the prevalence of specialised vaping and tobacco shops opening. An example being in the United Kingdom where vaping and tobacco shops were the sixth most common new store opening, ahead of convenience stores and sports & health clubs.<ref name=":1" /> ==== E-cigarette use by age demographic ==== E-cigarette use has increased over time with more young people using e-cigarettes than [[wikipedia:Cigarette|traditional cigarettes.]] <small>''[why are young people using them more?]''</small> The estimated global prevalence of e-cigarette use among young people is that 16.8% of young people have used an e-cigarette at least once and 4.8% of young people constantly used e-cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Salari|first=Nader|last2=Rahimi|first2=Sahel|last3=Darvishi|first3=Niloofar|last4=Abdolmaleki|first4=Amir|last5=Mohammadi|first5=Masoud|date=2024-06-01|title=The global prevalence of E-cigarettes in youth: A comprehensive systematic review and meta-analysis|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666535224000430|journal=Public Health in Practice|volume=7|pages=100506|doi=10.1016/j.puhip.2024.100506|issn=2666-5352}}</ref> Between 2014 and 2018 the increased use of e-cigarettes among young people has led to the conclusion that e-cigarettes are an initiation to nicotine whereas older people are more likely to be near quitters.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bandi|first=Priti|last2=Cahn|first2=Zachary|last3=Goding Sauer|first3=Ann|last4=Douglas|first4=Clifford E.|last5=Drope|first5=Jeffrey|last6=Jemal|first6=Ahmedin|last7=Fedewa|first7=Stacey A.|date=2021-02-01|title=Trends in E-Cigarette Use by Age Group and Combustible Cigarette Smoking Histories, U.S. Adults, 2014–2018|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379720303809|journal=American Journal of Preventive Medicine|volume=60|issue=2|pages=151–158|doi=10.1016/j.amepre.2020.07.026|issn=0749-3797}}</ref> Although people over the age of 60 are more likely to have used e-cigarettes within the last 30 days.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/smoking/young-peoples-vapes-e-cigarettes|title=Young people’s use of vapes and e-cigarettes|date=29 Feb 2024|website=Australian Institute of Health and Welfare|access-date=14/08/2025}}</ref> <quiz display="simple"> {The 60+ age group is more likely to have used e-cigarettes in the last 30 days than 40-49. |type="[]"} + True - False </quiz> == Motivation for e-cigarette use == The most self-reported and well researched motivations for e-cigarette use are an individual's socio-economic status, their perception on the health consequences of e-cigarette use, attempting to quit smoking traditional cigarettes, and the taste and flavours that e-cigarettes have that are not available with more traditional cigarettes. The common reasons as to why individuals continue to regularly use e-cigarettes after having them the first time is the chemical reaction induced from using e-cigarettes that contain nicotine, an addictive substance that overtime requires more nicotine in order to feel the effects of dopamine. <small>''[why do people continue to use e-cigarettes once they start?]''</small>{{f}} ==== Socio-economic Situation ==== Adolescent individuals who live in low-income households are more likely to be exposed to cigarettes and cigarette use.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Simon|first=Patricia|last2=Camenga|first2=Deepa R.|last3=Morean|first3=Meghan E.|last4=Kong|first4=Grace|last5=Bold|first5=Krysten W.|last6=Cavallo|first6=Dana A.|last7=Krishnan-Sarin|first7=Suchitra|date=2018-07|title=Socioeconomic status and adolescent e-cigarette use: The mediating role of e-cigarette advertisement exposure|url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6007030/|journal=Preventive Medicine|volume=112|pages=193–198|doi=10.1016/j.ypmed.2018.04.019|issn=1096-0260|pmc=6007030|pmid=29673887}}</ref> Which leads to Adolescents in low-income households to be more likely to consume e-cigarettes. Those living in disadvantaged areas according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics were more likely to smoke than those who did not, 18.1% in disadvantaged areas and 5.4% not disadvantaged areas.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/health/health-conditions-and-risks/smoking-and-vaping/latest-release|title=Smoking and vaping, 2022 {{!}} Australian Bureau of Statistics|date=2023-12-15|website=www.abs.gov.au|language=en|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> ==== Perceptions on the Health Consequences of E-cigarette Use ==== It has been found that younger people not only believe that e-cigarettes are healthier than conventional cigarettes, but also believe they are healthy in the general sense.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Anand|first=Vivek|last2=McGinty|first2=Kaye L.|last3=O'Brien|first3=Kevin|last4=Guenthner|first4=Gregory|last5=Hahn|first5=Ellen|last6=Martin|first6=Catherine A.|date=2015-07|title=E-cigarette Use and Beliefs Among Urban Public High School Students in North Carolina|url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26095408|journal=The Journal of Adolescent Health: Official Publication of the Society for Adolescent Medicine|volume=57|issue=1|pages=46–51|doi=10.1016/j.jadohealth.2015.03.018|issn=1879-1972|pmid=26095408}}</ref> However, although younger people, especially in high income countries, tend to have more positive perceptions of e-cigarettes than traditional cigarettes. The primary reason for this has not been concluded with too many clashes of perspective in advertising, health advice, and personal advice for researchers to be able to conclusively determine what the primary cause of the positive perception relative to traditional cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sharma|first=Anupriya|last2=McCausland|first2=Kahlia|last3=Jancey|first3=Jonine|date=2021-05-01|title=Adolescents' Health Perceptions of E-Cigarettes: A Systematic Review|url=https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797(21)00065-9/abstract|journal=American Journal of Preventive Medicine|language=English|volume=60|issue=5|pages=716–725|doi=10.1016/j.amepre.2020.12.013|issn=0749-3797|pmid=33775514}}</ref> It has been found that when people are questioned on whether or not there was less harmful chemicals within an e-cigarette compared to a conventional cigarette 20% percent of respondents replied they viewed the chemicals in e-cigarettes as less harmful than conventional cigarettes and another ==== Attempting to Quit Smoking Traditional Cigarettes ==== As shown in Figure 2, {{g}} the primary reason for using e-cigarettes among respondents in 2018 was to{{sp}} quit smoking traditional cigarettes. However, this has since been disputed as the primary motivation of e-cigarette use, at least among Australian adolescents, young adults, and adults, with curiosity being the main motivation for e-cigarette use among those who had never tried cigarettes and the taste and flavour of e-cigarettes being the main motivation for those who continue to use e-cigarettes and flavours were also the primary motivation of individuals who smoke traditional cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Thoonen|first=Karlijn A. H. J.|last2=Jongenelis|first2=Michelle I.|date=2024-01-01|title=Motivators of e-cigarette use among Australian adolescents, young adults, and adults|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953623007682|journal=Social Science & Medicine|volume=340|pages=116411|doi=10.1016/j.socscimed.2023.116411|issn=0277-9536}}</ref> While a significant number of people cite using e-cigarettes and [https://www.vapestore.pk/ pod kit MTL vape] with [https://vipvapestore.pk/ nicotine salt flavor] as an attempt to quit smoking comparisons attempting to discern whether e-cigarette use has been more effective than no help at all. In attempting to quit, people found that e-cigarettes were five times more likely to help individuals stop smoking after a monthly follow-up of 1 month{{sp}} of e-cigarette use.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=McDermott|first=Máirtín S.|last2=East|first2=Katherine A.|last3=Brose|first3=Leonie S.|last4=McNeill|first4=Ann|last5=Hitchman|first5=Sara C.|last6=Partos|first6=Timea R.|date=2021|title=The effectiveness of using e-cigarettes for quitting smoking compared to other cessation methods among adults in the United Kingdom|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/add.15474|journal=Addiction|language=en|volume=116|issue=10|pages=2825–2836|doi=10.1111/add.15474|issn=1360-0443}}</ref> However, health advice from the American Centre for Disease Control (CDC) recommend that when using e-cigarettes in an attempt to quit smoking they should switch from conventional cigarettes to e-cigarettes immediately as extended periods of dual use delays quitting smoking completely.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://archive.cdc.gov/#/details?url=https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/severe-lung-disease.html|title=Outbreak of Lung Injury Associated with the Use of E-Cigarette, or Vaping, Products|date=3/8/2021|website=Centers for Disease Control and Prevention|archive-url=https://archive.cdc.gov/www_cdc_gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/severe-lung-disease.html|archive-date=21/6/2024}}</ref> ==== Taste and Flavour of E-cigarettes ==== Unlike traditional cigarettes, e-cigarettes are able to contain flavours and tastes that are often found to be more appealing and help to incentivise younger customers who may be hesitant to use traditional cigarettes due to the well-known health consequences. The flavours that e-cigarettes contain such as [https://ecigarettereviewed.com/best-e-juice-flavors/ Boosted, No.32, and Fuji Apple Strawberry Nectarine] are also widely cited as one of the reasons younger people especially children are more attracted to e-cigarettes than traditional cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Cotti|first=Chad|last2=Courtemanche|first2=Charles|last3=Liang|first3=Yang|last4=Maclean|first4=Johanna Catherine|last5=Nesson|first5=Erik|last6=Sabia|first6=Joseph J.|date=2025-08-01|title=The effect of e-cigarette flavor bans on tobacco use|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629625000487|journal=Journal of Health Economics|volume=102|pages=103013|doi=10.1016/j.jhealeco.2025.103013|issn=0167-6296}}</ref> In America e-cigarettes are available in all types of shapes and sizes, with more than 400 brands and an estimated 15,500 flavours.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hsu|first=Greta|last2=Sun|first2=Jessica Y.|last3=Zhu|first3=Shu-Hong|date=2018-03-12|title=Evolution of Electronic Cigarette Brands From 2013-2014 to 2016-2017: Analysis of Brand Websites|url=https://www.jmir.org/2018/3/e80|journal=Journal of Medical Internet Research|language=EN|volume=20|issue=3|pages=e8550|doi=10.2196/jmir.8550|pmc=5869180|pmid=29530840}}</ref> == Motivations for the regular use of e-cigarettes == {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} ==== Nicotine ==== [[File:Nicotine 3D Model.png|thumb|'''Figure 4'''. 3D Model of Nicotine<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nicotine_3D_Model.png|title=File:Nicotine 3D Model.png - Wikimedia Commons|website=commons.wikimedia.org|language=en|access-date=2025-09-28}}</ref>]] Nicotine is a highly addictive chemical that causes your brain to release dopamine, commonly referred to as a feel-good chemical. The longer an individual has been smoking the more nicotine they need for the extra dopamine their brain craves.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web|url=https://www.health.gov.au/topics/smoking-vaping-and-tobacco/about-smoking/effects|title=Effects of Smoking and Tobacco|date=8-5-2024|website=Department of Health, Disability and Ageing}}</ref> Once a person develops a dependency for nicotine they begin to start feeling withdrawal symptoms which can cause people to be irritable, nervous, and anxious often driving individuals to smoke.<ref name=":3" /> Nicotine initiates addiction by latching on to neural circuitry which functions as a way to reinforce behaviours that lead to rewarding goals. There are many brain structures that help this reward system function but one particular system, mesocorticolimbic dopamine (DA), plays a particularly important role in the adoption of behaviours that are inappropriately reinforced by psychostimulant drugs such as nicotine<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=De Biasi|first=Mariella|last2=Dani|first2=John A.|date=2011|title=Reward, Addiction, Withdrawal to Nicotine|url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4542051/pdf/nihms-671027.pdf|journal=The Neuropharmacology of Nicotine Dependence|volume=34|pages=105-139|via=NIH Public Access}}</ref>. Nicotine increases the firing activity and phasic burst activity of midbrain DA neurons and elevates DA in other targets, this is what underlies nicotine's ability to enhance rewards from brain stimulation, reinforce conditioned preferences, and support self-administration.<ref name=":4" /> ==== Social Influences ==== [[File:Social media collection 2020s.png|thumb|'''Figure 5'''. Social Media Networks<ref>{{Citation|title=English: Social media collection icons in 2020s|url=https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Social_media_collection_2020s.png|date=2024-08-06|accessdate=2025-09-28|last=Ibrahim.ID}}</ref>]] There has been a substantial amount of research done on the influence that social factors such as social interactions, social norms, and advertising. Social media itself within the research is considered a conduit for these social factors. While there are substantial gaps in the research, advertising played a significant role when it came to what social factors were influencing people to use e-cigarettes, people who reported seeing advertising for e-cigarettes had an increased intention to use e-cigarettes<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Amon|first=Samia|last2=Dunn|first2=Adam G.|last3=Laranjo|first3=Liliana|date=January 2020|title=Social Influence in the Uptake and Use of Electronic Cigarettes: A Systematic Review|url=https://doi-org.ezproxy.canberra.edu.au/10.1016/j.amepre.2019.08.023|journal=American Journal of Preventative Medicine|volume=58|issue=1|pages=129-141}}</ref>. Advertising conducted through social media had the same effect. A study conducted attempting to see how many people were exposed to advertising e-cigarettes found that across four countries, Australia, China, India and the UK, 85% of respondents had been exposed to e-cigarette advertising through advertisement in real life as well as advertisement through popular social media platforms.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pettigrew|first=Simone|last2=Santos|first2=Joseph A|last3=Pinho-Gomes|first3=Ana-Catarina|last4=Li|first4=Yuan|last5=Jones|first5=Alexandra|date=October 2023|title=Exposure to e-cigarette advertising and young people's use of e-cigarettes: A four-country study|url=https://doi.org/10.18332/tid/172414|journal=Tobacco induced diseases|volume=21|pages=141}}</ref> People who may have already used an e-cigarette containing nicotine and are experiencing withdrawal would be more likely to use e-cigarettes again if exposed to advertising for e-cigarettes. The World Health Organisation has recommended that countries ban all forms of advertisements, sponsorship, and promotion of e-cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240032095|title=WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2021: addressing new and emerging products|last=World Health Oganisation|date=July 2021|website=World Health Organization}}</ref> ==== Coping with Mental Health Challenges ==== [[File:Mental Health Message.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 6'''. Mental Health Display<ref>{{Citation|title=English: Mental Health Wellness Psychology Mind.|url=https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mental_Health_Message.jpg|date=2017-01-29|accessdate=2025-09-28|first=Wokandapix at|last=Pixabay}}</ref>]] In a survey conducted of youth and young adults {{where}}, people aged 15-24 years of age, the most common reason for using e-cigarettes was coping with mental health challenges{{f}}. The people who{{g}} cited coping with mental health challenges as their reason for using e-cigarettes most common response when asked why that the e-cigarettes helped them relax, help them feel calm or less anxious, and that it helps them stay focused.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Do|first=Elizabeth K.|last2=Koris|first2=Kristiann|last3=Minter|first3=Tyler|last4=Esayed|first4=Suad|last5=Hair|first5=Elizabeth C.|date=July 2025|title=Reasons for E-cigarette Use and Their Associations With Frequency, Dependence, and Quit Intentions: Findings From a Youth and Young Adult Sample|url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2025.03.009|journal=American Journal of Preventative Medicine|volume=69|issue=1}}</ref> The perceived ability of e-cigarettes to help youth and young people feel calm or more relaxed is likely associated with the nicotine content that can be found in many e-cigarettes and initiate a process that reinforces conditioned process in the form of using e-cigarettes{{f}}. ==== Sensation Seeking ==== Sensation seeking has also been found to be a popular reason for youth and young adults to engage with e-cigarettes. When asked about why they were using e-cigarettes the replies consisted of responses such as they gave me a good buzz, they came in flavours that I liked, just to try, and just curious.<ref name=":5" /> These responses hint at a lack of knowledge on the health consequences of using e-cigarettes whether they contain nicotine or not. == Health consequences of e-cigarette use == {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} ==== Lung damage ==== E-cigarettes containing vitamin e acetate have been associated with life-threatening acute pulmonary illness, this is specifically distinct from typical health consequences associated with the long term use of e-cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Amjad|first=Mohammad Asim|last2=Ocazionez Trujillo|first2=Daniel|last3=Estrada-Y-Martin|first3=Rosa M.|last4=Cherian|first4=Sujith V.|date=2025-05-17|title=E-Cigarette or Vaping Product Use-Associated Lung Injury: A Comprehensive Review|url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12111167/|journal=International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health|volume=22|issue=5|pages=792|doi=10.3390/ijerph22050792|issn=1660-4601|pmc=12111167|pmid=40427906}}</ref> E-cigarette use has also been associated with inflaming conditions such as bronchitis, asthma, and respiratory tract irritation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hamann|first=Stephen L.|last2=Kungskulniti|first2=Nipapun|last3=Charoenca|first3=Naowarut|last4=Kasemsup|first4=Vijj|last5=Ruangkanchanasetr|first5=Suwanna|last6=Jongkhajornpong|first6=Passara|date=2023-09-22|title=Electronic Cigarette Harms: Aggregate Evidence Shows Damage to Biological Systems|url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10572885/|journal=International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health|volume=20|issue=19|pages=6808|doi=10.3390/ijerph20196808|issn=1660-4601|pmc=10572885|pmid=37835078}}</ref> A review of toxicological analyses of non-nicotine e-cigarettes found that of the identified 243 unique chemicals thirty-eight were listed as poisons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Banks|first=E|last2=Yazidjoglou|first2=A|last3=brown|first3=S|last4=Nguyen|first4=M|last5=Martin|first5=M|last6=Beckwith|first6=K|last7=Daluwatta|first7=A|last8=Campbell|first8=S|last9=Joshy|first9=G|date=4-2022|title=Summary Brief: Review of Global Evidence on The Health Effects of Electronic Cigarettes|url=https://nceph.anu.edu.au/files/E-cigarettes%20health%20outcomes%20review%20summary%20brief%202022.pdf|journal=National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health}}</ref> ==== Developmental consequences ==== E-cigarette use among children has been linked to adverse physical and mental health outcomes such as acute lung injury, reported cough, dyspnea (shortness of breath), cracked teeth, mouth/cheek pain, and constitutional problems.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://login.ezproxy.canberra.edu.au/login?qurl=https://doi.org%2f10.1016%2fj.pedn.2022.01.006|title=Shibboleth Authentication Request|website=login.ezproxy.canberra.edu.au|doi=10.1016/j.pedn.2022.01.006|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> However there is a deficit in the research on what affect e-cigarette use has on an adolescents development. A study also found that adolescents who had used e-cigarettes within the last year had 29% higher odds of reporting sleep-related complaints, and the association was found to be statistically significant and adolescents who had reported dual-product use within the last year had 57% higher odds of reporting sleep-related complaints.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Riehm|first=Kira E.|last2=Rojo-Wissar|first2=Darlynn M.|last3=Feder|first3=Kenneth A.|last4=Mojtabai|first4=Ramin|last5=Spira|first5=Adam P.|last6=Thrul|first6=Johannes|last7=Crum|first7=Rosa M.|date=March 2019|title=E-cigarette use and sleep-related complaints among youth|url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2019.08.009|journal=Journal of Adolescence|volume=76|pages=48-54}}</ref> ==== Cardiovascular health consequences ==== Acute exposure to e-cigarettes has been associated with increased blood pressure and an increase in heart rate compared to those who do not use e-cigarettes.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Kundu|first=Anasua|last2=Feore|first2=Anna|last3=Sanchez|first3=Sherald|last4=Abu-Zarour|first4=Nada|last5=Sutton|first5=Megan|last6=Sachdeva|first6=Kyran|last7=Seth|first7=Siddharth|last8=Schwartz|first8=Robert|last9=Chaiton|first9=Michael|date=2025-06-13|title=Cardiovascular health effects of vaping e-cigarettes: a systematic review and meta-analysis|url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/40010935|journal=Heart (British Cardiac Society)|volume=111|issue=13|pages=599–608|doi=10.1136/heartjnl-2024-325030|issn=1468-201X|pmid=40010935}}</ref> Lower resting heart rate and lower diastolic BP compared to those who have not use e-cigarettes.<ref name=":2" /> However, because of how recent the e-cigarette trend is, there has not been a lot of longitudinal research examining the effects that sustained use of e-cigarettes can have on an individual's cardiovascular health. == Conclusion == A significant amount of people that regularly use e-cigarettes use them to attempt quitting conventional cigarettes and the nicotine within e-cigarettes is the most significant reason as to why they continue to use e-cigarettes. E-cigarettes in comparison to conventional cigarettes are not as restricted when it comes to their ability to market the product. E-cigarettes come in a variety of different colours, shapes, sizes, and flavours that attract the attention of children and provide greater incentives to give e-cigarettes a try. Knowledge of the long-term health consequences of e-cigarettes is largely unknown given how recently e-cigarettes have been popularised there has not been an opportunity to conduct longitudinal studies on the health consequences of regular e-cigarette use over time. Many e-cigarettes also contain nicotine which can lead to addiction and reinforces the behaviour of using e-cigarettes while long term use also leads to larger doses of nicotine to feel the induced effects, as well as withdrawal symptoms when attempting to quit using e-cigarettes. While some e-cigarettes do not contain nicotine, they can contain dangerous chemicals that can cause serious damage to vital organs. The e-cigarette industry has taken off since its introduction in the early 2000s and has become especially popular with children and young adults, although there is research suggesting that certain types of e-cigarettes are healthier than conventional cigarettes, there has not been an opportunity to examine the long-term health consequences of regular e-cigarette use. ==See also== * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2024/E-cigarette use motivation|E-cigarette use motivation]] (Book chapter, 2024) == References == <references /> == External links == [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Drugs/Nicotine]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Motivation]] 8gb1e8nw1k4l928ivhmlxntnjp4sz33 2842403 2842402 2026-10-24T02:21:01Z StudentUC2026 3105303 removed spelling grammar tags 2842403 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|E-cigarette use motivation:<br>What motivates starting and continuing vaping of nicotine e-cigarettes?}} == Overview == {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:2023 E-papieros Argus XT i Requiem RTA.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. Example of an e-cigarette]] ;Case study Imagine a 19-year-old female with a childhood history of seizures, presented at a hospital for worsening shortness of breath. She had admitted to vaping for two years but denied that she had used any drugs. After tests for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and rapid influenza came back negative, doctors performed a lung biopsy on the lower part of her left lung. Her condition gradually improved, and she was discharged after 15 days. At a one-month follow-up appointment, her symptoms had resolved and repeat chest imaging showed that the cloudy areas in her lungs had improved (Pourshahid et al., 2022). However, within a few days after hearing her condition was improving, she resumed vaping. What factors could have led her to continue vaping even after experiencing its negative health consequences? {{RoundBoxBottom}} <ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pourshahid|first=Seyedmohammad|last2=Khademolhosseini|first2=Sara|last3=Hussain|first3=Shahzad|last4=Le|first4=Susanti R.|last5=Cirino-Marcano|first5=Maria Del Mar|last6=Aziz|first6=Sameh|last7=Biscardi|first7=Frank|last8=Foroozesh|first8=Mahtab|date=May 2022|title=A Case Series of E-cigarette or Vaping-Associated Lung Injury With a Review of Pathological and Radiological Findings|url=https://doi.org/10.7759/cureus.24822|journal=Cureus|volume=14|issue=5|pages=1-2}}</ref> [[wikipedia:Electronic_cigarette|Electronic cigarettes]] (e-cigarettes) are a device often designed to replicate a standard cigarette used to consume vapours that can contain nicotine, flavours, propylene glycol, and vegetable glycerin.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/electronic+cigarette|title=Definition of ELECTRONIC CIGARETTE|date=2025-06-22|website=www.merriam-webster.com|language=en|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Gotts|first=Jeffrey E|author-link=https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l5275#aff-1|last2=Jordt|first2=Sven-Eric|author-link2=https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l5275#aff-2|last3=McConnell|first3=Rob|author-link3=https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l5275#aff-4|last4=Tarran|first4=Robett|author-link4=https://www.bmj.com/content/366/bmj.l5275#aff-5|date=30-10-2019|title=What are the Respiratory effects of e-cigarettes?|url=https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.l5275|journal=BMJ|volume=366}}</ref> The first documented appearance of electronic cigarettes was in the early 20th century in the state of [[wikipedia:New_York_(state)|New York]] in a patent filed by Joseph Robinson in 1927.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-vaping-who-invented-e-cigs-2019-10|title=The wild history of vaping, from a 1927 'electric vaporizer' to today's mysterious lung injury crisis|last=Brueck|first=Hilary|website=Business Insider|language=en-US|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> However, despite the fact that a patent for e-cigarettes was filed in the early 20th century it was not until the early twenty-first century that e-cigarettes were popularised with the introduction of the "Ruyan" in China manufactured in 2004 and patented by [[w:Hon_Lik|Hon Lik]] in 2003.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/we-asked-the-inventor-of-the-e-cigarette-what-he-thinks-about-vape-regulations-5886b747f672c2456363054c/|title=We Asked the Inventor of the E-Cigarette What He Thinks About Vape Regulations|last=Rogers|first=Kaleigh|date=2016-07-18|website=VICE|language=en-US|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> Since 2003 e-cigarette use has increased dramatically with the Australian Bureau of Statistics reporting that one in seven adults have used e-cigarettes with men being more likely to consume e-cigarettes than women and at almost double the rate.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/health/health-conditions-and-risks/smoking-and-vaping/latest-release|title=Smoking and vaping, 2022 {{!}} Australian Bureau of Statistics|date=2023-12-15|website=www.abs.gov.au|language=en|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> In 2018 the estimated number of people who vaped was 58.1 million people by 2023 it was estimated that 114 million people globally had vaped, an increase of 55.9 million people over a 5 year period.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://gsthr.org/resources/global-state-of-thr-2024/estimated-global-number-of-vapers-2024/|title=Estimated global number of vapers (2024)|website=Global State of Tobacco Harm Reduction|language=en|access-date=2025-09-28}}</ref> [[File:Cigarette-key.svg|thumb|'''Figure 2'''. Conventional Cigarette <ref>{{Citation|title=English: Scheme of a cigarette.|url=https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cigarette-key.svg|date=2007-11-01|accessdate=2025-09-27|last=Sémhur}}</ref>]] == History of e-cigarettes == Whilst e-cigarettes can be traced back to the early 20th century, they have only been popularised recently with the release of the modern e-cigarette occurring in 2003. ==== First Documented Mentions of E-cigarettes ==== The first documented mention of e-cigarettes was in a patent filed in New York state by Joseph Robinson in 1927, although the product was not introduced commercially. In the 1960s, there was another attempt to take e-cigarettes to the commercial market by Herbert Gilbert who is credited with having invented the e-cigarette that most closely resembles the modern cigarette. Although Gilbert created multiple prototypes, he was unable to secure any funding and was unable to commercialise his inventions.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://casaa.org/education/vaping/historical-timeline-of-electronic-cigarettes/|title=The History of Vaping|website=CASAA|language=en-US|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> ==== Introduction of The Modern E-cigarette ==== The creation of the modern e-cigarette that is widely available today is largely credited to [[w:Hon_Lik|Hon Lik]] who filed for a patent in [[w:China|China]], the [[w:European_Union|European Union]], and the [[w:United_States|United States]] in 2003 and was manufactured in 2004. After releasing the e-cigarette in [[w:China|China]] [[wikipedia:Hon_Lik|Hon Lik]] received such positive feedback he felt empowered enough to release e-cigarettes in to the [[w:European_Union|European Union]].<ref name=":0" /> Although e-cigarettes have been found to be more healthy than conventional cigarettes, there have been health consequences associated with using e-cigarettes. Some common motivations for using e-cigarettes are socio-economic status, perceptions on the healthiness of e-cigarettes, and attempting to quit smoking conventional cigarettes. == E-cigarette use over time == [[File:Reasons for initiating e-cigarette use (EU 2018).jpg|thumb|'''Figure 3'''. Provided motivations for why people started to use E-cigarettes (EU 2018).]] {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} ==== General E-cigarette Use Over Time ==== According to Euromonitor International since 2011 the adult smoking population of vapour products has risen from seven million people to forty-two million people in 2018 (see Figure 2).<ref name=":1">{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-44295336|title=Vaping: How popular are e-cigarettes?|date=2018-05-30|access-date=2025-08-14|language=en-GB}}</ref> An indicator of growing e-cigarette use if the prevalence of specialised vaping and tobacco shops opening. An example being in the United Kingdom where vaping and tobacco shops were the sixth most common new store opening, ahead of convenience stores and sports & health clubs.<ref name=":1" /> ==== E-cigarette use by age demographic ==== E-cigarette use has increased over time with more young people using e-cigarettes than [[wikipedia:Cigarette|traditional cigarettes.]] <small>''[why are young people using them more?]''</small> The estimated global prevalence of e-cigarette use among young people is that 16.8% of young people have used an e-cigarette at least once and 4.8% of young people constantly used e-cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Salari|first=Nader|last2=Rahimi|first2=Sahel|last3=Darvishi|first3=Niloofar|last4=Abdolmaleki|first4=Amir|last5=Mohammadi|first5=Masoud|date=2024-06-01|title=The global prevalence of E-cigarettes in youth: A comprehensive systematic review and meta-analysis|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2666535224000430|journal=Public Health in Practice|volume=7|pages=100506|doi=10.1016/j.puhip.2024.100506|issn=2666-5352}}</ref> Between 2014 and 2018 the increased use of e-cigarettes among young people has led to the conclusion that e-cigarettes are an initiation to nicotine whereas older people are more likely to be near quitters.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bandi|first=Priti|last2=Cahn|first2=Zachary|last3=Goding Sauer|first3=Ann|last4=Douglas|first4=Clifford E.|last5=Drope|first5=Jeffrey|last6=Jemal|first6=Ahmedin|last7=Fedewa|first7=Stacey A.|date=2021-02-01|title=Trends in E-Cigarette Use by Age Group and Combustible Cigarette Smoking Histories, U.S. Adults, 2014–2018|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379720303809|journal=American Journal of Preventive Medicine|volume=60|issue=2|pages=151–158|doi=10.1016/j.amepre.2020.07.026|issn=0749-3797}}</ref> Although people over the age of 60 are more likely to have used e-cigarettes within the last 30 days.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/smoking/young-peoples-vapes-e-cigarettes|title=Young people’s use of vapes and e-cigarettes|date=29 Feb 2024|website=Australian Institute of Health and Welfare|access-date=14/08/2025}}</ref> <quiz display="simple"> {The 60+ age group is more likely to have used e-cigarettes in the last 30 days than 40-49. |type="[]"} + True - False </quiz> == Motivation for e-cigarette use == The most self-reported and well researched motivations for e-cigarette use are an individual's socio-economic status, their perception on the health consequences of e-cigarette use, attempting to quit smoking traditional cigarettes, and the taste and flavours that e-cigarettes have that are not available with more traditional cigarettes. The common reasons as to why individuals continue to regularly use e-cigarettes after having them the first time is the chemical reaction induced from using e-cigarettes that contain nicotine, an addictive substance that overtime requires more nicotine in order to feel the effects of dopamine. <small>''[why do people continue to use e-cigarettes once they start?]''</small>{{f}} ==== Socio-economic Situation ==== Adolescent individuals who live in low-income households are more likely to be exposed to cigarettes and cigarette use.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Simon|first=Patricia|last2=Camenga|first2=Deepa R.|last3=Morean|first3=Meghan E.|last4=Kong|first4=Grace|last5=Bold|first5=Krysten W.|last6=Cavallo|first6=Dana A.|last7=Krishnan-Sarin|first7=Suchitra|date=2018-07|title=Socioeconomic status and adolescent e-cigarette use: The mediating role of e-cigarette advertisement exposure|url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6007030/|journal=Preventive Medicine|volume=112|pages=193–198|doi=10.1016/j.ypmed.2018.04.019|issn=1096-0260|pmc=6007030|pmid=29673887}}</ref> Which leads to Adolescents in low-income households to be more likely to consume e-cigarettes. Those living in disadvantaged areas according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics were more likely to smoke than those who did not, 18.1% in disadvantaged areas and 5.4% not disadvantaged areas.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/health/health-conditions-and-risks/smoking-and-vaping/latest-release|title=Smoking and vaping, 2022 {{!}} Australian Bureau of Statistics|date=2023-12-15|website=www.abs.gov.au|language=en|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> ==== Perceptions on the Health Consequences of E-cigarette Use ==== It has been found that younger people not only believe that e-cigarettes are healthier than conventional cigarettes, but also believe they are healthy in the general sense.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Anand|first=Vivek|last2=McGinty|first2=Kaye L.|last3=O'Brien|first3=Kevin|last4=Guenthner|first4=Gregory|last5=Hahn|first5=Ellen|last6=Martin|first6=Catherine A.|date=2015-07|title=E-cigarette Use and Beliefs Among Urban Public High School Students in North Carolina|url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26095408|journal=The Journal of Adolescent Health: Official Publication of the Society for Adolescent Medicine|volume=57|issue=1|pages=46–51|doi=10.1016/j.jadohealth.2015.03.018|issn=1879-1972|pmid=26095408}}</ref> However, although younger people, especially in high income countries, tend to have more positive perceptions of e-cigarettes than traditional cigarettes. The primary reason for this has not been concluded with too many clashes of perspective in advertising, health advice, and personal advice for researchers to be able to conclusively determine what the primary cause of the positive perception relative to traditional cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sharma|first=Anupriya|last2=McCausland|first2=Kahlia|last3=Jancey|first3=Jonine|date=2021-05-01|title=Adolescents' Health Perceptions of E-Cigarettes: A Systematic Review|url=https://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797(21)00065-9/abstract|journal=American Journal of Preventive Medicine|language=English|volume=60|issue=5|pages=716–725|doi=10.1016/j.amepre.2020.12.013|issn=0749-3797|pmid=33775514}}</ref> It has been found that when people are questioned on whether or not there was less harmful chemicals within an e-cigarette compared to a conventional cigarette 20% percent of respondents replied they viewed the chemicals in e-cigarettes as less harmful than conventional cigarettes and another ==== Attempting to Quit Smoking Traditional Cigarettes ==== As shown in Figure 2, the primary reason for using e-cigarettes among respondents in 2018 was to quit smoking traditional cigarettes. However, this has since been disputed as the primary motivation of e-cigarette use, at least among Australian adolescents, young adults, and adults, with curiosity being the main motivation for e-cigarette use among those who had never tried cigarettes and the taste and flavour of e-cigarettes being the main motivation for those who continue to use e-cigarettes and flavours were also the primary motivation of individuals who smoke traditional cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Thoonen|first=Karlijn A. H. J.|last2=Jongenelis|first2=Michelle I.|date=2024-01-01|title=Motivators of e-cigarette use among Australian adolescents, young adults, and adults|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953623007682|journal=Social Science & Medicine|volume=340|pages=116411|doi=10.1016/j.socscimed.2023.116411|issn=0277-9536}}</ref> While a significant number of people cite using e-cigarettes and [https://www.vapestore.pk/ pod kit MTL vape] with [https://vipvapestore.pk/ nicotine salt flavor] as an attempt to quit smoking comparisons attempting to discern whether e-cigarette use has been more effective than no help at all. In attempting to quit, people found that e-cigarettes were five times more likely to help individuals stop smoking after a monthly follow-up of 1 month of e-cigarette use.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=McDermott|first=Máirtín S.|last2=East|first2=Katherine A.|last3=Brose|first3=Leonie S.|last4=McNeill|first4=Ann|last5=Hitchman|first5=Sara C.|last6=Partos|first6=Timea R.|date=2021|title=The effectiveness of using e-cigarettes for quitting smoking compared to other cessation methods among adults in the United Kingdom|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/add.15474|journal=Addiction|language=en|volume=116|issue=10|pages=2825–2836|doi=10.1111/add.15474|issn=1360-0443}}</ref> However, health advice from the American Centre for Disease Control (CDC) recommend that when using e-cigarettes in an attempt to quit smoking they should switch from conventional cigarettes to e-cigarettes immediately as extended periods of dual use delays quitting smoking completely.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://archive.cdc.gov/#/details?url=https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/severe-lung-disease.html|title=Outbreak of Lung Injury Associated with the Use of E-Cigarette, or Vaping, Products|date=3/8/2021|website=Centers for Disease Control and Prevention|archive-url=https://archive.cdc.gov/www_cdc_gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/severe-lung-disease.html|archive-date=21/6/2024}}</ref> ==== Taste and Flavour of E-cigarettes ==== Unlike traditional cigarettes, e-cigarettes are able to contain flavours and tastes that are often found to be more appealing and help to incentivise younger customers who may be hesitant to use traditional cigarettes due to the well-known health consequences. The flavours that e-cigarettes contain such as [https://ecigarettereviewed.com/best-e-juice-flavors/ Boosted, No.32, and Fuji Apple Strawberry Nectarine] are also widely cited as one of the reasons younger people especially children are more attracted to e-cigarettes than traditional cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Cotti|first=Chad|last2=Courtemanche|first2=Charles|last3=Liang|first3=Yang|last4=Maclean|first4=Johanna Catherine|last5=Nesson|first5=Erik|last6=Sabia|first6=Joseph J.|date=2025-08-01|title=The effect of e-cigarette flavor bans on tobacco use|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629625000487|journal=Journal of Health Economics|volume=102|pages=103013|doi=10.1016/j.jhealeco.2025.103013|issn=0167-6296}}</ref> In America e-cigarettes are available in all types of shapes and sizes, with more than 400 brands and an estimated 15,500 flavours.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hsu|first=Greta|last2=Sun|first2=Jessica Y.|last3=Zhu|first3=Shu-Hong|date=2018-03-12|title=Evolution of Electronic Cigarette Brands From 2013-2014 to 2016-2017: Analysis of Brand Websites|url=https://www.jmir.org/2018/3/e80|journal=Journal of Medical Internet Research|language=EN|volume=20|issue=3|pages=e8550|doi=10.2196/jmir.8550|pmc=5869180|pmid=29530840}}</ref> == Motivations for the regular use of e-cigarettes == {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} ==== Nicotine ==== [[File:Nicotine 3D Model.png|thumb|'''Figure 4'''. 3D Model of Nicotine<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nicotine_3D_Model.png|title=File:Nicotine 3D Model.png - Wikimedia Commons|website=commons.wikimedia.org|language=en|access-date=2025-09-28}}</ref>]] Nicotine is a highly addictive chemical that causes your brain to release dopamine, commonly referred to as a feel-good chemical. The longer an individual has been smoking the more nicotine they need for the extra dopamine their brain craves.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web|url=https://www.health.gov.au/topics/smoking-vaping-and-tobacco/about-smoking/effects|title=Effects of Smoking and Tobacco|date=8-5-2024|website=Department of Health, Disability and Ageing}}</ref> Once a person develops a dependency for nicotine they begin to start feeling withdrawal symptoms which can cause people to be irritable, nervous, and anxious often driving individuals to smoke.<ref name=":3" /> Nicotine initiates addiction by latching on to neural circuitry which functions as a way to reinforce behaviours that lead to rewarding goals. There are many brain structures that help this reward system function but one particular system, mesocorticolimbic dopamine (DA), plays a particularly important role in the adoption of behaviours that are inappropriately reinforced by psychostimulant drugs such as nicotine<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last=De Biasi|first=Mariella|last2=Dani|first2=John A.|date=2011|title=Reward, Addiction, Withdrawal to Nicotine|url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4542051/pdf/nihms-671027.pdf|journal=The Neuropharmacology of Nicotine Dependence|volume=34|pages=105-139|via=NIH Public Access}}</ref>. Nicotine increases the firing activity and phasic burst activity of midbrain DA neurons and elevates DA in other targets, this is what underlies nicotine's ability to enhance rewards from brain stimulation, reinforce conditioned preferences, and support self-administration.<ref name=":4" /> ==== Social Influences ==== [[File:Social media collection 2020s.png|thumb|'''Figure 5'''. Social Media Networks<ref>{{Citation|title=English: Social media collection icons in 2020s|url=https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Social_media_collection_2020s.png|date=2024-08-06|accessdate=2025-09-28|last=Ibrahim.ID}}</ref>]] There has been a substantial amount of research done on the influence that social factors such as social interactions, social norms, and advertising. Social media itself within the research is considered a conduit for these social factors. While there are substantial gaps in the research, advertising played a significant role when it came to what social factors were influencing people to use e-cigarettes, people who reported seeing advertising for e-cigarettes had an increased intention to use e-cigarettes<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Amon|first=Samia|last2=Dunn|first2=Adam G.|last3=Laranjo|first3=Liliana|date=January 2020|title=Social Influence in the Uptake and Use of Electronic Cigarettes: A Systematic Review|url=https://doi-org.ezproxy.canberra.edu.au/10.1016/j.amepre.2019.08.023|journal=American Journal of Preventative Medicine|volume=58|issue=1|pages=129-141}}</ref>. Advertising conducted through social media had the same effect. A study conducted attempting to see how many people were exposed to advertising e-cigarettes found that across four countries, Australia, China, India and the UK, 85% of respondents had been exposed to e-cigarette advertising through advertisement in real life as well as advertisement through popular social media platforms.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Pettigrew|first=Simone|last2=Santos|first2=Joseph A|last3=Pinho-Gomes|first3=Ana-Catarina|last4=Li|first4=Yuan|last5=Jones|first5=Alexandra|date=October 2023|title=Exposure to e-cigarette advertising and young people's use of e-cigarettes: A four-country study|url=https://doi.org/10.18332/tid/172414|journal=Tobacco induced diseases|volume=21|pages=141}}</ref> People who may have already used an e-cigarette containing nicotine and are experiencing withdrawal would be more likely to use e-cigarettes again if exposed to advertising for e-cigarettes. The World Health Organisation has recommended that countries ban all forms of advertisements, sponsorship, and promotion of e-cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240032095|title=WHO report on the global tobacco epidemic 2021: addressing new and emerging products|last=World Health Oganisation|date=July 2021|website=World Health Organization}}</ref> ==== Coping with Mental Health Challenges ==== [[File:Mental Health Message.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 6'''. Mental Health Display<ref>{{Citation|title=English: Mental Health Wellness Psychology Mind.|url=https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mental_Health_Message.jpg|date=2017-01-29|accessdate=2025-09-28|first=Wokandapix at|last=Pixabay}}</ref>]] In a survey conducted of youth and young adults {{where}}, people aged 15-24 years of age, the most common reason for using e-cigarettes was coping with mental health challenges{{f}}. The people who cited coping with mental health challenges as their reason for using e-cigarettes most common response when asked why that the e-cigarettes helped them relax, help them feel calm or less anxious, and that it helps them stay focused.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Do|first=Elizabeth K.|last2=Koris|first2=Kristiann|last3=Minter|first3=Tyler|last4=Esayed|first4=Suad|last5=Hair|first5=Elizabeth C.|date=July 2025|title=Reasons for E-cigarette Use and Their Associations With Frequency, Dependence, and Quit Intentions: Findings From a Youth and Young Adult Sample|url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2025.03.009|journal=American Journal of Preventative Medicine|volume=69|issue=1}}</ref> The perceived ability of e-cigarettes to help youth and young people feel calm or more relaxed is likely associated with the nicotine content that can be found in many e-cigarettes and initiate a process that reinforces conditioned process in the form of using e-cigarettes{{f}}. ==== Sensation Seeking ==== Sensation seeking has also been found to be a popular reason for youth and young adults to engage with e-cigarettes. When asked about why they were using e-cigarettes the replies consisted of responses such as they gave me a good buzz, they came in flavours that I liked, just to try, and just curious.<ref name=":5" /> These responses hint at a lack of knowledge on the health consequences of using e-cigarettes whether they contain nicotine or not. == Health consequences of e-cigarette use == {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} ==== Lung damage ==== E-cigarettes containing vitamin e acetate have been associated with life-threatening acute pulmonary illness, this is specifically distinct from typical health consequences associated with the long term use of e-cigarettes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Amjad|first=Mohammad Asim|last2=Ocazionez Trujillo|first2=Daniel|last3=Estrada-Y-Martin|first3=Rosa M.|last4=Cherian|first4=Sujith V.|date=2025-05-17|title=E-Cigarette or Vaping Product Use-Associated Lung Injury: A Comprehensive Review|url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12111167/|journal=International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health|volume=22|issue=5|pages=792|doi=10.3390/ijerph22050792|issn=1660-4601|pmc=12111167|pmid=40427906}}</ref> E-cigarette use has also been associated with inflaming conditions such as bronchitis, asthma, and respiratory tract irritation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hamann|first=Stephen L.|last2=Kungskulniti|first2=Nipapun|last3=Charoenca|first3=Naowarut|last4=Kasemsup|first4=Vijj|last5=Ruangkanchanasetr|first5=Suwanna|last6=Jongkhajornpong|first6=Passara|date=2023-09-22|title=Electronic Cigarette Harms: Aggregate Evidence Shows Damage to Biological Systems|url=https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10572885/|journal=International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health|volume=20|issue=19|pages=6808|doi=10.3390/ijerph20196808|issn=1660-4601|pmc=10572885|pmid=37835078}}</ref> A review of toxicological analyses of non-nicotine e-cigarettes found that of the identified 243 unique chemicals thirty-eight were listed as poisons.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Banks|first=E|last2=Yazidjoglou|first2=A|last3=brown|first3=S|last4=Nguyen|first4=M|last5=Martin|first5=M|last6=Beckwith|first6=K|last7=Daluwatta|first7=A|last8=Campbell|first8=S|last9=Joshy|first9=G|date=4-2022|title=Summary Brief: Review of Global Evidence on The Health Effects of Electronic Cigarettes|url=https://nceph.anu.edu.au/files/E-cigarettes%20health%20outcomes%20review%20summary%20brief%202022.pdf|journal=National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health}}</ref> ==== Developmental consequences ==== E-cigarette use among children has been linked to adverse physical and mental health outcomes such as acute lung injury, reported cough, dyspnea (shortness of breath), cracked teeth, mouth/cheek pain, and constitutional problems.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://login.ezproxy.canberra.edu.au/login?qurl=https://doi.org%2f10.1016%2fj.pedn.2022.01.006|title=Shibboleth Authentication Request|website=login.ezproxy.canberra.edu.au|doi=10.1016/j.pedn.2022.01.006|access-date=2025-08-14}}</ref> However there is a deficit in the research on what affect e-cigarette use has on an adolescents development. A study also found that adolescents who had used e-cigarettes within the last year had 29% higher odds of reporting sleep-related complaints, and the association was found to be statistically significant and adolescents who had reported dual-product use within the last year had 57% higher odds of reporting sleep-related complaints.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Riehm|first=Kira E.|last2=Rojo-Wissar|first2=Darlynn M.|last3=Feder|first3=Kenneth A.|last4=Mojtabai|first4=Ramin|last5=Spira|first5=Adam P.|last6=Thrul|first6=Johannes|last7=Crum|first7=Rosa M.|date=March 2019|title=E-cigarette use and sleep-related complaints among youth|url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2019.08.009|journal=Journal of Adolescence|volume=76|pages=48-54}}</ref> ==== Cardiovascular health consequences ==== Acute exposure to e-cigarettes has been associated with increased blood pressure and an increase in heart rate compared to those who do not use e-cigarettes.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last=Kundu|first=Anasua|last2=Feore|first2=Anna|last3=Sanchez|first3=Sherald|last4=Abu-Zarour|first4=Nada|last5=Sutton|first5=Megan|last6=Sachdeva|first6=Kyran|last7=Seth|first7=Siddharth|last8=Schwartz|first8=Robert|last9=Chaiton|first9=Michael|date=2025-06-13|title=Cardiovascular health effects of vaping e-cigarettes: a systematic review and meta-analysis|url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/40010935|journal=Heart (British Cardiac Society)|volume=111|issue=13|pages=599–608|doi=10.1136/heartjnl-2024-325030|issn=1468-201X|pmid=40010935}}</ref> Lower resting heart rate and lower diastolic BP compared to those who have not use e-cigarettes.<ref name=":2" /> However, because of how recent the e-cigarette trend is, there has not been a lot of longitudinal research examining the effects that sustained use of e-cigarettes can have on an individual's cardiovascular health. == Conclusion == A significant amount of people that regularly use e-cigarettes use them to attempt quitting conventional cigarettes and the nicotine within e-cigarettes is the most significant reason as to why they continue to use e-cigarettes. E-cigarettes in comparison to conventional cigarettes are not as restricted when it comes to their ability to market the product. E-cigarettes come in a variety of different colours, shapes, sizes, and flavours that attract the attention of children and provide greater incentives to give e-cigarettes a try. Knowledge of the long-term health consequences of e-cigarettes is largely unknown given how recently e-cigarettes have been popularised there has not been an opportunity to conduct longitudinal studies on the health consequences of regular e-cigarette use over time. Many e-cigarettes also contain nicotine which can lead to addiction and reinforces the behaviour of using e-cigarettes while long term use also leads to larger doses of nicotine to feel the induced effects, as well as withdrawal symptoms when attempting to quit using e-cigarettes. While some e-cigarettes do not contain nicotine, they can contain dangerous chemicals that can cause serious damage to vital organs. The e-cigarette industry has taken off since its introduction in the early 2000s and has become especially popular with children and young adults, although there is research suggesting that certain types of e-cigarettes are healthier than conventional cigarettes, there has not been an opportunity to examine the long-term health consequences of regular e-cigarette use. ==See also== * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2024/E-cigarette use motivation|E-cigarette use motivation]] (Book chapter, 2024) == References == <references /> == External links == [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Drugs/Nicotine]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Motivation]] nrnwo9gguxwollmlx7v8qxq7qdxu0s2 0 322598 2842406 2832228 2026-10-24T02:49:16Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Fixed all grammar and spelling errors that are flagged throughout. 2842406 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Boredom and substance use:<br>What role does boredom play in motivating substance use?}} __TOC__ ==Overview== {{robelbox|theme=5|title=Imagine this ...|iconwidth=55px|icon=Crystal_Clear_app_kdict.png}} [[File:Abstract Boredom SubstanceUse Picture.png|thumb|170px|'''Figure 1'''. Bored student, thinking about engaging in substance use.]] <div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> You are a university student who has three back-to-back tutorials in one day. Each tutorial requires you to engage in class discussions and take notes. You thoroughly enjoy the first class; your tutor is exciting and all other students are passionate about the content, so you find it very enjoyable and easy to engage with. However, as the day drags on, your attention slips, your motivation to take notes decreases, and you go for breaks more often to have a cigarette (see Figure 1). Cigaratte contains nicotine, which can temporarily affect attention and cognitive performance (Heishman et al. 2010). Smoking is also used to relieve boredom, with boredom relief associated with greater cigarette consumption (Wong et al., 2016) This is boredom. Everyone has experienced boredom at some point in their life, and responses to feeling bored vary among individuals. It can become serious if this state of boredom impacts your learning and functioning in everyday life. In this case, boredom is impacting your learning and functioning, as you are unable to remain seated and focused in several classes without needing to take several breaks. </div>  {{Robelbox/close}} This chapter explains how boredom motivates substance use. [[w:Boredom|Boredom]] is a psychological state which can motivate seeking excitement and attention. This can be problematic when other external and internal factors come into play, leading to high risk behaviours such as [[wikipedia:Substance_abuse|substance misuse]] (Bench & Lench, 2019). Around 91-98% of youth experience boredom in their daily lives (Chin et al., 2017). Additionally, 47% of individuals 14 years and over report using an illicit drug as some point in their lives (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2025) {{ic|Target an international audience; Australia represents 0.3% of the human population}}. Through this chapter, understanding why boredom arises will be beneficial in knowing how to handle it effectively and positively. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=7}} [[Image:Nuvola_apps_ktip.png|right|90px]] '''Focus questions''' * What are the psychological theories about boredom? * What are the psychological theories behind substance use? * What is the role of boredom in substance use? {{RoundBoxBottom}} == The psychology of boredom == <blockquote>''“Boredom: the desire for desires”'' <small>Tolstoy (1902/2013)</small></blockquote> Boredom is a universal human experience of desiring to engage in meaningful stimuli, but not being able to do so{{f}}. This emotion can arise from internal and external factors. Some individuals are more prone to experiencing it due to age, maturity or disposition. While boredom is often seen as trivial, it plays an important psychological role as it is linked to maladaptive issues such as attentional difficulties, unresolved internal conflicts and monotonous tasks. However, it also serves an adaptive function by motivating individuals to seek new goals and more meaningful engagement (Eastwood et al., 2012; Caldwell et al., 1999; Eplidorou, 2023; Ndetei et al., 2023). === Definition of boredom === Boredom is a negative emotional state of individuals seeking engagement with stimuli of interest, although the environment prevents this from occurring (Eastwood et al., 2012). Attentional theories suggest that some environments are under stimulating which impacts an individual's ability to focus (see Figure 2) (Westgate, 2020). Boredom may be perceived as unimportant; however, it can be argued that boredom allows for individuals to reignite [[motivation]] to pursue different [[Goal Setting Process|goals]] (Bench & Lench, 2013). [[File:Collage_of_bored_students.png|thumb|'''Figure 2.''' Collage of varying students that are all displaying states of boredom in class.]] === Causes of boredom === There are two types of boredom, “endogenous” and “reactive” boredom{{f}}. Endogenous boredom refers to what comes from within, it is also known as person-based state boredom (Mercer-Lynn et al., 2014). An example of this is if an individual is at work and they have increasing amounts of engaging tasks but they are still bored due to an internal sense of detachment and meaninglessness. Reactive boredom is the opposite of endogenous boredom, as it refers to a state of boredom that is brought on by the environment, also referred to as situation-based state boredom (Mercer-Lynn et al., 2014). An example would be if you are in class where the teacher is presenting a lecture on a topic you are uninterested in, it goes on for ages and is highly monotonous (see Figure 2). The propensity of experiencing boredom is that some individuals may have the tendency to experience boredom more so than others and it can translate across situations in their lives (Mercer-Lynn et al., 2014). Trait boredom is not necessarily a trait itself, it is a disposition to experience it more frequently or have difficulty tolerating it{{f}}. Furthermore, age and cultural differences can impact how or when someone experiences boredom (Ndetei et al., 2023). For example, adolescents are particularly vulnerable to boredom due to a conflict between desire for independence, limited autonomy and opportunities in their social environment. There is a bidirectional connection with boredom and depression, where boredom has the potential to worsen depressive symptoms, alongside being a risk factor for developing depression (Ndetei et al., 2023). Boredom can be an antecedent to depression as it can disrupt an individuals motivation, reduce pleasure and lead to negative emotional states. === Psychological theories of boredom === From a [[w:cognitive_psychology|cognitive psychological perspective]], research suggests that states of boredom are influenced by factors such as age and developmental stage. Individuals with lower levels of maturity may struggle to recognise potential changes in their environment or lack the awareness of strategies to act upon their desire for change once boredom is perceived (Caldwell et al., 1999). More broadly, boredom can be understood as arising from difficulties in sustaining attention or from attention being diverted elsewhere (Eplidorou, 2023). From a [[w:Psychodynamic_perspective|psychodynamic perspective]], boredom arises when conflicting wants or desires create an inner tension that cannot be resolved. This unresolved conflict leaves the individual in a state of dissatisfaction and disengagement, manifesting as boredom (Eastwood et al., 2007). There are several empirically evidenced theories of bored. The forced-effort theory of boredom asserts that boredom emerges when individuals are required to devote time and energy to monotonous or repetitive tasks{{f}}. Under such conditions, the effort expended is perceived as disproportionate to the level of stimulation or reward, resulting in a sense of disengagement and boredom (Caldwell et al., 1999). Alternatively, the functional theory of boredom conceptualises boredom as an affective state that serves an adaptive purpose{{f}}. Rather than being merely unpleasant, boredom signals the need to disengage from the current situation and seek alternative activities that are more meaningful or stimulating. This thereby guides individuals toward goal-directed action (Eplidorou, 2023). === How boredom can motivate === Boredom is not just an unpleasant emotion or state, rather simply best defined as a motivating state. Due to the inconsistency between attention and engagement, discomfort occurs and signals that the current situation is unfulfilling (Caldwell et al., 1999). Therefore, bored individuals are more likely to seek experiences and challenges, as they are motivated to seek the stimulation that they are lacking (Ndetei et al., 2023). From a functional perspective, boredom can be adaptive and push people to pursue more rewarding goals. Through a neurobiological lens, this is linked to reduced activity in the dopamine reward pathways, which drives the search for novelty or excitement to compensate for the deficit (Ernst & Luciana, 2015). While this can encourage positive outcomes such as creativity or learning, it can also lead to maladaptive behaviours. Maladaptive behaviours such as impulsivity or substance use can occur when individuals try to cope with the aversive state. Adolescents are pushed toward high risk behaviours when meaningful leisure opportunities are nonexistent (Wegner & Flisher, 2009). {{Robelbox|alt=|theme=7|title=Check your knowledge [[Image:Nuvola_apps_ktip.png|right|50px]]}}<div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> <quiz display=simple> Endogenous boredom comes from within a person, while reactive boredom is situation-based. |type="()"} + True - False {The psychodynamic theory suggests boredom occurs when conflicting desires cannot be resolved. |type="()"} + True - False </quiz> </div> {{Robelbox/close}} ==Psychology behind substance use== [[File:Figure_2._Abstract_image_of_different_substance_options.png|thumb|'''Figure 3.''' Bored individual is considering different types of substances.]] Substance use refers to the consumption of substances, which may include illicit drugs, prescription medications, or everyday substances like alcohol and caffeine (see Figure 3){{f}}. While general use does not always equate to harm, substance misuse occurs when use becomes uncontrollable and causes significant negative effects, sometimes leading to addiction (American Psychiatric Association, 2024). Several psychological theories explain substance misuse: the [[w:Biopsychosocial model|biopsychosocial model]] emphasises the interplay of genetic, psychological and socio-cultural factors (Rickwood et al., 2005); the [[w:Self-medication hypothesis|self-medication hypothesis]] suggests that individuals use substances to cope with distress or mental health issues, increasing vulnerability to disorders (Baskin‐Sommers & Hearon, 2015); and the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2023/Hijack hypothesis of drug addiction|hijacking model]] highlights how repeated use alters the brain's reward system, reinforcing dependence and contributing to long-term structural deficits (Baskin‐Sommers, & Hearon, 2015). === What is substance use and types of substances? === Substance abuse occurs when an individual uses specific substances on a recurring basis{{f}}. This can include illicit substances, or the misuse of over-the-counter prescriptions (American Psychiatric Association Website, 2024). Substances are typically categorised into four types (see Table 1). Substances are commonly categorised as [[w:depressants|depressants]], [[w:Stimulants|stimulants]], [[w:Hallucinogens|hallucinogens]] and [[w:Inhalants|inhalants]], each producing distinct psychological and physiological effects {| class="wikitable" |+ Table 1. Substance Categories !Types of Substances !Examples |- |Depressants |Alcohol, barbiturates, rohypnol, benzodiazepines, GHB, ketamine. |- |Stimulants |Cocaine, amphetamines, ritalin, caffeine, MDMA. |- |Hallucinogens |Ketamine, magic mushrooms, LSD, ecstasy. |- |Inhalants |Toluene, plastic cement, paint, gasoline, paint thinners, hair sprays. |} === The difference between using substances and misuse === Substance misuse (also known as substance abuse or ‘substance use disorders’) can be differentiated from general use of substances when an individual uses them in a way that causes harm, and they are unable to control their use of them despite the harmful effects - i.e. addiction. Substance misuse is associated with prescription medications, whilst substance abuse is associated with taking substances purposefully to get a high or inflict self-harm (Meridian Psychiatric Partners, 2020). === Psychological theories behind substance misuse === The [[wikipedia:Biopsychosocial_model|Biopsychosocial Model]] of substance use (Rickwood et al., 2005) highlights how biological, psychological and socio-cultural domains interact to influence the onset and maintenance of substance use. Biological factors include genetic vulnerability to both the risk factors that predispose individuals to use drugs and the physiological effects of drugs themselves (Rickwood et al., 2005). Psychological factors encompass learning and conditioning processes, cultural beliefs about substance use and underlying mental health conditions that may increase susceptibility. Socio-cultural factors involve the broader context, such as social networks and peer groups, environmental influences and socioeconomic status, which can act as either risk or protective factors (Rickwood et al., 2005). This framework emphasises the importance of individual, psychological and social dimensions in understanding substance use and its associated risks. The [[wikipedia:Self-medication#Self-medication_hypothesis|self-medication hypothesis]] suggests that individuals may turn to substance use as a means of alleviating or "quieting" distressing psychological states, such as those linked to stress or mental health disorders. While this provides temporary relief, it simultaneously increases vulnerability to substance use disorders as reliance on substances becomes a maladaptive coping mechanism (Baskin‐Sommers, & Hearon, 2015). The [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2023/Hijack hypothesis of drug addiction|"hijacking" model]] proposes that repeated substances use alters the brain's reward system by reshaping incentive structures and "wanting" mechanisms. Substances become strongly linked through predictive associations with reward value therefore reinforcing use. Over time these changes extend beyond motivation, contributing to structural and functional brain alterations that exacerbate cognitive and emotional deficits, thereby maintaining vulnerability to substance use disorders (Baskin‐Sommers, & Hearon, 2015). {{Robelbox|alt=|theme=7|title=Check your knowledge [[Image:Nuvola_apps_ktip.png|right|50px]]}}<div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> <quiz display=simple> The biopsychosocial model emphasises biological, psychological, and socio-cultural influences on substance use. |type="()"} + True - False {The self-medication hypothesis suggests people sometimes use substances to cope with stress or mental health symptoms. |type="()"} + True - False {The “hijacking” model describes how repeated substance use can change brain reward pathways and motivations. |type="()"} + True - False </quiz> </div> {{Robelbox/close}} ==The relationship between boredom and substance use== Boredom is linked to substance use, especially in adolescents as they are sensitive to rewards due to developmental changes in the dopamine system{{f}}. This makes them more likely to use substances as a coping strategy to escape under-stimulation or distress{{f}}. This process is reinforced by the self-medication hypothesis and the overlap between boredom and depression. Over time, substances hijack dopamine pathways, leading to reduced rewards for natural activities and increasing the vulnerability to dependence on substances. Preventative strategies like routines, hobbies, exercise and healthy coping mechanisms can reduce this risk.{{f}} === Why is there a relationship between boredom & substance use? === Adolescents would rely on substance use as a way to overcome under-stimulating environments and this was worsened by early age and the high levels of use (Weybright et al., 2015). During adolescence, neurodevelopment synaptic pruning and reductions in glial cells occur (Green at al., 2023). These changes are critical for cognitive development as synaptic pruning involves the process of eliminating unnecessary synapses. Therefore, this is a critical time where individuals can be influenced by peers easily. This, along with neurodevelopment, can lead to interrupted prefrontal cortex maturation, which leads to behaviour regulation difficulties (Yücel et al., 2007). Additionally, adolescents with high boredom trait levels were more likely to engage in substance abuse overall (Weybright et al., 2015). Studies indicate that adolescents experiencing boredom are 50% more likely to smoke, drink, become intoxicated and use illicit substances compared to their non-bored peers (Columbia University, 2003){{expand}}. This population may turn to substance use as a coping strategy, using it to alleviate or escape the aversive experience of boredom (Ndetei et al., 2023). This aligns with the self-medication hypothesis, which proposes that individuals use substances to reduce distressing psychological states, such as stress, low mood or mental health difficulties that can be enhanced by feelings of boredom (Baskin‐Sommers, & Hearon, 2015). Boredom has been identified as both a risk factor for and a symptom of depression, with both states characterised by feelings of numbness, low motivation and disengagement (Ndetei et al., 2023). According to the self-medication hypothesis, substance use may provide temporary relief by reducing aversive psychological states (Baskin‐Sommers, & Hearon, 2015). However, this short-term alleviation reinforces reliance on substances, therefore heightening the vulnerability to substance use disorders. Therefore, boredom and depression can be considered as interconnected drivers that funnel individuals toward self-medication through substance use. The dopamine system, particularly the [[wikipedia:Mesolimbic_pathway|mesolimbic pathway]] ([[wikipedia:Ventral_tegmental_area|ventral tegmental area]] → [[wikipedia:Nucleus_accumbens|nucleus accumbens]] → [[wikipedia:Prefrontal_cortex|prefrontal cortex]]) plays a central role in reward sensitivity, motivation and learning, and its activity is heightened during adolescence (Ernst & Luciana, 2015). When individuals are bored, this aversive state triggers a motivational drive to seek out rewarding stimuli. Adolescents are especially sensitive to such rewards due to developmental changes in dopamine-rich brain circuitry, making boredom more likely to push them toward high reward behaviours such as substance use (Galván, 2013). Substances that are often abused intensify this effect by producing large, rapid dopamine surges in the striatum, reinforcing drug-related cues and increasing their incentive salience, which makes them more attention-grabbing and desirable (Volkov & Morales, 2015). Repeated substance use over time leads to neuroadaptations where natural rewards elicit diminished dopamine responses, while drug cues elicit heightened responses which reduces the capacity to enjoy non-drug rewards and further reinforcing substance use patterns (see Figure 4) (Poisson et al., 2021). A systematic review by Wegner and Flisher (2009) strengthen findings that leisure boredom consistently predicts higher levels of adolescent substance use. It was also highlighted that contextual factors such as a lack of structured leisure options and limited parental monitoring increases the risk. These conclusions are supported by later empirical studies (Weybright et al., 2015), further strengthening the evidence that boredom is a key driver of adolescent substance use. === Preventative measures === Creating a consistent routine can help bring purpose to your life and reduce idle time that may otherwise feel unproductive. Incorporating hobbies, physical activity and creative pursuits into this routine is especially beneficial, as these activities not only provide structure but also enhance mood and fulfil the brain's need for reward. Additionally, replacing maladaptive coping mechanisms with healthier alternatives is important for long-term well-being. Having a list of preplanned activities can provide constructive outlets and reduce the likelihood of slipping back into old substance use habits. Example of activities include, going for a walk, calling a friend, creative activity (knitting, painting, drawing), exercise or others.{{f}} {{Robelbox|alt=|theme=7|title=Check your knowledge [[Image:Nuvola_apps_ktip.png|right|50px]]}}<div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> <quiz display=simple> Adolescents high in boredom proneness are no more likely to use substances than their peers. |type="()"} - True + False {Boredom can increase substance use because people seek stimulation or a dopamine hit. |type="()"} + True - False </quiz> </div> {{Robelbox/close}} ==Conclusion== Boredom can be understand through multiple psychological perspectives including cognitive theory, the forced-effort theory, the functional theory, and the psychodynamic perspective. Substance misuse is often explained by the biopsychosocial model, alongside the self-medication hypothesis. Boredom acts as a key driver of substance use by creating an aversive state that individuals seek to escape. Turning to substances is a form of coping from stress and a way to seek stimulation and dopamine-driven rewards. Over time, there is a reliance that is formed and reinforces the patterns of misuse and increases the risk of dependence. Boredom can be a warning sign, if you do not manage it then it may push you toward unhealthy coping mechanisms like substance use. Try utilising your boredom for growth rather than risk. ==See also== * [[wikipedia:Addiction|Addiction]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Boredom|Boredom]] (Wikipedia) * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2020/Boredom and technology addiction|Boredom and technology addiction]] (Book chapter, 2020) * [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2015/Boredom_and_motivation&veaction=edit&section=16 Boredom and motivation] (Book chapter, 2015) * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2019/Boredom and emotion|Boredom and emotion]] (Book chapter, 2019) * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2025/Alcohol, dopamine, motivation, and emotion|Alcohol, dopamine, motivation, and emotion]] (Book chapter, 2025) * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2025/E-cigarette use motivation|E-cigarette use motivation]] (Book chapter, 2025) * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2023/Treatment motivation in substance use disorder|Treatment motivation in substance use disorder]] (Book chapter, 2023) == References == {{Hanging indent|1= American Psychiatric Association. (2024). Substance-related and addictive disorders. ''Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-5-TR)''. https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/addiction-substance-use-disorders/what-is-a-substance-use-disorder Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2025). Illicit drug use. https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/illicit-use-of-drugs/illicit-drug-use Baskin‐Sommers, A. R., & Hearon, B. A. (2015). The intersection between neurobiological and psychological theories of substance use disorders. In H. R. White & S. H. Rabiner (Eds.), ''The handbook of drugs and society'' (pp. 218–235). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118726761.ch11 Bench, S. W., & Lench, H. C. (2019). Boredom as a seeking state: Boredom prompts the pursuit of novel (even negative) experiences. ''Emotion'', ''19''(2), 242–254. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000433 Caldwell, L. L., Darling, N., Payne, L. L., & Dowdy, B. (1999). “Why are you bored?”: An examination of psychological and social control causes of boredom among adolescents. ''Journal of Leisure Research'', ''31''(2), 103–121. https://doi.org/10.1080/00222216.1999.11949853 Chin, A., Markey, A., Bhargava, S., Kassam, K. S., & Loewenstein, G. (2017). Bored in the USA: Experience sampling and boredom in everyday life. ''Emotion'', ''17''(2), 359. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000232 Columbia University. (2003). National survey of American attitudes on substance abuse VIII: Teens and parents. New York, NY: National Centre on Addiction. https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED478693.pdf Eastwood, J. D., Cavaliere, C., Fahlman, S. A., & Eastwood, A. E. (2007). A desire for desires: Boredom and its relation to alexithymia. ''Personality and Individual Differences'', ''42''(6), 1035–1045. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2006.08.027 Eastwood, J., Frischen, A., Fenske, M., & Smilek, D. (2012). The unengaged mind: Defining boredom in terms of attention. ''Perspectives on Psychological Science'', ''7'', 482–495. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612456044 Elpidorou, A. (2023). Boredom and cognitive engagement: A functional theory of boredom. ''Review of Philosophy and Psychology'', ''14''(3), 959–988. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00599-6 Ernst, M., & Luciana, M. (2015). Neuroimaging of the dopamine/reward system in adolescent drug use. CNS Spectrums, 20(4), 427–441. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1092852915000395 Galván, A. (2013). The Teenage Brain: Sensitivity to Rewards. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(2), 88-93. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721413480859 Green, R., Meredith, L. R., Mewton, L., & Squeglia, L. M. (2023). Adolescent neurodevelopment within the context of impulsivity and substance use. Current addiction reports, 10(2), 166-177. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40429-023-00485-4 Heishman, S. J., Kleykamp, B. A., & Singleton, E. G. (2010). Meta-analysis of the acute effects of nicotine and smoking on human performance. Psychopharmacology, 210(4), 453–469. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-010-1848-1 Mercer-Lynn, K. B., Bar, R. J., & Eastwood, J. D. (2014). Causes of boredom: The person, the situation, or both? ''Personality and Individual Differences'', ''56'', 122–126. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2013.08.034 Ndetei, D. M., Nyamai, P., & Mutiso, V. (2023). Boredom—understanding the emotion and its impact on our lives: An African perspective. ''Frontiers in Sociology'', ''8'', 1213190. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2023.1213190 Poisson, C. L., Engel, L., & Saunders, B. T. (2021). Dopamine circuit mechanisms of addiction-like behaviors. Frontiers in Neural Circuits, 15, 752420. https://doi.org/10.3389/fncir.2021.752420 Rickwood, D., Crowley, M., Dyer, K., Magor-Blatch, L., Melrose, J., Mentha, H., & Ryder, D. (2005). ''Perspectives in psychology: Substance use''. Melbourne: Australian Psychological Society. https://doi.org/10.5172/jamh.4.3.218 Tolstoy, L. (2013). ''Leo Tolstoy - A short story collection: "Boredom: The desire for desires."'' Copyright Group Limited. https://books.google.com.au/books?id=4uzCtQEACAAJ Volkow, N. D., & Morales, M. (2015). The brain on drugs: from reward to addiction. Cell, 162(4), 712-725. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2015.07.046 Wegner, L., & Flisher, A. J. (2009). Leisure boredom and adolescent risk behaviour: A systematic literature review. Journal of child and adolescent mental health, 21(1), 1-28. https://doi.org/10.2989/JCAMH.2009.21.1.4.806 Wong, E. C., Haardörfer, R., Windle, M., & Berg, C. J. (2016). Distinct Motives for Use Among Polytobacco Versus Cigarette Only Users and Among Single Tobacco Product Users. Nicotine & Tobacco Research, ntw284. https://doi.org/10.1093/ntr/ntw284 Westgate, E. C. (2020). Why boredom is interesting. ''Current Directions in Psychological Science'', ''29''(1), 33–40. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721419884309 Weybright, E. H., Caldwell, L. L., Ram, N., Smith, E. A., & Wegner, L. (2015). Boredom prone or nothing to do? Distinguishing between state and trait leisure boredom and its association with substance use in South African adolescents. ''Leisure Sciences'', ''37''(4), 311–331. https://doi.org/10.1080/01490400.2015.1014530 Yücel, M., Lubman, D. I., Solowij, N., & Brewer, W. J. (2007). Understanding drug addiction: A neuropsychological perspective. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 41(12), 957-968. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048670701689444 }} ==External links== *[https://www.healthline.com/health/boredom Boredom] (Healthline) *[https://meridianpsychiatricpartners.com/drug-misuse-abuse-and-addiction-whats-the-difference/ Drug misuse, abuse and addiction: What’s the difference?] (Meridian Psychiatric Partners) *[https://www.ted.com/dubbing/manoush_zomorodi_how_boredom_can_lead_to_your_most_brilliant_ideas?language=en&audio=en How boredom can lead to your most brilliant ideas] (TED Talk) *[https://www.northpointrecovery.com/blog/how-to-deal-with-boredom-in-recovery-from-addiction/? How to deal with boredom in recovery from addiction] (Northpoint Recovery) *[https://www.aristarecovery.com/blog/life-is-boring-without-drugs-d7a0e? Life is boring without drugs] (Arista Recovery) *[https://www.ted.com/talks/judy_grisel_never_enough_the_neuroscience_and_experience_of_addiction Never enough: The neuroscience and experience of addiction] (TEDx Talk) *[https://www.healthdirect.gov.au/substance-abuse Substance abuse] (Healthdirect) *[https://www.theguardian.com/books/2025/jun/15/the-big-idea-should-we-embrace-boredom The big idea: should we embrace boredom?] (The Guardian) *[https://www.jacksonhouserehab.com/blog/posts/2024/june/the-connection-between-boredom-and-addiction/ The connection between boredom and addiction] (Jackson House Rehab) *[https://fountainhillsrecovery.com/blog/boredom-and-relapse/? Why boredom can lead to relapse and 3 ways to prevent it] (Fountain Hills Recovery) [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Boredom]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Drugs]] 2e7hnv5t4zxjkcazp41fd072xhaxnr3 0 322620 2842296 2836828 2026-10-23T13:42:24Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Edited first paragraph after the first feature box to improve readability 2842296 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Adenosine and sleep motivation:<br>How does adenosine affect the motivation to sleep??}} __TOC__ == Overview == {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:Example en.svg|150px|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. ...caption goes here...]] ;Scenario Imagine Emily, a graduate student, who has been up since daybreak and now, at 2 a.m., is struggling with her thesis. She tries her best not to, but the words get a little fuzzy and her focus wanes—a weightless, magnetic slide into sleep. It’s not merely fatigue—this is a potent biochemical drive called “sleep pressure,” and it’s driven by the molecule adenosine, which has been quietly building up in Emily’s brain all day. {{RoundBoxBottom}} In the stillness of the dark brain, a sleep-regulating structure called the circadian clock ticks away while, apparently, adenosine, a waste product of energy consumption in the brain, accumulates in the synapses “like coffee grounds in the bottom of the pot,” as one of the study’s authors, Benington, put it literally nudging the brain very gently away from sleep and toward wakefulness{{f}}. This unseen tide generates what psychologists refer to as “sleep motivation”: a visceral urge as potent as hunger or thirst that, if thwarted, makes its denial increasingly unbearable to mind and body the longer a person is awake. Understanding this biological force is more than academic exercise{{g}}. It also helps us tease out why people yawn, lose concentration, or easily succumb to sleep when they have to remain as wide awake as possible. This chapter, will {{ic|Use 3rd person perspective}} take a closer look at what it means to be sleep motivated that is, what that looks like, why it’s important, and how researchers assess it. This chapter discusses how adenosine builds up in the brain when a person is awake and stimulates particular subtypes of receptors that tell the brain it’s time for sleep. The chapter links these neurochemical substrates to the real-world experiences: how a person's afternoon coffee, evening sport or irregular patterns of sleep can push the scales of sleep desire. Translated into clinical and pharmacological opportunities, this approach may ultimately inform strategies to modulate sleep drive through the promotion of habits, pharmacological intervention, and more. In general, this primer emphasises the vital connections tying the chemistry of the brain, behaviour, and the search for restorative sleep. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=5}} '''Focus questions''' * What role does adenosine play in regulating the motivation to sleep? * How does adenosine interact with other neurotransmitters and brain regions involved in sleep regulation? * Why does caffeine reduce feelings of sleepiness, and what does this reveal about adenosine’s function? * How does the build-up and clearance of adenosine influence daily rhythms of alertness and fatigue? {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Understanding Sleep Motivation == {{ic|Provide an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-headings}} === Definition and Importance === Sleep motivation — also known as sleep pressure — is the biological drive that builds the longer a person is awake. It is as if the 'urge' is a compulsion, such as hunger or thirst, to ensure a vital need is met. Deprive sleep and attention wanes, recall declines, emotion regulation deteriorates ([https://researchnow.flinders.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/137288446/Phillips_Modeling_P2017.pdf Phillips & Robinson, 2017]). Understanding what motivates sleep is a fundamental puzzle not just for the neuroscientist but also for anyone who is concerned about health and performance. {{Box|title=💡 Key insight|background=#E6FFE6|width=80%| Adenosine is something like a biological sleep gauge — the longer you’re awake, the more adenosine you accrue — until sleep toxicity resets the system. }} ==== Measurement Approaches ==== To evaluate sleep propensity, investigators rely on subjective instruments (e.g., Karolinska Sleepiness Scale), cognitive measures (e.g., reaction time tasks), and physiological indices (e.g., EEG slow-wave activity). Modeling studies have also generated models for estimating sleep pressure and the level of alertness ([https://researchnow.flinders.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/137288446/Phillips_Modeling_P2017.pdf Phillips & Robinson, 2017]; [[doi:10.1046/j.1365-2869.2000.00225.x|Thomas et al., 2000]]). Such tools enable the invisible accumulation of sleep drive to be connected to visible changes in behaviour and brain function. == The Role of Adenosine in Sleep == {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} '''Biological Mechanisms''' The brain's homeostatic sleep-wake regulating system adenosine, a neuromodulator is accumulated in the brain with wakefulness, due to energy demands of the cells ([[doi:10.3109/07853899908998788|Radulovacki, 1999]]). With high levels, adenosine binds to receptors that inhibit arousal-promoting neurons, pushing the equilibrium further toward sleep ([[doi:10.1126/science.276.5316.1265|Porkka-Heiskanen et al., 1997]]). Adenosine levels drop during sleep, resetting the cycle for the next day. ([https://www.sleepfoundation.org/how-sleep-works/adenosine-and-sleep Sleep Foundation, 2024]). ==== Adenosine Receptors ==== Adenosine mainly exerts its actions through A₁ and A₂A receptors. A1 receptors, which inhibit excitatory neurotransmission, induce sleepiness, whereas A2A receptors in the basal forebrain and striatum mediate the transition into slow-wave sleep ([[doi:10.1016/j.coph.2011.02.007|Huang et al., 2011; Lazarus et al., 2019]]). The unique but interlocking jobs of these receptors are yet another example of how exquisitely the sleep machinery of our brain is tuned. ===== Interaction with Circadian Rhythms ===== Though adenosine gradually accumulates sleep pressure over the day, it is not the only system that determines when people sleep. The internal body clock that governs when people sleep and wake, known as the circadian rhythm, is driven by the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN) of the hypothalamus and acts together with adenosine to control when we sleep. Together, these constitute the two-process model of sleep regulation (Borbély, 1982). * '''Process S (Sleep Pressure)''': It is mainly adenosine dependent; increases with wakefulness and decreases during sleep. * '''Process C (Circadian Rhythm)''': A 24-hour oscillation which drives wakefulness during daylight hours and sleep at night and is driven primarily by light exposure. The interplay of these two processes is what causes people to get sleepy in the afternoon even as they're driving to and from work with the circadian signal still going strong against drowsiness, and why people can get a late-night “second wind” in the absence of lots of adenosine. Learning in such systems is also a source of functional flexibility and adaptation, through which the learning system mediates the relations between the biological systems and the cognitive context in which demands are confronted. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=8}} 🎉 Fun facts about adenosine and sleep{{f}} * ☕ '''Caffeine’s trick''': Coffee doesn’t remove adenosine – it just blocks its receptors. * 🧬 '''Night owls vs. early birds''': Genes in adenosine receptors influence sleep timing. * 🧹 '''Brain cleaning crew''': Deep sleep clears adenosine and brain waste. * 🏃 '''Exercise effect''': Intense workouts speed up adenosine build-up. * 😴 '''Nap reset''': Even a 20-minute nap lowers adenosine and restores alertness. {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Adenosine and Sleep Motivation == === Neurochemical Pathways === The build-up of adenosine is known to raise the inhibitory 'stock' in waking networks (such as cholinergic and dopaminergic pathways) and to lower the 'asset value' in sleep promoting circuits ([[doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2008.11.024|Halassa et al., 2009]]). It is this neurochemical flip, they say [<small>''who?''</small>] , that accounts for the mounting desire to sleep with increased hours of wakefulness and the refreshing reset that occurs with a night’s sleep. ==== Empirical Evidence ==== Animal research has played a fundamental role in showing what adenosine does. Microdialysis studies have demonstrated that extracellular adenosine levels increase in the basal forebrain during long wake and decrease during sleep ([[doi:10.1126/science.276.5316.1265|Porkka-Heiskanen et al., 1997]]; [[doi:10.3109/07853899908998788|Radulovacki, 1999]]). Human studies provide further evidence that the sleep architecture and subjectively reported sleepiness can be altered by targeting adenosine signalling ([[doi:10.1016/j.bcp.2007.08.018|Landolt, 2008]]; [[doi:10.1016/j.tins.2019.05.001|Lazarus et al., 2019]]). == Influence of Lifestyle Factors == {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} === Caffeine Consumption === Caffeine acts by blockading adenosine receptors, particularly A 2A, from signalling fatigue ([https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.3109/07853899908998788 Fredholm et al., 1999]). That is why coffee and tea wake people up and helps concentration. Blocking adenosine, however, has its drawbacks: It diminishes slow-wave sleep, disturbs sleep and can cause a crash when the drug subsequently wears off ([[doi:10.1016/0893-133X(94)00156-L|Landolt et al., 1995]]; MDPI, 2016). The timing is important: caffeine consumed too late can disturb sleep. {| class="wikitable" style="background-color:#f0f8ff;{{Text color default}}; border-left:5px solid #1e90ff;" |- | '''🌟 Fun Fact 1''' The reality is, Caffeine doesn't just get rid of your sleepiness! Caffeine makes you feel less tired because it actually temporarily blocks adenosine receptors in your brain. Caffeine can actually help you maintain alertness! perfect for late night study sessions — but the adenosine remains and continues to build, prolonging the inevitable sleep crash (Reichert et al. 2022). |} ==== Exercise and Sleep ==== Even better?{{g}} Working out may increase your body’s adenosine amount, which means even deeper, more restorative sleep. Animal research indicates that extracellular adenosine in sleep-controlling brain areas is elevated after physical exercise ([[doi:10.1152/japplphysiol.00514.2007|Dworak et al., 2007]]). In humans, regular moderate intensity exercise is associated with enhanced sleep ó with the precise contribution of adenosine to this process requiring further investigation ([[doi:10.1111/jsr.13825|Salvadori et al., 2024]]). {{RoundBoxTop|theme=4}} {| class="wikitable" style="background-color:#fffacd;{{Text color default}}; border-left:5px solid #ff8c00;" |- | '''❓ Fun Question 2''' Why do you think pulling an '''all-nighter''' makes you feel especially groggy the next morning — even if you drink coffee? (Hint: adenosine keeps piling up, and caffeine can’t erase it!) |} {{RoundBoxBottom}} ===== Individual Differences in Sleep Motivation ===== Sleep pressure isn’t the same for everyone. Genetic variations, behavior and even age could affect how adenosine mediates sleep motivation.{{Source|example=Source?}} * '''Genetic variability''': Polymorphism in genes encoding adenosine receptor (e.g., ADORA2A) influence sensitivity to both adenosine and caffeine. While some individuals can consume coffee in the evening with little interference, others show a marked alerting effect and poorer sleep (Rétey et al., 2007). * '''Chronotype''' : Morning larks” and night owls” vary in the degree to which their circadian rhythm is timed to go to sleep and wake up in conjunction with adenosine-fueled sleep pressure, making the times at which they feel most alert or sleepy different.. * '''Age differences''': Elderly people frequently display decreased slow-wave sleep and impaired adenosine functioning, which might result in shallow and fragmented sleep (Münch et al., 2005). Acknowledgment of these distinctions underscores that there is no one-size-fits-all in all matters of sleep. What wakes one person up and causes another to fall asleep is like the routine that works at the family gym; in other words, the key is individualized{{ic|Use Australian spelling}} sleep strategies == Practical Applications == [[File:Adenosine Sleep Two Process Model.png|thumb|'''Figure 1.''' Adenosine build-up in the brain increases sleep pressure over the day. The two-process model of sleep regulation. Process S (blue line) represents the build-up of sleep pressure due to adenosine accumulation during wakefulness, which decreases during sleep. Process C (orange line) represents the circadian rhythm of alertness controlled by the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN). Together, these processes explain fluctuations in sleep motivation, such as morning alertness, the afternoon slump, the evening “second wind,” and the strong drive for sleep at night. (Adapted from Borbély’s two-process model, 1982.)]] === Improving Sleep Hygiene === * Cut down on caffeine in the afternoon: By blocking adenosine in the hours before bed, you can delay sleep while you lessen sleep quality ([[doi:10.1016/j.bcp.2007.08.018|Landolt, 2008]]). * Keep a routine sleep-wake cycle: Regularity helps endogenous adenosine oscillations to become synchronized with circadian rhythmicity ([https://researchnow.flinders.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/137288446/Phillips_Modeling_P2017.pdf Phillips & Robinson, 2017]). * Use exercise judiciously: A moderate amount of physical activity during the day may build up sleep pressure, but late-night, strenuous workouts might delay sleep onset. {| class="wikitable" style="background-color:#e6ffe6;{{Text color default}}; border-left:5px solid #2e8b57;" |- | '''🌟 Fun Fact 3''' Other individuals carry a gene variant (in ADORA2A) that gives them a heightened response to caffeine. For them, a single espresso in the afternoon is enough to wreck their sleep that night.{{f}} |} ==== Clinical Implications ==== Pharmacological modulation of adenosine is being investigated as a treatment for sleep and neuropsychiatric disorders. For instance, A2A receptor selective antagonists are being investigated for Parkinson’s disease and excessive daytime sleepiness ([[doi:10.1007/s00213-016-4212-2|Ferré, 2016]]; [[doi:10.1016/j.coph.2011.02.007|Huang et al., 2011]]). Conversely, adenosine-elevating interventions are possibilities in insomnia or in shift-work related disorder ([[doi:10.3389/fnins.2023.1077597|Lazarus et al., 2023]]). ==Conclusion== Adenosine is the chemical motor of the sleep drive, slowly building up during wakefulness and hitting receptors that damp down arousal. Its effects are why, when we’ve {{ic|Use 3rd person perspective}} been awake for a while, sleep becomes irresistible, and why restorative rest can reset the system. Lifestyle considerations, particularly caffeine and exercise, have a lot of influence on this process for better or worse. Future research should explore: * How genetic variation in adenosine receptors plays a role in determining bedtime. * How best to harness adenosine’s natural cadence with lifestyle interventions (exercise timing, timing of caffeine). * The safe use of adenosine-targeting drugs in the clinic. In linking molecules to motivation, adenosine is a reminder that sleep is not just idle time — it is a regulated biological drive, a signal to the body that it needs to regroup, recover and restore, a process that may affect everything from mental clarity and emotional stability to the long-term health of organs and systems. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} {{Box|title=✅ Key takeaway|background=#E6FFE6|border=#66CC66|width=80%| Adenosine works like a biological sleep meter – the longer you’re awake, the more it builds up, creating sleep pressure. Sleep then clears adenosine, resetting the system. }} {{RoundBoxBottom}} == See also == * [[wikipedia:Adenosine|Adenosine]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Sleep|Sleep]] (Wikipedia) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= ChatGPT. (2025, August 14). Conversation with user on adenosine and sleep motivation chapter guidelines and resources. OpenAI. Personal communication. https://chatgpt.com/c/689ca37a-ecbc-8332-ac58-01d86b94de44 {{ic|Unable to load conversation; remove this reference because it is not a peer-reviewed source and instead acknowledge genAI use in edit summaries with working links to relevant conversations}} Dworak, M., Diel, P., Voss, S., Hollmann, W., & Strüder, H. K. (2007). Intense exercise increases adenosine concentrations in the rat brain: Implications for a sleep-promoting function of exercise? Journal of Applied Physiology, 103(5), 1964–1968. https://doi.org/10.1152/japplphysiol.00514.2007 Ferré, S. (2016). Mechanisms of the psychostimulant effects of caffeine: Implications for substance use disorders. Psychopharmacology, 233(10), 1963–1979. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-016-4212-2 Fredholm, B. B., Bättig, K., Holmén, J., Nehlig, A., & Zvartau, E. E. (1999). Actions of caffeine in the brain with special reference to factors that contribute to its widespread use. Pharmacological Reviews, 51(1), 83–133. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.3109/07853899908998788 Halassa, M. M., Florian, C., Fellin, T., Munoz, J. R., Lee, S. Y., Abel, T., ... & Haydon, P. G. (2009). Astrocytic modulation of sleep homeostasis and cognitive consequences of sleep loss. Neuron, 61(2), 213–219. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2008.11.024 Huang, Z. L., Urade, Y., & Hayaishi, O. (2011). Prostaglandins and adenosine in sleep–wake regulation. Current Opinion in Pharmacology, 11(1), 52–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.coph.2011.02.007 Landolt, H. P. (2008). Sleep homeostasis: A role for adenosine in humans? Biochemical Pharmacology, 75(11), 2070–2079. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bcp.2007.08.018 Landolt, H. P., Dijk, D. J., Gaus, S. E., & Borbély, A. A. (1995). Caffeine reduces low-frequency delta activity in the human sleep EEG. Neuropsychopharmacology, 12(3), 229–238. https://doi.org/10.1016/0893-133X(94)00156-L Lazarus, M., Huang, Z. L., Lu, J., Urade, Y., & Chen, J. F. (2019). How do the basal ganglia regulate sleep–wake behavior? Trends in Neurosciences, 42(7), 546–559. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2019.05.001 Lazarus, M., Oishi, Y., Bjorness, T. E., & Greene, R. W. (2019). Gating and the need for sleep: Dissociable effects of adenosine A₁ and A₂A receptors. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 13, 740. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2019.00740 Lazarus, M., Urade, Y., & Chen, J. F. (2023). Adenosine and sleep. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 17, 1077597. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2023.1077597 Li, C., Kroll, T., Matusch, A., Aeschbach, D., Bauer, A., Elmenhorst, E.-M., & Elmenhorst, D. (2023). Associations between resting state brain activity and A₁ adenosine receptor availability in the healthy brain: Effects of acute sleep deprivation. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 17, 1077597. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2023.1077597 Phillips, A. J. K., & Robinson, P. A. (2017). Modeling sleep pressure and circadian influences on sleep. Progress in Brain Research, 230, 109–126. https://researchnow.flinders.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/137288446/Phillips_Modeling_P2017.pdf Porkka-Heiskanen, T., Strecker, R. E., Thakkar, M., Bjorkum, A. A., Greene, R. W., & McCarley, R. W. (1997). Adenosine: A mediator of the sleep-inducing effects of prolonged wakefulness. Science, 276(5316), 1265–1268. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.276.5316.1265 Porkka-Heiskanen, T., Strecker, R. E., Thakkar, M., Bjorness, T., Greene, R. W., & McCarley, R. W. (2000). Adenosine: A mediator of the sleep-inducing effects of prolonged wakefulness. Science, 276(5316), 1265–1268. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.276.5316.1265 Radulovacki, M. (1999). Adenosine sleep theory. Neuropsychopharmacology, 21(6), 455–468. https://doi.org/10.3109/07853899908998788 Reichert, C. F., Maire, M., Schmidt, C., & Cajochen, C. (2016). Sleep-Wake Regulation and Its Impact on Working Memory Performance: The Role of Adenosine. Biology, 5(1), 11. https://doi.org/10.3390/biology5010011 Salvadori, E., & Santoro, A. (2024). Exercise, adenosine and sleep: Emerging evidence. Journal of Sleep Research, 33(1), e13825. https://doi.org/10.1111/jsr.13825 Sleep Foundation. (2024). Adenosine and sleep. Sleep Foundation. https://www.sleepfoundation.org/how-sleep-works/adenosine-and-sleep Sleep Foundation. (2025, July). Adenosine and sleep: Understanding your sleep drive. Sleep Foundation. https://www.sleepfoundation.org/how-sleep-works/adenosine-and-sleep Thomas, M., Sing, H., Belenky, G., Holcomb, H., Mayberg, H., Dannals, R., ... & Redmond, D. (2000). Neural basis of alertness and cognitive performance impairments during sleepiness. Journal of Sleep Research, 9(4), 335–352. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2869.2000.00225.x }} ==External links== * [https://www.sleepfoundation.org National sleep foundation] * [https://www.sleepfoundation.org/how-sleep-works/adenosine-and-sleep Sleep foundation: adenosine and sleep] [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Neurotransmitters/Adenosine]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Sleep]] cn8ivi2xoibl0vvdmaq6rykuucevkii 2842297 2842296 2026-10-23T13:51:07Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Removed 'em dashes' throughout the chapter and made minor improvements 2842297 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Adenosine and sleep motivation:<br>How does adenosine affect the motivation to sleep??}} __TOC__ == Overview == {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:Example en.svg|150px|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. ...caption goes here...]] ;Scenario Imagine Emily, a graduate student, who has been up since daybreak and now, at 2 a.m., is struggling with her thesis. She tries her best not to, but the words get a little fuzzy and her focus wanes a weightless, magnetic slide into sleep. It’s not merely fatigue, this is a potent biochemical drive called “sleep pressure,” and it’s driven by the molecule adenosine, which has been quietly building up in Emily’s brain all day. {{RoundBoxBottom}} In the stillness of the dark brain, a sleep-regulating structure called the circadian clock ticks away while, apparently, adenosine, a waste product of energy consumption in the brain, accumulates in the synapses “like coffee grounds in the bottom of the pot,” as one of the study’s authors, Benington, put it literally nudging the brain very gently away from sleep and toward wakefulness{{f}}. This unseen tide generates what psychologists refer to as “sleep motivation”: a visceral urge as potent as hunger or thirst that, if thwarted, makes its denial increasingly unbearable to mind and body the longer a person is awake. Understanding this biological force is more than academic exercise{{g}}. It also helps us tease out why people yawn, lose concentration, or easily succumb to sleep when they have to remain as wide awake as possible. This chapter, will {{ic|Use 3rd person perspective}} take a closer look at what it means to be sleep motivated that is, what that looks like, why it’s important, and how researchers assess it. This chapter discusses how adenosine builds up in the brain when a person is awake and stimulates particular subtypes of receptors that tell the brain it’s time for sleep. The chapter links these neurochemical substrates to the real-world experiences: how a person's afternoon coffee, evening sport or irregular patterns of sleep can push the scales of sleep desire. Translated into clinical and pharmacological opportunities, this approach may ultimately inform strategies to modulate sleep drive through the promotion of habits, pharmacological intervention, and more. In general, this primer emphasises the vital connections tying the chemistry of the brain, behaviour, and the search for restorative sleep. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=5}} '''Focus questions''' * What role does adenosine play in regulating the motivation to sleep? * How does adenosine interact with other neurotransmitters and brain regions involved in sleep regulation? * Why does caffeine reduce feelings of sleepiness, and what does this reveal about adenosine’s function? * How does the build-up and clearance of adenosine influence daily rhythms of alertness and fatigue? {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Understanding Sleep Motivation == {{ic|Provide an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-headings}} === Definition and Importance === Sleep motivation, also known as sleep pressure, is the biological drive that builds the longer a person is awake. It is as if the 'urge' is a compulsion, such as hunger or thirst, to ensure a vital need is met. Deprive sleep and attention wanes, recall declines, emotion regulation deteriorates ([https://researchnow.flinders.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/137288446/Phillips_Modeling_P2017.pdf Phillips & Robinson, 2017]). Understanding what motivates sleep is a fundamental puzzle not just for the neuroscientist but also for anyone who is concerned about health and performance. {{Box|title=💡 Key insight|background=#E6FFE6|width=80%| Adenosine is something like a biological sleep gauge — the longer you’re awake, the more adenosine you accrue — until sleep toxicity resets the system. }} ==== Measurement Approaches ==== To evaluate sleep propensity, investigators rely on subjective instruments (e.g., Karolinska Sleepiness Scale), cognitive measures (e.g., reaction time tasks), and physiological indices (e.g., EEG slow-wave activity). Modeling studies have also generated models for estimating sleep pressure and the level of alertness ([https://researchnow.flinders.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/137288446/Phillips_Modeling_P2017.pdf Phillips & Robinson, 2017]; [[doi:10.1046/j.1365-2869.2000.00225.x|Thomas et al., 2000]]). Such tools enable the invisible accumulation of sleep drive to be connected to visible changes in behaviour and brain function. == The Role of Adenosine in Sleep == {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} '''Biological Mechanisms''' The brain's homeostatic sleep-wake regulating system adenosine, a neuromodulator is accumulated in the brain with wakefulness, due to energy demands of the cells ([[doi:10.3109/07853899908998788|Radulovacki, 1999]]). With high levels, adenosine binds to receptors that inhibit arousal-promoting neurons, pushing the equilibrium further toward sleep ([[doi:10.1126/science.276.5316.1265|Porkka-Heiskanen et al., 1997]]). Adenosine levels drop during sleep, resetting the cycle for the next day. ([https://www.sleepfoundation.org/how-sleep-works/adenosine-and-sleep Sleep Foundation, 2024]). ==== Adenosine Receptors ==== Adenosine mainly exerts its actions through A₁ and A₂A receptors. A1 receptors, which inhibit excitatory neurotransmission, induce sleepiness, whereas A2A receptors in the basal forebrain and striatum mediate the transition into slow-wave sleep ([[doi:10.1016/j.coph.2011.02.007|Huang et al., 2011; Lazarus et al., 2019]]). The unique but interlocking jobs of these receptors are yet another example of how exquisitely the sleep machinery of our brain is tuned. ===== Interaction with Circadian Rhythms ===== Though adenosine gradually accumulates sleep pressure over the day, it is not the only system that determines when people sleep. The internal body clock that governs when people sleep and wake, known as the circadian rhythm, is driven by the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN) of the hypothalamus and acts together with adenosine to control when we sleep. Together, these constitute the two-process model of sleep regulation (Borbély, 1982). * '''Process S (Sleep Pressure)''': It is mainly adenosine dependent; increases with wakefulness and decreases during sleep. * '''Process C (Circadian Rhythm)''': A 24-hour oscillation which drives wakefulness during daylight hours and sleep at night and is driven primarily by light exposure. The interplay of these two processes is what causes people to get sleepy in the afternoon even as they're driving to and from work with the circadian signal still going strong against drowsiness, and why people can get a late-night “second wind” in the absence of lots of adenosine. Learning in such systems is also a source of functional flexibility and adaptation, through which the learning system mediates the relations between the biological systems and the cognitive context in which demands are confronted. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=8}} 🎉 Fun facts about adenosine and sleep{{f}} * ☕ '''Caffeine’s trick''': Coffee doesn’t remove adenosine – it just blocks its receptors. * 🧬 '''Night owls vs. early birds''': Genes in adenosine receptors influence sleep timing. * 🧹 '''Brain cleaning crew''': Deep sleep clears adenosine and brain waste. * 🏃 '''Exercise effect''': Intense workouts speed up adenosine build-up. * 😴 '''Nap reset''': Even a 20-minute nap lowers adenosine and restores alertness. {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Adenosine and Sleep Motivation == === Neurochemical Pathways === The build-up of adenosine is known to raise the inhibitory 'stock' in waking networks (such as cholinergic and dopaminergic pathways) and to lower the 'asset value' in sleep promoting circuits ([[doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2008.11.024|Halassa et al., 2009]]). It is this neurochemical flip, they say [<small>''who?''</small>] , that accounts for the mounting desire to sleep with increased hours of wakefulness and the refreshing reset that occurs with a night’s sleep. ==== Empirical Evidence ==== Animal research has played a fundamental role in showing what adenosine does. Microdialysis studies have demonstrated that extracellular adenosine levels increase in the basal forebrain during long wake and decrease during sleep ([[doi:10.1126/science.276.5316.1265|Porkka-Heiskanen et al., 1997]]; [[doi:10.3109/07853899908998788|Radulovacki, 1999]]). Human studies provide further evidence that the sleep architecture and subjectively reported sleepiness can be altered by targeting adenosine signalling ([[doi:10.1016/j.bcp.2007.08.018|Landolt, 2008]]; [[doi:10.1016/j.tins.2019.05.001|Lazarus et al., 2019]]). == Influence of Lifestyle Factors == {{ic|Include an introductory paragraph before branching into sub-sections}} === Caffeine Consumption === Caffeine acts by blockading adenosine receptors, particularly A 2A, from signalling fatigue ([https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.3109/07853899908998788 Fredholm et al., 1999]). That is why coffee and tea wake people up and helps concentration. Blocking adenosine, however, has its drawbacks: It diminishes slow-wave sleep, disturbs sleep and can cause a crash when the drug subsequently wears off ([[doi:10.1016/0893-133X(94)00156-L|Landolt et al., 1995]]; MDPI, 2016). The timing is important: caffeine consumed too late can disturb sleep. {| class="wikitable" style="background-color:#f0f8ff;{{Text color default}}; border-left:5px solid #1e90ff;" |- | '''🌟 Fun Fact 1''' The reality is, Caffeine doesn't just get rid of your sleepiness! Caffeine makes you feel less tired because it actually temporarily blocks adenosine receptors in your brain. Caffeine can actually help you maintain alertness! perfect for late night study sessions — but the adenosine remains and continues to build, prolonging the inevitable sleep crash (Reichert et al. 2022). |} ==== Exercise and Sleep ==== Even better?{{g}} Working out may increase your body’s adenosine amount, which means even deeper, more restorative sleep. Animal research indicates that extracellular adenosine in sleep-controlling brain areas is elevated after physical exercise ([[doi:10.1152/japplphysiol.00514.2007|Dworak et al., 2007]]). In humans, regular moderate intensity exercise is associated with enhanced sleep ó with the precise contribution of adenosine to this process requiring further investigation ([[doi:10.1111/jsr.13825|Salvadori et al., 2024]]). {{RoundBoxTop|theme=4}} {| class="wikitable" style="background-color:#fffacd;{{Text color default}}; border-left:5px solid #ff8c00;" |- | '''❓ Fun Question 2''' Why do you think pulling an '''all-nighter''' makes you feel especially groggy the next morning — even if you drink coffee? (Hint: adenosine keeps piling up, and caffeine can’t erase it!) |} {{RoundBoxBottom}} ===== Individual Differences in Sleep Motivation ===== Sleep pressure isn’t the same for everyone. Genetic variations, behavior and even age could affect how adenosine mediates sleep motivation.{{Source|example=Source?}} * '''Genetic variability''': Polymorphism in genes encoding adenosine receptor (e.g., ADORA2A) influence sensitivity to both adenosine and caffeine. While some individuals can consume coffee in the evening with little interference, others show a marked alerting effect and poorer sleep (Rétey et al., 2007). * '''Chronotype''' : Morning larks” and night owls” vary in the degree to which their circadian rhythm is timed to go to sleep and wake up in conjunction with adenosine-fueled sleep pressure, making the times at which they feel most alert or sleepy different.. * '''Age differences''': Elderly people frequently display decreased slow-wave sleep and impaired adenosine functioning, which might result in shallow and fragmented sleep (Münch et al., 2005). Acknowledgment of these distinctions underscores that there is no one-size-fits-all in all matters of sleep. What wakes one person up and causes another to fall asleep is like the routine that works at the family gym; in other words, the key is individualised{{ic|Use Australian spelling}} sleep strategies == Practical Applications == [[File:Adenosine Sleep Two Process Model.png|thumb|'''Figure 1.''' Adenosine build-up in the brain increases sleep pressure over the day. The two-process model of sleep regulation. Process S (blue line) represents the build-up of sleep pressure due to adenosine accumulation during wakefulness, which decreases during sleep. Process C (orange line) represents the circadian rhythm of alertness controlled by the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN). Together, these processes explain fluctuations in sleep motivation, such as morning alertness, the afternoon slump, the evening “second wind,” and the strong drive for sleep at night. (Adapted from Borbély’s two-process model, 1982.)]] === Improving Sleep Hygiene === * Cut down on caffeine in the afternoon: By blocking adenosine in the hours before bed, you can delay sleep while you lessen sleep quality ([[doi:10.1016/j.bcp.2007.08.018|Landolt, 2008]]). * Keep a routine sleep-wake cycle: Regularity helps endogenous adenosine oscillations to become synchronized with circadian rhythmicity ([https://researchnow.flinders.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/137288446/Phillips_Modeling_P2017.pdf Phillips & Robinson, 2017]). * Use exercise judiciously: A moderate amount of physical activity during the day may build up sleep pressure, but late-night, strenuous workouts might delay sleep onset. {| class="wikitable" style="background-color:#e6ffe6;{{Text color default}}; border-left:5px solid #2e8b57;" |- | '''🌟 Fun Fact 3''' Other individuals carry a gene variant (in ADORA2A) that gives them a heightened response to caffeine. For them, a single espresso in the afternoon is enough to wreck their sleep that night.{{f}} |} ==== Clinical Implications ==== Pharmacological modulation of adenosine is being investigated as a treatment for sleep and neuropsychiatric disorders. For instance, A2A receptor selective antagonists are being investigated for Parkinson’s disease and excessive daytime sleepiness ([[doi:10.1007/s00213-016-4212-2|Ferré, 2016]]; [[doi:10.1016/j.coph.2011.02.007|Huang et al., 2011]]). Conversely, adenosine-elevating interventions are possibilities in insomnia or in shift-work related disorder ([[doi:10.3389/fnins.2023.1077597|Lazarus et al., 2023]]). ==Conclusion== Adenosine is the chemical motor of the sleep drive, slowly building up during wakefulness and hitting receptors that damp down arousal. Its effects are why, when the body has {{ic|Use 3rd person perspective}} been awake for a while, sleep becomes irresistible, and why restorative rest can reset the system. Lifestyle considerations, particularly caffeine and exercise, have a lot of influence on this process for better or worse. Future research should explore: * How genetic variation in adenosine receptors plays a role in determining bedtime. * How best to harness adenosine’s natural cadence with lifestyle interventions (exercise timing, timing of caffeine). * The safe use of adenosine-targeting drugs in the clinic. In linking molecules to motivation, adenosine is a reminder that sleep is not just idle time, it is a regulated biological drive, a signal to the body that it needs to regroup, recover and restore, a process that may affect everything from mental clarity and emotional stability to the long-term health of organs and systems. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} {{Box|title=✅ Key takeaway|background=#E6FFE6|border=#66CC66|width=80%| Adenosine works like a biological sleep meter – the longer you’re awake, the more it builds up, creating sleep pressure. Sleep then clears adenosine, resetting the system. }} {{RoundBoxBottom}} == See also == * [[wikipedia:Adenosine|Adenosine]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Sleep|Sleep]] (Wikipedia) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= ChatGPT. (2025, August 14). Conversation with user on adenosine and sleep motivation chapter guidelines and resources. OpenAI. Personal communication. https://chatgpt.com/c/689ca37a-ecbc-8332-ac58-01d86b94de44 {{ic|Unable to load conversation; remove this reference because it is not a peer-reviewed source and instead acknowledge genAI use in edit summaries with working links to relevant conversations}} Dworak, M., Diel, P., Voss, S., Hollmann, W., & Strüder, H. K. (2007). Intense exercise increases adenosine concentrations in the rat brain: Implications for a sleep-promoting function of exercise? Journal of Applied Physiology, 103(5), 1964–1968. https://doi.org/10.1152/japplphysiol.00514.2007 Ferré, S. (2016). Mechanisms of the psychostimulant effects of caffeine: Implications for substance use disorders. Psychopharmacology, 233(10), 1963–1979. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-016-4212-2 Fredholm, B. B., Bättig, K., Holmén, J., Nehlig, A., & Zvartau, E. E. (1999). Actions of caffeine in the brain with special reference to factors that contribute to its widespread use. Pharmacological Reviews, 51(1), 83–133. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.3109/07853899908998788 Halassa, M. M., Florian, C., Fellin, T., Munoz, J. R., Lee, S. Y., Abel, T., ... & Haydon, P. G. (2009). Astrocytic modulation of sleep homeostasis and cognitive consequences of sleep loss. Neuron, 61(2), 213–219. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2008.11.024 Huang, Z. L., Urade, Y., & Hayaishi, O. (2011). Prostaglandins and adenosine in sleep–wake regulation. Current Opinion in Pharmacology, 11(1), 52–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.coph.2011.02.007 Landolt, H. P. (2008). Sleep homeostasis: A role for adenosine in humans? Biochemical Pharmacology, 75(11), 2070–2079. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bcp.2007.08.018 Landolt, H. P., Dijk, D. J., Gaus, S. E., & Borbély, A. A. (1995). Caffeine reduces low-frequency delta activity in the human sleep EEG. Neuropsychopharmacology, 12(3), 229–238. https://doi.org/10.1016/0893-133X(94)00156-L Lazarus, M., Huang, Z. L., Lu, J., Urade, Y., & Chen, J. F. (2019). How do the basal ganglia regulate sleep–wake behavior? Trends in Neurosciences, 42(7), 546–559. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2019.05.001 Lazarus, M., Oishi, Y., Bjorness, T. E., & Greene, R. W. (2019). Gating and the need for sleep: Dissociable effects of adenosine A₁ and A₂A receptors. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 13, 740. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2019.00740 Lazarus, M., Urade, Y., & Chen, J. F. (2023). Adenosine and sleep. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 17, 1077597. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2023.1077597 Li, C., Kroll, T., Matusch, A., Aeschbach, D., Bauer, A., Elmenhorst, E.-M., & Elmenhorst, D. (2023). Associations between resting state brain activity and A₁ adenosine receptor availability in the healthy brain: Effects of acute sleep deprivation. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 17, 1077597. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2023.1077597 Phillips, A. J. K., & Robinson, P. A. (2017). Modeling sleep pressure and circadian influences on sleep. Progress in Brain Research, 230, 109–126. https://researchnow.flinders.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/137288446/Phillips_Modeling_P2017.pdf Porkka-Heiskanen, T., Strecker, R. E., Thakkar, M., Bjorkum, A. A., Greene, R. W., & McCarley, R. W. (1997). Adenosine: A mediator of the sleep-inducing effects of prolonged wakefulness. Science, 276(5316), 1265–1268. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.276.5316.1265 Porkka-Heiskanen, T., Strecker, R. E., Thakkar, M., Bjorness, T., Greene, R. W., & McCarley, R. W. (2000). Adenosine: A mediator of the sleep-inducing effects of prolonged wakefulness. Science, 276(5316), 1265–1268. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.276.5316.1265 Radulovacki, M. (1999). Adenosine sleep theory. Neuropsychopharmacology, 21(6), 455–468. https://doi.org/10.3109/07853899908998788 Reichert, C. F., Maire, M., Schmidt, C., & Cajochen, C. (2016). Sleep-Wake Regulation and Its Impact on Working Memory Performance: The Role of Adenosine. Biology, 5(1), 11. https://doi.org/10.3390/biology5010011 Salvadori, E., & Santoro, A. (2024). Exercise, adenosine and sleep: Emerging evidence. Journal of Sleep Research, 33(1), e13825. https://doi.org/10.1111/jsr.13825 Sleep Foundation. (2024). Adenosine and sleep. Sleep Foundation. https://www.sleepfoundation.org/how-sleep-works/adenosine-and-sleep Sleep Foundation. (2025, July). Adenosine and sleep: Understanding your sleep drive. Sleep Foundation. https://www.sleepfoundation.org/how-sleep-works/adenosine-and-sleep Thomas, M., Sing, H., Belenky, G., Holcomb, H., Mayberg, H., Dannals, R., ... & Redmond, D. (2000). Neural basis of alertness and cognitive performance impairments during sleepiness. Journal of Sleep Research, 9(4), 335–352. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2869.2000.00225.x }} ==External links== * [https://www.sleepfoundation.org National sleep foundation] * [https://www.sleepfoundation.org/how-sleep-works/adenosine-and-sleep Sleep foundation: adenosine and sleep] [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Neurotransmitters/Adenosine]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Sleep]] bmfr5k95qo77zdq2fpz4zpjsm1139x4 0 322659 2842398 2814757 2026-10-24T00:52:56Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Fixed all grammar errors throughout, also improved some sentences and readability 2842398 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Encouragement and motivation:<br>How does encouragement influence persistence and effort?}} __TOC__ ==Overview== {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:Army 10-Miler Shadow Run (7457992).jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. Encouragement at a Army 10-Miler Shadow Run]] ;Picture this ... You've been training for a half-marathon for months and after much hard work you think you're ready. When race day comes, however half way through you start to think you're not going to be able to complete it. Your legs, feet and body is so fatigued and sore that you're genuinely losing the will to keep going. Your motivation drops astronomically and at this rate all that hard work is about to go out of the window. Then one of the event's volunteers starts to cheer for you as you get closer and makes a simple statement of "You've got this, keep pushing, you're doing amazing, don't give up." {{g}} {{RoundBoxBottom}} Persistence and effort are key components of motivated behaviour. Encouragement, which is a specific form of social support, influences motivated behaviour {{ic|influences what?}} through cognitive, emotional, and physiological mechanisms such as enhanced self-efficacy, competence and motivation, {{ic|maybe split into two sentences}}as shown in Figure 1{{g}}. '''Problem outline:''' *Conceptual confusion: Encouragement is often conflated with praise or generic feedback, creating inconsistent definitions and weak theoretical integration. *Limited research: Most research examines performance outcomes without isolating encouragement’s effect on persistence. *Cultural differences: Encouragement is not the same across all contexts and cultures, making it difficult to identify universal effects. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} '''Focus questions''' *What is encouragement and how is it distinct from praise or reinforcement? *How does encouragement trigger persistence and increase effort? *What empirical evidence supports these {{what}} effects across different settings? *How can health{{what}} practitioners apply encouragement effectively to sustain effort over time? {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Introduction== Most people can remember a moment in which a simple few words of support made the difference between giving up and doubling down, whether it was a teacher, coach, therapist, coworker, peer, family member or friend. These moments capture the essence of encouragement. At its core, encouragement is not rewarding success or trying to inflate someone's ego, it is about affirming someone's capacity, effort and potential, even in times of difficulty. Psychologists have long recognised that motivation is not all about the internal, but also the external. By nature humans are social creatures, whose persistence in difficult tasks are often dependent on the perceived presence or absence of support. While often overlooked in comparison to rewards or praise, encouragement is uniquely positioned to sustain motivation, working through a wide range of mechanisms cognitively, physiologically and psychologically. Encouragement, however, is not pure magic, often dependent on numerous factors for successful implementation such as authenticity, timing and context ^{[''do some of the sentences in this paragraph need a [[Wikiversity:Citation needed|source]]?]''}. Despite its everyday presence, encouragement has historically received less attention than other similar concepts such as praise, reinforcement and social support^{''[<nowiki/>[[Wikiversity:Citation needed|source]]?]''}. This lack of interest has caused ambiguity in definitions, applications, theoretical operationalism and measurements. Whilst it has been practically applied in a range of settings such as the classroom, sports field or health with notable success, there is still room for improvement. ==Defining encouragement in psychology == [[File:What is encouragement poster generated by ChatGPT.png|right|200px|thumb|Figure 2: What is encouragement?]] Much of today's contemporary understanding of encouragement can be attributed to Alfred Adler and his work. Adler viewed encouragement to be at the centre of human development due to its role in overcoming discouragement, which he viewed to be the ultimate obstacle in human growth (Watts & Pietrzak, 2000). People often abandon tasks not because they are incapable, but because discouragement withers away at an individual's motivation to keep going. For this reason Adler viewed encouragement as the antidote to discouragement, allowing individuals to persist and continue to exert effort even in the face of adversity ^{''[<nowiki/>[[Wikiversity:Citation needed|source]]?]''}. Figure 2 poses the question of what is encouragement? Encouragement can be defined as a process that aims to affirm an individual's capacity and effort, particularly in the face of adversity, and fosters persistence and motivation {{g}} (Wong et al., 2025). This definition emphasises three core elements:{{g}}: *Focus on effort and capacity *Salience during difficulty *Forward-looking orientation{{f}} It is also important to note how encouragement differs from praise, reinforcement and social support. Praise affirms success, reinforcement shapes behaviour through consequences and social support through perceived support. Encouragement contrasts these by affirming values of persistence and effort though the emphasis of its core elements (Wong et al., 2025). ===Examples of encouragement=== *A teacher to a student: “You’ve worked really hard on this problem, I can see your reasoning improving. Keep building on that, you can do it.” *A physiotherapist to a patient in rehab: “This stage is tough, but it’s exactly where progress happens. Keep at it, you’re moving forward step by step, day by day.” *A coach: “You’ve built such a strong foundation, imagine how much further you’ll go if you keep at it, you're going to be a weapon.” {{robelbox|theme=3|title=Test yourself!|iconwidth=55px|icon=Search-icon-white-background.png}} <div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> <quiz display="simple"> Which of the following are core elements of encouragement? |type="()"} - Focus on effort and capacity - Salience during difficulty - Forward-looking orientation + All of the above </quiz> </div> {{RoundBoxBottom}} {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} With this definition established, the next step is to ask: Why does encouragement sustain persistence and effort? For the answer we turn to motivational theories and mechanisms. {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Mechanisms linking encouragement to persistence and effort== [[File:Gears animation.gif|thumb|Figure 3. Mechanisms]] Encouragement exerts its influence through a range of psychological mechanisms, see Figure 3, which can be explained using motivational theories and understanding. At its core,^[''comma]'' encouragement bolsters self-belief, strengthens commitment to goal and helps to maintain persistence even in the face of difficulty. '''Self-efficacy theory''' Self-efficacy theory helps to posit that individuals tend to persist and exert effort when they believe that they can obtain success. Encouragement for this reason can help to sway this belief in a positive manner by reinforcing someone's confidence in their capacity in a way which helps them to believe they obtain success even in the face of difficulty (Bandura & Adams, 1977). '''Goal-setting theory''' Goal-setting theory helps to emphasise^{[''use Australian spelling]''} the importance of clear and challenging goals, which in turn help to enhance effort and persistence. Whilst commitment to such goals can falter and wither when faced with difficulty or fatigue, encouragement helps to overcome this by reminding individuals of their capacity to obtain the goal by reframing setbacks as temporary and as a part of the process. This helps to maintain persistence and renew effort when such difficulties or challenges arise (Luneburg, 2011). '''Expectancy-value theory ''' Expectancy-value theory helps to explain persistence as an indicator of whether individuals expect to succeed and values the outcome. Using this understanding, encouragement can be viewed to strengthen persistence by working to bolster expectancy and value by reaffirming an individual's capacity and value behind obtaining the goal (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). '''Social cognitive theory''' Social cognitive theory helps to place emphasis on learning through social influence and modelling. Whilst encouragement is often delivered from one person to another, it can also be used in self-talk or self-evaluation. {{g}} In this instance observed encouragement can act as social cues that can be used to shape self-talk, expectations and for behaviours involving persistence (Van et al., 2011). '''Self-determination theory''' Self-determination theory identifies competence, autonomy and relatedness as basic psychosocial needs. Encouragement can be used to support and meet these needs by affirming competence, autonomy-supportive affirmation and strengthening relatedness though social connection. In satisfying these needs encouragement can be regarded to foster self-determination and as an extension sustain persistence (Cervone & Shoda, 1999). '''Summary of mechanisms''' *Encouragement sustains belief in ability (self-efficacy). *Encouragement reinforces goal commitment (goal-setting theory). *Encouragement strengthens expectancy and value (expectancy-value theory). *Encouragement provides social modelling and affirmation (social cognitive theory). *Encouragement satisfies psychological needs (self-determination theory). {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} Theoretical perspectives provide strong explanations for why encouragement should foster persistence and effort. But do these mechanisms hold up in real-world contexts? The next section examines empirical evidence across education, sport and health. {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Research evidence: Effects across contexts {{vague}}== Theories of motivation suggest encouragement works {{g}} by enhancing persistence and effort by bolstering beliefs, goal commitment, expectancy-value appraisals, social modelling and by helping to satisfy psychosocial needs. Whilst this provides a solid theoretical basis, it is important that it is validated by practical research. For this reason numerous studies have been conducted globally to empirically test encouragement, with such research being conducted in education, sports, therapy and health. '''Education''' Educational contexts have provided some of the clearest and {{g}} most valuable insight into the effects of encouragement. With teachers frequently facing the challenge of motivating students to persist with difficult tasks, encouragement has shown to be a powerful tool. *Wong, Cheng, McDermott, Deng and McCullough (2019) developed the Academic Encouragement Scale to measure how students perceive and internalise encouragement. They found that higher levels of perceived encouragement were associated with increased persistence in academic tasks, improved engagement and higher motivation to overcome setbacks or challenges. These findings help to show encouragement as a functional tool which can be used to increase motivation in regard to learning tasks. *Reeve (2024) {{ic|Not a research study; this is a textbook}} noted that, in a broader review of classroom motivation that verbal messages were important in affirming students'{{g}} competence and potential. It was found that these verbal messages of encouragement were some of the most effective ways to sustain student engagement during lessons containing difficulty and or new content in learning. For this reason Reeve communicated encouragement to act as a scaffold to keep students engaged and invested in learning rather than to simply disengage when they encountered difficulty. In an educational setting, the findings align closely with self-efficacy theory and expectancy-value theory. By working to reaffirm students' academic competence, along with the possibility of success and importance of effort, encouragement helps strengthen motivated behaviour{{g}}. '''Sport and physical performance''' Sports and physical performance contexts have been {{g}} another area of interest, with numerous studies evaluating the impact of encouragement not only on persistence and effort but also strength, endurance and competitive performance. *McNair, Depledge, Brettkelly and Stanley (1996) found that verbal encouragement was responsible for significantly increasing voluntary muscle exertion during strength testing.They also found that when athletes received encouragement it had the additional benefit of enabling them to exert more force and to maintain effort longer in comparison to those who did not. *Examination of anecdotal evidence and testimony from coaches and athletes further validate this. With many athletes citing their coach's encouragement as a pivotal moment at a point of potential disengagement, enabling them to persist in difficult training sessions or competitions (Jedloc et al., 2007). In a sports and physical performance context encouragement works closely with goal-setting theory and self-determination theory. In helping athletes to commit to their goals and to affirm competence to help support intrinsic motivation. '''Therapy and counselling''' Psychologists and health practitioners also have shown encouragement to be an important tool in their line of work. In therapy and interventions encouragement has been shown to be an important tool in keeping clients engaged and motivated. *Carlson and Slavik (2006), in reviewing Adlerian literature, highlighted the importance of encouragement by citing its ability to help clients maintain persistence and effort. A process which is only possible because it encourages the capacity to help affirm clients’ capacity and value of the end goal. *Wong (2015) also cited encouragement to be important in therapy and behavioral change programs. Highlighting encouragement’s capacity to improve a client’s relatedness and motivational capacity through human interaction and affirming their competence along with capacity for change. All of which help to contribute to ensure clients persistence in these programs and motivation even when it is difficult. In behavioral change programs and therapeutic settings, encouragement can be shown to consistently improve motivation, which in turn increases persistence and effort{{f}}. This can be attributed to the way in which encouragement in this context helps to communicate competence, relatedness, social modelling, value behind achieving goals and potential to succeed. '''Health and well-being''' Encouragement has also been practically applied and evaluated in health contexts, often where persistence and effort determine long-term outcomes. *Wong et al. (2025) in evaluating health behaviours such as exercise, health dieting, and lifestyle changes, finding that encouragement improved persistence by affirming effort and potential in routine tasks which may feel difficult or under-rewarding in the short term{{g}}. *Wang, Guo, Wu and Zhang (2017) found that videos of encouragement prompting self-empowerment through exercise such as running or healthier dieting also had similar effects to traditional encouragement, helping individuals engaged in either finding it motivational and a way in which to affirm their effort and capacity to meet their health goals. The findings in a health and well-being context help to show encouragement work using conceptual pathways presented in expectant-value theory, self-efficacy theory and social cognitive theory. By providing external affirmation on the value of the goal, the plausibility of success, self competence and relatedness, encouragement helps drive intrinsic motivation and persistence{{g}}. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} '''Summary of research''': In looking at different contexts from education, sports, health, therapy and counseling, it is apparent that encouragement helps to consistently boost persistence, motivation and effort in a range of ways and a range of settings. This has been achieved by strengthening self-belief, reinforcing the value of goals, affirming progress, affirming competency, improving relatedness and plausibility of success. Whilst the findings show empirical evidence to support the theoretical basis established through theories of motivation, there exists a gap in how encouragement is moderated by culture and its long term effects. {{RoundBoxBottom}} {{robelbox|theme=3|title=Test yourself!|iconwidth=55px|icon=Search-icon-white-background.png}} <div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> <quiz display="simple"> Which of the following does current research show about encouragement and improving persistence? |type="()"} + That encouragement increases persistence - It has little or no impact - There is not enough evidence - It decreases persistence </quiz> </div> {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Limitations and future directions== Although encouragement has a solid theoretical grounding in motivational theories and promising empirical evidence, it still has many associated limitations and conceptual issues. Like many other psychological tools, its impact depends on a range of variables as to its application. Whilst more research has been conducted to improve its understanding and uniqueness compared to similar constructs such as praise, reinforcement and social support, it's not to the same extent and can be regarded as less mature. '''Methodological limitations''' *'''Small-scale and context-specific studies''': Many existing studies are relatively small, context-specific, or qualitative. For instance, McNair et al.’s (1996) work on verbal encouragement and muscle exertion was highly controlled but limited in scope. For this reason generalising the findings across domains is challenging. Large-scale, multi-context studies are also very rare, leaving gaps in what could otherwise be robust, generalisable evidence. *'''Measurement challenges''': While measurement tools such as the Academic Encouragement Scale exist and Wong et al. (2019) is a step forward, measurement tools remain limited. Many studies rely on subjective perceptions or simplistic coding of encouragement, which may not capture the whole nature of encouragement. Without improving or standardising measurement tools, there is a notable risk of being impressionistic. *'''Causal inference''': Much of the research conducted is also correlational, making it difficult in determining whether encouragement is the sole factor acting on persistence, motivation and effort. This is also problematic because of the lack of experimental and longitudinal studies, which could be used to help clarify causality and effects over time. '''Cultural and contextual limitations''' *'''Cultural variability''': Encouragement is not the same across all cultures. {{g}} What may be perceived as encouragement in Western cultures may not be perceived the same way in Eastern cultures, something in which can be attributed to either their respective collectivist or individualist qualities (Howard & Vigotsky, 2019). However, because of these differences it can hinder the ability to infer outcomes and produce models that can reliably predict outcomes. *'''Age and developmental differences''': Children, teens and adults respond differently to encouragement and its forms. For this reason, children and teens may rely more on external encouragement for persistence, while adults may rely more so on internal encouragement for improving persistence (Berg et al., 2022). *'''Context dependency''': Encouragement also does not hold the same level of effectiveness across different contexts, with research suggesting that encouragement in educational settings may be more effective than therapeutic or sporting contexts. This indicates that, although encouragement can be applied in a range of settings, it does not necessarily have the same effectiveness or impact (Wong, 2015){{g}}. '''Risks and ethical concerns''' *'''Inauthentic encouragement''': Whilst encouragement is generally regarded as a positive action, performing it inauthentically may make it seem forced, generic or insincere. Consequently, because of this there is a risk that it can undermine trust and adversely reduce persistence and motivation (Wong et al., 2019). *'''Over-reliance''': Whilst encouragement can be a valuable tool, abusing it or excessive use may unintentionally have the side effect of individuals becoming dependent on external validation and affirmation if it is not balanced with intrinsic motivation and self-encouragement (Berg et al., 2022). *'''Unequal access to encouragement''': Encouragement is not equally distributed. {{g}} There are always going to be individuals who get a lot, whilst others get little or none. In sports and education this raises questions about the ethical nature of encouragement, particularly whether it is fair that some individuls receive evaluative feedback whilst others do not. {{huh}}. {{robelbox|theme=3|title=Test yourself!|iconwidth=55px|icon=Search-icon-white-background.png}} <div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> <quiz display="simple"> Which of the following is one limitation {{g}} surrounding encouragement and subsequent research? |type="()"} - Time of day - Lack of researchers - Geelong's loss to Brisbane in the finals {{ic|Target an international audience; Australia represents 0.3% of the human population}} + Measurement challenges </quiz> </div> {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Future directions for research== Addressing some of these limitations would help to benefit understanding of encouragement and to advance it in a constructive manner. It would also help to improve contemporary psychological understanding and relatedness to wider psychological theories outside of just motivation{{awkward}}. *'''Refining definitions and frameworks''': As noted in studies such as Wong et al (2025), the anatomy of encouragement should continue to be clarified as to distinguish it from related constructs such as praise, reinforcement and social support. It could also benefit from the development of typologies. *'''Improved measurement tools''': Future research should also focus on the creation of multidimensional tools which can better capture encouragement and improve interpretation of its impact not only motivation, persistence and effort, but also other factors (Andreacci et al., 2002; Alcott, 2017). *'''Experimental and longitudinal studies''': Whilst there have been numerous studies conducted, many are short-term and limited in their scope. In conducting more long-term or longitudinal studies it could help to establish casualty and demonstrate the long term effects of encouragement on persistence and effort. It would also be beneficial if studies were conducted in a range of settings to evaluate cross-dimensional aspects and nuanced differences (Wong et al., 2019). *'''Cross-cultural and developmental comparisons''': Cultural contexts and differences is another area of potential research which can be conducted as to further develop fundamental understanding and different ways in which encouragement can be shown and or received. Additionally, this would also help to show if there are aspects in which are universal and or cultural specific whilst filling in a gap of current understanding (Wong et al., 2025). *'''Mechanistic integration''': Future work should also focus on further integrating encouragement into already established theories of motivation, as to better ground it in broader psychological models as to better explore encouragement through its cognitive, emotional and relational mechanisms in more depth. {{robelbox|theme=3|title=Test yourself!|iconwidth=55px|icon=Search-icon-white-background.png}} <div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> <quiz display="simple"> Which of the following would benefit research in encouragement going forward? |type="()"} - Improving measurement tools - Reframing definitions and framework - Cross-cultural research + All of them </quiz></div> {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Conclusion== Encouragement is more than just a simple gesture. It’s a psychological tool which can be used to shape persistence and effort in meaningful ways, even when facing difficulties or fatigue. In defining encouragement, {{g}} it enables the ability to understand its theoretical framework and internal mechanisms which are all crucial in understanding the outcome of related research, practical applications, limitations and future directions. The insight from this demonstrates the promise and complexity behind encouragement and how it functions to influence human motivation. At its core, encouragement works by reinforcing an individual's belief in their capacity, communicating the importance of goals, social affirmation and satisfying psychological needs. For these reasons, it helps to align encouragement with major motivational theories, from Bandura’s self-efficacy theory to Deci and Ryan’s self-determination theory. Encouragement is not just anecdotal, but grounded in contemporary psychological frameworks and understanding. This is further supported by empirical evidence, whether in classrooms, sports fields and or clinics. Encouragement has been shown to enhance persistence and sustain effort even in the face of difficulty or fatigue. However, it relies on authenticity, timing and context for meaningful application. Encouragement if delivered thoughtfully can sustain motivation, however if delivered poorly it can undermine it. In evaluating practical implementation of encouragement it is clear that effective encouragement requires skill, sensitivity and adaptability. Teachers, coaches, psychologists and health professionals all benefit from utilising encouragement, but only when they can tailor it to the individual's needs and do so in a thoughtful manner. It is important to note and account for the fact that encouragement is not without limitations. Encouragement is not a magic solution to discouragement and persistence. Over-reliance and overuse risks creating dependency and undermining its power. It is also important to note that encouragement is not culturally universal. Whilst these are challenges, it is also an opportunity to direct future research towards better clarifying encouragement, expand cultural research, examine long-term outcomes and to help align it with already established psychological understanding. Ultimately encouragement matters because it has the capacity to motivate individuals in a truly unique and special way, helping to communicate to an individual that they are believed in, supported and have the potential to do any task they want. If done right, encouragement helps individuals to persist when they would otherwise give up, to sustain effort and motivation when challenges come about. Whilst there is a need for more research as to how encouragement is understood and applied, the evidence so far is clear, encouragement is more than a simple gesture, it's a powerful tool and driver for persistence, effort and human flourishing. ==See also== *[https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Motivation_and_emotion/Lectures/Extrinsic_motivation_and_psychological_needs Extrinsic motivation and psychological needs] *[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motivation Motivation ] ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Alcott, B. (2017). Does Teacher Encouragement Influence Students’ Educational Progress? A Propensity-Score Matching Analysis. Research in Higher Education, 58(7), 773–804. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11162-017-9446-2 Andreacci, J. L., Lemura, L. M., Cohen, S. L., Urbansky, E. A., Chelland, S. A., & Duvillard, S. P. von. (2002). The effects of frequency of encouragement on performance during maximal exercise testing. Journal of Sports Sciences, 20(4), 345–352. https://doi.org/10.1080/026404102753576125 Bandura, A., Adams, N.E. (1977). Analysis of self-efficacy theory of behavioral change. Cognitive Therapy Research, 1, 287–310. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01663995 Berg, I., Hovne, V., Carlbring, P., Bernhard-Oettel, C., Oscarsson, M., Mechler, J., Lindqvist, K., Topooco, N., Andersson, G., & Philips, B. (2022). “Good job!”: Therapists' encouragement, affirmation, and personal address in internet-based cognitive behavior therapy for adolescents with depression. Internet Interventions, 30, 100592. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.invent.2022.100592 Carlson, J., & Slavik, S. (2006). A review of the professional literature concerning the consistency of the definition and application of Adlerian encouragement. In R. E. Watts (Ed.), Readings in the theory of individual psychology (pp. 293–310). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203956571-33 Cervone, D., & Shoda, Y. (1999). The coherence of personality: Social-cognitive bases of consistency, variability, and organization. Guilford Press. Howard, M. C., & Crayne, M. P. (2019). Persistence: Defining the multidimensional construct and creating a measure. Personality and Individual Differences.,1 39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.11.00 Jedlic, B., Hall, N., Munroe-Chandler, K., & Hall, C. (2007). Coaches’ Encouragement of Athletes’ Imagery Use. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 78(4), 351–363. https://doi.org/10.1080/02701367.2007.10599432 Luneburg, F. C. (2011). Goal-setting theory of motivation. International Journal of management, business and administration, 15(1), 1-6. McNair, P. J., Depledge, J., Brettkelly, M., & Stanley, S. N. (1996). Verbal encouragement: Effects on maximum effort voluntary muscle action. British Journal of Sports Medicine, 30(3), 243–245. https://doi.org/10.1136/bjsm.30.3.243 Reeve, J. (2024). Understanding motivation and emotion (8th ed.). John Wiley & Sons. Van, P. A. M., Higgins, E. T., & Kruglanski, A. W. (Eds.). (2011). Handbook of theories of social psychology (Vol. 1). Sage Publications. Wang, L., Guo, X., Wu, T., Lv, L., & Zhang, Z. (2017). Short-term effects of social encouragement on exercise behavior: Insights from China’s Wanbu network. Public Health, 148 (Supplement C), A1–A2. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2017.03.009 Watts, R. E., & Pietrzak, D. (2000). Adlerian “Encouragement” and the Therapeutic Process of Solution‐Focused Brief Therapy. Journal of Counseling and Development., 78(4). https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1556-6676.2000.tb01927.x Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (2000). Expectancy-Value Theory of Achievement Motivation. Contemporary Educational Psychology., 25(1). https://doi.org/10.1006/ceps.1999.1015 Wong, Y. J. (2015). The psychology of encouragement: Theory, research, and applications. The Counseling Psychologist, 43(2), 178–216. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011000014545091 Wong, Y. J., Cheng, H., McDermott, M. R., Deng, K., & McCullough, K. M. (2019). I Believe in You! Measuring the experience of encouragement using the academic encouragement scale. The Journal of Positive Psychology., 14(6). https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2019.1579357 Wong, Y. J., Li, P. F. J., Cheng, H.-L., & McDermott, R. C. (2025). The Anatomy of Encouragement: Addressing the What, Why, When, Who, and For Whom of Encouragement Messages. Journal of Prevention and Health Promotion, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/26320770251330870 }} ==External links== * [https://www.simplypsychology.org/self-efficacy.html Bandura’s Self-Efficacy Theory Of Motivation In Psychology] * [https://edudream.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Final-MEP-Designed-Report.pdf Contextual Analysis of Motivation, Engagement, & Persistence] [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Behaviour]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Encouragement]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Motivation]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Persistence]] fevtqlih7fab4yyzojl12thqehy165x 2842404 2842398 2026-10-24T02:26:50Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Removing flags that were addressed 2842404 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Encouragement and motivation:<br>How does encouragement influence persistence and effort?}} __TOC__ ==Overview== {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:Army 10-Miler Shadow Run (7457992).jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. Encouragement at a Army 10-Miler Shadow Run]] ;Picture this ... You've been training for a half-marathon for months and after much hard work you think you're ready. When race day comes, however half way through you start to think you're not going to be able to complete it. Your legs, feet and body is so fatigued and sore that you're genuinely losing the will to keep going. Your motivation drops astronomically and at this rate all that hard work is about to go out of the window. Then one of the event's volunteers starts to cheer for you as you get closer and makes a simple statement of "You've got this, keep pushing, you're doing amazing, don't give up." {{g}} {{RoundBoxBottom}} Persistence and effort are key components of motivated behaviour. Encouragement, which is a specific form of social support, influences motivated behaviour through cognitive, emotional, and physiological mechanisms such as enhanced self-efficacy, competence and motivation, {{ic|maybe split into two sentences}}as shown in Figure 1. '''Problem outline:''' *Conceptual confusion: Encouragement is often conflated with praise or generic feedback, creating inconsistent definitions and weak theoretical integration. *Limited research: Most research examines performance outcomes without isolating encouragement’s effect on persistence. *Cultural differences: Encouragement is not the same across all contexts and cultures, making it difficult to identify universal effects. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} '''Focus questions''' *What is encouragement and how is it distinct from praise or reinforcement? *How does encouragement trigger persistence and increase effort? *What empirical evidence supports these {{what}} effects across different settings? *How can health{{what}} practitioners apply encouragement effectively to sustain effort over time? {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Introduction== Most people can remember a moment in which a simple few words of support made the difference between giving up and doubling down, whether it was a teacher, coach, therapist, coworker, peer, family member or friend. These moments capture the essence of encouragement. At its core, encouragement is not rewarding success or trying to inflate someone's ego, it is about affirming someone's capacity, effort and potential, even in times of difficulty. Psychologists have long recognised that motivation is not all about the internal, but also the external. By nature humans are social creatures, whose persistence in difficult tasks are often dependent on the perceived presence or absence of support. While often overlooked in comparison to rewards or praise, encouragement is uniquely positioned to sustain motivation, working through a wide range of mechanisms cognitively, physiologically and psychologically. Encouragement, however, is not pure magic, often dependent on numerous factors for successful implementation such as authenticity, timing and context ^{[''do some of the sentences in this paragraph need a [[Wikiversity:Citation needed|source]]?]''}. Despite its everyday presence, encouragement has historically received less attention than other similar concepts such as praise, reinforcement and social support^{''[<nowiki/>[[Wikiversity:Citation needed|source]]?]''}. This lack of interest has caused ambiguity in definitions, applications, theoretical operationalism and measurements. Whilst it has been practically applied in a range of settings such as the classroom, sports field or health with notable success, there is still room for improvement. ==Defining encouragement in psychology == [[File:What is encouragement poster generated by ChatGPT.png|right|200px|thumb|Figure 2: What is encouragement?]] Much of today's contemporary understanding of encouragement can be attributed to Alfred Adler and his work. Adler viewed encouragement to be at the centre of human development due to its role in overcoming discouragement, which he viewed to be the ultimate obstacle in human growth (Watts & Pietrzak, 2000). People often abandon tasks not because they are incapable, but because discouragement withers away at an individual's motivation to keep going. For this reason Adler viewed encouragement as the antidote to discouragement, allowing individuals to persist and continue to exert effort even in the face of adversity ^{''[<nowiki/>[[Wikiversity:Citation needed|source]]?]''}. Figure 2 poses the question of what is encouragement? Encouragement can be defined as a process that aims to affirm an individual's capacity and effort, particularly in the face of adversity, and fosters persistence and motivation (Wong et al., 2025). This definition emphasises three core elements: *Focus on effort and capacity *Salience during difficulty *Forward-looking orientation{{f}} It is also important to note how encouragement differs from praise, reinforcement and social support. Praise affirms success, reinforcement shapes behaviour through consequences and social support through perceived support. Encouragement contrasts these by affirming values of persistence and effort though the emphasis of its core elements (Wong et al., 2025). ===Examples of encouragement=== *A teacher to a student: “You’ve worked really hard on this problem, I can see your reasoning improving. Keep building on that, you can do it.” *A physiotherapist to a patient in rehab: “This stage is tough, but it’s exactly where progress happens. Keep at it, you’re moving forward step by step, day by day.” *A coach: “You’ve built such a strong foundation, imagine how much further you’ll go if you keep at it, you're going to be a weapon.” {{robelbox|theme=3|title=Test yourself!|iconwidth=55px|icon=Search-icon-white-background.png}} <div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> <quiz display="simple"> Which of the following are core elements of encouragement? |type="()"} - Focus on effort and capacity - Salience during difficulty - Forward-looking orientation + All of the above </quiz> </div> {{RoundBoxBottom}} {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} With this definition established, the next step is to ask: Why does encouragement sustain persistence and effort? For the answer we turn to motivational theories and mechanisms. {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Mechanisms linking encouragement to persistence and effort== [[File:Gears animation.gif|thumb|Figure 3. Mechanisms]] Encouragement exerts its influence through a range of psychological mechanisms, see Figure 3, which can be explained using motivational theories and understanding. At its core, encouragement bolsters self-belief, strengthens commitment to goal and helps to maintain persistence even in the face of difficulty. '''Self-efficacy theory''' Self-efficacy theory helps to posit that individuals tend to persist and exert effort when they believe that they can obtain success. Encouragement for this reason can help to sway this belief in a positive manner by reinforcing someone's confidence in their capacity in a way which helps them to believe they obtain success even in the face of difficulty (Bandura & Adams, 1977). '''Goal-setting theory''' Goal-setting theory helps to emphasise the importance of clear and challenging goals, which in turn help to enhance effort and persistence. Whilst commitment to such goals can falter and wither when faced with difficulty or fatigue, encouragement helps to overcome this by reminding individuals of their capacity to obtain the goal by reframing setbacks as temporary and as a part of the process. This helps to maintain persistence and renew effort when such difficulties or challenges arise (Luneburg, 2011). '''Expectancy-value theory ''' Expectancy-value theory helps to explain persistence as an indicator of whether individuals expect to succeed and values the outcome. Using this understanding, encouragement can be viewed to strengthen persistence by working to bolster expectancy and value by reaffirming an individual's capacity and value behind obtaining the goal (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). '''Social cognitive theory''' Social cognitive theory helps to place emphasis on learning through social influence and modelling. Whilst encouragement is often delivered from one person to another, it can also be used in self-talk or self-evaluation. In this instance observed encouragement can act as social cues that can be used to shape self-talk, expectations and for behaviours involving persistence (Van et al., 2011). '''Self-determination theory''' Self-determination theory identifies competence, autonomy and relatedness as basic psychosocial needs. Encouragement can be used to support and meet these needs by affirming competence, autonomy-supportive affirmation and strengthening relatedness though social connection. In satisfying these needs encouragement can be regarded to foster self-determination and as an extension sustain persistence (Cervone & Shoda, 1999). '''Summary of mechanisms''' *Encouragement sustains belief in ability (self-efficacy). *Encouragement reinforces goal commitment (goal-setting theory). *Encouragement strengthens expectancy and value (expectancy-value theory). *Encouragement provides social modelling and affirmation (social cognitive theory). *Encouragement satisfies psychological needs (self-determination theory). {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} Theoretical perspectives provide strong explanations for why encouragement should foster persistence and effort. But do these mechanisms hold up in real-world contexts? The next section examines empirical evidence across education, sport and health. {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Research evidence: Effects across contexts {{vague}}== Theories of motivation suggest encouragement works by enhancing persistence and effort by bolstering beliefs, goal commitment, expectancy-value appraisals, social modelling and by helping to satisfy psychosocial needs. Whilst this provides a solid theoretical basis, it is important that it is validated by practical research. For this reason numerous studies have been conducted globally to empirically test encouragement, with such research being conducted in education, sports, therapy and health. '''Education''' Educational contexts have provided some of the clearest and most valuable insight into the effects of encouragement. With teachers frequently facing the challenge of motivating students to persist with difficult tasks, encouragement has shown to be a powerful tool. *Wong, Cheng, McDermott, Deng and McCullough (2019) developed the Academic Encouragement Scale to measure how students perceive and internalise encouragement. They found that higher levels of perceived encouragement were associated with increased persistence in academic tasks, improved engagement and higher motivation to overcome setbacks or challenges. These findings help to show encouragement as a functional tool which can be used to increase motivation in regard to learning tasks. *Reeve (2024) {{ic|Not a research study; this is a textbook}} noted that, in a broader review of classroom motivation that verbal messages were important in affirming students' competence and potential. It was found that these verbal messages of encouragement were some of the most effective ways to sustain student engagement during lessons containing difficulty and or new content in learning. For this reason Reeve communicated encouragement to act as a scaffold to keep students engaged and invested in learning rather than to simply disengage when they encountered difficulty. In an educational setting, the findings align closely with self-efficacy theory and expectancy-value theory. By working to reaffirm students' academic competence, along with the possibility of success and importance of effort, encouragement helps strengthen motivated behaviour. '''Sport and physical performance''' Sports and physical performance contexts have been another area of interest, with numerous studies evaluating the impact of encouragement not only on persistence and effort but also strength, endurance and competitive performance. *McNair, Depledge, Brettkelly and Stanley (1996) found that verbal encouragement was responsible for significantly increasing voluntary muscle exertion during strength testing.They also found that when athletes received encouragement it had the additional benefit of enabling them to exert more force and to maintain effort longer in comparison to those who did not. *Examination of anecdotal evidence and testimony from coaches and athletes further validate this. With many athletes citing their coach's encouragement as a pivotal moment at a point of potential disengagement, enabling them to persist in difficult training sessions or competitions (Jedloc et al., 2007). In a sports and physical performance context encouragement works closely with goal-setting theory and self-determination theory. In helping athletes to commit to their goals and to affirm competence to help support intrinsic motivation. '''Therapy and counselling''' Psychologists and health practitioners also have shown encouragement to be an important tool in their line of work. In therapy and interventions encouragement has been shown to be an important tool in keeping clients engaged and motivated. *Carlson and Slavik (2006), in reviewing Adlerian literature, highlighted the importance of encouragement by citing its ability to help clients maintain persistence and effort. A process which is only possible because it encourages the capacity to help affirm clients’ capacity and value of the end goal. *Wong (2015) also cited encouragement to be important in therapy and behavioral change programs. Highlighting encouragement’s capacity to improve a client’s relatedness and motivational capacity through human interaction and affirming their competence along with capacity for change. All of which help to contribute to ensure clients persistence in these programs and motivation even when it is difficult. In behavioral change programs and therapeutic settings, encouragement can be shown to consistently improve motivation, which in turn increases persistence and effort{{f}}. This can be attributed to the way in which encouragement in this context helps to communicate competence, relatedness, social modelling, value behind achieving goals and potential to succeed. '''Health and well-being''' Encouragement has also been practically applied and evaluated in health contexts, often where persistence and effort determine long-term outcomes. *Wong et al. (2025) in evaluating health behaviours such as exercise, health dieting, and lifestyle changes, finding that encouragement improved persistence by affirming effort and potential in routine tasks which may feel difficult or under-rewarding in the short-term. *Wang, Guo, Wu and Zhang (2017) found that videos of encouragement prompting self-empowerment through exercise such as running or healthier dieting also had similar effects to traditional encouragement, helping individuals engaged in either finding it motivational and a way in which to affirm their effort and capacity to meet their health goals. The findings in a health and well-being context help to show encouragement work using conceptual pathways presented in expectant-value theory, self-efficacy theory and social cognitive theory. By providing external affirmation on the value of the goal, the plausibility of success, self competence and relatedness, encouragement helps drive intrinsic motivation and persistence. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} '''Summary of research''': In looking at different contexts from education, sports, health, therapy and counseling, it is apparent that encouragement helps to consistently boost persistence, motivation and effort in a range of ways and a range of settings. This has been achieved by strengthening self-belief, reinforcing the value of goals, affirming progress, affirming competency, improving relatedness and plausibility of success. Whilst the findings show empirical evidence to support the theoretical basis established through theories of motivation, there exists a gap in how encouragement is moderated by culture and its long term effects. {{RoundBoxBottom}} {{robelbox|theme=3|title=Test yourself!|iconwidth=55px|icon=Search-icon-white-background.png}} <div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> <quiz display="simple"> Which of the following does current research show about encouragement and improving persistence? |type="()"} + That encouragement increases persistence - It has little or no impact - There is not enough evidence - It decreases persistence </quiz> </div> {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Limitations and future directions== Although encouragement has a solid theoretical grounding in motivational theories and promising empirical evidence, it still has many associated limitations and conceptual issues. Like many other psychological tools, its impact depends on a range of variables as to its application. Whilst more research has been conducted to improve its understanding and uniqueness compared to similar constructs such as praise, reinforcement and social support, it's not to the same extent and can be regarded as less mature. '''Methodological limitations''' *'''Small-scale and context-specific studies''': Many existing studies are relatively small, context-specific, or qualitative. For instance, McNair et al.’s (1996) work on verbal encouragement and muscle exertion was highly controlled but limited in scope. For this reason generalising the findings across domains is challenging. Large-scale, multi-context studies are also very rare, leaving gaps in what could otherwise be robust, generalisable evidence. *'''Measurement challenges''': While measurement tools such as the Academic Encouragement Scale exist and Wong et al. (2019) is a step forward, measurement tools remain limited. Many studies rely on subjective perceptions or simplistic coding of encouragement, which may not capture the whole nature of encouragement. Without improving or standardising measurement tools, there is a notable risk of being impressionistic. *'''Causal inference''': Much of the research conducted is also correlational, making it difficult in determining whether encouragement is the sole factor acting on persistence, motivation and effort. This is also problematic because of the lack of experimental and longitudinal studies, which could be used to help clarify causality and effects over time. '''Cultural and contextual limitations''' *'''Cultural variability''': Encouragement is not the same across all cultures. What may be perceived as encouragement in Western cultures may not be perceived the same way in Eastern cultures, something in which can be attributed to either their respective collectivist or individualist qualities (Howard & Vigotsky, 2019). However, because of these differences it can hinder the ability to infer outcomes and produce models that can reliably predict outcomes. *'''Age and developmental differences''': Children, teens and adults respond differently to encouragement and its forms. For this reason, children and teens may rely more on external encouragement for persistence, while adults may rely more so on internal encouragement for improving persistence (Berg et al., 2022). *'''Context dependency''': Encouragement also does not hold the same level of effectiveness across different contexts, with research suggesting that encouragement in educational settings may be more effective than therapeutic or sporting contexts. This indicates that, although encouragement can be applied in a range of settings, it does not necessarily have the same effectiveness or impact (Wong, 2015). '''Risks and ethical concerns''' *'''Inauthentic encouragement''': Whilst encouragement is generally regarded as a positive action, performing it inauthentically may make it seem forced, generic or insincere. Consequently, because of this there is a risk that it can undermine trust and adversely reduce persistence and motivation (Wong et al., 2019). *'''Over-reliance''': Whilst encouragement can be a valuable tool, abusing it or excessive use may unintentionally have the side effect of individuals becoming dependent on external validation and affirmation if it is not balanced with intrinsic motivation and self-encouragement (Berg et al., 2022). *'''Unequal access to encouragement''': Encouragement is not equally distributed. There are always going to be individuals who get a lot, whilst others get little or none. In sports and education this raises questions about the ethical nature of encouragement, particularly whether it is fair that some individuls receive evaluative feedback whilst others do not. {{robelbox|theme=3|title=Test yourself!|iconwidth=55px|icon=Search-icon-white-background.png}} <div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> <quiz display="simple"> Which of the following is one limitation {{g}} surrounding encouragement and subsequent research? |type="()"} - Time of day - Lack of researchers - Geelong's loss to Brisbane in the finals {{ic|Target an international audience; Australia represents 0.3% of the human population}} + Measurement challenges </quiz> </div> {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Future directions for research== Addressing some of these limitations would help to benefit understanding of encouragement and to advance it in a constructive manner. It would also help to improve contemporary psychological understanding and relatedness to wider psychological theories outside of just motivation{{awkward}}. *'''Refining definitions and frameworks''': As noted in studies such as Wong et al (2025), the anatomy of encouragement should continue to be clarified as to distinguish it from related constructs such as praise, reinforcement and social support. It could also benefit from the development of typologies. *'''Improved measurement tools''': Future research should also focus on the creation of multidimensional tools which can better capture encouragement and improve interpretation of its impact not only motivation, persistence and effort, but also other factors (Andreacci et al., 2002; Alcott, 2017). *'''Experimental and longitudinal studies''': Whilst there have been numerous studies conducted, many are short-term and limited in their scope. In conducting more long-term or longitudinal studies it could help to establish casualty and demonstrate the long term effects of encouragement on persistence and effort. It would also be beneficial if studies were conducted in a range of settings to evaluate cross-dimensional aspects and nuanced differences (Wong et al., 2019). *'''Cross-cultural and developmental comparisons''': Cultural contexts and differences is another area of potential research which can be conducted as to further develop fundamental understanding and different ways in which encouragement can be shown and or received. Additionally, this would also help to show if there are aspects in which are universal and or cultural specific whilst filling in a gap of current understanding (Wong et al., 2025). *'''Mechanistic integration''': Future work should also focus on further integrating encouragement into already established theories of motivation, as to better ground it in broader psychological models as to better explore encouragement through its cognitive, emotional and relational mechanisms in more depth. {{robelbox|theme=3|title=Test yourself!|iconwidth=55px|icon=Search-icon-white-background.png}} <div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> <quiz display="simple"> Which of the following would benefit research in encouragement going forward? |type="()"} - Improving measurement tools - Reframing definitions and framework - Cross-cultural research + All of them </quiz></div> {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Conclusion== Encouragement is more than just a simple gesture. It’s a psychological tool which can be used to shape persistence and effort in meaningful ways, even when facing difficulties or fatigue. In defining encouragement, it enables the ability to understand its theoretical framework and internal mechanisms which are all crucial in understanding the outcome of related research, practical applications, limitations and future directions. The insight from this demonstrates the promise and complexity behind encouragement and how it functions to influence human motivation. At its core, encouragement works by reinforcing an individual's belief in their capacity, communicating the importance of goals, social affirmation and satisfying psychological needs. For these reasons, it helps to align encouragement with major motivational theories, from Bandura’s self-efficacy theory to Deci and Ryan’s self-determination theory. Encouragement is not just anecdotal, but grounded in contemporary psychological frameworks and understanding. This is further supported by empirical evidence, whether in classrooms, sports fields and or clinics. Encouragement has been shown to enhance persistence and sustain effort even in the face of difficulty or fatigue. However, it relies on authenticity, timing and context for meaningful application. Encouragement if delivered thoughtfully can sustain motivation, however if delivered poorly it can undermine it. In evaluating practical implementation of encouragement it is clear that effective encouragement requires skill, sensitivity and adaptability. Teachers, coaches, psychologists and health professionals all benefit from utilising encouragement, but only when they can tailor it to the individual's needs and do so in a thoughtful manner. It is important to note and account for the fact that encouragement is not without limitations. Encouragement is not a magic solution to discouragement and persistence. Over-reliance and overuse risks creating dependency and undermining its power. It is also important to note that encouragement is not culturally universal. Whilst these are challenges, it is also an opportunity to direct future research towards better clarifying encouragement, expand cultural research, examine long-term outcomes and to help align it with already established psychological understanding. Ultimately encouragement matters because it has the capacity to motivate individuals in a truly unique and special way, helping to communicate to an individual that they are believed in, supported and have the potential to do any task they want. If done right, encouragement helps individuals to persist when they would otherwise give up, to sustain effort and motivation when challenges come about. Whilst there is a need for more research as to how encouragement is understood and applied, the evidence so far is clear, encouragement is more than a simple gesture, it's a powerful tool and driver for persistence, effort and human flourishing. ==See also== *[https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Motivation_and_emotion/Lectures/Extrinsic_motivation_and_psychological_needs Extrinsic motivation and psychological needs] *[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motivation Motivation ] ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Alcott, B. (2017). Does Teacher Encouragement Influence Students’ Educational Progress? A Propensity-Score Matching Analysis. Research in Higher Education, 58(7), 773–804. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11162-017-9446-2 Andreacci, J. L., Lemura, L. M., Cohen, S. L., Urbansky, E. A., Chelland, S. A., & Duvillard, S. P. von. (2002). The effects of frequency of encouragement on performance during maximal exercise testing. Journal of Sports Sciences, 20(4), 345–352. https://doi.org/10.1080/026404102753576125 Bandura, A., Adams, N.E. (1977). Analysis of self-efficacy theory of behavioral change. Cognitive Therapy Research, 1, 287–310. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01663995 Berg, I., Hovne, V., Carlbring, P., Bernhard-Oettel, C., Oscarsson, M., Mechler, J., Lindqvist, K., Topooco, N., Andersson, G., & Philips, B. (2022). “Good job!”: Therapists' encouragement, affirmation, and personal address in internet-based cognitive behavior therapy for adolescents with depression. Internet Interventions, 30, 100592. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.invent.2022.100592 Carlson, J., & Slavik, S. (2006). A review of the professional literature concerning the consistency of the definition and application of Adlerian encouragement. In R. E. Watts (Ed.), Readings in the theory of individual psychology (pp. 293–310). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203956571-33 Cervone, D., & Shoda, Y. (1999). The coherence of personality: Social-cognitive bases of consistency, variability, and organization. Guilford Press. Howard, M. C., & Crayne, M. P. (2019). Persistence: Defining the multidimensional construct and creating a measure. Personality and Individual Differences.,1 39. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.11.00 Jedlic, B., Hall, N., Munroe-Chandler, K., & Hall, C. (2007). Coaches’ Encouragement of Athletes’ Imagery Use. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 78(4), 351–363. https://doi.org/10.1080/02701367.2007.10599432 Luneburg, F. C. (2011). Goal-setting theory of motivation. International Journal of management, business and administration, 15(1), 1-6. McNair, P. J., Depledge, J., Brettkelly, M., & Stanley, S. N. (1996). Verbal encouragement: Effects on maximum effort voluntary muscle action. British Journal of Sports Medicine, 30(3), 243–245. https://doi.org/10.1136/bjsm.30.3.243 Reeve, J. (2024). Understanding motivation and emotion (8th ed.). John Wiley & Sons. Van, P. A. M., Higgins, E. T., & Kruglanski, A. W. (Eds.). (2011). Handbook of theories of social psychology (Vol. 1). Sage Publications. Wang, L., Guo, X., Wu, T., Lv, L., & Zhang, Z. (2017). Short-term effects of social encouragement on exercise behavior: Insights from China’s Wanbu network. Public Health, 148 (Supplement C), A1–A2. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2017.03.009 Watts, R. E., & Pietrzak, D. (2000). Adlerian “Encouragement” and the Therapeutic Process of Solution‐Focused Brief Therapy. Journal of Counseling and Development., 78(4). https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1556-6676.2000.tb01927.x Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (2000). Expectancy-Value Theory of Achievement Motivation. Contemporary Educational Psychology., 25(1). https://doi.org/10.1006/ceps.1999.1015 Wong, Y. J. (2015). The psychology of encouragement: Theory, research, and applications. The Counseling Psychologist, 43(2), 178–216. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011000014545091 Wong, Y. J., Cheng, H., McDermott, M. R., Deng, K., & McCullough, K. M. (2019). I Believe in You! Measuring the experience of encouragement using the academic encouragement scale. The Journal of Positive Psychology., 14(6). https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2019.1579357 Wong, Y. J., Li, P. F. J., Cheng, H.-L., & McDermott, R. C. (2025). The Anatomy of Encouragement: Addressing the What, Why, When, Who, and For Whom of Encouragement Messages. Journal of Prevention and Health Promotion, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/26320770251330870 }} ==External links== * [https://www.simplypsychology.org/self-efficacy.html Bandura’s Self-Efficacy Theory Of Motivation In Psychology] * [https://edudream.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Final-MEP-Designed-Report.pdf Contextual Analysis of Motivation, Engagement, & Persistence] [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Behaviour]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Encouragement]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Motivation]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Persistence]] hs5618489a3rvfdrliihz0v5f4po4jz 0 322685 2842417 2821928 2026-10-24T05:17:12Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Fixed all grammar errors throughout, also improved some sentences and readability. 2842417 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Scarcity mindset and decision-making:<br>How does scarcity mindset impact cognitive flexibility, motivational processes, and decision-making quality?}} __TOC__ ==Overview== {{RoundBoxTop|theme=4}} [[File:Toilet paper mania.jpg|right|thumb|200px|'''Figure 1'''. A COVID-19 toilet paper collection.]] ; Why don't you just throw it all away? Throwing everything out may be the first thing that comes to mind when exposed to the mountains of stuff in the house of a hoarder, yet it is not that simple. Just as COVID-19 exposed many people in the world to the idea of hoarding resources that were perceived to be scarce and difficult to obtain, such as toilet paper (see Figure 1), it highlights how scarcity cues can shape behaviour.{{g}}. Scarcity also drives the behaviour of compulsive hoarders. However, they are often not motivated by toilet paper scarcity, but rather the perceived scarcity of emotional and social connections. Regardless of the resource, scarcity mindset can be a powerful motivator of behaviour. {{RoundBoxBottom}} [[w:Mindset|Mindset]] is a set of attitudes which influence how a person views and interacts with the world. [[w:scarcity|Scarcity]] [[w:Mindset|mindset]] is a mental framework that narrows the perspective of an individual, by focusing their attention on resources that are perceived to be limited. This attentional focus reduces the individual's available cognitive capacity, which impairs decision-making efficiency (Civai et al., 2024). Experiences of resource scarcity, including [[w:Poverty|poverty]], are linked to the development of a scarcity mindset (Bruijn & Antonides, 2021). Resource scarcity and reduced cognitive capacity may further disadvantage a person in their pursuit of their life goals. Additionally, scarcity mindset has been linked to maladaptive behaviours, including hoarding (Goldsmith et al., 2020). Therefore, research has sought to understand the mechanisms of scarcity mindset and how the effects of scarcity mindset can be reduced. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} '''Focus questions''' * What is a scarcity mindset? * Why do people develop a scarcity mindset? * How does scarcity mindset influence decision-making? * How can the effects of a scarcity mindset be reduced? {{RoundBoxBottom}} == What is scarcity mindset? == [[File:Multiple hourglasses.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 2.''' Scarcity mindset involves the perception of limited resources.]] A scarcity mindset is a mental framework that influences a person's perception of the world. It consists of attitudes and beliefs that a person does not have access to the resources they desire or need (Liang et al., 2020). This can include money, time, physical objects and social connections (Mitsui, 2022). In other words, it leads people to focus on the things that they don't have, which limits their mental capacity to focus on other important aspect of their life (see Figure 2). Scarcity mindset is used in [[w:Advertising|advertising]] campaigns to motivate people to purchase products (Goldsmith et al., 2020). This is done by increasing the perception of scarcity to motivate panic buying due to limited supply, which can lead people to stockpiling products (Goldsmith et al., 2020). In contrast, an abundance mindset focuses on the abundance of resources and opportunities in the world (Larkin, 2023), as shown in Table 1. This mindset is similar to the concept of [[w:Open-mindedness|open-mindedness]], as abundance mindset is not attentionally fixed on a lack of resources, which allows for broader cognitions (Huijsmans et al., 2019). As demonstrated in a study by Huijsmans et al. (2019), individuals primed with a scarcity mindset demonstrated higher levels of concern for a product's value when deciding how much to pay, and this concern was not present in those primed with an abundance mindset. This shows that scarcity mindset and abundance mindset influence behavioural motivation in opposing ways, as scarcity mindset limits and restricts decision-making processes. '''Table 1.''' A Comparison of Scarcity Mindset and Abundance Mindset (based on Larkin, 2023) <div align = "center"> {| class="wikitable" |+ ! !Scarcity mindset !Abundance mindset |- |Core belief |Resources are limited and there is never enough |The world is full of possibilities and resources are plentiful |- |Focus |Limitations and restrictions |Possibilities and opportunities |- |General mindset |Closed minded |Open minded |} </div> {{Robelbox|title=Quiz|theme=8}}<quiz display=simple> {Scarcity mindset increases cognitive capacity: |type="()"} - True + False {Scarcity mindset is used to increase people's motivation to buy a product: |type="()"} + True - False </quiz> {{Robelbox/close}} == How does a scarcity mindset develop? == Experiences of prolonged resource scarcity are associated with the development of a scarcity mindset (Sanchez et al., 2023). This can include scarcity of financial resources, physical products and social connection. A study by Mani et al. (2013) found that experiencing poverty decreases cognitive capacity as "poverty-related concerns consume mental resources, leaving less for other tasks" (p. 976). These limitations of attentional focus are also associated with poor financial decision-making (Bruijn & Antonides, 2021). However, the strength of these findings is limited due to accuracy deficits (Bruijn & Antonides, 2021). This suggests that more research is needed to understand the connection between scarcity mindset and poor financial decisions. [[File:Toilet paper mania.jpg|thumb|230x230px|'''Figure 3.''' Stockpile of toilet paper.]] However, scarcity mindset is associated with decisions related to product scarcity{{explain}}. A study by Mitsui (2022) found that "experiencing scarcity was associated with pessimism and maladaptive forms of coping" (p. 10). The effects of this were demonstrated in the [[w:Panic_buying|panic buying]] of the [[w:COVID-19_pandemic|COVID-19 pandemic]] (see Figure 3). Research by Sanchez et al. (2023) also found that social disconnection in early life is associated with the development of a scarcity mindset and hoarding disorder. This suggests that social support mediates the effects of scarcity and the development of a scarcity mindset. It can be seen that experiences of perceived scarcity increase the likelihood of developing a scarcity mindset. Additionally, research by Tripathi et al. (2022) found generational differences in the prevalence of scarcity mindset. Their research suggests that economic experiences influence scarcity mindset, as different generations experience a different type of economy and different economic changes. They also found that technology and social media influence generational perceptions of scarcity, which was demonstrated in the association between 'non-attachment' beliefs' and 'belief-in-a-just-world', with a decreased prevalence of scarcity mindset. This suggests that cognitive and affective factors influence the prevalence of scarcity mindset. Additionally, their findings showed increased levels of scarcity mindset in males, compared to females{{why}}. This suggests that gender roles influence the development of scarcity mindset. Although the genralisability of these results are limited due to the Indian sample, the research by Tripathi et al. (2022) shows that there are many factors that influence the development of scarcity mindset including generation and gender norms. ==How does scarcity mindset impact decision-making?== [[File:Problem Solving - Concept Illustration.jpg|thumb|200x200px|'''Figure 4.''' Decision making is a complex cognitive task.]] [[Decision Making|Decision-making]] is a cognitive process where a person selects something from a range of options. This process occurs for many types of decisions (e.g. what to eat, what career to pursue) and can be influenced by many factors (e.g. accessible information, past experiences) (see Figure 4). The mindset theory of action phases (MAPS) (Gollwitzer,1990) was constructed as a simple way to understand the process of decision-making. This theory presents four phases in the decision making process, which are: # Predecisional phase: before a person decides to complete an action # Preactional phase: a person has made the decision to complete an action, but not taken any steps towards the action # Actional phase: a person completes the action that they decided to complete # Postactional phase: evaluation of action completion Scarcity mindset influences each of these phases through alterations in cognitive flexibility, motivational processes and decision-making quality{{f}}. These factors are outlined below. === Cognitive flexibility === [[w:Cognitive_flexibility|Cognitive flexibility]] involves the ability of a person to switch between different tasks and topics of thought (Wang et al., 2024). Scarcity mindset limits cognitive flexibility, as it reduces cognitive capacity (Mani et al., 2013). This restricts the cognitive resources that a person has available. Research by Wang et al. (2024) showed that people with a scarcity mindset had slower response times, weakened cognitive flexibility and limited interference suppression when completing psychological tests. This suggests that scarcity mindset reduces a person's cognitive control, which limits their intentional focus and decision-making. Neurological research by Huang et al. (2023) investigated the physiological processes of these effects. They found that "perceived scarcity can lead to changes in the neural activity of the brain regions related to executive functioning, resulting in a temporary decrease in cognitive flexibility" (p. 1). This reduces a person's adaptability and learning efficiency (Huang et al., 2023), which limits their ability to integrate new information into their existing attitudes and beliefs. [[File:Mr Pipo Locked.svg|left|thumb|175x175px|'''Figure 5.''' Cognitively fixed on scarcity beliefs.]] The reduced cognitive flexibility and attentional focus on resource scarcity makes it difficult for a person to move through the phases of the decision making process{{f}}. This is due to resistance to change, and attentional fixation on existing beliefs of resource scarcity{{f}}. As shown in Figure 5, a person with a scarcity mindset is cognitively fixed on their beliefs of scarcity, therefore restricting any additional information{{f}}. However, a person with a scarcity mindset can easily move through the phases of decision making, if the decision that they are trying to make align closely with their scarcity beliefs{{f}}. That is the behaviour is motivated by their scarcity mindset (Gollwitzer, 1990). Although these decisions may not be maladaptive (Goldsmith et al., 2020), they serve to reinforce a persons scarcity mindset{{f}}. === Motivational processes === [[w:Motivation|Motivation]] is a state that drives behaviour, therefore motivational processes are the factors that influence progression towards this state. Scarcity mindset restricts the origins of motivation and motivational processes. Research by Zhang et al. (2025) found that scarcity mindset was associated with weakened proactive control, particularly when completing the computerised cognitive response task known as AX-[[w:Continuous_performance_task|CPT]]. This suggests that scarcity mindset decreases motivation. When investigating the effects of scarcity mindset on envy, Ren et al. (2023) found that "individuals with a scarcity mindset experienced more envy and generated more malicious motivation and less benign motivation to improve themselves after upward social comparison" (p. 3612). This suggests that scarcity mindset alters the affective components of motivation. Additionally, the motivations that drive actions are seen to be different across generations and genders (Tripathi et al., 2022). This suggests that societal norms can influence motivational processes and are important to consider when creating intervention programs for maladaptive behaviour. Overall, the research indicates that scarcity mindset negatively effects motivational processes.{{f}} Throughout the action phases scarcity mindset can result in diminished motivation{{f}}. As weakened proactive control makes it more difficult for a person to translate their wishes into goal intention and action intention (Gollwitzer, 1990). The influence of emotions increases the complex process of shifting between the phases of action{{f}}. Societal norms, which discourage an action also reduces the likelihood of a person being motivated enough to translate their wish to action (Gollwitzer, 1990). Therefore, scarcity mindset negatively effects motivational processes by restricting progression through the phases of action. === Decision-making quality === [[w:decision_quality|Decision-making quality]] refers to the quality of a decision based on the possible options available at the time of the decision{{f}}. There are a variety of factors that can influence the definition of a quality decision, therefore in regards to scarcity mindset a quality decision is an adaptive decision, rather than a maladaptive decision{{f}}. Research by Mitsui (2022) found that scarcity mindset increases maladaptive coping, including pessimism and self-blame. Other studies have also found that perceived scarcity increases the likelihood of participating in risk-taking behaviour (Liang et al., 2020) and can decrease prosocial behaviour (Civai at al. 2024). These findings suggest that scarcity mindset impairs decision-making quality. An explanation for this is that prolonged scarcity makes it difficult to imagine a better future and leads to maladaptive coping mechanisms in order to deal with the stress of experiencing scarcity (Sanchez et al., 2023). All of these factors show that scarcity mindset reduces decision-making quality. This reduced decision-making quality does not directly influence a person's progression through the action phases. However, it does influence the evaluation of the action in the post actional phase{{f}}. As a person compares the actual value of their behaviour to the expected value (Gollwitzer, 1990). Dissonance between these values may further diminish a person's motivation. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=4}} [[File:Woman lonely in a crowd.jpg|right|thumb|200px|'''Figure 6'''. Scarcity mindset can develop due perceived lack of social connections.]] ; Meet Stacey As a child, {{g}} Stacey always felt distant from her parents, as her mother worked long hours as a nurse and her father locked himself in his art studio for many hours at a time. At school Stacey struggled to make friends, as she felt that everyone always liked the other kids more than her (see Figure 6). Stacey's love for books began early in life, {{g}} and she always loved getting to know new characters. However, as she has grown{{rewrite}} older, her book collection has grown to the point where it now fills entire rooms of her apartment. Recently, Stacey's landlord issued a formal notice requesting that she reduce the clutter due to safety concerns. The points below describe how the presence of a scarcity mindset may influence Stacey's progress through the phases of action. # Predecisional phase: "I know my landlord has given me my final notice, but I just don't know how I am going to let go of my books" - reduced cognitive flexibility restricting a change in decision and the continuation maladaptive coping. # Preactional phase: "I really don't want to let go of my books, but maybe I could just keep my favourite books" - fear of loosing{{sp}} apartment influences the possibility of changing decision # Actional phase: "I am going to donate some books" - fear perpetuates into action. # Postactinoal{{sp}} phase: "I have gotten rid of some books, but my landlord is still unhappy. I might loose my apartment" - emotional connection to the books, cognitive inflexibility and maladaptive coping, mean that the expected value of the behaviour was not obtained. {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==How can the effects of scarcity mindset be reduced?== Scarcity mindset can be reduced by understanding how it develops and how it associated with motivation. Sarcity mindset develops through experiencing a perceived scarcity of resources. This mindset diminishes cognitive flexibility, motivational process and decision making quality. Research has shown that a scarcity mindset can be reduced by promoting an abundance mindset (Tripathi et al., 2022) and improving individuals sense of control (Ren et al., 2023). For example hoarding disorder demonstrates a powerful relationship between scarcity mindset and lack of social connections (Sanchez et al., 2023). Therefore building social and emotional connections can reduce the effects of scarcity mindset (Sanchez et al., 2023). This shows that it is important to understand what has caused a person to develop a scarcity mindset, so that interventions can be more effective. {{Robelbox|title=Quiz|theme=8}} <quiz display=simple> {How could Stacey's scarcity mindset be reduced? |type="()"} - Throwing all her books out so that she has a clear space and can think clearly + Connecting her to a book club </quiz> {{Robelbox/close}} ==Conclusion== Scarcity mindset is a mental framework that focuses a person's attention on perceived resource scarcity. This mindset reduces decision-making efficiency as it diminishes cognitive flexibility, motivational processes and decision-making quality. Through understanding the experiences of perceived scarcity that influenced it development, scarcity mindset can be reduced by improving social connections, increasing an individual's sense of control, and promoting an abundance mindset. Understanding scarcity mindset helps to build awareness of it effects and how the negative effects can be reduced. ==See also== * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2021/Consumer panic buying motivation|Consumer panic buying and motivation]] (Book chapter, 2021) * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2014/Hoarding and motivation|Hoarding and motivation]] (Book chapter, 2014) * [[wikipedia:Mindset|Mindset]] (Wikipedia) * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2016/Mindsets and motivation|Mindsets and motivation]] (Book chapter, 2016) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Bruijn, E.J., & Antonides, G. (2021). Poverty and economic decision making: a review of scarcity theory. ''Theory and Decision'', ''92(1)'', 5–37. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09802-7 Civai, C., Elbaek, C. T., & Capraro, V. (2024). Why scarcity can both increase and decrease prosocial behaviour: A review and theoretical framework for the complex relationship between scarcity and prosociality. ''Current Opinion in Psychology'', ''60(1)'', 101931–101931. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2024.101931 Goldsmith, K., Griskevicius, V., & Hamilton, R. (2020). Scarcity and Consumer Decision Making: Is Scarcity a Mindset, a Threat, a Reference Point, or a Journey? ''Journal of the Association for Consumer Research'', ''5(4)'', 358–364. https://doi.org/10.1086/710531 Gollwitzer, P. M. (1990). Action phases and mind-sets. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), ''Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior'' (pp. 53–92). The Guilford Press. Huang, L., Li, X., Xu, F., & Li, F. (2023). Consequences of scarcity: the impact of perceived scarcity on executive functioning and its neural basis. ''Frontiers in Neuroscience'', ''17(1)''. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2023.1158544 Larkin, T. J. (2023). Cultivating a Mindset of Abundance. ''The Journal of Continuing Education in Nursing'', ''54(8)'', 344–346. https://doi.org/10.3928/00220124-20230711-03 Liang, S., Ye, D., & Liu, Y. (2021). The effect of perceived scarcity: Experiencing scarcity increases risk taking. ''The Journal of Psychology'', ''155(1)'', 59–89. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.2020.1822770 Mani, A., Mullainathan, S., Shafir, E., & Zhao, J. (2013). Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function. ''Science'', ''341(6149)'', 976–980. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1238041 Mitsui, K. (2022). The Relationship Between Coping Mechanisms and the Scarcity Mindset. ''Undergraduate Research'', ''2(2)'', 10–27. https://kb.gcsu.edu/undergraduateresearch/vol2/iss2/21 Ren, M., Zou, S., Zhu, S., Shi, M., Li, W., & Ding, D. (2023). The effects of scarcity mindset on envy: the mediating role of the sense of control. ''Current Psychology'', ''43(8)'', 7612–7627. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-023-04872-y Sanchez, C., Linkovski, O., van Roessel, P., Steinberg, N. M., McCarthy, E., Muñoz Rodríguez, P. A., Avanesyan, T., Mukunda, P., Frost, R. O., & Rodriguez, C. I. (2023). Early life stress in adults with hoarding disorder: A mixed methods study. ''Journal of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders'', ''37(1)'', 2211–3649. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jocrd.2023.100785 Tripathi, R. C., Pande, N., Tripathi, V. N., Shankar, S., Pande, A., & Bahadur, R. (2022). Scarcity Mindsets and Generational Differences in India: The Role of Cognitive and Affective Factors. ''Psychology and Developing Societies'', ''34(1)'', 45–78. https://doi.org/10.1177/09713336221080628 Wang, Q., Liu, S., Wang, F., & Shi, W. (2024). How Money Scarcity Influences Individuals’ Cognitive Control. ''Sage Open'', ''14(2)'', 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1177/21582440241253740 Zhang, L., Xu, M., Du, X., & Qiao, L. (2025). Impact of a Scarcity Mindset on Proactive and Reactive Cognitive Control: The Role of Motivation and Cognitive Ability. Psychophysiology, 62(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/psyp.70001 }} ==External links== * [https://www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/lifematters/hoarding-tendencies-and-scarcity-mindset/103868918 How can a scarcity mindset lead to hoarding tendencies?] (ABC Listen) * [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0GUyGv1Ibqw How to spot scarcity mindset in your decision making and transform it to abundance] (Youtube) * [https://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/02/scarcity The psychology of scarcity] (American Psychological Association) * [https://www.headspace.com/mindfulness/there-will-always-be-more-overcoming-scarcity-mindset There will always be more: overcoming Scarcity mindset] (Headspace) [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Mindset]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Decision making]] pbxyhjdso45g24zwb1ajbck6aoqog5i 0 322693 2842409 2814974 2026-10-24T03:33:31Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Fixed all grammar errors throughout, also improved some sentences and readability 2842409 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Self-disclosure motivation:<br>What motivates people to share personal information with others?}} __TOC__ ==Overview== {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:Janet Fisher Distant thoughts.jpg|thumb|160px|'''Figure 1'''. A sense of calm and reflection, symbolising Mia’s moment after leaving the bus — processing what she has shared and the unexpected openness of her conversation]] ;Imagine this ... It is late in the afternoon, and Mia is sitting on a crowded bus after a long day. A stranger sits next to her, and within minutes, they are deep in conversation. {{g}} By the time Mia reaches her stop, she has shared details about her recent breakup, her struggles with balancing study and work, and even her fear of failing her degree. When she steps off the bus, walks for three minutes, {{g}} finds herself sitting in a field of flowers. Mia feels a rush of relief—it’s as if a weight has been lifted just by speaking the words aloud (see Figure 1). Why did Mia feel comfortable enough to open up?. Was it the anonymity of the stranger?. {{g}} the relief of being listened to, or the emotional weight she had been carrying all day? {{RoundBoxBottom}} This moment illustrates the power of self-disclosure: sharing personal thoughts, feelings, and experiences with others. Disclosure is not only a personal act but also a deeply social one. People reveal themselves to seek comfort, build trust, or even manage impressions in relationships. Self-disclosure can bring closeness and support, but it also carries risk-being judged, rejected or misunderstood. This chapter explores the motivations behind such moment of self-disclosure and the psychological, social and situational factors that drive people to share personal information with others. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} '''Focus questions''' * Why do people disclose personal information even when it can be risky? * How does psychological theory explains what motivates self-disclosure{{g}}? * What are the main reasons people choose to share personal information? * How do digital communication platforms change the motivations and patterns of self disclosure{{g}}? {{RoundBoxBottom}} == What is self-disclosure? == * '''[[wikipedia:Self-disclosure|Self-disclosure]]''' is a process of communication by which one person reveals information about themselves to another. The information can be descriptive or evaluative, and can include thoughts, feelings, aspirations, goals, failures, successes, fears, and dreams, as well as one's likes, dislikes, and favorites (wikipedia description{{f}}). Self-disclosure is a fundamental process that contributes to the development, maintenance and deepening of close relationships. The motivation to disclose stems partly from the human need to form and maintain enduring, positive, and meaningful relationships, satisfying a basic drive for belonging within both intimate dyads and broader social groups such as families, workplaces, and cultural communities ''(Rimé, 2016)''. The nature of disclosure can range from superficial exchanges to highly intimate revelations, depending on the depth of the relationship and the context of communication ''(Rimé, 2016)''. Altman and Taylor’s ''(1973)'' Social Penetration Theory explains that disclosure is a central mechanism through which individuals transition from acquaintances to close relational partners. At a surface level, disclosure may involve relatively inconsequential topics such as food preferences, daily activities, or recent events. However, it can also extend to highly personal and sensitive information, such as fears, religious convictions, or potentially stigmatizing experiences including abortion, sexual orientation, or illness ''(Rimé, 2016)''. == Theoretical foundations == * [[wikipedia:Social_penetration_theory|Social Penetration theory]] == Costs and benefits of disclosure == *trust and relationship satisfaction *vulnerability and regret *oversharing and privacy risks == Applications and implications == *self-disclosure in therapy and support groups *social media *impacts on mental health and wellbeing ==Perpectives== [[File:Thought bubble.svg|right|140px|thumb|'''Figure 2'''. Example of an image with a descriptive caption.]]'''Evolutionary''' From an evolutionary perspective, self-disclosure is considered both a valuable and controversial intervention within the therapeutic process because it engages and supports interpersonal motivational systems; attachment, caregiving, ranking and sexual system central to human survival and bonding, key drives identified by the Evolutionary Theory of Motivation (ETM). Approximately 90% of therapists report using self-disclosure, which generally involves sharing personal information with patients{{f}}. Patients tend to respond more positively to therapists who employ disclosure in a balanced way, as this activates affiliative motives, strengthens trust, and reduces anxiety by signalling warmth and authenticity{{f}}. Monticelli et al. ''(2022)'', introduces motivational monitoring to evaluate how therapist and client motivational systems interact during clinical sessions. Research conducted by Simonds and Spokes ''(2017)''<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28060578/|title=Therapist self-disclosure and the therapeutic alliance in the treatment of eating problems}}</ref> found that in patients with eating disorders, therapists' self-disclosure helped regulate the social emotion of shame and encouraged disclosure, enhancing therapeutic relationship and improving treatment outcomes. ETM highlighted that such outcomes reflect evolved needs for affiliation and emotional regulation, showing how self-disclosure can help restore therapeutic bond when it is threatened by patient withdrawal or criticism. Monticelli et al. (2022) caution that disclosure must remain patient-focused; when driven by the therapist’s needs, it risks undermining the alliance and shifting attention away from the patient’s adaptive goals. ETM emphasizes ongoing monitoring of interpersonal motivational systems—both in transcripts and in real time—to ensure that disclosure interventions remain aligned with evolved mechanisms for connection, trust, and healing. '''Biological''' Biological perspectives highlight self-disclosure as an intrinsically rewarding behaviour supported by neural reward systems. Tamir and Mitchell ''(2012)'' found in their study that individuals are often willing to forgo monetary rewards to disclose information about themselves, suggesting that disclosure has inherent subjective value comparable to primary rewards such as food or sex. Their neuroimaging findings revealed strong activation in the mesolimbic dopamine system, including the nucleus accumbens and ventral tegmental area, during acts of self-disclosure. This system, which is typically engaged by primary rewards and secondary reinforcers, also responds to social rewards such as agreement, humour, and attraction. Interestingly, both components of self-disclosure—the act of self-reflection and the act of communicating one’s thoughts to others—elicited reward-related neural activity, with effects magnified when disclosures were shared interpersonally. Participants consistently chose options where they could disclose information about themselves even when it meant earning less money. These results support the hypothesis that humans possess a species-specific motivation to broadcast their beliefs and knowledge, a tendency that may confer adaptive advantages by strengthening social bonds, eliciting feedback, and enhancing collective learning. Thus, from a biological standpoint, disclosure is motivated by evolved reward mechanisms that sustain the cooperative and highly social nature of human groups. ''(Tamir & Mitchell, 2012)''. '''Social Cognitive''' From a social cognitive perspective, self-disclosure is shaped by reinforcement dynamics: when individuals receive positive feedback in response to sharing personal information, they are motivated to disclose more deeply over time ''(Baack, Fogliasso, & Harris, 2000)''. Disclosure is not random but is influenced by three key factors: personal characteristics, reward–cost assessments, and situational context. People disclose peripheral aspects of themselves more readily, while the innermost “core” of personality—encompassing self-concept, values, and vulnerabilities—is reserved for those with whom trust has been established. Social Penetration Theory ''(Altman & Taylor, 1973)'' describes this process as gradual, moving through “layers” of the self, much like peeling an onion. Early stages of relationships involve rapid exchange of surface-level information, but progress slows as disclosure moves toward central values and self-defining traits, which carry higher risks of rejection. Whether this deeper penetration occurs depends on the balance of rewards and costs: when both partners perceive benefits as outweighing risks, disclosure accelerates, intimacy deepens, and individuals are more willing to reveal sensitive aspects of their identities. Conversely, when perceived costs outweigh rewards, disclosure stalls, and relational growth is limited ''(Baack, Fogliasso, & Harris, 2000)''. Self-disclosure is seen as an indicator of the level of sincerity of expression and the level of trust and love in bilateral relations ''(Arslan, 2021)''. Gender differences in self-disclosure have long been debated, research on gender and self-disclosure shows that men and women differ not simply in how much they share, but in the types of experiences they are willing to discuss, as demonstrated through meta-analyses{{rewrite}}. Recent work by Carbone et al. ''(2024)'' provides clearer evidence by examining not only disclosure behaviour but also the psychological desire to disclose. Across three studies, they found a robust interaction between gender and information valence: men and women were equally likely to want to share positive information, but men were significantly less inclined than women to disclose negative experiences. Importantly, the research also highlighted different underlying motivations, with men more likely to disclose as a means of self-enhancement and image management, while women more often disclosed to seek comfort and social support. These findings suggest that gender differences in disclosure cannot be reduced to overall frequency but instead depend on the type of information shared and the social functions disclosure serves ''(Carbone et al., 2024)''. ==Learning features== ;Quiz <quiz display=simple> {Which of the following is a common motivation for self-disclosure?: |type="()"} - To increase stress + To build trust and intimacy - To avoid social interaction - To remain anonymous {Trust plays a key role in whether people choose to share personal information |type="()"} + True - False </quiz> ==Conclusion== Self-disclosure is a multifaceted process motivated by psychological, social, and biological factors that both enrich and complicate human relationships. It can strengthen intimacy, foster trust, and enhance well-being, yet it also carries risks such as vulnerability, regret, and privacy loss. Evolutionary and biological perspectives emphasize disclosure as rooted in adaptive survival needs and neural reward mechanisms, while social cognitive approaches and Social Penetration Theory highlight reinforcement dynamics, reward–cost assessments, and the gradual movement from superficial to intimate layers of the self. Individual differences, including personality traits and gender, further shape the motivations and patterns of disclosure, demonstrating that disclosure is not uniform but context-dependent. In applied contexts, disclosure plays a critical role in therapeutic settings, interpersonal relationships, and digital communication. In therapy, balanced disclosure by both clients and clinicians can regulate emotions, strengthen alliances, and improve outcomes. In everyday relationships, disclosure maintains trust and provides emotional relief, while in digital environments it offers opportunities for connection alongside heightened risks to privacy and authenticity. Ultimately, the motivation to disclose reflects enduring human needs for belonging, authenticity, and emotional regulation, illustrating why people continue to share personal information even when potential costs are apparent. Research on self-disclosure motivation remains limited in several ways. Much of the existing evidence relies on self-report data, which may not accurately capture the depth or context of disclosure. Cross-cultural studies are still underdeveloped, leaving open questions about how cultural norms influence disclosure practices and motivations. {{tip|Self-disclosure is motivated by the need for connection, authenticity, and emotional relief. While sharing personal information can create risks, it also strengthens trust, builds intimacy, and supports well-being across relationships, therapy, and digital spaces.}} ==See also== * [[wikipedia:Social_penetration_theory|Social Penetration Theory]] ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Altman, I., & Taylor, D. (1973). Social penetration: The development of interpersonal relationships. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Arslan, S. (2021). Self-disclosure: A psychological analysis. International Journal of Educational Research Review, 6(4), 453–455. https://doi.org/10.24331/ijere.1010942 Baack, D. W., Fogliasso, C. E., & Harris, J. (2000). The personal impact of ethical decisions: A social penetration theory. Journal of Business Ethics, 24(1), 39–49. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1006037510116 Carbone, E., Loewenstein, G., Scopelliti, I., & Vosgerau, J. (2024). He said, she said: Gender differences in the disclosure of positive and negative information. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 110, Article 104525. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104525 Luo, M., & Hancock, J. T. (2020). Self-disclosure and social media: Motivations, mechanisms and psychological well-being. Current Opinion in Psychology, 31, 110–115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2019.08.019 Monticelli, F., Tombolini, L., Guerra, F., Liotti, M., Monticelli, C., Gasperini, E., Russo, M., Novaretto, S., La Vista, L., Mallozzi, P., Imperatori, C., & Del Brutto, C. (2022). Using motivational monitoring to evaluate the efficacy of self-disclosure and self-involving interventions. Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 52(3), 217–225. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10879-022-09533-y Pratiwi, N. I., Maharani, D. P., Arniti, N. K., Anggreswari, N. P. Y., Suparna, P., & Haes, P. E. (2025). Interpersonal communication in the dynamics of “friends with benefits” among Generation Z. Jurnal Komunikatio, 11(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.30997/jk.v11i1.16394 Rimé, B. (2016). Self-disclosure. In J. D. Wright (Ed.), International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences (2nd ed., Vol. 21, pp. 348–354). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-397045-9.00075-6 Simonds, L. M., & Spokes, N. (2017). Therapist self-disclosure and the therapeutic alliance in the treatment of eating problems. Eating Disorders, 25(2), 151–164. https://doi.org/10.1080/10640266.2016.1269557 Tamir, D. I., & Mitchell, J. P. (2012). Disclosing information about the self is intrinsically rewarding. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(21), 8038–8043. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1202129109 }} ==External links== {{expand}} [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Communication]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Self-disclosure]] h2flshozfjsw9siupntdqso6du3jxca 0 322694 2842413 2762239 2026-10-24T04:43:58Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Fixed all grammar errors throughout, also improved some sentences and readability. 2842413 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Homeostasis and basic drives:<br>What is the role of homeostatic regulation in driving basic physiological needs?}} __TOC__ ==Overview== {{RoundBoxTop|theme=9}} [[File:Everest, Nuptse, Khumbu Glacier, Nepal, Himalayas.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. Mount Everest the highest mountain on earth, a dangerous climb)]] ; Imagine this ... You are climbing Mount Everest {{ic|Add link to Wikipedia article}} and have just reached the summit. While enjoying the amazing view you notice your breathing begins to slow. Suddenly you are shivering, drowsy and you stumble as you walk over to another hiker. You try to say to the hiker that you're not feeling very good, but the words come out mumbled. Recognising the symptoms {{g}} you panic as you realise you have the symptoms of hypothermia. Thankfully, {{g}} the body’s internal regulation system, homeostasis, kicks in, and the hypothalamus compensates by increasing heat via shivering and vasoconstriction. Alongside using a warming blanket, homeostasis helps restore you back out of serious hyperthermia, you then can safely make it down the mountain. Homeostasis is much like a difficult mountain climb (see Figure 1), you can reach the peak but you have to get back down the mountain safely to restore the delicate balance of homeostasis. {{RoundBoxBottom}} Homeostasis is a physiological mechanism where the body maintains a stable environment despite changes. Homeostasis is often referred{{f}} to as the body's own internal thermometer, regulating and controlling changes to maintain a overall balance within the body (see figure 2). The importance of homeostatic regulation for basic needs is so significant that without it we would die. Think of blood glucose regulation or the enzymes within the body that only function under specific pH conditions, they lose their ability to function. The adaptive system that regulates, monitors change and returns us back to baseline is something we don’t normally take note of. When we are walking on a summer's day and begin to get hot, we slowly start to sweat and increase blood flow. This process is all facilitated with homeostasis and yet we don’t seem to appreciate its vast role in our well-being. Homeostasis remains an underappreciated aspect of physiology, it is vital to understand the inner workings of our most basic systems. Without understanding the different aspects of homeostatic regulation, which is the self-regulating processes that allow our systems to stabilize despite changes in the internal and external environment. Then it is not possible to fully comprehend how amazing its functions are in driving basic physiological needs (Billman, 2020). Psychological science can help us to connect understanding of homeostatic regulation with mental states. For example, when emotional eating or binge eating can override hunger cues, or when physiological stress interferes with normal sleep processes. The more we understand about homeostatic regulation and the ways it informs basic physiological needs the more we can understand our biological makeup and apply psychological understanding to this knowledge to address current health gaps. This book chapter focuses on the ways that homeostasis is involved in regulation of the body's basic physiological needs. The chapter introduces key theories, research, process of homeostatic regulation including hunger, thirst, temperature regulation, types of homeostasis, brain structures involved and the relationship between homeostasis and motivation. Key homeostasis processes include mainly blood pressure, temperature, oxygen, pH, and fluid balance. The chapter covers relevant theories that attempt to explain the role that homeostatic regulation plays in driving basic physiological needs. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=9}} '''Focus questions:''' * What is homeostasis? * What are basic physiological needs? * How does homeostatic regulation impact physiological needs? * How does homeostasis relate to motivation? {{RoundBoxBottom}} == What is homeostasis? == [[File:ThermometerHighTemp.png|thumb|15opx|'''Figure 2'''. Thermometer, showing high temperature. Homeostasis is often referred to as the body's own thermometer ]] * [[wikipedia:Homeostasis|Homeostasis]] may be something you have heard before, or even the word itself might be completely new to you. You can think of it like an equilibrium or balance within the body. * Homeostasis can seem complicated but really it is just the delicate process of maintaining and regulating a stable internal environment. Homeostasis is an important concept with more and more research being done to understand the complex areas of the body that work so tirelessly to keep us in balance. * Homeostasis manages a range of bodily functions, on the cellular level homeostasis impacts and can be seen in the biochemical reactions such as pH, temperature, oxygen, blood glucose regulation (Libretti & Puckett, 2023). The internal environment must be delicately maintained for any changes. === History of homeostasis === * The word homeostasis is Greek for 'homeo' meaning 'similar to', and 'stasis' meaning 'standing still' (Libretti & Puckett, 2023). * The concept of homeostasis originates from ancient Greek biology, {{g}} and the physiologist Claude Bernard described it as a ‘balance of the internal environment’ (Liu et al., 2024). The term used today was coined by Walter Cannon{{f}}, who emphasized the way the body changes to differing environments and self-regulates. ==== Key figures ==== * Claude Bernard (1865) - described internal environment * [[wikipedia:Walter_Bradford_Cannon|Walter Cannon]] - was a major influential figure who coined the term homeostasis in 1926 (Libretti & Puckett, 2023). * Carl Richter{{f}} - related behaviour to maintaining homeostasis. * James Hardy{{f}} - built on the specific setpoint concept. === What are basic needs? === [[File:Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Diagram.png|thumb|('''Figure 3.''' Pyramid showing Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs) |351x351px]] * Basic needs refer to needs that are essential for human survival, such as the fundamental need for food, water, shelter (this relates to homeostasis in regards to temperature) * Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1943) (see figure 3) is a theory that aims to explain motivation through five basic needs. # '''Physiological needs:''' these are fundamental for survival such as water, food, shelter and clothing, and include basic homeostasis functions such as sleep. # '''Safety needs:''' safety and security in the environment, no crime, health and well-being, safety-nets. # '''Love and belonging:''' Social connection and acceptance, having friends, family, strong relationships, affection and intimacy # '''Esteem:''' Recognition, competence and respect, confidence, achievement and self-respect. # '''Self-actualisation:''' The releasing of one's full potential, personal growth, pursuit of meaning, joy and insight. == Areas of the brain involved in homeostasis == [[File:Hypothalamus.gif|thumb|('''Figure 4.''' Rotating view of brain and highlighted Hypothalamus gif)]] * Brain structures involved in homeostasis include the hypothalamus (see figure 4), the brain-stem, cerebral-cortex and limbic system. === Hypothalamus === * The hypothalamus is responsible for satiety and is stimulated by leptin * In particular, the hypothalamus and brain stem are both involved in regulation of food. The hypothalamus has a key role in the homeostatic regulation of energy and glucose metabolism (Roh et al., 2016) [https://www.brainfacts.org/3d-brain#intro=false&focus=Brain-limbic_system-hypothalamus See here] for an interactive website of brain-regions: explore the drop-down menu to see structures involved in homeostasis. == Key aspects of homeostatic regulation through theories == * '''Homeostasis theory of well-being''' (Marks, 2024) explains how we all have a core steady positive psychological well-being state. This state is changed with our emotions and thoughts but is aimed to be maintained back to a stable place. ** '''[[wikipedia:Drive_reduction_theory_(learning_theory)|Drive reduction theory]]''' (Hall, 1943) ** This theory explains how individuals are motivated to satisfy biological needs, and when these basic needs are not met then a ‘drive’ to meet the physiological needs is produced (Ningjian, 2024). This theory specifically relates to homeostatic regulation of basic needs, such as hunger in order to reach homeostasis. ** The drive to meet the physiological need and restore the homeostatic imbalance can be done using behavioural or physiological means. For temperature regulation the homeostatic physiological drive is vasodilation or sweating to reduce heat. While the behavioral drive to restore homeostasis might be finding cool water, shade and taking of any warm clothing (Sigmund, 2023). ** Needs such as hunger and thirst can motivate us and create ‘drives’ to then act or behave. This motivation then drives us to seek or cook food to become full and not hungry to restore homeostasis. ** '''Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory''' (Maslow, 1943) ** This foundational theory connects and can be applied to homeostatic regulation through the way that physiological needs such as sleep, shelter and food are needed for homeostatic balance. An imbalance of any of the basic physiological needs according to Maslow's theory, means that these unsatisfied needs will cause tension and prevention from meeting the other higher needs. **Maslow's theory relates to motivation as physiological needs must be met, and attention to physiological needs that may be currently un-met such as lack of sleep, motivates individuals to take action to restore them, such as having a rest or sleep (Rojas et al., 2023). **see Table 1 '''Table''' '''1.''' Homeostasis and key theory application {| class="wikitable" |Theory |'''Application of homeostasis''' |'''Physiological need''' |- |'''Maslow''' |Maslow's theory explains how unmet physiological needs affect homeostasis, and motivates us to then meet these needs. Once basic needs are met the rest of Maslow's hierarchy pyramid need can be achieved. |Unmet needs such as sleep, temperature, hunger and thirst (applies to the basic physiological needs) |- |'''Drive-reduction theory''' |Internal changes disrupt homeostasis leading to a drive for a restoration of the imbalances.   |A drive to seek food or water for hunger and thirst needs to be maintained |} == Relationship of homeostatic regulation and basic needs == Homeostatic regulation impacts physiological needs as homeostasis facilitates and monitors the body’s internal condition. Meeting the basic needs such as hunger, thirst and temperature regulation through a detection of changes using negative feedback loop processes{{g}}. An example of this is thermoregulation, when the body is too warm then the homeostasis mechanism works by making you sweat and have vasoconstriction to cool back down. === Hunger and thirst: === *Hunger and thirst are basic physiological needs that are controlled and regulated by homeostatic mechanisms. [[File:Humanitarian aid OCPA-2005-10-28-090517a.jpg|thumb|('''Figure 5.''' young girls extreme thirst for water)]] === Thirst === *We have all experienced thirst, hopefully not to an extreme or dangerous degree that some unfortunately suffer (see figure 5). Overall, we know the feeling of being on a walk or run and feeling very thirsty for a drink. The mechanisms behind this restoration of thirst include homeostatic regulation. Loss of fluid is detected by [[wikipedia:Osmoreceptor|osmoreceptors]] and then sent to the hypothalamus to cue drinking. *If you're feeling stuck, check out the book chapter about [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2025/Thirst regulation|thirst regulation]] to gain a better understanding. === Ghrelin === * [[wikipedia:Ghrelin|Ghrelin]] is the hunger hormone, it signals to the brain to eat (stimulate appetite) * Ghrelin functions are stimulating hunger (affecting food intake or hunger) growth hormone release and fat deposition (Pradhan et al., 2013). * Ghrelin stimulates hunger and the declines after eating (typically three hours after eating). === Leptin === * [[wikipedia:Leptin|Leptin]] is often known as the opposite of ghrelin, It acts as the body’s satiety or ‘fullness’ signal. Leptin stops production of the hypothalamus to stop the effects of ghrelin. Leptin sends signals to the hypothalamus about levels of energy storage (Yeung & Tadi, 2023). * Leptin has also been linked to controlling reproduction, blood pressure and impacting the immune system. * Large amounts of research surrounding leptin and links to obesity have been produced as an idea of widespread concern and interest in science. * Together both leptin and ghrelin work in a balance to regulate energy, establishing homeostasis. (Yeung & Tadi, 2023). {{RoundBoxTop|theme=9}} '''Case Study''' Jacob is a 25 year old man who is a full time athlete sprinting for the track athletics team. Lately, he has been prepping for his big race, focusing on hydration as his sprint race is predicted to take place on a 36 degree day in January. Jacob has been having extra electrolyte sports drinks before training, a sodium filled breakfast and checking he is not dehydrated through urine colour. On race day, Jacob warms up but due to the increased heat from being directly in the sun his body begins to sweat and lose water and electrolytes. His blood osmolarity increases and osmoreceptors located in the hypothalamus direct this. Jacob has the urge to drink more water because of his hypothalamus activating the thirst center. - He rehydrates before his race and then wins his sprint race with no dehydration issues, this is because homeostatic regulation allowed for the early prevention of dehydration before his race began. {{RoundBoxBottom}} '''Table 2.''' Types of homeostasis and their mechanisms {| class="wikitable" style="margin: auto;" |- ! !! Types of homeostasis !! Mechanisms |- | '''Thermoregulation''' || Constant internal temperature || (Vasoconstriction and sweating) |- | '''Chemical regulation''' || The balance of chemical substance || (blood glucose,pH, oxygen) |} [[File:Temperature Regulation.jpg|thumb|350x350px|('''Figure 6.''' Homeostatic regulation of temperature]]Table 2. refers to types of homeostasis mechanisms, looking at differences of chemical regulation and thermoregulation. Homeostatic regulation of temperature refers to the action of adjusting to the environment changes to maintain the ideal core internal body temperature (see figure 6.) == Quiz == <quiz display="simple"> {True or False, the hypothalamus is important for regulation of body temperature? |type="()"} + True - False {When the body’s temperature gets too high (called hyperthermia), then the hypothalamus triggers to start the conservation of any body heat. It will do this with mechanisms such as shivering (this generates heat through muscle contractions). |type="()"} - True + False </quiz> == What is the relationship between homeostatic regulation and motivation? == [[File:Cathy Rigby on balance beam 1968.jpg|thumb|('''Figure 7.''' A girl delicately balancing on a gymnastic beam much like the intricate balancing act that is the process of homeostasis, to maintain our necessary bodily functions). ]] * The relationship between homeostatic regulation and motivation is close, as physiological needs such as hunger and thirst drive motivation to then impair the balance of homeostasis. * Having a better control of signals of homeostasis along with motivated feeding behaviour could perhaps be a possible new treatment for conditions such as eating disorders and obesity (Ferrario et al., 2016). * Homeostatic imbalances create physiological drives that start motivated behaviours to restore that balance. For example, hunger creates motivation to then find, shop, cook and eat food. Homeostasis relates to motivation in that an imbalance or negative feedback creates motivation to change or restore that balance. {{robelbox|theme=9|title=Test yourself!|iconwidth=55px|icon=Search-icon-white-background.png}} <div style="{{Robelbox/pad}}"> <quiz display="simple"> Homeostasis regulation involves preventing the body from experiencing any changes at all? |type="()"} - True + False </quiz></div>{{RoundBoxBottom}} == Conclusion == This chapter explored the role of homeostatic regulation in driving basic physiological needs. It found that homeostasis can be understood as an equilibrium or balance within the body. It is the delicate process of maintaining and regulating a stable internal environment. The basic physiological needs explored can be connected to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and are physiological needs (water, food, shelter, clothing and sleep). Safety needs, such as a safe environment and love and belonging via social connection, as well as esteem through recognition and self-actualisation needs, are essential components of well-being. This chapter also explored the ways homeostatic regulation impacts physiological needs. This was explored by looking closely at basic needs of hunger and thirst and thermoregulation and examining how homeostasis is involved. Homeostatic regulation impacts the physiological need of hunger by making sure that leptin (fullness/satiety signal) is sending signals to the hypothalamus to ensure fullness and prevent overeating. Homeostasis relates to motivation because physiological needs such as hunger and thirst drive motivation to then impair the balance of homeostasis. For example hunger creates motivation to then find, shop, cook and eat food. Homeostasis relates to motivation in the way that the imbalance or negative fead-back process motivation to change or restore that balance. This chapter explored the role of homeostatic regulation in driving basic physiological needs. It found that homeostasis can be understood as an equilibrium or balance within the body. It is the delicate process of maintaining and regulating a stable internal environment. The basic physiological needs explored can be connected to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, and are physiological needs (water, food, shelter, clothing and sleep). Safety needs, such as a safe environment and love and belonging via social connection. As well as esteem through recognition and self-actualisation needs. * This chapter also explored the ways homeostatic regulation impacts physiological needs. This was explored by looking closely at basic needs of hunger and thirst and thermoregulation and examining how homeostasis is involved. Homeostatic regulation impacts the physiological need of hunger by making sure that leptin (fullness/satiety signal) is sending signals to the hypothalamus to ensure fullness and prevent overeating. Homeostasis relates to motivation because physiological needs such as hunger and thirst drive motivation to then impair the balance of homeostasis. For example hunger creates motivation to then find, shop, cook and eat food. Homeostasis relates to motivation in the way that the imbalance or negative fead-back process motivation to change or restore that balance. * Overall homeostasis is under-appreciated for its role in driving basic physiological needs. For example, it maintains a constant internal temperature and adaps to environmental changes, and hunger is regulated through hormones such as leptin that processes satiety cues, along with many more delicate balances. Homeostatic regulation is fundamental to all basic needs and should continue to be explored in depth.     {{RoundBoxTop|theme=5}} ;Answers to focus questions '''What is homeostasis?''' * Homeostasis is the process of maintaining stable internal environment in order to maintain health and various body functions. '''What are the basic physiological needs?''' * The basic physiological needs are food water, food, shelter, clothing and sleep. '''How does homeostatic regulation impact physiological needs?''' * Homeostatic regulation impacts physiological needs by adjusting internal conditions to balance, maintain and suit physiological needs (like temperature or thirst). as Homeostasis facilitates, monitors the body’s internal condition and changes always adapting to be meeting the most basic needs. '''How does homeostasis relate to motivation?''' * Homeostatic imbalances create physiological drives that start motivated behaviours to restore that balance. For example hunger creates motivation to then find, shop, cook and eat food. homeostasis relates to motivation in the way that the imbalance or negative feedback produces motivation to change or restore that balance. {{RoundBoxBottom}} == See also == * [[wikipedia:Ghrelin|Ghrelin]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Leptin|Leptin]] (Wikipedia) * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2025/Thirst regulation|Thirst regulation]] (Book chapter, 2025) ==References== This section lists the cited references in [[w:APA style|APA style]] (7th ed.) or [[w:Wikipedia:Citing sources|wiki style]]. {{Hanging indent|1= Balmores-Paulino, R. S. (2019). Homeostasis. In Springer eBooks (pp. 1–2). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28099-8_674-1 Billman, G. E. (2020). Homeostasis: The underappreciated and far too often ignored central organizing principle of physiology. Frontiers in Physiology, 11, Article 200. https://doi.org/10.3389/fphys.2020.00200 Ferrario, C. R., Labouèbe, G., Liu, S., Nieh, E. H., Routh, V. H., Xu, S., & O’Connor, E. C. (2016). Homeostasis meets motivation in the battle to control food intake. Journal of Neuroscience, 36(45), 11469–11481. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2338-16.2016 Libretti, S., & Puckett, Y. (2023, May 1). Physiology, homeostasis. StatPearls – NCBI Bookshelf. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK559138/ Liu, X., Li, X., Shen, P., Cong, B., & Wang, L. (2024). Fundamental role of brain-organ interaction in behavior-driven holistic homeostasis. Fundamental Research. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fmre.2024.09.005 Marks, D. F. (2024). Homeostasis theory of well-being. Journal of Health Psychology, 29(7), 721–733. https://doi.org/10.1177/13591053231216014 Ningjian, L. (2024). Drive theory. In The ECPH Encyclopedia of Psychology (p. 429). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-7874-4_294 Nikolaou, K., Brown, J., & Crombag, H. (2023). Motivated behaviour: Nutrition and feeding. In Behavioral Neuroscience TWU. https://doi.org/10.20919/zdgf9829/14 Pradhan, G., Samson, S. L., & Sun, Y. (2013). Ghrelin. Current Opinion in Clinical Nutrition & Metabolic Care, 16(6), 619–624. https://doi.org/10.1097/MCO.0b013e328365b9be Roh, E., Song, D. K., & Kim, M.-S. (2016). Emerging role of the brain in the homeostatic regulation of energy and glucose metabolism. Experimental & Molecular Medicine, 48, e216. https://doi.org/10.1038/emm.2016.4 Rojas, M., Méndez, A., & Watkins-Fassler, K. (2023). The hierarchy of needs: Empirical examination of Maslow’s theory and lessons for development. World Development, 165, 106185. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106185 Sigmund, H. (2023). Drive theory {{!}} Research Starters {{!}} EBSCO Research. EBSCO. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/psychology/drive-theory Yeung, A. Y., & Tadi, P. (2023, January 3). Physiology, obesity neurohormonal appetite and satiety control. StatPearls – NCBI Bookshelf. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK555906/ }} ==External links== * [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iz0Q9nTZCw4 Homeostasis and negative and positive feedback] (Amoeba Sisters/Youtube) * [https://www.khanacademy.org/science/biology/principles-of-physiology/body-structure-and-homeostasis/a/homeostasis Khan Academy lesson] on homeostasis and body structures (Khan Academy.com) * [https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/articles/z9xrdnb#z78j6rd Mini podcast understanding homeostasis] (BBC Bitesize podcasts) * [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rgpj__C2jCc What is homeostasis? simple animation video] (Free animated education/Youtube) [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Homeostasis]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Needs]] mkx90xk6so9wbvoba1p8hau3p2x81s7 0 322972 2842407 2814970 2026-10-24T03:21:30Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Fixed all grammar errors throughout, also improved some sentences and readability. 2842407 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Role-playing game motivation:<br>What are the key psychosocial elements of RPGs that enhance player engagement?}} __TOC__ ==Overview== {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} ;Scenario Toby has work early in the morning tomorrow, but is currently playing his favourite massively multiplayer online role-playing game, called World of Warcraft, {{g}} he has recently joined a guild in this game and has made some new friends in it who have invited him to join a raid they have planned for later that night. Toby has accepted the invitation even though this raid may keep him up late into the night and affect his work tomorrow, {{g}} he agreed to join his guildmates in the difficult and time-consuming activity, hoping to get some high-level rewards for completing it. Which intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors may be at play in this scenario? Are there any conflicting motivations between playing his game and being rested for work the next day? {{RoundBoxBottom}} [[w:role-playing game|Role-playing games]] are a popular form of entertainment and have evolved into several different mediums from computer games to live action, allowing players to create characters and narratives to explore in fantasy settings. These allow players an outlet to explore different identities, perspectives and, social interactions within a safe environment. But what motivates players to get into the hobby and continue to engage with it? Through the [[w:self-determination theory|self-determination theory]] (SDT; Deci, & Ryan, 1985) some understanding of what motivates these players is gained, as well as the psychosocial elements present which can affect this motivation. This chapter focuses on understanding the psychosocial elements of role-playing games that motivate and enhance player engagement. This is done through the lens of SDT, as it provides a framework to view how players can be motivated through intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors to continue playing RPGs and how understanding the factors of motivation involved may be applied to other areas such as education or the workforce. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} '''Focus questions:''' # What are RPGs and the different forms they come in? # What key theories can explain player motivation in RPGs? # What sort of psychosocial factors affect player engagement? # Are there any possible applications for this type of motivation in other areas?{{ic|Use open-ended questions}} {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==What are role-playing games?== [[w:Role-playing game|Role-playing games]] have developed into several different formats over the course of their time as a popular form of entertainment, and such varieties include live-action, tabletop, and video-game RPGs, which can be single player or massively multiplayer online. These different forms allow for variations in how the role-playing can be played out, and often a video game will provide less creativity for actions to the players than a tabletop game would.{{f}} [[File:Role playing gamers (II).jpg|right|140px|thumb|'''Figure 2'''. A group playing a Tabletop Role-Playing game.]] ====LARP – Live action role-playing==== [[w:Live action role-playing game|Live action Role-playing]], also known as LARP is like improvisational theatre. Players must physically act out their characters actions rather than describe them, and similarly the real environment is used to represent the fictional setting of the game world. LARP typically uses costumes and props in addition to venues that have been prepared to reflect fictional or fantasy settings. In live-action pole-play participants also act out combat scenarios with prop weapons such as foam swords (Cyril et al., 2019). ====TTRPG – Tabletop role-playing games ==== [[w:Tabletop role-playing game|Tabletop role-playing games]] are arguably the most recognisable format due to the popularity of TTRPGs such as [[w:Dungeons and Dragons|Dungeons & Dragons]] which was the first commercially available RPG published during the 1970s. This also being closely related to pen-and-paper RPGs in their mechanics and how they are played. TTRPGs have rulebooks that can be followed by the gamemaster and players to inform them on what, enemies, weapons, abilities, classes or spells that can be used within a playthrough. TTRPGs typically have a [[w:Gamemaster|Gamemaster]] (GM) who will guide the narrative and the players towards their goal, the GM also controls [[w:Non-player character|non-player characters]] (NPCs) within the story this is done through verbally describing the world and any situation that the players may find themselves within it and how NPCs react to any actions taken by the players. The players in TTRPGs create characters which fit into a class such as a mage or warrior, which often will help the player decide how they will act or perform within the story (Liapis & Denisova, 2023). ====Massively multiplayer online RPGs and single player RPGs==== As computer games have become popularised the ideas of TTRPGs been translated to electronic media in various forms. There are two broadly defined types of video game RPGs, those being single player role-playing games and [[w:Massively multiplayer online role-playing game|massively multiplayer online role-playing games]]. Single Player RPGs are a loosely defined genre of games which share similarities to role-playing games such as D&D, basing much of their mechanics, settings and the terminology used on those found in TTRPGs such as character and stat creation and interactive narratives which can change depending on player actions{{rewrite}}. This adaptation provides players with a visual and interactive form of role-playing but can provide limits to how a player can interact with the game due to constraints of the games themselves which may not allow complete freedom in every facet otherwise available in TTRPGs (Ryan et al., 2006). Another popular form of video game RPG is MMORPGs, which are different from single player experiences by the number of players who can interact with one another, creating large social interactions between players through a persistent world which can change even if a player is offline, and this is hosted and maintained on servers owned by the game’s publisher. MMORPGs typically allow for players to form and join groups together to work towards a common goal or reward, or simply to establish social interactions and communities within the game world. ==Self-determination theory== [[w:Self-determination theory|Self-determination theory]] (SDT) is a macro theory of human motivation from the humanistic psychology perspective which consists of mini theories proposed by Edward L. Deci and Richard Ryan in 1985. While the theory was later expanded upon, further separating the concepts of [[w:intrinsic motivation|intrinsic]] and [[w:extrinsic motivation|extrinsic]] motivation and the addition of three basic psychological needs which motivate behaviour which are [[w:autonomy|autonomy]], competence, and relatedness. ====Mini theories of SDT==== There are six mini theories currently seen in the modern version of SDT, which address one facet of motivation or personality functioning, attempting to explain different motivationally based behaviours and phenomena. [[File:SDT_macrotheory.png|alt=|left|thumb|550x550px|''Figure 2.'' Five of the macro-theories which constitute the SDT, the last theory called Relationship motivation theory is not included in the graph ]] ====1. Cognitive evaluation theory (CET)==== This theory focuses on intrinsic motivation and how competence, autonomy and, social context influences motivation, in other words CET attempts to explain how extrinsic factors can affect intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 2012) CET describes two processes by which intrinsic motivation can be affected. The first of which describes that events such as a reward from completing a behaviour or if there is a feeling of having a choice to complete a behaviour, can either undermine or enhance an individual’s intrinsic motivation depending on whether this event leads to a perceived lack of autonomy and an external locus of causality or if there is a perceived level of autonomy and an internal one. The second process proposes that events such as positive feedback leads to increasing an individual’s perceived competence by supporting the competence need and enhancing the intrinsic motivation of that individual, it should be noted that for the positive feedback to enhance motivation it must be for activities or behaviours that are autonomously motivated or within an autonomy supportive context (Deci & Ryan, 2012). In contrast negative feedback that leads to a perceived incompetence has the opposite effect and will lead to undermining intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 2012). ====2. Organismic integration theory (OIT)==== The OIT focuses on extrinsic motivation and proposes that humans are growth orientated which manifests as the concept of internalisation. OIT suggests different types of extrinsic motivation fall upon a continuum of internalisation, which consists of external regulation, introjection, identification, and integration. The more internalised the extrinsic motivation the higher the level of autonomy is felt when a behaviour is acted out(Reeve, 2012). OIT also looks at the social contexts and how it can impact an individual in deeply accepting or resisting values or goals and how that can enhance or forestall internalisation. OIT ties in with the concepts of autonomy and relatedness in affecting motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2002, Deci & Ryan, 2012). ====3. Causality orientations theory (COT)==== COT describes three types of causality orientations to explain the differences between how people regulate behaviour and orient toward environments in varying ways. These orientation types include the autonomy orientation in which an individual will act or complete a behaviour out of interest and perceived value in the act; the control orientation in which an individual is focused on any reward, gains, or approval that may come from the act; and lastly the impersonal orientation which is when an individual has anxiety caused by their perceived lack of competency (Deci & Ryan, 2012). ====4. Basic Needs theory (BNT)==== BNT proposes that the three psychological needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness are predictive and essential to psychological well-being and optimal functioning and if one is facet is being affected there will be negative functional costs associated with it(Reeve, 2012). From this it is argued that situations and environments that support these three factors will impact well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2012, Reeve, 2012). ====5. Goals contents theory (GCT)==== GCT focuses on the impact on motivation and wellness from intrinsic and extrinsic goals and the distinctions between the two. As goals can be viewed as differentially impacting basic need satisfactions, in turn also being associated with psychological well-being(Reeve, 2012). Goals like financial success or popularity as extrinsic goals compared to intrinsic goals such as personal growth and developing close and meaningful relationships (Deci & Ryan, 2012, Reeve, 2012). ====6. Relationship motivation theory (RMT)==== RMT focuses on relatedness and how developing and maintain close personal relationships or belonging to groups as well as other relationships and how these interactions are essential for an individual’s well-being as these relationships provide satisfaction of the need for relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 2014). ====Basic Needs==== [[File:Basic needs.png|200px|right|thumb|'''Figure 3'''. The three basic psychological needs proposed by [[w:Self-determination theory|self-determination theory]] are considered essential components for intrinsic motivation and psychological well-being.]] *Autonomy – The need for an individual to feel that they are a causal agent in their life, to act on their own volition and experience freedom of will rather than feeling like they are forced to behave or act but that they feel a sense of willingness and choice in acting (Deci & Vansteenkiste, 2004). *Competence – The need for an individual to feel they are capable of effectively completing tasks and be efficient in dealing with their surrounding environment. This ability to control the outcome of situations they find themselves in such as work or school and in turn mastering these situations is key in maintaining a sense of competence (Deci & Vansteenkiste, 2004). *Relatedness – The need to interact with, be connected to, and experience caring for other people. This desire to create emotional connections with others is evident how people interact in many situations and why they seek out joining groups and activities with others (Deci & Vansteenkiste, 2004). ==Types of motivation in SDT== There are two types of motivation are proposed by SDT: extrinsic motivation and intrinsic motivation which creates a taxonomy of motivation which can be used to visually represent levels of motivation across the three orientations [[File:Taxonomy of motivation.png|thumb|600x600px|''Figure 4.'' Taxonomy of motivation: continuum of autonomy.]] ====Intrinsic motivation==== [[w:intrinsic motivation|Intrinsic motivation]] is the internal, natural drive to seek out challenges and development which is associated with optimal cognitive and social development according to SDT (Di Domenico & Ryan, 2017). This form of motivation is the most autonomous orientation as it behaviour that is intrinsically motivated are inherently interesting or enjoyable and are completed in the absence of external reward or punishment (Niemiec & Ryan 2009). The cognitive evaluation theory describes this form of motivation and how social and environmental factors help or hinder it; CET focuses on the SDT needs of competence and autonomy. Also tries to explain how motivation “crowding out” and how it can occur by the intrinsic motivation of an individual being overtaken by extrinsic motivation such as monetary rewards (Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M.,1985). ====Extrinsic mootivation==== [[w:extrinsic motivation|Extrinsic motivation]] comes from external sources, and the different ways this motivation can be regulated is explained by the OIT, one of the mini theories of self-determination theory (Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M., 1985). The four types of extrinsic motivation are as follows: '''1. Externally regulated behaviour''' The least autonomous of the 4 types and is when an act is performed due to external demand or a reward. Actions of this type have an externally perceived locus of control '''2. Introjected regulation of behaviour''' When an individual takes on regulations to behaviour that they do not fully accept as their own. This behaviour is seen in people motivated to demonstrate their ability to maintain self-worth which while an internally driven motivation, introjected behaviour is seen as having an externally perceived locus of causality. (Deci & Ryan, 1995). '''3. Regulation through identification''' More autonomously driven compared to the previous two types, this form of extrinsic motivation is when an individual sees value in the extrinsically motivated behaviour and willingly internalises the behaviour so that a sense of choice and personal commitment is felt, this regulation type has an internally perceived locus of causality (Reeve, 2012). '''4. Integrated Regulation''' The most autonomous of the 4 types, occurs when regulations are fully integrated within an individual’s beliefs and values, while this type shares similarities to intrinsic motivation it is still classed as extrinsic but also has an internally perceived locus of causality (Reeve, 2012). '''Table 1.''' Examples of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation {| class="wikitable" style="margin: auto; |- | '''Intrinsic Motivation''' || Reading a book because you enjoy the story |- | '''Extrinsic Motivation''' || Studying so you get a good grade |} ==Key Psychosocial elements within RPGs== Some of the psychosocial elements found within role-playing games are the social connections and relationships that can be fostered by them, in addition to providing a space to improve collaborative skills within safe environments (Higgins, 2023). RPGs also have been found to provide players an environment that supports autonomy and promotes competence through engaging and overcoming challenges presented within the games’ narrative (Higgins, 2023). TTRPG have also been found to support connectedness to others, and foster cooperation whilst playing through the narrative experience of these as well as an environment that allows them to explore their personality through role-play. Role-playing games have also been found to positively affect critical thinking and problem solving (Higgins, 2023, Yuliawati et al., 2024). ==How they increase engagement and motivation to play == The literature on motivation to play MMORPGs points towards factors such as social interaction, challenging or competitive, as well as immersion or the ability to escape into the fantasy world provided by the game (Chen, V. H et.al2006). It was also found that one of the most important factors to both enjoyment and the level of engagement was social interaction within MMORPGs, in addition to the skills and challenges that a player acquires and must face (Ryan et al., 2006). The link between social interaction and engagement found that non-engaged gamers were disinterested in social interaction and viewed it as a waste of and hindering their game play while in contrast engaged gamers valued social interactions and reported it to be both important and enjoyable in their experience playing. This study concluded that a balance between perceived challenges and skills and the types of social interaction within the game where influential in both enjoyment and engagement in playing MMORPGs, (Chen, V. H et.al, 2006). this may be linked with SDT’s concept of relatedness as well as competency as players felt greater enjoyment and engagement when they possessed adequate skills to play the game and if they had the ability to socially interact with other players (Higgins, C. D. 2023). Further studies on MMORPG motivation, which sampled a Spanish player base of the popular game World of Warcraft, found similar importance in the social aspects of online role-playing games. Additional subscales of motivation which also were found to correlate were exploration, which had a considerable link to motivation, while there was low interest in escaping from reality and identification with the player avatar (Fuster et al., 2013). Another study which applied the SDT framework on the factors affecting motivation of MMORPG players found game enjoyment and intentions for future play were significantly related to measurers of autonomy, competence and relatedness in addition to autonomy and competence being positively related to post-play mood which can further impact on continued engagement as players will want to revisit that increase in mood (Ryan et al., 2006). Similar studies on motivation for playing MMORPGs found three components which explained player motivation, and these were achievement, social, and immersion (Yee, 2006). These components consist of several subcomponents; achievement consists of advancement, mechanics and competition and these links can be associated with competence{{awkward}}. Social consists of socialising, relationship, and teamwork which can be linked with relatedness, and the final component of immersion which includes discovery, role-playing, customisation, and escapism links to the need for autonomy (Schoenau-Fog, H. 2011., Yee, 2006,). These components support other findings and can be linked with CET concepts such as autonomy linked to, competence and relatedness and how they can affect facilitate or impair both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Ryan et al., 2006). ==Applications== A scoping review of the potential benefits that TTRPG interventions could provide found, that while the field is still in an early stage of research, it shows promising signs of effectiveness as a beneficial psychological intervention (Yuliawati et al., 2024). As TTRPGs were shown to promote psychosocial and cognitive skills in their players in addition to preventing negative effects and stress due to how TTRPGs can give players a sense of agency through perceived control over major parts of the game, this sense of agency can be linked to the need for autonomy found with the SDT framework and other studies looking at player motivation (Schoenau-Fog, H. 2011., Yee, 2006, Yuliawati et al., 2024){{rewrite}}. Additional applications of RPG-based motivation may be found in education, as several studies have investigated the positive motivation outcomes from taking elements of TTRPGs and other forms into an education context. These studies have found that role-playing games and gamification can have a positive effect on student academic skills as well as provide opportunity for safe social interactions and collaboration (Almén, B., Ekman, J. 2025, Rosselet & Stauffer, 2013). ==Conclusion== Using the self-determination theory provides insight into how intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can be used to explain player engagement with role-playing games in their various forms as these genres of games provide players with opportunity to fulfill the basic needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness through the social interactions facilitated by RPGs{{rewrite}}. Challenges found within these games which require players to adapt and overcome with developed skills and knowledge while also providing players the chance to explore their personalities, ideas, and beliefs in a safe environment, can provide motivation for continued engagement with RPGs (Higgins, C. D. 2023){{rewrite}}. In addition, while the games may provide intrinsic motivation through being an enjoyable experience, extrinsic motivational factors such as rewards and approval of fellow players can also contribute to player engagement, and this combination presents possible applications within fields such as education as recent studies have shown signs that RPG based interventions in education may be effective in increasing learning motivation outcomes (Cyril et al., 2019; Niemiec & Ryan, 2009; Reeve, 2012).{{rewrite}} ==See also== * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2023/Role-playing games, motivation, and emotion]] (Book chapter, 2023) * [[w:Role-playing game|Role-playing game]] (Wikipedia) * [[w:Self determination theory|Self determination theory]] (Wikipedia) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Almén, B., & Ekman, J. (2025). Roll For Initiative: EFL Game Masters and Players’ Perceptions of Using TTRPGs in an Extramural English and Classroom Setting. Cyril, B., Dobrovolný, V., Děchtěrenko, F., Stárková, T., & Bromová, E. (2019). It’s Better to Enjoy Learning than Playing: Motivational Effects of an Educational Live Action Role-playing Game. Frontline Learning Research, 7(3), 64–90. https://doi.org/10.14786/flr.v7i3.459 Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. New York, NY: Plenum. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1995). Human autonomy: The basis for true self-esteem. In M. Kemis (Ed.), Efficacy, Agency, and Self-esteem (Pp. 31–49). New York: Plenum. https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1995-97476-002 Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2012). Self-Determination Theory. In SAGE Publications Ltd eBooks (pp. 416–437). https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446249215.n21 Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2014). Autonomy and need satisfaction in close relationships: Relationships Motivation Theory. In Springer eBooks (pp. 53–73). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8542-6_3 Deci, E. L., & Vansteenkiste, M. (2004). Self-determination theory and basic need satisfaction: Understanding human development in positive psychology. RICERCHE DI PSICOLOGIA, 27, 17–34. https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/113911 Di Domenico, S. I., & Ryan, R. M. (2017). The Emerging Neuroscience of Intrinsic Motivation: A new frontier in Self-Determination research. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 11. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2017.00145 Higgins, C. D. (2023). Leveling up: Table-top role-playing games as resources for emerging adult development during COVID-19 (Doctoral dissertation). Liapis, A., & Denisova, A. (2023). The Challenge of Evaluating Player Experience in Tabletop Role-Playing Games. ., 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1145/3582437.3582457 Niemiec, C. P., & Ryan, R. M. (2009). Autonomy, competence, and relatedness in the classroom. Theory and Research in Education, 7(2), 133–144. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477878509104318 Reeve, J. (2012). A Self-determination Theory Perspective on Student Engagement. In Springer eBooks (pp. 149–172). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-2018-7_7 Rosselet, J. G., & Stauffer, S. D. (2013). Using group role-playing games with gifted children and adolescents: A psychosocial intervention model. International Journal of Play Therapy, 22(4), 173–192. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034557 Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2002). Overview of self-determination theory: An organismic-dialectical perspective. . https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2002-01702-001 Ryan, R. M., Rigby, C. S., & Przybylski, A. (2006). The Motivational Pull of Video Games: A Self-Determination Theory Approach. Motivation and Emotion, 30(4), 344–360. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-006-9051-8 Yee, N. (2006). Motivations for play in online games. CyberPsychology & Behavior, 9(6), 772–775. https://doi.org/10.1089/cpb.2006.9.772 Yuliawati, L., Wardhani, P. A. P., & Ng, J. H. (2024). A scoping review of tabletop role-playing game (TTRPG) as psychological intervention: potential benefits and future directions. Psychology research and behavior management, 2885-2903. }} == External Links:== * [https://positivepsychology.com/motivation-theories-psychology/ 20 Most Popular Theories of Motivation in Psychology] * [https://www.britannica.com/topic/role-playing-video-game Britannica entry on role-playing video games and their history] * [https://selfdeterminationtheory.org/theory/ Self-determination theory website] [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Groups]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Games/Role-playing]] lpb8eou4rc2b04qe84encnm5putc7z3 0 323059 2842425 2758025 2026-10-24T10:39:52Z Kontributor 2K 2977296 ([[c:GR|GR]]) [[c:COM:FR|File renamed]]: [[File:Self-determination-theory-three-needs...png]] → [[File:Self-determination-theory-three-needs.png]] [[c:COM:FR#FR6|Criterion 6]] (maintenance or bug fix) 2842425 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Positive emotion and approach motivation:<br>How do positive emotional states enhance goal pursuit and achievement behaviours?}} __TOC__ ==Overview== {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:The-nuances-of-happiness-emotions-beyond-happiness-1717543-FINAL-d0a3441958324ec59087f3ed0a60d829.png|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. Positive emotions]] '''Scenario''' Elise, a final-year university student, has often struggled with motivation when it comes to academic assessments. However, after receiving positive feedback on a recent group project, she experienced a noticeable shift. The recognition left her feeling joyful, proud, and deeply grateful which are emotions that were rare in her academic journey. Energised by this newfound sense of capability, Elise took a bold step outside her comfort zone and signed up for a marathon which was something she never would have considered in the past. {{RoundBoxBottom}} This chapter explores the psychology behind Elise’s experience. Specifically, it examines how positive emotional states such as joy, pride, gratitude, and hope can enhance goal pursuit by activating approach motivation. While much attention in psychology has traditionally focused on how negative emotions signal problems to avoid, research increasingly shows that positive emotions can serve as powerful drivers of action. They don’t just make us feel good but they can make us move forward. In everyday life, this raises important questions: Why do some people thrive when they feel optimistic or proud, while others struggle even when motivated by fear or pressure?{{rewrite}} Can cultivating positive emotions lead to better academic, personal, or professional outcomes? What mechanisms explain how these emotions influence our behaviour? Throughout this chapter, we’ll unpack the following key concepts: * '''Positive emotion''' – affective states that feel good and signal progress or potential * '''Approach motivation''' – a motivational orientation that drives people toward goals or rewards * '''Goal pursuit''' – the behaviours and psychological processes involved in striving for personal objectives By combining psychological theory, empirical research and real-world examples, this chapter offers practical insights into how feeling good can help us do better and why understanding this relationship matters for anyone striving to achieve meaningful goals. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} '''Focus questions''' # How do positive emotional states enhance approach motivation? # What role does this play in goal pursuit and achievement behaviours? # Which psychological mechanisms explain this relationship? # How can this knowledge be applied to improving personal or professional outcomes? {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Understanding the Psychology of Positive Emotion and Motivation== The connection between positive emotion, approach motivation and goal pursuit is complex and multidimensional. To unpack this, we draw on several well-established psychological theories that provide a theoretical framework for understanding how emotions can drive, shape, and sustain motivation toward valued goals. This section explores three major theoretical perspectives: # Broaden-and-Build Theory (Fredrickson, 2004) # Gray’s Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) (Gray, 1982; Corr, 2008) # Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) === Broaden-and-Build Theory === Fredrickson’s Broaden-and-Build Theory posits that positive emotions broaden our momentary thought–action repertoires, enabling people to build long-term personal resources, such as psychological resilience, social connections, and problem-solving skills (Fredrickson, 2004). [[File:BROADEN-AND-BUILD-THEORY-BARBRA-FREDRICKSON-DIAGRAM-WWW.PROPERWELLBEING.CO .UK -1-1024x724.gif|thumb|'''Figure 2'''. Broaden and Build Theory Diagram]] Unlike negative emotions, which narrow focus to help us respond to threats (e.g., fight or flight), positive emotions expand cognition and attention, opening individuals up to explore, create, and take action toward goals. This broadened mindset facilitates approach-oriented behaviours, such as pursuing new challenges, engaging socially, or creatively solving problems all of which are vital for sustained goal pursuit.{{f}} For example, someone experiencing joy after a small success might be more willing to take on a new opportunity, reframe challenges positively, or persist in the face of setbacks and behaviours that, over time, build lasting achievement. '''Example:''' Elise felt renewed enthusiasm after receiving positive feedback. According to Broaden-and-Build, her joy triggered broadened thinking (e.g., setting clearer goals, signing up for a fitness challenge) and helped her develop coping and planning strategies that support sustained effort. ==== Critical Perspective: ==== While this theory is widely supported (Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; Cohn et al., 2009), some critiques note it lacks a strong causal mechanism for how positivity translates to measurable goal attainment. Additionally, overly intense or inappropriate positivity can impair realistic judgement (Gruber et al., 2011), suggesting that context matters. ==== Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST): ==== Gray’s Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) provides a biologically grounded framework for understanding the role of positive emotion in approach motivation. RST identifies the Behavioural Activation System (BAS) as the neural system responsible for regulating sensitivity to reward cues, which are often accompanied by positive affect (Gray, 1982; Corr, 2008). When activated by anticipated rewards (e.g., praise, achievement, recognition), the BAS produces approach-oriented emotions such as eagerness, excitement, or pride. These feelings, in turn, motivate goal-directed behaviour, especially when goals are perceived as attainable. '''Example:''' A student who anticipates the satisfaction of completing their thesis may feel energised and focused, fuelling consistent effort. This positive affective anticipation is underpinned by BAS activation. Modern expansions of RST recognise that positive emotion is both a consequence and cause of BAS activation, creating feedback loops where progress toward goals generates positive affect, which in turn enhances motivation. '''Critical Perspective:''' RST provides a neurobiological explanation for approach behaviour, but it does not fully explain how cognitive processes like goal-setting, planning, or self-regulation interact with emotion. It is best understood as part of a broader motivational system that includes emotion–cognition interaction. ==== Self-Determination Theory (SDT): ==== [[File:Self-determination-theory-three-needs.png|thumb|[https://positivepsychology.com/self-determination-theory/ Figure 3: ''Self-Determination Theory Needs'']]] The Self-Determination Theory (SDT) provides a robust framework for understanding how emotional states relate to intrinsic motivation such as pursuing goals for internal satisfaction rather than external rewards. According to SDT, individuals are most motivated when their needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness are met. Positive emotions often arise when these needs are fulfilled, for example, pride when mastering a skill, or joy when connecting with others which further enhances intrinsic motivation and self-directed goal pursuit (Ryan & Deci, 2000). This reinforces a positive cycle: goal progress produces positive affect, which increases engagement and persistence. '''Example:''' Elise's pride after a successful presentation satisfied her need for competence. This positive feeling enhanced her motivation to pursue further goals (like fitness and academic challenges) that aligned with her sense of autonomy and self-worth. SDT also emphasises the quality of goals, intrinsically motivated goals are more likely to sustain motivation and generate positive emotion than externally imposed ones (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). This helps explain why positive emotions are often stronger motivators than pressure, fear, or obligation. '''Critical Perspective:''' While SDT has strong empirical support, critics argue that it may underemphasise the role of external motivators, which can also elicit positive emotions in certain contexts (e.g., public recognition). Additionally, the model assumes a universally positive role of intrinsic motivation, which may be culturally bounded (Iyengar & DeVoe, 2003). {| class="wikitable" |+Table 1: ''Strengths and Limitations on the Three Major Theories of Emotions.'' !Theory !Key Contribution !Strengths !Limitations |- |Broaden-and-Build Theory (Fredrickson) |Positive emotions broaden cognition and build long-term resources. |Explains cogntive and behavioural flexibility. |Lacks precise mechanisms for behavioural change. |- |Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (Gray/Corr) |BAS system links reward anticipation with positive emotion and approach behaviour. |Grounded in neurobiology; explains automatic motivation. |Less focus on cognitive and social processes. |- |Self-Determination Theory (Deci & Ryan) |Positive affect arises from satisfying intrinsic needs, which boosts motivation. |Strong evidence base; integrates emotion and values. |Understates role of extrinsic goals and cultural variation. |} Table 1 outlines the key contributions, strengths and limitations of the three major theories of emotion, providing a comparative overview of how each theory explains the experience and expression of emotions, along with their practical implications and theoretical significance. ==Empirical Evidence Linking Positive Emotion, Approach Motivation and Goal Pursuit== A growing body of research across psychology and neuroscience supports the idea that positive emotions enhance goal-directed behaviour by activating approach motivation, improving cognitive flexibility and sustaining long-term engagement. This section examines key empirical findings including longitudinal studies, experimental research and meta-analyses that clarify how and when this relationship functions effectively. Consistent with the Broaden-and-Build Theory, several studies have demonstrated that positive affect enhances cognitive processes necessary for goal pursuit, including creativity, attention and problem-solving. In a seminal experimental study, Isen (1987) and colleagues found that participants induced into a positive mood solved complex, insight-based problems more effectively than those in neutral or negative moods. Similarly, Estrada et al. (1997) showed that physicians in positive moods made more accurate diagnoses by incorporating more information and demonstrating greater cognitive flexibility. These findings have direct implications for achievement behaviours showing that positive emotions may enhance goal pursuit by expanding the range of strategies people consider, improving adaptability in complex or uncertain environments (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). These studies primarily assess short-term cognitive performance. While useful, they don’t confirm whether these effects translate into long-term goal achievement, indicating a need for more longitudinal data. '''''Approach Motivation and Positive Emotion: Biopsychological Evidence''''' The connection between positive affect and approach motivation has been supported through biopsychological and psychophysiological research. Activation of the Behavioural Activation System (BAS) has been consistently linked to dopaminergic activity in the brain’s reward circuitry (e.g., ventral striatum, nucleus accumbens), which is responsive to positive stimuli and reward anticipation (Knutson & Greer, 2008). A study by Black et al. (2014) found that individuals high in BAS sensitivity exhibited stronger left-frontal EEG asymmetry during goal anticipation, reflecting increased approach-related activity, especially in response to positive emotional stimuli. This biological sensitivity to reward cues was associated with greater goal engagement over time. '''Implication:''' Positive emotions may not just reflect goal progress but they also prime the nervous system for continued action, especially in reward-oriented contexts. '''Limitation:''' Not all individuals respond equally. Personality traits such as extraversion, reward sensitivity, and optimism moderate the relationship between positive affect and motivation (Smillie, 2013){{expand}}. This underscores the importance of individual differences. '''''Positive Affect as a Predictor of Persistence and Performance:''''' Empirical research supports the idea that positive emotions predict higher persistence, which is crucial for long-term goal achievement. A longitudinal study by Carver and Scheier (1998) showed that individuals who reported higher levels of positive affect and dispositional optimism demonstrated greater persistence on self-regulated tasks, even after setbacks. Lyubomirsky et al. (2005), in their comprehensive meta-analysis, found that positive affect was associated with improved outcomes across multiple life domains, including academic success, job performance, and health. Their analysis of over 225 studies suggested that positive emotions are not simply consequences of success, they actively contribute to it. Critical view: While the meta-analysis is robust, it also noted a publication bias towards positive findings and a lack of studies in high-stress or trauma contexts, where positive emotion may not play the same role in motivation. '''''Emotion-Driven Feedback Loops in Goal Pursuit:''''' Positive emotions can also reinforce motivation through feedback loops — where small successes elicit positive feelings, which in turn enhance motivation, creating an upward spiral of engagement and effort. Emmons and McCullough (2003) demonstrated this through their well-known gratitude intervention study: participants who kept gratitude journals reported not only greater wellbeing but also increased goal progress and effort across academic and health domains. Similar studies (Wood et al., 2010) support the idea that emotionally reflective practices enhance both emotional wellbeing and self-regulatory goal pursuit. This aligns with Carver’s (2003) model of affect as a signal in self-regulation: positive emotion indicates successful goal progress, motivating continued action. Applied insight: These findings highlight the importance of self-generated positive emotions (e.g., gratitude, pride, hope) in sustaining effort, not just externally triggered emotional states. '''''Positive Emotions and Long-Term Achievement:''''' The relationship between positive emotion and long-term goal achievement is more complex and context-dependent. Sheldon and Lyubomirsky (2006) found that participants who experienced sustained positive emotion over 4 weeks (via positive psychology interventions) were more likely to report progress on self-concordant goals which are goals that reflect personal values and interests. However, other studies highlight the risk of positivity without action. Kappes et al. (2012) found that indulging in positive fantasies about future success (e.g., imagining success without planning) can reduce actual effort and achievement. Their research supports the idea that positive affect must be paired with realistic planning (via “mental contrasting”) to produce effective goal pursuit. '''Critical takeaway:''' Not all positive emotion leads to positive outcomes. Without structure or self-regulation, it can produce complacency or unrealistic optimism. '''Quiz''' <quiz display="simple"> {What does Control Theory {{ic|This is the first mention of control theory?}} view goal pursuit as: |type="()"} - Positive emotion always leads to success + Positive emotion helps when tied to values and planning - Negative emotion is more effective than positivity - Imagining success is enough without a plan </quiz> ==Integration== The interplay between theory and research reveals a compelling narrative: positive emotions are not just feel-good experiences but they play a functional and measurable role in enhancing approach motivation and goal pursuit. Each theoretical model discussed offers a unique lens to understand this relationship, and empirical findings both support and refine these perspectives. '''Broaden-and-Build Theory:''' Empirical studies consistently support the theory’s central claim that positive emotions broaden cognition, enhance flexibility, and build long-term psychological resources. The research aligns well with Fredrickson's framework, particularly in low-stress or growth-oriented contexts. However, the limitations of the theory become apparent in contexts that require more structured planning or self-control. As seen in Kappes{{gr}} et al. (2012) work on positive fantasies, unstructured positivity can reduce effort, suggesting that positive emotion must be paired with self-regulatory mechanisms for optimal results. Refinement: Broaden-and-Build explains the opening of opportunity, but not necessarily the follow-through required for sustained action. '''Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST):''' Neuroscientific evidence, as seen in Knutson & Greer (2008), confirms RST's biological basis: positive emotions linked to reward anticipation activate the BAS, driving approach behaviour. This theory is strengthened by consistent psychophysiological findings showing that positive stimuli prime action in goal-directed tasks. However, research also reveals that individual differences, such as extraversion and reward sensitivity (Smillie, 2013), moderate this effect. Not everyone responds equally to positive affect, limiting the generalisability of RST unless individual traits are considered. Refinement: RST effectively explains how and why people feel driven to act after experiencing positive emotion but only for those with compatible motivational profiles. '''Self-Determination Theory (SDT):''' SDT's emphasis on intrinsic motivation and psychological need fulfilment is strongly supported by longitudinal studies (Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2006; Emmons & McCullough, 2003). Research shows that positive affect emerges when goals align with autonomy, competence, and relatedness, and that this emotional feedback reinforces sustained engagement. However, as critics point out, SDT often underplays external rewards or culturally diverse motivations. Some studies such as Kappes et al., (2012), suggest that unrealistic optimism, even about intrinsic goals can reduce effort unless grounded in planning and contrast. Refinement: SDT explains why meaningful goals create emotional momentum, but benefits depend on cognitive realism and alignment with values. {| class="wikitable" |+Table 2: ''Theoretical Utility of the Research'' |'''Theory''' |'''Research''' |'''Utility''' |'''Limitations''' |- |'''Broaden-and-Build Theory''' |Strong empirical support for short-term flexibility and long-term growth. |Helps explains how positivity opens up behavioural options. |Lacks clear mechanisms for structured goal pursuit. |- |'''Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory''' |Supported by neuroscience and EEG studies. |Explains neurobiological basis for emotion-driven action. |Effects vary based on personality traits. |- |'''Self-Determination Theory''' |Strong support in motivation and wellbeing literature as mentioned in this chapter. |Explains the link between emotion, motivation and sustained engagement. |May underplay cultural/external influences and planning needs. |} Table 2 showcases the theoretical utility of the research by highlighting how the findings contribute to existing theoretical frameworks, enhance conceptual understanding and outline the limitations for research on these theories. ==Conclusion == Positive emotions do more than simply feel good, {{g}} they serve as a powerful source of motivational fuel. When individuals experience emotions like joy, hope, or pride, these feelings activate approach tendencies, expand cognitive flexibility, and reinforce persistence in the face of challenges. Across multiple theories and research findings, a consistent picture emerges: positive emotional states significantly enhance achievement behaviours, especially when they arise from progress toward meaningful, intrinsically motivated goals. However, while emotion can energise goal pursuit, emotion alone is not enough. Research shows that the most effective motivation arises when several conditions are met. For example, Carver (2003) argued that positive emotions are most beneficial when they signal meaningful progress and prime further action, rather than leading to complacency. Similarly, Isen et al. (1987) highlight that individuals need the cognitive resources such as mental clarity and focus to capitalise on emotional energy productively. Deci and Ryan’s (2000) self-determination theory reinforces the importance of aligning goals with one’s core psychological needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness. Finally, Kappes et al. (2012) demonstrated that optimism and emotional highs must be balanced with realistic planning, mental contrasting, and actionable feedback. For those seeking to enhance personal growth and goal attainment, several practical strategies emerge from this understanding. Positive emotions can and should be cultivated intentionally through gratitude practices, reflecting on progress, or celebrating small wins. These emotional boosts provide energy that can be channelled into meaningful action. Aligning goals with personal values and intrinsic interests increases emotional investment, making motivation more sustainable over time. Rather than relying solely on fleeting emotional highs, it’s important to harness those moments to plan concrete next steps. Emotion can spark momentum, but structure sustains it. Finally, it's important to acknowledge individual differences such as what energises and motivates one person may not have the same effect on another. Ultimately, understanding the role of positive emotion in motivation offers a transformative perspective, instead of pushing ourselves out of fear, guilt, or pressure, we can learn to be pulled forward by joy, purpose, and meaning. When emotion, cognition and action align, goal pursuit becomes not just more effective, but more fulfilling. ==See also== * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2024/Goals and emotion#:~:text=Understanding the relationship between objectives and emotions helps,emotional states influence performance, determination, and overall achievements.|Goals and emotion]] (Wikiversity) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Black, C. L., Goldstein, K. E., LaBelle, D. R., Brown, C. W., Harmon-Jones, E., Abramson, L. Y., & Alloy, L. B. (2014). 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The benefits of frequent positive affect: Does happiness lead to success? Psychological Bulletin, 131(6), 803–855. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.131.6.803 Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-being. American Psychologist, 55(1), 68–78. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68 Sheldon, K. M., & Elliot, A. J. (1999). Goal striving, need satisfaction, and longitudinal well-being: The self-concordance model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(3), 482–497. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.76.3.482 Sheldon, K. M., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2006). Achieving Sustainable Gains in Happiness: Change Your Actions, not Your Circumstances. Journal of Happiness Studies, 7(1), 55–86. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-005-0868-8 Smillie, L. D. (2013). Extraversion and Reward Processing. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(3), 167–172. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721412470133 Wood, A. M., Froh, J. J., & Geraghty, A. W. A. (2010). Gratitude and well-being: A review and theoretical integration. Clinical Psychology Review, 30(7), 890–905. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2010.03.005 }} ==External links== * [https://www.bing.com/videos/riverview/relatedvideo?&q=self+determination+theory+emotions&&mid=9B0AAE39D6C066837BEE9B0AAE39D6C066837BEE&&FORM=VRDGAR Self- determination theory] (YouTube) * [https://www.bing.com/videos/riverview/relatedvideo?&q=broaden+and+build+theory&&mid=18983B21B0C55E0E207918983B21B0C55E0E2079&&FORM=VRDGAR Broaden-and-Build theory] (Bing Videos) * Reinforcement Sensitivity theory [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Positive emotion]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Goal pursuit]] ri5teqeljauy6bkiuqcb4tihilq4xmx 0 323121 2842399 2765098 2026-10-24T01:34:23Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Fixed all grammar and spelling errors that are flagged throughout. 2842399 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes:<br>What is the role of cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes?}} __TOC__ ==Overview== {{RoundBoxTop|theme=2}} [[File:Carter and Ford in a debate, September 23, 1976 (cropped).jpg|right|thumb|250x250px|'''Figure 1.''' Politicians engaging in public debate.]] ;Imagine this ... Imagine that for all your life you have been loyal to a singular political party. So far, you have agreed with all their major policies and so do your family and friends. However, during this election cycle, a candidate from the opposite party makes several compelling arguments that leaves you feeling conflicted. Should you change allegiance to the other party? Talk to your friends and family who may disagree with you? Try to ignore the opposite party anyway or even reframe what they said to maintain your personal beliefs (see Figure 1). {{RoundBoxBottom}} In this scenario, internal conflict about attitudes, values, beliefs or behaviours can result in psychological stress and place strain on social interrelationships. The resolution or reduction of this psychological phenomenon is a significant driving force behind the formation and changing of individual attitudes. On a larger scale, social attitudes are also influenced by this mechanism of change, resulting in a cognitive re-evaluation of social issues, [[social norms]], [[Prejudice|prejudices]] and values. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) explains that when individuals are experiencing cognitive dissonance and then resolve it, often the outcome will be changed attitudes, beliefs or behaviours. Additionally, balance theory (Heider, 1946) examines how affiliation and sentiment in triadic social relationships can lead to reevaluated attitudes, beliefs or behaviours. The processes behind cognitive dissonance reduction and the maintenance of social balance in interrelated social connections are mechanisms for constructing and changing social attitudes. Understanding the motivations in society that underpin both individual and collective attitude change allows for critical self-reflection and deeper awareness of the surrounding social environment. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=7}} '''Focus questions''' * What are social attitudes and how are they formed? * How does cognitive dissonance explain changes in social attitudes? * How does balance theory explain the influence of relationships on social attitudes? {{RoundBoxBottom}} === Social attitudes === The ABC model (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998) describes how the entirety of an individual's attitudes is formed through affective, behavioural and cognitive components. The model describes the affective component as the emotional response such as fear, the behavioural component as actions and the cognitive component as the established beliefs and knowledge. In a social context {{g}} different collective variables such as cultures, political systems and economic status increase variety between societies. Attitudes, once formed, dictate the way individuals interact and evaluate social situations, issues, objects and people{{f}}. [[File:Young child and an old person are petting grey cute cat - 51622977008.jpg|left|thumb|'''Figure 2.''' Cat getting pet (Behaviour)]] Social attitudes refer to the function of attitudes on a collective scale. This encompasses shared values, beliefs and attitudes about concepts that exist beyond the individual such as political, economic, cultural and legal issues. Individual attitudes are generally stable but can change gradually over time (Wang et al., 2021). In social, political and legal issues such as income equality, legalised same-sex marriage and [[euthanasia]] use there has been an increased positive attitude but decreased positivity toward immigration (Leijen & Van Herk, 2024). There is a correlation between individual attitudes reflecting the collectively held attitudes and vice versa. If the social structures within societies do not represent the collective attitude, individuals may be motivated to cause social change in acts like protesting and raising awareness for the cause. It is important to understand social attitudes as they are an indicator of attitudes, beliefs and behaviours within relative contexts. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=5}}Example: (Figure 2) I love fluffy cats much more than dogs (Affective). Every time I see a cat I go to pet and play with it (Behavioural) despite the fact that I am allergic and they can scratch me (Cognitive). {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Cognitive dissonance theory== Cognitive dissonance is a psychological state of discomfort that occurs when there is a conflict or inconsistency between two or more simultaneously held beliefs, attitudes, behaviours, actions or ideas (Festinger, 1957). Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) postulates that, {{g}} in addition to cognitive dissonance creating psychological tension, there is also an innate motivation to resolve that discomfort in some way. Festinger hypothesised that cognitive consistency was a baseline that individuals sctively strive to return to when experiencing dissonance, through either adaptive or maladaptive strategies{{rewrite}}. Cognitive dissonance theory also {{g}} considers the magnitude of the dissonance as a motivating factor because the larger the dissonance, the more urgency there is to reduce the tension (Cooper, 2019). To measure cognitive dissonance, {{g}} four distinct paradigms are identified that explain the situations and contexts where cognitive dissonance occurs. In order to resolve the dissonance, {{g}} individuals will either change their attitude about the dissonant cognition{{missing}}, add new cognitive information that increases internal consistency or reevaluate the dissonant situation's magnitude (Festinger, 1957). === Paradigm applications === Situations that cause cognitive dissonance can be categorised into the following four core paradigms that examine everyday activities such as decision making or putting in effort{{f}}. The magnitude of the cognitions within the paradigms plays a large role when evaluating importance and reduction strategy{{f}}. This accounts for situations that may fit a paradigm but if an individual doesn't find it important there may be limited dissonance or maladaptive resolutions (Cancino-Montecinos et al., 2020). For example, social attitudes on social issues online are less likely to be changed through social media due to [[Confirmation bias and conflict|confirmation bias,]] {{g}} as individuals are more likely to reinterpret or actively seek opinions consistent with their values (Wang et al., 2021). Despite this, attitude change is the most common way to adaptively resolve cognitive dissonance and directly contributes to change on a collective scale. The mechanisms behind reducing cognitive dissonance within the paradigms demonstrates how social attitudes are formed, maintained and changed in societies. ==== Free choice ==== The free choice paradigm refers to a situation in which, {{g}} after making a difficult choice between two options individuals are likely to reevaluate their chosen option more positively and devalue the rejected option (Chen & Risen, 2010a). In the classic experiment by Brem (1956) {{ic|Not in References}} participants rank a set of items and then are asked again to rank two chosen items. After the re-evaluation of the items, {{g}} the extent to which the ranks are change is referred to as the spreading of alternatives (Chen & Risen, 2010b). This paradigm uses justification techniques to resolve cognitive dissonance by changing the perceived value of the two objects. The re-evaluation and spreading of alternatives can resolve dissonance if there is post decision regret{{f}}. ==== Belief disconfirmation ==== The belief disconfirmation paradigm refers to when new information directly conflicts with an individual’s established attitudes and values{{f}}. If an individual is not perceptive to changing their established attitudes despite the obvious inconsistencies, they are experiencing a disconfirmation bias and may maladaptively react. In the political domain, participants that favoured Donald Trump reviewed news articles about alleged legal and moral wrongdoings but when tested there was an increase in hostility toward his political opponent (Harmon-Jones et al., 2020). In this paradigm, {{g}} new information causes cognitive dissonance but the magnitude was not significant enough to change attitudes or behaviours instead causing reaffirmation and continuation of attitudes. Politically, this relationship highlights how dissonance reduction processes can form and sustain social beliefs in individuals. ==== Induced compliance ==== The induced compliance paradigm occurs when an individual is forced to behave in a way that does not align with their previously established attitudes{{f}}. In Festinger and Carlsmith's (1959) fundamental experiment, {{g}} participants completed a boring activity and then were given either $1 or $20 after telling another person the task was fun. The participants who {{g}} were paid only $1 experienced more cognitive dissonance as they had to reevaluate the task as enjoyable without the external reward as a justification (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). This paradigm explores how social attitudes can be reshaped when behaviours or actions are forced on an individual. ==== Effort justification ==== The effort justification paradigm refers to when individuals exert significant effort or cost but receive disappointing results or outcomes{{f}}. In an experiment by Aronson & Mills (1959), participants undertook various levels of severity of initiation to get into a group discussion that ended up being uninteresting. Individuals who had the most severe initiation effort required experienced cognitive dissonance and had to self-justify the effort by evaluating the class more positively than the low severity participants (Aronson & Mills, 1959). This paradigm demonstrates how individuals may attach their attitudes to social groups if a significant effort was produced even without optimal outcome. == Balance theory == Balance theory, created by Fritz Heider (1946), is based on the concept that individuals innately seek balance in their social relationships and their own attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. When an imbalance occurs between either component it motivates a drive to maintain cognitive consistency and harmony by restoring the equilibrium.{{example}} Heider {{f}} utilised a triadic framework to demonstrate balance theory. The first element is relative to the individual's perspective, the second is the other individual in the relationship or social situation and finally the third element is an undefined 'object' that can be manipulated to fit context and situation, often referring to another person, object, idea, behaviour or attitude (Heider, 1946).{{example}} === POX model === To illustrate Heider's triadic relationship the POX model was developed by Cartwright and Harary (1956) for both social and broader research applications. As it was based on Heider's theory and original equation, {{g}} POX can be broken down into three elements. In POX, 'P' represents a person, referencing the focus on the self, 'O' represents the other person and 'X' represents the unspecified final element. Within the framework there are two dynamics between the relationships of the three elements. Unit relationships refer to the dynamic of similarity or dissimilarity of the elements and sentimental relationships refer to the emotion-based evaluations, usually just like or dislike as the positive and negative. In the POX model balance and imbalance is based on the accumulative positive and negative interactions between both unit and sentimental elements (Hummon & Doreian, 2003). To rebalance an imbalanced triad one of the elements must be either changed or reevaluated to create stability and remove psychological tension. If you (P) like the other person (P likes O) but they don't like a band (O dislikes X) that you do like (P likes X) there is an imbalance. To solve this, you could change your attitude about the band, change the other person's attitude about the band or change your evaluation of liking the other person. === Applications === The POX model allows for simplistic understanding of the cognitive and behavioural complexities in social environments by breaking it down into elements and dynamics. It is hypothesised that, maintenance of balanced social networks on an individual level, particularly in terms of sentiment, correlates with [[wikipedia:Group_cohesiveness|social cohesion]] and balanced interrelationships on a societal level{{g}}. (Rawlings & Friedkin, 2017). The balance theory can be utilised to motivate social change in situations like {{awkward}} when the 'X' element is regarding a social or political issue and 'P' and 'O' have opposing attitudes towards it. The mechanisms behind rebalancing interrelated triadic relationships in the POX model can be applied to many social domains as a motivator of changed social attitudes. ==== Workplace ==== To maintain social cohesion in the workplace, {{g}} where there is often power dynamics at play, it is important to not experience psychological discomfort due to imbalanced relationships (Reid et al., 2017). ==== Consumer habits ==== * Celebrity endorsements{{sp}} are effective only when the individual is a fan of the celebrity otherwise there is no sentimental relationship{{f}}. ==== Health ==== * If you smoked cigarettes but knew an admired family member didn't like you smoking, {{g}} there are two forms of pressure in the family members attitude toward smoking as well as their proximity to the individual.{{explain}} ==== Social ==== * Cultural experiences outside of an individual's social network, if positive, can improve prejudiced attitudes and beliefs{{f}}. {| class="wikitable" |+Comparison of theories (social attitudes) !Cognitive dissonance theory !Balance theory |- |Explains how individuals change their attitudes when there is psychological dissonance. |Explains how social attitudes impact social relationships. |- |Attitudes are changed by the need for cognitive consistancy |Attitudes develop based on interrelated social balance |- |Highlights individual attitudes and values |Highlights social networks and relationships |} <quiz display="simple"> {Cognitive dissonance refers to the psychological{{sp}} discomfort experienced due to holding two conflicting attitudes at the same time: |type="(-)"} + True - False {Balance theory refers to the preference of harmony and balance within relationships and attitudes: |type="(-)"} - True + False </quiz> ==Conclusion== Cognitive dissonance theory and balance theory are complementary in the mechanisms and assumptions that form, sustain and grow social attitudes. Social attitudes encompass an how an individual's attitudes, beliefs and values are built from their unique social context and personal factors. Cognitive dissonance focuses on the internal conflict and discomfort that requires resolution as a motivator for change in social attitudes. Similarly, balance theory utilises the influence of emotional connection and proximity to influence social attitudes. The broader implications extend across societies and individuals. Having personal knowledge of these theories will help in personal self-reflection. ==See also== * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2021/Cognitive dissonance and motivation|Cognitive dissonance and motivation]] (Book chapter, 2021) * [[Cognitive dissonance]] (Wikiversity) * [[wikipedia:Group_cohesiveness|Social cohesion]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Theory_of_planned_behavior|Theory of planned behaviour]] (Wikipedia) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 179–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-t Aronson, E., & Mills, J. (1959). The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group. Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology, 59(2), 177–181. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0047195 Cancino-Montecinos, S., Björklund, F., & Lindholm, T. (2020). A general model of dissonance reduction: unifying past accounts via an emotion regulation perspective. Frontiers in Psychology, 11. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.540081 Cartwright, D., & Harary, F. (1956). Structural balance: a generalization of Heider's theory. Psychological Review, 63(5), 277–293. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/h0046049 Chen, M. K., & Risen, J. L. (2010a). How choice affects and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99(4), 573–594. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020217 Chen, M. K., & Risen, J. L. (2010b). How to Study Choice-Induced Attitude Change: Strategies for Fixing the Free-Choice Paradigm. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4(12), 1151–1164. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00323.x Cooper, J. (2019). Cognitive dissonance: where we’ve been and where we’re going. International Review of Social Psychology, 32(1). https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.277 Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1998). Attitude structure and function. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., pp. 269–322). McGraw-Hill. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press. Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology, 58(2), 203–210. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0041593 Harmon-Jones, E., Harmon-Jones, C., & Denson, T. F. (2020). A novel way of responding to dissonance evoked by belief disconfirmation: making the wrongdoing of an opponent salient. Social Influence, 15(1), 34–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/15534510.2020.1781248 Heider, F. (1946). Attitudes and cognitive organization. The Journal of Psychology, 21(1), 107–112. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.1946.9917275 Hummon, N. P., & Doreian, P. (2003). Some dynamics of social balance processes: bringing Heider back into balance theory. Social Networks, 25(1), 17–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-8733(02)00019-9 Leijen, I., & Van Herk, H. (2024). Longitudinal analysis of the relation between changes in human values and social attitudes. Personality and Individual Differences, 236, 112994. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2024.112994 Rawlings, C. M., & Friedkin, N. E. (2017). The Structural Balance Theory of Sentiment Networks: Elaboration and Test. American Journal of Sociology, 123(2), 510–548. https://doi.org/10.1086/692757 Reid, C. A., Davis, J. L., Pollack, J. M., & Coughlan, R. S. (2017). Balance theory revisited: Relationship issue relevance affects Imbalance-Induced Tension in Workplace relationships. The Journal of Psychology, 151(6), 547–565. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.2017.1372342 Wang, Y., Dai, Y., Li, H., & Song, L. (2021). Social media and attitude change: Information booming promote or resist persuasion? Frontiers in Psychology, 12. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.596071 }} ==External links== * [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/oct/25/trump-sexual-misconduct-allegations-timeline Timeline of Trumps alleged sexual misconduct] (The Guardian){{g}} [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Attitude]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Cognition]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Social]] jsbe44gaujgkal1cwhoo52kezddzf3b 2842405 2842399 2026-10-24T02:32:24Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Removed most tags that were addressed 2842405 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes:<br>What is the role of cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes?}} __TOC__ ==Overview== {{RoundBoxTop|theme=2}} [[File:Carter and Ford in a debate, September 23, 1976 (cropped).jpg|right|thumb|250x250px|'''Figure 1.''' Politicians engaging in public debate.]] ;Imagine this ... Imagine that for all your life you have been loyal to a singular political party. So far, you have agreed with all their major policies and so do your family and friends. However, during this election cycle, a candidate from the opposite party makes several compelling arguments that leaves you feeling conflicted. Should you change allegiance to the other party? Talk to your friends and family who may disagree with you? Try to ignore the opposite party anyway or even reframe what they said to maintain your personal beliefs (see Figure 1). {{RoundBoxBottom}} In this scenario, internal conflict about attitudes, values, beliefs or behaviours can result in psychological stress and place strain on social interrelationships. The resolution or reduction of this psychological phenomenon is a significant driving force behind the formation and changing of individual attitudes. On a larger scale, social attitudes are also influenced by this mechanism of change, resulting in a cognitive re-evaluation of social issues, [[social norms]], [[Prejudice|prejudices]] and values. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) explains that when individuals are experiencing cognitive dissonance and then resolve it, often the outcome will be changed attitudes, beliefs or behaviours. Additionally, balance theory (Heider, 1946) examines how affiliation and sentiment in triadic social relationships can lead to reevaluated attitudes, beliefs or behaviours. The processes behind cognitive dissonance reduction and the maintenance of social balance in interrelated social connections are mechanisms for constructing and changing social attitudes. Understanding the motivations in society that underpin both individual and collective attitude change allows for critical self-reflection and deeper awareness of the surrounding social environment. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=7}} '''Focus questions''' * What are social attitudes and how are they formed? * How does cognitive dissonance explain changes in social attitudes? * How does balance theory explain the influence of relationships on social attitudes? {{RoundBoxBottom}} === Social attitudes === The ABC model (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998) describes how the entirety of an individual's attitudes is formed through affective, behavioural and cognitive components. The model describes the affective component as the emotional response such as fear, the behavioural component as actions and the cognitive component as the established beliefs and knowledge. In a social context, different collective variables such as cultures, political systems and economic status increase variety between societies. Attitudes, once formed, dictate the way individuals interact and evaluate social situations, issues, objects and people{{f}}. [[File:Young child and an old person are petting grey cute cat - 51622977008.jpg|left|thumb|'''Figure 2.''' Cat getting pet (Behaviour)]] Social attitudes refer to the function of attitudes on a collective scale. This encompasses shared values, beliefs and attitudes about concepts that exist beyond the individual such as political, economic, cultural and legal issues. Individual attitudes are generally stable but can change gradually over time (Wang et al., 2021). In social, political and legal issues such as income equality, legalised same-sex marriage and [[euthanasia]] use there has been an increased positive attitude but decreased positivity toward immigration (Leijen & Van Herk, 2024). There is a correlation between individual attitudes reflecting the collectively held attitudes and vice versa. If the social structures within societies do not represent the collective attitude, individuals may be motivated to cause social change in acts like protesting and raising awareness for the cause. It is important to understand social attitudes as they are an indicator of attitudes, beliefs and behaviours within relative contexts. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=5}}Example: (Figure 2) I love fluffy cats much more than dogs (Affective). Every time I see a cat I go to pet and play with it (Behavioural) despite the fact that I am allergic and they can scratch me (Cognitive). {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Cognitive dissonance theory== Cognitive dissonance is a psychological state of discomfort that occurs when there is a conflict or inconsistency between two or more simultaneously held beliefs, attitudes, behaviours, actions or ideas (Festinger, 1957). Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) postulates that, in addition to cognitive dissonance creating psychological tension, there is also an innate motivation to resolve that discomfort in some way. Festinger hypothesised that cognitive consistency was a baseline that individuals actively strive to return to when experiencing dissonance, through either adaptive or maladaptive strategies{{rewrite}}. Cognitive dissonance theory also considers the magnitude of the dissonance as a motivating factor because the larger the dissonance, the more urgency there is to reduce the tension (Cooper, 2019). To measure cognitive dissonance, four distinct paradigms are identified that explain the situations and contexts where cognitive dissonance occurs. In order to resolve the dissonance, individuals will either change their attitude about the dissonant cognition add new cognitive information that increases internal consistency or reevaluate the dissonant situation's magnitude (Festinger, 1957). === Paradigm applications === Situations that cause cognitive dissonance can be categorised into the following four core paradigms that examine everyday activities such as decision making or putting in effort{{f}}. The magnitude of the cognitions within the paradigms plays a large role when evaluating importance and reduction strategy{{f}}. This accounts for situations that may fit a paradigm but if an individual doesn't find it important there may be limited dissonance or maladaptive resolutions (Cancino-Montecinos et al., 2020). For example, social attitudes on social issues online are less likely to be changed through social media due to [[Confirmation bias and conflict|confirmation bias,]] as individuals are more likely to reinterpret or actively seek opinions consistent with their values (Wang et al., 2021). Despite this, attitude change is the most common way to adaptively resolve cognitive dissonance and directly contributes to change on a collective scale. The mechanisms behind reducing cognitive dissonance within the paradigms demonstrates how social attitudes are formed, maintained and changed in societies. ==== Free choice ==== The free choice paradigm refers to a situation in which, after making a difficult choice between two options individuals are likely to reevaluate their chosen option more positively and devalue the rejected option (Chen & Risen, 2010a). In the classic experiment by Brem (1956) {{ic|Not in References}} participants rank a set of items and then are asked again to rank two chosen items. After the re-evaluation of the items, the extent to which the ranks are change is referred to as the spreading of alternatives (Chen & Risen, 2010b). This paradigm uses justification techniques to resolve cognitive dissonance by changing the perceived value of the two objects. The re-evaluation and spreading of alternatives can resolve dissonance if there is post decision regret{{f}}. ==== Belief disconfirmation ==== The belief disconfirmation paradigm refers to when new information directly conflicts with an individual’s established attitudes and values{{f}}. If an individual is not perceptive to changing their established attitudes despite the obvious inconsistencies, they are experiencing a disconfirmation bias and may maladaptively react. In the political domain, participants that favoured Donald Trump reviewed news articles about alleged legal and moral wrongdoings but when tested there was an increase in hostility toward his political opponent (Harmon-Jones et al., 2020). In this paradigm, new information causes cognitive dissonance but the magnitude was not significant enough to change attitudes or behaviours instead causing reaffirmation and continuation of attitudes. Politically, this relationship highlights how dissonance reduction processes can form and sustain social beliefs in individuals. ==== Induced compliance ==== The induced compliance paradigm occurs when an individual is forced to behave in a way that does not align with their previously established attitudes{{f}}. In Festinger and Carlsmith's (1959) fundamental experiment, participants completed a boring activity and then were given either $1 or $20 after telling another person the task was fun. The participants who were paid only $1 experienced more cognitive dissonance as they had to reevaluate the task as enjoyable without the external reward as a justification (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). This paradigm explores how social attitudes can be reshaped when behaviours or actions are forced on an individual. ==== Effort justification ==== The effort justification paradigm refers to when individuals exert significant effort or cost but receive disappointing results or outcomes{{f}}. In an experiment by Aronson & Mills (1959), participants undertook various levels of severity of initiation to get into a group discussion that ended up being uninteresting. Individuals who had the most severe initiation effort required experienced cognitive dissonance and had to self-justify the effort by evaluating the class more positively than the low severity participants (Aronson & Mills, 1959). This paradigm demonstrates how individuals may attach their attitudes to social groups if a significant effort was produced even without optimal outcome. == Balance theory == Balance theory, created by Fritz Heider (1946), is based on the concept that individuals innately seek balance in their social relationships and their own attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. When an imbalance occurs between either component it motivates a drive to maintain cognitive consistency and harmony by restoring the equilibrium.{{example}} Heider {{f}} utilised a triadic framework to demonstrate balance theory. The first element is relative to the individual's perspective, the second is the other individual in the relationship or social situation and finally the third element is an undefined 'object' that can be manipulated to fit context and situation, often referring to another person, object, idea, behaviour or attitude (Heider, 1946).{{example}} === POX model === To illustrate Heider's triadic relationship the POX model was developed by Cartwright and Harary (1956) for both social and broader research applications. As it was based on Heider's theory and original equation, POX can be broken down into three elements. In POX, 'P' represents a person, referencing the focus on the self, 'O' represents the other person and 'X' represents the unspecified final element. Within the framework there are two dynamics between the relationships of the three elements. Unit relationships refer to the dynamic of similarity or dissimilarity of the elements and sentimental relationships refer to the emotion-based evaluations, usually just like or dislike as the positive and negative. In the POX model balance and imbalance is based on the accumulative positive and negative interactions between both unit and sentimental elements (Hummon & Doreian, 2003). To rebalance an imbalanced triad one of the elements must be either changed or reevaluated to create stability and remove psychological tension. If you (P) like the other person (P likes O) but they don't like a band (O dislikes X) that you do like (P likes X) there is an imbalance. To solve this, you could change your attitude about the band, change the other person's attitude about the band or change your evaluation of liking the other person. === Applications === The POX model allows for simplistic understanding of the cognitive and behavioural complexities in social environments by breaking it down into elements and dynamics. It is hypothesised that, maintenance of balanced social networks on an individual level, particularly in terms of sentiment, correlates with [[wikipedia:Group_cohesiveness|social cohesion]] and balanced interrelationships on a societal level (Rawlings & Friedkin, 2017). The balance theory can be utilised to motivate social change in situations like {{awkward}} when the 'X' element is regarding a social or political issue and 'P' and 'O' have opposing attitudes towards it. The mechanisms behind rebalancing interrelated triadic relationships in the POX model can be applied to many social domains as a motivator of changed social attitudes. ==== Workplace ==== To maintain social cohesion in the workplace, where there is often power dynamics at play, it is important to not experience psychological discomfort due to imbalanced relationships (Reid et al., 2017). ==== Consumer habits ==== * Celebrity endorsements are effective only when the individual is a fan of the celebrity otherwise there is no sentimental relationship{{f}}. ==== Health ==== * If you smoked cigarettes but knew an admired family member didn't like you smoking, there are two forms of pressure in the family members attitude toward smoking as well as their proximity to the individual.{{explain}} ==== Social ==== * Cultural experiences outside of an individual's social network, if positive, can improve prejudiced attitudes and beliefs{{f}}. {| class="wikitable" |+Comparison of theories (social attitudes) !Cognitive dissonance theory !Balance theory |- |Explains how individuals change their attitudes when there is psychological dissonance. |Explains how social attitudes impact social relationships. |- |Attitudes are changed by the need for cognitive consistancy |Attitudes develop based on interrelated social balance |- |Highlights individual attitudes and values |Highlights social networks and relationships |} <quiz display="simple"> {Cognitive dissonance refers to the psychological{{sp}} discomfort experienced due to holding two conflicting attitudes at the same time: |type="(-)"} + True - False {Balance theory refers to the preference of harmony and balance within relationships and attitudes: |type="(-)"} - True + False </quiz> ==Conclusion== Cognitive dissonance theory and balance theory are complementary in the mechanisms and assumptions that form, sustain and grow social attitudes. Social attitudes encompass an how an individual's attitudes, beliefs and values are built from their unique social context and personal factors. Cognitive dissonance focuses on the internal conflict and discomfort that requires resolution as a motivator for change in social attitudes. Similarly, balance theory utilises the influence of emotional connection and proximity to influence social attitudes. The broader implications extend across societies and individuals. Having personal knowledge of these theories will help in personal self-reflection. ==See also== * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2021/Cognitive dissonance and motivation|Cognitive dissonance and motivation]] (Book chapter, 2021) * [[Cognitive dissonance]] (Wikiversity) * [[wikipedia:Group_cohesiveness|Social cohesion]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Theory_of_planned_behavior|Theory of planned behaviour]] (Wikipedia) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 179–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-t Aronson, E., & Mills, J. (1959). The effect of severity of initiation on liking for a group. Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology, 59(2), 177–181. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0047195 Cancino-Montecinos, S., Björklund, F., & Lindholm, T. (2020). A general model of dissonance reduction: unifying past accounts via an emotion regulation perspective. Frontiers in Psychology, 11. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.540081 Cartwright, D., & Harary, F. (1956). Structural balance: a generalization of Heider's theory. Psychological Review, 63(5), 277–293. https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/h0046049 Chen, M. K., & Risen, J. L. (2010a). How choice affects and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99(4), 573–594. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020217 Chen, M. K., & Risen, J. L. (2010b). How to Study Choice-Induced Attitude Change: Strategies for Fixing the Free-Choice Paradigm. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4(12), 1151–1164. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00323.x Cooper, J. (2019). Cognitive dissonance: where we’ve been and where we’re going. International Review of Social Psychology, 32(1). https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.277 Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1998). Attitude structure and function. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., pp. 269–322). McGraw-Hill. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press. Festinger, L., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology, 58(2), 203–210. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0041593 Harmon-Jones, E., Harmon-Jones, C., & Denson, T. F. (2020). A novel way of responding to dissonance evoked by belief disconfirmation: making the wrongdoing of an opponent salient. Social Influence, 15(1), 34–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/15534510.2020.1781248 Heider, F. (1946). Attitudes and cognitive organization. The Journal of Psychology, 21(1), 107–112. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.1946.9917275 Hummon, N. P., & Doreian, P. (2003). Some dynamics of social balance processes: bringing Heider back into balance theory. Social Networks, 25(1), 17–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-8733(02)00019-9 Leijen, I., & Van Herk, H. (2024). Longitudinal analysis of the relation between changes in human values and social attitudes. Personality and Individual Differences, 236, 112994. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2024.112994 Rawlings, C. M., & Friedkin, N. E. (2017). The Structural Balance Theory of Sentiment Networks: Elaboration and Test. American Journal of Sociology, 123(2), 510–548. https://doi.org/10.1086/692757 Reid, C. A., Davis, J. L., Pollack, J. M., & Coughlan, R. S. (2017). Balance theory revisited: Relationship issue relevance affects Imbalance-Induced Tension in Workplace relationships. The Journal of Psychology, 151(6), 547–565. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.2017.1372342 Wang, Y., Dai, Y., Li, H., & Song, L. (2021). Social media and attitude change: Information booming promote or resist persuasion? Frontiers in Psychology, 12. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.596071 }} ==External links== * [https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/oct/25/trump-sexual-misconduct-allegations-timeline Timeline of Trumps alleged sexual misconduct] The Guardian{{g}} [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Attitude]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Cognition]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Social]] h6pysfoqbz0hw22l4mvxffy1zhtichc 0 324861 2842331 2766152 2026-10-23T17:06:12Z ~2026-56658-20 3113184 /* System boundaries */ 2842331 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Chapter | title = Introduction to thermodynamics | number = 3 | lesson = System and surroundings | previous = What is thermodynamics? | next = Extensive and intensive properties }} == Thermodynamic system == A thermodynamic system is a entity being subject to analysis. An entity is any collection of matter within a region of space. {{Defbox | name = Thermodynamic system | value = A thermodynamic system is a defined collection of entities subject to exchange of energy or matter, that is studied macroscopically. All space outside of this defined boundary is called the surroundings. A thermodynamic system can be decomposed into several subsystems, the entire composition of which can be called the total system. | italic = yes }} There are two kinds of systems commonly used in analysis; closed systems and open systems. Very simply, closed systems are impermeable to mass transfer, while open systems are permeable to mass transfer. This definition does not restrict the flow or transfer of energy to or from these systems. Isolated systems are also useful to highlight when a system's boundary is impermeable both to mass transfer and any transfer of work or heat. [[File:Diagram Systems.svg]] == Open system == {{Defbox | name = Open system | value = An open system is a system that exchange both energy and matter through its boundary. | italic = yes }} System that comprises a fixed region in space where the system boundary is permeable to heat, work and mass transfer. [[File:First law open system.png]] == Closed system == {{Defbox | name = Closed system | value = A closed system is one that can exchange energy but not matter through its boundary. | italic = yes }} System that comprises a fixed quantity of mass where heat and work cross the system boundary, but where the boundary is impermeable to mass transfer. == Isolated system == {{Defbox | name = Isolated system | value = An isolated system is one that can neither exchange energy nor matter through its boundary. | italic = yes }}[[File:Closed system.svg|thumb|Diagram of thermodynamic closed system.]] == System boundaries == In order to better visualize and apply closed and open systems, it is necessary to conceptualize the different way in which boundaries could be applied to analyze the same system. Imagine a piston containing a compressible gas that is slowly being compressed. If time could be stopped, a boundary can be drawn inside the piston at a given point in time that describes the exact volume and mass of the gas. This boundary would contain every single gas particle, but perfectly exclude everything outside those particles. Now if time were allowed to continue, and the piston continued to compress, the volume inside the piston would decrease by some elementary amount, and assuming the piston is perfectly sealed, the mass of the gas contained inside the piston would remain constant. ''To-do: add GIF or diagram or series of pictures describing the paragraph above.''{{BookCat}} isl92yyhj0h3krg4ymc7jd6dkhtr8he 4 327642 2842316 2792017 2026-10-23T15:09:38Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Bartending Course on Wikiversity */ archive from [[Wikiversity:Colloquium]] ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842316 wikitext text/x-wiki {{archive|Colloquium}} == Bartending Course on Wikiversity == I recently finished the course on [[Bartending]], and while I have experience editing on Wikipedia, this is my first Wikiversity project. If any of you have the time or interest, I could use an experienced eye to see if there's anything obviously missing from the course in terms of Wikiversity administration. I'm not sure what's active, if the course should belong in an existing school, or if there's any obvious discoverability tool I haven't implemented. Any tips are welcomed, or just a thumbs up saying it looks fine would be great. [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] recommended I post this here in case someone wanted to include the new course under News on the [[Wikiversity:Main Page|Main Page]]. Thanks! [[User:Sabbier|Sabbier]] ([[User talk:Sabbier|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Sabbier|contribs]]) 01:24, 1 September 2026 (UTC) :Wow! Fantastic work- I'm so impressed! Your work gives me inspiration on how to better organize the courses I'm working on. :) [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 21:32, 3 September 2026 (UTC) : Awesome work. I've added this course to the [[Main Page/News|main page news]]. : We could also consider for [[Wikiversity:Featured]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:43, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::The course [[Creating Wikiversity Courses]] is intended to provide guidance to new Wikiversity editors. I hope it is helpful and I welcome improvement suggestions. Thanks. [[User:Lbeaumont|Lbeaumont]] ([[User talk:Lbeaumont|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Lbeaumont|contribs]]) 14:08, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :Just checked it out; Very impressive! [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:48, 12 October 2026 (UTC) mrax0gw7rnsi9a9lyas8qlgurnkbrfx 2842318 2842316 2026-10-23T15:09:53Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Writing news here */ archive from [[Wikiversity:Colloquium]] ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842318 wikitext text/x-wiki {{archive|Colloquium}} == Bartending Course on Wikiversity == I recently finished the course on [[Bartending]], and while I have experience editing on Wikipedia, this is my first Wikiversity project. If any of you have the time or interest, I could use an experienced eye to see if there's anything obviously missing from the course in terms of Wikiversity administration. I'm not sure what's active, if the course should belong in an existing school, or if there's any obvious discoverability tool I haven't implemented. Any tips are welcomed, or just a thumbs up saying it looks fine would be great. [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] recommended I post this here in case someone wanted to include the new course under News on the [[Wikiversity:Main Page|Main Page]]. Thanks! [[User:Sabbier|Sabbier]] ([[User talk:Sabbier|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Sabbier|contribs]]) 01:24, 1 September 2026 (UTC) :Wow! Fantastic work- I'm so impressed! Your work gives me inspiration on how to better organize the courses I'm working on. :) [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 21:32, 3 September 2026 (UTC) : Awesome work. I've added this course to the [[Main Page/News|main page news]]. : We could also consider for [[Wikiversity:Featured]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:43, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::The course [[Creating Wikiversity Courses]] is intended to provide guidance to new Wikiversity editors. I hope it is helpful and I welcome improvement suggestions. Thanks. [[User:Lbeaumont|Lbeaumont]] ([[User talk:Lbeaumont|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Lbeaumont|contribs]]) 14:08, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :Just checked it out; Very impressive! [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:48, 12 October 2026 (UTC) == Writing news here == I'm bringing up this discussion again because I think it is beneficial to the project since Wikinews is gone, thank you. [[User:BigKrow|BigKrow]] ([[User talk:BigKrow|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BigKrow|contribs]]) 03:17, 1 September 2026 (UTC) : Given that the community consensus here was not to replicate WikiNews within Wikiversity, I suggest thinking differently e.g., in terms of specific news-related projects you are interested in that have educational objectives that satisfy Wikiversity's mission. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:46, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::I wonder if you mean <u>Wikiversity:Main Page/News ?</u> ::If so I have just checked this page and I see it only contains news for 2026 and part of 2025, even though the history indicates it was created in the 2000-decade. If you go back and check all revisions there is a wealth of (historical?) information. [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 16:28, 13 September 2026 (UTC) ::: I didn't mean that page, but yes, its history could be reconstructed into a more accessible format. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:37, 13 September 2026 (UTC) ii4mc1khtxjwjcpuzx6jflj68c46pr1 2842320 2842318 2026-10-23T15:10:06Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group */ archive from [[Wikiversity:Colloquium]] ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842320 wikitext text/x-wiki {{archive|Colloquium}} == Bartending Course on Wikiversity == I recently finished the course on [[Bartending]], and while I have experience editing on Wikipedia, this is my first Wikiversity project. If any of you have the time or interest, I could use an experienced eye to see if there's anything obviously missing from the course in terms of Wikiversity administration. I'm not sure what's active, if the course should belong in an existing school, or if there's any obvious discoverability tool I haven't implemented. Any tips are welcomed, or just a thumbs up saying it looks fine would be great. [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] recommended I post this here in case someone wanted to include the new course under News on the [[Wikiversity:Main Page|Main Page]]. Thanks! [[User:Sabbier|Sabbier]] ([[User talk:Sabbier|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Sabbier|contribs]]) 01:24, 1 September 2026 (UTC) :Wow! Fantastic work- I'm so impressed! Your work gives me inspiration on how to better organize the courses I'm working on. :) [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 21:32, 3 September 2026 (UTC) : Awesome work. I've added this course to the [[Main Page/News|main page news]]. : We could also consider for [[Wikiversity:Featured]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:43, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::The course [[Creating Wikiversity Courses]] is intended to provide guidance to new Wikiversity editors. I hope it is helpful and I welcome improvement suggestions. Thanks. [[User:Lbeaumont|Lbeaumont]] ([[User talk:Lbeaumont|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Lbeaumont|contribs]]) 14:08, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :Just checked it out; Very impressive! [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:48, 12 October 2026 (UTC) == Writing news here == I'm bringing up this discussion again because I think it is beneficial to the project since Wikinews is gone, thank you. [[User:BigKrow|BigKrow]] ([[User talk:BigKrow|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BigKrow|contribs]]) 03:17, 1 September 2026 (UTC) : Given that the community consensus here was not to replicate WikiNews within Wikiversity, I suggest thinking differently e.g., in terms of specific news-related projects you are interested in that have educational objectives that satisfy Wikiversity's mission. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:46, 5 September 2026 (UTC) ::I wonder if you mean <u>Wikiversity:Main Page/News ?</u> ::If so I have just checked this page and I see it only contains news for 2026 and part of 2025, even though the history indicates it was created in the 2000-decade. If you go back and check all revisions there is a wealth of (historical?) information. [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 16:28, 13 September 2026 (UTC) ::: I didn't mean that page, but yes, its history could be reconstructed into a more accessible format. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:37, 13 September 2026 (UTC) == [[Wikiversity talk:Interface administrators#My thoughts about this user group]] == {{Archive top}} Per [[User:Codename_Noreste]] withdrawing this proposal I am archiving it. I will reopen a new discussion on the particulars of IA policy in a new thread. We will continue discussion of the topic there. I'm optimistic that we can agree on some some minor changes to IA policy. It might take a bit more discussion to agree on major changes. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 03:56, 23 October 2026 (UTC) As I suggested, I would like to propose allowing permanent interface administrators on English Wikiversity. My temporary interface admin rights are about to expire soon, and I will soon create a new CfIA page (and its header). We should also have a minimum of two interface administrators. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:44, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :I am also in favor of this and we did discuss it pretty recently and came to a consensus on extending IA rights and lowering the administrative overhead, but not allowing indefinite at this juncture. From my perspective, since we discussed this so recently and nothing seems to have changed much, I personally would recommend holding off for a couple of years or until/unless there is some critical new information. Again, I would continue to support indef IA rights were it to come up again and think that at least two is also a sensible proposal. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:32, 6 September 2026 (UTC) ::Responding to myself so that I don't derail: I would be interested/willing to be an indef IA. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 17:36, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : I made [[Wikiversity:Candidates for Interface Adminship]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:24, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: CC to @[[User:Koavf|Koavf]]. I made a request since my IA rights are about to expire. We should also hold a separate vote to allow permanent IAs here (for this policy). [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 16:55, 7 September 2026 (UTC) : @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]], I count at least three in favor (votes below, and Koavf agreeing), so can you close this request? Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:22, 24 September 2026 (UTC) :: Second ping to @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 02:24, 7 October 2026 (UTC) :Temporary rights can be extended for a year. I'd like a little more time to consider permanent rights and justin's sensible suggestion of a minimum of two. Let's not rush into this. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:38, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::Sorry, my mistake, policy is 120 days. Interface allows 1 year or indef. I don't see any reason why a nom couldn't request extending rights for another 120 days while we clarify indef and other wording of policy. I'll look closer tomorrow. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 05:00, 7 October 2026 (UTC) : Personally, I'm not convinced of the need for permanent interface administrators. This isn't necessarily a strong view. But it seems that Wikiversity's interface administration needs can largely currently be met by permitting temporary periods for individual users. : If there are users who make productive use of several temporary periods, then that could strengthen a case for allowing longer periods or permanent use. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 10:15, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :I am also not (yet) convinced of the need for permanent, but could be persuaded. My main concern is that we are simultaneously voting on changing the policy while also voting for a nom to hold the right based on a policy that doesn't yet exist. The current [[WV:IA|policy]] states "For now, Wikiversity does not have a need for permanent or long term interface administrators. Accordingly, interface administratorship '''may only be granted temporarily'''..." This should have been addressed before the community even started a discussion on a permanent nomination. I'd be inclined to change temporary from "between 14 and 120 days" to "between 1 week and 1 year" just to align with the pull down menu options in [[Special:UserRights|UserRights]]. I'm in favor of the suggestion that there be a minimum of two with permanent, should we adopt that. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Okay, so considering the opinions of the bureaucrats above, I would sincerely like to withdraw this proposal. Thank you. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 14:14, 22 October 2026 (UTC) === Votes === * For the record, I am creating a separate subsection for voting, whether or not we should allow permanent interface administrators. {{support}} accordingly. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:32, 15 September 2026 (UTC) *: To the above, I support for indefinite interface adminship rights. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:47, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * {{support}} [[User:PieWriter|PieWriter]] ([[User talk:PieWriter|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/PieWriter|contribs]]) 00:51, 18 September 2026 (UTC) *{{support}} ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 02:22, 7 October 2026 (UTC) * Temporary {{oppose}} until there has been further discussion. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 19:31, 13 October 2026 (UTC) {{Archive bottom}} elf6pcw6o2dx5fdnzqc6vk793fpsfke 0 328510 2842332 2799095 2026-10-23T17:12:01Z ~2026-56658-20 3113184 2842332 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Chapter|title=Thermodynamics|number=11|lesson=Applications of the third law|previous=The Third law of thermodynamics|next=Heat}}At the limit of absolute, which is a temperature that cannot be physically reached, the equilibrium of a system tends towards a constant, that is independent of the other intensive properties. The constant that is approached is taken to be zero (third law). Therefore, this constant reference of 0 at 0 degrees Kelvin, gives meaning to the specific values of entropy, and not "up to an additive constant" as seen with the change in entropy given by <math>\Delta S</math> in the formula described in the second law. This principle is irreducibly linked to the quantum indistinguishability of identical particles. No body can reach a temperature below absolute zero<ref>However, since temperature is the intensive variable associated with entropy S, in statistical thermodynamics, in particular cases, we can have negative temperatures but in this case it has nothing to do with the thermal notion of hot and cold; the temperature T is then only the intensive parameter associated with S such that T = (δU / δS)V,N .</ref>. This statement can be compared to saying, "a bottle cannot be less than empty." If that statement were not true, that would imply a body can have a negative mass or negative volume. == References == {{BookCat}} oaisnc31983cq2op1dgdqnzpi2k7uf1 0 329638 2842330 2836941 2026-10-23T16:52:32Z DavidMCEddy 218607 /* 2. Training in nonviolent noncooperation for anyone willing to listen */ cite chenoweth and stephan + iron law of oligarchy 2842330 wikitext text/x-wiki [[File:Nukes or nonviolence.png|thumb|Nuclear war or nonviolent noncooperation?]] :''Humanity is one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation. ... This is madness. We must reverse course.'' : -- [[w:António Guterres|UN Secretary General António Guterres]] (2022)<ref>Jacobsen (2024), BBC (2022).</ref> :This book is a combination instruction manual on [[w:Media literacy|media literacy]] and an invitation to you to support collaborative / crowd-sourced research on how to improve the world's understanding of media literacy and how to accelerate its understanding and use globally for the betterment of humanity. Part I of this book on ''[[Media Literacy and You]]'' discusses "The media and political economy". Except in times of terror, massive lawlessness or war, most humans place a high priority on their financial situation, the primary focus of Part I. Part II on "The media and war" focuses on security concerns starting with this chapter on "Deterrence without threat". == Introduction == What are the most important things political and military leaders need to know about war to maximize the prospects for broadly shared peace and prosperity for the long term? Candidate questions include the following: # What's the probability of a military attack in the near future? # What are the military capabilities of likely adversaries? # ''What drives humans off the sidelines to support one side or the other in conflict? What pushes humans to increase or decrease their level of support for one side of the other in conflict? What pushes humans to desert or defect?'' Many would likely agree on the importance of the first two questions. However, very little research seems to have been done on the third question. It is mentioned obliquely by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) in noting that it tends to be easier to attract more participants to support nonviolent events than to violence.<ref>See also the discussion in the Wikiversity article on "[[Effective defense]]".</ref> Also Samuelson (2025) notes that it's extremely difficult to defeat an insurgency without "providing a path toward peaceful addressing of grievances fuels the insurgency", as discussed in a bit more detail below. The present author has not yet done a literature search for work discussing "motiv" citing the [[w:Armed Conflict Location and Event Data|Armed Conflict Location and Event Data]] (ACLED); a search in that Wikipedia article on 2026-09-24 found no matches. === Selection of political and military leaders === It should seem clear that most political leaders are selected on their ability to please the people who control most of the to money for the media. One exception was [[w:Franklin D. Roosevelt|Franklin Roosevelt]], who got substantial support to tax the wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since at a time when the standard conservative mantra that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, as discussed in the chapter in this book on "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]". However, it seems that many, if not all, major media organizations seem more interested in promoting "entrepreneurs of hate"<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 60); Reicher et al. (2005).</ref> than in promoting broadly shared peace and prosperity for the long term, as long as such political entrepreneurs do not offend people who control much of the money for the media And military leaders in combat are often promoted on their ability to win battles. Lawrence (2015) noted that his Dupuy Institute<ref><!-- Dupuy Institute-->{{cite Q|Q135969462}}</ref> had done several projects for [[w:United States Department of Defense|US Department of Defense]] creating databases of insurgencies and building statistical models. They proposed studying "how does one terminate or end these wars, ... but no one expressed a strong interest in examining war termination."<ref>Lawrence (2015, p. 404).</ref> In brief, apparently, * ''Few political and military leaders are selected for their ability to promote broadly shared peace and prosperity for the long term.'' * ''This raises questions about their commitment to the well-being of the bottom 99 percent.'' == Every individual and group has a right and an obligation to defend itself == Every individual and group has a right and an obligation to defend itself. Unfortunately, when most humans<ref>We distinguish here between "humans" and "people" or "persons", because under current US law, corporations are "people" and money is speech, per the US Supreme Court decision in ''[[w:Citizens United v. FEC|Citizens United v. FEC]]'' (2010) and many other judicial rulings and US law such as the [[w:Patriot Act|Patriot Act]] of 2001.</ref> think of defense, they often think of violent responses to provocations. However, there is a growing body of research documenting :(a) how most uses of violence are counterproductive, and :(b) there are usually nonviolent options to violence that would more effectively promote broadly shared peace and prosperity for the long term. This research is rarely discussed by major media outlets, because it would offend the "people"<ref>We put "people" in quotes in this essay, because that term includes corporations under current US law.</ref> who control most of the money for the media: Nonviolence threatens their ability to get compliance from security forces. As a result, many elites prefer to use force to the detriment of the bottom 99 percent of humanity. As discussed below, a military posture that supports projecting force beyond one’s own borders may be as likely to ''provoke'' as ''prevent'' an attack.<ref>For example, Lebow (2025) cites some of his previous work with others to support the claim that large militaries have been "more provocative than preventative in" their effects. And Lebow (2024) insists that, "Policymakers respond more instinctively than analytically in deciding that some policy is or is not in the national interest." See also Lebow et al. (2023).</ref> This chapter outlines a 3-part strategy that research suggests would more likely lead to better outcomes for the vast majority of humans: # Citizen-directed subsidies for local news nonprofits with firewall(s) to prevent political interference in the content. # Training in nonviolent noncooperation for anyone willing to listen. # Forbid uses of force beyond one’s own borders and covert interference in foreign countries. We now discuss each of these briefly. == 1. Citizen-directed subsidies for local news nonprofits with firewall(s) to prevent political interference in the content. == It seems that :''Primary drivers of every major conflict include differences between the media that the different parties find crecible.'' In a recent interview with [[w:Fordham University|Fordham University]] Professor Emerita of Communications Robin Andersen,<ref name=Andersen><!--Robin Andersen-->{{cite Q|Q132982358}}</ref> she agreed with this claim and added: :''We only have enemies of our very own making.'' The media are involved in this, because: :''The major media create the stage upon which politicians read their lines.''<ref>In 1791 James Madison, who represented part of Virginia in the US House of Representatives 1789-1801 and later became the 4th President of the US (1809-1819), said, "Public opinion sets bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign in every free one." Quoted from the ''[[w:National Gazette|National Gazette]]'' (published 1791-1793) by Schmeller (2009, p. 36) and Sauer (2016, p. 5). Sauer described how the American Revolutionaries, especially the first four US presidents, planted stories in newspapers to build support for how they dealt with the [[w:Barbary corsairs|Barbary pirates]], who were seizing merchant ships, raiding European coastal towns and villages, and selling European captives into slavery. The first two US presidents, [[w:George Washington|Washington]] and [[w:John Adams|Adams]], used that support for protecting US shipping and citizens by paying tribute to government leaders in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. The next two presidents, [[w:Thomas Jefferson|Jefferson]] and [[w:James Madison|Madison]], convinced Congress to fund a navy and marines to fight the [[w:Barbary Wars|Barbary Wars]]. This included the [[w:Battle of Derna (1805)|Battle of Derna]] (April-May 1805), memorialized in the [[w:Marines' Hymn|Marines' Hymn]], which mentions actions "to the shores of Tripoli". Sauer described how the policies were sold to the public via planted stories in the different partisan newspapers.</ref> This works because (a) virtually everyone thinks they know more than they do ([[w:Overconfidence effect|overconfidence effect]]), and (b) virtually everyone prefers information and sources consistent with preconceptions ([[w:confirmation bias|confirmation bias]]). Also, in many, perhaps all, countries, the primary constituency for foreign and military policy is the people with foreign business interests. Many of these people also control substantial portions of the money for the media, which have too often encourage questionable and counterproductive uses of military force.<ref>If we [[w:follow the money|follow the money]], we might find that "watchdogs generally protect the people who feed them", as discussed in the 2025-09-25 interview with British journalist and media reform activist Dan Hind discussing how the British [[Media Reform Coalition challenges anti-democratic media bias in the UK]].</ref> === Examples === A leader in documenting the role of the media in armed conflict is Robin Andersen,<ref>e.g., Andersen (2006, 2026).</ref> but she is not alone. For example, [[w:University of Denver|University of Denver]] journalism professor Kareem El Damanhoury<ref name=Daman><!--Kareem El Damanhoury-->{{cite Q|Q113752441}}</ref> has compared how [[w:Gaza Strip|Gaza]] has been framed differently by [[w:Al Jazeera Media Network|Al Jazeera]], the [[w:BBC|BBC]]<ref>El Damanhoury et al. (2025).</ref> and [[w:Fox News|Fox]].<ref>El Damanhoury and Saleh (2024).</ref><ref>Some of El Damanhoury's work in this regard [[Differences between media outlets including coverage of Gaza|is reviewed in a 2025-11-20 interview with him]].</ref> ==== World War I ==== Andersen's (2006) ''A Century of Media, A Century of War'' begins with a discussion of "The birth of war propaganda" in "The Great War and the Fight between Good and Evil".<ref>Andersen (2006, ch. 1)</ref> A more detailed but compatible discussion of the media and [[w:World War I|World War I]] is given by [[w:John Maxwell Hamilton|John Maxwell Hamilton]]. Among other things, he said: {{quote| The first iron law of propaganda is that only the enemy does it.<ref>Hamilton (2020, p. 642). See also the [[John Maxwell Hamilton on American propaganda|2025-12-11 interview with Hamilton]].</ref>}} [[File:MB Walker - German bayoneting children - Life - July 25, 1915.png|thumb|left|Figure 1. Stories of German soldiers impaling children on their bayonets were widely reported during the war. However, no credible evidence was found to support these claims when questions were raised after the war.<ref>{{cite web|title=Alleged German atrocities: Bryce report|url=http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/spotlights/p_alleged_german.htm|publisher=The National Archives|access-date=13 July 2014}}</ref>]] Andersen (2006, pp. 8-9) said, {{quote| James Bryce, the former British ambassador to the United States, ... helped prepare a sixty-one page ''Report on the Committee on alleged German Outrages'', which was translated into thirty languages and was said to be based on twelve hundred depositions ... included gruesome and titillating details of how German soldiers publicly raped Belgian girls in the marketplace at Liege and bayonetted a two-year-old child. ... [A]fter the war a Belgian commission of inquiry found no evidence for any major accusation in the report. ...}} {{quote| German propagandists, on the other hand, ... "bungled, because they were naïve: they thought the success of the war depended almost solely on military strategy and therefore they tended to neglect propaganda." ... Thus, when German soldiers shot some Allied nurses who had carried weapons, they admitted it openly. The Allies reported the incident as an atrocity and featured it in press propaganda. When French troops shot German nurses under similar circumstances, the Germans failed to exploit it.}} ==== Jonathan Swift 1710 ==== This is not limited to World War I. In 1710, [[w:Jonathan Swift|Jonathan Swift]] reportedly said, "Falsehood flies, and truth comes limping after ... like a physician, who hath found out an infallible medicine, after the patient is dead."<ref name=Swift>Excerpted from a line in [[Wikiquote:Jonathan Swift]] consulted 2026-04-13.</ref> ==== The Marines' Hymn ==== The [[w:Marines' Hymn|Marine Corps Hymn]] begins, {{quote| From the Halls of Montezuma To the shores of Tripoli; We fight our country's battles In the air, on land, and sea.}} The "[[w:Battle of Chapultepec|Halls of Montezuma]]" refer to the [[w:Mexican–American War|Mexican–American War]], which was fought to expand slavery first into [[w:Texas|Texas]] -- and supporters of slavery hoped that would help expand slavery further west. The "[[w:Battle of Derna (1805)|shores of Tripoli]]" were part of the [[w:Barbary Wars|Barbary Wars]], which were fought to reduce the need to pay (a) tribute to the [[w:Barbary Coast|Barbary or Berber]] states of [[w:Morocco|Morocco]], [[w:Algeria|Algeria]], [[w:Tunisia|Tunisia]], and [[w:Libya|Libya]] or (b) ransom to [[w:Barbary corsairs|Barbary pirates]], who were otherwise capturing Christians and selling them into slavery. Did the bottom 99 percent of the US population of that time benefit? Or did these wars (and any tribute and ransom paid by the US government before the Barbary wars) constitute a hidden transfer of wealth from the poor to the wealthy? A partial answer to this question is that [[w:tariff|tariff]]s on imported goods covered between 80 and 95 percent of all federal revenue up to 1860, and [[w:excise|excise taxes]] on only a few goods, such as whiskey, rum, tobacco, snuff and refined sugar, made up nearly all the rest.<ref>See the section on "[[w:Excise tax in the United States#Historical background|Historical background]]" in the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Excise tax in the United States|Excise tax in the United States]]", accessed 2026-05-26.</ref> The money raised from taxes on income during the Civil War, visible in Figure 3 above, were apparently negligible as a portion of federal revenue during the Barbary Wars and the Mexican-American War. ==== Gulf of Tonkin Resolution: "Betray the nation or do not get elected." ==== Regarding the [[w:Vietnam War|Vietnam War]], former president [[w:Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] wrote in his autobiography, which appeared in 1963 (he left the presidency 1961-01-20), that he had never communicated {{quote| with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs [including Vietnam] who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting [leading to the defeat of the French in 1954], possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist [[w:Ho Chi Minh|Ho Chi Minh]].<ref>Eisenhower (1963, p. 372).</ref>}} [[w:Joseph McCarthy|Joseph McCarthy]], who had been elected to the US Senate in 1946 and "experienced a meteoric rise in national profile beginning on February 9, 1950, when he gave a" speech during which he said something like, "The [[w:United States Secretary of State|State Department]] is infested with communists. I have here in my hand a list of 205—a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department." McCarthy's mostly baseless claims went largely unchallenged in the media, including accusing the Democrats of "twenty years of treason" for having been allied with the Soviet Union, which took the bulk of casualties during World War II. By the end of 1953 with (Republican) Eisenhower as president roughly 11 months, McCarthy was complaining about "''21'' years of treason", complaining that Eisenhower was not sufficiently aggressive in rooting out the communists who McCarthy claimed were in the government.<ref>Fried (1997, p. 179).</ref> Then the French were defeated by Vietnamese communists 1954-05-07 in the [[w:Battle of Dien Bien Phu|Battle of Dien Bien Phu]]. The [[w:1954 Geneva Conference|1954 Geneva Conference]], which had begun eleven days earlier, 1954-04-26, concluded 1954-07-21 with the "Geneva Accords of 1954".<ref>The [[w:Battle of Dien Bien Phu|Battle of Dien Bien Phu]], 1954-05-07, effectively ended the [[w:First Indochina War|French Indochina War]]. This led to the [[w:1954 Geneva Conference|Geneva accords of 1954]], officially dated 1954-07-20 but actually signed the following morning. Those accords took effect on three different dates, July 27 and August 1 and 11 in three different sectors of Vietnam. See <!--Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam-->{{cite Q|Q139676410}}</ref> Those accords called for UN-supervised elections for July of 1956, when Eisenhower would presumably be campaigning for reelection. Eisenhower doubtless knew that he might lose his bid for re-election in 1956, if the Communist Ho Chi Minh won elections in July of that year. :''The consistent suppression of honest portrayal in the major media of that day of the perspective of anyone whom Eisenhower considered "knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs" gave him -- and his successors [[w:John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]], [[w:Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson]], and [[w:Richard Nixon|Nixon]] -- the choice between betraying the nation or not getting elected.'' In this environment, the [[w:Operation 34A|US initiated a series of clandestine operations against North Vietnam]] including infiltrating CIA-recruited spies and supporting attacks against North Vietnam by South Vietnamese commandos.<ref>Paterson (2008).</ref> This included a raid 1964-07-30 by South Vietnamese commandos on the island of Hòn Mê, roughly 300 km (180 miles) north of the [[w:Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone|Vietnamese Demilitarized Zone]] in the [[w:Gulf of Tonkin|Gulf of Tonkin]], covered by [[w:DESOTO patrol|US naval vessels]] patrolling in that area. Then during a dark and stormy night six days later, US naval vessels opened fire on radar snow, and President Johnson requested and received Congressional approval of the [[w:Gulf of Tonkin Resolution|Gulf of Tonkin Resolution]]; then-[[w:United States Secretary of Defense|US Secretary of Defense]] [[w:Robert McNamara|McNamara]] claimed those attacks were "unprovoked".<ref>Karnow (1983, p. 375). See also the section on [[w:Gulf of Tonkin Resolution#Congress votes|Congress votes]]" in the Wikipedia article on [[w:Gulf of Tonkin Resolution|Gulf of Tonkin Resolution]], accessed 2026-05-14.</ref> In this media environment, only two officials in the US Congress voted against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution: [[w:Ernest Gruening|Ernest Gruening]] (D-AK) and [[w:Wayne Morse|Wayne Morse]] (D-OR). Gruening lost in his next primary campaign to [[w:Mike Gravel|Mike Gravel]], and Morse lost in his next general election campaign to [[w:Bob Packwood|Bob Packwood]]. These results support the previous claim that the major media give politicians the choice: :''Betray the nation, or do not get elected.'' That resolution became the primary authorization for the US war in Vietnam until Congress ended the funding. ==== Was the Vietnam War lost in Washington or by media biases? ==== [[w:John Mueller|John Mueller]], prolific author, Professor Emeritus of international relations at [[w:Ohio State University|Ohio State University]] and Senior Fellow at the [[w:Cato Institute|Cato Institute]], said that the most effective thing the US did to win the [[w:Cold War|Cold War]] was — :''nothing'': Between the [[w:Fall of Saigon|Fall of Saigon]] in 1975 and the inauguration of [[w:Ronald Reagan|Ronald Reagan]] as President of the US, the US "went into a sort of containment funk: it effectively adopted a policy of complacency (or perhaps of appeasement) as it watched from the sidelines as the Soviet Union … opportunistically gathered a set of Third World countries into its imperial embrace: Angola in 1976, Mozambique and Ethiopia in 1977, South Yemen and Afghanistan in 1978, Grenada and Nicaragua in 1979."<ref>Mueller (2021, p. 59).</ref> Nearly all became major economic and political drains on the Soviets with Afghanistan being the worst. And their Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe became a severe economic drain and psychic problem.<ref>Mueller and Graves (2023).</ref> President Reagan, inaugurated 1981-01-20, had a very different vision of the role of the US in foreign relations from his predecessor, [[w:Jimmy Carter|Jimmy Carter]]. In 1983-06-21 Reagan insisted, "We cannot permit the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan axis to take over Central America", because the consequences would include "a tidal wave of refugees ... 'feet people' ... swarming into our country."<ref>Clines (1983).</ref> Other sources<ref>e.g., Andersen (2006, Part II).</ref> insist the opposite, that the vast majority of deaths in Central America during the Reagan years were poor humans petitioning nonviolently for a redress of grievances, suppressed by terrorist / death squads supported by the Reagan administration largely in violation of laws passed by Congress and signed by President Reagan. On 1986-10-05 [[w:Corporate Air Services HPF821|a Nicaraguan soldier with a surface to air missile shot down a C-123]] cargo aircraft carrying supplies to the Contra roughly 35 miles (56 km) north of Costa Rica. Documents found in the wreckage and a confession by the sole survivor led to the [[w:Iran–Contra affair|Iran-Contra hearings]] the following year, during which Lt. Col. [[w:Oliver North|Oliver North]] insisted, "We didn't lose the war in Vietnam ..., we lost it in this city."<ref>Andersen (2006, p. 137). See also, Wikipedia, "[[w:Stab-in-the-back myth|Stab-in-the-back myth]]", accessed 2026-05-13.</ref> The previous section on the "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution" provides an alternative narrative of the Vietnam War: If as Eisenhower claimed, "possibly 80 per cent of the [Vietnamese] population would have voted for the Communist [[w:Ho Chi Minh|Ho Chi Minh]]" if elections had been held there, it's hard to imagine how anyone else could have won without aggressive action that actually ''improved'' the lives of Vietnamese peasants in the South. US-led efforts there were officially designed to win "[[w:Hearts and Minds (Vietnam War)|Hearts and Minds]]" but were implemented with such coercion that the result was the opposite. A cynic might say that :''It is hard to win people's hearts and minds by killing them.'' ====Richard Barlow and nuclear proliferation==== There is also documentation that the US helped Pakistan get nuclear weapons and destroyed the career of an intelligence analyst, [[w:Richard Barlow (intelligence analyst)|Richard Barlow]], for telling his managers they should not lie to Congress about it. Barlow has insisted that neither Pakistan nor North Korea would have nuclear weapons and Iran would not have a nuclear weapons program today, if the US had followed its own laws. Barlow’s claims, including his punishment by administration officials, have been reported in major media outlets<ref>e.g., Stein (2013). See also Wikipedia, "[[w:Richard Barlow (intelligence analyst)|Richard Barlow (intelligence analyst)]]", accessed 2026-05-06.</ref> but not in a way that would seriously limit the ability — and need — for administration officials to lie to Congress. If Barlow's claims are accurate, it suggests that US government officials violated US obligations under the [[w:Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons|Non-Proliferation Treaty]] (NPT).<ref>Per the [[w:Treaty Clause|Treaty Clause]] of the US Constitution, a treaty negotiated by the President and approved by the Senate has "the force of federal law."</ref> ==== Nayirah testimony and the 1990-1991 Gulf War ==== A more recent example is the 1990-10-10 testimony by [[w:Nayirah testimony|Nayirah al-Ṣabaḥ to the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus]], two months after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. She claimed to have seen Iraqi soldiers taking premature babies out of incubators in a maternity ward before looting the incubators and leaving the babies to die on the floor after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; she said she had been a volunteer nurse in the hospital at that time. The failure of journalists, including with the ''[[w:NBC Nightly News|NBC Nightly News]]'', to adequate check facts behind this and other atrocity stories helped convince the US public to support the US-led invasion of Iraq in 1990-1991. Nayirah's statements were widely publicized and cited numerous times in the United States Senate and by American president George H. W. Bush to contribute to the rationale for pursuing military action against Iraq. It was later revealed that she was the daughter of Kuwaiti ambassador to the US, [[w:Saud Nasser Al-Saud Al-Sabah|Saud Nasser Al-Saud Al-Sabah]], "Reps. [[w:Tom Lantos|Tom Lantos]] and [[w:John Porter (Illinois politician)|John Edward Porter]], who sponsored the congressional hearings, had started a group called the Congressional Human Rights Foundation that had received $50,000 from Citizens for a Free Kuwait, as well as free office space in [[w:Hill & Knowlton|Hill and Knowlton]]'s Washington headquarters",<ref>Rowse (1992).</ref> and the public relations firm Hill and Knowlton had made a video while coaching her rehearsing her perjury and used that to prepare a video press release "that eventually reached a total audience of about thirty-five million", 14 percent of the [[w:Demographic history of the United States|US population of 249 million per the census then in process]], with portions aired on the ''[[w:NBC Nightly News|NBC Nightly News]]'' the night after the testimony.<ref>Andersen (2006, pp. 170-171).</ref> ==== 1998 Embassy bombings and September 11 ==== As another example, there is substantial documentation available today that [[1998 Embassy bombings and September 11|the suicide mass murders of September 11, 2001]], likely would not have occurred if the US had treated the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as law enforcement issues. Muslim clerics all over the world initially condemned those acts. Al-Qaeda was dead. Their funding had largely dried up. And bin Laden was scheduled to be extradited the following month to Saudi Arabia to be prosecuted for treason, where he would likely have been convicted and executed. Mayer (2008, p. 114) claimed those embassy bombings were motivated as retaliation for US support for torture.<ref>For more on torture, see the the section on [[#Make media responsible for harms|Make media responsible for harms]] below.</ref> But it seemed questionable at best whether major media executives in the US would have given favorable coverage to such a diplomatic solution. Instead, the US bombed a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan and al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Then Muslim public opinion turned 180 degrees to conclude, "Bin Laden is right: The US ''is'' an evil empire." The US became bin Laden’s only indispensable ally, according to the CIA agent responsible for tracking bin Laden at that time.<ref>Scheuer (2004, p. xv).</ref> Leading Saudis started supporting al-Qaeda, including some working for the Saudi embassy and consulates in the US. Only one country seems to have been involved in the preparations for the September 11 attacks, and that was Saudi Arabia. But Saudis were friends of the Bush family, and a crisis is a terrible thing to waste.<ref>Romer (2009).</ref> :''Did the US invade Afghanistan and Iraq on grounds that senior journalists and leading media executives should have known at the time were questionable and likely fraudulent — to the detriment of nearly everyone except the "people" who control most of the money for the media?'' :In particular, was Iraqi president [[w:Saddam Hussein|Saddam Hussein]] really a bigger threat to the US after he invaded Kuwait in 1990 or after the [[w:September 11 attacks|suicide mass murders of September 11, 2001]] than he was during the 1980s, when the US supported him [[w:Iran-Iraq War|killing Iranians]] or [[w:Anfal campaign|his own native Kurds]]? On 2003-05-29 [[w:BBC|BBC]] journalist [[w:Andrew Gilligan|Andrew Gilligan]] reported that the [[w:Tony Blaire|Blair government]] had "sexed up" [[w:September Dossier|intelligence reports]] issued the previous September to justify supporting the 2003-03-20 [[w:Iraq War|US-led invasion of Iraq]], two months before Gilligan's report. This led to the [[w:Hutton Inquiry|Hutton Inquiry]], which led to the resignations of Gilligan and the BBC's chairman and the firing of the BBC's director-general. However, the British public expressed so many reservations about the Hutton Inquiry that a follow-up investigation was ordered in 2009. This became the "[[w:Iraq Inquiry|Iraq Inquiry]]", whose 2016-07-06 report essentially validated what Gilligan had said just over 13 years earlier. This provides one more example of the 1710 maxim of Jonathan Swift that, "Falsehood flies, and truth comes limping after ... like a physician, who hath found out an infallible medicine, after the patient is dead."<ref name=Swift/> ====Ukraine war==== Page 1 of the 2023-05-04 edition of ''[[w:Le Monde Diplomatique|Le Monde Diplomatique]]'' carried a headline: :One year after the invasion of Ukraine: The media, vanguard of the war party,<ref>Halimi and Rimbert (2023) in the French-language original.</ref> consistent with Andersen (2006). === Make media responsible for harms === How might the world be different if injured parties could successfully sue major media for harms that result from government policies contradicted by evidence reasonably available to the major media outlets? For example, how might the world be different if: * combat veterans or their families could successfully sue major media outlets for biased reporting that stampede the nation into ill advised and counterproductive uses of military force on grounds that leading media personalities should have known at the time were questionable and likely fraudulent? * Vietnamese or Afghanis or Iraqis or Palestinians or victims in other countries could win similar lawsuits? * immigrants could sue major media outlets for failing to publish reasonable summaries of the available research that says that immigrants on average are more entrepreneurial<ref>Aghion et al. (2022, pp. 266-270).</ref> and no more likely to engage in criminal activities than native born, benefitting both the sending and receiving countries?<ref>The Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration|Immigration]] cites research saying, "that migration can be beneficial both to the receiving and sending countries. The academic literature provides mixed findings for the relationship between immigration and crime worldwide. ... [P]ublic perception often exaggerates the connection between immigration and crime, influenced by sensationalised media coverage and political rhetoric." The Wikipedia article on [[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]] notes that in some countries immigrants are over-represented in prison populations due to violations of immigration law or anti-immigrant biases in criminal justice. The Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|Sanctuary city]]" says that, "Some studies on the relationship between sanctuary status and crime have found that sanctuary policies either have no effect on crime or that sanctuary cities have lower crime rates and stronger economies than comparable non-sanctuary cities." All references 2026-05-26.</ref> * humans tortured by the US could sue the major media for suppressing honest discussion of the research that documents that torture is more likely counterproductive? An important report of the efficacy of torture was published in 1631 by [[w:Friedrich Spee|Friedrich Spee]], a German Jesuit priest and professor. A few years earlier, the Duke of Brunswick had invited Spee and another famous Jesuit scholar to supervise a continuation of the torture of a confessed witch. The Jesuits had previously told the Duke, "The Inquisitors are doing their duty. They are arresting only people who have been implicated by the confession of other witches." The Duke then led the Jesuits to a woman being stretched on the rack and asked her, "You are a confessed witch. I suspect these two men of being warlocks. What do you say? Another turn of the rack, executioners." "No, no!" screamed the woman. "You are quite right. I have often seen .. . They can turn themselves into goats, wolves ... Several witches have had children by them. ... The children had heads like toads and legs like spiders."<ref>Pinker (2011, pp. 138-139). Mannix (1964, pp. 134-135). Mackay ( 2009, p. 320).</ref> Crudely similar comments about the counterproductive nature of torture were made by Generals [[w:Stanley McChrystal|Stanley McChrystal]] (2013) and [[w:David Petraeus|David Petraeus]],<ref>DePaulo (2008).</ref> who held command positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The major media in the US has provided ample coverage of, e.g., comments by Donald Trump supporting torture (McCarthy 2016), while largely suppressing honest discussion of the research on it. Might the world be safer and more prosperous if major media outlets and their executives and journalists could be successfully sued when their biased reporting have substantive negative consequences? Might [[w:Freedom of information|the public's right to receive diverse information]] be advanced in this way, recognizing that false information disseminated by major media outlets can lead to substantive harms, similar to "[[w:Shouting fire in a crowded theater|shouting ''fire'' in a crowded theater]]", while the same information disseminated by minor outlets would ''not'' produce such harms? Lawsuits of this nature could be facilitated by "group libel" laws. Activists were working to pass such laws in the 1940s. By 1950 those campaigns had been abandoned, according to Barbas (2023).<ref>See also Calvert et al. (2023, pp. 178ff).</ref> [[w:Yael Eisenstat|Yaël Eisenstat]] agrees that under [[w:Section 230|Section 230]] of Title 47 of the US Code, "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." However, Eisenstat insists that [[Online platforms' effects on public health, safety and democracy|"an interactive computer service" ''can'' be held liable when their algorithms have substantive negative consequences]], as in the jury verdicts against Meta in New Mexico<ref>Allyn (2026).</ref> and against Meta and Google in Los Angeles.<ref>McQue (2026).</ref> She said, "those technologies, if they are, in the end, contributing to an illegal activity or to harm, that's what we should be addressing. ... The ultimate goal is not to shut down every social media company. The ultimate goal is to figure out what a safer online experience looks like and what accountability looks like when something unsafe happens." === in sum === You, dear reader, can help overcome these problems by talking, as suggested in the exercises below and the rest of this book. If you can help others become less angry and more willing to agree to disagree agreeably with others, that should reduce the risk of war and improve the prospects for progress on other major problems facing humanity today. ==2. Training in nonviolent noncooperation for anyone willing to listen == A major driver of the current conflict between India and Pakistan is mistreatment of Muslims in India. Simulations of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan suggest that such a war would likely produce a nuclear autumn lasting years during which 40 percent of humanity would starve to death if they did not die of something else sooner. Over 90 percent of those would be in countries not involved in the nuclear exchange.<ref>Xia et al. (2022). See also Wikiversity, "[[Responding to a nuclear attack]]", accessed 2026-05-05.</ref> The recent "[[w:2025 India–Pakistan conflict|2025 India–Pakistan conflict]]" was a response by India to violence in Indian-administered [[w:Kashmir|Kashmir]] by terrorists allegedly supported by Pakistan. India would have had much more difficulty justifying violent repression of ''nonviolent'' protests, especially if a more diverse media ecology gave such protests more and more sympathetic coverage. During the [[w:Great Depression|Great Depression]], ethnic Germans in the [[w:Sudetenland|Sudetenland]] region of [[w:Czechoslovakia|Czechoslovakia]] were harder hit by increasing trade barriers than their non-German neighbors. They were therefore more open to populist and extremist movements such as fascism, communism and German irredentism.<ref>Wikipedia, "[[w:Sudetenland|Sudetenland]]", esp. the section on "[[w: Sudetenland#Within the Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938)|Within the Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938)]]", accessed 2026-05-05.</ref> If those ethnic Germans had used nonviolent noncooperation to highlight their grievances, and if Czechoslovakia at that time had had a substantially more diverse media system, it seems likely that they could have gotten reasonable redress of grievances. If so, it would have been harder for Hitler to use that as an excuse to invade Czechoslovakia, as he did in 1938.<ref>Wikipedia, "[[w:Occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938–1945)|Occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938–1945)]]", accessed 2026-05-05.</ref> In 1940, during [[w:World War II|World War II]], Germany invade Denmark, which had previously declared neutrality. The Germans allowed [[w:1943 Danish Folketing election|Danish parliamentary elections in 1943]]; the Danish Nazi party won only 2.1% of the votes.<ref>{{cite web|title=Rigsdagsvalgene i Marts og April 1943|url=http://www.dst.dk/pukora/epub/upload/20217/valg1943.pdf|date=|publisher=Danmarks Statistic|accessdate=11 February 2021}}</ref> When the Nazis ordered the Danes [[w:Rescue of the Danish Jews|to ship their Jews to the death camps, the Danes ignored those orders.]] When the Germans decided to do it themselves, a German diplomat leaked that decision, and nearly all Danish Jews escaped to neutral Sweden; 99% of Denmark's Jewish population survived the Holocaust. An ideal settlement of the current Russo-Ukraine war might include training in nonviolent noncooperation made more effective through a more diverse media culture as suggested above. A substantial portion of the Ukrainian population, especially the Ukrainian military, are reported to be vicious anti-Russian Nazis, and the Ukrainian government has outlawed many uses of non-Ukrainian languages, especially Russian.<ref>Horton (2024).</ref> A campaign of nonviolent noncooperation with a vigorous, diverse adversarial press would likely make it harder for Ukraine to continue any persecution of Russian speakers. It would also make it harder for major media in the US and Western Europe to suppress honest discussion of anti-Russian racism in Ukraine. Swanson (2022) said that the [[w:Baltic states|Baltic states]] have implemented such training in preparations for a possible Russian invasion; they might be asked to support such training in Ukraine (and elsewhere).<ref>Swanson (2022).</ref> === Database of violent and nonviolent governmental change efforts === Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) created a database of all the major violent and nonviolent governmental change efforts of the twentieth century -- over 200 violent revolutions and over 11 nonviolent campaigns. Fifty-three percent of the nonviolent campaigns were successful, but only a quarter of the violent revolutions were. More importantly, win or lose, the nonviolent campaigns on average increases the level of democracy after relative to before the end of the campaigns, while violent revolutions had no impact on average on the level of democratization. This seems to refine the "[[w:Iron law of oligarchy|Iron law of oligarchy]]", by which power within any organization too large to work as a direct democracy will be delegated to elites, who will rewrite the rules to benefit them at the expanse of everyone else.<ref>[[w:Robert Michels|Michels]] (1911).</ref> === Training in nonviolent noncooperation === Organizations offering training in [[w:Nonviolent resistance|nonviolent noncooperation]] include [[w:Nonviolence International|Nonviolence International]] and the [[w:Highlander Research and Education Center|Highlander Research and Education Center]]. === Civil resistance deters fracking === Duhamel (2013) claimed that well-advertised planning and training in nonviolent noncooperation helped deter oil companies from attempting hydraulic fracturing in [[w:Quebec|Quebec Province]] in [[w:Canada|Canada]]. Deterring a foreign invasion is different, but the same principle should apply: It's clear from many sources that elites consider nonviolence a threat; it's a felony to teach nonviolence to someone whom the US State Department claims supports a "foreign terrorist organization", discussed in the next section. === Life in prison for teaching nonviolence === Per the US Supreme Court decision in ''[[w:Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project|Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project]]'' (2010), teaching nonviolence to anyone whom the US State Department claims supports a foreign terrorist organization is "[[w:Providing material support for terrorism|providing material support for terrorism]]", which is a felony under the USA [[w:Patriot Act|Patriot Act]] of 2001. Moreover, if the State Department claims that the death of any "person" resulted from the activities of the designated foreign terrorist organization, the penalty can be life in prison, where "person" is defined in the Patriot Act as "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property".<ref>The treatment of [[w:Sami Al-Arian|Sami Al-Arian]] is worth noting in discussing the Patriot Act. Al-Arian is a Kuwaiti-born political activist of Palestinian origin, who earned a doctorate in Electrical Sciences and Systems Engineering at [[w:North Carolina State University|North Carolina State]] in 1985 and taught computer engineering at [[w:University of South Florida|University of South Florida]] (USF) beginning in 1986. He was granted permanent resident status in 1989. In 1993 he earned a Distinguished Teacher Award as a tenured associate professor at USF. He was an [[w:imam|imam]] in a local [[w:mosque|mosque]] and led in other initiatives to promote dialogue and public policy initiatives between the West and Middle East. On September 26, 2001, he appeared on ''[[w:The O'Reilly Factor|The O'Reilly Factor]]'' where he was confronted with a 1988 recording of him shouting "death to Israel". Al-Arian replied that "Death to Israel" meant "death to occupation, ... apartheid, ...oppression," whereupon O'Reilly cut him off and called for the [[w:Central Intelligence Agency|Central Intelligence Agency]] to investigate him. Al-Arian spent most of the next 14 years between that 2001 interview and 2015 in detention, much of it in solitary confinement. This period included a 2005 trial that ended with acquittal on 8 counts and a hung jury on another 9. In 2015 he was deported to Turkey. In 2017, he founded the Center for Islam and Global Affairs at [[w:Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University|Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University]] in Istanbul, Turkey, which he directs. What has been the impact of treatment of Al-Arian on the well-being of the bottom 99 percent of the US and world population?</ref> How did these provisions get written into the Patriot Act? That's a question that deserves research, perhaps by asking elected officials in the US Congress and lobbying for their repeal. A speculation consistent with the thesis of this book is that nonviolence terrifies those who control most of they money for the media, because it threatens their ability to get their security forces to follow orders. ==3. Forbid uses of force beyond one’s own borders and covert interference in foreign countries == :''[[w:Si vis pacem, para bellum|If you want peace, prepare for war.]]'' : -- ''[[w:De Re Militari|De Re Militari]]'' by [[w:Vegetius|Vegetius]] (fourth or fifth century AD) The record of history is now clear: Those who prepared for war often got war initiated when one party claimed they were being attacked or about to be attacked and believed they would fare better by attacking. Sometimes this occurred when the media environment convinced leaders that their political futures required them to clandestinely provoke foreign entities to do things that could then be denounced as unprovoked to justify military escalation, as mentioned in the previous section. Samuelson (2025) summarized quantitative analyses of 60 insurgencies since World War II, whose findings included the complete absence of success with counterinsurgencies without large force ratios (at least four, and most often more than ten, times the force of the insurgents) and without "providing a path toward peaceful addressing of grievances". He also noted that, "Brutality toward the civilian population ... tends to inflame the insurgency."<ref>Samuelson (2025) summarized Lawrence (2015).</ref> His analysis gave a pessimistic prognosis for the [[w:Gaza war|Gaza war]] that began 2023-10-07. His conclusions are consistent with the history of the current [[w:Russo-Ukrainian war|Russo-Ukrainian war]], the [[w:Vietnam War|Vietnam War]], the [[w:Graveyard of empires|First, Second, and Third Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839-1919), the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), the US-led War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)]], the 2001-2011 [[w:Iraq War|Iraq War]], and others. A key point is that invaders often to lose unless they enter with overwhelming force like Germany in the early stages of World War II: The [[w:Occupation of Czechoslovakia (1938–1945)|Czechoslovaks]], [[w:Invasion of Poland|Poles]], [[w:France during World War II|French]], and others were not prepared to fight the Germans, but the [[w:Soviet Union in World War II|Soviets]] were. [[w:Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] doubtless knew that the [[w:Switzerland during World War I and World War II|Swiss]] were prepared to fight, so he attacked other countries first. While fighting the [[w:Russo-Ukrainian war#Full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022)|Russian invasion]] that began 2022-02-24, [[w:Defense industry of Ukraine|Ukraine has developed]] military drones that are highly effective relative to the cost, as witnessed by sales of such to Gulf Arab states,<ref>Sharawi and Shapiro (2026).</ref> illustrating the point that foreign invaders often encounter vastly more resistance than they expect -- and should expect highly effective resistance if they invade a country prepared to fight on their own territory. The rest of this section discusses weaknesses with standard deterrence theory. ===Deterrence theory and nuclear Armageddon=== Standard [[w:Deterrence theory|deterrence theory]] assumes that one's opponents are rational and do not want [[w:Armageddon|Armageddon]]. The record of history summarized above raises questions about this assumption: In World War I, even the "winners" arguably lost more than they gained -- doubtless excepting a few merchants, who made fortunes from what they sold. Many of the other military decisions discussed above seem to have been driven more by the media than military necessity. Beyond that, at least some portions of the [[w:Islamic State|Islamic State]] reportedly violates this assumption, because it "not only believes in the literal meaning of the coming Armageddon – it sees itself as its chief protagonist."<ref>Misra (2015).</ref> Some [[w:Christian nationalism|Christian nationalists]] promoted to command positions by [[w:United States Secretary of Defense|US Secretary of Defense]] [[w:Pete Hegseth|Hegseth]] and President Trump also seem to believe that Armageddon might be desirable. On 2026-03-03 the [[w:Military Religious Freedom Foundation|Military Religious Freedom Foundation]] said they had received over 200 complaints from over 50 different US military installations with comments like, "President Trump has been anointed by Jesus to light the signal fire in Iran to cause Armageddon and mark his return to Earth", per an email from one [[w:Non-commissioned officer|NCO]].<ref>Nick Mordowanec (2026).</ref> With Hegseth holding monthly Christian worship services in the Pentagon during business hours,<ref>Black (2025), Mayes-Osterman (2025). See also the section on "[[w:Pete Hegseth#Pentagon Christian worship services and "biblically sanctioned war"|Pentagon Christian worship services and "biblically sanctioned war"]] in the Wikipedia article on [[w:Pete Hegseth|Pete Hegseth]], accessed 2026-05-14.</ref> this suggests that Hegseth could have appointed enough Christian nationalists to key positions to initiate nuclear attacks on Iran or Russia, claiming that President Trump had ordered such whether he had or not.<ref>The [[w:Gold Codes|Gold Codes]] carried in the "[[w:nuclear football|nuclear football]]" required by the [[w:Permissive action link|permissive action link]]s would ''not'' prevent Hegseth and a few others appointed by him from initiating nuclear Armageddon, according to Ellsberg, who had been a nuclear war planner for presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, before releasing the ''[[w:Pentagon Papers|Pentagon Papers]]''. Ellsberg (2017, p. 69) insisted that the security provided by those Gold Codes were a hoax, because otherwise a single nuclear detonation on Washington, DC, when both the president and vice president were in town "would would definitively block any authorized, coordinated nuclear response to that or any subsequent nuclear attack."</ref> The biggest risk today may be the risk of [[w:Nuclear holocaust|nuclear Armageddon]], which seems on average to grow over time consistent with experience with "[[w:system accidents|system accidents]]" in other fields: It is naive to assume that any system as complex as military command, control and communications systems never fail. And managers of complex systems subject to rare, catastrophic failures "learn" from experience that they can take ever greater risks, because they have "safely" done so in the past — until there is a catastrophe:<ref>Kahneman and Klein (2009) found that expert intuition, when it exists, is learned from frequent, rapid, high quality feedback. With anything nuclear, mishaps are so rare that managers develop "expert intuition" that they can "safely" ignore safety concerns -- until there is a catastrophe. See also Sagan (1993).</ref> Veterans for Peace (2022) recommend global reduction and rapid elimination of nuclear weapons "to reduce the real risk of nuclear confrontation through accidental launch or miscalculated escalation". ==== National security tariffs ==== Free trade agreements supported by the [[w:World Trade Organization|World Trade Organization]] allow exemptions for national security and other objectives. [[Responding to a nuclear attack|Even a minor nuclear war between India and Pakistan would have a negative impact on the entirety of humanity]]. It might therefore be sensible for parties to the [[w:Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons|Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons]] (TPNW) to institute gradually increasing tariffs on nuclear weapon states, not so great as to seriously impact the economy of the nation applying such tariffs but aggressive enough to gradually wean their economy from reliance on trade with nuclear-weapon states that refuse to support the TPNW. See also the chapter below on [[/Media Literacy and You/Responding to a nuclear attack/|Responding to a nuclear attack]]. ===Research on the effectiveness of deterrence and implications=== Lebow and others have provided substantial documentation of case studies claiming that leaders are often not rational, and deterrence based on threatening use of military force beyond one’s own borders has been ''as likely to provoke as prevent'' undesired behavior.<ref>Lebow (2025, 2024), Lebow et al. (2023).</ref> The most obvious portions of this threat can be entirely eliminated by policies clearly and effectively forbidding use of force beyond one’s own borders. This can be signaled in at least three ways: * Eliminate all weapon systems like missiles and aircraft with a range of more than, e.g., a hundred miles or 200 kilometers with the possible exception of surveillance only aircraft that cannot be easily configured to carry [[w:Materiel#Military|ordnance]], e.g., explosives. Similarly eliminate nuclear weapons, which few if any countries would want to use for military defense inside their own borders. * Supply a national guard and reserves with weapons, training, and rules of engagement that prohibit projecting force beyond one’s own borders. Train them also in development and use of improvised explosive devices and other tactics and devices like low cost military drones. :Afghanistan is said to be the "[[w:Graveyard of empires|Graveyard of empires]]". They defeated the British three times (1839–1842, 1878–1880, 1919), the Soviet Union (1979–1989), and the US (2001–2021). Each victory came with foreign supplies, but any foreign troops helping Afghanis were primarily under the command of local leaders. :The [[w:2003 invasion of Iraq|2003 invasion of Iraq]] might have produced [[w:Nation-building|nation-building]] more like the experience of [[w:Nation-building#Germany and Japan after World War II|Germany and Japan after World War II]] if the US had mandated a vigorous adversarial press instead of strict censorship, according to McChesney and Nichols.<ref>McChesney and Nichols (2010, Appendix II. Ike, MacArthur and the Forging of Free and Independent Press, pp. 241-254).</ref> This claim by McChesney and Nichols was not endorsed by [[News from Germany 1900-1945 and implications for today#After the war in Germany vs. Iraq|University of British Columbia History professor Heidi Tworek]], who said the democratization efforts in Germany and Japan after World War II were more complicated than that implied by that brief discussion by McChesney and Nichols.<ref>The 2025-07-03 interview with Tworek is available at "[[News from Germany 1900-1945 and implications for today]]", accessed 2026-05-14.</ref> However, the research by Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) and the related research on news deserts summarized in the preface to this ''[[Media Literacy and You]]'' book largely supports those claims by McChesney and Nichols. :[[w:Defense industry of Ukraine|Ukraine has become a world leader in military drones]], many of which are dramatically cheaper than alternatives. Most of those have limited range but have been useful for reconnaissance and delivery of ordnance and improving targeting of, e.g., surface to air missiles. :[[w:Eliot A. Cohen|Eliot Cohen]], who served as a special advisor to [[w:United States Secretary of State|US Secretary of State]] [[w:Condoleezza Rice|Condoleezza Rice]] from 2007 to 2009, wrote, "As the United States discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan, no matter how large, technologically advanced, and proficient an army is, motivated insurgents can still inflict casualties in the tens of thousands."<ref>Cohen (2022), cited from Horton (2024, p. 1026).</ref> Cohen recommended we "Arm the Ukranians now". Horton said that the neoconservatives learned from Iraq War II and Afghanistan that the US "should fight like those who defeated them."<ref>Horton (2024, p. 1026).</ref> :Leading economist [[w:Jeffrey Sachs|Jeffrey Sachs]] addressed the European Parliament 2025-02-19, claiming that the tragedy that befell Serbia in 1999 and subsequent US uses of force in Iraq and Syria, plus wars in Africa including Syria, Somalia and Libya and the current wars in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war, "are to a very significant extent the result of deeply misguided US policies."<ref>Sachs (2025-02).</ref> He said that Europe should craft its own foreign and military policies, independent of the US. ''[[w:Le Monde Diplomatique|Le Monde Diplomatique]]'' noted that Sachs' speech has circulated among social media since ''but has yet to be seriously discussed by major European media.''<ref>Sachs (2025-04; emphasis added).</ref> * Change the laws of government secrecy so government officials cannot secretly interfere in the internal affairs of foreign countries or otherwise project force outside their own borders. This might be achieved in the US in part by requiring anyone with information about questionable actions by government officials to provide such documentation to one or more congressional oversight bodies while also allowing any current or former government employee or contractor to file suit in any US federal jurisdiction if they feel they have been punished for refusing to support questionable activities. In addition, federal judges should be authorized to subpoena classified government documents that may be relevant to any case in their jurisdiction and declassify them subject to appellate review if they believe the national interest would be better served by declassification. :If the law is changed without a substantive [[#1. Citizen-directed subsidies for local news nonprofits with firewall(s) to prevent political interference in the content.|citizen-directed subsidies for local news nonprofits with firewall(s) to prevent political interference]], as discussed above, the change could be merely cosmetic and unconvincing to local public officials and potential adversaries. :Connelly (2023) noted that US government secrecy has in the past encouraged administration officials to do things to provoke actions by foreign entities that can then be denounced as “unprovoked” to stampede the US Congress and the public into supporting counterproductive uses of military force, as discussed above.<ref>See also Connelly et al. (2023).</ref> A more diverse media culture should make it harder for administration officials to lie to the public and to Congress — and harder to punish government employees who tell their managers that they should not lie to Congress, as they reportedly did to [[#Richard Barlow and nuclear proliferation|Richard Barlow]], mentioned above. :The Barlow case and many others explain why the US should, e.g., give federal judges the authority to subpoena classified documents and declassify them if they believe the public good is better served from declassification than continued secrecy.<ref>See, e.g., the 2025-05-08 interview with Seth Stern and Lauren Harper discussing what the "[[Freedom of the Press Foundation says...]]", Graves (2014), and [[w:Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy|Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy]], accessed 2026-05-06. Graves (2021) recommends "Congressional Gold Medals for" Barlow and whistleblowers.</ref> These policies would make it hard for any foreign leader to justify an attack for multiple reasons: First, it would be difficult to convince their supporters that such an attack is necessary. Second, a rational foreign leader might be hesitant to invade a country that is prepared to fight a guerrilla war. Germany reportedly considered invading [[w:Switzerland during World War I and World War II|Switzerland during both World Wars I and II]] and decided against it in part because Switzerland had large, well-trained ready reserves, who were ready to fight. Belgium seemed to be an easier route.<ref>Documented in Wikipedia, "[[w:Switzerland during World War I and World War II|Switzerland during World War I and World War II]]", accessed 2026-05-06. Switzerland also has many mountains, which make it easier to defend, but the capabilities of the Swiss military also influenced the German decision to avoid Switzerland.</ref> Third, even if foreign invaders defeat the guerrillas, they should not assume that their invading forces would continue to follow orders. [[w:Rescue of the Danish Jews|Ninety-nine percent of Danish Jews reportedly survived World War II]] because of Danish noncooperation ''supported by a German diplomat''.<ref>Wikipedia, "[[w:Rescue of the Danish Jews|Rescue of the Danish Jews]]", accessed 2026-05-06.</ref> With policies like these in place, it would be hard for foreign leaders to convince their supporters of a need to attack, as [[w:2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine|Putin did when invading Ukraine in 2022]],<ref>The Wikipedia article on "[[w:2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine|2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]]", accessed 2026-05-06, includes a paragraph saying, 'In July 2021, Putin published an essay "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians", in which he called Ukraine "historically Russian lands" and claimed there is "no historical basis" for the "idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russians"'. Putin was accused of promoting Russian imperialism, historical revisionism and disinformation. Writing in 2024, Michael McFaul and Robert Person described this essay as representing not only "cynical propaganda" but also Putin's "deeply held and internalized beliefs". See the Wikipedia article for references supporting those claims.</ref> as [[w:2025 India–Pakistan crisis|India did when attacking Pakistan in 2025]], and as [[w:Invasion of Poland|Hitler did when invading Poland in 1939]], to name only three examples. === If we continue to base deterrence on threats === There are now calls for Europe to get their own nuclear weapons,<ref>Burgard (2025).</ref> while Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, South Korea and Taiwan have been suggested as other candidates for acquiring nuclear weapons should they feel a sufficient need.<ref>Ruehl (2024).</ref> It is difficult to imagine how the number of nuclear weapon states could be increased without increasing the risks of a nuclear war, consistent with the discussion of "[[w:system accident|system accident]]s" earlier in this chapter. Secondarily, intelligence services with information on political corruption including attempts to intimidate and murder journalists should not be allowed to keep that information secret: They should be required to find ways to leak that information to journalists. Such attacks on journalists in their own country should be exposed and prosecuted if the evidence seems likely to obtain a conviction. Intelligence services with information about such attacks in other countries should be required to find ways to leak it to competent journalists without identifying their sources and methods: Doing so would likely reduce political corruption worldwide and with that the risks of war. == Collateral damage == The research cited above supports the claim that, :''[[w:Collateral damage|Collateral damage]] that our designated enemies commit prove to us that they are subhuman or criminally misled.'' :''Meanwhile, collateral damage that we commit is unfortunate but necessary -- from our perspective. However, it proves to our designated enemies that we are subhuman or criminally misled.'' This observation supports this entire program of deterrence without threat: * Forbidding use of force beyond one’s own borders and covert interference in foreign countries would automatically reduce collateral damage. It would also avoid uses of force that seem not to contribute to broadly shared peace and prosperity, according to research cited above. * The effectiveness of nonviolent noncooperation rests in part on its near universal avoidance of collateral damage. * Citizen-directed subsidies for local news nonprofits with firewall(s) to prevent political interference in the content should make it much harder for major media to convince the public to do things contrary to their best interests, like invading or interfering covertly in foreign countries. == Call for help == Do you, dear reader, know other serious research not cited herein that might improve this analysis? If yes, you can help improve this discussion by adding comments with citations -- or by adding such citation(s) to the "Discuss" page associated with this chapter, suggesting someone else revise the chapter appropriately. There are plenty of contrary claims in the major media, but the lead author of this chapter is not aware of any that are based on serious research. In the absence of such research, the current author finds it difficult to imagine any national defense policies that carry a greater risk of nuclear Armageddon than our current policies, as discussed in the next chapter of this book on ''[[Media Literacy and You]]'' on "[[Media Literacy and You/Responding to a nuclear attack|Responding to a nuclear attack]]". That chapter, in sum, claims that the ''worst'' response to a nuclear attack would be nuclear response, because it would escalate a catastrophe killing millions of humans to one killing ''billions'', possibly 80 percent of humanity in a war between the US and Russia that lofts so much smoke from burning cities to the stratosphere where it covers the globe depressing crop yields for years during with 99 percent of the humans in the US, Europe and Russia would starve to death if they did not die of something else sooner. Moreover, the record of "[[w:System accident|system accident]]s" suggests that the chances of such a war before the end of this century is substantially greater than the 40 percent median estimate based on history mentioned in a presentation on "[[Time to nuclear Armageddon]]" delivered to the 2019 Joint Statistical Meetings. This chapter is being written in the hopes of inspiring action to improve the prospects for broadly shared peace and prosperity for the long term. == Exercises == 1. Disconfirmation bias: Brainstorm your biggest concerns about a current or possible future war. :1.1. Select the one that is of greatest concern to you currently. ::One issue that may not be a major concern for many but might elicit a broad consensus for action would be a campaign to ask elected officials in the US Congress to explain how we benefit from the provisions of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 that authorize [[#life in prison for teaching nonviolence|life in prison for teaching nonviolence]]. :1.2. Who are your designated enemies? :1.3. Research what your designated enemies are saying about your biggest concern. :1.4. Under what circumstances would you support what you see your designated enemies advocating or doing? ::If you cannot see such circumstances, expand your research: Look for more sources that support your designated enemies. 2. Interacting: Ask others if you can share what you've learned about that conflict. If they say, "No", don't push it. If they agree, share what you've learned in a friendly supportive manner without saying that anything is "true". ::''Show me someone who knows the truth, and I will show you someone who is dangerous.'' :2.1. The primary goal in this is ''not'' to convince anyone that you are right and they are wrong but to lower the level of anger and increase the level of tolerance for dissenting views. :2.2. Another goal is to comfortably enjoy civil conversations of this nature, agreeing to disagree agreeably and building trusting relationships that support collaboration on issues of common concern. :2.3. After becoming adept at building collaborations on issues of common concern, you might consider teaching this important skill and approach to issues. 3. Teaching: Each one teach two, as discussed in the section on "[[Media Literacy and You#Text and self-help book and point of discuss|Text and self-help book and point of discuss]]" in the preface to this book. <!--== See also ==--> == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2022) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations-->{{cite Q|Q139874218}} * <!--Bobby Allyn (2026-03-25) "Jury finds Meta and Google negligent in social media harms trial-->{{cite Q|Q139572103}} * <!--BBC (2022-08-01) "Nuclear annihilation just one miscalculation away, UN chief warns"-->{{cite Q|Q139596165|author=BBC}} * <!--Elizabeth Black (2026-05-22) "Hegseth hosts first monthly Christian service in Pentagon"-->{{cite Q|Q139791642}} * <!--Hans Günter Brauch, ed, Towards Rethinking Politics, Policy and Polity in the Anthropocene: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Springer, pp. 225-234).-->{{cite Q|Q134488491|author= Hans Günter Brauch, ed.}} * <!--Jan Philipp Burgard (2025-04-08) “Opinion | Europe Needs Its Own Nukes”, Politico-->{{cite Q|Q134465922}} * <!--Clay Calvert, Dan V. Kozlowski, and Derigan Silver (2023) Mass Media Law, 22nd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q135455067}} * <!--Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict-->{{cite Q|Q88725216}} * <!--Francis X. Clines (1983-06-21) "Reagan says his opponents risk Central American influx"-->{{cite Q|Q139790146}} * <!--Eliot Cohen (2022-02-23) “Arm the Ukrainians Now”, The Atlantic-->{{cite Q|Q139679796}} * <!--Matthew Connelly (2023) The Declassification Engine: What History Reveals About America’s Top Secrets (Pantheon).->{{cite Q|Q116786691}} * <!--Matthew Connelly, Douglas A. Samuelson, and Spencer Graves (2023-03-14) “Does US government secrecy threaten national security?”, Radio Active Magazine on KKFI-->{{cite Q|Q125582094}} * <!--Lisa DePaulo (2008-10-31) "Leader of the Year: Right Man, Right Time"-->{{cite Q|Q114039844}} * <!--Philippe Duhamel (2013-09-26) Civil resistance as deterrent to fracking: Part One, They shale not pass-->{{cite Q|Q140833946}} * <!--Dwight D. 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Mannix (1964) The history of torture-->{{cite Q|Q116896896}} * <!--Jane Mayer (2008) Dark side : the inside story of how the war on terror turned into a war on American ideals (Doubleday)-->{{cite Q|Q1681286}} * <!--Cybele Mayes-Osterman (2025-12-18) Pete Hegseth pushes his Christian faith in Pentagon prayer services-->{{cite Q|Q139791710}} * <!--Tom McCarthy (2016-02-07) “Donald Trump: I’d bring back ‘a hell of a lot worse than waterboarding'”, The Guardian-->{{cite Q|Q134462630}} * <!-- McChesney and Nichols (2010) The Death and Life of American Journalism-->{{cite Q|Q104888067}} * <!--Stanley A. McChrystal (2013). My share of the task: A memoir (Penguin)-->{{cite Q|Q135406522}} * <!--Katie McQue (2026-04-24) " Meta ordered to pay $375m after being found liable in child exploitation case-->{{cite Q|Q139572337}} * <!--Amalendu Misra (2015-11-19) “What does Islamic State actually want?”, The Conversation-->{{cite Q|Q134487571}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Graz Schumpeter Lectures; Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Nick Mordowanec (2026-03-03) " Commanders Accused of Framing Iran War as Biblical Mandate, Jesus' 'Return'"-->{{cite Q|Q138840951}} * <!--John Mueller (2021) The Stupidity of War: American Foreign Policy and the Case for Complacency (Cambridge U. 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Ruehl (2025-11-01) “Which Countries Are on the Brink of Going Nuclear?”, Peninsula Peace & Justice Center-->{{cite Q|Q134465827}} * <!--Jeffrey Sachs (2025-04) “File: The trap of major rearmament: Geopolitics of peace (in French: “Dossier : Le piège du grand réarmement: Géopolitique de la paix”), Le Monde Diplomatique (https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2025/04/SACHS/68242).-->{{cite Q|Q134463099}} * <!--Jeffrey Sachs (2025-02) “Jeffrey Sachs: Speech at European Parliament on February 19, 2025”: Edited transcript and YouTube video (https://newkontinent.org/jeffrey-sachs-speech-at-european-parliament-on-february-19-2025/)-->{{cite Q|Q134463038}} * <!--Scott Sagan (1993) The limits of safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton U. Pr.)-->{{cite Q|Q136765429}} * <!--Douglas A. Samuelson (2025-09-26) " Assessing Israel’s Approach in Gaza"-->{{cite Q|Q138843324}} * <!--Amanda Sauer (2016-05-09) "Political Agenda Setting in Early America: The Barbary Wars"-->{{cite Q|Q139589295}} * <!--Michael Scheuer (2004) Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Brassey’s).-->{{cite Q|Q6006645}} * <!--Mark Schmeller (2009) "The Political Economy of Opinion: Public Credit and Concepts of Public Opinion in the Age of Federalism"-->{{cite Q|Q139589348}} * <!--Ahmad Sharawi and Dimitriy Shapiro (2026-04-01) "Ukraine Agrees to Mutually Beneficial Defense Deals With Gulf Arab States"-->{{cite Q|Q139948808}} * <!--Jeff Stein (2013-12-04) “The Perils of Whistle-Blowing”, Newsweek-->{{cite Q|Q63257553}} * <!--David Swanson (2022-03-15) " 30 Nonviolent Things Russia Could Have Done and 30 Nonviolent Things Ukraine Could Do"-->{{cite Q|Q134465808}} * <!--Veterans For Peace Nuclear Posture Review-->{{cite Q|Q111141993|author=Veterans for Peace}} * <!-- Xia et al. (2022) Global food insecurity and famine ... from a nuclear war ...-->{{cite Q| Q113732668}} [[Category:Media literacy]] [[Category:Communication]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Law]] [[Category:Psychology]] [[Category:Sociology]] [[Category:War History]] [[Category:Media Literacy and You]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Wikiversity:Category_Review --> 7gwpj0iki9vyb1wubwvn2d4yitvoq6g 0 330077 2842367 2839137 2026-10-23T23:09:57Z Jtneill 10242 Copyediting 2842367 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Lifelong learning motivation:<br>What motivates lifelong learning?}} __TOC__ == Overview == {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:Schenker VIA14 Laptop asv2021-01.jpg|thumb|350px|'''Figure 1'''. Browsing Wikimedia site on device, as reader is currently doing.]] ;Case study '''Consider yourself''', the reader of this chapter, what motivated you to navigate to this Wikiversity page? As you read this, you are reading just one article out of the '''{{NUMBEROFARTICLES}}''' articles you could have possibly accessed on Wikiversity. This doesn't yet consider the countless other tasks you may have elected to do instead of coming to, and continuing to read this page. Perhaps your internet search was motivated by needing information for a personal, academic or workplace project. Alternatively you may want to learn about what motivates lifelong learning for your own personal growth, editing another Wikiversity article or simply as a pass time. In this way, your motivation to keep reading this chapter is a product of many interconnected factors and systems. As you continue to read through this page consider why it continues to hold your engagement over all the other activities you may want to be doing. Assuming you are interest {{g}} in lifelong learning, why does the concept interest you? Is being a lifelong learning{{g}} something which is closely aligned with your values? Or is it perhaps a means to an end, where you stand to gain something from becoming a lifelong learner? {{RoundBoxBottom}} Lifelong learning is the sustained and active pursuit of knowledge and skills across the lifespan. It has been recognised as an important 21st century skill for individuals around the world, attracting great international interest, including being recognised by the [[United Nations]] and [[w:OECD|Organisation for Economic Co-operation]] and Development (Diana, et al. 2026) The motivational factors which underpin lifelong learning are varied as a product of individual cognitive differences, developmental level, socio-environmental factors, and cultural context. While this makes lifelong learning [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motivation motivation] a complex and multi-faceted area of research, this complexity has also generated a vast body of applied psychological research into how lifelong learning motivation can be improved by leveraging the numerous factors which underpin it. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} '''Focus questions''' * How is lifelong learning defined by psychological science? * What key theoretical frameoworks are used to understand lifelong learning motivation? * Which meta-cognitive skills are needed to motivate and maintain lifelong learning? * What socio-environmental factors influence lifelong learning motivation? * How does lifelong learning motivation change across the lifespan? * How do the motivations supporting lifelong learning vary across cultures? {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Lifelong learning == [[w:Lifelong_learning|Lifelong learning]] has been defined in many ways since it's {{g}} inception, both philosophically and psychologically (Regmi, 2015). Traditionally, the idea of lifelong learning stemmed largely from philosophical and economic considerations rather that psychological science (Regmi, 2015). In contemporary psychological science, a more holistic and parsimonious definition of lifelong learning is that it is simply the continuous presence of the motivation to learn throughout a persons {{g}} life (McComb, 1991). That is, the question "what motivates lifelong learning?" can be simplified to "what motivates learning?" at any given stage of the lifespan. Lifelong learning in it's {{g}} original conceptualisation was philosophical rather than psychological, which has shaped the focus of research into why motivating lifelong learning is important as well as how to best motivate lifelong learning (Regmi, 2015). Lifelong learning was first conceptualised through a [[w:Humanism|humanist]] philosophical lens, with lifelong learning seen as necessary for empowering individuals in order to achieve a more democratic and egalitarian society for the well-being of all {{f}}. However, lifelong learning had also been recognised as driver of economic growth which Regmi (2015) calls the "human-capital model", where an individuals' {{g}} education and learning is seen as an investment, {{g}} for the prosperity and economic growth of a nation. [[File:Science of Lifelong Learning Onion.png|right|thumb|450px|'''Figure 2'''. Onion diagram of the scientific underpinnings of lifelong learning]] While the psychological science of lifelong learning has been influenced by these philosophical underpinnings, it has also elaborated on the importance of lifelong learning for individuals' well-being and education. The best current understanding of lifelong learning suggests that the motivation to learn is naturally occurring and intrinsically rewarding, thus to motivate lifelong learning can also be more precisely defined as directing individuals' natural curiosity to learn toward a lifelong pursuit of knowledge (McCombs, 1991). From this perspective, understanding the motivational underpinnings of lifelong learning is important at all developmental levels. These underpinnings are broad and varied, requiring a synthesis of individual, socio-environmental and well being factors, {{g}} (see Figure 2) (Goodwill & Chen, 2021). Due to the complexity and breadth of these underpinnings, the synthesis of these factors are best understood through multiple theoretical lenses. == Theoretical perspectives == The complexity of lifelong learning has meant that no unified psychological models or grand theories of the motivational principles underpinning it have yet been formalised. Some general motivational theories can be used as a conceptual framework to understand lifelong learning, though these generalisations may lack some nuanced considerations of the unique motivational mechanisms involved in learning (Sheffler, 2022). The most well-recognised of these theories is self-determination theory, which has been extensively applied in understanding extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation in learning {{f}}. However, research interest in education and learning has also generated theories, frameworks, and models which are more narrowly focused on how and why learners are motivated across the lifespan. The most well-applied of these theories are socio-constructivism, self-regulated learning, and self-directed learning, which, when taken together, suggest that learners are active participants in learning who are both shaped by, and shape, their learning environments {{f}}. === Self-determination theory === [[File:Self-Determination model.png|thumb|350x350px|'''Figure 3'''. The three psychological needs of self-determination theory.]] The self-determination model was initially developed by Deci and Ryan (1985) as a broadly generalisable theory of motivation and behaviour. As it relates to lifelong learning, it suggests that learning can be either extrinsically or intrinsically motivated. Of these, intrinsic motivation is generally seen as a stronger motivational force, reflecting natural human curiosity and and desire to learn for the sake of learning and understanding their environment (Vidigal-Alfaya, 2025). Additionally, for a learner to be a instrinsically motivated and effective lifelong learner, key psychological needs must be met, including autonomy, relatedness and competence (see Figure 3) (Vidigal-Alfaya, 2025). If any of these psychological needs are not met, individuals will not be motivated to learn (Deci & Ryan, 1985). === Socio-constructivism === The oldest and most foundational of the theories which focus on learning specifically is [[w:Constructivism_(philosophy_of_education)|socio-constructivism]], building from the work of [[w:Jean_Piaget|Piaget]] and [[w:Lev_Vygotsky|Vygotsky]]. The theory suggests that knowledge is socially constructed, with learners as active participants in this construction (Fleming, 2011). This theory underpins much of the socio-environmental motivators in lifelong learning, relating most closely to how learners engage with different learning environments (Fleming, 2011). The theory suggests that learners are active meaning-makers within their learning environment, {{g}} who accommodate or assimilate new information into existing mental representations called schemas (Fleming, 2011). This supports learners {{g}} autonomy and relatedness by allowing them to actively engage with content in ways that are intrinsically motivating to them (Fleming, 2011). Aditionally, the social dimension of knowledge creation in this way may also act as a motivating influence (Sheffler et al., 2022; Mohammed & Kinyo, 2020). === Self-regulated learning === Self-regulated learning theory, introduced by Zimmerman (2000), is central to understanding how learning is actively initiated, monitored, and evaluated by individuals. The theory suggests a model of cyclical phases of forethought, performance, and self-reflection (Zimmerman, 2000). In the forethought phase, learners analyse a task, set relevant goals, and plan the implementation of a learning strategy, and are motivated by perceived intrinsic value of the task, self-efficacy, and expectations regarding the outcome of learning (Taranto & Buchanan, 2020). In the performance phase, as learners engage in learning tasks, they actively monitor and evaluate their performance, ensuring that they are focused on the goals and strategies they set within the forethought phase (Taranto & Buchanan, 2020). In the self-reflection phase, learners reflect on how well their strategy and performance align with the initially set learning goals, as well as on the value of achieving, or not achieving, their learning goals, which in turn guides future motivation. === Self-directed learning === Like self-regulated learning theory, self-directed learning theory focuses primarily on the individual, but differs in its scope as it also focuses on how learners can shape their learning environments through the knowledge they acquire (Cronin-Golomb & Bauer, 2023). In this way, self-directed learning theory has significant overlap with both socio-constructivist and self-regulated learning theory, loosely integrating concepts from both. The theory extends the concept that learners are active participants in learning by suggesting that, while learners engage in the meta-cognitive processes outlined in self-regulated learning theory, they also choose which knowledge they would like to specialise in and how they can shape their environment to accommodate this (Cronin-Golomb & Bauer, 2023). One motivational implication of self-directed learning theory is problem-based learning, where learners are generally motivated to learn in order to solve a particular problem that is important, and immediately relevant to them, rather than being motivated to learn about an entire subject area systematically (Wijnia et al., 2024). {{RoundBoxTop|theme=14}} <quiz display=simple> {Both self-regulated learning theory and self-determined learning theory are primarily concerned with the individual as active participants in learning |type="()"} + True - False {Self-regulated-learning theory, socio-constructivist theory and self-determined learning theory conceptualise learners as _____ in the learning process |type="()"} + active participants - inactive participants - explicitly instructed </quiz> {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Meta-cognitive skills and well-being == {{RoundBoxTop|theme=4}} [[File:Gold Star.svg|32px]] '''Critical Learning Section''' This section is focused on individual motivational factors in lifelong learning. As such, this section is of particular importance for readers who would like would like to directly improve the motivation for lifelong learning, either in themselves or others. Of all motivational principles involved in lifelong learning, meta-cognitive skills are the most closely connected to the indivdiual (see Figure 2), and are almost entirely learnable. {{RoundBoxBottom}} Meta-cognitive skills are key determinants of the motivation to engage in life-long learning and are closely connected to both self-regulated learning theory and self-directed learning theory. Meta-cognitive skills are bidirectional critical in the motivation for lifelong learning, meaning that as meta-cognitive skills increase, so to does learning motivation, and when motivation increases, so to do meta-cognitive skills develop (Sheffler et al., 2022). A lack of baseline meta-cognitive skills can substantially increase the amount of effort required to engage in learning and thus reduce motivation (Goodwill & Chen, 2021). Fortunately, meta-cognitive skills are malleable and can be improved through self-directed and self-regulated learning or through explicit instruction, which in turn, may subsequently improve an individuals {{g}} motivation to become a lifelong learner. === Monitoring, implementation and evaluation === Monitoring, implementation, and evaluation are the key meta-cognitive processes of the self-regulatory learning cycle (Cornford, 2002). Monitoring involves assessing progress towards learning goals, implementation involves applying learning strategies, and evaluation involves reflecting on the effectiveness of those strategies and their outcomes. Together, these processes enable learners to actively regulate their learning and adapt their learning approaches. While these meta-cognitive skills can be improved through engaging with them throughout the learning process, they can also be improved through explicit instruction (Van den Broeck et al., 2024). As a result, much focus within K-12 education around the world has shifted towards developing meta-cognitive skills to facilitate lifelong learning in the classroom and beyond (Van den Broeck et al., 2024). === Self-efficacy === In a similar sense to meta-cognition, self-efficacy is a cyclical motivator for lifelong learning, in that while lifelong learning can support well-being, well-being is also an important factor supporting engagement in lifelong learning. Across all motivational theories involved in lifelong learning, self-efficacy is widely regarded as a key motivational factor. Self-efficacy refers to an individual's belief in their ability to successfully perform tasks and achieve desired outcomes, influencing both their willingness to engage in learning and their persistence when faced with challenges. One key concept in self-efficacy is the learning biography, where an individual's view of their aptitude as a learner is established as a result of self-perception, educational background, and social influence (Lischewski et al., 2020). {{RoundBoxTop|theme=14}} <quiz display=simple> {Although meta-cognitive skills are important motivators for lifelong, they cannot be explicitly improved. |type="()"} - True + False {Which of the following best fits the definition of monitoring? |type"()"} - A learner adapts their learning strategies to match those of the people around them. + A learner actively evaluating whether their learning strategies line up with the the strategies they identified. - A learner comparing the outcome of their learning process to expectations they set before engaging with a topic. </quiz> {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Socio-environmental motivators == Individuals are not only motivated to learn as a result of individual factors; they are also influenced by a combination of social and environmental factors. In lifelong learning research, {{g}} three broad categories of learning environments are commonly recognised: informal, non-formal, and formal learning environments. Each environment introduces unique affordances and challenges in facilitating motivation for lifelong learning (Lischewski et al., 2020). === Informal learning environments === Informal learning environments refer to environments where learning occurs voluntarily, spontaneously, and primarily as a result of intrinsic motivators rather than extrinsic motivators. Informal learning in this way is not constrained by set curricula or educational systems, but is rather determined by the learner themselves (Lischewski et al., 2020). However, due to the nature of informal education being self-directed, it is also often self-funded, introducing potential monetary and time constraints that make informal learning unfeasible for some individuals, especially where informal learning may not be recognised by employers or formal learning environments (Lischewski et al., 2020). === Non-formal learning environments === Similarly {{sp}} to informal learning environments, non-formal learning environments are typically voluntary and learner-directed, but involve greater structure and organisation. Non-formal learning environments often sit at an intersection between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. They are generally more structured than informal learning environments and may be accompanied by certifications that are recognised by employers and formal learning institutions (Lischewski et al., 2020). Examples of contemporary non-formal learning environments include Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), which are largely self-directed learning environments (Doo et al., 2023). === Formal learning environments === [[File:Main Quadrangle, University of Sydney (cropped).jpg|thumb|'''Figure 3'''. University of Sydney. The oldest example of a tertiary formal learning environment in Australia.]] While traditional conceptualisations of lifelong learning have focused on adult learning beyond the formal years of education, renewed interest in the concept of lifelong learning has emerged within the formal learning environments of K-12 and tertiary education. The focus has been both on motivating learners to be effective lifelong learners and incorporating the principles that make lifelong learning so effective into formal education (Yurdal & Toraman, 2023). === Digital technology === Ubiquitous across all learning environments in the 21st century is digital technology, which presents both unique challenges and affordances for learners engaging in lifelong learning. Digital technology itself and its rapid proliferation are major contributing factors to the motivation for lifelong learning. At the same time, leveraging digital technologies can support motivation by encouraging personalised learning environments and improving access to educational resources and learning opportunities (Mohammed & Kinyo, 2020). Considering these two factors, digital technology is a highly influential motivational factor in lifelong learning. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=2}} '''Did you know?''' Wikiversity is simultaneously a formal, non-formal, informal learning environment, all dependent on how a user interacts with it. For instance, this book chapter was initially produced as part of an formal university assessment. For subsequent editors, their contribution to this chapter is a structured non-formal learning exercise. Lastly, the casual readers of this chapter are likely engaging with an informal learning environment, motivated by their own intrinsic desire to learn.{{RoundBoxBottom}}{{RoundBoxTop|theme=14}} <quiz display=simple> {'''Quiz! Check your understanding''' |type="()"} {Formal learning environments are irrelevant to lifelong learning. |type="()"} - True + False {A casual reader of a Wikiversity learning resource who is taking a quiz to check their understanding is engaging with what type of learning environment? |type"()"} + Informal - Non-formal - Formal {In descending order, extrinsic motivators are most prevelant in ___, then ___ and lastly ___ learning environments. |type"()"} - Non-formal → Formal → Informal - Informal → Non-formal → Formal + Formal → Non-formal → Informal - Formal → Informal → Non-formal </quiz> {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Lifelong learning motivation across the lifespan == While lifelong learning can be understood to be a motivational state which drives learning across the lifespan, the specific motivators underpinning it change across different developmental levels (Sheffler et al., 2022). Understanding these motivational factors and how they change between developmental levels, allows motivational interventions to effectively support learners across the lifespan, thus fostering lifelong learning (Sheffler et al., 2022). === Childhood === [[File:A curious child, smelling flower, India.jpg|thumb|312x312px|'''Figure 2'''. Naturally curious child investigates a new stimulus (flower).]] From infancy, children are inherently and biologically motivated to be curious learners through natural reward pathways in the brain (Sheffler et al., 2022). As a result, of all developmental levels, children are most likely to intrinsically initiate information-seeking behaviour and learning (Cronin-Golomb & Bauer, 2023). Despite this, children's intrinsic motivation declines as they enter formal schooling as academic pressure erodes the self-regulatory motivation to learn (Sheffler et al., 2022). This is especially the case when children begin to conceptualise academic effort as the inverse of being capable self-directed learning - believing that having to exert more effort to learn is indicative of their incompetence (Sheffler et al., 2022). However, due to their developmental level, young children may lack the necessary executive-functioning to be effectively motivated through meta-cognitive interventions (Eberhart et al., 2024). Instead, interventions focused on cultivating growth mindsets and grit can motivate children by fostering the idea that knowledge and comptency can be improved through effort (Sheffler, 2022). === Adults === Compared to younger learners, adults are generally motivated extrinsically, often as a result of societal and financial pressures (Sheffler et al., 2022). Despite this, adults are also naturally curious learners and can be supported through allowing self-determination of their learning needs (Sheffler et al., 2022). Interventions based on self-directed learning theory have been particularly well applied to the study of lifelong learning motivation in adults {{f}}. Unlike young children, adults possess the necessary executive functioning in order to integrate new and disparate ideas into novel questions, which act as important problems for them to solve (Cronin-Golomb & Bauer, 2023). In a meta-analysis by of 23 studies Yurdal and Toraman (2023) examined the degree to which self-directed learning readiness predicted both motivation and subsequent academic achievement in formal learning environments, finding strong effect sizes for adult learners {{g}}. As such, adults can significantly benefit from building self-directed learning skills, especially through formal education initiatives such as tertiary education (Yurdal & Toraman, 2023). === Older Adults === Less is known about the lifelong learning motivation in older adults, partially as a result of how lifelong learning has been conceptualised, which as discussed, has focused on lifelong learning as a way to increase productivity and industry under the dominant economic model of lifelong learning. There is often little utility in older adults improving skills for the workplace, seeing as they are likely already passed working age (Sheffler, 2022). As such, motivation for older adults is not strongly tied to the extrinsic motivators which dominant the majority of the lifespan. However, for older adults, intrinsic motivators such as well-being represent critical motivators for lifelong learning. A systematic review and meta-analysis by Noble et al. (2021) examining 32 studies and pooled sample of 4,239 adults aged 55 and over, showed increased well-being in the form of life-satisfaction, self-confidence and cognitive functioning through formal education initiatives. Not only does this show the relevance of instrinsic motivation for older adults, but it also challenges the notion that formal education is largely irrelevant for older adults. While younger adults and adolescents typically undertake formal training and education as a result of extrinsic motivators, older adults may still be motivated to engage with formal learning environments for largely intrinsic motives. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=14}} <quiz display=simple> {'''Quiz! Check your understanding''' |type="()"} {Older adults are most effectively motivated by extrinsic factors. |type="()"} -True +False {Both _____ and _____ are primarily intrinsically motivated to learn. |type"()"} - Adults, older adults - Children, adolescents - Adolescents, adults + Children, older adults </quiz> {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Lifelong learning motivation across cultures == The ubiquitous and globalised interest in lifelong learning and its benefits has expanded lifelong learning from a Western-centric educational initiative to a framework that has been recognised worldwide (Diana et al., 2026). As such, increasing research has recognised that the motivators underpinning lifelong learning vary as a function of cultural context (Diana et al., 2026). Learning and learning motivation are heavily influenced by cultural and socio-cultural factors (Chen & Liu, 2019). The diversity of cultural motives for lifelong learning is highly variable, making differences between cultures difficult to summarise. However, psychological science has attempted to identify cultural determinants of lifelong learning motivation in the context of socially utilitarian cultures versus individualistic cultures (Chen & Liu, 2019). === Individual Interest versus social utilitarianism === A study by Chen and Liu (2019) examining cross-cultural lifelong learning motives in the United States (US) and China found that where US culture focused primarily on learning motivated by individual interests and hobbies, Chinese culture emphasised social utility and collective benefit. These differences are deep-rooted and can be found within government policy, family structures, and formal learning environments such as schools and universities (Chen & Liu, 2019). Preliminary evidence suggests that cultures motivated by social utilitarianism may be more motivated to engage in lifelong learning, though research is currently limited in its ability to generalise these results to other cultures around the world (Chen & Liu, 2019). On this point, social utilitarianism is not a fixed construct, with its expression varying across cultures despite broad similarities. This was evidenced through a systematic literature review by Diana et al. (2026) examining parental motivations for lifelong learning in Japanese and Indonesian cultures, which found several key cross-cultural differences between two otherwise socially utilitarian cultures. It was observed that Japanese culture emphasises lifelong learning as the pursuit of mastery through highly disciplined, formalised systems that build skills in order that individuals can fulfil their personal obligations to the broader community, whereas Indonesian culture is more strongly influenced by religiosity and the development of moral character (Diana et al., 2026). In this way, while social utilitarianism is a prominent motivational influence, especially amongst non-Western cultures, the specific motives which underpin it can vary drastically between cultures. === Trans-cultural lifelong learning === While nuanced differences in motives for lifelong learning exist between cultures, the body of research examining these differences in too underdeveloped to definitely suggest that any single culture produces more motivated or effective lifelong learners. Furthermore, motivating factors that are cultural in nature are relatively stable and not easily modified and as such, improving motivation through changing cultural motives is largely unfeasible. However, this does not mean that cultural factors related to learning motivation cannot be used to improve individuals' motivation to engage in lifelong learning. An emerging body of research has highlighted the opportunity to use the rich cultural diversity within lifelong learning practices to increase lifelong learning motivation where there may be considerable utility in learners engaging with different cultural epistemologies (Jurkova & Guo, 2021). A study by Jurkova and Guo (2021) found that individuals who engaged with cultures other than their own were able to adopt practices they valued and integrate them into their own learning strategies. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=14}} <quiz display=simple> {'''Quiz! Check your understanding''' |type="()"} {Social utilitarianism refers to a single, fixed concept. |type="()"} - True + False {Western-centric cultures tend to be motivated by _____ factors, |type"()"} + Individual - Social utilitarianism - Cross-cultural - Trans-cultural </quiz> {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Conclusion== Lifelong learning is widely recognised as an important skill for 21st-century learners and is underpinned by a range of motivational factors. The motivations for lifelong learning are complex, varied, and can be explored through multiple theories and contexts. This complexity, combined with the lack of a unified theory, means that lifelong learning is best understood as the product of multiple theoretical perspectives, each contributing unique insights into the motivational foundations of lifelong learning. These theories, together with advances in the psychological science of lifelong learning, have converged on the understanding that, at least in western cultures, meta-cognitive skills, self-efficacy, and supportive learning environments are important motivational influences across the lifespan. Many of the factors underpinning lifelong learning, particularly individual factors such as meta-cognitive skills and socio-environmental factors such as learning environments, can be readily modified to promote motivation for lifelong learning. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=2}} '''Did you know?''' By reaching the end of this book chapter, considerable evidence suggests that you are a self-motivated lifelong learner. Reflect back on the case study presented at the start of this chapter and ask yourself, which factor(s) was most relevant in keeping you motivated to learn throughout this chapter? {{RoundBoxBottom}} {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} '''Key take-home messages''' * Lifelong learning can be conceptualised as the motivational state to engage in learning throughout the lifespan. * Formal, non-formal and informal learning environments can uniqely support or potentially hinder, the motivation for lifelong learning. * Meta-cognitive skills are malleable and building them are critical for improving lifelong learning motivation. * Lifelong learning motivation varies across the lifespan and can be supported by targeted intervention. * Westen{{sp}}-centric ideals of lifelong learning have been prominently researched, but motivators vary between cultures. {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==See also== * [[w:Lifelong_learning|Lifelong learning]] (Wikipedia) * [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2025/Lifelong learning motivation|Lifelong learning motivation]] (Book chapter, 2025) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Chen, Z., & Liu, Y. (2019). The different style of lifelong learning in China and the USA based on influencing motivations and factors. International Journal of Educational Research, 95, 13-25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijer.2019.03.005 Chukwuedo, S. O., Mbagwu, F. O., & Ogbuanya, T. C. (2021). Motivating academic engagement and lifelong learning among vocational and adult education students via self-direction in learning. Learning and Motivation, 74, 101729. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lmot.2021.101729 Cornford, I. R. (2002). Learning-to-learn strategies as a basis for effective lifelong learning. International journal of lifelong education, 21(4), 357–368. https://doi.org/10.1080/02601370210141020 Cronin-Golomb, L. M., & Bauer, P. J. (2023). Self-motivated and directed learning across the lifespan. Acta Psychologica, 232, 103816. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2022.103816 Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). The general causality orientations scale: Self-determination in personality. Journal of research in personality, 19(2), 109-134. Diana, Matsumoto, D., Windiarti, R., Munawaroh, E., Amin, Z. N., Hasjiandito, A., ... & Nafiah, Q. N. (2026). How Parenting Influences Lifelong Learning: A Cross‐Cultural Review of Indonesia and Japan. European Journal of Education, 61(1), e70440. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejed.70440 Doo, M. Y., Zhu, M., & Bonk, C. J. (2023). Influence of self-directed learning on learning outcomes in MOOCs: A meta-analysis. Distance Education, 44(1), 86-105. https://doi.org/10.1080/01587919.2022.2155618 Endres, T., Leber, J., Böttger, C., Rovers, S., & Renkl, A. (2021). Improving lifelong learning by fostering students’ learning strategies at university. Psychology Learning & Teaching, 20(1), 144–160. https://doi.org/10.1177/1475725720952025 Goodwill, A., & Chen, S. H. (2021). The science of lifelong learning. The United Nations Institute for Lifelong Learning Jurkova, S., & Guo, S. (2021). Conceptualising a holistic model of transcultural lifelong learning. International Review of Education, 67(6), 791-810. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11159-021-09930-w Lischewski, J., Seeber, S., Wuttke, E., & Rosemann, T. (2020). What influences participation in non-formal and informal modes of continuous vocational education and training? An analysis of individual and institutional influencing factors. Frontiers in psychology, 11, 534485. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.534485 Noble, C., Medin, D., Quail, Z., Young, C., & Carter, M. (2021). How does participation in formal education or learning for older people affect wellbeing and cognition? A systematic literature review and meta-analysis. Gerontology and Geriatric Medicine, 7, 2333721420986027. https://doi.org/10.1177/2333721420986027 Sheffler, P., Rodriguez, T. M., Cheung, C. S., & Wu, R. (2022). Cognitive and metacognitive, motivational, and resource considerations for learning new skills across the lifespan. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 13(2), e1585. Van den Broeck, L., De Laet, T., Dujardin, R., Tuyaerts, S., & Langie, G. (2024). Unveiling the competencies at the core of lifelong learning: A systematic literature review. Educational Research Review, 45, Article 100646. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.edurev.2024.100646 Vidigal Alfaya, S., Ballesteros Moscosio, M. Á., & Yanes Cabrera, C. M. (2025). Motivation as a key factor in lifelong learning. https://doi.org/10.11591/edulearn.v19i3.21960 Wijnia, L., Noordzij, G., Arends, L. R., Rikers, R. M., & Loyens, S. M. (2024). The effects of problem-based, project-based, and case-based learning on students’ motivation: A meta-analysis. Educational Psychology Review, 36(1), 29. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119173243.ch12 Zimmerman, B. J. (2000). Attaining self-regulation: A social cognitive perspective. In Handbook of self-regulation (pp. 13-39). Academic press. }} ==External links== * [https://uni-freiburg.de/en/studies/lifelong-learning/ Lifelong learning] (University of Freiburg) * [https://www.uil.unesco.org/en UNESCO institute for lifelong learning] (UNESCO) * [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p6woiCiMSpk Learning as a competitive advantage] (TEDx Talks, YouTube) [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Education]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Learning]] qg2ajtjndxd80mxm2ucsotyvw0ztpe1 10 330232 2842341 2842278 2026-10-23T21:13:59Z Jtneill 10242 2842341 wikitext text/x-wiki <noinclude>Feedback [[wikiversity:FAQ/Template|template]] for the [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter|book chapter]] exercise for the [[motivation and emotion]] unit. Designed to be [[Help:Transclusion|transcluded]] on a chapter [[Help:Talk page|talk page]]. __NOTOC__</noinclude><includeonly> ==[[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter|Book chapter]] review and feedback== {{RoundBoxTop|theme=8}} This chapter has been reviewed according to the [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Marking criteria|marking criteria]]. Written feedback is provided below, plus there is a [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Feedback|general feedback]] page. Please also check the chapter's [[Help:Page history|page history]] to check for editing changes made whilst reviewing through the chapter. Chapter marks will be available via {{Motivation and emotion/Canvas}} along with [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Social contribution|social contribution]] marks and feedback. Keep an eye on Announcements. {{RoundBoxBottom}} {{RoundBoxTop|theme=}}[[File:Wikiuutiset logo typewriter.png|right|85px]] ===Overall=== {{{1|No comment}}} ===[[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Marking criteria#Overview (5%)|Overview]]=== {{{2|No comment}}} ===[[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Marking criteria#Theory (20%)|Theory]]=== {{{3|No comment}}} ===[[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Marking criteria#Research (25%)|Research]]=== {{{4|No comment}}} ===[[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Marking criteria#Integration (10%)|Integration]]=== {{{5|No comment}}} ===[[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Marking criteria#Conclusion (5%)|Conclusion]]=== {{{6|No comment}}} ===[[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Marking criteria#Style (20%)|Style]]=== {{{7|No comment}}} ===[[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Marking criteria#Learning features (5%)|Learning features]]=== {{{8|No comment}}} ===[[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Marking criteria#Social contribution (10%)|Social contribution]]=== {{{9|No comment}}} {{RoundBoxBottom}}</includeonly><noinclude>{{collapse top|Simple example}} ==Simple example== See also [[#Detailed example|detailed example]] <pre> <!-- Official feedback --> {{MEBF/2026 |1= <!-- Overall comments... --> # |2= <!-- Overview comments... --> # |3= <!-- Theory comments... --> # |4= <!-- Research comments... --> # |5= <!-- Integration comments... --> # |6= <!-- Conclusion comments... --> # |7= <!-- Style comments... --> # |8= <!-- Learning features comments... --> # |9= <!-- Social contribution comments... --> # }} ~~~~ </pre> gives <!-- Official book chapter feedback --> {{MEBF/2026 |1= <!-- Overall comments... --> # |2= <!-- Overview comments... --> # |3= <!-- Theory comments... --> # |4= <!-- Research comments... --> # |5= <!-- Integration comments... --> # |6= <!-- Conclusion comments... --> # |7= <!-- Style comments... --> # |8= <!-- Learning features comments... --> # |9= <!-- Social contribution comments... --> # }} -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 09:47, 10 October 2026 (UTC) {{Collapse bottom}} ==Detailed example== Example use of the template, with some common feedback comments: <small><small><small><pre> <!-- Official book chapter feedback --> {{MEBF/2026 |1= <!-- Overall comments... --> # This is an outstanding chapter that successfully integrates psychological theory and research in a highly readable way to address a practical, real-world phenomenon or problem # This is an excellent chapter that successfully uses psychological theory and research to address a practical, real-world phenomenon or problem # This is a very good chapter that makes very good use of psychological theory and research to address a real-world phenomenon or problem # This is a good chapter that makes good use of psychological theory and research to address a real-world phenomenon or problem # This is a reasonably good chapter that makes good use of psychological theory and research to address a real-world phenomenon or problem # This is a basic chapter # This is an insufficient chapter # The main area(s) for potential improvement: #* use the best psychological theory about the topic #* more detailed review of the best psychological research about the topic #* quality of written expression #* tackle the target topic more directly; this chapter [[wikt:beat around the bush|beats around the bush]] #* integrate more strongly with other chapters by using embedded links to related topics #* overuse of unacknowledged [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI]] (watch out for [[w:AI slop|AI slop]])—express more in your own words #* I suspect that the [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment#Assessment items|recommended 75 hours]] were not invested in preparing this chapter <!-- Overall - Edit summaries --> #* Excellent use of [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] to clearly communicate the changes made in most or all of the main edits #* [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|Edit summaries]] are used to communicate the changes for most edits #* Use more specific [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] to clearly communicate the changes made in each edit #* Insufficient use [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] to describe the changes made in each edit <!-- Overall - GenAI --> #* [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI|GenAI use]] is appropriately acknowledged #* In some places, there is overreliance on genAI #* There is insufficient acknowledgement in [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] when adding [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI|genAI output]]; this violates academic integrity principles #* [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI|GenAI use]] has not been appropriately acknowledged in [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] with links to the conversation sources despite previous feedback about this issue. Unacknowledged use of GenAI-generated content raises concerns about compliance with academic integrity principles and assessment requirements and [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence|Wikiversity's artificial intelligence policy]]. <!-- Overall – Citations --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient use of academic, peer-reviewed citations to support claims # Only cite sources that you consult # All citations need to be in the References <!-- Overall – Word count --> # Under the [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter#Wordcount|maximum word count]], so there is room to expand # Over the [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter#Wordcount|maximum word count]]. Content beyond 4,000 words has been ignored for marking purposes. <!-- Overall – Copyedits --> # For additional feedback, see the following comments and [ these copyedits] |2= <!-- Overview – Comments... --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Underdeveloped <!-- Overview – Scenario --> <!-- Overview – Scenario - Description --> # Engaging scenario or case study # Reasonably engaging scenario or case study # Basic scenario or case study # Use a more practical, real-life scenario; move review of research into a subsequent section # Consider using an example that a wider audience can relate to (less than 5% of the world population are university students) # Add an engaging case study or scenario <!-- Overview – Scenario - Figure --> # Figure 1 is relevant to the scenario # Figure 1 could be more relevant to the scenario # Instead of a diagram, use an image which illustrates the scenario taking a place; use the diagram in a subsequent section # Include a relevant image <!-- Overview – Scenario - Feature box --> # The scenario uses an appropriate feature box # Put the scenario in a feature box <!-- Overview – Explains problem --> # Clearly explains the psychological problem or phenomenon # Explains the psychological problem or phenomenon reasonably well/in a basic way # Briefly explains the psychological problem or phenomenon; provide more detail # Description of problem is too long/overly complicated—explain the psychological problem or phenomenon in a simpler way. Move detail into subsequent sections. # Clarity of written expression can be improved <!-- Overview – Focus questions --> # The focus questions are excellent (clear and relevant)/very good/good/reasonably good/basic/promising/insufficient # The focus questions could be improved by: ## being more specific to the topic (i.e., the sub-title) ## matching the top-level headings more closely ## being [[w:Open-ended question|open-ended]] rather than [[w:Closed-ended question|closed-ended]] ## splitting double-barrelled questions into separate questions ## using bullet points as taught in [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials/Wiki editing|Tutorial 2]] ## being presented in a feature box to help guide the reader (fixed) # Add focus questions in a feature box # See copyedits for examples of possible improvements |3= <!-- Theory comments... --> <!-- Theory – Breadth --> # Excellent—key theories are very well explained and applied # Very good—key theories are well explained and applied; minor areas for improvements # Reasonably good—relevant theories are selected, described, and explained, with some room for improvement # Basic—a basic range of relevant theories are selected, described, and explained; there is considerable room for improvement # A promising range of ideas are presented but it is far from clear how this material is derived from a first person reading of the best peer-reviewed psychological theory and research about this topic # Insufficient use of relevant psychological theory about this topic # Reduce general theoretical background (e.g., definitions). Instead, summarise and link to related resources (i.e., other book chapters and/or Wikipedia articles). Increase emphasis on [[wikt:substantive|substantive]] aspects of theory that relate directly to the specific topic (i.e., the sub-title question). <!-- Theory – Builds on --> # Builds exceptionally well on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Builds effectively on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Builds reasonably well on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Builds somewhat on other [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Builds in a basic way on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Builds on one [[w:|Wikipedia]] article and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Build more strongly on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Doesn't build on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms <!-- Theory – Depth --> # Insightful/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient depth is provided about key theory(ies) <!-- Theory – Tables/Figures/Lists --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient/No use of tables, figures, and/or lists to clearly convey key theoretical information <!-- Theory – Citations --> # Key citations are well used # In some/many places, the chapter could be strengthened by including more academic, peer-reviewed citations (e.g., see the {{f}} tags). This would help to demonstrate a deeper understanding of relevant psychological theory about the topic. # Insufficient use of academic, peer-reviewed citations (e.g., see the {{f}} tags) # If you didn't consult an original source (e.g., ?), cite it as a [https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/citations/secondary-sources secondary source] # If you didn't consult an original source, don't cite it <!-- Theory – Examples --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic use of examples to illustrate theoretical concepts # Consider using more examples to illustrate theoretical concepts # Use more examples to illustrate theoretical concepts # Insufficient use of examples to illustrate theoretical concepts |4= <!-- Research comments... --> <!-- Research – Key findings --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient review of relevant research # Excellent emphasis on systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses # Some emphasis on systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses; more emphasis would be ideal # Insufficient use of relevant systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses # More detail about key studies would be ideal # Claims are well referenced # In some/many places, the chapter could be strengthened by including more academic, peer-reviewed citations (e.g., see the {{f}} tags). This would help to demonstrate a deeper understanding of relevant psychological science about the topic. # Insufficient use of academic, peer-reviewed citations (e.g., see the {{f}} tags) <!-- Research – Critical thinking --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient [[w:Critical thinking|critical thinking]] about relevant research is evident # [[w:Critical thinking|Critical thinking]] about research could be further evidenced by: ## describing the methodology (e.g., sample, measures) in important studies ## considering the strength of relationships ## acknowledging limitations ## pointing out critiques/counterarguments ## suggesting ''specific'' directions for future research |5= <!-- Integration comments... --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient integration between the most relevant theory(ies) and the best research # The chapter places more emphasis on theory than on research; strive for an integrated balance # Rather than describing individual studies separately, synthesise findings across related studies to identify common themes, patterns, and differences in the evidence # The chapter could be strengthened through deeper integration with related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by including more embedded links # Insufficient integration with related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] |6= <!-- Conclusion comments... --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic summary and conclusion # Insufficient as a cohesive summary of the best psychological theory and research about the topic # Reads like generic [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI|genAI output]]; write more compellingly in your own words # Is this section based on [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI|genAI output]]? If so, this was not acknowledged in the [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summary]]. # Highlights the importance of the problem or phenomenon of interest # Highlight the importance of the problem or phenomenon of interest <!-- Conclusion – Key points --> # Key points are well summarised # Key points are summarised in a basic way # Summarise key points <!-- Conclusion – Focus questions --> # The focus questions are addressed # The take-away messages for each focus question could be spelt out more clearly # Address the focus questions <!-- Conclusion – Take-home messages --> # Clear take-home message(s) # Add practical, take-home message(s) <!-- Conclusion – Word count --> # Not counted for marking purposes due to the chapter being over the maximum word count |7= <!-- Written expression – Style comments... --> <!-- Written expression – Written expression --> # Written expression ## The quality of written expression is excellent/very good/good/reasonably good/basic ## The quality of written expression is OK but there are several aspects which are below professional standard ## The quality of written expression is below professional standard. [https://www.canberra.edu.au/current-students/study-skills UC Study Skills] assistance is recommended to help improve writing skills. ### GenAI is over-used; write more in your own words, based on your own knowledge based on reading the primary sources ## Use active (e.g., "this chapter explores" or "this chapter explored") rather than passive voice (e.g., "this chapter will explore" or "this chapter has explored") [https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/grammar/active-passive-voice][https://www.grammarly.com/blog/active-vs-passive-voice/] ## Target an ''international'' rather than domestic national audience. [http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/australia-population/ Only 0.3% of the world human population lives in Australia]. ## Reduce excessive use of bold font <!-- Written expression – Sentences --> ## Some/Many sentences could be explained more clearly (e.g., see the {{explain}} and {{rewrite}} tags); consider using [https://www.studiosity.com/students/ Studiosity] for targetted feedback to help improve the quality of written expression ## Some/Many sentences are overly long. Strive for the simplest expression. Consider splitting longer sentences into two shorter sentences. Shorter words and sentences are more [[w:Readability|readable]]. Try conducting a readability analysis such as via https://www.webfx.com/tools/read-able/. This chapter gets a score of . Aim for 50+. ## Avoid starting sentences with a citation unless the author is particularly pertinent. Instead, it is more interesting for the the content/key point to be communicated, with the citation included along the way or, more typically, in [[w:Bracket#Parentheses|parentheses]] at the end of the sentence. <!-- Written expression – Paragraphs --> ## Some paragraphs are overly long. Communicate one key idea per paragraph in three to five sentences. ## Avoid one sentence paragraphs. Communicate one idea per paragraph using three to five sentences. ## Bullet points are overused. Develop more of the bullet point statements into full sentences and paragraphs. <!-- Written expression – Language --> ## Use [https://www.grammarly.com/blog/first-second-and-third-person/ 3rd person perspective] (e.g., "it") instead of 1st (e.g., "we") or 2nd person (e.g., "you") in the main text. 1st or 2nd person can work well for case studies or feature boxes. ## Avoid phrases such as “as previously mentioned” or “as noted above,” as these add little value and can disrupt flow. If referencing another part of the chapter is necessary, use [[w:Help#Section linking|section linking]]. ## Embed direct quotes within sentences and paragraphs, rather than presenting them [[wikt:holus-bolus|holus-bolus]] ## "Individuals" is overused. "People" is usually a clearer term than "individuals". Use ''individuals'' to highlight each person separately (e.g., “individual test scores”) and ''people'' when referring to humans more generally. ## Remove [[w:weasel words|weasel words]]—they add bulk without improving meaning ## Use permanent, rather than relative, time references. For example, instead of "20 years ago", refer to something like "at the beginning of the 21st century". In this way, the text will survive better into the future, without needing to be rewritten. ## Avoid overly emotive language (e.g,. *) in science-based communication <!-- Written expression – Layout --> # Layout ## The chapter is well structured, with major sections using sub-sections ## The headings could be more clearly aligned with the focus questions ## The structure is overly complicated; simplify and integrate ## The structure is overly complicated; aim for 3 to 6 top-level headings between the Introduction and Conclusion ## The chapter structure is underdeveloped; expand by using subheadings ## Avoid having sections with 1 sub-heading – use 0 or 2+ sub-headings ## Use the default heading style (e.g., remove additional numbers, italics, bold, and/or change in font size) ## See earlier comment about [[#Heading casing|heading casing]] ## Provide more descriptive headings ## Move links from headings into their first mention in text ## Remove abbreviations/citations from headings ## Include an introductory paragraph before branching into the sub-sections (see {{expand}} tags) ## Integrate learning features rather than having it as a stand-alone section ## The Overview and Conclusion should not have subheadings (fixed) ## Remove colons (:) from the ends of headings <!-- Written expression – Grammar --> # Grammar and spelling are excellent # Grammar ## The grammar for some/many sentences could be improved (e.g., see {{g}} tags); consider using a grammar checking tool, [https://www.studiosity.com/students/ Studiosity], and/or peer feedback ## Improve the clarity and flow of the writing by checking and correct use of commas. See [https://www.grammarly.com/blog/comma/ Grammarly's guide to using commas]. ## Check and make correct use of [https://www.merriam-webster.com/grammar/em-dash-en-dash-how-to-use em dashes (instead of hyphens)] to set off an amplifying or explanatory element ## [https://www.grammarly.com/blog/punctuation-capitalization/possessive-apostrophe/ Possessive apostrophes] are not used correctly (e.g., cats vs cat's vs cats') ## Check and correct use of [https://www.google.com.au/search?q=grammar+that+vs+who that vs. who] ## Check and correct use of [https://www.google.com.au/search?q=affect+vs.+effect+grammar affect vs. effect] ## Check and correct use of [http://www.colonsemicolon.com/ semicolons (;) and colons (:)] ## Use past tense when describing research studies, although implications of findings could be in the present tense <!-- Written expression – Abbreviations --> ## Abbreviations ### Only use abbreviations such as e.g., i.e., et al., etc. inside [[w:Bracket#Parentheses|parentheses]], otherwise spell them out ### Check and correct formatting of abbreviations (such as e.g., i.e., etc.) ### Use abbreviations sparingly. Do not use abbreviations for minor/infrequently used terms. ### Spell out abbreviations on their first use, to explain them to the reader ### Once an abbreviation has been established (e.g., PTSD), use it consistently afterwards ### Only introduce abbreviations which are subsequently used <!-- Written expression – Spelling --> # Spelling ## Use [https://www.abc.net.au/education/learn-english/australian-vs-american-spelling/11244196 Australian spelling] (e.g., hypothesize vs. hypothesise; behavior vs. behaviour) ## Some words are misspelt (e.g., see the {{sp}} tags). Spell-checking tools are available in most internet browsers and word processing software packages. <!-- Written expression – Proofreading --> # Proofreading ## More proofreading is needed (e.g., fix punctuation and typographical errors) to bring the quality of written expression closer to a professional standard ## Remove unnecessary capitalisation – [https://polishedpaper.com/blog/capitalization-apa-style more info] <!-- Written expression – APA style --> # APA style ## Use [[w:Serial comma|serial comma]]s[https://www.buzzfeed.com/adamdavis/the-oxford-comma-is-extremely-important-and-everyone-should][https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gBx8ooDupXY] ## Use [https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/capitalization/diseases-disorders-therapies sentence casing (not capitals) for disorders, therapies, theories, etc.] ## [https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/numbers Express numbers under 10 using words (e.g., two) and 10 and over using numerals (e.g., 99)] <!-- Written expression – APA style - Quotes --> ## Use double (not single) quotation marks "to introduce a word or phrase used ... as slang, or as an invented or coined expression" ([https://apastyle.apa.org/products/publication-manual-7th-edition APA Style 7th ed.], 2020, p. 159) ## "Use quotation marks only for the first occurrence of the word or phrase, not for subsequent occurrences" ([https://apastyle.apa.org/products/publication-manual-7th-edition APA Style 7th ed.], 2020, p. 159) ## Direct quotes need page numbers—even better, communicate about concepts in your own words ## Direct quotes are overused—it is better to communicate about concepts in your own words <!-- Written expression – Figures --> ## Figures ### Very well/Well/Reasonably well captioned ### Brief captions; provide more detail to help connect the figure to the text ### Use this format for captions: '''Figure X'''. Descriptive caption goes here in sentence casing. [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Figures|See example]]. ### Add captions <!-- Written expression – Figures - Citations --> ### Each Figure is referred to at least once within the main text using APA style ### Each Figure is referred to at least once within the main text. Refer to each Figure using APA style (e.g., "(see Figure 1)"; do not use bold, italics, check and correct capitalisation). ### Refer to each Figure at least once within the main text (e.g., "(see Figure 1)") <!-- Written expression – Figures - Other --> ### Some image uploads were removed because of a lack of sufficient/appropriate copyright information ### Numbering needs correcting ### Adjust some image sizes to make them easier to read (increase size) and/or less dominant (decrease size) <!-- Written expression – Tables --> ## Tables ### Very well/Well/Reasonably well captioned ### Brief caption(s); provide more explanatory detail about the table ### Add an APA style caption to each table ([[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Tables|see example]]) <!-- Written expression – Tables - Citations --> ### Each Table is referred to at least once within the main text using APA style ### Each Table is referred to at least once within the main text ### Refer to each Table using APA style (e.g., do not use bold, italics, check and correct capitalisation) ### Refer to each Table at least once within the main text (e.g., see Table 1) <!-- Written expression – Citations --> # Citations use excellent [https://apastyle.apa.org/products/publication-manual-7th-edition APA Style (7th ed.)] # Citations use very good/good/reasonably good/basic/poor [https://apastyle.apa.org/products/publication-manual-7th-edition APA Style (7th ed.)] # In some/many places, better use could be made of academic, peer-reviewed citations (e.g., see the {{f}} tags) ## If there are three or more authors, cite the first author followed by et al., then year. For example, either: ### in-text, Smith et al. (2020), or ### in [[w:Bracket#Parentheses|parentheses]] (Smith et al., 2020) ## Do not include author first name or initials ## Use ampersand (&) inside [[w:Bracket#Parentheses|parentheses]] and "and" outside parentheses ## List multiple citations in alphabetical order by first author surname (e.g., Giraffe, 2024; Zebra & Aardvark, 2020) ## A full stop is needed after "et al" (i.e., "et al.") because it is an abbreviation of [[wikt:et alii|et alii]] ## Use a comma between the author(s) and year for citations in [[w:Bracket#Parentheses|parentheses]] ## Select up to a maximum of three citations per point (i.e., avoid citing four or more citations to support a single point) ## Check and correct placement of full-stops ## Move embedded links to academic peer-reviewed sources into the [[{{PAGENAME}}#References|References]] as APA style citations with hyperlinked dois ## Move embedded links to non-peer reviewed sources into the [[{{PAGENAME}}#External links|External links]] section; only cite peer-reviewed sources # For citations, use APA style or wiki style, but not both # Secondary citations are overused; strive to consult primary sources <!-- Written expression – References --> ## References use excellent/very good/good/reasonably good/basic/poor APA style: ### Check and correct use of italicisation ### Check and correct use of capitalisation[https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/capitalization] ### Separate page numbers using an [[w:Dash#En dash|en dash]] (–) rather than a hyphen (-) ### Include dois where available ### Hyperlink dois for 1-click access ### Provide the full titles of journals ### Remove "Retrieved from " ### Use alphabetical order ### Move Wikipedia links into the [[{{PAGENAME}}#See also|See also]] section ### Move non-peer reviewed sources into the [[{{PAGENAME}}#External links|External links]] section ### Remove bullet-points; add hanging indent <!-- Feedback responsiveness ---> ## No evidence of responsiveness to feedback on talk page |8= <!-- Learning features comments... --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient use of learning features <!-- Learning features – Wikipedia embedded links --> # Excellent use of embedded in-text [[m:Help:Interwiki linking|interwiki links]] to Wikipedia articles # Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/One use of embedded in-text [[m:Help:Interwiki linking|interwiki links]] to Wikipedia articles. Adding more interwiki links for the first mention of key words and technical concepts would make the text even more interactive. See [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2020/Nutrition and anxiety|example]]. # Use [[m:Help:Interwiki linking|interwiki links]] (rather than external links) to Wikipedia articles, per [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials/Wiki editing|Tutorial 2]] # Add embedded in-text [[m:Help:Interwiki linking|interwiki links]] to Wikipedia articles. Adding interwiki links for the first mention of key words and technical concepts would make the text more interactive. See [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2020/Nutrition and anxiety|example]]. <!-- Learning features – Wikiversity embedded links --> # Excellent use of embedded in-text links to related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|book chapters]] # Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/One use of embedded in-text links to related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|book chapters]]. Embedding in-text links to related book chapters helps to integrate this chapter into the broader book project. # Use in-text [[m:Help:Interwiki linking|interwiki links]], rather than external links to Wikiversity chapters, per [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials/Wiki editing|Tutorial 2]] # Move embedded links to non-peer-reviewed sources to the [[{{PAGENAME}}#External links|External links]] section # Add embedded in-text links to related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|book chapters]]. Embedding in-text links to related book chapters helps to integrate this chapter into the broader book project. <!-- Learning features – Figures, tables, feature boxes, scenarios --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient/No use of figure(s) # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/No use of table(s) # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic use of feature box(es) # No use of feature boxes other than the opening scenario # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic use of scenarios, case studies, or examples # No use of scenarios, case studies, or examples, other than opening scenario <!-- Learning features – Quizzes --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic use of quiz(zes) and/or reflection question(s) # The quiz questions could be improved by being more focused on the key points and/or take-home messages # The quiz questions could be more effective as learning prompts by being embedded as single questions within each corresponding section rather than as a set of questions at the end # The reflection questions could be made more interactive by using a drop-down box that the reader can expand to see an answer/prompt to figure out the answers to the questions (e.g., see [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|this chapter]]) # No use of quiz(zes) and/or reflection question(s) <!-- Learning features – See also --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient/No use of the [[{{PAGENAME}}#See also|See also]] section ## Use the format shown in the [[Template:Motivation and emotion/Book chapter structure#See also|template]] ## Use bullet points per [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials/Wiki editing|Tutorial 2]] ## Rename links per [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials/Wiki editing|Tutorial 2]] ## Use internal linking style per [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials/Wiki editing|Tutorial 2]] ## Also include links to [[Motivation and emotion/Book|related book chapters]] ## Also include links to related Wikipedia articles ## Use [https://www.masterclass.com/articles/sentence-case-explained sentence casing] ## Use alphabetical order ## Include sources in [[w:Bracket#Parentheses|parentheses]] after the link ## Move peer-reviewed articles into the [[{{PAGENAME}}#References|References]] section and cite ## Move external links into the [[{{PAGENAME}}#References|External links]] section ## Add more links # [[{{PAGENAME}}#See also|See also]] section not counted for marking purposes due to being over the maximum word count <!-- Learning features – External links --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient/No use of the [[{{PAGENAME}}#External links|External links]] section ## Use the format shown in the [[Template:Motivation and emotion/Book chapter structure#External links|template]] ## Use bullet points per [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials/Wiki editing|Tutorial 2]] ## Rename links per [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials/Wiki editing|Tutorial 2]] ## Use [https://www.masterclass.com/articles/sentence-case-explained sentence casing] ## Use alphabetical order ## Include sources in [[w:Bracket#Parentheses|parentheses]] after the link ## Move Wikipedia/Wikiversity links to the [[{{PAGENAME}}#See also|See also]] section ## Move peer-reviewed articles to the [[{{PAGENAME}}#References|References]] section and cite ## Target an international audience ## Add more links ## Link to the top 3-6 external resources about this topic # [[{{PAGENAME}}#External links|External links]] section not counted for marking purposes due to being over the maximum word count |9= <!-- Social contribution comments... --> # ~ logged, useful, mostly minor/moderate/major contributions with [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Summarising social contributions#How to add direct links to contributions|direct links to evidence]] # ~ logged contributions without [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Summarising social contributions#How to add direct links to contributions|direct links to evidence]], so unable to easily verify and assess. See [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials|tutorials]] for guidance about how to get direct links to evidence. # Thanks for the Wiki Commons uploads # Thanks very much for your extensive contributions # Use a numbered list per [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials/Wiki editing|Tutorial 2]] # No logged contributions }} ~~~~ </pre></small></small></small> gives <!-- Official book chapter feedback --> {{MEBF/2026 |1= <!-- Overall comments... --> # This is an outstanding chapter that successfully integrates psychological theory and research in a highly readable way to address a practical, real-world phenomenon or problem # This is an excellent chapter that successfully uses psychological theory and research to address a practical, real-world phenomenon or problem # This is a very good chapter that makes very good use of psychological theory and research to address a real-world phenomenon or problem # This is a good chapter that makes good use of psychological theory and research to address a real-world phenomenon or problem # This is a reasonably good chapter that makes good use of psychological theory and research to address a real-world phenomenon or problem # This is a basic chapter # This is an insufficient chapter # The main area(s) for potential improvement: #* use the best psychological theory about the topic #* more detailed review of the best psychological research about the topic #* quality of written expression #* tackle the target topic more directly; this chapter [[wikt:beat around the bush|beats around the bush]] #* integrate more strongly with other chapters by using embedded links to related topics #* overuse of unacknowledged [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI]] (watch out for [[w:AI slop|AI slop]])—express more in your own words #* I suspect that the [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment#Assessment items|recommended 75 hours]] were not invested in preparing this chapter <!-- Overall - Edit summaries --> #* Excellent use of [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] to clearly communicate the changes made in most or all of the main edits #* [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|Edit summaries]] are used to communicate the changes for most edits #* Use more specific [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] to clearly communicate the changes made in each edit #* Insufficient use [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] to describe the changes made in each edit <!-- Overall - GenAI --> #* [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI|GenAI use]] is appropriately acknowledged #* In some places, there is overreliance on genAI #* There is insufficient acknowledgement in [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] when adding [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI|genAI output]]; this violates academic integrity principles #* [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI|GenAI use]] has not been appropriately acknowledged in [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] with links to the conversation sources despite previous feedback about this issue. Unacknowledged use of GenAI-generated content raises concerns about compliance with academic integrity principles and assessment requirements and [[Wikiversity:Artificial intelligence|Wikiversity's artificial intelligence policy]]. <!-- Overall – Citations --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient use of academic, peer-reviewed citations to support claims # Only cite sources that you consult # All citations need to be in the References <!-- Overall – Word count --> # Under the [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter#Wordcount|maximum word count]], so there is room to expand # Over the [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter#Wordcount|maximum word count]]. Content beyond 4,000 words has been ignored for marking purposes. <!-- Overall – Copyedits --> # For additional feedback, see the following comments and [ these copyedits] |2= <!-- Overview – Comments... --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Underdeveloped <!-- Overview – Scenario --> <!-- Overview – Scenario - Description --> # Engaging scenario or case study # Reasonably engaging scenario or case study # Basic scenario or case study # Use a more practical, real-life scenario; move review of research into a subsequent section # Consider using an example that a wider audience can relate to (less than 5% of the world population are university students) # Add an engaging case study or scenario <!-- Overview – Scenario - Figure --> # Figure 1 is relevant to the scenario # Figure 1 could be more relevant to the scenario # Instead of a diagram, use an image which illustrates the scenario taking a place; use the diagram in a subsequent section # Include a relevant image <!-- Overview – Scenario - Feature box --> # The scenario uses an appropriate feature box # Put the scenario in a feature box <!-- Overview – Explains problem --> # Clearly explains the psychological problem or phenomenon # Explains the psychological problem or phenomenon reasonably well/in a basic way # Briefly explains the psychological problem or phenomenon; provide more detail # Description of problem is too long/overly complicated—explain the psychological problem or phenomenon in a simpler way. Move detail into subsequent sections. # Clarity of written expression can be improved <!-- Overview – Focus questions --> # The focus questions are excellent (clear and relevant)/very good/good/reasonably good/basic/promising/insufficient # The focus questions could be improved by: ## being more specific to the topic (i.e., the sub-title) ## matching the top-level headings more closely ## being [[w:Open-ended question|open-ended]] rather than [[w:Closed-ended question|closed-ended]] ## splitting double-barrelled questions into separate questions ## using bullet points as taught in [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials/Wiki editing|Tutorial 2]] ## being presented in a feature box to help guide the reader (fixed) # Add focus questions in a feature box # See copyedits for examples of possible improvements |3= <!-- Theory comments... --> <!-- Theory – Breadth --> # Excellent—key theories are very well explained and applied # Very good—key theories are well explained and applied; minor areas for improvements # Reasonably good—relevant theories are selected, described, and explained, with some room for improvement # Basic—a basic range of relevant theories are selected, described, and explained; there is considerable room for improvement # A promising range of ideas are presented but it is far from clear how this material is derived from a first person reading of the best peer-reviewed psychological theory and research about this topic # Insufficient use of relevant psychological theory about this topic # Reduce general theoretical background (e.g., definitions). Instead, summarise and link to related resources (i.e., other book chapters and/or Wikipedia articles). Increase emphasis on [[wikt:substantive|substantive]] aspects of theory that relate directly to the specific topic (i.e., the sub-title question). <!-- Theory – Builds on --> # Builds exceptionally well on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Builds effectively on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Builds reasonably well on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Builds somewhat on other [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Builds in a basic way on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Builds on one [[w:|Wikipedia]] article and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Build more strongly on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms # Doesn't build on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles and/or/but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms <!-- Theory – Depth --> # Insightful/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient depth is provided about key theory(ies) <!-- Theory – Tables/Figures/Lists --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient/No use of tables, figures, and/or lists to clearly convey key theoretical information <!-- Theory – Citations --> # Key citations are well used # In some/many places, the chapter could be strengthened by including more academic, peer-reviewed citations (e.g., see the {{f}} tags). This would help to demonstrate a deeper understanding of relevant psychological theory about the topic. # Insufficient use of academic, peer-reviewed citations (e.g., see the {{f}} tags) # If you didn't consult an original source (e.g., ?), cite it as a [https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/citations/secondary-sources secondary source] # If you didn't consult an original source, don't cite it <!-- Theory – Examples --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic use of examples to illustrate theoretical concepts # Consider using more examples to illustrate theoretical concepts # Use more examples to illustrate theoretical concepts # Insufficient use of examples to illustrate theoretical concepts |4= <!-- Research comments... --> <!-- Research – Key findings --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient review of relevant research # Excellent emphasis on systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses # Some emphasis on systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses; more emphasis would be ideal # Insufficient use of relevant systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses # More detail about key studies would be ideal # Claims are well referenced # In some/many places, the chapter could be strengthened by including more academic, peer-reviewed citations (e.g., see the {{f}} tags). This would help to demonstrate a deeper understanding of relevant psychological science about the topic. # Insufficient use of academic, peer-reviewed citations (e.g., see the {{f}} tags) <!-- Research – Critical thinking --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient [[w:Critical thinking|critical thinking]] about relevant research is evident # [[w:Critical thinking|Critical thinking]] about research could be further evidenced by: ## describing the methodology (e.g., sample, measures) in important studies ## considering the strength of relationships ## acknowledging limitations ## pointing out critiques/counterarguments ## suggesting ''specific'' directions for future research |5= <!-- Integration comments... --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic/Insufficient integration between the most relevant theory(ies) and the best research # The chapter places more emphasis on theory than on research; strive for an integrated balance # Rather than describing individual studies separately, synthesise findings across related studies to identify common themes, patterns, and differences in the evidence # The chapter could be strengthened through deeper integration with related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by including more embedded links # Insufficient integration with related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] |6= <!-- Conclusion comments... --> # Excellent/Very good/Good/Reasonably good/Basic summary and conclusion # Insufficient as a cohesive summary of the best psychological theory and research about the topic # Reads like generic [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI|genAI output]]; write more compellingly in your own words # Is this section based on [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI|genAI output]]? If so, this was not acknowledged in the [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summary]]. # Highlights the importance of the problem or phenomenon of interest # Highlight the importance of the problem or phenomenon of interest <!-- Conclusion – Key points --> # Key points are well summarised # Key points are summarised in a basic way # Summarise key points <!-- Conclusion – Focus questions --> # The focus questions are addressed # The take-away messages for each focus question could be spelt out more clearly # Address the focus questions <!-- Conclusion – Take-home messages --> # Clear take-home message(s) # Add practical, take-home message(s) <!-- Conclusion – Word count --> # Not counted for marking purposes due to the chapter being over the maximum word count |7= <!-- Written expression – Style comments... --> <!-- Written expression – Written expression --> # Written expression ## The quality of written expression is excellent/very good/good/reasonably good/basic ## The quality of written expression is OK but there are several aspects which are below professional standard ## The quality of written expression is below professional standard. [https://www.canberra.edu.au/current-students/study-skills UC Study Skills] assistance is recommended to help improve writing skills. ### GenAI is over-used; write more in your own words, based on your own knowledge based on reading the primary sources ## Use active (e.g., "this chapter explores" or "this chapter explored") rather than passive voice (e.g., "this chapter will explore" or "this chapter has explored") [https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/grammar/active-passive-voice][https://www.grammarly.com/blog/active-vs-passive-voice/] ## Target an ''international'' rather than domestic national audience. [http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/australia-population/ Only 0.3% of the world human population lives in Australia]. ## Reduce excessive use of bold font <!-- Written expression – Sentences --> ## Some/Many sentences could be explained more clearly (e.g., see the {{explain}} and {{rewrite}} tags); consider using [https://www.studiosity.com/students/ Studiosity] for targetted feedback to help improve the quality of written expression ## Some/Many sentences are overly long. Strive for the simplest expression. Consider splitting longer sentences into two shorter sentences. Shorter words and sentences are more [[w:Readability|readable]]. Try conducting a readability analysis such as via https://www.webfx.com/tools/read-able/. This chapter gets a score of . Aim for 50+. ## Avoid starting sentences with a citation unless the author is particularly pertinent. Instead, it is more interesting for the the content/key point to be communicated, with the citation included along the way or, more typically, in [[w:Bracket#Parentheses|parentheses]] at the end of the sentence. <!-- Written expression – Paragraphs --> ## Some paragraphs are overly long. Communicate one key idea per paragraph in three to five sentences. ## Avoid one sentence paragraphs. Communicate one idea per paragraph using three to five sentences. ## Bullet points are overused. Develop more of the bullet point statements into full sentences and paragraphs. <!-- Written expression – Language --> ## Use [https://www.grammarly.com/blog/first-second-and-third-person/ 3rd person perspective] (e.g., "it") instead of 1st (e.g., "we") or 2nd person (e.g., "you") in the main text. 1st of 2nd person can work well for case studies or feature boxes. ## Avoid phrases such as “as previously mentioned” or “as noted above,” as these add little value and can disrupt flow. If referencing another part of the chapter is necessary, use [[w:Help#Section linking|section linking]].## Embed direct quotes within sentences and paragraphs, rather than presenting them [[wikt:holus-bolus|holus-bolus]] ## "Individuals" is overused. "People" is usually a clearer term than "individuals". Use ''individuals'' to highlight each person separately (e.g., “individual test scores”) and ''people'' when referring to humans more generally. ## Remove [[w:weasel words|weasel words]]—they add bulk without improving meaning ## Use permanent, rather than relative, time references. For example, instead of "20 years ago", refer to something like "at the beginning of the 21st century". In this way, the text will survive better into the future, without needing to be rewritten. ## Avoid overly emotive language (e.g,. *) in science-based communication <!-- Written expression – Layout --> # Layout ## The chapter is well structured, with major sections using sub-sections ## The headings could be more clearly aligned with the focus questions ## The structure is overly complicated; simplify and integrate ## The structure is overly complicated; aim for 3 to 6 top-level headings between the Introduction and Conclusion ## The chapter structure is underdeveloped; expand by using subheadings ## Avoid having sections with 1 sub-heading – use 0 or 2+ sub-headings ## Use the default heading style (e.g., remove additional numbers, italics, bo]ld, and/or change in font size) ## See earlier comment about [[#Heading casing|heading casing]] ## Provide more descriptive headings ## Move links from headings into their first mention in text ## Remove abbreviations/citations from headings ## Include an introductory paragraph before branching into the sub-sections (see {{expand}} tags) ## Integrate learning features rather than having it as a stand-alone section ## The Overview and Conclusion should not have subheadings (fixed) ## Remove colons (:) from the ends of headings <!-- Written expression – Grammar --> # Grammar and spelling are excellent # Grammar ## The grammar for some/many sentences could be improved (e.g., see {{g}} tags); consider using a grammar checking tool, [https://www.studiosity.com/students/ Studiosity], and/or peer feedback ## Improve the clarity and flow of the writing by checking and correct use of commas. See [https://www.grammarly.com/blog/comma/ Grammarly's guide to using commas]. ## Check and make correct use of [https://www.merriam-webster.com/grammar/em-dash-en-dash-how-to-use em dashes (instead of hyphens)] to set off an amplifying or explanatory element ## [https://www.grammarly.com/blog/punctuation-capitalization/possessive-apostrophe/ Possessive apostrophes] are not used correctly (e.g., cats vs cat's vs cats') ## Check and correct use of [https://www.google.com.au/search?q=grammar+that+vs+who that vs. who] ## Check and correct use of [https://www.google.com.au/search?q=affect+vs.+effect+grammar affect vs. effect] ## Check and correct use of [http://www.colonsemicolon.com/ semicolons (;) and colons (:)] ## Use past tense when describing research studies, although implications of findings could be in the present tense <!-- Written expression – Abbreviations --> ## Abbreviations ### Only use abbreviations such as e.g., i.e., et al., etc. inside [[w:Bracket#Parentheses|parentheses]], otherwise spell them out ### Check and correct formatting of abbreviations (such as e.g., i.e., etc.) ### Use abbreviations sparingly. Do not use abbreviations for minor/infrequently used terms. ### Spell out abbreviations on their first use, to explain them to the reader ### Once an abbreviation has been established (e.g., PTSD), use it consistently afterwards ### Only introduce abbreviations which are subsequently used <!-- Written expression – Spelling --> # Spelling ## Use [https://www.abc.net.au/education/learn-english/australian-vs-american-spelling/11244196 Australian spelling] (e.g., hypothesize vs. hypothesise; behavior vs. behaviour) ## Some words are misspelt (e.g., see the {{sp}} tags). Spell-checking tools are available in most internet browsers and word processing software packages. <!-- Written expression – Proofreading --> # Proofreading ## More proofreading is needed (e.g., fix punctuation and typographical errors) to bring the quality of written expression closer to a professional standard ## Remove unnecessary capitalisation – [https://polishedpaper.com/blog/capitalization-apa-style more info] <!-- Written expression – APA style --> # APA style ## Use [[w:Serial comma|serial comma]]s[https://www.buzzfeed.com/adamdavis/the-oxford-comma-is-extremely-important-and-everyone-should][https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gBx8ooDupXY] ## Use [https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/capitalization/diseases-disorders-therapies sentence casing (not capitals) for disorders, therapies, theories, etc.] ## [https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/numbers Express numbers under 10 using words (e.g., two) and 10 and over using numerals (e.g., 99)] <!-- Written expression – APA style - Quotes --> ## Use double (not single) quotation marks "to introduce a word or phrase used ... as slang, or as an invented or coined expression" ([https://apastyle.apa.org/products/publication-manual-7th-edition APA Style 7th ed.], 2020, p. 159) ## "Use quotation marks only for the first occurrence of the word or phrase, not for subsequent occurrences" ([https://apastyle.apa.org/products/publication-manual-7th-edition APA Style 7th ed.], 2020, p. 159) ## Direct quotes need page numbers—even better, communicate about concepts in your own words ## Direct quotes are overused—it is better to communicate about concepts in your own words <!-- Written expression – Figures --> ## Figures ### Very well/Well/Reasonably well captioned ### Brief captions; provide more detail to help connect the figure to the text ### Use this format for captions: '''Figure X'''. Descriptive caption goes here in sentence casing. [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Figures|See example]]. ### Add captions <!-- Written expression – Figures - Citations --> ### Each Figure is referred to at least once within the main text using APA style ### Each Figure is referred to at least once within the main text. 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See [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials|tutorials]] for guidance about how to get direct links to evidence. # Thanks for the Wiki Commons uploads # Thanks very much for your extensive contributions # Use a numbered list per [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials/Wiki editing|Tutorial 2]] # No logged contributions }} -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 09:47, 10 October 2026 (UTC) ==See also== * [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter|Book chapter guidelines]] * [[Template:METF]] * [[Template:MEMF]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Admin/2026]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter]] </noinclude> idasp7nodyvqhrg5i8c814n8ide3f6k 0 331201 2842295 2842243 2026-10-23T13:34:14Z StudentUC2026 3105303 GenAI Acknowledgement - This chapter involved minimal use of generative artificial intelligence following the Topic Development stage. Microsoft Copilot and Studiosity were used to assist the auther with reducing writer's block, providing feedback on draft sections, and supporting spelling, grammar, and formatting checks. These tools were used only to enhance clarity and expression; all theoretical content, analysis, and research interpretation were developed independently by the author. 2842295 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation:<br>What is expectancy-value theory and how can it be applied to understand and enhance educational motivation?}} __TOC__ ==Overview == {| style="width:100%; background:#FFE1F4; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0; padding:2px;" |- ! style="background:#F9C3E5; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0; padding:2px;" | Imagine this scenario |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:8px; border:0;" | <div style="background-color:#F6F4E7;{{Text color default}}; padding:8px; width:150px; float:right; text-align:center;"> [[File:Motivation Laptop.svg|150px|alt=A student reflecting on their motivation to learn]] <br> <span style="line-height:1.2; display:block; margin-top:2px;"> '''Figure 1'''. A student reflecting on their motivation to learn. </span> </div> You are sitting at your desk, working through a short maths quiz before dinner. The first question looks familiar, yet you pause, unsure whether you can solve it. You read it again, feeling a small wave of hesitation and mild frustration as you try to work out where to begin, see Figure 1. After a moment, you recall solving a similar problem last week, and your teacher mentioned you were on the right track. This memory gives you a small boost of confidence, enough to try the first step. As you work through the question, you start thinking about why you’re even doing this quiz. You remind yourself that completing these tasks helps you prepare for the upcoming test and supports your longer‑term academic goals. This shift in mindset increases your confidence and clarifies the importance of the task. The quiz feels more manageable, and you start working through the first question. With this renewed sense of direction, you continue working through the quiz. This scenario demonstrates how expectancy and task value shape a learner’s motivation during routine academic activities. Expectancy-value theory provides a clear framework for understanding how changes in confidence and task value affect a learner’s motivation. This theory proposes that motivation increases when learners feel capable of succeeding and when they view a task as important, useful, or aligned with their goals. |} This example illustrates how small shifts in confidence and perceived value can make everyday learning tasks feel either overwhelming or manageable. Many students experience fluctuating motivation during routine academic tasks, which can make learning feel overwhelming or discouraging. [[wikipedia:Expectancy-value_theory|Expectancy-value theory]] helps explain this pattern by showing how confidence (expectancy beliefs) and perceived importance or usefulness (task values) shape a learner’s motivation. This theory provides a [[wikipedia:Social_cognition|social-cognitive]] explanation of why students choose to engage in learning activities and offers evidence-based strategies to strengthen both expectancy beliefs and task values. The following sections outline these core components and show how to apply them in educational settings to support more adaptive learning behaviours. {| style="width:100%; background:#CBF2D3; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0;" |- ! style="background:#96E25B; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0;" | Focus questions |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:10px; border:0;" | * What is expectancy-value theory? * How do social‑cognitive models explain educational motivation? * How do expectancy beliefs influence educational motivation? * How do task values influence educational motivation? * How can expectancy-value theory be used to enhance motivation in educational settings? |} == What is expectancy-value theory? == [[File:Situated Expectancy-Value Theory SEVT Diagram.png|thumb|right|450px|'''Figure 2.''' Conceptual diagram illustrating expectancy‑value theory (EVT). Diagram created by author.]] Expectancy-value theory comes from research on student motivation, especially the work of Eccles and Wigfield (2000, 2002). The theory says that students are motivated by two main things: how confident they feel about doing a task and how much they value the task, which is seen in a conceptual flow chart in Figure 2. Expectancy is about whether a student believes they can succeed, and while task value describes how important, useful, or enjoyable the task feels, together these ideas shape how students approach schoolwork, how much effort they put in, and how long they keep trying. An example of this would be that a student is more likely to study for a maths test if they feel capable and believe the test will help them reach future goals (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). The theory includes several components that help explain why students respond differently to the same task. 'Expectancy' refers to beliefs about success, while task value includes four parts: intrinsic value, utility value, attainment value, and cost (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). 'Intrinsic value' is the level of enjoyment a student gets from the task, 'utility value' is about how well the task aligns with future goals, and 'attainment value' is about how important doing well in the task is to the student. 'Cost' refers to the downsides of doing the task, such as the amount of effort, time or stress required for the task. These components influence how worthwhile a task feels and how much time and energy students are willing to invest. Table 1 summarises these components with definitions and examples. Although expectancy-value theory is widely used, researchers have pointed out some limitations. Pintrich (2003) argues that the theory focuses too much on logical decision-making and does not fully consider emotional or social influences. Flake et al. (2015) also note that theory does not clearly explain how expectancies and values develop or why they differ between students. These critiques have led to updates of the theory, adding the “S” (situated) to EVT, which evolved EVT into situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT). This contemporary work emphasises how motivation changes across different contexts and learning environments (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). This new theory reflects a meaningful extension of EVT, highlighting how context actively shapes motivation. ==How do social-cognitive models explain educational motivation?== Social-cognitive models explain educational motivation by emphasising the beliefs students hold about their abilities and the value they assign to learning tasks. Bandura’s [[wikipedia:Self-efficacy|self-efficacy]] theory proposes that learners’ confidence in their capability to succeed strongly influences the choices they make, the effort they invest, and their persistence when facing challenges (Bandura, 1997). Building on this work, Pajares (1996) demonstrates that self-efficacy beliefs are powerful predictors of academic performance because they shape how students interpret difficulty and regulate their learning. Schunk and Pajares (2009) further explain that self-efficacy develops through experiences such as [[wikipedia:Mastery_learning|mastery]], feedback, and social comparison, which means classroom environments play a central role in shaping motivation. Self-efficacy theory and expectancy-value theory share an important similarity: both recognise that motivation is shaped not only by internal beliefs but also by the environment in which learning occurs. EVT makes a similar point through the development of situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT), which emphasises that expectancies and tasks shift value depending on the learning context. In both models, motivation is not fixed within the individual but is shaped by the interaction between personal beliefs and environmental factors. This overlap reflects the broader [[wikipedia:Nature_versus_nurture|nature-versus-nurture]] debate, showing that educational motivation emerges from both internal psychological processes (nature) and external influences such as teaching practices, feedback, and classroom climate (nurture). Although social-cognitive models emphasise how beliefs about ability and value shape motivation, other perspectives highlight different underlying processes. [[wikipedia:Self-determination_theory|Self-determination theory]] (Deci & Ryan, 2000) provides a useful contrast because it focuses on basic psychological needs such as autonomy, competence, and relatedness rather than cognitive appraisals of expectancy and value. EVT explains motivation through beliefs about ability and task importance, whereas SDT argues that motivation depends on whether learning environments support students’ sense of choice, capability, and connection. This comparison shows that EVT describes how students evaluate tasks, while SDT explains why those evaluations emerge, offering a complementary lens on the factors that shape educational motivation. == How do expectancy beliefs influence educational motivation? == Expectancy beliefs refer to students’ judgements about how capable they are of completing a task successfully. Eccles and Wigfield (2002) explain that these beliefs come from students' past achievements, their self-concept, and how difficult they think the task will be. When students believe they can succeed, they are more willing to start a task, put effort in and keep going when challenges arise or the task becomes more difficult. This makes expectancy beliefs a key part of understanding why some students engage strongly with schoolwork while others hold back. Bandura (1997), Pajares (1996), and Schunk and Pajares (2009) are key social-cognitive researchers who show how strongly expectancy beliefs influence students’ effort, persistence, and academic performance. Bandura’s work demonstrates that when students feel capable, they try harder and keep going when the task becomes difficult. Pajares (1996) adds that these beliefs shape how students interpret challenges and manage their learning. Schunk and Pajares (2009) explain that expectancy beliefs grow through experiences like mastery, feedback, and seeing others succeed. This suggests that classroom environments and teacher support play an important role in building students’ confidence. Together, these researchers show that expectancy beliefs are central to understanding why students engage differently with schoolwork. Expectancy beliefs help explain educational motivation because students who believe they can succeed are more likely to engage with learning tasks, keep trying when things get difficult and choose activities that support their academic progress (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Bandura, 1997). These beliefs shape how students understand classroom demands and influence how much effort they are willing to put in (Pajares, 1996). This is why students with similar abilities can show very different levels of motivation: it is not only their actual skill that matters, but what they believe they can achieve (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). Expectancy beliefs act as a motivational filter that guides how students approach schoolwork. Although expectancy beliefs are strong predictors of motivation, researchers point out several limitations. Critics argue that these models focus too heavily on cognitive judgements and overlook the emotional and contextual factors that influence how students engage. Pajares (1996) and Bandura (1997) show that confidence alone cannot fully explain motivation, especially when anxiety, stress, or negative classroom climates reduce students’ willingness to participate. A student may believe they are capable but still disengage if the environment feels overwhelming or unsupportive. These critiques highlight why newer approaches, such as situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT), emphasise how motivation shifts across different learning contexts. == How do task values influence educational motivation? == Expectancy-value theory proposes that students' motivation is shaped by how valuable they perceive a learning activity to be. Eccles and Wigfield (2000, 2002) outline four components of task value: '''intrinsic value, utility value, attainment value, and cost,''' and these components influence students' effort, persistence, and academic choices. === Intrinsic value === Intrinsic value refers to the enjoyment or interest students experience when engaging in a learning activity. Students are more motivated when they find tasks enjoyable or personally meaningful, and research consistently shows that intrinsic value predicts greater engagement and persistence (Eccles & Wigfield, 2000). Intrinsic value can vary across subjects and activities, which helps explain why students may feel highly motivated in one learning domain but less interested in another. === Utility value === Utility value reflects how useful a task is for achieving future goals. Students invest more effort when they believe a learning activity will help them progress academically or professionally (Harackiewicz & Hulleman, 2009). Recent meta-analytic work by Canning et al. (2018) shows that utility value interventions, which ask students to explain how course content connects to their personal goals, are particularly effective for learners with low initial expectancy beliefs. When students doubt their ability, highlighting usefulness can compensate for low confidence and increased engagement. This finding demonstrates that utility value interacts with expectancy beliefs, which reinforces the idea that motivation is shaped by both confidence and perceived relevance. === Attainment value === Attainment value refers to the personal importance of performing well on a task (Eccles & Wigfield, 2000). Students are motivated when success aligns with their identity, values, or self-concept. For example, a student who sees being good at maths as part of who they are is more likely to invest effort in maths-related tasks. Attainment value influences subject choices and long-term academic commitment, especially in domains that feel central to students' sense of self. === Cost === Cost represents the negative aspects of engaging in a task, including effort, stress, anxiety, and time demands. Although cost is grouped within the task value framework, it functions differently from the other components because it refers to the negative demands associated with a task rather than its motivational benefits. Flake et al., (2015) show that high perceived cost can reduce motivation even when intrinsic, utility, or attainment values are strong. Students may find a task enjoyable or useful but still disengage if the workload feels overwhelming or emotionally demanding. This helps explain why motivation can drop in situations where stress, pressure, or other academic pressures interfere with students' ability to engage with learning tasks. === Task value as a motivational process === Task values shape motivation by influencing how students judge whether a learning activity is worth their time and effort. This perspective aligns with socio-cognitive models, which emphasise how students evaluate the worth of academic tasks and how these evaluations shape engagement (Pintrich, 2003). While traditional expectancy-value theory focuses on relatively stable beliefs about enjoyment, usefulness, importance, and cost, more recent work highlights that these values can shift across situations. Situated expectancy-value theory extends EVT by emphasising that task values are context dependent (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). Classroom climate, social interactions, cultural background, and moment-to-moment experiences influence how students perceive enjoyment, usefulness, importance, and cost. This situational perspective explains why motivation fluctuates across different learning environments. {| class="wikitable" style="margin: auto;" |- ! style="background:#B3BBE4;{{Text color default}};" | Component ! style="background:#B3BBE4;{{Text color default}};" | Definition ! style="background:#B3BBE4;{{Text color default}};" | Example in education |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | '''Expectancy''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Belief about ability to succeed | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "I can pass this exam if I study." |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;;{{Text color default}};" | '''Intrinsic value''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Enjoyment or interest in the task | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "I enjoy learning psychology." |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | '''Utility value''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Usefulness for future goals | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "This unit is required for my degree." |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | '''Attainment value''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Importance to identity | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "Being good at maths matters to me." |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | '''Cost''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Negative aspects of engagement | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "This assignment is stressful and time-consuming." |} '''Table 1.''' Key components of expectancy-value theory and the relevance to educational motivation. {| style="width:100%; background:#FFE1F4; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0; padding:2px;" |- ! style="background:#F9C3E5; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0; padding:2px;" | Imagine this scenario |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:8px; border:0;" | <div style="background-color:#F6F4E7;{{Text color default}}; padding:8px; width:150px; float:right; text-align:center;"> [[File:Science Lab at Pace Brantley Preparatory School.jpg|Science_Lab_at_Pace_Brantley_Preparatory_School|150px|alt= Science student's engaging in a group activity]] <br> <span style="line-height:1.2; display:block; margin-top:2px;"> '''Figure 3.'''. Science students engaging in a group activity. </span> </div> You are sitting in a crowded classroom during a weekly science workshop. The activity involves a group problem-solving task that requires quick thinking and collaboration. As the task begins, you notice that the instructions feel unclear, and your group members start discussing ideas rapidly. You hesitate, unsure whether your contribution will be helpful. This uncertainty lowers your confidence, even though you usually feel capable when working on similar material in quieter settings. The noise in the room makes it difficult to concentrate, and you begin to question whether the task is worth the effort at this moment. You remind yourself that the activity is part of your assessment, but the immediate pressure and social dynamics make the task feel less manageable. This situation contrasts with the scenario at the beginning of this book chapter, where motivation was shaped by stable beliefs about ability and long-term goals. In the current example, motivation shifts in response to the environment, social interactions, and moment-to-moment changes in confidence. Situated expectancy-value theory explains these fluctuations by emphasising that expectancies and values are influenced by context and can vary across settings and activities (Eccles & Wigfield, 2020). Figure 3 illustrates how these situational influences interact with expectancy and task value, showing that motivation is shaped not only by learners’ beliefs but also by the conditions in which learning occurs. The learner’s confidence decreases because the classroom environment feels overwhelming, and the value of the task changes because the immediate demands differ from previous experiences. |} This scenario illustrates how expectancy and value can fluctuate in response to environmental and social cues, which reflects the situational perspective introduced in contemporary extensions of expectancy-value theory. Unlike the earlier example in the first scenario where motivation was guided by stable beliefs and long-term goals, this scenario shows how context can rapidly alter confidence and perceived task value. Situated expectancy-value theory highlights that motivation is shaped not only by what learners believe and value but also by the conditions under which learning takes place (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). == How can expectancy-value theory be used to enhance motivation in educational settings? == Expectancy-value theory can be applied in several practical ways to strengthen students’ motivation in educational settings. By targeting expectancy beliefs, task values and perceived cost, educators can shape how students think about their abilities, the importance of learning activities, and the effort required to complete them. The following sections outline key strategies grounded in EVT and explain how each can support more consistent and sustained engagement. ===Strengthening expectancy beliefs=== Strengthening expectancy beliefs is one way EVT can be used to enhance motivation in educational settings. Students are more willing to engage when they believe they can succeed, and teachers can support this by providing support and guidance with how to approach tasks, breaking the work into manageable steps and providing clear feedback. This will help build confidence strengthening their expectancy beliefs and enhancing motivation. Demonstrating effective strategies, such as thinking aloud while problem solving or showing how to organise information, helps students to see what successful performance looks like. Research shows that confidence develops through repeated experiences of mastery and supportive information, which increases students’ willingness to attempt challenging tasks (Bandura, 1997; Schunk & Pajares, 2009). By helping students build a realistic sense of competence, educators create conditions where expectancy beliefs contribute to stronger and more sustained motivation. ===Enhancing task value=== Enhancing task values is another way EVT can be applied to strengthen motivation in educational settings. Students are more likely to engage when they see learning activities as relevant, useful, or personally meaningful, therefore teachers can support this by explaining how tasks connect to future goals or real-world situations. Highlighting the purpose behind an activity helps students understand why it matters, and providing examples of how skills are used outside the classroom further strengthens students' perceptions of the task's usefulness. Research shows that when students recognise the value of what they are learning, they invest more effort and show greater persistence (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009). By making the significance of academic tasks clear, educators can help students develop stronger and more enduring task values. ===Reducing perceived cost=== Reducing perceived cost is another way EVT can be applied to strengthen motivation in educational settings. Students are less willing to engage when tasks feel overwhelming, stressful, or too time-consuming, and research shows that these experiences can lower motivation (Flake et al., 2015). Teachers can support students by creating classroom environments that minimise this pressure through manageable workloads, breaking tasks into smaller steps, and offering opportunities for autonomy. Supportive classroom climates also help reduce stress and anxiety, making students more comfortable asking questions and attempting challenging work. Lowering perceived cost has been shown to increase engagement even when students already hold high intrinsic, utility, or attainment value for a task (Flake et al., 2015), meaning that reducing stress and workload pressure can still make a meaningful difference for learners who otherwise see the activity as valuable. ===Hulleman's & Harackiewicz (2009), utility-value intervention=== A practical example of EVT in educational settings is the utility-value intervention, where students complete a short writing task that asks them to explain how a learning activity connects to their personal goals or future plans. This process helps students recognise the usefulness of what they are learning, which increases task value and encourages greater engagement. However, the writing component can be difficult for students with lower literacy skills, which limits the effectiveness of the intervention for those who may benefit from it the most, meaning the intervention may be most effective for students who already possess stronger academic abilities. This creates a paradox where the strategy can enhance motivation for students who need it least, while offering limited benefit, or even reducing confidence, for those who may benefit the most. Despite this limitation, the approach has been shown to improve motivation and academic performance, particularly for students with lower initial expectancy beliefs (Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009). ===Critique for applying EVT in educational settings=== Although expectancy-value theory provides clear framework for understanding educational motivation, several limitations affect how effectively it can be applied in real learning environments. One major issue is that increasing task values or expectancy beliefs may have limited impact when students face barriers such as poor teaching quality, limited resources, or high levels of stress and anxiety. These conditions can restrict students' opportunities to engage, even when they recognise the value of a task or believe they can succeed (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). A second limitation concerns measurement challenges, particularly in distinguishing between intrinsic, utility, and attainment value. Eccles (2005) notes that these components often overlap in real learning contexts, making them difficult to measure distinctly. Students may find a task enjoyable because it aligns with their identity, or view a task as useful because it is enjoyable. EVT also faces limitations with emotional influences, which traditional EVT underemphasises. EVT focuses primarily on cognitive appraisals of ability and value, yet research shows that emotions such as anxiety, stress, boredom, and frustration strongly shape students' willingness to engage (Pekrun, 2006; Pekrun et al., 2017). For example, a student may believe they are capable of completing a task but still disengage if they experience classroom pressures. These emotional processes interact with expectancy and value in ways that EVT does not fully explain, highlighting the need for models that incorporate affective and relational factors. Another critique involves cultural differences in value perceptions. EVT assumes that students evaluate tasks based on personal enjoyment, usefulness, and identity relevance, but these constructs vary across cultural contexts. Research shows that students in collectivist cultures often value tasks because they align with family expectations, social obligations, or group harmony rather than personal interest or identity (King & McInerney, 2014; Tomasetto et al., 2011). This means EVT-based interventions may not generalise across diverse cultural groups without adaptation, and the theory may oversimplify how students from different backgrounds interpret the importance or usefulness of academic tasks. These limitations highlight why contemporary extensions such as situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT) are necessary. SEVT addresses several gaps in traditional EVT by emphasising that expectancies and task values are not fixed traits but fluctuate across context, social environments, and moment-to-moment experiences (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). By incorporating situational, emotional, and relational influences, SEVT provides a more comprehensive explanation of how motivation changes in real learning environments. This contextual perspective helps account for variability in students' motivation and offers a more flexible foundation for designing interventions that respond to dynamic learning environments. {| style="width:100%; background:#DBEAFA; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0; padding:2px;" |- ! style="background:#B2E4FF; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0; padding:2px;" | Contemporary developments in expectancy-value theory: SEVT and the MUSIC model |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:8px; border:0;" | <div style="float:left; margin:10px 20px 10px 0; width:320px;"> [[File:MUSIC model of motivation diagram.png|335px|alt=MUSIC model diagram]] <br> <span style="line-height:1.2; display:block; margin-top:2px;"> '''''Figure 4'''. Author-created visual representation of the MUSIC Model of Motivation, adapted from Jones(2009,2018).'' </span> </div> ''' The MUSIC model of motivation '''<br> Recent developments in expectancy-value theory emphasise the role of context in shaping motivation, which has led to the emergence of situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT) and practical frameworks such as the MUSIC Model of Motivation (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020; Jones, 2018), see Figure 4. The MUSIC Model of Motivation (Jones, 2009; 2018) provides a practical framework that complements and extends SEVT. EVT explains how expectancy and task value influence motivation (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002), and SEVT emphasises how these beliefs fluctuate across contexts (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). However, neither framework specifies how educators can intentionally shape the contextual factors that influence motivation. The MUSIC model addresses this gap by identifying five classroom features: empowerment, usefulness, success, interest, and caring (Jones, 2009). These features influence students’ moment-to-moment expectancies and task values. '''Empowerment''' aligns with SEVT’s emphasis on contextual influences by giving students autonomy and control over their learning environment (Jones, 2018). This supports expectancy beliefs by helping students feel capable of directing their own learning, which is consistent with research on self-efficacy and mastery experiences (Bandura, 1997; Schunk & Pajares, 2009). Research by Jones and Skaggs (2016) shows that empowerment predicts increases in students' expectancy beliefs, which aligns with EVT's emphasis on confidence as a core driver of motivation. '''Usefulness''' corresponds directly to utility value in EVT and reinforces the idea that students are more motivated when they perceive tasks as relevant to their goals (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009). Utility value interventions (Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009) demonstrate that perceived usefulness increases engagement, reinforcing the MUSIC model’s claim that usefulness directly strengthens task value. '''Success''' reflects students’ confidence in achieving desired outcomes and strengthens expectancy beliefs, which aligns with both EVT and self-efficacy theory (Pajares, 1996). Success perceptions mirror EVT’s expectancy component, and empirical work consistently shows that confidence in achieving outcomes predicts persistence and performance (Bandura, 1997; Pajares, 1996). '''Interest''' aligns with intrinsic value by emphasising the role of enjoyment and engagement in shaping task value. Research shows that when students find learning enjoyable, they are more likely to sustain their engagement across different contexts (Eccles & Wigfield, 2000). <div style="float:right; background-color:#F6F4E7; padding:8px; width:150px; text-align:center; margin:10px 0 10px 20px;"> [[File:YouTube social white square (2024).svg|100px|alt=YouTube icon|link=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=De5U-GE4YkE]] <br> <span style="line-height:1.2; display:block; margin-top:2px;"> '''''Figure 5'''. Youtube video: Motivating Others (Ep. 3), Brett D. Jones'' </span> </div> '''Caring''' reflects the social and emotional climate of the classroom, an aspect underemphasised in traditional EVT but central to SEVT’s focus on contextual and relational influences (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020; Jones, 2018). Research shows that supportive teacher–student relationships strengthen both expectancy beliefs and task values, reinforcing SEVT’s emphasis on relational factors in moment to moment motivation (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). As shown in Figure 5 Brett D. Jones demonstrates how each MUSIC component can be implemented in classroom settings to strengthen students' expectancy beliefs and task values. Empirical research supports the connection between MUSIC and EVT/SEVT. Jones and Skaggs (2016) found that increases in empowerment, usefulness, and success predicted higher expectancy beliefs and task values. Together, these findings show that the MUSIC model provides a practical mechanism for applying EVT and SEVT because each component directly maps onto expectancy or value and is supported by empirical evidence. |} The MUSIC model aligns closely with EVT because each component corresponds to either expectancy or value. Empowerment and success strengthen expectancy beliefs by increasing students’ sense of control and confidence. Usefulness and interest map directly onto utility and intrinsic value, reinforcing the idea that students engage more when tasks feel relevant and enjoyable. Caring reflects contextual and relational influences that SEVT identifies as central to moment-to-moment changes in motivation. This mapping shows that MUSIC does not replace EVT but operationalises and complements it, offering educators concrete ways to shape the expectancy and value processes described by EVT and SEVT. == Knowledge checkpoint == {| style="width:100%; background:#F4CECE; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0; padding:2px;" |- ! style="background:#E07F87; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0; padding:2px;" | <big>Quiz</big> |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:2px; border:0;" | <div style="margin-top:-15px;"> <quiz display=simple> {Which component of expectancy-value theory refers to a student's belief about their ability to succeed? |type="()"} + Expectancy - Intrinsic value - Utility value - Cost {Which value component of EVT reflects how enjoyable or interesting a task is? |type="()"} - Attainment value + Intrinsic value - Utility value - Cost {What was added to the updated theory SEVT that was not a component of traditional EVT? |type="()"} - Stable, long-term beliefs about ability - The inclusion of cost value + The idea that motivation is shaped by situational and contextual factors - The addition of attainment value } </quiz> </div> |} ==Conclusion== This chapter explored what expectancy-value theory is, how social-cognitive models explain motivation, and how expectancy beliefs and task values influence students' engagement with learning. EVT shows that motivation is shaped by students' confidence and the value they assign to academic tasks however, contemporary research demonstrates that these beliefs shift across different environments and social conditions. Situated expectancy-value theory provides the most contemporary explanantion of motivation because it shows how expectancies and values shift in response to real-time contextual influences. This makes SEVT the key development moving forward, as it accounts for the moment-to-moment changes that occur in authentic learning environments. The MUSIC model complements SEVT by identifying specific contextual features that educators can design to strengthen students' motivation, including empowerment, usefulness, success, interest, and caring. Together, SEVT and the MUSIC model show that effective motivation is not about shaping the environments that influence those beliefs but about intentionally designing learning environments that strengthen expectancies and task values. This contemporary perspective offers a practical and evidence-based approach for supporting stronger and more consistent motivation in everyday classrooms. {| style="width:100%; background:#FEFB9F; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0;" |- ! style="background:#FFD208; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0;" | Take-home messages |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:10px; border:0;" | * Students engage more when they feel capable and see value in the task. * Clear feedback, manageable steps, and modelling strategies help build expectancy beliefs. * Connecting tasks to real-world relevance strengthens task value. *Reducing stress, workload pressure, and anxiety lowers perceived cost, supporting engagement. *SEVT highlights that motivation is context-sensitive, meaning classroom climate and task design matter. |} == See also == *[[Achievement motivation]] (Book chapter 2011) *[[wikipedia:Educational_psychology|Educational psychology]] (Wikipedia) *[[wikipedia:Expectancy-value_theory|Expectancy-value theory]] (Wikipedia) *[[wikipedia:Motivation|Motivation]] (Wikipedia) == External links == *[https://study.com/academy/lesson/video/the-expectancy-value-theory-of-motivation.html Expectancy-value theory video] (Study.com) *[https://www.simplypsychology.org/differences-between-extrinsic-and-intrinsic-motivation.html Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Motivation: What’s the Difference?] (Verywell Mind article) *[https://education.okstate.edu/site-files/documents/motivation-classrooms/motivation-minute-expectancy-value-theory.pdf Motivation minute: Expectancy-value theory] (Oklahoma State University, professional teaching resource) *[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=De5U-GE4YkE Expectancy-Value Theory - Motivating Others Ep. 3] (Brett D. Jones, PhD, Professor at Virginia Tech) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Bandura, A. (1997). ''Self-efficacy: The exercise of control.'' W. H. Freeman. Canning, E. A., Harackiewicz, J. M., Priniski, S. J., Hecht, C. A., Tibbetts, Y., & Hyde, J. S. (2018). Improving performance and retention in introductory biology with a utility-value intervention. ''Journal of Educational Psychology,'' 110(6), 834–849. https://doi.org/10.1037/edu0000244 Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self‑determination of behavior. ''Psychological Inquiry, 11''(4), 227–268. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1104_01 Eccles, J. S. (2005). Subjective task value and the Eccles et al. model of achievement-related choices. In A. J. Elliot & C. S. Dweck (Eds.), ''Handbook of competence and motivation'' (pp. 105–121). Guilford Press. Eccles, J. S., Adler, T. F., Futterman, R., Goff, S. B., Kaczala, C. M., Meece, J. L., & Midgley, C. (1983). Expectancies, values, and academic behaviors. In J. T. Spence (Ed.), ''Achievement and achievement motives'' (pp. 75–146). W. H. Freeman. Eccles, J. S., & Wigfield, A. (2002). Motivational beliefs, values, and goals. ''Annual Review of Psychology,'' 53(1), 109–132. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135153 EricEdwardWilson714. (2021, July 21). ''Science lab at Pace Brantley Preparatory School'' [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Science_Lab_at_Pace_Brantley_Preparatory_School.jpg Flake, J. K., Barron, K. E., Hulleman, C., McCoach, B. D., & Welsh, M. E. (2015). Measuring cost: The forgotten component of expectancy-value theory. ''Contemporary Educational Psychology, 41,'' 232–244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cedpsych.2015.03.002 Harackiewicz, J. M., & Priniski, S. J. (2018). Improving student outcomes in higher education: The science of targeted intervention. ''Annual Review of Psychology, 69,'' 409–435. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-122216-011725 Hulleman, C. S., & Harackiewicz, J. M. (2009). Promoting interest and performance in high school science classes. ''Science, 326''(5958), 1410–1412. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1177067 Jones, B. D., & Skaggs, G. (2016). Measuring students’ motivation: Validity evidence for the MUSIC Model of Academic Motivation Inventory. ''International Journal for the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning, 10''(1), Article 7. https://doi.org/10.20429/ijsotl.2016.10010 Jones, B. D. (2009). Motivating students to engage in learning: The MUSIC Model of Academic Motivation. ''International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, 21''(2), 272–285. Jones, B. D. (2018).''Motivating students by design: Practical strategies for professors.'' Virginia Tech Publishing. King, R. B., & McInerney, D. M. (2014). Culture’s consequences on student motivation: Capturing cross cultural differences in motivation using the Inventory of School Motivation. ''Educational Psychology, 34''(5), 513–535. https://doi.org/10.1080/00461520.2014.926813 Lazowski, R. A., & Hulleman, C. S. (2016). Motivation Interventions in Education: A Meta-Analytic Review. ''Review of Educational Research, 86''(2), 602–640. https://doi.org/10.3102/0034654315617832 Pajares, F. (1996). Self-efficacy beliefs in academic settings. ''Review of Educational Research, 66''(4), 543–578. https://doi.org/10.3102/00346543066004543 Pintrich, P. R. (2003). A Motivational Science Perspective on the Role of Student Motivation in Learning and Teaching Contexts. ''Journal of Educational Psychology, 95''(4), 667–686. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0663.95.4.667 S00246164. (2025).''Motivation Laptop.svg''[SVG image]. Wikiversity. https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/File:Motivation_Laptop.svg Schunk, D. H., & Pajares, F. (2009). Self-efficacy theory. In K. R. Wentzel & A. Wigfield (Eds.), ''Handbook of motivation at school'' (pp. 35–53). Routledge. Tomasetto, C., Alparone, F. R., & Cadinu, M. (2011). Girls’ math performance under stereotype threat: The moderating role of mothers’ gender stereotypes. ''Developmental Psychology, 47''(4), 943–949. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024047 Wigfield, A., & Cambria, J. (2010). Students’ achievement values, goal orientations, and interest: Definitions, development, and relations to achievement outcomes. ''Developmental Review,'' 30, 1–35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2009.12.001 Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (2000). Expectancy–Value Theory of Achievement Motivation. ''Contemporary Educational Psychology'', ''25''(1), 68–81. https://doi.org/10.1006/ceps.1999.1015 Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (2020). From expectancy–value theory to situated expectancy–value theory: A developmental, social cognitive, and sociocultural perspective on motivation. ''Contemporary Educational Psychology,'' 61, Article 101859. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cedpsych.2020.101859 }} nu1xbs8a8v3qt3o1lv5sx0wt7opdmif 2842305 2842295 2026-10-23T14:12:12Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Moved external links to correct spot 2842305 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation:<br>What is expectancy-value theory and how can it be applied to understand and enhance educational motivation?}} __TOC__ ==Overview == {| style="width:100%; background:#FFE1F4; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0; padding:2px;" |- ! style="background:#F9C3E5; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0; padding:2px;" | Imagine this scenario |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:8px; border:0;" | <div style="background-color:#F6F4E7;{{Text color default}}; padding:8px; width:150px; float:right; text-align:center;"> [[File:Motivation Laptop.svg|150px|alt=A student reflecting on their motivation to learn]] <br> <span style="line-height:1.2; display:block; margin-top:2px;"> '''Figure 1'''. A student reflecting on their motivation to learn. </span> </div> You are sitting at your desk, working through a short maths quiz before dinner. The first question looks familiar, yet you pause, unsure whether you can solve it. You read it again, feeling a small wave of hesitation and mild frustration as you try to work out where to begin, see Figure 1. After a moment, you recall solving a similar problem last week, and your teacher mentioned you were on the right track. This memory gives you a small boost of confidence, enough to try the first step. As you work through the question, you start thinking about why you’re even doing this quiz. You remind yourself that completing these tasks helps you prepare for the upcoming test and supports your longer‑term academic goals. This shift in mindset increases your confidence and clarifies the importance of the task. The quiz feels more manageable, and you start working through the first question. With this renewed sense of direction, you continue working through the quiz. This scenario demonstrates how expectancy and task value shape a learner’s motivation during routine academic activities. Expectancy-value theory provides a clear framework for understanding how changes in confidence and task value affect a learner’s motivation. This theory proposes that motivation increases when learners feel capable of succeeding and when they view a task as important, useful, or aligned with their goals. |} This example illustrates how small shifts in confidence and perceived value can make everyday learning tasks feel either overwhelming or manageable. Many students experience fluctuating motivation during routine academic tasks, which can make learning feel overwhelming or discouraging. [[wikipedia:Expectancy-value_theory|Expectancy-value theory]] helps explain this pattern by showing how confidence (expectancy beliefs) and perceived importance or usefulness (task values) shape a learner’s motivation. This theory provides a [[wikipedia:Social_cognition|social-cognitive]] explanation of why students choose to engage in learning activities and offers evidence-based strategies to strengthen both expectancy beliefs and task values. The following sections outline these core components and show how to apply them in educational settings to support more adaptive learning behaviours. {| style="width:100%; background:#CBF2D3; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0;" |- ! style="background:#96E25B; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0;" | Focus questions |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:10px; border:0;" | * What is expectancy-value theory? * How do social‑cognitive models explain educational motivation? * How do expectancy beliefs influence educational motivation? * How do task values influence educational motivation? * How can expectancy-value theory be used to enhance motivation in educational settings? |} == What is expectancy-value theory? == [[File:Situated Expectancy-Value Theory SEVT Diagram.png|thumb|right|450px|'''Figure 2.''' Conceptual diagram illustrating expectancy‑value theory (EVT). Diagram created by author.]] Expectancy-value theory comes from research on student motivation, especially the work of Eccles and Wigfield (2000, 2002). The theory says that students are motivated by two main things: how confident they feel about doing a task and how much they value the task, which is seen in a conceptual flow chart in Figure 2. Expectancy is about whether a student believes they can succeed, and while task value describes how important, useful, or enjoyable the task feels, together these ideas shape how students approach schoolwork, how much effort they put in, and how long they keep trying. An example of this would be that a student is more likely to study for a maths test if they feel capable and believe the test will help them reach future goals (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). The theory includes several components that help explain why students respond differently to the same task. 'Expectancy' refers to beliefs about success, while task value includes four parts: intrinsic value, utility value, attainment value, and cost (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). 'Intrinsic value' is the level of enjoyment a student gets from the task, 'utility value' is about how well the task aligns with future goals, and 'attainment value' is about how important doing well in the task is to the student. 'Cost' refers to the downsides of doing the task, such as the amount of effort, time or stress required for the task. These components influence how worthwhile a task feels and how much time and energy students are willing to invest. Table 1 summarises these components with definitions and examples. Although expectancy-value theory is widely used, researchers have pointed out some limitations. Pintrich (2003) argues that the theory focuses too much on logical decision-making and does not fully consider emotional or social influences. Flake et al. (2015) also note that theory does not clearly explain how expectancies and values develop or why they differ between students. These critiques have led to updates of the theory, adding the “S” (situated) to EVT, which evolved EVT into situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT). This contemporary work emphasises how motivation changes across different contexts and learning environments (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). This new theory reflects a meaningful extension of EVT, highlighting how context actively shapes motivation. ==How do social-cognitive models explain educational motivation?== Social-cognitive models explain educational motivation by emphasising the beliefs students hold about their abilities and the value they assign to learning tasks. Bandura’s [[wikipedia:Self-efficacy|self-efficacy]] theory proposes that learners’ confidence in their capability to succeed strongly influences the choices they make, the effort they invest, and their persistence when facing challenges (Bandura, 1997). Building on this work, Pajares (1996) demonstrates that self-efficacy beliefs are powerful predictors of academic performance because they shape how students interpret difficulty and regulate their learning. Schunk and Pajares (2009) further explain that self-efficacy develops through experiences such as [[wikipedia:Mastery_learning|mastery]], feedback, and social comparison, which means classroom environments play a central role in shaping motivation. Self-efficacy theory and expectancy-value theory share an important similarity: both recognise that motivation is shaped not only by internal beliefs but also by the environment in which learning occurs. EVT makes a similar point through the development of situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT), which emphasises that expectancies and tasks shift value depending on the learning context. In both models, motivation is not fixed within the individual but is shaped by the interaction between personal beliefs and environmental factors. This overlap reflects the broader [[wikipedia:Nature_versus_nurture|nature-versus-nurture]] debate, showing that educational motivation emerges from both internal psychological processes (nature) and external influences such as teaching practices, feedback, and classroom climate (nurture). Although social-cognitive models emphasise how beliefs about ability and value shape motivation, other perspectives highlight different underlying processes. [[wikipedia:Self-determination_theory|Self-determination theory]] (Deci & Ryan, 2000) provides a useful contrast because it focuses on basic psychological needs such as autonomy, competence, and relatedness rather than cognitive appraisals of expectancy and value. EVT explains motivation through beliefs about ability and task importance, whereas SDT argues that motivation depends on whether learning environments support students’ sense of choice, capability, and connection. This comparison shows that EVT describes how students evaluate tasks, while SDT explains why those evaluations emerge, offering a complementary lens on the factors that shape educational motivation. == How do expectancy beliefs influence educational motivation? == Expectancy beliefs refer to students’ judgements about how capable they are of completing a task successfully. Eccles and Wigfield (2002) explain that these beliefs come from students' past achievements, their self-concept, and how difficult they think the task will be. When students believe they can succeed, they are more willing to start a task, put effort in and keep going when challenges arise or the task becomes more difficult. This makes expectancy beliefs a key part of understanding why some students engage strongly with schoolwork while others hold back. Bandura (1997), Pajares (1996), and Schunk and Pajares (2009) are key social-cognitive researchers who show how strongly expectancy beliefs influence students’ effort, persistence, and academic performance. Bandura’s work demonstrates that when students feel capable, they try harder and keep going when the task becomes difficult. Pajares (1996) adds that these beliefs shape how students interpret challenges and manage their learning. Schunk and Pajares (2009) explain that expectancy beliefs grow through experiences like mastery, feedback, and seeing others succeed. This suggests that classroom environments and teacher support play an important role in building students’ confidence. Together, these researchers show that expectancy beliefs are central to understanding why students engage differently with schoolwork. Expectancy beliefs help explain educational motivation because students who believe they can succeed are more likely to engage with learning tasks, keep trying when things get difficult and choose activities that support their academic progress (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Bandura, 1997). These beliefs shape how students understand classroom demands and influence how much effort they are willing to put in (Pajares, 1996). This is why students with similar abilities can show very different levels of motivation: it is not only their actual skill that matters, but what they believe they can achieve (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). Expectancy beliefs act as a motivational filter that guides how students approach schoolwork. Although expectancy beliefs are strong predictors of motivation, researchers point out several limitations. Critics argue that these models focus too heavily on cognitive judgements and overlook the emotional and contextual factors that influence how students engage. Pajares (1996) and Bandura (1997) show that confidence alone cannot fully explain motivation, especially when anxiety, stress, or negative classroom climates reduce students’ willingness to participate. A student may believe they are capable but still disengage if the environment feels overwhelming or unsupportive. These critiques highlight why newer approaches, such as situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT), emphasise how motivation shifts across different learning contexts. == How do task values influence educational motivation? == Expectancy-value theory proposes that students' motivation is shaped by how valuable they perceive a learning activity to be. Eccles and Wigfield (2000, 2002) outline four components of task value: '''intrinsic value, utility value, attainment value, and cost,''' and these components influence students' effort, persistence, and academic choices. === Intrinsic value === Intrinsic value refers to the enjoyment or interest students experience when engaging in a learning activity. Students are more motivated when they find tasks enjoyable or personally meaningful, and research consistently shows that intrinsic value predicts greater engagement and persistence (Eccles & Wigfield, 2000). Intrinsic value can vary across subjects and activities, which helps explain why students may feel highly motivated in one learning domain but less interested in another. === Utility value === Utility value reflects how useful a task is for achieving future goals. Students invest more effort when they believe a learning activity will help them progress academically or professionally (Harackiewicz & Hulleman, 2009). Recent meta-analytic work by Canning et al. (2018) shows that utility value interventions, which ask students to explain how course content connects to their personal goals, are particularly effective for learners with low initial expectancy beliefs. When students doubt their ability, highlighting usefulness can compensate for low confidence and increased engagement. This finding demonstrates that utility value interacts with expectancy beliefs, which reinforces the idea that motivation is shaped by both confidence and perceived relevance. === Attainment value === Attainment value refers to the personal importance of performing well on a task (Eccles & Wigfield, 2000). Students are motivated when success aligns with their identity, values, or self-concept. For example, a student who sees being good at maths as part of who they are is more likely to invest effort in maths-related tasks. Attainment value influences subject choices and long-term academic commitment, especially in domains that feel central to students' sense of self. === Cost === Cost represents the negative aspects of engaging in a task, including effort, stress, anxiety, and time demands. Although cost is grouped within the task value framework, it functions differently from the other components because it refers to the negative demands associated with a task rather than its motivational benefits. Flake et al., (2015) show that high perceived cost can reduce motivation even when intrinsic, utility, or attainment values are strong. Students may find a task enjoyable or useful but still disengage if the workload feels overwhelming or emotionally demanding. This helps explain why motivation can drop in situations where stress, pressure, or other academic pressures interfere with students' ability to engage with learning tasks. === Task value as a motivational process === Task values shape motivation by influencing how students judge whether a learning activity is worth their time and effort. This perspective aligns with socio-cognitive models, which emphasise how students evaluate the worth of academic tasks and how these evaluations shape engagement (Pintrich, 2003). While traditional expectancy-value theory focuses on relatively stable beliefs about enjoyment, usefulness, importance, and cost, more recent work highlights that these values can shift across situations. Situated expectancy-value theory extends EVT by emphasising that task values are context dependent (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). Classroom climate, social interactions, cultural background, and moment-to-moment experiences influence how students perceive enjoyment, usefulness, importance, and cost. This situational perspective explains why motivation fluctuates across different learning environments. {| class="wikitable" style="margin: auto;" |- ! style="background:#B3BBE4;{{Text color default}};" | Component ! style="background:#B3BBE4;{{Text color default}};" | Definition ! style="background:#B3BBE4;{{Text color default}};" | Example in education |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | '''Expectancy''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Belief about ability to succeed | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "I can pass this exam if I study." |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;;{{Text color default}};" | '''Intrinsic value''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Enjoyment or interest in the task | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "I enjoy learning psychology." |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | '''Utility value''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Usefulness for future goals | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "This unit is required for my degree." |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | '''Attainment value''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Importance to identity | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "Being good at maths matters to me." |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | '''Cost''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Negative aspects of engagement | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "This assignment is stressful and time-consuming." |} '''Table 1.''' Key components of expectancy-value theory and the relevance to educational motivation. {| style="width:100%; background:#FFE1F4; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0; padding:2px;" |- ! style="background:#F9C3E5; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0; padding:2px;" | Imagine this scenario |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:8px; border:0;" | <div style="background-color:#F6F4E7;{{Text color default}}; padding:8px; width:150px; float:right; text-align:center;"> [[File:Science Lab at Pace Brantley Preparatory School.jpg|Science_Lab_at_Pace_Brantley_Preparatory_School|150px|alt= Science student's engaging in a group activity]] <br> <span style="line-height:1.2; display:block; margin-top:2px;"> '''Figure 3.'''. Science students engaging in a group activity. </span> </div> You are sitting in a crowded classroom during a weekly science workshop. The activity involves a group problem-solving task that requires quick thinking and collaboration. As the task begins, you notice that the instructions feel unclear, and your group members start discussing ideas rapidly. You hesitate, unsure whether your contribution will be helpful. This uncertainty lowers your confidence, even though you usually feel capable when working on similar material in quieter settings. The noise in the room makes it difficult to concentrate, and you begin to question whether the task is worth the effort at this moment. You remind yourself that the activity is part of your assessment, but the immediate pressure and social dynamics make the task feel less manageable. This situation contrasts with the scenario at the beginning of this book chapter, where motivation was shaped by stable beliefs about ability and long-term goals. In the current example, motivation shifts in response to the environment, social interactions, and moment-to-moment changes in confidence. Situated expectancy-value theory explains these fluctuations by emphasising that expectancies and values are influenced by context and can vary across settings and activities (Eccles & Wigfield, 2020). Figure 3 illustrates how these situational influences interact with expectancy and task value, showing that motivation is shaped not only by learners’ beliefs but also by the conditions in which learning occurs. The learner’s confidence decreases because the classroom environment feels overwhelming, and the value of the task changes because the immediate demands differ from previous experiences. |} This scenario illustrates how expectancy and value can fluctuate in response to environmental and social cues, which reflects the situational perspective introduced in contemporary extensions of expectancy-value theory. Unlike the earlier example in the first scenario where motivation was guided by stable beliefs and long-term goals, this scenario shows how context can rapidly alter confidence and perceived task value. Situated expectancy-value theory highlights that motivation is shaped not only by what learners believe and value but also by the conditions under which learning takes place (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). == How can expectancy-value theory be used to enhance motivation in educational settings? == Expectancy-value theory can be applied in several practical ways to strengthen students’ motivation in educational settings. By targeting expectancy beliefs, task values and perceived cost, educators can shape how students think about their abilities, the importance of learning activities, and the effort required to complete them. The following sections outline key strategies grounded in EVT and explain how each can support more consistent and sustained engagement. ===Strengthening expectancy beliefs=== Strengthening expectancy beliefs is one way EVT can be used to enhance motivation in educational settings. Students are more willing to engage when they believe they can succeed, and teachers can support this by providing support and guidance with how to approach tasks, breaking the work into manageable steps and providing clear feedback. This will help build confidence strengthening their expectancy beliefs and enhancing motivation. Demonstrating effective strategies, such as thinking aloud while problem solving or showing how to organise information, helps students to see what successful performance looks like. Research shows that confidence develops through repeated experiences of mastery and supportive information, which increases students’ willingness to attempt challenging tasks (Bandura, 1997; Schunk & Pajares, 2009). By helping students build a realistic sense of competence, educators create conditions where expectancy beliefs contribute to stronger and more sustained motivation. ===Enhancing task value=== Enhancing task values is another way EVT can be applied to strengthen motivation in educational settings. Students are more likely to engage when they see learning activities as relevant, useful, or personally meaningful, therefore teachers can support this by explaining how tasks connect to future goals or real-world situations. Highlighting the purpose behind an activity helps students understand why it matters, and providing examples of how skills are used outside the classroom further strengthens students' perceptions of the task's usefulness. Research shows that when students recognise the value of what they are learning, they invest more effort and show greater persistence (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009). By making the significance of academic tasks clear, educators can help students develop stronger and more enduring task values. ===Reducing perceived cost=== Reducing perceived cost is another way EVT can be applied to strengthen motivation in educational settings. Students are less willing to engage when tasks feel overwhelming, stressful, or too time-consuming, and research shows that these experiences can lower motivation (Flake et al., 2015). Teachers can support students by creating classroom environments that minimise this pressure through manageable workloads, breaking tasks into smaller steps, and offering opportunities for autonomy. Supportive classroom climates also help reduce stress and anxiety, making students more comfortable asking questions and attempting challenging work. Lowering perceived cost has been shown to increase engagement even when students already hold high intrinsic, utility, or attainment value for a task (Flake et al., 2015), meaning that reducing stress and workload pressure can still make a meaningful difference for learners who otherwise see the activity as valuable. ===Hulleman's & Harackiewicz (2009), utility-value intervention=== A practical example of EVT in educational settings is the utility-value intervention, where students complete a short writing task that asks them to explain how a learning activity connects to their personal goals or future plans. This process helps students recognise the usefulness of what they are learning, which increases task value and encourages greater engagement. However, the writing component can be difficult for students with lower literacy skills, which limits the effectiveness of the intervention for those who may benefit from it the most, meaning the intervention may be most effective for students who already possess stronger academic abilities. This creates a paradox where the strategy can enhance motivation for students who need it least, while offering limited benefit, or even reducing confidence, for those who may benefit the most. Despite this limitation, the approach has been shown to improve motivation and academic performance, particularly for students with lower initial expectancy beliefs (Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009). ===Critique for applying EVT in educational settings=== Although expectancy-value theory provides clear framework for understanding educational motivation, several limitations affect how effectively it can be applied in real learning environments. One major issue is that increasing task values or expectancy beliefs may have limited impact when students face barriers such as poor teaching quality, limited resources, or high levels of stress and anxiety. These conditions can restrict students' opportunities to engage, even when they recognise the value of a task or believe they can succeed (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). A second limitation concerns measurement challenges, particularly in distinguishing between intrinsic, utility, and attainment value. Eccles (2005) notes that these components often overlap in real learning contexts, making them difficult to measure distinctly. Students may find a task enjoyable because it aligns with their identity, or view a task as useful because it is enjoyable. EVT also faces limitations with emotional influences, which traditional EVT underemphasises. EVT focuses primarily on cognitive appraisals of ability and value, yet research shows that emotions such as anxiety, stress, boredom, and frustration strongly shape students' willingness to engage (Pekrun, 2006; Pekrun et al., 2017). For example, a student may believe they are capable of completing a task but still disengage if they experience classroom pressures. These emotional processes interact with expectancy and value in ways that EVT does not fully explain, highlighting the need for models that incorporate affective and relational factors. Another critique involves cultural differences in value perceptions. EVT assumes that students evaluate tasks based on personal enjoyment, usefulness, and identity relevance, but these constructs vary across cultural contexts. Research shows that students in collectivist cultures often value tasks because they align with family expectations, social obligations, or group harmony rather than personal interest or identity (King & McInerney, 2014; Tomasetto et al., 2011). This means EVT-based interventions may not generalise across diverse cultural groups without adaptation, and the theory may oversimplify how students from different backgrounds interpret the importance or usefulness of academic tasks. These limitations highlight why contemporary extensions such as situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT) are necessary. SEVT addresses several gaps in traditional EVT by emphasising that expectancies and task values are not fixed traits but fluctuate across context, social environments, and moment-to-moment experiences (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). By incorporating situational, emotional, and relational influences, SEVT provides a more comprehensive explanation of how motivation changes in real learning environments. This contextual perspective helps account for variability in students' motivation and offers a more flexible foundation for designing interventions that respond to dynamic learning environments. {| style="width:100%; background:#DBEAFA; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0; padding:2px;" |- ! style="background:#B2E4FF; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0; padding:2px;" | Contemporary developments in expectancy-value theory: SEVT and the MUSIC model |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:8px; border:0;" | <div style="float:left; margin:10px 20px 10px 0; width:320px;"> [[File:MUSIC model of motivation diagram.png|335px|alt=MUSIC model diagram]] <br> <span style="line-height:1.2; display:block; margin-top:2px;"> '''''Figure 4'''. Author-created visual representation of the MUSIC Model of Motivation, adapted from Jones(2009,2018).'' </span> </div> ''' The MUSIC model of motivation '''<br> Recent developments in expectancy-value theory emphasise the role of context in shaping motivation, which has led to the emergence of situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT) and practical frameworks such as the MUSIC Model of Motivation (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020; Jones, 2018), see Figure 4. The MUSIC Model of Motivation (Jones, 2009; 2018) provides a practical framework that complements and extends SEVT. EVT explains how expectancy and task value influence motivation (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002), and SEVT emphasises how these beliefs fluctuate across contexts (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). However, neither framework specifies how educators can intentionally shape the contextual factors that influence motivation. The MUSIC model addresses this gap by identifying five classroom features: empowerment, usefulness, success, interest, and caring (Jones, 2009). These features influence students’ moment-to-moment expectancies and task values. '''Empowerment''' aligns with SEVT’s emphasis on contextual influences by giving students autonomy and control over their learning environment (Jones, 2018). This supports expectancy beliefs by helping students feel capable of directing their own learning, which is consistent with research on self-efficacy and mastery experiences (Bandura, 1997; Schunk & Pajares, 2009). Research by Jones and Skaggs (2016) shows that empowerment predicts increases in students' expectancy beliefs, which aligns with EVT's emphasis on confidence as a core driver of motivation. '''Usefulness''' corresponds directly to utility value in EVT and reinforces the idea that students are more motivated when they perceive tasks as relevant to their goals (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009). Utility value interventions (Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009) demonstrate that perceived usefulness increases engagement, reinforcing the MUSIC model’s claim that usefulness directly strengthens task value. '''Success''' reflects students’ confidence in achieving desired outcomes and strengthens expectancy beliefs, which aligns with both EVT and self-efficacy theory (Pajares, 1996). Success perceptions mirror EVT’s expectancy component, and empirical work consistently shows that confidence in achieving outcomes predicts persistence and performance (Bandura, 1997; Pajares, 1996). '''Interest''' aligns with intrinsic value by emphasising the role of enjoyment and engagement in shaping task value. Research shows that when students find learning enjoyable, they are more likely to sustain their engagement across different contexts (Eccles & Wigfield, 2000). <div style="float:right; background-color:#F6F4E7; padding:8px; width:150px; text-align:center; margin:10px 0 10px 20px;"> [[File:YouTube social white square (2024).svg|100px|alt=YouTube icon|link=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=De5U-GE4YkE]] <br> <span style="line-height:1.2; display:block; margin-top:2px;"> '''''Figure 5'''. Youtube video: Motivating Others (Ep. 3), Brett D. Jones'' </span> </div> '''Caring''' reflects the social and emotional climate of the classroom, an aspect underemphasised in traditional EVT but central to SEVT’s focus on contextual and relational influences (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020; Jones, 2018). Research shows that supportive teacher–student relationships strengthen both expectancy beliefs and task values, reinforcing SEVT’s emphasis on relational factors in moment to moment motivation (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). As shown in Figure 5 Brett D. Jones demonstrates how each MUSIC component can be implemented in classroom settings to strengthen students' expectancy beliefs and task values. Empirical research supports the connection between MUSIC and EVT/SEVT. Jones and Skaggs (2016) found that increases in empowerment, usefulness, and success predicted higher expectancy beliefs and task values. Together, these findings show that the MUSIC model provides a practical mechanism for applying EVT and SEVT because each component directly maps onto expectancy or value and is supported by empirical evidence. |} The MUSIC model aligns closely with EVT because each component corresponds to either expectancy or value. Empowerment and success strengthen expectancy beliefs by increasing students’ sense of control and confidence. Usefulness and interest map directly onto utility and intrinsic value, reinforcing the idea that students engage more when tasks feel relevant and enjoyable. Caring reflects contextual and relational influences that SEVT identifies as central to moment-to-moment changes in motivation. This mapping shows that MUSIC does not replace EVT but operationalises and complements it, offering educators concrete ways to shape the expectancy and value processes described by EVT and SEVT. == Knowledge checkpoint == {| style="width:100%; background:#F4CECE; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0; padding:2px;" |- ! style="background:#E07F87; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0; padding:2px;" | <big>Quiz</big> |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:2px; border:0;" | <div style="margin-top:-15px;"> <quiz display=simple> {Which component of expectancy-value theory refers to a student's belief about their ability to succeed? |type="()"} + Expectancy - Intrinsic value - Utility value - Cost {Which value component of EVT reflects how enjoyable or interesting a task is? |type="()"} - Attainment value + Intrinsic value - Utility value - Cost {What was added to the updated theory SEVT that was not a component of traditional EVT? |type="()"} - Stable, long-term beliefs about ability - The inclusion of cost value + The idea that motivation is shaped by situational and contextual factors - The addition of attainment value } </quiz> </div> |} ==Conclusion== This chapter explored what expectancy-value theory is, how social-cognitive models explain motivation, and how expectancy beliefs and task values influence students' engagement with learning. EVT shows that motivation is shaped by students' confidence and the value they assign to academic tasks however, contemporary research demonstrates that these beliefs shift across different environments and social conditions. Situated expectancy-value theory provides the most contemporary explanantion of motivation because it shows how expectancies and values shift in response to real-time contextual influences. This makes SEVT the key development moving forward, as it accounts for the moment-to-moment changes that occur in authentic learning environments. The MUSIC model complements SEVT by identifying specific contextual features that educators can design to strengthen students' motivation, including empowerment, usefulness, success, interest, and caring. Together, SEVT and the MUSIC model show that effective motivation is not about shaping the environments that influence those beliefs but about intentionally designing learning environments that strengthen expectancies and task values. This contemporary perspective offers a practical and evidence-based approach for supporting stronger and more consistent motivation in everyday classrooms. {| style="width:100%; background:#FEFB9F; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0;" |- ! style="background:#FFD208; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0;" | Take-home messages |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:10px; border:0;" | * Students engage more when they feel capable and see value in the task. * Clear feedback, manageable steps, and modelling strategies help build expectancy beliefs. * Connecting tasks to real-world relevance strengthens task value. *Reducing stress, workload pressure, and anxiety lowers perceived cost, supporting engagement. *SEVT highlights that motivation is context-sensitive, meaning classroom climate and task design matter. |} == See also == *[[Achievement motivation]] (Book chapter 2011) *[[wikipedia:Educational_psychology|Educational psychology]] (Wikipedia) *[[wikipedia:Expectancy-value_theory|Expectancy-value theory]] (Wikipedia) *[[wikipedia:Motivation|Motivation]] (Wikipedia) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Bandura, A. (1997). ''Self-efficacy: The exercise of control.'' W. H. Freeman. Canning, E. A., Harackiewicz, J. M., Priniski, S. J., Hecht, C. A., Tibbetts, Y., & Hyde, J. S. (2018). Improving performance and retention in introductory biology with a utility-value intervention. ''Journal of Educational Psychology,'' 110(6), 834–849. https://doi.org/10.1037/edu0000244 Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self‑determination of behavior. ''Psychological Inquiry, 11''(4), 227–268. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1104_01 Eccles, J. S. (2005). Subjective task value and the Eccles et al. model of achievement-related choices. In A. J. Elliot & C. S. Dweck (Eds.), ''Handbook of competence and motivation'' (pp. 105–121). Guilford Press. Eccles, J. S., Adler, T. F., Futterman, R., Goff, S. B., Kaczala, C. M., Meece, J. L., & Midgley, C. (1983). Expectancies, values, and academic behaviors. In J. T. Spence (Ed.), ''Achievement and achievement motives'' (pp. 75–146). W. H. Freeman. Eccles, J. S., & Wigfield, A. (2002). Motivational beliefs, values, and goals. ''Annual Review of Psychology,'' 53(1), 109–132. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135153 EricEdwardWilson714. (2021, July 21). ''Science lab at Pace Brantley Preparatory School'' [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Science_Lab_at_Pace_Brantley_Preparatory_School.jpg Flake, J. K., Barron, K. E., Hulleman, C., McCoach, B. D., & Welsh, M. E. (2015). Measuring cost: The forgotten component of expectancy-value theory. ''Contemporary Educational Psychology, 41,'' 232–244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cedpsych.2015.03.002 Harackiewicz, J. M., & Priniski, S. J. (2018). Improving student outcomes in higher education: The science of targeted intervention. ''Annual Review of Psychology, 69,'' 409–435. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-122216-011725 Hulleman, C. S., & Harackiewicz, J. M. (2009). Promoting interest and performance in high school science classes. ''Science, 326''(5958), 1410–1412. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1177067 Jones, B. D., & Skaggs, G. (2016). Measuring students’ motivation: Validity evidence for the MUSIC Model of Academic Motivation Inventory. ''International Journal for the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning, 10''(1), Article 7. https://doi.org/10.20429/ijsotl.2016.10010 Jones, B. D. (2009). Motivating students to engage in learning: The MUSIC Model of Academic Motivation. ''International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, 21''(2), 272–285. Jones, B. D. (2018).''Motivating students by design: Practical strategies for professors.'' Virginia Tech Publishing. King, R. B., & McInerney, D. M. (2014). Culture’s consequences on student motivation: Capturing cross cultural differences in motivation using the Inventory of School Motivation. ''Educational Psychology, 34''(5), 513–535. https://doi.org/10.1080/00461520.2014.926813 Lazowski, R. A., & Hulleman, C. S. (2016). Motivation Interventions in Education: A Meta-Analytic Review. ''Review of Educational Research, 86''(2), 602–640. https://doi.org/10.3102/0034654315617832 Pajares, F. (1996). Self-efficacy beliefs in academic settings. ''Review of Educational Research, 66''(4), 543–578. https://doi.org/10.3102/00346543066004543 Pintrich, P. R. (2003). A Motivational Science Perspective on the Role of Student Motivation in Learning and Teaching Contexts. ''Journal of Educational Psychology, 95''(4), 667–686. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0663.95.4.667 S00246164. (2025).''Motivation Laptop.svg''[SVG image]. Wikiversity. https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/File:Motivation_Laptop.svg Schunk, D. H., & Pajares, F. (2009). Self-efficacy theory. In K. R. Wentzel & A. Wigfield (Eds.), ''Handbook of motivation at school'' (pp. 35–53). Routledge. Tomasetto, C., Alparone, F. R., & Cadinu, M. (2011). Girls’ math performance under stereotype threat: The moderating role of mothers’ gender stereotypes. ''Developmental Psychology, 47''(4), 943–949. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024047 Wigfield, A., & Cambria, J. (2010). Students’ achievement values, goal orientations, and interest: Definitions, development, and relations to achievement outcomes. ''Developmental Review,'' 30, 1–35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2009.12.001 Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (2000). Expectancy–Value Theory of Achievement Motivation. ''Contemporary Educational Psychology'', ''25''(1), 68–81. https://doi.org/10.1006/ceps.1999.1015 Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (2020). From expectancy–value theory to situated expectancy–value theory: A developmental, social cognitive, and sociocultural perspective on motivation. ''Contemporary Educational Psychology,'' 61, Article 101859. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cedpsych.2020.101859 }} == External links == *[https://study.com/academy/lesson/video/the-expectancy-value-theory-of-motivation.html Expectancy-value theory video] (Study.com) *[https://www.simplypsychology.org/differences-between-extrinsic-and-intrinsic-motivation.html Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Motivation: What’s the Difference?] (Verywell Mind article) *[https://education.okstate.edu/site-files/documents/motivation-classrooms/motivation-minute-expectancy-value-theory.pdf Motivation minute: Expectancy-value theory] (Oklahoma State University, professional teaching resource) *[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=De5U-GE4YkE Expectancy-Value Theory - Motivating Others Ep. 3] (Brett D. Jones, PhD, Professor at Virginia Tech) qcwsrbi4bpb9xbmqt2vwj8alxgx5u0q 2842306 2842305 2026-10-23T14:12:47Z StudentUC2026 3105303 2842306 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation:<br>What is expectancy-value theory and how can it be applied to understand and enhance educational motivation?}} __TOC__ ==Overview == {| style="width:100%; background:#FFE1F4; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0; padding:2px;" |- ! style="background:#F9C3E5; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0; padding:2px;" | Imagine this scenario |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:8px; border:0;" | <div style="background-color:#F6F4E7;{{Text color default}}; padding:8px; width:150px; float:right; text-align:center;"> [[File:Motivation Laptop.svg|150px|alt=A student reflecting on their motivation to learn]] <br> <span style="line-height:1.2; display:block; margin-top:2px;"> '''Figure 1'''. A student reflecting on their motivation to learn. </span> </div> You are sitting at your desk, working through a short maths quiz before dinner. The first question looks familiar, yet you pause, unsure whether you can solve it. You read it again, feeling a small wave of hesitation and mild frustration as you try to work out where to begin, see Figure 1. After a moment, you recall solving a similar problem last week, and your teacher mentioned you were on the right track. This memory gives you a small boost of confidence, enough to try the first step. As you work through the question, you start thinking about why you’re even doing this quiz. You remind yourself that completing these tasks helps you prepare for the upcoming test and supports your longer‑term academic goals. This shift in mindset increases your confidence and clarifies the importance of the task. The quiz feels more manageable, and you start working through the first question. With this renewed sense of direction, you continue working through the quiz. This scenario demonstrates how expectancy and task value shape a learner’s motivation during routine academic activities. Expectancy-value theory provides a clear framework for understanding how changes in confidence and task value affect a learner’s motivation. This theory proposes that motivation increases when learners feel capable of succeeding and when they view a task as important, useful, or aligned with their goals. |} This example illustrates how small shifts in confidence and perceived value can make everyday learning tasks feel either overwhelming or manageable. Many students experience fluctuating motivation during routine academic tasks, which can make learning feel overwhelming or discouraging. [[wikipedia:Expectancy-value_theory|Expectancy-value theory]] helps explain this pattern by showing how confidence (expectancy beliefs) and perceived importance or usefulness (task values) shape a learner’s motivation. This theory provides a [[wikipedia:Social_cognition|social-cognitive]] explanation of why students choose to engage in learning activities and offers evidence-based strategies to strengthen both expectancy beliefs and task values. The following sections outline these core components and show how to apply them in educational settings to support more adaptive learning behaviours. {| style="width:100%; background:#CBF2D3; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0;" |- ! style="background:#96E25B; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0;" | Focus questions |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:10px; border:0;" | * What is expectancy-value theory? * How do social‑cognitive models explain educational motivation? * How do expectancy beliefs influence educational motivation? * How do task values influence educational motivation? * How can expectancy-value theory be used to enhance motivation in educational settings? |} == What is expectancy-value theory? == [[File:Situated Expectancy-Value Theory SEVT Diagram.png|thumb|right|450px|'''Figure 2.''' Conceptual diagram illustrating expectancy‑value theory (EVT). Diagram created by author.]] Expectancy-value theory comes from research on student motivation, especially the work of Eccles and Wigfield (2000, 2002). The theory says that students are motivated by two main things: how confident they feel about doing a task and how much they value the task, which is seen in a conceptual flow chart in Figure 2. Expectancy is about whether a student believes they can succeed, and while task value describes how important, useful, or enjoyable the task feels, together these ideas shape how students approach schoolwork, how much effort they put in, and how long they keep trying. An example of this would be that a student is more likely to study for a maths test if they feel capable and believe the test will help them reach future goals (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). The theory includes several components that help explain why students respond differently to the same task. 'Expectancy' refers to beliefs about success, while task value includes four parts: intrinsic value, utility value, attainment value, and cost (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). 'Intrinsic value' is the level of enjoyment a student gets from the task, 'utility value' is about how well the task aligns with future goals, and 'attainment value' is about how important doing well in the task is to the student. 'Cost' refers to the downsides of doing the task, such as the amount of effort, time or stress required for the task. These components influence how worthwhile a task feels and how much time and energy students are willing to invest. Table 1 summarises these components with definitions and examples. Although expectancy-value theory is widely used, researchers have pointed out some limitations. Pintrich (2003) argues that the theory focuses too much on logical decision-making and does not fully consider emotional or social influences. Flake et al. (2015) also note that theory does not clearly explain how expectancies and values develop or why they differ between students. These critiques have led to updates of the theory, adding the “S” (situated) to EVT, which evolved EVT into situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT). This contemporary work emphasises how motivation changes across different contexts and learning environments (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). This new theory reflects a meaningful extension of EVT, highlighting how context actively shapes motivation. ==How do social-cognitive models explain educational motivation?== Social-cognitive models explain educational motivation by emphasising the beliefs students hold about their abilities and the value they assign to learning tasks. Bandura’s [[wikipedia:Self-efficacy|self-efficacy]] theory proposes that learners’ confidence in their capability to succeed strongly influences the choices they make, the effort they invest, and their persistence when facing challenges (Bandura, 1997). Building on this work, Pajares (1996) demonstrates that self-efficacy beliefs are powerful predictors of academic performance because they shape how students interpret difficulty and regulate their learning. Schunk and Pajares (2009) further explain that self-efficacy develops through experiences such as [[wikipedia:Mastery_learning|mastery]], feedback, and social comparison, which means classroom environments play a central role in shaping motivation. Self-efficacy theory and expectancy-value theory share an important similarity: both recognise that motivation is shaped not only by internal beliefs but also by the environment in which learning occurs. EVT makes a similar point through the development of situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT), which emphasises that expectancies and tasks shift value depending on the learning context. In both models, motivation is not fixed within the individual but is shaped by the interaction between personal beliefs and environmental factors. This overlap reflects the broader [[wikipedia:Nature_versus_nurture|nature-versus-nurture]] debate, showing that educational motivation emerges from both internal psychological processes (nature) and external influences such as teaching practices, feedback, and classroom climate (nurture). Although social-cognitive models emphasise how beliefs about ability and value shape motivation, other perspectives highlight different underlying processes. [[wikipedia:Self-determination_theory|Self-determination theory]] (Deci & Ryan, 2000) provides a useful contrast because it focuses on basic psychological needs such as autonomy, competence, and relatedness rather than cognitive appraisals of expectancy and value. EVT explains motivation through beliefs about ability and task importance, whereas SDT argues that motivation depends on whether learning environments support students’ sense of choice, capability, and connection. This comparison shows that EVT describes how students evaluate tasks, while SDT explains why those evaluations emerge, offering a complementary lens on the factors that shape educational motivation. == How do expectancy beliefs influence educational motivation? == Expectancy beliefs refer to students’ judgements about how capable they are of completing a task successfully. Eccles and Wigfield (2002) explain that these beliefs come from students' past achievements, their self-concept, and how difficult they think the task will be. When students believe they can succeed, they are more willing to start a task, put effort in and keep going when challenges arise or the task becomes more difficult. This makes expectancy beliefs a key part of understanding why some students engage strongly with schoolwork while others hold back. Bandura (1997), Pajares (1996), and Schunk and Pajares (2009) are key social-cognitive researchers who show how strongly expectancy beliefs influence students’ effort, persistence, and academic performance. Bandura’s work demonstrates that when students feel capable, they try harder and keep going when the task becomes difficult. Pajares (1996) adds that these beliefs shape how students interpret challenges and manage their learning. Schunk and Pajares (2009) explain that expectancy beliefs grow through experiences like mastery, feedback, and seeing others succeed. This suggests that classroom environments and teacher support play an important role in building students’ confidence. Together, these researchers show that expectancy beliefs are central to understanding why students engage differently with schoolwork. Expectancy beliefs help explain educational motivation because students who believe they can succeed are more likely to engage with learning tasks, keep trying when things get difficult and choose activities that support their academic progress (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Bandura, 1997). These beliefs shape how students understand classroom demands and influence how much effort they are willing to put in (Pajares, 1996). This is why students with similar abilities can show very different levels of motivation: it is not only their actual skill that matters, but what they believe they can achieve (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). Expectancy beliefs act as a motivational filter that guides how students approach schoolwork. Although expectancy beliefs are strong predictors of motivation, researchers point out several limitations. Critics argue that these models focus too heavily on cognitive judgements and overlook the emotional and contextual factors that influence how students engage. Pajares (1996) and Bandura (1997) show that confidence alone cannot fully explain motivation, especially when anxiety, stress, or negative classroom climates reduce students’ willingness to participate. A student may believe they are capable but still disengage if the environment feels overwhelming or unsupportive. These critiques highlight why newer approaches, such as situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT), emphasise how motivation shifts across different learning contexts. == How do task values influence educational motivation? == Expectancy-value theory proposes that students' motivation is shaped by how valuable they perceive a learning activity to be. Eccles and Wigfield (2000, 2002) outline four components of task value: '''intrinsic value, utility value, attainment value, and cost,''' and these components influence students' effort, persistence, and academic choices. === Intrinsic value === Intrinsic value refers to the enjoyment or interest students experience when engaging in a learning activity. Students are more motivated when they find tasks enjoyable or personally meaningful, and research consistently shows that intrinsic value predicts greater engagement and persistence (Eccles & Wigfield, 2000). Intrinsic value can vary across subjects and activities, which helps explain why students may feel highly motivated in one learning domain but less interested in another. === Utility value === Utility value reflects how useful a task is for achieving future goals. Students invest more effort when they believe a learning activity will help them progress academically or professionally (Harackiewicz & Hulleman, 2009). Recent meta-analytic work by Canning et al. (2018) shows that utility value interventions, which ask students to explain how course content connects to their personal goals, are particularly effective for learners with low initial expectancy beliefs. When students doubt their ability, highlighting usefulness can compensate for low confidence and increased engagement. This finding demonstrates that utility value interacts with expectancy beliefs, which reinforces the idea that motivation is shaped by both confidence and perceived relevance. === Attainment value === Attainment value refers to the personal importance of performing well on a task (Eccles & Wigfield, 2000). Students are motivated when success aligns with their identity, values, or self-concept. For example, a student who sees being good at maths as part of who they are is more likely to invest effort in maths-related tasks. Attainment value influences subject choices and long-term academic commitment, especially in domains that feel central to students' sense of self. === Cost === Cost represents the negative aspects of engaging in a task, including effort, stress, anxiety, and time demands. Although cost is grouped within the task value framework, it functions differently from the other components because it refers to the negative demands associated with a task rather than its motivational benefits. Flake et al., (2015) show that high perceived cost can reduce motivation even when intrinsic, utility, or attainment values are strong. Students may find a task enjoyable or useful but still disengage if the workload feels overwhelming or emotionally demanding. This helps explain why motivation can drop in situations where stress, pressure, or other academic pressures interfere with students' ability to engage with learning tasks. === Task value as a motivational process === Task values shape motivation by influencing how students judge whether a learning activity is worth their time and effort. This perspective aligns with socio-cognitive models, which emphasise how students evaluate the worth of academic tasks and how these evaluations shape engagement (Pintrich, 2003). While traditional expectancy-value theory focuses on relatively stable beliefs about enjoyment, usefulness, importance, and cost, more recent work highlights that these values can shift across situations. Situated expectancy-value theory extends EVT by emphasising that task values are context dependent (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). Classroom climate, social interactions, cultural background, and moment-to-moment experiences influence how students perceive enjoyment, usefulness, importance, and cost. This situational perspective explains why motivation fluctuates across different learning environments. {| class="wikitable" style="margin: auto;" |- ! style="background:#B3BBE4;{{Text color default}};" | Component ! style="background:#B3BBE4;{{Text color default}};" | Definition ! style="background:#B3BBE4;{{Text color default}};" | Example in education |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | '''Expectancy''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Belief about ability to succeed | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "I can pass this exam if I study." |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;;{{Text color default}};" | '''Intrinsic value''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Enjoyment or interest in the task | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "I enjoy learning psychology." |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | '''Utility value''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Usefulness for future goals | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "This unit is required for my degree." |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | '''Attainment value''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Importance to identity | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "Being good at maths matters to me." |- | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | '''Cost''' | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | Negative aspects of engagement | style="background:#CEEEF4;{{Text color default}};" | "This assignment is stressful and time-consuming." |} '''Table 1.''' Key components of expectancy-value theory and the relevance to educational motivation. {| style="width:100%; background:#FFE1F4; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0; padding:2px;" |- ! style="background:#F9C3E5; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0; padding:2px;" | Imagine this scenario |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:8px; border:0;" | <div style="background-color:#F6F4E7;{{Text color default}}; padding:8px; width:150px; float:right; text-align:center;"> [[File:Science Lab at Pace Brantley Preparatory School.jpg|Science_Lab_at_Pace_Brantley_Preparatory_School|150px|alt= Science student's engaging in a group activity]] <br> <span style="line-height:1.2; display:block; margin-top:2px;"> '''Figure 3.'''. Science students engaging in a group activity. </span> </div> You are sitting in a crowded classroom during a weekly science workshop. The activity involves a group problem-solving task that requires quick thinking and collaboration. As the task begins, you notice that the instructions feel unclear, and your group members start discussing ideas rapidly. You hesitate, unsure whether your contribution will be helpful. This uncertainty lowers your confidence, even though you usually feel capable when working on similar material in quieter settings. The noise in the room makes it difficult to concentrate, and you begin to question whether the task is worth the effort at this moment. You remind yourself that the activity is part of your assessment, but the immediate pressure and social dynamics make the task feel less manageable. This situation contrasts with the scenario at the beginning of this book chapter, where motivation was shaped by stable beliefs about ability and long-term goals. In the current example, motivation shifts in response to the environment, social interactions, and moment-to-moment changes in confidence. Situated expectancy-value theory explains these fluctuations by emphasising that expectancies and values are influenced by context and can vary across settings and activities (Eccles & Wigfield, 2020). Figure 3 illustrates how these situational influences interact with expectancy and task value, showing that motivation is shaped not only by learners’ beliefs but also by the conditions in which learning occurs. The learner’s confidence decreases because the classroom environment feels overwhelming, and the value of the task changes because the immediate demands differ from previous experiences. |} This scenario illustrates how expectancy and value can fluctuate in response to environmental and social cues, which reflects the situational perspective introduced in contemporary extensions of expectancy-value theory. Unlike the earlier example in the first scenario where motivation was guided by stable beliefs and long-term goals, this scenario shows how context can rapidly alter confidence and perceived task value. Situated expectancy-value theory highlights that motivation is shaped not only by what learners believe and value but also by the conditions under which learning takes place (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). == How can expectancy-value theory be used to enhance motivation in educational settings? == Expectancy-value theory can be applied in several practical ways to strengthen students’ motivation in educational settings. By targeting expectancy beliefs, task values and perceived cost, educators can shape how students think about their abilities, the importance of learning activities, and the effort required to complete them. The following sections outline key strategies grounded in EVT and explain how each can support more consistent and sustained engagement. ===Strengthening expectancy beliefs=== Strengthening expectancy beliefs is one way EVT can be used to enhance motivation in educational settings. Students are more willing to engage when they believe they can succeed, and teachers can support this by providing support and guidance with how to approach tasks, breaking the work into manageable steps and providing clear feedback. This will help build confidence strengthening their expectancy beliefs and enhancing motivation. Demonstrating effective strategies, such as thinking aloud while problem solving or showing how to organise information, helps students to see what successful performance looks like. Research shows that confidence develops through repeated experiences of mastery and supportive information, which increases students’ willingness to attempt challenging tasks (Bandura, 1997; Schunk & Pajares, 2009). By helping students build a realistic sense of competence, educators create conditions where expectancy beliefs contribute to stronger and more sustained motivation. ===Enhancing task value=== Enhancing task values is another way EVT can be applied to strengthen motivation in educational settings. Students are more likely to engage when they see learning activities as relevant, useful, or personally meaningful, therefore teachers can support this by explaining how tasks connect to future goals or real-world situations. Highlighting the purpose behind an activity helps students understand why it matters, and providing examples of how skills are used outside the classroom further strengthens students' perceptions of the task's usefulness. Research shows that when students recognise the value of what they are learning, they invest more effort and show greater persistence (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009). By making the significance of academic tasks clear, educators can help students develop stronger and more enduring task values. ===Reducing perceived cost=== Reducing perceived cost is another way EVT can be applied to strengthen motivation in educational settings. Students are less willing to engage when tasks feel overwhelming, stressful, or too time-consuming, and research shows that these experiences can lower motivation (Flake et al., 2015). Teachers can support students by creating classroom environments that minimise this pressure through manageable workloads, breaking tasks into smaller steps, and offering opportunities for autonomy. Supportive classroom climates also help reduce stress and anxiety, making students more comfortable asking questions and attempting challenging work. Lowering perceived cost has been shown to increase engagement even when students already hold high intrinsic, utility, or attainment value for a task (Flake et al., 2015), meaning that reducing stress and workload pressure can still make a meaningful difference for learners who otherwise see the activity as valuable. ===Hulleman's & Harackiewicz (2009), utility-value intervention=== A practical example of EVT in educational settings is the utility-value intervention, where students complete a short writing task that asks them to explain how a learning activity connects to their personal goals or future plans. This process helps students recognise the usefulness of what they are learning, which increases task value and encourages greater engagement. However, the writing component can be difficult for students with lower literacy skills, which limits the effectiveness of the intervention for those who may benefit from it the most, meaning the intervention may be most effective for students who already possess stronger academic abilities. This creates a paradox where the strategy can enhance motivation for students who need it least, while offering limited benefit, or even reducing confidence, for those who may benefit the most. Despite this limitation, the approach has been shown to improve motivation and academic performance, particularly for students with lower initial expectancy beliefs (Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009). ===Critique for applying EVT in educational settings=== Although expectancy-value theory provides clear framework for understanding educational motivation, several limitations affect how effectively it can be applied in real learning environments. One major issue is that increasing task values or expectancy beliefs may have limited impact when students face barriers such as poor teaching quality, limited resources, or high levels of stress and anxiety. These conditions can restrict students' opportunities to engage, even when they recognise the value of a task or believe they can succeed (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). A second limitation concerns measurement challenges, particularly in distinguishing between intrinsic, utility, and attainment value. Eccles (2005) notes that these components often overlap in real learning contexts, making them difficult to measure distinctly. Students may find a task enjoyable because it aligns with their identity, or view a task as useful because it is enjoyable. EVT also faces limitations with emotional influences, which traditional EVT underemphasises. EVT focuses primarily on cognitive appraisals of ability and value, yet research shows that emotions such as anxiety, stress, boredom, and frustration strongly shape students' willingness to engage (Pekrun, 2006; Pekrun et al., 2017). For example, a student may believe they are capable of completing a task but still disengage if they experience classroom pressures. These emotional processes interact with expectancy and value in ways that EVT does not fully explain, highlighting the need for models that incorporate affective and relational factors. Another critique involves cultural differences in value perceptions. EVT assumes that students evaluate tasks based on personal enjoyment, usefulness, and identity relevance, but these constructs vary across cultural contexts. Research shows that students in collectivist cultures often value tasks because they align with family expectations, social obligations, or group harmony rather than personal interest or identity (King & McInerney, 2014; Tomasetto et al., 2011). This means EVT-based interventions may not generalise across diverse cultural groups without adaptation, and the theory may oversimplify how students from different backgrounds interpret the importance or usefulness of academic tasks. These limitations highlight why contemporary extensions such as situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT) are necessary. SEVT addresses several gaps in traditional EVT by emphasising that expectancies and task values are not fixed traits but fluctuate across context, social environments, and moment-to-moment experiences (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). By incorporating situational, emotional, and relational influences, SEVT provides a more comprehensive explanation of how motivation changes in real learning environments. This contextual perspective helps account for variability in students' motivation and offers a more flexible foundation for designing interventions that respond to dynamic learning environments. {| style="width:100%; background:#DBEAFA; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0; padding:2px;" |- ! style="background:#B2E4FF; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0; padding:2px;" | Contemporary developments in expectancy-value theory: SEVT and the MUSIC model |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:8px; border:0;" | <div style="float:left; margin:10px 20px 10px 0; width:320px;"> [[File:MUSIC model of motivation diagram.png|335px|alt=MUSIC model diagram]] <br> <span style="line-height:1.2; display:block; margin-top:2px;"> '''''Figure 4'''. Author-created visual representation of the MUSIC Model of Motivation, adapted from Jones(2009,2018).'' </span> </div> ''' The MUSIC model of motivation '''<br> Recent developments in expectancy-value theory emphasise the role of context in shaping motivation, which has led to the emergence of situated expectancy-value theory (SEVT) and practical frameworks such as the MUSIC Model of Motivation (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020; Jones, 2018), see Figure 4. The MUSIC Model of Motivation (Jones, 2009; 2018) provides a practical framework that complements and extends SEVT. EVT explains how expectancy and task value influence motivation (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002), and SEVT emphasises how these beliefs fluctuate across contexts (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). However, neither framework specifies how educators can intentionally shape the contextual factors that influence motivation. The MUSIC model addresses this gap by identifying five classroom features: empowerment, usefulness, success, interest, and caring (Jones, 2009). These features influence students’ moment-to-moment expectancies and task values. '''Empowerment''' aligns with SEVT’s emphasis on contextual influences by giving students autonomy and control over their learning environment (Jones, 2018). This supports expectancy beliefs by helping students feel capable of directing their own learning, which is consistent with research on self-efficacy and mastery experiences (Bandura, 1997; Schunk & Pajares, 2009). Research by Jones and Skaggs (2016) shows that empowerment predicts increases in students' expectancy beliefs, which aligns with EVT's emphasis on confidence as a core driver of motivation. '''Usefulness''' corresponds directly to utility value in EVT and reinforces the idea that students are more motivated when they perceive tasks as relevant to their goals (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009). Utility value interventions (Hulleman & Harackiewicz, 2009) demonstrate that perceived usefulness increases engagement, reinforcing the MUSIC model’s claim that usefulness directly strengthens task value. '''Success''' reflects students’ confidence in achieving desired outcomes and strengthens expectancy beliefs, which aligns with both EVT and self-efficacy theory (Pajares, 1996). Success perceptions mirror EVT’s expectancy component, and empirical work consistently shows that confidence in achieving outcomes predicts persistence and performance (Bandura, 1997; Pajares, 1996). '''Interest''' aligns with intrinsic value by emphasising the role of enjoyment and engagement in shaping task value. Research shows that when students find learning enjoyable, they are more likely to sustain their engagement across different contexts (Eccles & Wigfield, 2000). <div style="float:right; background-color:#F6F4E7; padding:8px; width:150px; text-align:center; margin:10px 0 10px 20px;"> [[File:YouTube social white square (2024).svg|100px|alt=YouTube icon|link=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=De5U-GE4YkE]] <br> <span style="line-height:1.2; display:block; margin-top:2px;"> '''''Figure 5'''. Youtube video: Motivating Others (Ep. 3), Brett D. Jones'' </span> </div> '''Caring''' reflects the social and emotional climate of the classroom, an aspect underemphasised in traditional EVT but central to SEVT’s focus on contextual and relational influences (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020; Jones, 2018). Research shows that supportive teacher–student relationships strengthen both expectancy beliefs and task values, reinforcing SEVT’s emphasis on relational factors in moment to moment motivation (Wigfield & Eccles, 2020). As shown in Figure 5 Brett D. Jones demonstrates how each MUSIC component can be implemented in classroom settings to strengthen students' expectancy beliefs and task values. Empirical research supports the connection between MUSIC and EVT/SEVT. Jones and Skaggs (2016) found that increases in empowerment, usefulness, and success predicted higher expectancy beliefs and task values. Together, these findings show that the MUSIC model provides a practical mechanism for applying EVT and SEVT because each component directly maps onto expectancy or value and is supported by empirical evidence. |} The MUSIC model aligns closely with EVT because each component corresponds to either expectancy or value. Empowerment and success strengthen expectancy beliefs by increasing students’ sense of control and confidence. Usefulness and interest map directly onto utility and intrinsic value, reinforcing the idea that students engage more when tasks feel relevant and enjoyable. Caring reflects contextual and relational influences that SEVT identifies as central to moment-to-moment changes in motivation. This mapping shows that MUSIC does not replace EVT but operationalises and complements it, offering educators concrete ways to shape the expectancy and value processes described by EVT and SEVT. == Knowledge checkpoint == {| style="width:100%; background:#F4CECE; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0; padding:2px;" |- ! style="background:#E07F87; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0; padding:2px;" | <big>Quiz</big> |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:2px; border:0;" | <div style="margin-top:-15px;"> <quiz display=simple> {Which component of expectancy-value theory refers to a student's belief about their ability to succeed? |type="()"} + Expectancy - Intrinsic value - Utility value - Cost {Which value component of EVT reflects how enjoyable or interesting a task is? |type="()"} - Attainment value + Intrinsic value - Utility value - Cost {What was added to the updated theory SEVT that was not a component of traditional EVT? |type="()"} - Stable, long-term beliefs about ability - The inclusion of cost value + The idea that motivation is shaped by situational and contextual factors - The addition of attainment value } </quiz> </div> |} ==Conclusion== This chapter explored what expectancy-value theory is, how social-cognitive models explain motivation, and how expectancy beliefs and task values influence students' engagement with learning. EVT shows that motivation is shaped by students' confidence and the value they assign to academic tasks however, contemporary research demonstrates that these beliefs shift across different environments and social conditions. Situated expectancy-value theory provides the most contemporary explanantion of motivation because it shows how expectancies and values shift in response to real-time contextual influences. This makes SEVT the key development moving forward, as it accounts for the moment-to-moment changes that occur in authentic learning environments. The MUSIC model complements SEVT by identifying specific contextual features that educators can design to strengthen students' motivation, including empowerment, usefulness, success, interest, and caring. Together, SEVT and the MUSIC model show that effective motivation is not about shaping the environments that influence those beliefs but about intentionally designing learning environments that strengthen expectancies and task values. This contemporary perspective offers a practical and evidence-based approach for supporting stronger and more consistent motivation in everyday classrooms. {| style="width:100%; background:#FEFB9F; color:black; border-radius:12px; border:0;" |- ! style="background:#FFD208; color:black; border-radius:12px 12px 0 0; border:0;" | Take-home messages |- | style="border-radius:0 0 12px 12px; padding:10px; border:0;" | * Students engage more when they feel capable and see value in the task. * Clear feedback, manageable steps, and modelling strategies help build expectancy beliefs. * Connecting tasks to real-world relevance strengthens task value. *Reducing stress, workload pressure, and anxiety lowers perceived cost, supporting engagement. *SEVT highlights that motivation is context-sensitive, meaning classroom climate and task design matter. |} == See also == *[[Achievement motivation]] (Book chapter 2011) *[[wikipedia:Educational_psychology|Educational psychology]] (Wikipedia) *[[wikipedia:Expectancy-value_theory|Expectancy-value theory]] (Wikipedia) *[[wikipedia:Motivation|Motivation]] (Wikipedia) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Bandura, A. (1997). ''Self-efficacy: The exercise of control.'' W. H. Freeman. Canning, E. A., Harackiewicz, J. M., Priniski, S. J., Hecht, C. A., Tibbetts, Y., & Hyde, J. S. (2018). Improving performance and retention in introductory biology with a utility-value intervention. ''Journal of Educational Psychology,'' 110(6), 834–849. https://doi.org/10.1037/edu0000244 Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self‑determination of behavior. ''Psychological Inquiry, 11''(4), 227–268. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1104_01 Eccles, J. S. (2005). Subjective task value and the Eccles et al. model of achievement-related choices. In A. J. Elliot & C. S. Dweck (Eds.), ''Handbook of competence and motivation'' (pp. 105–121). Guilford Press. Eccles, J. S., Adler, T. F., Futterman, R., Goff, S. B., Kaczala, C. M., Meece, J. L., & Midgley, C. (1983). Expectancies, values, and academic behaviors. In J. T. Spence (Ed.), ''Achievement and achievement motives'' (pp. 75–146). W. H. Freeman. Eccles, J. S., & Wigfield, A. (2002). Motivational beliefs, values, and goals. ''Annual Review of Psychology,'' 53(1), 109–132. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135153 EricEdwardWilson714. (2021, July 21). ''Science lab at Pace Brantley Preparatory School'' [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Science_Lab_at_Pace_Brantley_Preparatory_School.jpg Flake, J. K., Barron, K. E., Hulleman, C., McCoach, B. D., & Welsh, M. E. (2015). Measuring cost: The forgotten component of expectancy-value theory. ''Contemporary Educational Psychology, 41,'' 232–244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cedpsych.2015.03.002 Harackiewicz, J. M., & Priniski, S. J. (2018). Improving student outcomes in higher education: The science of targeted intervention. ''Annual Review of Psychology, 69,'' 409–435. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-122216-011725 Hulleman, C. S., & Harackiewicz, J. M. (2009). Promoting interest and performance in high school science classes. ''Science, 326''(5958), 1410–1412. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1177067 Jones, B. D., & Skaggs, G. (2016). Measuring students’ motivation: Validity evidence for the MUSIC Model of Academic Motivation Inventory. ''International Journal for the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning, 10''(1), Article 7. https://doi.org/10.20429/ijsotl.2016.10010 Jones, B. D. (2009). Motivating students to engage in learning: The MUSIC Model of Academic Motivation. ''International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education, 21''(2), 272–285. Jones, B. D. (2018).''Motivating students by design: Practical strategies for professors.'' Virginia Tech Publishing. King, R. B., & McInerney, D. M. (2014). Culture’s consequences on student motivation: Capturing cross cultural differences in motivation using the Inventory of School Motivation. ''Educational Psychology, 34''(5), 513–535. https://doi.org/10.1080/00461520.2014.926813 Lazowski, R. A., & Hulleman, C. S. (2016). Motivation Interventions in Education: A Meta-Analytic Review. ''Review of Educational Research, 86''(2), 602–640. https://doi.org/10.3102/0034654315617832 Pajares, F. (1996). Self-efficacy beliefs in academic settings. ''Review of Educational Research, 66''(4), 543–578. https://doi.org/10.3102/00346543066004543 Pintrich, P. R. (2003). A Motivational Science Perspective on the Role of Student Motivation in Learning and Teaching Contexts. ''Journal of Educational Psychology, 95''(4), 667–686. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0663.95.4.667 S00246164. (2025).''Motivation Laptop.svg''[SVG image]. Wikiversity. https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/File:Motivation_Laptop.svg Schunk, D. H., & Pajares, F. (2009). Self-efficacy theory. In K. R. Wentzel & A. Wigfield (Eds.), ''Handbook of motivation at school'' (pp. 35–53). Routledge. Tomasetto, C., Alparone, F. R., & Cadinu, M. (2011). Girls’ math performance under stereotype threat: The moderating role of mothers’ gender stereotypes. ''Developmental Psychology, 47''(4), 943–949. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024047 Wigfield, A., & Cambria, J. (2010). Students’ achievement values, goal orientations, and interest: Definitions, development, and relations to achievement outcomes. ''Developmental Review,'' 30, 1–35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2009.12.001 Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (2000). Expectancy–Value Theory of Achievement Motivation. ''Contemporary Educational Psychology'', ''25''(1), 68–81. https://doi.org/10.1006/ceps.1999.1015 Wigfield, A., & Eccles, J. S. (2020). From expectancy–value theory to situated expectancy–value theory: A developmental, social cognitive, and sociocultural perspective on motivation. ''Contemporary Educational Psychology,'' 61, Article 101859. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cedpsych.2020.101859 }} == External links == *[https://study.com/academy/lesson/video/the-expectancy-value-theory-of-motivation.html Expectancy-value theory video] (Study.com) *[https://www.simplypsychology.org/differences-between-extrinsic-and-intrinsic-motivation.html Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Motivation: What’s the Difference?] (Verywell Mind article) *[https://education.okstate.edu/site-files/documents/motivation-classrooms/motivation-minute-expectancy-value-theory.pdf Motivation minute: Expectancy-value theory] (Oklahoma State University, professional teaching resource) *[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=De5U-GE4YkE Expectancy-Value Theory - Motivating Others Ep. 3] (Brett D. Jones, PhD, Professor at Virginia Tech) mayxiozejkywcleertytwtc7au9jaqr 2 331202 2842291 2842238 2026-10-23T13:16:16Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ 2842291 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] (pug cross beagle), and his name is Spike. He is not a fan of his ears, as they are floppy beagle ears, and his pug brain can't comprehend why he has heightened senses. == Book chapter I'm working on == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&oldid=2824868 ''Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)''] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|''Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)'']] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&action=edit&oldid=2842208 ''Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)''] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the ''[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)]'' chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Self-blame_and_emotion&oldid=2842229 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. gpuoosye8w8spgull88tdlhzj442r3z 2842292 2842291 2026-10-23T13:16:49Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* About me */ 2842292 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] (pug cross beagle), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter I'm working on == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&oldid=2824868 ''Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)''] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|''Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)'']] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&action=edit&oldid=2842208 ''Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)''] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the ''[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)]'' chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Self-blame_and_emotion&oldid=2842229 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. b2d1vkg8u7qr8619fxkak8bwzjhnm03 2842293 2842292 2026-10-23T13:19:15Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* About me */ Adding interwiki links 2842293 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&oldid=2824868 ''Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)''] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|''Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)'']] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&action=edit&oldid=2842208 ''Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)''] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the ''[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)]'' chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Self-blame_and_emotion&oldid=2842229 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. su6exxors9a5ook335hylqgluljuahm 2842294 2842293 2026-10-23T13:19:36Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ 2842294 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&action=edit&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Self-blame_and_emotion&oldid=2842229 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. rfkseaz3r5sgdj7tztidgvgps6tluf4 2842301 2842294 2026-10-23T13:57:12Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ Added social contributions 2842301 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&action=edit&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Self-blame_and_emotion&oldid=2842229 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments fa77le1616acuv7pkyibuyehwdnyn1t 2842302 2842301 2026-10-23T13:58:51Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ 2842302 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&action=edit&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Self-blame_and_emotion&oldid=2842229 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments # dy8m9b3bjihfzyzm35btf030cf0rg0f 2842304 2842302 2026-10-23T14:06:58Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ fixed embeded links as I just worked out how to compare versions 2842304 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments # p42tkp7flwycotnogpego1c0u5cgg23 2842307 2842304 2026-10-23T14:32:47Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* About me */ 2842307 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments # f9td92aotsmn5cptgl66g44p3fr5fko 2842308 2842307 2026-10-23T14:37:44Z StudentUC2026 3105303 2842308 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments # 05jbnl4yj3cgs43emb99j1rraj1eeqz 2842309 2842308 2026-10-23T14:40:35Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ 2842309 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #Provided conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons #Provided conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons fka6m0d3y3zj2cd1p9rn64lcg9smce3 2842310 2842309 2026-10-23T14:41:39Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ 2842310 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #Created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons #Created conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons 3qdazas15wvsg6h8c1hrj79forxveqr 2842375 2842310 2026-10-23T23:44:41Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ Embeded links to social contributions 13 and 14 2842375 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons]] #[[c:File:MUSIC_model_of_motivation_diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons]] 4k6n00x8cberqvey6xjuletx67jsv04 2842384 2842375 2026-10-24T00:07:30Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ added social contribution 2842384 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons]] #[[c:File:MUSIC_model_of_motivation_diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons]] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FE-cigarette_use_motivation&diff=2842383&oldid=2839021 24/10/2026 - E-cigarette use motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] sx20v5e9o6x1pa82bbh5wvpoz2cz409 2842400 2842384 2026-10-24T01:36:27Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ Added social contributions 2842400 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons]] #[[c:File:MUSIC_model_of_motivation_diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons]] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FE-cigarette_use_motivation&diff=2842383&oldid=2839021 24/10/2026 - E-cigarette use motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FEncouragement_and_motivation&diff=2842398&oldid=2814757 24/10/2026 - Encouragement and motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FCognitive_dissonance_and_balance_theory_in_social_attitudes&diff=2842399&oldid=2765098 24/10/2026 - Cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes (2025) book chapter direct edit] npjhcd7lhx6nzcr4enkpek68r7pc8gh 2842408 2842400 2026-10-24T03:23:25Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ Added social contributions 2842408 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons]] #[[c:File:MUSIC_model_of_motivation_diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons]] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FE-cigarette_use_motivation&diff=2842383&oldid=2839021 24/10/2026 - E-cigarette use motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FEncouragement_and_motivation&diff=2842398&oldid=2814757 24/10/2026 - Encouragement and motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FCognitive_dissonance_and_balance_theory_in_social_attitudes&diff=2842399&oldid=2765098 24/10/2026 - Cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FBoredom_and_substance_use&diff=2842406&oldid=2832228 24/10/2026 - Boredom and substance (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FRole-playing_game_motivation&diff=2842407&oldid=2814970 24/10/2026 - Role-playing game motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] # mj8w45w3m3fqefnfo2xhvzywshfyt32 2842410 2842408 2026-10-24T03:35:18Z StudentUC2026 3105303 Added social contribution 2842410 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons]] #[[c:File:MUSIC_model_of_motivation_diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons]] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FE-cigarette_use_motivation&diff=2842383&oldid=2839021 24/10/2026 - E-cigarette use motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FEncouragement_and_motivation&diff=2842398&oldid=2814757 24/10/2026 - Encouragement and motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FCognitive_dissonance_and_balance_theory_in_social_attitudes&diff=2842399&oldid=2765098 24/10/2026 - Cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FBoredom_and_substance_use&diff=2842406&oldid=2832228 24/10/2026 - Boredom and substance (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FRole-playing_game_motivation&diff=2842407&oldid=2814970 24/10/2026 - Role-playing game motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FSelf-disclosure_motivation&diff=2842409&oldid=2814974 24/10/2026 - Self-disclosure motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] # q1sacstobucf5hz9z4qcnts75uwq721 2842414 2842410 2026-10-24T04:46:03Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ Added social contribution 2842414 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons]] #[[c:File:MUSIC_model_of_motivation_diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons]] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FE-cigarette_use_motivation&diff=2842383&oldid=2839021 24/10/2026 - E-cigarette use motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FEncouragement_and_motivation&diff=2842398&oldid=2814757 24/10/2026 - Encouragement and motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FCognitive_dissonance_and_balance_theory_in_social_attitudes&diff=2842399&oldid=2765098 24/10/2026 - Cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FBoredom_and_substance_use&diff=2842406&oldid=2832228 24/10/2026 - Boredom and substance (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FRole-playing_game_motivation&diff=2842407&oldid=2814970 24/10/2026 - Role-playing game motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FSelf-disclosure_motivation&diff=2842409&oldid=2814974 24/10/2026 - Self-disclosure motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FHomeostasis_and_basic_drives&diff=2842413&oldid=2762239 24/10/2026 - Homeostasis and basic drives (2025) book chapter direct edit] r6zdosnssbjz52fkszh1p13c1ys8na0 2842415 2842414 2026-10-24T04:52:33Z StudentUC2026 3105303 2842415 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons]] for public use #[[c:File:MUSIC_model_of_motivation_diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons]] for public use #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FE-cigarette_use_motivation&diff=2842383&oldid=2839021 24/10/2026 - E-cigarette use motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FEncouragement_and_motivation&diff=2842398&oldid=2814757 24/10/2026 - Encouragement and motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FCognitive_dissonance_and_balance_theory_in_social_attitudes&diff=2842399&oldid=2765098 24/10/2026 - Cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FBoredom_and_substance_use&diff=2842406&oldid=2832228 24/10/2026 - Boredom and substance (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FRole-playing_game_motivation&diff=2842407&oldid=2814970 24/10/2026 - Role-playing game motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FSelf-disclosure_motivation&diff=2842409&oldid=2814974 24/10/2026 - Self-disclosure motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FHomeostasis_and_basic_drives&diff=2842413&oldid=2762239 24/10/2026 - Homeostasis and basic drives (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability b4g4ypfenb4bo6kkk93w5zsfht6sngw 2842418 2842415 2026-10-24T05:19:40Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ Added social contribution 2842418 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons]] for public use #[[c:File:MUSIC_model_of_motivation_diagram.png|Created conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons]] for public use #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FE-cigarette_use_motivation&diff=2842383&oldid=2839021 24/10/2026 - E-cigarette use motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FEncouragement_and_motivation&diff=2842398&oldid=2814757 24/10/2026 - Encouragement and motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FCognitive_dissonance_and_balance_theory_in_social_attitudes&diff=2842399&oldid=2765098 24/10/2026 - Cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FBoredom_and_substance_use&diff=2842406&oldid=2832228 24/10/2026 - Boredom and substance (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FRole-playing_game_motivation&diff=2842407&oldid=2814970 24/10/2026 - Role-playing game motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FSelf-disclosure_motivation&diff=2842409&oldid=2814974 24/10/2026 - Self-disclosure motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FHomeostasis_and_basic_drives&diff=2842413&oldid=2762239 24/10/2026 - Homeostasis and basic drives (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FScarcity_mindset_and_decision-making&diff=2842417&oldid=2821928 24/10/2026 - Scarcity mindset and decision-making (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability 6lygpvtgrk64z0fl0x3jklk0uvv0scp 2842419 2842418 2026-10-24T05:22:47Z StudentUC2026 3105303 2842419 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Media upload - created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons]] for public use #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Media upload - c]][[c:File:MUSIC_model_of_motivation_diagram.png|reated conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons]] for public use #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FE-cigarette_use_motivation&diff=2842383&oldid=2839021 24/10/2026 - E-cigarette use motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FEncouragement_and_motivation&diff=2842398&oldid=2814757 24/10/2026 - Encouragement and motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FCognitive_dissonance_and_balance_theory_in_social_attitudes&diff=2842399&oldid=2765098 24/10/2026 - Cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FBoredom_and_substance_use&diff=2842406&oldid=2832228 24/10/2026 - Boredom and substance (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FRole-playing_game_motivation&diff=2842407&oldid=2814970 24/10/2026 - Role-playing game motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FSelf-disclosure_motivation&diff=2842409&oldid=2814974 24/10/2026 - Self-disclosure motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FHomeostasis_and_basic_drives&diff=2842413&oldid=2762239 24/10/2026 - Homeostasis and basic drives (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FScarcity_mindset_and_decision-making&diff=2842417&oldid=2821928 24/10/2026 - Scarcity mindset and decision-making (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability o2gamewjq7jdythkkpk48khjivn6sun 2842420 2842419 2026-10-24T05:43:00Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ 2842420 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # 23/10.2026 - Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # 23/10.2026 - Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # 23/10.2026 - Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # 23/10.2026 - Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Media upload - created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons]] for public use #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Media upload - c]][[c:File:MUSIC_model_of_motivation_diagram.png|reated conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons]] for public use #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FE-cigarette_use_motivation&diff=2842383&oldid=2839021 24/10/2026 - E-cigarette use motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FEncouragement_and_motivation&diff=2842398&oldid=2814757 24/10/2026 - Encouragement and motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FCognitive_dissonance_and_balance_theory_in_social_attitudes&diff=2842399&oldid=2765098 24/10/2026 - Cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FBoredom_and_substance_use&diff=2842406&oldid=2832228 24/10/2026 - Boredom and substance (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FRole-playing_game_motivation&diff=2842407&oldid=2814970 24/10/2026 - Role-playing game motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FSelf-disclosure_motivation&diff=2842409&oldid=2814974 24/10/2026 - Self-disclosure motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FHomeostasis_and_basic_drives&diff=2842413&oldid=2762239 24/10/2026 - Homeostasis and basic drives (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FScarcity_mindset_and_decision-making&diff=2842417&oldid=2821928 24/10/2026 - Scarcity mindset and decision-making (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability o9xxf9fplb18ycoin4mqrdvi71eb1ff 2842421 2842420 2026-10-24T05:51:20Z StudentUC2026 3105303 /* Social contributions */ Adding dates of social contributions 2842421 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # 22/08/2026 - Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # 22/08/2026 - Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # 24/08/2026 - Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # 24/08/2026 - Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # 24/08/2026 - [[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Media upload - created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons]] for public use # 23/10.2026 - Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # 23/10/2026 - [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # 23/10/2026 - Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # 23/10/2026 - Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # 23/10/2026 - Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # 23/10/2026 - Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # 23/10/2026 - Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # 23/10/2026 - Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #[[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|20/10/2026 - Media upload - created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons for public useMedia upload - c]][[c:File:MUSIC_model_of_motivation_diagram.png|reated conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons]] for public use #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FE-cigarette_use_motivation&diff=2842383&oldid=2839021 24/10/2026 - E-cigarette use motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FEncouragement_and_motivation&diff=2842398&oldid=2814757 24/10/2026 - Encouragement and motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FCognitive_dissonance_and_balance_theory_in_social_attitudes&diff=2842399&oldid=2765098 24/10/2026 - Cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FBoredom_and_substance_use&diff=2842406&oldid=2832228 24/10/2026 - Boredom and substance (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FRole-playing_game_motivation&diff=2842407&oldid=2814970 24/10/2026 - Role-playing game motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FSelf-disclosure_motivation&diff=2842409&oldid=2814974 24/10/2026 - Self-disclosure motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FHomeostasis_and_basic_drives&diff=2842413&oldid=2762239 24/10/2026 - Homeostasis and basic drives (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FScarcity_mindset_and_decision-making&diff=2842417&oldid=2821928 24/10/2026 - Scarcity mindset and decision-making (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability cklo9hmq6p2im81asdkpe2tqf7xvo10 2842422 2842421 2026-10-24T06:14:14Z StudentUC2026 3105303 2842422 wikitext text/x-wiki == About me == Hi, my name is Allyn and I am a student at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra] and I am studying for an undergraduate degree in psychology. I am currently enrolled in the unit Motivation and Emotion and will be creating and producing a book chapter this semester. [[File:272-foto-de-snowboard.jpg|thumb|'''Figure 1'''. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bluebird%20day?utm_source=copilot.com Bluebird day] at the snow]] Hobbies: * Gaming * [[w:Snowboarding|Snowboarding]] * Exploring new places Pets: * Dog – A [[wikipedia:Puggle|puggle]] ([[wikipedia:Pug|pug]] cross [[wikipedia:Beagle|beagle]]), and his name is Spike. == Book chapter == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation|Expectancy-value theory of educational motivation]] == Social contributions == # 22/08/2026 - Left constructive feedback on the [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment|Immersive therapy for PTSD treatment (2026)]] chapter, highlighting its strong theoretical integration and high-quality topic development. # 22/08/2026 - Contributed to the UC Learn [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/455468 topic development discussion] by clarifying the use of custom boxes and colour choices for Wikiversity formatting. # 24/08/2026 - Identified and flagged a dead link in the book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2011/Achievement_motivation&oldid=2824902 Achievement motivation (2011)] # 24/08/2026 - Improved the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2824868 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] chapter by adding an explanation of expectancy-value theory to strengthen the theoretical integration of cultural constructs with achievement motivation. # 24/08/2026 - [[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|Media upload - created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons]] for public use # [[c:File:Situated_Expectancy-Value_Theory_SEVT_Diagram.png|20/10/2026 - Media upload - created conceptual diagram of EVT uploaded to wiki commons for public useMedia upload - c]][[c:File:MUSIC_model_of_motivation_diagram.png|reated conceptual diagram of the MUSIC model of motivation uploaded to wiki commons]] for public use # 23/10.2026 - Posted to discussion forum on UCLearn answering the question [https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/456345 "How do you motivate yourself?"] # 23/10/2026 - [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2025/Cultural_differences_in_achievement_motivation&diff=prev&oldid=2842234 Cultural differences in achievement motivation (2025)] - Direct edit # 23/10/2026 - Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Automaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=prev&oldid=2842208 Automaticity and goal pursuit (2026)] chapter. Provided an evidence-based resource related to Type 1/Type 2 processing and dual-process theory. # 23/10/2026 - Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Romantic rejection and emotional response (2026)] chapter, sharing a self‑compassion reference that complements the emotion regulation section. # 23/10/2026 - Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Romantic_rejection_and_emotional_response&diff=prev&oldid=2842215 Self-blame and emotion (2026)] chapter. Provided useful recent research links to relevant self-blame and emotional outcomes. # 23/10/2026 - Posted a discussion comment on the [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Boredom_and_interest&diff=prev&oldid=2842228 Boredom and interest (2026)] chapter. Provided a useful evidence-based perspective on flow theory as a complementary concept to interest. # 23/10/2026 - Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842296&oldid=2836828 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025).] Improved readability # 23/10/2026 - Direct edit to book chapter [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FAdenosine_and_sleep_motivation&diff=2842297&oldid=2842296 Adenosine and sleep motivation: Difference between revisions (2025)]. Removed em dashes throughout and made minor adjustments #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FE-cigarette_use_motivation&diff=2842383&oldid=2839021 24/10/2026 - E-cigarette use motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FEncouragement_and_motivation&diff=2842398&oldid=2814757 24/10/2026 - Encouragement and motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FCognitive_dissonance_and_balance_theory_in_social_attitudes&diff=2842399&oldid=2765098 24/10/2026 - Cognitive dissonance and balance theory in social attitudes (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FBoredom_and_substance_use&diff=2842406&oldid=2832228 24/10/2026 - Boredom and substance (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FRole-playing_game_motivation&diff=2842407&oldid=2814970 24/10/2026 - Role-playing game motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FSelf-disclosure_motivation&diff=2842409&oldid=2814974 24/10/2026 - Self-disclosure motivation (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FHomeostasis_and_basic_drives&diff=2842413&oldid=2762239 24/10/2026 - Homeostasis and basic drives (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2025%2FScarcity_mindset_and_decision-making&diff=2842417&oldid=2821928 24/10/2026 - Scarcity mindset and decision-making (2025) book chapter direct edit] - spelling and grammar corrections throughout and improved readability iytm1zql2wz7m3v7b1kk1ifzd3jyyua 2 331318 2842363 2838727 2026-10-23T22:30:51Z Jtneill 10242 Fix spelling 2842363 wikitext text/x-wiki == About Me == I am J Labuschagne, a student of Dr. James Neill's class [[Motivation and emotion|Motivation and Emotion]] at the [https://www.canberra.edu.au/ University of Canberra].[[File:Cognitive Science Hexagon.svg|thumb|'''Figure 1.''' The interdisciplinary underpinnings of cognitive science.]]My research interests are: * The intersection between [[cognitive science]] and [[w:Computer_science|computer science]]. * Learning science * Motivation and Emotion == Motivation and Emotion Book Chapter 2026 == [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026/Lifelong learning motivation|Lifelong learning motivation]] == Social Contributions == # [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2026%2FAutomaticity_and_goal_pursuit&diff=2827038&oldid=2827029 Added and populated template with existing content] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Mesolimbic_pathway_and_addiction_motivation&oldid=2827366 Suggested potentially useful source on discussion page] #[https://uclearn.canberra.edu.au/courses/20143/discussion_topics/457809 Contributed to book chapter discussion on UClearn] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Lifelong_learning_motivation&action=history Adapted and uploaded figure to Wikiversity] #[https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion/Book/2026/Mesolimbic_pathway_and_addiction_motivation&action=history Added quiz focused quiz to book chapter] 7e4hi9pk94rhkw0tq58o74d5se3d3cr 1 331321 2842368 2839090 2026-10-23T23:10:23Z Jtneill 10242 Book chapter feedback 2842368 wikitext text/x-wiki == A potential reading for you to explore == Hi! I have previously looked at some resources related to this topic. [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001691822003316 Self-motivated and directed learning across the lifespan] may be of use to you :) [[User:U3275940|U3275940]] ([[User talk:U3275940|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/U3275940|contribs]]) 02:21, 20 August 2026 (UTC) <!-- Official topic development feedback --> {{METF/2026 |1= <!-- Title --> # Title and subtitle are correctly worded and use [[w:Letter case#Sentence casing|sentence casing]] |2= <!-- Headings --> <!-- 1-level --> # Promising [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Major project/Structure|1-level heading structure]] – could benefit from further development (e.g., consider using subheadings) # Headings could be more detailed <!-- Alignment with focus questions --> # Excellent alignment between sub-title, focus questions, and heading structure |3= <!-- Overview--> # Excellent – Scenario, image, evocative description of the problem/topic, and focus questions <!-- Scenario --> # A scenario or case study is presented in a feature box with an image at the start of this section # Use an image rather than a diagram to help attract reader interest <!-- Description --> # A clear description of the problem/topic is planned or presented # Focus questions are aligned with sub-title and top-level headings <!-- Key points--> <!-- Overall --> # Key points are well developed for each section # The theoretical perspectives could be further developed, with consideration of relevant research # Provide more detailed [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] <!-- Scope --> # The scope is excellent (i.e., not too little/narrow or too big/broad) <!-- Theory and research --> # Strive for an integrated balance of the best psychological theory and research about this topic, with practical examples. <!-- Conclusion --> # Conclusion is underway # What are the practical, take-home messages? (address the focus questions) |5= <!-- Figure --> # Excellent - Relevant figure(s) presented, captioned, and cited # Move the diagram into a subsequent section; use an image in the scenario <!-- Caption --> # Figure caption(s) provide(s) a clear, appropriately detailed description that is meaningfully connected with the main text <!-- Cite --> # Figure(s) are cited at least once in the main text <!-- Creation --> # Well done on creating and uploading your own image! {{smile}}—this can also be listed on your user page as a social contribution |6= <!-- Learning feature --> <!-- Interwiki links ---> # Excellent in-text [[m:Help:Interwiki linking|interwiki links]] for first mention of key terms to [[w:|Wikipedia]]. Also embed links to [[Motivation and emotion/Book|book chapters]]. <!-- Scenarios/examples/case studies --> # Consider use of more scenarios/examples/case studies <!-- Quiz --> # Excellent use of quiz question(s) <!-- Tables --> # Also consider using tables to summarise key information |7= <!-- References --> <!-- Overall --> # Very good <!-- Systematic reviews --> # At least one relevant systematic review and/or meta-analysis has been identified <!-- APA style --> # Check and correct [https://apastyle.apa.org/instructional-aids/reference-guide.pdf APA referencing style]: ## capitalisation ## [[Help:Wikitext quick reference|italicisation]] |8= <!-- Resources --> <!-- See also --> # See also ## Excellent <!-- External links --> # External links ## Excellent ## Very good |9= <!-- User page --> # Used effectively <!-- Description about self --> # Brief description about self – consider expanding <!-- Links to profile(s) --> # Consider linking to your [https://portfolio.canberra.edu.au/ eportfolio] page and/or any other professional online profile or resume such as [https://www.linkedin.com/ LinkedIn]. This is not required, but it can be useful to interlink your professional networks. <!-- Link to book chapter --> # A link to the book chapter is provided |10= <!-- Social contribution --> # Excellent – at least three different types of contributions with direct link(s) to evidence }} -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 10:53, 5 September 2026 (UTC) == Edits == Hi, I just made some minor edits for you. Check the edits to see. Good job! [[User:U3261207|U3261207]] ([[User talk:U3261207|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/U3261207|contribs]]) 06:12, 8 October 2026 (UTC) == Recommendations == Hi there! This chapter addresses an important topic, and the classroom scenario effectively demonstrates how gendered socialisation may shape achievement motivation. Attribution theory and expectancy-value theory are relevant choices, but much of the chapter currently reads as planning notes rather than a completed discussion. Developing the bullet points into full paragraphs, explaining the mechanisms connecting gendered experiences with competence beliefs and task values, and avoiding broad generalisations about women and men would strengthen the analysis. The chapter would also benefit from more recent peer-reviewed research, consideration of cultural and intersectional differences, additional learning features, removal of template instructions and a complete conclusion that answers the subtitle question. Best of luck and amazing work! [[User:U3275909|U3275909]] ([[User talk:U3275909|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/U3275909|contribs]]) 00:07, 11 October 2026 (UTC) == External resources suggestion == Hey, really well done on your book chapter :) I can see the effort that you put in. The scenario is very personalised, it asks the person to really reflect on their own experience as they are reading. The quizzes and learning features are integrated really nicely, complementing the research. The only thing I can suggest is some external resources I found, that may be of interest to you: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-lifelong-learning-podcast/id1278570933 Chris Maguire's lifelong learning podcast interviews educators on varying topics related to lifelong learning. Each episode is a different topic. https://lifelonglearn.substack.com/ Lifelong learning club by Eva Keiffenheim MSc goes through learning strategies and research that you have mentioned, also I find it personally interesting as it includes AI as a tool to "augment cognition". < Although substack is more for general research, not peer-reviewed. [[User:U3282656|U3282656]] ([[User talk:U3282656|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/U3282656|contribs]]) 11:49, 11 October 2026 (UTC) <!-- Official book chapter feedback --> {{MEBF/2026 |1= <!-- Overall comments... --> # This is an very good chapter that makes excellent use of psychological theory and good use research to address a practical, real-world phenomenon or problem <!-- Overall - Edit summaries --> #* Insufficient use [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] to describe the changes made in each edit <!-- Overall – Citations --> # Very good use of academic, peer-reviewed citations to support claims <!-- Overall – Word count --> # Over the [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter#Wordcount|maximum word count]]. 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See [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials|tutorials]] for guidance about how to get direct links to evidence. # 2 non-logged Wikimedia Commons uploads }} -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 23:10, 23 October 2026 (UTC) 0v1xsf6w4hcku18f9lh9v4gl5o819lt 0 331379 2842344 2839553 2026-10-23T21:18:43Z Jtneill 10242 Copyediting 2842344 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Athletic identity loss and returning to sport after injury:<br>How does injury related disruption to athletic identity affect motivation to return to sport?}} __TOC__ == Overview == {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:Bianca Chatfield 2008c.jpg|thumb|170px|'''Figure 1'''. International netball players playing at a tournament.]] Maggie had always considered herself an athlete. Netball training shaped her days, her confidence, and her identity. But, one bad landing changed everything. The {{ic|what sort of?}} injury benched her for months, and without competition or routine, she felt her sense of self slipping. As rehabilitation dragged on, motivation became unpredictable. Some days she was desperate to return but other days she wondered if she still belonged in the sport at all. Fear of reinjury, pressure to perform, and the loss of her athletic identity made the path back feel uncertain. Her body was healing but her identity was not. {{RoundBoxBottom}} This chapter explores how injury can disrupt athletes' identity and affect their motivation to return to sport. To support this exploration, two key scientific theories {{ic|What are the names of the two theories? Several other theories are also considered?}} are considered in relation to athletic identity especially where injury has occurred. While there is substantial research in identity and the role it plays for athletes, further research could be considered for athletes across different age groups, genders and levels of participation, ranging from recreational to elite sport. Injury can destabilise an athlete's core sense of self. When sport is central to [[wikipedia:Identity_(social_science)|identity]], losing the ability to participate can trigger grief, uncertainty, and reduced confidence. This identity disruption directly affects [[wikipedia:Motivation#Intrinsic_and_extrinsic|motivation]] to return, often creating a tension between the desire to restore the sense of self and fearing further injury. Understanding this relationship is crucial not only for athletes who are returning to sport following an injury but also for coaches and clinicians as well as family and friends supporting athletes who are navigating return to sport. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=2}} ;Focus questions * How can an athletes' {{g}} identity shape motivation to return following an injury? * How does an injury weaken or strengthen an athletes' desire to return to sport? * How do key psychological theories such as self-determination theory apply to support return to sport? * How do factors such {{missing}} social support, age and participation level influence recovery? {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Athletic identity== Identity sits at the centre of human experience. It is shaped by what we do, how we see ourselves, and how we believe others see us. [[wikipedia:Athletic_identity|Athletic identity]] refers to how an individual identifies with being an athlete and the degree of importance they place on its contribution to shaping their sense of self. Chun et al. (2023) considers athletic identity important to "continuous development, revision and maintenance of themselves". In a systematic review conducted by Chun et al. (2023) of 54 studies relating to athletic identity they aimed to understand how athletes develop, maintain and adapt identity and how this correlates to positive outcomes in sport. The research identified that stronger athletic identity has positive outcomes such as greater participation in sport and physical activity as well as a stronger reported [[wikipedia:Self-efficacy|self-efficacy]] or self belief in themselves and greater meaning in life. The review also acknowledged that while positive outcomes were identified so were challenges for those with strong athletic identity. This included balancing commitments, eating disorders as well as struggles with injury and retirement. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} Maggie has fond memories of spending hours at the local netball courts with her friends. From an early age, she would spend every Saturday playing netball while her Mum umpired her team. Maggie remembers having fun with her friends, feeling sad when loosing games and happy when winning finals. She remembers wanting to be on court and feeling frustrated when she was on the bench. These hours spent at her chosen sport were crucial in early development of athletic skills, confidence building and social interactions but also for shaping how she grew as a person. Over time netball became more than just a fun game but a meaningful part of how Maggie viewed herself. {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==== '''Sport and the impacts on youth identity''' ==== In a systematic review of literature {{ic|of how many studies?}} relating to athletic identity in youth athletes, Edison et al. (2021) explored whether athletic identity can become a core component of the individual's sense of self. Some studies identified that athletic identity varies but may increase during adolescence as athletes progress through sporting levels of participation and competition, however limited research exists to conclusively support this. This may indicate that experience and exposure to sport contributes to athletic identity. A strong athletic identity can contribute towards motivation, a sense of belonging to something bigger and increased confidence. Brewer and Chatterton (2024) agree that identity formation is a key developmental task in adolescence and they note that it can become especially significant when young athletes experience a sport injury. A disruption such as an injury can directly shape how young athletes perceive themselves and their future in sport. In their review of 23 studies considering athletic identity and sport injury amongst youth athletes aged 10-24 years, they found that athletic identity can be both a challenge and a strength. Where some athletes with strong athletic identity experienced withdrawal and depression others demonstrated better engagement with rehabilitation processes, more effective coping strategies and motivation to continue participating in sport. Although the findings indicated there is limited research for youth athletes with strong athletic identities recovering from injury, it did highlight the importance of having a balanced sense of identity that extends beyond sport. ==== '''Sport participation levels and athletic identity''' ==== The level of sporting competition can shape the formation of athletic identity, with elite athletes developing a stronger connection to their athletic identity. Lochbaum et all. (2022) conducted a review which examines athletic identity, with the aim to understand if athletes who compete at higher levels identify more strongly as athletes and are there positive or negative outcomes associated. A meta analysis of over 20,000 athletes looked at athletic identity scores using the Athletic Identity Measurement Scale {{f}}. The findings identified that elite athletes (see Figure 1) competing at higher levels reported stronger athletic identity than lower level athletes such as recreational athletes. The research also found positive psychological outcomes associated with athletic identity such as self identity, intrinsic motivation, mastery and commitment. However, whilst the relationship was smaller {{g}} negative factors such as poor body image and eating concerns were present. Another study by Lamont-Mills and Christensen (2006) considered the relationship between athletic identity and three tiers of sport being elite, recreational and non-participant. Also utilising the Athletic Identity Measurement Scale the key conclusion of this study was that athletic identity was not exclusive to elite athletes, with recreational participation also contributing to a sense of self. In practical terms, this suggests that even athletes who do not compete at an elite level may still strongly identify with their sporting role. As a result, disruptions such as injury can threaten their sense of self and lead to significant psychological consequences. == Effects of injury on athletes == Sporting disruption through injury can have a significant impact on athletes and their sense of self, particularly where their identity is closely tied to their sport. Being unable to participate can disrupt social connections and emotional well being leading to negative emotions and loss of purpose. ==== Psychological impacts ==== The impact of injury extends further than the physical damage, {{g}} it affects emotionally and psychologically. Gould et al. (1997) examined psychological impacts that 21 elite skiers experiences {{ic|use past tense}} following serious injury. The research highlighted that injury can disrupt more than a persons {{g}} physical ability, it can also affect social relationships, confidence, future opportunities and career options. Addressing psychological concerns and barriers early and throughout a rehabilitation process may help assist with maintaining motivation. In another study from Dawes and Roach (1997) of 52 athletes, 42 men and 10 women, athletes completed a psychological questionnaire before physiotherapy sessions. The key findings noted that emotional responses were both varied and non-linear. This aligns with an experience of many athletes facing injury where set backs occur and emotions fluctuate. Smith et al. (1990) in a similar study of 72 athletes {{where}} investigated emotional responses to injuries. Frustration, depression and anger were common responses with athletes with more severe injuries reporting significant emotions and durations. Interestingly, younger athletes reported greater anger than older athletes and no differences between female and male athletes. The study suggests that early identification of psychological distress should be an important part of sports injury support, particularly those with persistent and prolonged emotional states. Collectively, these studies suggest that sports injuries can have significant psychological and emotional consequences that can affect motivation and their future in sport. The non-linear nature of emotional responses highlighted that rehabilitation can be a challenging experience. Recognising psychological distress is therefore important to seek support and maintain the athletes overall wellbeing. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} One landing, followed by pain. For Maggie, the injury wasn't just physical. It was more than being unable to play netball. It changed a lifelong connection to a sport that had shaped her life. It was her routine, her friendships, her confidence and sense of belonging. Maggie always saw herself as an athlete and sh struggled when she could no longer describe herself this way. Maggie questioned who she was outside of being an athlete. {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Key psychological theories == Psychological theories such as [[wikipedia:Self-determination_theory|self determination theory]], the athletic identity theory and the sport commitment model can support athletes returning to sport following an injury and assist with rebuilding of athletic identity. Theories can provide evidence-based explanations to support athletes and support teams to understand psychological challenges, barriers and develop interventions that support motivation to return to sport as well as well being through the rehabilitation process. ==== '''Self-determination theory''' ==== Self-determination theory was created by psychologists Deci and Ryan in the 1900's {{g}} {{ic|be more precise with the time period}}. Ryan and Deci (2000) explain the theory focuses largely on the understanding that motivation is intrinsic with three key needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness (see Figure 2). Weir (2025) explained that the theory has been "established as an evidence-based framework for understanding human motivation, personality development, and wellness". This theory can be applied to athletes where intrinsic motivation is crucial for performance in addition to fulfilling psychological needs of autonomy, competence and relatedness. Where this theory could be particularly useful for athletes is when they are injured. Self-determination theory could explain why key concepts affect athletic identity. [[File:Self-determination-theory-three-needs...png|thumb|300px|'''Figure 2.''' The three core components of self-determination theory are autonomy, competence and relatedness.]] [[wikipedia:Autonomy|Autonomy]] is the feeling of having control over your own actions and decisions. Mossman et al. (2024) drew from the self-determination theory in their research to find that athletes benefit from having their decisions and behaviours are self affirmed as apposed to external pressure {{g}}. Interestingly, the findings also demonstrated that autonomy support through coaching, meaning athletes are given choices, information and input, has led to creating an environment that better supports wellbeing and motivation of athletes. Injury-related disruptions to athletic identity may undermine feelings of competence {{ic|this is about competence, not autonomy?}}, as athletes can no longer perform the role that previously defined them. According to self-determination theory, reductions in perceived competence are likely to diminish intrinsic motivation and confidence during rehabilitation. Consequently, athletes experiencing identity loss may require targeted psychological support to rebuild competence and restore motivation to return to sport. [[wikipedia:Competence|Competence]] is the athletes {{g}} belief in their abilities to perform requirements of their chosen sport, which may be increasingly important following injury. Fear of re-injury is a common concern for athletes and can affect motivation and confidence as well as delay or prevent a return to sport at all (Hsu et al. 2007). Addressing this barrier is important to ensure the athletes psychological progress is supporting physical advances. Relatedness considers the athlete's need to be connected and supported by others. Injuries can at times, leave athletes with [[wikipedia:Social_isolation|social isolation]] and reduction in connection. This change can affect both motivation as well as their sense of belonging and identity. Bianco (2001) identified in their study of a group of 10 elite skiers recovery {{g}} from serious injury, that social support can help athletes cope with the psychological challenges of injury including isolation and identity loss. Support received also contributed to maintaining motivation throughout rehabilitation and return to sport as well as maintaining their sense of belonging. As demonstrated in Figure 2, the self-determination theory prioritises three basic human needs of autonomy, competence and relatedness. Podlog and Eklund (2007) identified the need to treat each athlete as an active participant in the recovery process. In their literature review a number of frameworks are considered for supporting athletes psychosocial needs when returning to sport following injury. Although, the review does not guarantee a single framework will ensure positive outcomes, high emphasis is placed on meeting the athletes {{g}} needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness. They identify that an athlete may be physically ready to return to sport but may not be psychologically ready (Wadey and Evans 2011). Hsu et al. (2007) acknowledges that "incorporating principles of psychologically informed practice into sports injury rehabilitation could improve rehabilitation outcomes for athletes with high fear of reinjury". Successful rehabilitation must therefore account for the athletes {{g}} motivation to return, confidence in their abilities and support around them during the process. ==== '''Integrated model of psychological response to sport injury''' ==== The integrated model of psychological response to sport injury and rehabilitation aims to explain how athletes respond to injury through relationships between emotions, thought and behaviours. It was developed by Wiese-Bjornstal et al. (1998) and seeks to explain why athletes experience fear, frustration and reduced confidence following an injury and how their interpretation of their injury affects their response to injury. The model considers how the athletes {{g}} thoughts, behaviours and emotions can influence and effect rehabilitation. The model considers previous experience, social support and personality as contributing factors for how the athlete will interpret the injury and respond. As the model focuses on the individual and that every athlete may respond differently, support systems are also emphasised as an important role in recovery and maintaining a positive attitude throughout the process (Wiese-Bjornstal et al. 1889). The model is particularly useful in sport as it supports coaches and support teams to better understand the needs of the injured athlete. ==== '''Sport commitment model''' ==== The sport commitment model was developed by Scanlan et al. (1993) and is an established framework for understanding sport participation. The model was originally developed with young baseball players with the model later applied to adult tennis players by Casper et al. (2007) and aims to explore why athletes participate in sport and what motivates commitment. The framework has five key factors that influence an individuals desire to continue participating in sport; enjoyment, investment, involvement opportunities, social constraints, alternatives. The framework seeks to understand not just continued involvement but also why an individual may no longer participate in sport. Inigo, et al. (2015) applied the model to athletes who had committed to sport following an injury. This study identified additional factors that influenced continued participation in the sport of wanting to be the best, self-affirmation and contractual obligations. The commitment to return to sport is shaped by a number of factors, the sport commitment model highlights a number of psychological and social factors that contribute alongside physical recovery. Each theory offers unique strengths in understanding athletic identity and return to sport following injury. As theories developed within a sporting context, the integrated model of psychological response to sport injury and rehabilitation and the sport commitment model are particularly relevant for understanding the broader response to an injury and the factors that influence athletes' motivation to return to sport. However, the Self-Determination Theory is supported by a substantial body of research and provides a robust, theory informed framework for understanding the psychological effects that injury may have and support mechanisms for both the athlete and those supporting them. What is prevalent across models is that {{g}} in addition to supporting physical recovery, considering an athlete's psychological needs such as motivation and identity, may help create a more effective and holistic pathway for returning to sport. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} Maggie realised that rehabilitating her injury was not just about healing physically. She also needed to rebuild her confidence and her sense of self. Working with her coach, physiotherapist and sports psychologist, Maggie began to reconnect with teammates and set small, achievable goals both on and off the court. Achieving these goals helped to strengthen her sense of autonomy and confidence, and she recorded her progress in a journal she wrote in regularly. Maggie gradually came to realise that, even though she was not on the court, she could remain connected to her community. This helped her to see her value extended beyond her role as an athlete. {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Quiz == <quiz display="simple"> {Only elite athletes can have an athletic identity? |type="()"} - True + False {A scale used to measure athletic identity is called the Athletic Identity Measurement Scale? |type="()"} - True + False {Psychologists Edward Deci and Richard Ryan created self determination theory and formalised the theory in 1985? |type="()"} + True - False {The three basic needs outlined in self determination theory are autonomy, competence and relatedness? |type="()"} + True - False </quiz> {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} Maggie knew that it would be a long road ahead before she would be able to take the court again however along the way she had learned valuable lessons about herself. Some days were tough, but she saw an opportunity to not only rebuild herself as an athlete but also recognise her strengths outside sport and help others who had experienced similar journeys. {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Conclusion== Athletic identity has many positive benefits from strong self-efficacy, social connections and physical health benefit {{g}} however it can also be associated with challenges particularly where that identity can be challenged through injury. Athletic injury does more than interrupt training it disrupts identity, confidence, and the psychological foundations of motivation. When athletes experience a change in their athletic identity, their drive to return becomes shaped not only by physical readiness but by how they reconstruct their sense of self during recovery. Psychological science offers clear insights into how identity and motivation interact in the recovery and return to sport process. Theoretical frameworks such as the self-determination theory, the integrated model of psychological response to sport injury and rehabilitation and the sport commitment model can provide support and guidance for athletes and their support team. Through addressing identity and motivation frameworks can inform tailored plans to support the psychological well being alongside the physical needs. While research has begun to examine the relationship between athletic identity, injury and motivation, further investigation is needed across diverse populations. In particular, youth athletes may experience different challenges as identity development is especially important during this stage of life. Further research could also investigate differences across genders and participation levels from recreational to elite athletes, to better understand how identity disruption influences motivation to continue playing sport. Many of the current studies have limitations such as relying on self report measures and small cohorts of subjects. There is significant opportunities in this field to research the connection between athletic identity disruption through injury and motivation to return to sport. Athletic identity can foster commitment to sport and a stronger sense of belonging. However, when an injury disrupts participation and challenges and athlete's sense of self, supporting an athletes {{g}} understanding and development of a broader identity may enhance psychological wellbeing and recovery alongside physical rehabilitation to support motivation to return to sport successfully. == See also == * [[wikipedia:Athletic_identity|Athletic identity]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Identity|Identity]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Sports_injury|Sports injury]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Team_sport|Team sport]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Self-determination_theory|Self Determination Theory]] (Wikipedia) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Andersen, M. B. (2001). Returning to action and the prevention of future injury. In J. Crossman (Ed.), Coping with sports injuries: Psychological strategies for rehabilitation (pp. 162–173). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192632159.003.0009 Bianco, T. (2001). Social support and recovery from sport injury: Elite skiers share their experiences. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 72(4), 376–388. https://doi.org/10.1080/02701367.2001.10608974 Brewer, B. W., Cornelius, A. E., Van Raalte, J. L., Petitpas, A. J., Sklar, J. H., Pohlman, M. H., Krushell, R. J., & Ditmar, T. D. (2003). Age-related differences in predictors of adherence to rehabilitation after anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction. Journal of Athletic Training, 38(2), 158–162 Brewer, B. W. (1999). Self-identity and specific vulnerability to depressed mood. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 11(1), 84-93. https://doi.org/10.1080/10413209908404201 Brewer BW, Cornelius AE, Van Raalte JL, Petitpas AJ, Sklar JH, Pohlman MH, et al. (2003) Age-related differences in predictors of adherence to rehabilitation after anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction.;38(2):158–62 Chun, Y., Wendling, E., & Sagas, M. (2023). Identity work in athletes: A systematic review of the literature. 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BMC Sports Science, Medicine and Rehabilitation, 13, Article 37. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13102-021-00264-6 Podlog, L., & Eklund, R. C. (2007). The psychosocial aspects of a return to sport following serious injury: A review of the literature from a self-determination perspective. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 8(4), 535-566. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2006.07.008 Podlog, L., Heil, J., & Schulte, S. (2014). Psychosocial factors in sports injury rehabilitation and return to play. Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinics of North America, 25(4), 915-930. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pmr.2014.06.011 Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55(1), 68–78. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68 Smith, A. M., Scott, S. G., O’Fallon, W. M., & Young, M. L. (1990). Emotional responses of athletes to injury. Mayo Clinic Proceedings, 65(1), 38–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0025-6196(12)62108-9 Tracey, J. (2003). The emotional response to the injury and rehabilitation process. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 15(4), 279-293. https://doi.org/10.1080/714044197 Wadey, R., Evans, L., Evans, K., & Mitchell, I. (2011). Perceived benefits following sport injury: A qualitative examination of their antecedents and underlying mechanisms. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 23(2), 142–158. Weber Rawlins, M. L., Beasley, L. E., & Kontos, A. P. (2023). The influence of athletic identity, passion, and perceptions of concussion severity on athletes’ willingness to report concussion symptoms. Journal of Sport Rehabilitation, 32(7), 767–775. https://doi.org/10.1123/jsr.2022-0313 Webster, K. E., Clement, D., & Ardern, C. L. (2021). Differences in athletic identity, sport participation, and psychosocial factors following anterior cruciate ligament rehabilitation in youth athletes. Frontiers in Sports and Active Living, 3, 660835. https://doi.org/10.3389/fspor.2021.660835 Weir, K. (2025, March 2). Self-determination theory. American Psychological Association. https://www.apa.org/research-practice/conduct-research/self-determination-theory Wiese-Bjornstal, D. M., Smith, A. M., Shaffer, S. M., & Morrey, M. A. (1998). An integrated model of response to sport injury: Psychological and sociological dynamics. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 10(1), 46–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/10413209808406377 }} ==External links== * [https://www.ausport.gov.au Australian Sports Commission] (ausport.gov.au) * [https://www.beyondblue.org.au Beyond Blue] (beyondblue.org.au) [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Health]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Sport]] 8ugd6khc6f1ufj3dhoemkiaffqsqd3x 2842345 2842344 2026-10-23T21:19:10Z Jtneill 10242 /* See also */ Fix capitalisation 2842345 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Athletic identity loss and returning to sport after injury:<br>How does injury related disruption to athletic identity affect motivation to return to sport?}} __TOC__ == Overview == {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:Bianca Chatfield 2008c.jpg|thumb|170px|'''Figure 1'''. International netball players playing at a tournament.]] Maggie had always considered herself an athlete. Netball training shaped her days, her confidence, and her identity. But, one bad landing changed everything. The {{ic|what sort of?}} injury benched her for months, and without competition or routine, she felt her sense of self slipping. As rehabilitation dragged on, motivation became unpredictable. Some days she was desperate to return but other days she wondered if she still belonged in the sport at all. Fear of reinjury, pressure to perform, and the loss of her athletic identity made the path back feel uncertain. Her body was healing but her identity was not. {{RoundBoxBottom}} This chapter explores how injury can disrupt athletes' identity and affect their motivation to return to sport. To support this exploration, two key scientific theories {{ic|What are the names of the two theories? Several other theories are also considered?}} are considered in relation to athletic identity especially where injury has occurred. While there is substantial research in identity and the role it plays for athletes, further research could be considered for athletes across different age groups, genders and levels of participation, ranging from recreational to elite sport. Injury can destabilise an athlete's core sense of self. When sport is central to [[wikipedia:Identity_(social_science)|identity]], losing the ability to participate can trigger grief, uncertainty, and reduced confidence. This identity disruption directly affects [[wikipedia:Motivation#Intrinsic_and_extrinsic|motivation]] to return, often creating a tension between the desire to restore the sense of self and fearing further injury. Understanding this relationship is crucial not only for athletes who are returning to sport following an injury but also for coaches and clinicians as well as family and friends supporting athletes who are navigating return to sport. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=2}} ;Focus questions * How can an athletes' {{g}} identity shape motivation to return following an injury? * How does an injury weaken or strengthen an athletes' desire to return to sport? * How do key psychological theories such as self-determination theory apply to support return to sport? * How do factors such {{missing}} social support, age and participation level influence recovery? {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Athletic identity== Identity sits at the centre of human experience. It is shaped by what we do, how we see ourselves, and how we believe others see us. [[wikipedia:Athletic_identity|Athletic identity]] refers to how an individual identifies with being an athlete and the degree of importance they place on its contribution to shaping their sense of self. Chun et al. (2023) considers athletic identity important to "continuous development, revision and maintenance of themselves". In a systematic review conducted by Chun et al. (2023) of 54 studies relating to athletic identity they aimed to understand how athletes develop, maintain and adapt identity and how this correlates to positive outcomes in sport. The research identified that stronger athletic identity has positive outcomes such as greater participation in sport and physical activity as well as a stronger reported [[wikipedia:Self-efficacy|self-efficacy]] or self belief in themselves and greater meaning in life. The review also acknowledged that while positive outcomes were identified so were challenges for those with strong athletic identity. This included balancing commitments, eating disorders as well as struggles with injury and retirement. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} Maggie has fond memories of spending hours at the local netball courts with her friends. From an early age, she would spend every Saturday playing netball while her Mum umpired her team. Maggie remembers having fun with her friends, feeling sad when loosing games and happy when winning finals. She remembers wanting to be on court and feeling frustrated when she was on the bench. These hours spent at her chosen sport were crucial in early development of athletic skills, confidence building and social interactions but also for shaping how she grew as a person. Over time netball became more than just a fun game but a meaningful part of how Maggie viewed herself. {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==== '''Sport and the impacts on youth identity''' ==== In a systematic review of literature {{ic|of how many studies?}} relating to athletic identity in youth athletes, Edison et al. (2021) explored whether athletic identity can become a core component of the individual's sense of self. Some studies identified that athletic identity varies but may increase during adolescence as athletes progress through sporting levels of participation and competition, however limited research exists to conclusively support this. This may indicate that experience and exposure to sport contributes to athletic identity. A strong athletic identity can contribute towards motivation, a sense of belonging to something bigger and increased confidence. Brewer and Chatterton (2024) agree that identity formation is a key developmental task in adolescence and they note that it can become especially significant when young athletes experience a sport injury. A disruption such as an injury can directly shape how young athletes perceive themselves and their future in sport. In their review of 23 studies considering athletic identity and sport injury amongst youth athletes aged 10-24 years, they found that athletic identity can be both a challenge and a strength. Where some athletes with strong athletic identity experienced withdrawal and depression others demonstrated better engagement with rehabilitation processes, more effective coping strategies and motivation to continue participating in sport. Although the findings indicated there is limited research for youth athletes with strong athletic identities recovering from injury, it did highlight the importance of having a balanced sense of identity that extends beyond sport. ==== '''Sport participation levels and athletic identity''' ==== The level of sporting competition can shape the formation of athletic identity, with elite athletes developing a stronger connection to their athletic identity. Lochbaum et all. (2022) conducted a review which examines athletic identity, with the aim to understand if athletes who compete at higher levels identify more strongly as athletes and are there positive or negative outcomes associated. A meta analysis of over 20,000 athletes looked at athletic identity scores using the Athletic Identity Measurement Scale {{f}}. The findings identified that elite athletes (see Figure 1) competing at higher levels reported stronger athletic identity than lower level athletes such as recreational athletes. The research also found positive psychological outcomes associated with athletic identity such as self identity, intrinsic motivation, mastery and commitment. However, whilst the relationship was smaller {{g}} negative factors such as poor body image and eating concerns were present. Another study by Lamont-Mills and Christensen (2006) considered the relationship between athletic identity and three tiers of sport being elite, recreational and non-participant. Also utilising the Athletic Identity Measurement Scale the key conclusion of this study was that athletic identity was not exclusive to elite athletes, with recreational participation also contributing to a sense of self. In practical terms, this suggests that even athletes who do not compete at an elite level may still strongly identify with their sporting role. As a result, disruptions such as injury can threaten their sense of self and lead to significant psychological consequences. == Effects of injury on athletes == Sporting disruption through injury can have a significant impact on athletes and their sense of self, particularly where their identity is closely tied to their sport. Being unable to participate can disrupt social connections and emotional well being leading to negative emotions and loss of purpose. ==== Psychological impacts ==== The impact of injury extends further than the physical damage, {{g}} it affects emotionally and psychologically. Gould et al. (1997) examined psychological impacts that 21 elite skiers experiences {{ic|use past tense}} following serious injury. The research highlighted that injury can disrupt more than a persons {{g}} physical ability, it can also affect social relationships, confidence, future opportunities and career options. Addressing psychological concerns and barriers early and throughout a rehabilitation process may help assist with maintaining motivation. In another study from Dawes and Roach (1997) of 52 athletes, 42 men and 10 women, athletes completed a psychological questionnaire before physiotherapy sessions. The key findings noted that emotional responses were both varied and non-linear. This aligns with an experience of many athletes facing injury where set backs occur and emotions fluctuate. Smith et al. (1990) in a similar study of 72 athletes {{where}} investigated emotional responses to injuries. Frustration, depression and anger were common responses with athletes with more severe injuries reporting significant emotions and durations. Interestingly, younger athletes reported greater anger than older athletes and no differences between female and male athletes. The study suggests that early identification of psychological distress should be an important part of sports injury support, particularly those with persistent and prolonged emotional states. Collectively, these studies suggest that sports injuries can have significant psychological and emotional consequences that can affect motivation and their future in sport. The non-linear nature of emotional responses highlighted that rehabilitation can be a challenging experience. Recognising psychological distress is therefore important to seek support and maintain the athletes overall wellbeing. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} One landing, followed by pain. For Maggie, the injury wasn't just physical. It was more than being unable to play netball. It changed a lifelong connection to a sport that had shaped her life. It was her routine, her friendships, her confidence and sense of belonging. Maggie always saw herself as an athlete and sh struggled when she could no longer describe herself this way. Maggie questioned who she was outside of being an athlete. {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Key psychological theories == Psychological theories such as [[wikipedia:Self-determination_theory|self determination theory]], the athletic identity theory and the sport commitment model can support athletes returning to sport following an injury and assist with rebuilding of athletic identity. Theories can provide evidence-based explanations to support athletes and support teams to understand psychological challenges, barriers and develop interventions that support motivation to return to sport as well as well being through the rehabilitation process. ==== '''Self-determination theory''' ==== Self-determination theory was created by psychologists Deci and Ryan in the 1900's {{g}} {{ic|be more precise with the time period}}. Ryan and Deci (2000) explain the theory focuses largely on the understanding that motivation is intrinsic with three key needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness (see Figure 2). Weir (2025) explained that the theory has been "established as an evidence-based framework for understanding human motivation, personality development, and wellness". This theory can be applied to athletes where intrinsic motivation is crucial for performance in addition to fulfilling psychological needs of autonomy, competence and relatedness. Where this theory could be particularly useful for athletes is when they are injured. Self-determination theory could explain why key concepts affect athletic identity. [[File:Self-determination-theory-three-needs...png|thumb|300px|'''Figure 2.''' The three core components of self-determination theory are autonomy, competence and relatedness.]] [[wikipedia:Autonomy|Autonomy]] is the feeling of having control over your own actions and decisions. Mossman et al. (2024) drew from the self-determination theory in their research to find that athletes benefit from having their decisions and behaviours are self affirmed as apposed to external pressure {{g}}. Interestingly, the findings also demonstrated that autonomy support through coaching, meaning athletes are given choices, information and input, has led to creating an environment that better supports wellbeing and motivation of athletes. Injury-related disruptions to athletic identity may undermine feelings of competence {{ic|this is about competence, not autonomy?}}, as athletes can no longer perform the role that previously defined them. According to self-determination theory, reductions in perceived competence are likely to diminish intrinsic motivation and confidence during rehabilitation. Consequently, athletes experiencing identity loss may require targeted psychological support to rebuild competence and restore motivation to return to sport. [[wikipedia:Competence|Competence]] is the athletes {{g}} belief in their abilities to perform requirements of their chosen sport, which may be increasingly important following injury. Fear of re-injury is a common concern for athletes and can affect motivation and confidence as well as delay or prevent a return to sport at all (Hsu et al. 2007). Addressing this barrier is important to ensure the athletes psychological progress is supporting physical advances. Relatedness considers the athlete's need to be connected and supported by others. Injuries can at times, leave athletes with [[wikipedia:Social_isolation|social isolation]] and reduction in connection. This change can affect both motivation as well as their sense of belonging and identity. Bianco (2001) identified in their study of a group of 10 elite skiers recovery {{g}} from serious injury, that social support can help athletes cope with the psychological challenges of injury including isolation and identity loss. Support received also contributed to maintaining motivation throughout rehabilitation and return to sport as well as maintaining their sense of belonging. As demonstrated in Figure 2, the self-determination theory prioritises three basic human needs of autonomy, competence and relatedness. Podlog and Eklund (2007) identified the need to treat each athlete as an active participant in the recovery process. In their literature review a number of frameworks are considered for supporting athletes psychosocial needs when returning to sport following injury. Although, the review does not guarantee a single framework will ensure positive outcomes, high emphasis is placed on meeting the athletes {{g}} needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness. They identify that an athlete may be physically ready to return to sport but may not be psychologically ready (Wadey and Evans 2011). Hsu et al. (2007) acknowledges that "incorporating principles of psychologically informed practice into sports injury rehabilitation could improve rehabilitation outcomes for athletes with high fear of reinjury". Successful rehabilitation must therefore account for the athletes {{g}} motivation to return, confidence in their abilities and support around them during the process. ==== '''Integrated model of psychological response to sport injury''' ==== The integrated model of psychological response to sport injury and rehabilitation aims to explain how athletes respond to injury through relationships between emotions, thought and behaviours. It was developed by Wiese-Bjornstal et al. (1998) and seeks to explain why athletes experience fear, frustration and reduced confidence following an injury and how their interpretation of their injury affects their response to injury. The model considers how the athletes {{g}} thoughts, behaviours and emotions can influence and effect rehabilitation. The model considers previous experience, social support and personality as contributing factors for how the athlete will interpret the injury and respond. As the model focuses on the individual and that every athlete may respond differently, support systems are also emphasised as an important role in recovery and maintaining a positive attitude throughout the process (Wiese-Bjornstal et al. 1889). The model is particularly useful in sport as it supports coaches and support teams to better understand the needs of the injured athlete. ==== '''Sport commitment model''' ==== The sport commitment model was developed by Scanlan et al. (1993) and is an established framework for understanding sport participation. The model was originally developed with young baseball players with the model later applied to adult tennis players by Casper et al. (2007) and aims to explore why athletes participate in sport and what motivates commitment. The framework has five key factors that influence an individuals desire to continue participating in sport; enjoyment, investment, involvement opportunities, social constraints, alternatives. The framework seeks to understand not just continued involvement but also why an individual may no longer participate in sport. Inigo, et al. (2015) applied the model to athletes who had committed to sport following an injury. This study identified additional factors that influenced continued participation in the sport of wanting to be the best, self-affirmation and contractual obligations. The commitment to return to sport is shaped by a number of factors, the sport commitment model highlights a number of psychological and social factors that contribute alongside physical recovery. Each theory offers unique strengths in understanding athletic identity and return to sport following injury. As theories developed within a sporting context, the integrated model of psychological response to sport injury and rehabilitation and the sport commitment model are particularly relevant for understanding the broader response to an injury and the factors that influence athletes' motivation to return to sport. However, the Self-Determination Theory is supported by a substantial body of research and provides a robust, theory informed framework for understanding the psychological effects that injury may have and support mechanisms for both the athlete and those supporting them. What is prevalent across models is that {{g}} in addition to supporting physical recovery, considering an athlete's psychological needs such as motivation and identity, may help create a more effective and holistic pathway for returning to sport. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} Maggie realised that rehabilitating her injury was not just about healing physically. She also needed to rebuild her confidence and her sense of self. Working with her coach, physiotherapist and sports psychologist, Maggie began to reconnect with teammates and set small, achievable goals both on and off the court. Achieving these goals helped to strengthen her sense of autonomy and confidence, and she recorded her progress in a journal she wrote in regularly. Maggie gradually came to realise that, even though she was not on the court, she could remain connected to her community. This helped her to see her value extended beyond her role as an athlete. {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Quiz == <quiz display="simple"> {Only elite athletes can have an athletic identity? |type="()"} - True + False {A scale used to measure athletic identity is called the Athletic Identity Measurement Scale? |type="()"} - True + False {Psychologists Edward Deci and Richard Ryan created self determination theory and formalised the theory in 1985? |type="()"} + True - False {The three basic needs outlined in self determination theory are autonomy, competence and relatedness? |type="()"} + True - False </quiz> {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} Maggie knew that it would be a long road ahead before she would be able to take the court again however along the way she had learned valuable lessons about herself. Some days were tough, but she saw an opportunity to not only rebuild herself as an athlete but also recognise her strengths outside sport and help others who had experienced similar journeys. {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Conclusion== Athletic identity has many positive benefits from strong self-efficacy, social connections and physical health benefit {{g}} however it can also be associated with challenges particularly where that identity can be challenged through injury. Athletic injury does more than interrupt training it disrupts identity, confidence, and the psychological foundations of motivation. When athletes experience a change in their athletic identity, their drive to return becomes shaped not only by physical readiness but by how they reconstruct their sense of self during recovery. Psychological science offers clear insights into how identity and motivation interact in the recovery and return to sport process. Theoretical frameworks such as the self-determination theory, the integrated model of psychological response to sport injury and rehabilitation and the sport commitment model can provide support and guidance for athletes and their support team. Through addressing identity and motivation frameworks can inform tailored plans to support the psychological well being alongside the physical needs. While research has begun to examine the relationship between athletic identity, injury and motivation, further investigation is needed across diverse populations. In particular, youth athletes may experience different challenges as identity development is especially important during this stage of life. Further research could also investigate differences across genders and participation levels from recreational to elite athletes, to better understand how identity disruption influences motivation to continue playing sport. Many of the current studies have limitations such as relying on self report measures and small cohorts of subjects. There is significant opportunities in this field to research the connection between athletic identity disruption through injury and motivation to return to sport. Athletic identity can foster commitment to sport and a stronger sense of belonging. However, when an injury disrupts participation and challenges and athlete's sense of self, supporting an athletes {{g}} understanding and development of a broader identity may enhance psychological wellbeing and recovery alongside physical rehabilitation to support motivation to return to sport successfully. == See also == * [[wikipedia:Athletic_identity|Athletic identity]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Identity|Identity]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Sports_injury|Sports injury]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Team_sport|Team sport]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Self-determination_theory|Self-determination theory]] (Wikipedia) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Andersen, M. B. (2001). Returning to action and the prevention of future injury. In J. Crossman (Ed.), Coping with sports injuries: Psychological strategies for rehabilitation (pp. 162–173). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192632159.003.0009 Bianco, T. (2001). Social support and recovery from sport injury: Elite skiers share their experiences. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 72(4), 376–388. https://doi.org/10.1080/02701367.2001.10608974 Brewer, B. W., Cornelius, A. E., Van Raalte, J. L., Petitpas, A. J., Sklar, J. H., Pohlman, M. H., Krushell, R. J., & Ditmar, T. D. (2003). Age-related differences in predictors of adherence to rehabilitation after anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction. Journal of Athletic Training, 38(2), 158–162 Brewer, B. W. (1999). Self-identity and specific vulnerability to depressed mood. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 11(1), 84-93. https://doi.org/10.1080/10413209908404201 Brewer BW, Cornelius AE, Van Raalte JL, Petitpas AJ, Sklar JH, Pohlman MH, et al. (2003) Age-related differences in predictors of adherence to rehabilitation after anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction.;38(2):158–62 Chun, Y., Wendling, E., & Sagas, M. (2023). Identity work in athletes: A systematic review of the literature. Sports, 11(10), 203. https://doi.org/10.3390/sports11100203 Dawes, H., & Roach, N. K. (1997). Emotional responses of athletes to injury and treatment. Physiotherapy, 83(5), 243–247. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0031-9406(05)66215-3 Edison, B. R., Christino, M. A., & Rizzone, K. H. (2021). Athletic Identity in Youth Athletes: A Systematic Review of the Literature. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 18(14), 7331 Evans, L., Hardy, L., & Fleming, S. (2000). Intervention strategies with injured athletes: An action research study. The Sport Psychologist, 14(2), 188–206. Gould, D., Udry, E., Bridges, D., & Beck, L. (1997). Stress sources encountered when rehabilitating from season-ending ski injuries. The Sport Psychologist, 11(4), 361–378. Hsu, C.-J., Meierbachtol, A., George, S. Z., & Chmielewski, T. L. (2017). Fear of reinjury in athletes: Implications for rehabilitation. Sports Health, 9(2), 162–167. https://doi.org/10.1177/1941738116666813 Iñigo, M. M., Podlog, L., & Hall, M. S. (2015). Why do athletes remain committed to sport after severe injury? An examination of the Sport Commitment Model. The Sport Psychologist, 29(2), 143-155. https://doi.org/10.1123/tsp.2014-0086 Lamont-Mills, A., & Christensen, S. A. (2006). Athletic identity and its relationship to sport participation levels. Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport, 9(6), 472–478. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsams.2006.04.004 Lochbaum, M., Cooper, S., & Limp, S. (2022). The Athletic Identity Measurement Scale: A systematic review with meta-analysis from 1993 to 2021. European Journal of Investigation in Health, Psychology and Education, 12(9), 1391–1414. https://doi.org/10.3390/ejihpe12090097 Lu, F. J. H., Lee, W. P., Chang, Y. K., Chou, C. C., Hsu, Y. W., Lin, J. H., & Gill, D. L. (2016). Mental toughness, social support, and athletic identity: Moderators of the life stress–injury relationship in collegiate football players. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 24, 92–100. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2016.01.009 McGinley, J., Stapleton, E., Worrall, H., Ellis, H. B., Wilson, P. L., & Ulman, S. (2022). Sport participation and psychosocial factors which influence athletic identity in youth athletes with anterior cruciate ligament injury. Frontiers in Sports and Active Living, 3, 660836. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.906300 Mossman, L. H., Slemp, G. R., Lewis, K. J., Colla, R. H., & O’Halloran, P. (2024). Autonomy support in sport and exercise settings: A systematic review and meta-analysis. International Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 17(1), 540–563. https://doi.org/10.1080/1750984X.2022.2031252 Ohji, S., Aizawa, J., Hirohata, K., Mitomo, S., Ohmi, T., Jinno, T., Koga, H., & Yagishita, K. (2021). Athletic identity and sport commitment in athletes after anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction who have returned to sports at their pre-injury level of competition. BMC Sports Science, Medicine and Rehabilitation, 13, Article 37. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13102-021-00264-6 Podlog, L., & Eklund, R. C. (2007). The psychosocial aspects of a return to sport following serious injury: A review of the literature from a self-determination perspective. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 8(4), 535-566. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2006.07.008 Podlog, L., Heil, J., & Schulte, S. (2014). Psychosocial factors in sports injury rehabilitation and return to play. Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinics of North America, 25(4), 915-930. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pmr.2014.06.011 Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55(1), 68–78. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68 Smith, A. M., Scott, S. G., O’Fallon, W. M., & Young, M. L. (1990). Emotional responses of athletes to injury. Mayo Clinic Proceedings, 65(1), 38–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0025-6196(12)62108-9 Tracey, J. (2003). The emotional response to the injury and rehabilitation process. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 15(4), 279-293. https://doi.org/10.1080/714044197 Wadey, R., Evans, L., Evans, K., & Mitchell, I. (2011). Perceived benefits following sport injury: A qualitative examination of their antecedents and underlying mechanisms. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 23(2), 142–158. Weber Rawlins, M. L., Beasley, L. E., & Kontos, A. P. (2023). The influence of athletic identity, passion, and perceptions of concussion severity on athletes’ willingness to report concussion symptoms. Journal of Sport Rehabilitation, 32(7), 767–775. https://doi.org/10.1123/jsr.2022-0313 Webster, K. E., Clement, D., & Ardern, C. L. (2021). Differences in athletic identity, sport participation, and psychosocial factors following anterior cruciate ligament rehabilitation in youth athletes. Frontiers in Sports and Active Living, 3, 660835. https://doi.org/10.3389/fspor.2021.660835 Weir, K. (2025, March 2). Self-determination theory. American Psychological Association. https://www.apa.org/research-practice/conduct-research/self-determination-theory Wiese-Bjornstal, D. M., Smith, A. M., Shaffer, S. M., & Morrey, M. A. (1998). An integrated model of response to sport injury: Psychological and sociological dynamics. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 10(1), 46–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/10413209808406377 }} ==External links== * [https://www.ausport.gov.au Australian Sports Commission] (ausport.gov.au) * [https://www.beyondblue.org.au Beyond Blue] (beyondblue.org.au) [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Health]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Sport]] 9cz2bfooy3pqeogzx7hmujsam0k52e4 2842426 2842345 2026-10-24T10:39:53Z Kontributor 2K 2977296 ([[c:GR|GR]]) [[c:COM:FR|File renamed]]: [[File:Self-determination-theory-three-needs...png]] → [[File:Self-determination-theory-three-needs.png]] [[c:COM:FR#FR6|Criterion 6]] (maintenance or bug fix) 2842426 wikitext text/x-wiki {{title|Athletic identity loss and returning to sport after injury:<br>How does injury related disruption to athletic identity affect motivation to return to sport?}} __TOC__ == Overview == {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} [[File:Bianca Chatfield 2008c.jpg|thumb|170px|'''Figure 1'''. International netball players playing at a tournament.]] Maggie had always considered herself an athlete. Netball training shaped her days, her confidence, and her identity. But, one bad landing changed everything. The {{ic|what sort of?}} injury benched her for months, and without competition or routine, she felt her sense of self slipping. As rehabilitation dragged on, motivation became unpredictable. Some days she was desperate to return but other days she wondered if she still belonged in the sport at all. Fear of reinjury, pressure to perform, and the loss of her athletic identity made the path back feel uncertain. Her body was healing but her identity was not. {{RoundBoxBottom}} This chapter explores how injury can disrupt athletes' identity and affect their motivation to return to sport. To support this exploration, two key scientific theories {{ic|What are the names of the two theories? Several other theories are also considered?}} are considered in relation to athletic identity especially where injury has occurred. While there is substantial research in identity and the role it plays for athletes, further research could be considered for athletes across different age groups, genders and levels of participation, ranging from recreational to elite sport. Injury can destabilise an athlete's core sense of self. When sport is central to [[wikipedia:Identity_(social_science)|identity]], losing the ability to participate can trigger grief, uncertainty, and reduced confidence. This identity disruption directly affects [[wikipedia:Motivation#Intrinsic_and_extrinsic|motivation]] to return, often creating a tension between the desire to restore the sense of self and fearing further injury. Understanding this relationship is crucial not only for athletes who are returning to sport following an injury but also for coaches and clinicians as well as family and friends supporting athletes who are navigating return to sport. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=2}} ;Focus questions * How can an athletes' {{g}} identity shape motivation to return following an injury? * How does an injury weaken or strengthen an athletes' desire to return to sport? * How do key psychological theories such as self-determination theory apply to support return to sport? * How do factors such {{missing}} social support, age and participation level influence recovery? {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Athletic identity== Identity sits at the centre of human experience. It is shaped by what we do, how we see ourselves, and how we believe others see us. [[wikipedia:Athletic_identity|Athletic identity]] refers to how an individual identifies with being an athlete and the degree of importance they place on its contribution to shaping their sense of self. Chun et al. (2023) considers athletic identity important to "continuous development, revision and maintenance of themselves". In a systematic review conducted by Chun et al. (2023) of 54 studies relating to athletic identity they aimed to understand how athletes develop, maintain and adapt identity and how this correlates to positive outcomes in sport. The research identified that stronger athletic identity has positive outcomes such as greater participation in sport and physical activity as well as a stronger reported [[wikipedia:Self-efficacy|self-efficacy]] or self belief in themselves and greater meaning in life. The review also acknowledged that while positive outcomes were identified so were challenges for those with strong athletic identity. This included balancing commitments, eating disorders as well as struggles with injury and retirement. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} Maggie has fond memories of spending hours at the local netball courts with her friends. From an early age, she would spend every Saturday playing netball while her Mum umpired her team. Maggie remembers having fun with her friends, feeling sad when loosing games and happy when winning finals. She remembers wanting to be on court and feeling frustrated when she was on the bench. These hours spent at her chosen sport were crucial in early development of athletic skills, confidence building and social interactions but also for shaping how she grew as a person. Over time netball became more than just a fun game but a meaningful part of how Maggie viewed herself. {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==== '''Sport and the impacts on youth identity''' ==== In a systematic review of literature {{ic|of how many studies?}} relating to athletic identity in youth athletes, Edison et al. (2021) explored whether athletic identity can become a core component of the individual's sense of self. Some studies identified that athletic identity varies but may increase during adolescence as athletes progress through sporting levels of participation and competition, however limited research exists to conclusively support this. This may indicate that experience and exposure to sport contributes to athletic identity. A strong athletic identity can contribute towards motivation, a sense of belonging to something bigger and increased confidence. Brewer and Chatterton (2024) agree that identity formation is a key developmental task in adolescence and they note that it can become especially significant when young athletes experience a sport injury. A disruption such as an injury can directly shape how young athletes perceive themselves and their future in sport. In their review of 23 studies considering athletic identity and sport injury amongst youth athletes aged 10-24 years, they found that athletic identity can be both a challenge and a strength. Where some athletes with strong athletic identity experienced withdrawal and depression others demonstrated better engagement with rehabilitation processes, more effective coping strategies and motivation to continue participating in sport. Although the findings indicated there is limited research for youth athletes with strong athletic identities recovering from injury, it did highlight the importance of having a balanced sense of identity that extends beyond sport. ==== '''Sport participation levels and athletic identity''' ==== The level of sporting competition can shape the formation of athletic identity, with elite athletes developing a stronger connection to their athletic identity. Lochbaum et all. (2022) conducted a review which examines athletic identity, with the aim to understand if athletes who compete at higher levels identify more strongly as athletes and are there positive or negative outcomes associated. A meta analysis of over 20,000 athletes looked at athletic identity scores using the Athletic Identity Measurement Scale {{f}}. The findings identified that elite athletes (see Figure 1) competing at higher levels reported stronger athletic identity than lower level athletes such as recreational athletes. The research also found positive psychological outcomes associated with athletic identity such as self identity, intrinsic motivation, mastery and commitment. However, whilst the relationship was smaller {{g}} negative factors such as poor body image and eating concerns were present. Another study by Lamont-Mills and Christensen (2006) considered the relationship between athletic identity and three tiers of sport being elite, recreational and non-participant. Also utilising the Athletic Identity Measurement Scale the key conclusion of this study was that athletic identity was not exclusive to elite athletes, with recreational participation also contributing to a sense of self. In practical terms, this suggests that even athletes who do not compete at an elite level may still strongly identify with their sporting role. As a result, disruptions such as injury can threaten their sense of self and lead to significant psychological consequences. == Effects of injury on athletes == Sporting disruption through injury can have a significant impact on athletes and their sense of self, particularly where their identity is closely tied to their sport. Being unable to participate can disrupt social connections and emotional well being leading to negative emotions and loss of purpose. ==== Psychological impacts ==== The impact of injury extends further than the physical damage, {{g}} it affects emotionally and psychologically. Gould et al. (1997) examined psychological impacts that 21 elite skiers experiences {{ic|use past tense}} following serious injury. The research highlighted that injury can disrupt more than a persons {{g}} physical ability, it can also affect social relationships, confidence, future opportunities and career options. Addressing psychological concerns and barriers early and throughout a rehabilitation process may help assist with maintaining motivation. In another study from Dawes and Roach (1997) of 52 athletes, 42 men and 10 women, athletes completed a psychological questionnaire before physiotherapy sessions. The key findings noted that emotional responses were both varied and non-linear. This aligns with an experience of many athletes facing injury where set backs occur and emotions fluctuate. Smith et al. (1990) in a similar study of 72 athletes {{where}} investigated emotional responses to injuries. Frustration, depression and anger were common responses with athletes with more severe injuries reporting significant emotions and durations. Interestingly, younger athletes reported greater anger than older athletes and no differences between female and male athletes. The study suggests that early identification of psychological distress should be an important part of sports injury support, particularly those with persistent and prolonged emotional states. Collectively, these studies suggest that sports injuries can have significant psychological and emotional consequences that can affect motivation and their future in sport. The non-linear nature of emotional responses highlighted that rehabilitation can be a challenging experience. Recognising psychological distress is therefore important to seek support and maintain the athletes overall wellbeing. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} One landing, followed by pain. For Maggie, the injury wasn't just physical. It was more than being unable to play netball. It changed a lifelong connection to a sport that had shaped her life. It was her routine, her friendships, her confidence and sense of belonging. Maggie always saw herself as an athlete and sh struggled when she could no longer describe herself this way. Maggie questioned who she was outside of being an athlete. {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Key psychological theories == Psychological theories such as [[wikipedia:Self-determination_theory|self determination theory]], the athletic identity theory and the sport commitment model can support athletes returning to sport following an injury and assist with rebuilding of athletic identity. Theories can provide evidence-based explanations to support athletes and support teams to understand psychological challenges, barriers and develop interventions that support motivation to return to sport as well as well being through the rehabilitation process. ==== '''Self-determination theory''' ==== Self-determination theory was created by psychologists Deci and Ryan in the 1900's {{g}} {{ic|be more precise with the time period}}. Ryan and Deci (2000) explain the theory focuses largely on the understanding that motivation is intrinsic with three key needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness (see Figure 2). Weir (2025) explained that the theory has been "established as an evidence-based framework for understanding human motivation, personality development, and wellness". This theory can be applied to athletes where intrinsic motivation is crucial for performance in addition to fulfilling psychological needs of autonomy, competence and relatedness. Where this theory could be particularly useful for athletes is when they are injured. Self-determination theory could explain why key concepts affect athletic identity. [[File:Self-determination-theory-three-needs.png|thumb|300px|'''Figure 2.''' The three core components of self-determination theory are autonomy, competence and relatedness.]] [[wikipedia:Autonomy|Autonomy]] is the feeling of having control over your own actions and decisions. Mossman et al. (2024) drew from the self-determination theory in their research to find that athletes benefit from having their decisions and behaviours are self affirmed as apposed to external pressure {{g}}. Interestingly, the findings also demonstrated that autonomy support through coaching, meaning athletes are given choices, information and input, has led to creating an environment that better supports wellbeing and motivation of athletes. Injury-related disruptions to athletic identity may undermine feelings of competence {{ic|this is about competence, not autonomy?}}, as athletes can no longer perform the role that previously defined them. According to self-determination theory, reductions in perceived competence are likely to diminish intrinsic motivation and confidence during rehabilitation. Consequently, athletes experiencing identity loss may require targeted psychological support to rebuild competence and restore motivation to return to sport. [[wikipedia:Competence|Competence]] is the athletes {{g}} belief in their abilities to perform requirements of their chosen sport, which may be increasingly important following injury. Fear of re-injury is a common concern for athletes and can affect motivation and confidence as well as delay or prevent a return to sport at all (Hsu et al. 2007). Addressing this barrier is important to ensure the athletes psychological progress is supporting physical advances. Relatedness considers the athlete's need to be connected and supported by others. Injuries can at times, leave athletes with [[wikipedia:Social_isolation|social isolation]] and reduction in connection. This change can affect both motivation as well as their sense of belonging and identity. Bianco (2001) identified in their study of a group of 10 elite skiers recovery {{g}} from serious injury, that social support can help athletes cope with the psychological challenges of injury including isolation and identity loss. Support received also contributed to maintaining motivation throughout rehabilitation and return to sport as well as maintaining their sense of belonging. As demonstrated in Figure 2, the self-determination theory prioritises three basic human needs of autonomy, competence and relatedness. Podlog and Eklund (2007) identified the need to treat each athlete as an active participant in the recovery process. In their literature review a number of frameworks are considered for supporting athletes psychosocial needs when returning to sport following injury. Although, the review does not guarantee a single framework will ensure positive outcomes, high emphasis is placed on meeting the athletes {{g}} needs for competence, autonomy and relatedness. They identify that an athlete may be physically ready to return to sport but may not be psychologically ready (Wadey and Evans 2011). Hsu et al. (2007) acknowledges that "incorporating principles of psychologically informed practice into sports injury rehabilitation could improve rehabilitation outcomes for athletes with high fear of reinjury". Successful rehabilitation must therefore account for the athletes {{g}} motivation to return, confidence in their abilities and support around them during the process. ==== '''Integrated model of psychological response to sport injury''' ==== The integrated model of psychological response to sport injury and rehabilitation aims to explain how athletes respond to injury through relationships between emotions, thought and behaviours. It was developed by Wiese-Bjornstal et al. (1998) and seeks to explain why athletes experience fear, frustration and reduced confidence following an injury and how their interpretation of their injury affects their response to injury. The model considers how the athletes {{g}} thoughts, behaviours and emotions can influence and effect rehabilitation. The model considers previous experience, social support and personality as contributing factors for how the athlete will interpret the injury and respond. As the model focuses on the individual and that every athlete may respond differently, support systems are also emphasised as an important role in recovery and maintaining a positive attitude throughout the process (Wiese-Bjornstal et al. 1889). The model is particularly useful in sport as it supports coaches and support teams to better understand the needs of the injured athlete. ==== '''Sport commitment model''' ==== The sport commitment model was developed by Scanlan et al. (1993) and is an established framework for understanding sport participation. The model was originally developed with young baseball players with the model later applied to adult tennis players by Casper et al. (2007) and aims to explore why athletes participate in sport and what motivates commitment. The framework has five key factors that influence an individuals desire to continue participating in sport; enjoyment, investment, involvement opportunities, social constraints, alternatives. The framework seeks to understand not just continued involvement but also why an individual may no longer participate in sport. Inigo, et al. (2015) applied the model to athletes who had committed to sport following an injury. This study identified additional factors that influenced continued participation in the sport of wanting to be the best, self-affirmation and contractual obligations. The commitment to return to sport is shaped by a number of factors, the sport commitment model highlights a number of psychological and social factors that contribute alongside physical recovery. Each theory offers unique strengths in understanding athletic identity and return to sport following injury. As theories developed within a sporting context, the integrated model of psychological response to sport injury and rehabilitation and the sport commitment model are particularly relevant for understanding the broader response to an injury and the factors that influence athletes' motivation to return to sport. However, the Self-Determination Theory is supported by a substantial body of research and provides a robust, theory informed framework for understanding the psychological effects that injury may have and support mechanisms for both the athlete and those supporting them. What is prevalent across models is that {{g}} in addition to supporting physical recovery, considering an athlete's psychological needs such as motivation and identity, may help create a more effective and holistic pathway for returning to sport. {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} Maggie realised that rehabilitating her injury was not just about healing physically. She also needed to rebuild her confidence and her sense of self. Working with her coach, physiotherapist and sports psychologist, Maggie began to reconnect with teammates and set small, achievable goals both on and off the court. Achieving these goals helped to strengthen her sense of autonomy and confidence, and she recorded her progress in a journal she wrote in regularly. Maggie gradually came to realise that, even though she was not on the court, she could remain connected to her community. This helped her to see her value extended beyond her role as an athlete. {{RoundBoxBottom}} == Quiz == <quiz display="simple"> {Only elite athletes can have an athletic identity? |type="()"} - True + False {A scale used to measure athletic identity is called the Athletic Identity Measurement Scale? |type="()"} - True + False {Psychologists Edward Deci and Richard Ryan created self determination theory and formalised the theory in 1985? |type="()"} + True - False {The three basic needs outlined in self determination theory are autonomy, competence and relatedness? |type="()"} + True - False </quiz> {{RoundBoxTop|theme=3}} Maggie knew that it would be a long road ahead before she would be able to take the court again however along the way she had learned valuable lessons about herself. Some days were tough, but she saw an opportunity to not only rebuild herself as an athlete but also recognise her strengths outside sport and help others who had experienced similar journeys. {{RoundBoxBottom}} ==Conclusion== Athletic identity has many positive benefits from strong self-efficacy, social connections and physical health benefit {{g}} however it can also be associated with challenges particularly where that identity can be challenged through injury. Athletic injury does more than interrupt training it disrupts identity, confidence, and the psychological foundations of motivation. When athletes experience a change in their athletic identity, their drive to return becomes shaped not only by physical readiness but by how they reconstruct their sense of self during recovery. Psychological science offers clear insights into how identity and motivation interact in the recovery and return to sport process. Theoretical frameworks such as the self-determination theory, the integrated model of psychological response to sport injury and rehabilitation and the sport commitment model can provide support and guidance for athletes and their support team. Through addressing identity and motivation frameworks can inform tailored plans to support the psychological well being alongside the physical needs. While research has begun to examine the relationship between athletic identity, injury and motivation, further investigation is needed across diverse populations. In particular, youth athletes may experience different challenges as identity development is especially important during this stage of life. Further research could also investigate differences across genders and participation levels from recreational to elite athletes, to better understand how identity disruption influences motivation to continue playing sport. Many of the current studies have limitations such as relying on self report measures and small cohorts of subjects. There is significant opportunities in this field to research the connection between athletic identity disruption through injury and motivation to return to sport. Athletic identity can foster commitment to sport and a stronger sense of belonging. However, when an injury disrupts participation and challenges and athlete's sense of self, supporting an athletes {{g}} understanding and development of a broader identity may enhance psychological wellbeing and recovery alongside physical rehabilitation to support motivation to return to sport successfully. == See also == * [[wikipedia:Athletic_identity|Athletic identity]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Identity|Identity]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Sports_injury|Sports injury]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Team_sport|Team sport]] (Wikipedia) * [[wikipedia:Self-determination_theory|Self-determination theory]] (Wikipedia) ==References== {{Hanging indent|1= Andersen, M. B. (2001). Returning to action and the prevention of future injury. In J. Crossman (Ed.), Coping with sports injuries: Psychological strategies for rehabilitation (pp. 162–173). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192632159.003.0009 Bianco, T. (2001). Social support and recovery from sport injury: Elite skiers share their experiences. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 72(4), 376–388. https://doi.org/10.1080/02701367.2001.10608974 Brewer, B. W., Cornelius, A. E., Van Raalte, J. L., Petitpas, A. J., Sklar, J. H., Pohlman, M. H., Krushell, R. J., & Ditmar, T. D. (2003). Age-related differences in predictors of adherence to rehabilitation after anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction. Journal of Athletic Training, 38(2), 158–162 Brewer, B. W. (1999). Self-identity and specific vulnerability to depressed mood. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 11(1), 84-93. https://doi.org/10.1080/10413209908404201 Brewer BW, Cornelius AE, Van Raalte JL, Petitpas AJ, Sklar JH, Pohlman MH, et al. (2003) Age-related differences in predictors of adherence to rehabilitation after anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction.;38(2):158–62 Chun, Y., Wendling, E., & Sagas, M. (2023). Identity work in athletes: A systematic review of the literature. Sports, 11(10), 203. https://doi.org/10.3390/sports11100203 Dawes, H., & Roach, N. K. (1997). Emotional responses of athletes to injury and treatment. Physiotherapy, 83(5), 243–247. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0031-9406(05)66215-3 Edison, B. R., Christino, M. A., & Rizzone, K. H. (2021). Athletic Identity in Youth Athletes: A Systematic Review of the Literature. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 18(14), 7331 Evans, L., Hardy, L., & Fleming, S. (2000). Intervention strategies with injured athletes: An action research study. The Sport Psychologist, 14(2), 188–206. Gould, D., Udry, E., Bridges, D., & Beck, L. (1997). Stress sources encountered when rehabilitating from season-ending ski injuries. The Sport Psychologist, 11(4), 361–378. Hsu, C.-J., Meierbachtol, A., George, S. Z., & Chmielewski, T. L. (2017). Fear of reinjury in athletes: Implications for rehabilitation. Sports Health, 9(2), 162–167. https://doi.org/10.1177/1941738116666813 Iñigo, M. M., Podlog, L., & Hall, M. S. (2015). Why do athletes remain committed to sport after severe injury? An examination of the Sport Commitment Model. The Sport Psychologist, 29(2), 143-155. https://doi.org/10.1123/tsp.2014-0086 Lamont-Mills, A., & Christensen, S. A. (2006). Athletic identity and its relationship to sport participation levels. Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport, 9(6), 472–478. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsams.2006.04.004 Lochbaum, M., Cooper, S., & Limp, S. (2022). The Athletic Identity Measurement Scale: A systematic review with meta-analysis from 1993 to 2021. European Journal of Investigation in Health, Psychology and Education, 12(9), 1391–1414. https://doi.org/10.3390/ejihpe12090097 Lu, F. J. H., Lee, W. P., Chang, Y. K., Chou, C. C., Hsu, Y. W., Lin, J. H., & Gill, D. L. (2016). Mental toughness, social support, and athletic identity: Moderators of the life stress–injury relationship in collegiate football players. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 24, 92–100. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2016.01.009 McGinley, J., Stapleton, E., Worrall, H., Ellis, H. B., Wilson, P. L., & Ulman, S. (2022). Sport participation and psychosocial factors which influence athletic identity in youth athletes with anterior cruciate ligament injury. Frontiers in Sports and Active Living, 3, 660836. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.906300 Mossman, L. H., Slemp, G. R., Lewis, K. J., Colla, R. H., & O’Halloran, P. (2024). Autonomy support in sport and exercise settings: A systematic review and meta-analysis. International Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 17(1), 540–563. https://doi.org/10.1080/1750984X.2022.2031252 Ohji, S., Aizawa, J., Hirohata, K., Mitomo, S., Ohmi, T., Jinno, T., Koga, H., & Yagishita, K. (2021). Athletic identity and sport commitment in athletes after anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction who have returned to sports at their pre-injury level of competition. BMC Sports Science, Medicine and Rehabilitation, 13, Article 37. https://doi.org/10.1186/s13102-021-00264-6 Podlog, L., & Eklund, R. C. (2007). The psychosocial aspects of a return to sport following serious injury: A review of the literature from a self-determination perspective. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 8(4), 535-566. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2006.07.008 Podlog, L., Heil, J., & Schulte, S. (2014). Psychosocial factors in sports injury rehabilitation and return to play. Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Clinics of North America, 25(4), 915-930. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pmr.2014.06.011 Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55(1), 68–78. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68 Smith, A. M., Scott, S. G., O’Fallon, W. M., & Young, M. L. (1990). Emotional responses of athletes to injury. Mayo Clinic Proceedings, 65(1), 38–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0025-6196(12)62108-9 Tracey, J. (2003). The emotional response to the injury and rehabilitation process. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 15(4), 279-293. https://doi.org/10.1080/714044197 Wadey, R., Evans, L., Evans, K., & Mitchell, I. (2011). Perceived benefits following sport injury: A qualitative examination of their antecedents and underlying mechanisms. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 23(2), 142–158. Weber Rawlins, M. L., Beasley, L. E., & Kontos, A. P. (2023). The influence of athletic identity, passion, and perceptions of concussion severity on athletes’ willingness to report concussion symptoms. Journal of Sport Rehabilitation, 32(7), 767–775. https://doi.org/10.1123/jsr.2022-0313 Webster, K. E., Clement, D., & Ardern, C. L. (2021). Differences in athletic identity, sport participation, and psychosocial factors following anterior cruciate ligament rehabilitation in youth athletes. Frontiers in Sports and Active Living, 3, 660835. https://doi.org/10.3389/fspor.2021.660835 Weir, K. (2025, March 2). Self-determination theory. American Psychological Association. https://www.apa.org/research-practice/conduct-research/self-determination-theory Wiese-Bjornstal, D. M., Smith, A. M., Shaffer, S. M., & Morrey, M. A. (1998). An integrated model of response to sport injury: Psychological and sociological dynamics. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 10(1), 46–69. https://doi.org/10.1080/10413209808406377 }} ==External links== * [https://www.ausport.gov.au Australian Sports Commission] (ausport.gov.au) * [https://www.beyondblue.org.au Beyond Blue] (beyondblue.org.au) [[Category:{{#titleparts:{{PAGENAME}}|3}}]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Health]] [[Category:Motivation and emotion/Book/Sport]] hadb9k06pdnomowy1ogb7ryu3mmmm6r 1 331633 2842346 2834437 2026-10-23T21:20:04Z Jtneill 10242 Book chapter feedback 2842346 wikitext text/x-wiki == Feedback == Hi there! I really like your overview scenario as it felt easy to follow, and I felt engaged with your book chapter after reading it. I also liked how you linked it back to implications in the field of sport for different professionals. [[User:Leilab23|U3220827]] ([[User talk:Leilab23|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Leilab23|contribs]]) 22:41, 27 August 2026 (UTC) <!-- Official topic development feedback --> {{METF/2026 |1= <!-- Title --> # Title and subtitle are correctly worded and use [[w:Letter case#Sentence casing|sentence casing]] |2= <!-- Headings --> # See earlier comment about [[#heading casing|heading casing]] <!-- Heading structure --> <!-- 1-level --> # Under-developed, [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Major project/Structure|1-level heading structure]] – develop further, perhaps using a 2-level structure for larger section(s) (i.e., including subheadings) <!-- Other ---> # Aim for 3 to 6 top-level headings between the Overview and Conclusion, with 3 to 5 sub-headings for large sections <!-- Alignment with focus questions --> # Insufficient alignment between sub-title, focus questions, and top-level headings |3= <!-- Overview--> # Very good <!-- Scenario --> # A scenario or case study is presented in a feature box at the start of this section # I moved an image into the feature box to help attract reader interest <!-- Description --> # A promising description of the problem/topic is planned or presented <!-- Focus questions --> # Develop closer alignment between the sub-title, focus questions, and top-level headings # Present focus questions in a feature box at the end of this section (fixed) |4= <!-- Key points--> <!-- Overall --> # Basic development <!-- Theory and research --> # Balance theoretical content with critical synthesis of relevant research <!-- GenAI ---> # Addition of [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI|genAI content]] needs to be acknowledged in the edit summaries with a link to the conversations, otherwise it violates academic integrity. <!-- Conclusion --> # Conclusion is underway # What are the practical, take-home messages? (address the focus questions) |5= <!-- Figure --> # Relevant figure(s) are presented and captioned <!-- Caption --> # Figure caption(s) should include '''Figure X'''. [bold] ... (fixed) <!-- Cite --> # Cite each figure at least once in the main text using APA style (e.g., see Figure 1), near where the Figure is presented |6= <!-- Learning feature --> <!-- Interwiki links ---> # Two in-text [[m:Help:Interwiki linking|interwiki links]] for first mention of key terms to [[w:|Wikipedia]]. Also embed links to [[Motivation and emotion/Book|book chapters]]. <!-- Scenarios/examples/case studies --> # Consider incorporating additional scenarios, examples, or case studies to illustrate key concepts. These could build on the Overview scenario or introduce new real-world situations in the main body of the chapter to demonstrate how the concepts apply in practice. <!-- Quiz --> # Promising use of quiz question(s) # Place each quiz question in the most relevant section # Focus the quiz question(s) on the take-home messages <!-- Tables --> # Also consider using [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Tables|table(s)]] to summarise key information |7= <!-- References --> <!-- Overall --> # Excellent # Very good # Good # Basic # Insufficient # To be developed <!-- Systematic reviews --> # What are the most relevant systematic reviews/meta-analyses about this topic? <!-- APA style --> # Check and correct [https://apastyle.apa.org/instructional-aids/reference-guide.pdf APA referencing style]: ## [[Help:Wikitext quick reference|italicisation]] ## check and correct formatting of author initials ## only cite sources you have consulted |8= <!-- Resources --> <!-- See also --> # See also ## One of two link types provided ### Also link to related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|motivation and emotion book chapters]] <!-- External links --> # External links ## Insufficient; too general ## Target an international audience; Australians only represent 0.33% of the world population ## Link to the most relevant external resources about this topic |9= <!-- User page --> # Used effectively <!-- Description about self --> # Description about self provided <!-- Links to profile(s) --> # Consider linking to your [https://portfolio.canberra.edu.au/ eportfolio] page and/or any other professional online profile or resume such as [https://www.linkedin.com/ LinkedIn]. This is not required, but it can be useful to interlink your professional networks. <!-- Link to book chapter --> # A link to the book chapter is provided |10= <!-- Social contribution --> # One out of three types of contributions made with direct link(s) to evidence. The other types of contribution are making: #* direct improvements to other [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters (past or current)]] #* posts about the unit or project on the {{Motivation and emotion/Canvas}} discussion forum }} == Suggestions for 'See also' section == Hi there, Well done on your topic development, I enjoyed reading your work thus far! I noticed that you hadn't yet included internal wiki links to relevant motivation and emotion book chapters in your ''See also'' section. You should check out the chapters on [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2023/Sport injury recovery motivation|Sport injury recovery motivation]] (Book chapter, 2023) and [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2023/Long-term injury in high performance field athletes and emotion|Long-term injury in high performance field athletes and emotion]] (Book chapter, 2023), I think that these might be valuable additions to your book chapter. Best regards. [[User:U3285438|U3285438]] ([[User talk:U3285438|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/U3285438|contribs]]) 01:23, 25 September 2026 (UTC) <!-- Official book chapter feedback --> {{MEBF/2026 |1= <!-- Overall comments... --> # This is an excellent chapter that successfully uses psychological theory and research to address a practical, real-world phenomenon or problem <!-- Overall - Edit summaries --> #* Excellent use of [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|edit summaries]] to clearly communicate the changes made in most or all of the main edits #* [[Motivation and emotion/Wikiversity/Edit summary|Edit summaries]] are used to communicate the changes for most edits <!-- Overall - GenAI --> #* [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Using generative AI|GenAI use]] is appropriately acknowledged <!-- Overall – Word count --> # Over the [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter#Wordcount|maximum word count]]. Content beyond 4,000 words has been ignored for marking purposes. <!-- Overall – Copyedits --> # For additional feedback, see the following comments and [https://en.wikiversity.org/w/index.php?title=Motivation_and_emotion%2FBook%2F2026%2FAthletic_identity_loss_and_returning_to_sport_after_injury&diff=2842345&oldid=2839553 these copyedits] |2= <!-- Overview – Comments... --> # Very good <!-- Overview – Scenario --> <!-- Overview – Scenario - Description --> # Engaging scenario or case study # What was the injury? <!-- Overview – Scenario - Figure --> # Figure 1 is relevant to the scenario <!-- Overview – Scenario - Feature box --> # The scenario uses an appropriate feature box <!-- Overview – Explains problem --> # Clearly explains the psychological problem or phenomenon # What are the two theories? <!-- Overview – Focus questions --> # The focus questions are excellent (clear and relevant)/very good/good/reasonably good/basic/promising/insufficient # More proofreading needed for the focus questions |3= <!-- Theory comments... --> <!-- Theory – Breadth --> # Excellent—key theories are very well explained and applied <!-- Theory – Builds on --> # Builds reasonably well on [[w:|Wikipedia]] articles but not related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] by embedding interwiki links for key terms <!-- Theory – Depth --> # Very good depth is provided about key theory(ies) <!-- Theory – Tables/Figures/Lists --> # Basic use of tables, figures, and/or lists to clearly convey key theoretical information <!-- Theory – Citations --> # Key citations are well used <!-- Theory – Examples --> # Excellent use of examples to illustrate theoretical concepts |4= <!-- Research comments... --> <!-- Research – Key findings --> # Excellent review of relevant research # Excellent emphasis on systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses <!-- Research – Critical thinking --> # Reasonably good [[w:Critical thinking|critical thinking]] about relevant research is evident # [[w:Critical thinking|Critical thinking]] about research could be further evidenced by: ## describing the methodology (e.g., sample, measures) in important studies ## considering the strength of relationships ## acknowledging limitations ## pointing out critiques/counterarguments ## suggesting ''specific'' directions for future research |5= <!-- Integration comments... --> # Excellent/ integration between the most relevant theory(ies) and the best research # Insufficient integration with related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|chapters]] |6= <!-- Conclusion comments... --> # Good summary and conclusion # Highlight the importance of the problem or phenomenon of interest <!-- Conclusion – Key points --> # Key points are well summarised <!-- Conclusion – Focus questions --> # Address the focus questions <!-- Conclusion – Take-home messages --> # Add practical, take-home message(s) |7= <!-- Written expression – Style comments... --> <!-- Written expression – Written expression --> # Written expression ## The quality of written expression is very good <!-- Written expression – Paragraphs --> ## Some paragraphs are overly long. Communicate one key idea per paragraph in three to five sentences. <!-- Written expression – Layout --> # Layout ## Avoid having sections with 1 sub-heading – use 0 or 2+ sub-headings ## Use the default heading style (e.g., remove additional numbers, italics, bold, and/or change in font size) ## Remove "Quiz" as a heading; distribute each of the quiz questions into the most relevant corresponding sections <!-- Written expression – Grammar --> # Grammar ## The grammar for some sentences could be improved (e.g., see {{g}} tags); consider using a grammar checking tool, [https://www.studiosity.com/students/ Studiosity], and/or peer feedback ## Use past tense when describing research studies, although implications of findings could be in the present tense ## [https://www.grammarly.com/blog/punctuation-capitalization/possessive-apostrophe/ Possessive apostrophes] are not used correctly (e.g., cats vs cat's vs cats') ## Check and correct use of [https://www.google.com.au/search?q=affect+vs.+effect+grammar affect vs. effect] <!-- Written expression – Proofreading --> # Proofreading ## More proofreading is needed (e.g., fix punctuation and typographical errors) to bring the quality of written expression closer to a professional standard <!-- Written expression – APA style --> # APA style ## Use [[w:Serial comma|serial comma]]s[https://www.buzzfeed.com/adamdavis/the-oxford-comma-is-extremely-important-and-everyone-should][https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gBx8ooDupXY] ## Use [https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/capitalization/diseases-disorders-therapies sentence casing (not capitals) for disorders, therapies, theories, etc.] ## Direct quotes need page numbers—even better, communicate about concepts in your own words ## Direct quotes are overused—it is better to communicate about concepts in your own words <!-- Written expression – Figures --> ## Figures ### Very well captioned <!-- Written expression – Figures - Citations --> ### Each Figure is referred to at least once within the main text using APA style <!-- Written expression – Citations --> # Citations use excellent [https://apastyle.apa.org/products/publication-manual-7th-edition APA Style (7th ed.)] <!-- Written expression – References --> ## References use good APA style: ### Check and correct use of italicisation ### Include dois where available ### More proofreading needed to ensure consistency <!-- Feedback responsiveness ---> ## No evidence of responsiveness to feedback on talk page |8= <!-- Learning features comments... --> # Reasonably good use of learning features <!-- Learning features – Wikipedia embedded links --> # Reasonably good/ use of embedded in-text [[m:Help:Interwiki linking|interwiki links]] to Wikipedia articles. Adding more interwiki links for the first mention of key words and technical concepts would make the text even more interactive. See [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2020/Nutrition and anxiety|example]]. <!-- Learning features – Wikiversity embedded links --> # Add embedded in-text links to related [[Motivation and emotion/Book|book chapters]]. Embedding in-text links to related book chapters helps to integrate this chapter into the broader book project. <!-- Learning features – Figures, tables, feature boxes, scenarios --> # Basic use of figure(s) # No use of table(s) # No use of feature boxes other than the opening scenario # Excellent use of scenarios, case studies, or examples <!-- Learning features – Quizzes --> # Basic use of quiz(zes) and/or reflection question(s) # The quiz questions could be improved by being more focused on the key points and/or take-home messages # The quiz questions could be more effective as learning prompts by being embedded as single questions within each corresponding section rather than as a set of questions at the end <!-- Learning features – See also --> # Basic use of the [[{{PAGENAME}}#See also|See also]] section ## Also include links to [[Motivation and emotion/Book|related book chapters]] <!-- Learning features – External links --> # Insufficient use of the [[{{PAGENAME}}#External links|External links]] section ## Target an international audience ## Add more links ## Link to the top 3-6 external resources about this topic |9= <!-- Social contribution comments... --> # ~7 logged, useful, mostly minor/moderate/major contributions with [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Summarising social contributions#How to add direct links to contributions|direct links to evidence]] # ~2 logged contributions without [[Motivation and emotion/Assessment/Chapter/Summarising social contributions#How to add direct links to contributions|direct links to evidence]], so unable to easily verify and assess. See [[Motivation and emotion/Tutorials|tutorials]] for guidance about how to get direct links to evidence. # ~1 logged contribution was made without being logged in (not counted) }} -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:19, 23 October 2026 (UTC) bk7zfxgecmc1sgdqh58rgqytp8zu30h 4 331834 2842314 2833341 2026-10-23T15:08:33Z Codename Noreste 2969951 /* Add an edit count requirement for autoconfirmed? */ archive from [[Wikiversity:Colloquium]] ([[mw:c:Special:MyLanguage/User:JWBTH/CD|CD]]) 2842314 wikitext text/x-wiki == August 2026 Wikimedia Café meetups regarding [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Next_25 Next 25] == <div class="border-box" style="background-color: var(--background-color-warning-subtle, #f8eaba); max-width: 875px; padding: 5px; border: 1px solid black; margin: 5px; color: var(--clr-dark)"> <div class="box" style="float:left; padding-top: 10px; padding-right: 10px; padding-left: 10px; padding-bottom: 10px;">[[File:Wikimedia Café logo in plain SVG format.svg|60px|alt=The logo for the Wikimedia Café]]</div> Hello! 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Participants may attend either or both Café sessions. #'''29 August 2026 15:00 UTC''' ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1788015600 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to the Americas, Africa, and Europe #'''30 August 2026 03:00 UTC''' ([https://zonestamp.toolforge.org/1788058800 timestamp converter]), at a time friendly to Asia and the Pacific Please see the [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 Café] page for more information, including [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#Agenda._This_will_be_an_approximately_1_hour_Caf%C3%A9_session agenda details] and [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9#How_to_attend_the_session how to register]! To subscribe or unsubscribe for Café notices on your talk page please [https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_message_delivery/Targets/Wikimedia_Caf%C3%A9 go here]. <br /> [[File:Buntstifte Eberhard Faber crop 64h.jpg|860px|alt=cropped image of colored pencils]]</div> <span style="white-space:nowrap;">[[User:Pine|<span style="color:#01796f; text-shadow:#00BFFF 0 0 1.0em">༄ᨒ𖠰 Pine</span>]] [[User talk:Pine|<span style="color:DeepSkyBlue">(<b style="color:#FFDF00;text-shadow:#FFDF00 0 0 1.0em">✉</b>)</span>]]</span> 01:31, 17 August 2026 (UTC) == Motivation and emotion - Student editing == We are underway with [[Motivation and emotion]] this semester (Aug - Nov), which will see ~150 students signing up to and edting [[Motivation and emotion/Book/2026]]. Please be friendly and help them out as they learn their way around. Sincerely, James -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 00:16, 10 August 2026 (UTC) == Add an edit count requirement for autoconfirmed? == Currently, only waiting for four days is required for a user to become autoconfirmed. I am proposing that we include a minimum edit count of <s>10 edits (akin to Wikipedia)</s> 5 edits especially because of [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|a private abuse filter]], and LTAs may game autoconfirmed permissions to vandalize here. Thoughts? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] ([[User talk:Codename Noreste|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Codename Noreste|contribs]]) 23:01, 23 August 2026 (UTC) : [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]] : Are you suggesting an additional requirement? i.e., 4 days + 10 edits? : How is it adjusted? -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 03:57, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :: Yes. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:30, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :: @[[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]]: I said yes to your first question. As for the adjustment question, in the InitialiseSettings.php file on noc.wikimedia.org, on <code>wgAutoConfirmCount</code> is where English Wikiversity would be added as <code>'enwikiversity' => 10,</code>. Does my reply make sense? [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 18:31, 15 September 2026 (UTC) :As a newly volunteered member, it doesn't seem unreasonable to me to require a certain number of edits to establish my bona fides. [[User:Cfm490|Cfm490]] ([[User talk:Cfm490|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Cfm490|contribs]]) 17:53, 5 September 2026 (UTC) :I agree that adding an edit count requirement is a reasonable expectation before the user can become autoconfirmed. [[User:IanVG|IanVG]] ([[User talk:IanVG|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/IanVG|contribs]]) 18:56, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :+ 1 —[[User:Atcovi|Atcovi]] [[User talk:Atcovi|(Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Atcovi|Contribs)]] 19:40, 6 September 2026 (UTC) :'''Weak support''' Generally reasonable, but I would caution that we should really make this clear for those instances where professors have students edit here and make it frictionless for them to get autoconfirmed status. ―[[User:Koavf|Justin (<span style="color:grey">ko'''a'''<span style="color:black">v</span>f</span>)]]<span style="color:red">❤[[User talk:Koavf|T]]☮[[Special:Contributions/Koavf|C]]☺[[Special:Emailuser/Koavf|M]]☯</span> 19:42, 6 September 2026 (UTC) : {{oppose|No support}} because I cannot see the [[Special:AbuseFilter/16|abuse filter]] cited as the primary reason and I do not know what LTAs is. I guess you don’t want support from ''ordinary'' users. ‑‑[[User:Kai Burghardt|Kays]] ([[User talk:Kai Burghardt|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Kai Burghardt|contribs]]) 18:18, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::Also some readers may be interested in this: ::* [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]] ::[[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 19:05, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::: An LTA means a long-term abuser, and it means someone who is usually abusive. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 20:42, 14 September 2026 (UTC) ::::@[[User:Codename Noreste|Codename Noreste]], an LTA is someone who is usually abusive? That's news to me. Can you please point us to the source of this information. ::::Thanks in advance, [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 15:50, 14 October 2026 (UTC) :::::[[w:WP:LTA|WP:LTA]] :::::[[User:Chrisblammo123|Chrisblammo123]] ([[User talk:Chrisblammo123|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Chrisblammo123|contribs]]) 08:59, 15 October 2026 (UTC) :'''Strong''' {{support}}; specially to battle LTA [[User:Mbataw|Mbataw]] ([[User talk:Mbataw|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Mbataw|contribs]]) 13:17, 18 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}}, having no edit count requirement for autoconfirmed is a bad idea in general. [[User:BooksBooksBooks3|BooksBooksBooks3]] ([[User talk:BooksBooksBooks3|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/BooksBooksBooks3|contribs]]) 01:43, 19 September 2026 (UTC) :Comment: I realize that it is not easy to be an admin on wikimedia projects. I realize that many admins have to deal with some VERY unpleasant personalities. But.. :Admins are not the only users who encounter harassment on wikimedia projects, big or small. Anyone who's been here as long as I have, has come across users who are not tolerated by the "community". Not necessarily because they are spammers, trollers, paid editors, LTAs , disruptive etc, but simply because they are different. :When I "edit" without logging in, I carry no baggage. I also get encouraging prompts such as this: :* This year, Wikipedia has had fewer visitors and fewer new supporters, so '''<big>your visit today means a lot</BIG>''' :Anyway, back to the topic at hand [[Wikipedia/Types of user accounts]]. I believe the section about IP editors is outdated since wikimedia now views users who are not logged-in as anonymous, and only trusted users are allowed to see their IP address (I am not clear on the details). I wonder if anyone participating here has an interest in bringing this page uptodate? [[Special:Contributions/~2026-40514-81|~2026-40514-81]] ([[User talk:~2026-40514-81|talk]]) 04:13, 22 September 2026 (UTC) : If there's some obvious things to fix, I'd say go ahead. It looks like there were several useful anonymous contributions to that page recently. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 07:54, 22 September 2026 (UTC) :hmm [[User:Tornaiden|Tornaiden]] ([[User talk:Tornaiden|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/Tornaiden|contribs]]) 02:02, 27 September 2026 (UTC) :{{support}} Having a reasonable (and very modest) number of edits in addition to 4 days is sensible and not overly burdensome. The benefits outweigh any inconveniences. --[[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 04:18, 7 October 2026 (UTC) ::I agree that the 5 edit minimum described below is sufficient. [[User:Mu301|mikeu]] ^{[[User talk:Mu301|talk]]} 01:14, 13 October 2026 (UTC) :I'd say that a minimum of five (5) edits would be a good compromise, given the lower user activity/user traffic present here (when compared with Wikipedia). [[User:SamLaxarox|SamLaxarox]] ([[User talk:SamLaxarox|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/SamLaxarox|contribs]]) 17:47, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I agree that a minimum edit count is a prudent addition, but also agree with @[[User:SamLaxarox|SamLazaraox]] that a minimum of 5 is sufficient. It can be frustrating for new, genuine users when they get caught in new user restrictions. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:49, 12 October 2026 (UTC) :: I adjusted the proposal to require at least 5 edits for autoconfirmed users, instead of 10. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 01:18, 13 October 2026 (UTC) : Here is current page about [[Wikiversity:Autoconfirmed users]]. -- [[User:Jtneill|Jtneill]] - <small>[[User talk:Jtneill|Talk]] - [[Special:Contributions/Jtneill|c]]</small> 21:50, 12 October 2026 (UTC) : I made [[phab:T442057]]. [[User:Codename Noreste|<span style="color: blue">Codename Noreste</span>]] /// [[User talk:Codename Noreste|⭐️✨]] 15:37, 22 October 2026 (UTC) e4fj4au9yru9dozj59x0hkynsrh83cj 0 332412 2842364 2842175 2026-10-23T22:48:25Z Scogdill 1331941 2842364 wikitext text/x-wiki =Event= International championship boxing match between British Jem Smith and Australian Frank Slavin on 23 December 1889 in Bruges, Belgium. ==Overview== On 23 December 1889 a boxing match in Bruges did not end with integrity: British Jim Smith was losing, so his supporters entered the ring, pinned Australian Frank Slavin's arms and beat him up. The referee called it a draw to prevent Slavin from being killed, and then fled. The Cork Constitution called it "the Smith-Slavin piece of brutality."<ref>"Mr. Abington." ''Cork Constitution'' 14 January 1890, Tuesday: 7 [of 8], Col. 5b [of 6]. ''British Newspaper Archive''https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.com/image-viewer?issue=BL%2F0001648%2F18900114&page=7&article=099&stringtohighlight=mandeville+viscount. Same title and p.</ref> ==Logistics== * 23 December 1889, 8:00 a.m. * Stakes: £1,000 ==Related Events== * [[Social Victorians/Boxing/Pelican Club Meeting Smith-Slavin match|Pelican Club Meetings about the Smith-Slavin match]] * the "[[Social Victorians/Boxing/Fracas at the Trocadero|Fracas at the Trocadero]]" ==Who Was Present== # [[Social Victorians/People/Mandeville|Kim Montagu, Viscount Mandeville]] # Jem Smith, British boxer # Frank Slavin, Australian boxer # Lord Rosslyn # Sir M. Sandys # Mr. G. Abington Baird, Smith's manager? and horseman (see description in Anthology) ==Entertainment== ==Anthology== The Evening News and Post On Wedesday, 1 January 1890, the Evening News and Post === The ''Sportsman'' === On Monday, 30 December 1889:<blockquote> "The Ring. The Slavin Testimonial." The Sportsman 30 December 1889, Monday: 4 [of A committee meeting of the above was held on Saturday afternoon, Mr W. J. Innes in the chair.  There were also present Mr W. Riley, Mr Fred H. [Gala?], Mr C. Parsons, Mr A. Butler, Mr M. J. Harrow (Margate), Mr Ike White, Mr E. C. Irish, and Mr G. T. Dunning (hon. sec. and treasurer). The chairman read a letter from Mr John Lees, regretting his inability to attend owing to illness, whilst the remaining committeeman, Mr E. W. Bayly, was absent in Paris. The appointment of the hon. sec. and treasurer was confirmed by the committee, and after some discussion it was decided to close the subscription-list on Monday, January 20, and to present the proceeds to Slavin at the Cambridge Music Hall, Bishopsgate-street, on a day to be named. Other business of minor importance was transacted, and after the next committee meeting had been fixed for Wednesday,  January 15, the meeting closed with a vote of thanks to the chairman. Additional subscriptions to the fund, which now reaches 300''i''., will be found appended [names set as unordered list to save space] * Lord Mandeville   * Lard Royston * Lord James Douglas * Hon. Michael Sandys * Fred [Ketchie?] * Mr Ike White * Mr W. Riley * Mr C. Parsons * Mr J. Kilby * Mr Frank  Hinde * Proprietors of The Sportsman * Mr. J. Purdey * Mr. E. W. Bayly * Messrs H. A. Domby and Son * "Caption Coe" * Mr C. W. Bulpett * Mr P. W. Carr * Mr W. Morley Pegge * W. D. S. * J. E. S. * Mr W. H. Grenfel * Mr Quartermaine East * Mr H. H. Hungerford * Mr Noel Fenwick * Sir John Leslie, Bart. * Mr T. Brinkman * Mr Calder * Mr H. W. Hill * Mr John Young * Mr D. A. Neilson * Mr W. Neilson * Mr Julius Simon * Mr J. Edge * Mr H. Marshall * Mr F. Aynsley * Col. Hon. Wellesley * Mr Charles Hawtrey * Mr W. F. Ashton * Mr Barratt * Old Durham Ox * Sir John Willoughby * A friend, per C. H. A. * Mr Ben Giles * Mr Tom Vale * [E.?] W. * Officer * Per Mr Ike White, Exchange Club: ** S. W. ** Mr G. B. Knight ** Mr A. Powles ** Mr S. Blandford ** T. F. W. C. ** Mr Leo Harward ** Mr J. Harward ** Mr H. Harward ** Mr [Monteagle?] [Moutcagie??] ** Mr C. Orate ** W. G. P. ** H. R. T ** Mr Josiah Smith ** W. H. R. ** Mr R. Wilson * Per Mr M. J. Harlow, Margate: ** Mr A. H. [Cosi? Coni?] ** Mr J. Thurston ** Mr J. A. Fagg ** Mr F. [Miles?] ** Mr Adolphe [Drineqbeir?] ** Mr Ernest [Drineqbier?] ** Mr Lacy Brown ** Mr Algy Brown ** Mr M. J. Harlow ** An Admirer ** Mr J. W. Robinson ** Mr W. Searles ** Mr J. Smith ** Mr J. Hume ** Mr J. Painter ** A Scotchman ** Mr J. Mundell ** Mr Bob Redman ** Mr G. A. Body ** Mr J. Phipps ** Mr J. Doughty ** Old Fisherman ** Mr Joe Knott * Per Mr B. J. Angle ** Some mebers of the Stock Exchange ** Hr Henry J. Turner * Per Mr W. J. Innes: ** Mr Sidney Fry ** Mr W. J. I. ** Mr W. Schlesinger ** Mr Joseph Thompson ** Mr Barney Thompson ** Mr L. Meyers ** Mr W. Shoe ** Mr George Cooper ** Mr J. T. Crossley ** Mr Andy Anderson ** Mr G. M. T. ** Mr F. R. ** Mr W. Bertram ** Mr J. W. Hammon ** Mr Alec Harris ** Mr John Isaacs ** Mr Edward [Dance? Dasce?] ** Mr George Blanchett ** Mr F. [Leleu? Lolou?] ** Mr W. J. R. ** Mr H. C. ** Mr A. A. M. ** Mr D. W. Fowler * Per Mr F. H. Gale: ** Mr R. Moore ** Mr A. H. Goode ** Mr [B.? E.? R.?] J. G. Goode ** Mr F. H. Gale ** Mr H. Ulph ** Mr J. Hooper ** Mr C. Kittall ** Mr C. Moore * Per Mr W. Riley: ** Mr Brand (Wiltshire) ** Mr Charles Godfrey ** Mrs Lane (Britannia) ** Mr Sam Adams ** B. and M. * Per Mr A. Cockburn: ** Mr Richardson ** Mr A. Cox ** Mr Hy. Brackenbury To the Editor of The Sportsman. Sir,— From the evidence of your eye-witness reporter there seems to me the clearest possible case against Smith, Harper, and Baldock — that Smith held Slavin on the ropes while the roughs kicked and "knuckle-dustered" him, that Harper put his knee on Slavin when down, and that Baldock did likewise, and that throughout they advised Smith to stand like a coward under the protection of the savages till the instinct which filled Slavin's manly bosom prompted the honest outburst to Smith, "Come and have a round." The duty for sportsmen to fulfil with the assistance of their representative journal, is, firstly, to see that Slavin is elected Champion and that he is handsomely recompensed, and that these so-called "seconds" should be properly punished and our splendid timber-yard Champion put in his proper place. The names of those who hired the roughs should also be published. I have spoken to at least fifty patrons of boxing shows, and one and all have made the most positive and determined objection to supporting any entertainment where the three men named above are concerned directly or indirectly. They, by their own stupidity and cupidity, have put the last nail in their own coffin, I hope. With regard to the referee, this individual is decidedly unsatisfactory. He allowed Smith to bolt when the cry of "Police" was raised without disqualifying him in any way, and then put an end to the business by declaring it a draw. Now, if the said referee is not a determined or courageous man, then he acted to the best of his judgment, for he was afraid of personal violence, having literally to escape to London; but on his arrival here, I and numberless others naturally expected some explanation or a reversal of his decision. The whole sporting community are on the tiptoe of excitement, and Mr Vesey in the coolest  possible manner washes his hands of the affair, declining absolutely to expose any opinion. This is rather rough on the public considering that be consented to act as referee of his own free will, and he is no chicken in such matters. He does not tell us whether he is aware that he has the power to reverse a decision given under fear; nor does he say whether he still considers the decision made on the spot a happy one. How was it that no steps were taken to protect the referee? There is no legitimate courage in the Brummagem rough. He is an imposter. With assistance of our excellent so-called Champion, and about another ten, armed with knuckle-dusters, he will doubtless attack Slavin, and if a torrent of filthy, cowardly abuse could kill he would beat Slavin single-handed. One of these gallant gentry actually returned to Birmingham without going to Bruges, being positively afraid to chance crossing the tiny stretch of sea. An American reader will bear me out that had our unsatisfactory referee been under the protection of one single genuine Nebraska "tough," as they are called out there, he would, without uttering one word of bad language, have cleared out the lot had they attempted violence to his charge. But it would never have come to that, for the sight of a real, genuine armed rough, with determined set features, would have struck terror into the hearts of the pluckless Brum shoddy bully, with the proverbial dull, stupid, animal-like pudding face. As an Englishman I [Col. 1c–2a] positively feel guilty among my American friends when they ask me what about my vaunted British fairplay, and I quite fail to see or understand how "seconds" — no matter, for argument's sake, how dishonest they may be can such fools as to kill the goose which lays their golden eggs. Prize-fighting and boxing are their bread-and-butter, and some of those who accepted the assistance of the roughs in the recent important international fight must have surely prognosticated that trouble and disgrace would follow, and they of all men should have been the last to wantonly risk breaking up one of our favourite English sports. In conclusion, contrast the courage of the two men. Slavin practically fought about six men, not knowing the moment that one well-directed blow from a "duster" might have cost him his life or lost him the fight. Think of his manly appeals to the cowards for a few minutes' fairplay. I only wish they each had to have four rounds singly with him! — Yours, &c., A Lover of Boxing. To the Editor of The Sportsman. Sir, — Previous to the late show of ruffianism I was in sympathy with and respected Smith as the Champion, but I am grieved to say that nothing of late years has so thoroughly disgusted me as the ill-treatment which was meted out to Slavin by those who disgrace not only sport but the very name of man. I sincerely hope that Slain will still continue to think that one of the dearest wishes of the true sportsman of this country is to see fair play. I enclose my mite in the shape of one guinea, and subscribe myself, yours, &c., Leicester, December 28. J. Barrett. To the Editor of The Sportsman. Sir, — Herewith I inclose cheque 1''l''. 1''s''. to the Slavin Fund, and hope that his manly and honourable conduct will be well rewarded. I cannot, however, agree with those who hope "that we have seen the last of prize-fighting," and other sentiments of the kind. It will be an evil day for England when the fighting instinct dies out from among her sons. No, let us rather hope that the Slavin-Smith ''fiasco'' will be the beginning of a new era, and that for the future fights will not be allowed to take place without proper ring-keepers, as in the days of Spring, Langham, and Bendigo, and that the Championship of England will not be long without a native defender.—Yours, &c., J. W. B. C., Junior Carlton Club, December 27. Sta,—l hew to inclose you the sum of one  my subscription to tbe Stavin FOOL IRS  sorry to read of the outrageoms saddertisrees huaL  meet Slavin received from &WO& anpywrlsee. which  support was tail* eatight did by cuss leaving  his corner sad resedsd o bis as IM maw el the  wedaDY Eaellallana abeeil bees dud ad peeto  call Wart a i• lbegbars Cliedeplos." I  feel quite certain that bad lib es tiegeses eseded  r away without the skews_esedemelles it received  at all good sporting menliiseds stiffs esudry,  and the hearty and tba ii 1111111•111111111111rapithy  er  le  w o ened for nevi% the hods * a  feat n eeord is betwentbe  fraternity of the two easseriss. Now and Old  would soon have ceased to odd. Aestealians are  great stickers to and warm suippoeters of4and and  the English, and they will anted used the slur  cast upon " British fair-play and —Yours,  a lover of it, Bram d£LvAnrs.  York, December 21.  TO Tea SDITOR Or MI lIPORTSIUN..  SI R. will 1;1 - ei g no for am  guinea as a simple trials to Iloth. who 00  squarely Mid his ewe, sod who slissid not to  Wind versa us &sinew la a diews esosary, but es  a earls Inglishorse, who iisserres impart. auk  only as • true mpurftwa but do male* lie fearful  ordeal of rimi to width le has been subjected.  As a lowa of Ye play believe me, yews hithfuily,  Birssisergs,Demabee 27. Tow S. Suer.  TO TO MOM OT TO I.O.IIIKAN.  hie,—geooTooliTiEl4s: tOixoliWilarna already  mat you for Slavin tootimoniol, so 4 oblige, yours, &c.,  I. Warn.  Exchange Club, Quaen-stroot, Chespaido, Doe. 28.  TILE PM= 71017 AT LUIS.  AT Lade, en array. Qller ehleteriage 'WAN  Modify-ere, Myrrh Uses, wee breught iip  " semi  with lie oweeiNeed a bee& et the presto,  in s prime will strater mss. ere err  Wee. on . las= d =r ise eeill to wise  to I Ire 11611"  Old Uwe Mr/ a mewl el 00 purr. w Imre a  erg. Webb tile awl esether ire woe Ighlieli.  Is were he the weieL Ile erseeselel le aneriiii  peissest. bull ether era gel sway. He rhea Mr e  rare tar s week. The reipsietee et ere parr dUr  eisrell. era the primmer therages aspire tar MIL Thill  wee Mewed. Use Flame le ere eireety Gent ere two  amebas '''et''' U. ere. The ere will be herd eat listerdsy. </blockquote> On 9 January 1890 in part of a much larger partisan report with critiques of the investigative committee, its chair and its results as well as other newspapers printing rumors:<blockquote>JOHN L. SULLIVAN ON ENGLISH FAIR PLAY.<p> J<small>OHN</small> L S<small>ULLIVAN</small> has been speaking his mind on the Smith-Slavin fight to some purpose. "I can't see how an English fighter can be beaten," he said. This man Smith is little better than a middle-weight, and I haven't the slightest doubt that Slavin beat him fairly. Some people wonder why I did not go to England to fight Smith. Now you understand why I insisted on meeting him in this country. In England fair play is unknown. The man with the greatest number of 'heelers' always wins or saves himself from defeat. Slavin or Jackson will, in all probability, look for a match with me when they arrive in this country, and | am perfectly willing to meet either or both of them for a proper consideration. I want a big purse, and I am not particular where I fight so long as it is in a club-house. No more law-breaking for  me."<ref>"The Late Fight. Meeting of the Pelican Club. Stormy Proceedings. The Committee Resigns." ''The Sportsman'' 9 January 1890, Thursday: 4 [of 4], Col. 3b [of 7]. ''British Newspaper Archive'' https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.com/image-viewer?issue=BL%2F0001055%2F18900109&page=4&article=049&stringtohighlight=mandeville+viscount. Same print title and p.</ref></blockquote> Also on January 9, the ''Sportsman'' reported on a collection made for Slavin:<blockquote>THE SLAVIN TESTIMONIAL<p> The subscriptions towards the above now amount to over 400''l.'', and it having been decided to close the list on the 20th, the committee will be obliged if those who have promised donations will forward the same to the hon. sec. and treasurer, Mr. G. T. Dunning, T<small>HE</small> S<small>PORTSMAN</small> Office.</blockquote> {| class="wikitable" ! !£ !s. !d. |- |Amount already acknowledged |407 |3 |6 |- |Mr E.Tabernacle |1 |1 |1 |- |H. S. |1 |1 |0 |} <blockquote>The guinea acknowledged per Mr Riley, from C. R., yesterday, should be from C. K.<ref>"The Late Fight. Meeting of the Pelican Club. Stormy Proceedings. The Committee Resigns." ''The Sportsman'' 9 January 1890, Thursday: 4 [of 4], Col. 3b [of 7]. ''British Newspaper Archive'' https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.com/image-viewer?issue=BL%2F0001055%2F18900109&page=4&article=049&stringtohighlight=mandeville+viscount. Same print title and p.</ref></blockquote> === The ''Huddersfield Daily Chronicle'' === On 10 January 1890:<blockquote> Mitchell and Lord Mandeville. As an addendum to the important meeting of the Pelican Club committee, on Wednesday, came a gathering of "sports" at the Trocadero, Piccadilly Circus. Lord Mandeville and Mr. Abington., who had been in attendance at Denman-street, were joined by "Pony" Moore, his son-in-law, C. Mitchell, J. Carney (the Birmingham light-weight), J. Baldock, B. Habbijam, C. Bates, &c. The party, who occupied seats in the stalls, naturally discussed things pugilistic, the talk being mostly devoted to the recent international fight between Frank P. Slavin and Jem Smith. " [sic] The Squire's opinions on the matter happened not to coincide with those of Mitchell, and high words were exchanged between the pair. Suddenly the Birmingham boxer jumped up and "went for" Mr. Abington, but did not strike him. Lord Mandeville immediately interposed and asked Mitchell to be quiet, whereupon the latter directed his attention to his lordship, and struck him sharply on the forehead. Carney and Baldock sprang to his lordship's assistance, and Mitchell and "Pony" Moore at once left the building, the whole proceedings not lasting longer than a few seconds. It soon became noised abroad that there was "something up," and a crowd gathered, but the police saw Mitchell and Mr. G. W. Moore safely across the road.<ref>"The Smith-Slavin Fight." ''Huddersfield Daily Chronicle'' 10 January 1890, Friday: 4 [of 4], Col. 6b [of 6]. ''British Newspaper Archive'' https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.com/image-viewer?issue=BL%2F0002876%2F18900110&page=4&article=071&stringtohighlight=mandeville+viscount. Same print title and p.</ref></blockquote> After the Pelican Club meetings, Slavin comments:<blockquote>On Wednesday at Westminster Aquarium, F.  P. Slavin, the colonial pugilist, who received such bad treatment at the hands of roughs in his recent prize-fight with Jem Smith, the English "champion," made his first public appearance since the fight. Mr. Frank Hinde, in introducing Slavin, said he would give an exhibition with Cosnett of Birmingham, who seconded him in his fight. Slavin was the gamest man that ever  stepped into a ring, he hoped the audience would rive him a good old English welcome. On appearing on the stage Slavin met with a most enthusiastic reception, and the three rounds' sparring with Cosnett was much appreciated. At the conclusion Slavin, in response to loud calls, bowed his acknowledgments.<ref>"Slavin at the Royal Acquarium." ''Liverpool Weekly Courier'' 11 January 1890, Saturday: 3 [of 8], Col. 5a [of 8]. ''British Newspaper Archive'' https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.com/image-viewer?issue=BL%2F0003067%2F18900111&page=3&article=042&stringtohighlight=mandeville+viscount. Same print title and p.</ref></blockquote> === ''Reynolds's Newspaper'' === ''Reynolds's Newspaper'' quotes J. L. Sullivan on the Smith-Slavin match:<blockquote>Mr. John L. Sullivan has been speaking his mind on the Smith-Slavin fight to some purpose. "I can't see how an English fighter can be beaten," he said. "This man Smith is little better than a middle-weight, and I haven't the slightest doubt that Slavin beat him fairly. Some people wonder why I did not go to England to fight Smith. Now you can understand why I insisted on meeting him in this country. In England fair play is unknown. The man with the greatest number of "heelers" always wins or saves himself from defeat. Slavin or Jackson will in all probability look for a match with me when they arrive in this country, and I am perfectly willing to meet either or both of them for a proper consideration. I went a big purse, and I am not particular where I fight so long as it is in a club-house. No more law-breaking for me."<ref>"The Recent Prize Fight." ''Reynolds's Newspaper'' 12 January 1890, Sunday: 6 [of 8], Col. 4a–b [of 7]. ''British Newspaper Archive'' https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.com/image-viewer?issue=BL%2F0000101%2F18900112&page=6&article=053&stringtohighlight=mandeville+viscount. Same print title and p.</ref></blockquote> === The ''Cork Constitution'' === About Mr G Baird (Mr. Abington) from the ''Cork Constitution'':, referring at the end to the [[Social Victorians/Boxing/Fracas at the Trocadero|Fracas at the Trocadero]] or a restaurant:<blockquote>This well-known sportsman (Mr G Baird) who is occupying an unenviable position owing to his conduct at the Smith-Slavin piece of brutality, is the largest owner of race horses in England. He has no less than 100 horses in training, and though he won £10,000 in stakes last year it is computed that he should have won £25,000 additional to even pay his way. Anent that fight which has caused such indignation in the country, a London music hall was last week the scene of a pretty disturbance. Mr Abington and Lord Mandeville occupied a box during the entertainment, and received, amongst others, Charlie Mitchell, the well-known pugilist; an angry discussion ''re'' the fight ensued, and concluded by the peer measuring himself on the floor from one Mitchell’s "lefts."<ref>"Mr. Abington." ''Cork Constitution'' 14 January 1890, Tuesday: 7 [of 8], Col. 5b [of 6]. ''British Newspaper Archive'' https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.com/image-viewer?issue=BL%2F0001648%2F18900114&page=7&article=099&stringtohighlight=mandeville+viscount. Same title and p.</ref></blockquote> === The ''Colonial Standard and Jamaica Despatch'' === This report from the ''Colonial Standard and Jamaica Despatch'' mentions fighting in the streets (at a corner in Fleet Street) and tosses in an unrelated sentence about an upcoming match between a West Indian and J. L. Sullivan:<blockquote>The disgraceful affair, called by courtesy and [sic] "International Prize Fight," which desecrated the peaceful dignity of the quaint old city of Bruges on Monday morning ought to convince people that there is nothing left to hope for in the Prize Ring. [2c–3a] At eight o'clock in the morning, Jem Smith, self-styled Champion of England, and Frank Slavin, the Australian Champion, with their seconds and parties, met in the grounds of a private gentleman to try conclusions. The "fight" lasted for twenty-five minutes, and was then brought to an abrupt conclusion by the referee declaring it drawn — he would have been killed had he given it to Slavin, who proved to be incomparably the better man. Fourteen rounds were fought in all, during the whole of which time Smith's friends and Smith's seconds worried, and at last assaulted, the Australian, who behaved quite pluckily. It is a disgrace to the name of Englishmen that this brutal scene should go forth to the world. Smith's backers knew well that he had no chance of winning, so they laid their plans to smash Slavin on their own account. It is a wonder that he was not killed — as was reported in Fleet-street at ten o'clock — for Smith's roughs struck and kicked him whenever he came near their corner. Although Lord Mandeville, Lord Rosslyn, Sir M. Sandys, and a few other members of the upper circle, were present at the fight, the bulk of the spectators were the refuse of the gambling rings of London, blackguards and ruffians of the deepest dye. The stakes were £1,000. So great an amount of indignation has been expressed on all sides at the treatment to which the Australian was exposed, that a subscription has been opened up for him. The West Indian, Jackson, is just leaving London for San Francisco, in order to get ready to meet J. L. Sullivan.<ref>"London." ''Colonial Standard and Jamaica Despatch'' 16 January 1890, Thursday: 2 [of 4], Col. 2c–3a [of 6]. ''British Newspaper Archive'' https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.com/image-viewer?issue=BL%2F0004059%2F18900116&page=2&article=019&stringtohighlight=mandeville+viscount. Same print title, n.p.</ref></blockquote> == Notes and Questions == # ==References== {{reflist}} fvkhn2xymogxr213bfir55s8z5blbjw 0 332549 2842348 2842226 2026-10-23T21:28:51Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842348 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1, as well as [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], as discussed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade and converting Venice into a museum, according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so the secular elites would "protect" them in wars against the designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature.<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king traveling around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. After the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588, this class of merchants became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], who supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance, and Parliamentarians. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. That economic growth was presumably supported by the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were both roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 3umevqf13axplfv2g6qvn4hj066fa8c 2842349 2842348 2026-10-23T21:32:41Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842349 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so the secular elites would "protect" them in wars against the designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature.<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king traveling around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. After the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588, this class of merchants became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], who supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance, and Parliamentarians. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. That economic growth was presumably supported by the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were both roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> l46bsonr69a2bj0w7gdsyb8jdiveowm 2842350 2842349 2026-10-23T21:36:08Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842350 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against the designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature.<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king traveling around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. After the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588, this class of merchants became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], who supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance, and Parliamentarians. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. That economic growth was presumably supported by the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were both roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> r5yzkzoocmp7g7hj35nfehra6jh2scp 2842351 2842350 2026-10-23T21:37:23Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842351 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature.<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king traveling around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. After the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588, this class of merchants became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], who supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance, and Parliamentarians. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. That economic growth was presumably supported by the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were both roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> cubl0u1s9sek7t1jsr35nhw3x2rrnij 2842352 2842351 2026-10-23T21:50:21Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842352 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. After the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588, this class of merchants became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], who supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance, and Parliamentarians. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. That economic growth was presumably supported by the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were both roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> dpki8i2p4fhslbm9t4x8u4n85zu6gor 2842353 2842352 2026-10-23T21:55:06Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842353 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], who supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance, and Parliamentarians. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. That economic growth was presumably supported by the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were both roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 03eaffayg4h8yuh047u5kyrnlk5t4c1 2842354 2842353 2026-10-23T21:56:57Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842354 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], who supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance, and Parliamentarians. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. That economic growth was presumably supported by the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were both roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 7iqggowid089klv2q6841jtjgeft4rg 2842355 2842354 2026-10-23T21:58:02Z DavidMCEddy 218607 typo 2842355 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], who supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance, and Parliamentarians. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. That economic growth was presumably supported by the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were both roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> qiehd1sbeyqg8vz661y77nj0n2gavg9 2842356 2842355 2026-10-23T22:00:21Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842356 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. That economic growth was presumably supported by the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were both roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 7jng6rhi64t9gp0kra5ozbwiah6f3rk 2842357 2842356 2026-10-23T22:09:24Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842357 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were both roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> b79to44vdz5ruow7wh3ib1wmm5r0fdg 2842358 2842357 2026-10-23T22:12:20Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842358 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were both roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 0ywjen6wivz26z1s21j50ub5vi10zjo 2842359 2842358 2026-10-23T22:18:11Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842359 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 8wgvi36w2q27t5n6fi4ak1hsydiki74 2842360 2842359 2026-10-23T22:19:12Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842360 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor, whose successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 5lv5cvd35nmnf3vqrxdrqo67mplb881 2842361 2842360 2026-10-23T22:20:17Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842361 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> But FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> gj74fn3bm9ohp8xdn9cgm2p9ica5dp8 2842362 2842361 2026-10-23T22:21:57Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842362 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) explain that (a) the success of Parliament in restricting the power of Elizabeth I to grant monopolies and (b) the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588 facilitated the growth of a class of independent merchants. The latter became wealthy from the Atlantic trade. When Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, James VI of Scotland, who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|Divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29, This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. This merchant class used the pamphlets and books mentioned by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461), cited above, to organize opposition to the excesses of James I and his son, Charles I. After Charles I was beheaded, his replacement, [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> p30o0ne7xi1sg1aov64hrq3z322e7r4 2842365 2842362 2026-10-23T22:54:56Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842365 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above, ''and'' encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 3whr1a2wocuqu6x4vn9b4hpp5839v4l 2842366 2842365 2026-10-23T22:56:10Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842366 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how "the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting abruptly after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 6gdh1rio3y4urez7y7547y8rxgd42fl 2842369 2842366 2026-10-23T23:12:02Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842369 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714) followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820), then another dramatic increase in the slope starting abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> qarhpubm4d8qghtmknno7v7lydne8yd 2842370 2842369 2026-10-23T23:15:45Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842370 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. However, the data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> kfgtiedvv4tlqcw02a781w3utnjlves 2842371 2842370 2026-10-23T23:21:05Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842371 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> qpgk63b017wolw9j7r6ads5ya5ksxw8 2842372 2842371 2026-10-23T23:26:24Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842372 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Commons|commons]]" (shared land) to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> b9ek93l47er17zuv3jwpkc7abgm8x14 2842373 2842372 2026-10-23T23:40:57Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842373 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That period came to an abrupt end at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 1j7pc6jb9eepnfo1mr247vs3395orhh 2842374 2842373 2026-10-23T23:44:30Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842374 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> ta2s384020piywp7k5oq18gh25zau1n 2842376 2842374 2026-10-23T23:45:57Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842376 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made by them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> mlfagbwi9kox3t06e0u0ijqrn2pwkce 2842377 2842376 2026-10-23T23:47:17Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842377 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices of cereal grains and products made from them, high. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 2p0l5g69qe2k57uvac2ui6u1qn2jlyh 2842378 2842377 2026-10-23T23:48:40Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842378 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the Fifteenth Hussars had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 4qfrnlha6y73hmaxuf1so39wk2pa7bf 2842379 2842378 2026-10-23T23:51:08Z DavidMCEddy 218607 link 2842379 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> su92m4jm8cxw0elcy3ladiu1fv0io8e 2842381 2842379 2026-10-24T00:01:35Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842381 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, "The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England, although the ''Manchester Observer'' closed roughly two years later after [[w:Manchester Observer#Closure by repeated prosecution|repeated prosecutions]] for [[w:Seditious libel|Seditious libel]]. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... ." And the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> n3i4oeg4q5guhbjrkti4hnil2rsv00z 2842385 2842381 2026-10-24T00:09:12Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842385 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, {{quote| The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... .}} The ''Manchester Observer'' closed roughly two years later after [[w:Manchester Observer#Closure by repeated prosecution|repeated prosecutions]] for [[w:Seditious libel|Seditious libel]], but the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> mzq025fgwqby6rabczgkz8ququu3kwj 2842386 2842385 2026-10-24T00:10:06Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842386 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, {{quote| The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... .}} The ''Manchester Observer'' closed roughly two years later after [[w:Manchester Observer#Closure by repeated prosecution|repeated prosecutions]] for [[w:Seditious libel|seditious libel]], but the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 23d0wj6p90bcz53fgzhhxmiwy4uf96m 2842387 2842386 2026-10-24T00:11:21Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842387 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line could be due to the change in reference, as [[w:Holland|Holland]] at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, {{quote| The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... .}} The ''Manchester Observer'' closed roughly two years later after [[w:Manchester Observer#Closure by repeated prosecution|repeated prosecutions]] for [[w:Seditious libel|seditious libel]]. However, the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 0inkigvwjsd2p2lfqva6ov0kjo7ahpv 2842389 2842387 2026-10-24T00:15:46Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsm 2842389 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line between 1807 and 1808 could be due to the change in reference from [[w:Holland|Holland]] to the Netherlands, as Holland at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the administrations threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, {{quote| The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... .}} The ''Manchester Observer'' closed roughly two years later after [[w:Manchester Observer#Closure by repeated prosecution|repeated prosecutions]] for [[w:Seditious libel|seditious libel]]. However, the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 6bhmf6xqh6g9ac8k9k2i3526ibvav3p 2842390 2842389 2026-10-24T00:20:09Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsm 2842390 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line between 1807 and 1808 could be due to the change in reference from [[w:Holland|Holland]] to the Netherlands, as Holland at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the Trump administration's threats against the ABC network because they didn't like a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, {{quote| The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... .}} The ''Manchester Observer'' closed roughly two years later after [[w:Manchester Observer#Closure by repeated prosecution|repeated prosecutions]] for [[w:Seditious libel|seditious libel]]. However, the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> bc45ot5tete5j7gk6vjjybwinqo6vka 2842393 2842390 2026-10-24T00:21:38Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsm 2842393 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line between 1807 and 1808 could be due to the change in reference from [[w:Holland|Holland]] to the Netherlands, as Holland at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the Trump administration's threats against the ABC network over a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the Institute for Nonprofit News, relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, {{quote| The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... .}} The ''Manchester Observer'' closed roughly two years later after [[w:Manchester Observer#Closure by repeated prosecution|repeated prosecutions]] for [[w:Seditious libel|seditious libel]]. However, the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 6x8jq2xo21bftt3i7dnyv02930ei2mi 2842395 2842393 2026-10-24T00:26:38Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsm 2842395 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line between 1807 and 1808 could be due to the change in reference from [[w:Holland|Holland]] to the Netherlands, as Holland at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the Trump administration's threats against the ABC network over a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the [[w:Institute for Nonprofit News|Institute for Nonprofit News]] (INN), relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019. They found on average 10 federal prosecutions for political corruption for each federal court district per year. Thus, 1.4 additional prosecutions per year per district represents an increase of 14 percent per member of INN.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland / Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, {{quote| The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... .}} The ''Manchester Observer'' closed roughly two years later after [[w:Manchester Observer#Closure by repeated prosecution|repeated prosecutions]] for [[w:Seditious libel|seditious libel]]. However, the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> cgrqwvytt4pj4kk8wax3rr8721pbe5w 2842396 2842395 2026-10-24T00:29:58Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842396 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line between 1807 and 1808 could be due to the change in reference from [[w:Holland|Holland]] to the Netherlands, as Holland at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the Trump administration's threats against the ABC network over a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the [[w:Institute for Nonprofit News|Institute for Nonprofit News]] (INN), relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019. They found on average 10 federal prosecutions for political corruption for each federal court district per year. Thus, 1.4 additional prosecutions per year per district represents an increase of 14 percent per member of INN.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland and Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement, who became known as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, who became known as "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, {{quote| The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... .}} The ''Manchester Observer'' closed roughly two years later after [[w:Manchester Observer#Closure by repeated prosecution|repeated prosecutions]] for [[w:Seditious libel|seditious libel]]. However, the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> k4yfhm6st1o5j563iy61kv6cdg1jz21 2842397 2842396 2026-10-24T00:31:37Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842397 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line between 1807 and 1808 could be due to the change in reference from [[w:Holland|Holland]] to the Netherlands, as Holland at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260).</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the Trump administration's threats against the ABC network over a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the [[w:Institute for Nonprofit News|Institute for Nonprofit News]] (INN), relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019. They found on average 10 federal prosecutions for political corruption for each federal court district per year. Thus, 1.4 additional prosecutions per year per district represents an increase of 14 percent per member of INN.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland and Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement, who became known as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, who became known as "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]]", accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, {{quote| The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... .}} The ''Manchester Observer'' closed roughly two years later after [[w:Manchester Observer#Closure by repeated prosecution|repeated prosecutions]] for [[w:Seditious libel|seditious libel]]. However, the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 3hbvpgglt5ssuvrt7q3bnhz4yjqlk1u 2842401 2842397 2026-10-24T01:59:42Z DavidMCEddy 218607 add Iron Law of oligarchy 2842401 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line between 1807 and 1808 could be due to the change in reference from [[w:Holland|Holland]] to the Netherlands, as Holland at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260). [[w:Robert Michels|Michels]] (1911) called this "the [[w:Iron law of oligarchy|iron law of oligarchy]]".</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. Both Parliamentarians and Levellers supported the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which won the war. Levellers were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the Trump administration's threats against the ABC network over a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the [[w:Institute for Nonprofit News|Institute for Nonprofit News]] (INN), relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019. They found on average 10 federal prosecutions for political corruption for each federal court district per year. Thus, 1.4 additional prosecutions per year per district represents an increase of 14 percent per member of INN.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland and Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement, who became known as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, who became known as "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]]", accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, {{quote| The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... .}} The ''Manchester Observer'' closed roughly two years later after [[w:Manchester Observer#Closure by repeated prosecution|repeated prosecutions]] for [[w:Seditious libel|seditious libel]]. However, the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Robert Michels (1911) Les Partis politiques, essai sur les tendances oligarchiques des démocraties-->{{cite Q|Q7210216}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> 6149vmh1vroccuaoqmzg577ije7nqxc 2842429 2842401 2026-10-24T11:47:40Z DavidMCEddy 218607 wdsmth 2842429 wikitext text/x-wiki {{Research project}} :''This article invites all to contribute references and interpretations to the growth in average annual income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity, as applied to leading countries in the [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]].'' :''This essay is on Wikiversity to encourage a wide discussion of the issues it raises moderated by the Wikimedia rules that invite contributors to [[w:Wikipedia:Be bold|“be bold but not reckless,”]] contributing revisions written from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”'''{{'}} page]] -- and treating others with respect.'' ::''This article uses [[w:ISO 8601|ISO 8601]] dates except for References, which are controlled by standard Wikidata formatting, and direct quotes. In the initial author's experience, [[ISO 8601 and computing differences between dates|ISO 8601 dates seem to make it easier to remember dates and to compute differences between them.]]'' == Abstract == This article first identifies and plots GDP per capita for leading countries in the Maddison data then discusses comments by Nobel prize winning economists and others to interpret what appears in said plot. While no one really knows how to make economies grow, immigrants and free, competitive media markets have been suggested as playing major roles in the creative destruction that is required for economic growth at the technology frontier. == Maddison Historical Statistics == [[File:MaddisonDataLeaders1349-2022.svg|thumb|''Figure 1. World leaders in GDP per capita 1349-2022 (NLD = initially Holland to 1809 and the Netherlands after; GBR = initially England to 1700, Great Britain to 1870, then the UK; USA starting with the 13 colonies that became the US; SGP = Singapore).<ref>See Bolt and van Zanden (2024) for the Maddison Data generally, Broadberry et al. (2015) for the data on England 1252–1700 and on Great Britain until 1870, Sugimoto (2011) for Singapore to 2007, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012) for the data on Holland 1349–1807, and Smits et al. (2000) for the data on the Netherlands 1808-1913. The dramatic drop in the orange line between 1807 and 1808 could be due to the change in reference from [[w:Holland|Holland]] to the Netherlands, as Holland at that time was more prosperous than the rest of the Netherlands.</ref>'']] The [[w:Maddison Project|Maddison Historical Statistics Project]] (aka Maddison Project) is widely recognized as the premier data source on historical macroeconomic data. It is named after [[w:Angus Maddison|Angus Maddison]] (1926-2010), who was a pioneer in [[w:National accounts|national accounts]], especially estimating [[w:Gros Domestic Product|gross domestic product]] (GDP) per capita (GDPpc) and population (pop) at various times dating back to the year 1 of the [[w:Common Era|Common Era]] (CE / AD). After Maddison's death, the Maddison Project has continued to update the database to include the best sources available on any country for any historical period since year 1. When accessed 2026-10-10 the version of the data available had been released 2024-09-18 containing data to 2022.<ref>Bolt and van Zanden (2024).</ref> This dataset includes 23,280 observations on at least one of GDPpc and pop for an average of 137 years for 169 countries. Only 18 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. Annual data starts in 1252, and that's only for one country, GBR = England / Great Britain / the United Kingdom. NLD (Holland / the Netherlands) had the highest GDPpc for 97 percent of the years between 1349 and 1807, and the Dutch leadership in Figure 1 may have ended then, not because of the devastation from the [[w:Napoleonic Wars|Napoleonic Wars]] (which negatively impacted them) but because the available data prior to 1807 are for [[w:Holland|Holland]], while more recent data are for the Netherlands, of which Holland is only a part, though probably the most prosperous part at that time. This analysis focuses on data since 1349, in part because data were available for at most 4 countries for most years prior to that date. (The 3-letter country codes used here are [[w:ISO 3166-1 alpha-3|ISO 3166-1 alpha-3]], used in the Maddison data.) We are interested in technology leaders, so we eliminate the [[w:petrostates|petrostates]] of Qatar (QAT), Kuwait (KWT), and United Arab Emirates (ARE), plus Norway (NOR), which owes a substantial portion of their wealth to democratic management of [[w:North Sea oil|North Sea oil]].<ref>Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017).</ref> With these restrictions 12 countries had the highest GDPpc for at least one year. However, FRA (France), ITA (Italy), SWE (Sweden), BEL (Belgium), NZL (New Zealand) and CHE (Switzerland) led for at most 7 of the 675 years between 1349 and 2022; we eliminate those, because including them would seem to add more clutter than clarity. We also eliminate AUS (Australia), which led for 17 of the 39 years between 1853 and 1891, when it was competing for the leadership with GBR and USA, for the same reason. And we eliminate LUX (Luxembourg), which has a population under a million. This leaves NLD, GBR, USA, and SGP (Singapore), plotted in Figure 1. This plot has some interesting features, which we discuss in the remainder of this research report. == Nobel economists and others == Banerjee and Duflo (2019, p. 207) said, "despite the best efforts of generations of economists, the deep mechanisms of persistent economic growth remain elusive." That appeared shortly before they shared the 2019 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]] with [[w:Michael Kremer|Michael Kremer]] for documenting how [[w:Randomized controlled trial|randomized controlled trial]]s could be used to alleviating poverty in [[w:Development economics|development economics]]. While Banerjee and Duflo insist that no one knows how to make an economy grow, other leading economists recommend partial solutions. For example, [[w:Joel Mokyr|Mokyr]] (2017, p. 53) said, "The willingness of the Netherlands and later Britain and the United States to tolerate Jews and dissenting Christians contributed a great deal to their economies, especially in high-skilled manufacturing and financial services." In other words, immigrants made an outsized contribution to the growth of NLD, GBR, and US, visible in Figure 1. Mokyr's comment appeared over a year before Banerjee and Duflo (2019) and roughy eight years before Mokyr shared the 2025 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics with [[w:Philippe Aghion|Aghion]] and [[w:Peter Howitt (economist)|Howitt]]. Mokyr (2017, p. 255) also said that, "intellectual innovation will eventually end up being increasingly resisted by an incumbent technology; if that resistance is not overcome, technological progress may be extinguished." That resistance, he suggested, drives {{quote| the empirical regularity that no society remains at the cutting edge of technological creativity for very long<ref>Mokyr (2017, p. 260). [[w:Robert Michels|Michels]] (1911) called this "the [[w:Iron law of oligarchy|iron law of oligarchy]]".</ref>.}} Mokyr (2017, p. 260; 1994) calls this "Cardwell's Law" after Cardwell (1972), which describes {{quote| the interaction between technological creativity and political competition ... based on the observation that technological progress encounters resistance from various groups that believe they stand to lose from innovation. These pressure groups will try to manipulate the political system to suppress successful innovation.}} Further documentation of this appears in Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). This provides one explanation for the end of growth of the economy of Holland shortly before 1600 and for the slowing of economic growth in recent decades in the US, the UK, and the Netherlands, visible in Figure 1. It can also explain [[w:History of the Roman Empire|the rise and fall of the Roman Empire]], of the [[w:Maya civilization|Maya civilization]], and other societies that became very rich from allowing commoners to become entrepreneurs and then declined after previous winners changed the rules of the political economy to block further [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]]. This includes how [[w:History of the Republic of Venice|Venice]] became "possibly the richest place in the world, with the most advanced set of inclusive economic institutions", dominating trade in the [[w:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] based on a system that encouraged entrepreneurial commoners to undertake risky trading ventures starting after 810 CE and ending when leaders made wealthy by such ventures changed the rules to end that system starting in 1297, destroying their dominance of Mediterranean trade "and converting Venice into a museum", in the words of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 152-155). Mokyr (2017, p. 60) also mentioned "entrepreneurs of hate", who convince others to dislike some group in a way that may benefit those "entrepreneurs" and major media organizations, who promote such "entrepreneurs" to please those who control much of the money for the media. For-profit social media have been particularly effective in herding their audiences into echo chambers, reinforcing their preconceptions in ways that increase political polarization and violence and threaten democracy.<ref>See, e.g., DiResta (2026), DiResta and Keinfeld (2025), and the Wikiversity article on "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> When successful this protects current elites from competition that would otherwise drive [[w:creative destruction|creative destruction]], benefitting the public at large while threatening existing elites. For example, most research on immigrants suggest that on average immigrants are more entrepreneurial and no more likely to commit crime than native born,<ref>e.g., Martínez et al. (2017); Muchow and Stanishevska (2026); Ajzenman(2023).</ref> and some studies report that [[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary jurisdiction]]s have on average higher median incomes and less crime.<ref>Martínez et al. (2017); Wong (2017). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Sanctuary city|sanctuary city]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> Where immigrant crime is higher, it typically result from anti-immigrant labor market restrictions or from young less-educated males with irregular status.<ref>Marie and Paolo (2024). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Immigration and crime|Immigration and crime]]", accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> But major media outlets make money from featuring charismatic figures, who attract an audience without offending people who control much of the money for the media. In 2017 President [[w:Immigration policy of the first Trump administration|Trump]]'s Attorney General [[w:Jeff Sessions|Jeff Sessions]] quoted a research study that supposedly showed that sanctuary cities had more crime than cities without sanctuary policies. The authors of that study insisted that Sessions had ''misrepresented'' their work, which concluded "that sanctuary policies have no effect on crime rates, despite narratives to the contrary."<ref>Roll (2017); Gonzalez O’Brien, et al. (2017).</ref> To the extent that these comments provide a balanced summary of the research in this area, it suggests that leaders like Trump and Sessions, to name only two, can be fairly describes as "entrepreneurs of hate". We next discuss competition in media markets before discussing immigrants further. === Diversity of ownership of the major media === Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, esp. ch. 4) describe how religious leaders in hierarchical societies prior to [[w:James VI and I|King James]] of the [[w:King James Version|King James Bible]] convinced commoners to live in poverty while giving increasing shares of what they produced, so religious and secular elites could live in opulence. Prior to King James the major media were religious organizations. In such hierarchical societies some religious leaders were entrepreneurs of hate, exhorting the faithful to fear and hate designated evil others and give increasing shares of what they produce so secular elites would "protect" them in wars against designated evil others. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 461) said, "Empowerment of society at large is difficult to coordinate and maintain without widespread information about whether there are economic and political abuses by those in power. ... Pamphlets and books informing and galvanizing people played an important role during the [[w:Glorious Revolution|Glorious Revolution]] [1688] in England, the French Revolution [1789-1799]" and in the US. ([[w:Daron Acemoglu|Acemoglu]], [[w:Simon Johnson (economist)|Johnson]] and [[w:James A. Robinson|Robinson]] shared the 2024 [[w:List of Nobel Memorial Prize laureates in Economic Sciences|Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics]].) But pamplets started challenging established power structures much earlier. The publication of [[w:Martin Luther|Martin Luther]]'s ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'' in Latin 1517-10-31 was quickly condemned by [[w:Pope Leo X|Pope Leo X]] and his hierarchy. [[w:Johann Tetzel|Johann Tetzel]], who had been selling [[w:Indulgence|indulgence]]s, published a pamphlet calling for Luther to be burnt for [[w:heresy|heresy]]. Eight hundred copies were reportedly sent to [[w:Wittenberg|Wittenberg]] to be sold, but students seized and burned them.<ref>Hendrix (2015, p. 64), quoted from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> This led to a pamphlet war. Luther's brief German-language reply was short and easy for commoners to understand<ref>Leppin and Wengert (2015, p. 389), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> and was much more popular than Tetzel's.<ref>Pettegree (2015, p. 145), cited from the Wikipedia article on the ''[[w:Ninety-five Theses|Ninety-five Theses]]'', accessed 2026-10-14.</ref> Less than twenty years later, in 1534, King [[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]] declared himself head of the [[w:Church of England|Church of England]], denying the authority of the Pope. To secure the support of his subjects, he drove a propaganda war that included print literature<ref>Raymond (2006), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Pamphlet war|pamphlet war]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> and theatre and minstrel troupes funded by the king. The latter traveled around the land to promote the new religious practices. Henry was portrayed as the glorious king of England, bravely and heroically defending the true faith against foreign devils, especially the Pope and Catholic priests, monks, etc.<ref>Hibbert et al. (2010, p. 928), cited from the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Henry VIII|Henry VIII]]", accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> Henry died in 1547. Less than a dozen years later, the crown passed to [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]]. Her limited personal wealth and English tradition required her to negotiate with Parliament for tax money. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-111) noted that she was forced to limit the granting of monopolies and allow a class of merchants to compete in international trade. Many English merchants became wealthy, helped by the defeat of the [[w:Spanish Armada|Spanish Armada]] in 1588. When Elizabeth died in 1603, she was replaced by her cousin, King [[w:James VI and I|James VI of Scotland]], who then became also James I of England. He claimed [[w:Divine right of kings|divine right of kings]], threatening this class of merchants. To raise money without asking Parliament, he granted patents and monopolies to those who would pay. Parliament responded by passing the [[w:Statute of Monopolies|Statute of Monopolies]] on 1624-05-29. This statute repealed some past and future patents and monopolies except for novel inventions. But that Statute of Monopolies did not end the conflict. It ultimately went public, described as, "A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643".<ref>Washington (2018).</ref> Some pamphlets supported [[w:Charles I of England|Charles I]], who became King after James died in 1625. Others supported Parliamentarians and [[w:Levellers|Levellers]]. The latter supported radical ideas like [[w:popular sovereignty|popular sovereignty]], extended suffrage, equality before the law and religious tolerance. In 1642 war broke out between Parliament and Charles I, though many in Parliament sided with Charles -- especially those, who had received monopolies from him.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 189).</ref> The war was won by the [[w:New Model Army|New Model Army]], which represented many in Parliament plus Levellers. The latter were excluded from the government that followed the [[w:Execution of Charles I of England|beheading of King Charles I]] in 1649.<ref>Foxley (2013, p. 207), cited from the Wikipedia article on [[w:Levellers|Levellers]], accessed 2026-10-15.</ref> However, that new government stopped granting as many monopolies and allowed so many commoners to become entrepreneurs that the GDP per capita began to grow at rates that are key features of Figure 1 for England and the 13 English colonies that became the US over a century later. One explanation for that economic growth was the diversity of independent publishers of pamphlets, books and newspapers. [[w:Robert W. McChesney|McChesney]] and [[w:John Nichols (journalist)|Nichols]] (2010, 2016) suggested that the US [[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]] of 1792<ref>Wikipedia "[[w:Postal Service Act|Postal Service Act]]", accessed 2023-07-11.</ref> made a major contribution to making the US what it is today. Under that act, newspapers were delivered up to 100 miles for a penny, when postage for letters was between 6 and 25 cents depending on distance.<ref>Historian, USPS (2010).</ref> McChesney and Nichols estimated that between 1840 and 1844, the US postal subsidy was a little over 0.2% of GDP.<ref name=McC-N2010>McChesney and Nichols (2010, pp. 310-311, note 88).</ref> During the first half of the nineteenth century the US had more independent newspaper publishers (more independent media organizations) per million population than at any other time or place in human history.<ref>John (1995). See also the interview with him at "[[Media concentration per Columbia History Professor Richard John]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-12.</ref> In 1932 with official unemployment over 20 percent, the conservative argument that blames the poor for their poverty did not sell newspapers, and the US still had sufficient competition in media markets that presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) got a mandate to spend the money to put humans back to work while taxing the ultra-wealthy like they had never been taxed before or since and during World War II to institute wage and price controls under the [[w:Office of Price Administration|Office of Price Administration]]. The latter prevented price gouging by government contractors that had generated inflation and stifled economic growth in previous major wars (World War I, the Civil War, and the War of 1812). Instead, the US averaged 7 percent per year growth for FDR's 12 years.<ref>The "6 percent per year" growth during FDR's 12 years was computed as the average of log(GDPpc) in the Maddison Data. To be precise, that computation produced 0.0597; converting that from a log scale to percent increase gives 0.0615. Using data from [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]] instead of Maddison, we get 0.783 and 0.815, respectively. More documentation of this is available in "[[Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" on Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> One of the most interesting features of Figure 1 is the behavior of the US economy in the administrations of [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]] and FDR: Under Hoover, the economy declined at 9 percent per year for 4 years, a financial disaster that created the public demand for change that gave FDR the mandate to do what he did. Economic growth under two other presidents are numerically comparable to FDR's numbers but for much shorter periods: (1) [[w: Warren G. Harding|Warren G. Harding]] averaged 7 percent annual growth for two years before he died in 1923 during the [[w:Roaring Twenties|Roaring Twenties]]. (2) [[w:Rutherford B Hayes|Rutherford B Hayes]], who took office in 1877 at the end of the [[w:Panic of 1873|Panic of 1873]], oversaw 5.5 percent growth per year for his 4 years as president. Those impressive sounding average growth figures are so short that they are not noticeably different from other minor features visible in Figure 1. FDR also dramatically reduced inequality. For over a century between about 1820 and 1932 the top 1 percent of the US population owned roughly 45 percent of net personal wealth in the US, while the bottom 90 percent owned roughly 22 percent. Shortly after FDR died, the wealth of the top 1 percent and bottom 90 percent were even at roughly 30 percent. FDR also oversaw dramatic growth in the power of organized labor. Their successes continued to reduce inequality to roughly 22 percent for the top 1 percent vs. 37 percent for the bottom 90 percent when Ronald Reagan became president. Since then, [[w:Reaganomics|Reaganomics]] have been rebuilding the [[w:Robber baron (industrialist)|Robber Baron]]s.<ref>This history of inequality is documented in [[:File:Share of US wealth 90p99.svg|Figure 7. Shares of US wealth - bottom 90 and top 1 percent, 1820-2023]] in the Wikiversity article on "[[w:Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future|Media Literacy and You/Fox, the Great Depression, the Great Recession, and our future]]" in Wikiversity, accessed 2026-10-13.</ref> FDR made enemies among the wealthiest and most powerful. In a [[q:Franklin D. Roosevelt#Address at Madison Square Garden (1936)|speech in Maddison Square Garden in 1936]], FDR mentioned, "the old enemies of peace: business and financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism, sectionalism, war profiteering. ... They are unanimous in their hate for me -- and I welcome their hatred." They doubtless could see that they could no longer afford as many personal servants -- maids, butlers, cooks, chauffeurs, etc. -- as they had before FDR. Broadcasting was relatively new when FDR took office. The economics of broadcasting naturally favored a very few networks, whose power concerned FDR. In 1941 his [[w:Federal Communications Commission| Federal Communications Commission]] (FCC) adopted the [[w:Mayflower doctrine|Mayflower doctrine]], which prohibited broadcasters from advocacy. When FDR died, people with power were able to get the Mayflower doctrine replaced by the more lenient [[w:Fairness Doctrine|Fairness Doctrine]], which opened the floodgates for entrepreneurs of hate, who drove the [[w:McCarthyism|McCarthy Red Scare]] in the US and many other problems since. Over time this became worse, facilitated by increasing concentration of ownership of the media. That contributed to the end of the Fairness Doctrine starting in 1985. That revocation and especially the more recent rise of for-profit social media have amplified the ability of entrepreneurs of hate to make money both for commercial social media and for themselves by disseminating lies about others, e.g., immigrants.<ref>On how for-profit social media companies promote entrepreneurs of hate, see, e.g., DiResta (2026) and the Wikiversity article on, "[[Managing the good and the evils of social media]]", accessed 2026-10-12. DiResta (2026, p. 1) described the promotion of "influencers" by for-profit social media as essentially unleashed "a war for power, influence, and reality itself—a conflict in which the ends justify any means, and one that has ripped America apart, threatened our very democracy, and consumed my own life for the past decade, leading to death threats, congressional subpoenas, lawsuits, and legal bills running into seven figures." In the interview on Wikiversity, DiResta said her legal bills to that point had exceeded $7 million.</ref> And the rate of economic growth in the US (and the Netherlands and the UK) have been slowing in recent decades, as is visible in Figure 1. Inequality expert [[w:Thomas Piketty|Piketty]] (2022, p. 139) noted, {{quote| In the United States, the national income per inhabitant rose at a rate ... of 2.2% between 1950 to 1990 when the top tax rate reached on average 72%. The top rate was then cut in half, with the announced objective of boosting growth. But in fact, growth fell by half, to 1.1% per annum between 1990 and 2020 ... . Beyond a certain level of inequality, repeatedly increasing differences in income and wealth has clearly had no positive effect on economic dynamism. In sum, all the data at our disposal today suggest that virtually confiscatory tax rates have been an immense historical success. They have made it possible to greatly reduce the divergences of fortunes and incomes, while at the same time improving the situation of the middle and lower classes, developing the welfare state, and stimulating better economic and social performance overall. Historically, it is the battle for equality and education that has made economic development and human progress possible, and not the veneration of property, stability, and inequality.}} Table 1 compares Piketty's growth numbers with computations based on the data from both Maddison and [[w:MeasuringWorth|MeasuringWorth]]: The numbers are close but not exact. {| class="wikitable sortable" style="text-align: center;" |+ Table 1. US growth rate 1950 to 1990 to 2020 |- ! ! colspan=3 | US GDP per capita !! colspan=2 | Growth (% / yr) |- ! source || 1950 !! 1990 !! 2020 !! 1950 - 1990 !! 1990 - 2020 |- | Piketty || - || - || - || 2.2% || 1.1% |- | Maddison || $15,240 || $36,982 || $54,379 || 2.24% || 1.29% |- | MeasuringWorth || $16,208 || $40,191 || $61,127 || 2.30% || 1.41% |} Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 105-106) provide a historical analysis supporting Piketty's concern about inequality slowing growth. They note that in 1588, England, Spain and France {{quote| were ruled by relatively absolutist monarchs: [[w:Elizabeth I|Elizabeth I]] in England, [[w:Philip II of Spain|Philip II]] in Spain, and [[w:Henry III of France|Henry III]] in France. All were battling with assemblies of citizens -- such as the [[w:Parliament of England#Tudor era (1485–1603)|Parliament]] in England, the [[w:Cortes Generales#Habsburg rule (16th–17th centuries)|Cortes]] in Spain, and the [[w:Estates General (France)#Revival in 1560–1614|Estates-General]] in France -- that were demanding more rights and control over the monarchy. ... [T]he English Parliament and the Spanish Cortes had power over taxation, while the Estates-General did not. In Spain this mattered little, because after 1492 the Spanish Crown had a vast American empire and benefited massively from the gold and silver found there. In England ... Elizabeth I was far less financially independent, so she had to beg Parliament for more taxes. In exchange, Parliament demanded concessions, in particular restrictions of the right of Elizabeth to create monopolies. ... In Spain the Cortes lost a similar conflict.}} Consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) and the discussion above, inequality tends to increase elite control of the media, which it makes it harder for commoners to get a fair hearing of their concerns. === Media conflicts of interest in IP law === Major media have [[w:Conflict of interest|conflicts of interest]] in honestly reporting on anything involving [[w:Intellectual property|intellectual property]] (IP) law. An example of Cardwell's law, mentioned above, is the [[w:Copyright Term Extension Act|Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act]], also known as the Mickey Mouse Protection Act of 1998. The copyright term on ''[[w:Steamboat Willie|Steamboat Willie]]'', the first [[w:Mickey Mouse|Mickey Mouse]] animated film that Disney distributed, was extended multiple times by the US Congress following extensive lobbying by the film industry led by [[w:The Walt Disney Company|the Walt Disney Company]]. ''Steamboat Willie'', which debuted in 1928, finally entered the [[w:Public domain in the United States|US public domain]] on January 1, 2024. Eric Eldred and others filed suit, claiming that allowing any number of retroactive extensions violated the [[w:Copyright Clause|Copyright Clause]] of the US Constitution, which says, {{quote| [the United States Congress shall have power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.}} In ''[[w:Eldred v. Ashcroft|Eldred v. Ashcroft]]'' (2003), the [[w:Supreme Court of the United States|US Supreme Court]] disagreed with Eldred and allowed the statute to remain in effect. However, that case drew enough public attention that copyright terms have not (yet) been extended further, and ''Steamboat Willie'' is currently in the pubic domain. [[w:Lawrence Lessig|Lessig]] (2004) ''[[w:Free Culture (book)|Free Culture]]'' describes other examples, where US copyright law seems to ''limit'' rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts". This includes a case where a 2002 freshman, Jesse Jordan, modified a search engine to make it easier for other student to find pictures, research, notes, movie clips, etc., on an [[w:intranet|intranet]] at [[w:Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute|Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute]] (RPI). The [[w:Recording Industry Association of America|Recording Industry Association of America]] (RIAA) sued Jordan and three other students for close to $100 billion for copyright violations -- six times the total profit of the film industry in 2001. Jordan had an uncle, who was an attorney, who explained that the legal bills for fighting that case would be at least $250,000. That would bankrupt his parents; they could not recover that money, even if they won. Jordan had saved $12,000 to cover part of his college expenses. RIAA accepted that and settled the case.<ref>Lessig (2004, p. 42).</ref> This is an example of a [[w:Strategic lawsuit against public participation|strategic lawsuit against public participation]] (SLAPP), which in this case rested on questionable interpretations of copyright law. The major media have conflicts of interest in honestly reporting on anything involving (a) copyright laws, because much of their income is derived from copyright royalties, or (b) anything that might offend their major accounts, including major corporations. And anti-SLAPP laws, which exist in some jurisdictions but not others,<ref>[[w:Robert Corn-Revere|Robert Corn-Revere]], Chief Counsel for the [[w:Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression|Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]], supports anti-SLAPP laws and the "JAWBONE act", to limit the power of the government to threaten questionable actions, like the Trump administration's threats against the ABC network over a Jimmy Kimmel monolog. See the Wikiversity article on "[[Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression]]", accessed 2026-10-16.</ref> limit the ability of major corporations to abuse their power against potential challengers without such deep pockets. Similarly Graves (2023) asked, "Do copyrights and paywalls on refereed academic journals violate the US constitution?" No one expects to make money from copyright royalties for drafts submitted to refereed academic journals. They do it out of a felt need (a) to contribute to the future of humanity or (b) to build their reputation or (c) because promotions at many universities are based partly on publication records. Graves is not alone in his concern about this: Many European countries do not allow reports of research they fund to be published behind paywalls.<ref>Dimi Zagorski is concerned that copyright exceptions for scientific research are different in different European countries, and that's a problem for the Wikimedia Foundation. See the discussion of this in the Wikiversity article on "[[Wikimedia concerns with European copyright rules including AI and scientific research]]". That's the opposite of US law, which grants patents to universities, research institutions, private companies, and individuals for innovations developed under government contracts, per the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, described by Baker (2016, p. 80).</ref> Regarding patent law, the major media have conflicts of interest in discussing proposed changes affecting major accounts, but they make little use of patent law themselves. This seems to have contributed to the claim that, "[O]ver the last four decades ... stronger patent protection seems to be associated with slower growth" in the US, according to [[w:Dean Baker|Baker]] (2016, pp. 77-78). A potentially similar phenomenon appears in a comparison of 21 different European countries in an analysis that displays "a positive relationship between anticorruption measures in a country and rate of innovation in that country as measured by patents per capita", discussed by Aghion et al. (2021, Figure 15.1b, pp. 292-293).<ref>Usher and Kim-Leffingwell (2022) documented how each member of the [[w:Institute for Nonprofit News|Institute for Nonprofit News]] (INN), relatively small nonprofits independent of major media organizations and not funded by advertising, in a US federal court district was associated with on average 1.4 additional prosecutions for political corruption per year between 2003 and 2019. They found on average 10 federal prosecutions for political corruption for each federal court district per year. Thus, 1.4 additional prosecutions per year per district represents an increase of 14 percent per member of INN.</ref> === Immigrants === We now return to discussing the initiation of economic growth following the beheading of Charles I in 1649 visible in Figure 1. Charles I was replaced by [[w:English Council of State|Lord Protector Cromwell]], who refused to authorize as many monopolies as his predecessors, as mentioned above. He also encouraged Jews and dissenting Christians to settle in England, as mentioned by Mokyr (2017, p. 53), cited above. But Mokyr is not alone in claiming that immigrants contribute to economic growth. Aghion et al. (2021, p. 266) cite Arkolakis et al. (2020) for explaining how the period 1880–1920 is noteworthy for two parallel evolutions. First, the United States caught up with England and France to become the most technologically advanced country in the world as well as the wealthiest in terms of GDP per capita. Second, the United States welcomed large numbers of immigrants, most notably from Europe. The purpose of the cited study was to demonstrate a causal connection between these two phenomena: in other words, to show that European immigration was responsible for the United States’ taking the lead in technology. ... More precisely, if the United States had completely closed its borders to all foreign immigrants in 1880, its per capita GDP would have been 30 percent lower than the level actually attained in 1920". === Industrial Revolution === There seems to be a broad consensus that the [[w:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] began in England. However, there is less agreement on when it began. Mokyr (2017, p. 3) says, "The British Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century unleashed a phenomenon never before even remotely experienced by any society." He described "three cultural elements" required for "sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress": (1, 2) The belief that it was both ''possible'' and ''desirable''. (3) Supportive policy measures had to be implemented. "[B]efore 1750 they did not produce anything like an Industrial Revolution or sustainable economic growth propelled by technological progress.<ref>Mokyr (2017, pp. 19-20).</ref> Acemoglu (2026, p. 53) similarly mentioned the eighteenth century in saying, "The breakthroughs in production technology that started in the middle of the eighteenth century in Britain unleashed the Industrial Revolution." Aghion et al. (2021, esp. pp. 29-30) offer a ''later'' date for the start of the Industrial Revolution: They report that, "European economies prior to 1820 experienced a series of phases of growth and decline. This raises a question: How did the pre-1820 period differ from the takeoff that started with the first Industrial Revolution?" Aghion et al. (2021, p. 20) describe the "first Industrial Revolution" as having been triggered by "the invention of the steam engine by James Watt in the 1770s ... . The invention of electricity set off the second Industrial Revolution, whose golden age was in the first half of the twentieth century. This second revolution originated with the invention of the [[w:Incandescent light bulb|light bulb]] by [[w:Thomas Edison|Thomas Edison]] in 1879 and of the [[w:dynamo|dynamo]] by [[w:Werner von Siemens|Werner von Siemens]] in 1866."<ref>The dynamo was independently invented by [[w:Henry Wilde (engineer)|Henry Wilde]], [[w:Charles Wheatstone|Charles Wheatstone]], [[w:Samuel Alfred Varley|Samuel Alfred Varley]] and Siemens, all about the same time, according to the Wikipedia article on [[w:Dynamo#Practical designs|dynamo]], accessed 2026-10-18.</ref> The image in Figure 1 raises questions about these claims by Mokyr, Acemogu, and Aghion et al.: It shows growth followed by stagnation in Holland but not "phases of growth and decline" with the exception of wars and [[w:Herbert Hoover|Herbert Hoover]]. It also does ''not'' show the slope (i.e., rate of growth) increasing starting around 1750 or the 1770s or 1879 or 1886. Instead it shows sustained growth in GDP per capita for England / Great Britain / the UK starting ''abruptly'' after 1649 with economic disruptions during the reign of [[w:Anne, Queen of Great Britain|Queen Anne]] (1702-1714) and the [[w:War of the Spanish Succession|War of the Spanish Succession]] (1701-1714). This was followed by relatively steady but slower growth as England was ruled by Kings [[w:House of Hanover#Monarchs of Great Britain, Ireland, and Hanover|George I, II, and III]] (1714-1820). Another dramatic increase in the slope started abruptly about 1819. Acemoglu and Johnson (2023, chapter 1) are more consistent with Figure 1. They said that, "the Industrial Revolution ... [was] rooted in institutional changes that started empowering the middling sort of English people from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward." ... However, "the quality of life of a European peasant circa 1700 was not much different from that of an Egyptian peasant two thousand or seven thousand years previously." (chapter 5) They also claim that, "English national production per capita doubled from 1500 to 1700", (chapter 5), and "Growth emerged slowly in the second half of the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution, based on major technological breakthroughs and their application in industry, took root." (p. 45, chapter 2) Indeed, Figure 1 shows English GDP per capita doubling between 1500 and 1700, but it appears to have been fairly constant from 1500 to 1649, then roughly doubled in the next half century. [The data on England up to 1700 in Figure 1 came from Broadberry et al. (2015), which was not available when Acemoglu and Robinson were writing ''Why Nations Fail'', which appeared in 2012.] Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, ch. 11) describe the financial instability and slow growth during the reigns of Queen Anne and George I, II, and III. After the Glorious Revolution, France, Spain, the pope, and others refused to recognize [[w:William III of England|William and Mary]] (1689-1702) and then Queen Anne as heads of state of England. Instead they continued to support the claims of James II and then his son, [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|James Francis Edward Stuart]] (the "Old Pretender", a brother of Queen Anne), after James II died in 1701. During the War of the Spanish Succession, each side tried to exploit the internal divisions of the other. Owen (1938, ch. 8) said France almost succeeded in an attempt in 1708 to [[w:Planned French invasion of Britain (1708)|land between 5 and 6 thousand soldiers in northeast Scotland]]. [[w:Louis XIV|Louis XIV]] had hoped to get the Old Protector named as King James VIII of Scotland. There were still [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobites]] in Scotland, who supported the Old Pretender and likely would have supported the invaders if they had landed. If they had succeeded, it would have created major problems for Queen Anne and her supporters. However, the Royal Navy prevented the invaders from disembarking, and they returned to France. When Queen Anne died in 1702, she was succeeded by George I. His Parliament was dominated by the Whig party, which represented the new mercantile and economic interests and had been the main organization behind the Glorious Revolution. Once in power, they were tempted to use their newly found position to prey on the rights of others but were constrained both by competing groups in Parliament, "and by the very institutions that they had fought to introduce to strengthen Parliament and to prevent the emergence of a new absolutism and the return of the Stuarts",<ref>After James II fled England, the new government worked to block [[w:Jacobitism|Jacobitism]], which attempted to restore the [[w:House of Stuart|House of Stuart]] to the thrones of Scotland and Britain. When James II died, his son became titular head of this movement, who became known as "the [[w:James Francis Edward Stuart|Old Pretender]]". After he died, he was replaced by his son, who became known as "the [[w:Charles Edward Stuart|Young Pretender]]".</ref> according to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 302-303). The Whigs gave "[[w:Common land|common land]]" to nobles, confiscating it from commoners. Some commoners, who had traditionally shared that land, joined "Blacks", so called, because they blackened their faces when hunting on former commons or destroying the property of the nobility or extorting money from nobles or their employees. Parliament retaliated by passing the [[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]], under which someone accused of [[w:Poaching|poaching]] a [[w:Hare|hare]], for example, could under certain circumstances receive a summary judgment of guilty and then be executed without delay if apprehended later.<ref>Newman and Brown, eds. (1997, p. 58). See also the Wikipedia article on "[[w:Black Act 1723|Black Act 1723]]", accessed 2026-10-17.</ref> But not all accused were summarily executed. In 1724 "John Huntridge was accused of aiding deer stealers and abetting known Blacks, both crimes punishable by hanging. The prosecution of Huntridge came right from the top, initiated by the Regency Council of Lords Justices ... . After a trial of eight or nine hours, the jury found Huntridge innocent, partly on procedural grounds, since there were irregularities with the way the evidence had been collected. ... The jury was made up not of Huntridge’s peers, but of major landowners and gentry, who ought to have sympathized" with the noble, whose property had been attacked by Blacks allegedly aided by Huntridge.<ref>Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 304-305).</ref> These kinds of actions by the Parliaments of George I, II, and III might explain the slower growth during that period compared to that of the last half of the seventeenth century. That slower growth ended abruptly at the time of the [[w:Peterloo massacre|Peterloo Massacre]], 1819-08-16, visible in Figure 1. The growth of factories implied growth of cities, where workers lived closer together and could more easily organize. A campaign arose with multiple demands: They opposed the [[w:Corn Laws|Corn Laws]], which kept prices high for cereal grains and products made from them. They also demanded "universal [adult male] suffrage" and secret ballots in elections. A series of public meetings discussing these grievances led to one 1819-08-16, which attracted roughly 60,000. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, p. 207) reported that, {{quote| The authorities were very nervous about the meeting, and a force of six hundred cavalry of the [[w:15th The King's Hussars|Fifteenth Hussars]] had been assembled. As the speeches began, a local magistrate decided to issue a warrant for the arrest of the speakers. As police tried to enforce the warrant, they met with the opposition of the crowd, and fighting broke out. At this point the Hussars charged the crowd. Within a few chaotic minutes, eleven people were dead and probably six hundred wounded. The ''[[w:Manchester Observer|Manchester Observer]]'' called it the Peterloo Massacre. But given the changes that had already taken place in economic and political institutions, long-run repression was not a solution in England. The Peterloo Massacre would remain an isolated incident. Following the riot, the political institutions in England gave way to the pressure, and the destabilizing threat of much wider social unrest, particularly after the 1830 revolution in France against [[w:Charles X of France|Charles X]], who had tried to restore the absolutism destroyed by the French Revolution of 1789. In 1832 the government passed the [[w:Reform Act 1832|First Reform Act]]. It enfranchised [[w:Birmingham|Birmingham]], [[w:Leeds|Leeds]], [[w:Manchester|Manchester]], and [[w:Sheffield|Sheffield]], and broadened the base of voting so that manufacturers could be represented in Parliament. ... [I]n 1846 they managed to get the hated Corn Laws repealed ... .}} The ''Manchester Observer'' closed roughly two years later after [[w:Manchester Observer#Closure by repeated prosecution|repeated prosecutions]] for [[w:Seditious libel|seditious libel]]. However, the British government placed enough other limits on its power that enough other commoners were allowed to become successful entrepreneurs that the rate of economic growth in the UK increased immediately, as indicated by the increase in the slope of the UK line in Figure 1 until World Wars I and II. == In sum == The above suggests that the rate of economic growth changes with either (a) a change in administration -- a new head of state -- or (b) some other major event like war, the Peterloo Massacre, or the [[w:Wall Street crash of 1929|Wall Street crash of 1929]]. Policy changes that can increase growth include (1) diverse ownership and control of the major media and (2) immigrants. However, correlation does not imply causation. [[w:Randomized controlled trial|Randomized controlled trial]]s could make important contributions to human understanding of economic growth, as suggested by Banerjee, Duflo, and Kramer, cited above and recommended in the Wikiversity article on "[[Information is a public good: Designing experiments to improve government]]". Failing that, more analyses of data from different political jurisdictions with different media policies could be useful, as described by Neff and Pickard (2024).<ref>Graves (2025) includes an analysis of the data in Neff and Pickard (2024).</ref> == Caveat == The above attempts to accurately reflect the perspectives of all sources cited. Readers are invited to revise this article, subject to the standard Wikimedia rules of writing from a [[Wikiversity:Disclosures|neutral point of view]], [[Wikiversity:Cite sources|citing credible sources]] -- while raising other questions and concerns on the associated [[Wikiversity:FAQ|'''{{'}}“Discuss”{{'}}''' page]] -- and treating others with respect. == Notes == {{reflist}} == Bibliography == * <!-- Daron Acemoglu (2026-08-11) What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity (Function)-->{{cite Q|Q141241291}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2023) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q125292212}} * <!--Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012) Why Nations Fail (Crown)-->{{cite Q|Q7997840}} * <!--Philippe Aghion, Céline Antonin, and Simon Bunel (2021) The Power of Creative Destruction: Economic Upheaval and the Wealth of Nations (Harvard University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q137641358}} * <!--Ajzenman, Nicolas (29 January 2023). "Migrants don't cause crime rates to increase — but false perceptions endure anyway". The Conversation.-->{{cite Q|Q141758664}} * <!--Costas Arkolakis, Michael Peters, and Sun Kyoung Lee, (2020) "European Immigrants and the United States’ Rise to the Technological Frontier"-->{{cite Q|Q141678287}} * <!--Dean Baker (2016) Rigged: How globalization and the rules to the modern economy were structured to make the rich richer-->{{cite Q|Q100216001}} * <!--Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo (2019) Good Economics for Hard Times (PublicAffairs)-->{{cite Q|Q85764011}} * <!--Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2024-09-18) "Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy: A new 2023 update", Journal of Economic Surveys, 1-41-->{{cite Q|Q126723821}} * <!--S. N. Broadberry, B. Campbell, A. Klein, M. Overton and B. van Leeuwen (2015) ''British Economic Growth 1270-1870'' (Cambridge University Press)__>{{cite Q|Q57945943}} * <!--Donald S. L. Cardwell (1972) Turning Points in Western Technology (Neale Watson, Science History Pubs)-->{{cite Q|Q141795083}} * <!--Renée DiResta (2026) Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies into Reality, updated edition-->{{cite Q|Q141156783}} * <!--Renée DiResta and Rachel Kleinfeld (2025-09-10) For Expertise to Matter, Nonpartisan Institutions Need New Communications Strategies-->{{cite Q|Q141158362}} * <!--Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak (2017) "Model of state management of petroleum sector -- Case of Norway-->{{cite Q|Q141774179}} * <!--Rachel Foxley (2013) The Levellers: Radical Political Thought in the English Revolution (Oxford University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136227988}} * <!--Benjamin Gonzalez O’Brien, Loren Collingwood, Stephen Omar El-Khatib (2017-05-07) "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration-->{{cite Q|Q55932800}} * <!--Graves (2025-01-08) Defend Free Speech For All (Town Hall)-->{{cite Q|Q132855526}} * <!--Graves (2023-03-21) Do copyrights and paywalls on academic journals violate the US Constitution?-->{{cite Q|Q126116187}} * <!--Christopher Hibbert, Ben Weinreb, John Keay, Julia Keay, and Matthew Weinreb (2011-09-09) The London Encyclopaedia, 3rd ed.-->{{cite Q|Q137188993}} * <!-- Historian, USPS (2010) Postage Rates for Periodicals -->{{cite Q|Q112167199}} * <!--Richard R. John (1995) Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse-->{{cite Q|Q54641943}} * <!--Volker Leppin and Timothy J. Wengert (2015) "Sources for and against the Posting of the Ninety-Five Theses"-->{{cite Q|Q141737347}} * <!--Lawrence Lessig (2004) Free Culture-->{{cite Q|Q830526}} * <!--Olivier Marie and Paolo Pinotti (2024-02-01) "Immigration and Crime: An International Perspective", Journal of Economic Perspectives. 38 (1): 181–200-->{{cite Q|Q128434874}} * <!--Martínez, Daniel E.; Martínez-Schuldt, Ricardo D.; Cantor, Guillermo (2017). " Providing Sanctuary or Fostering Crime? A Review of the Research on 'Sanctuary Cities' and Crime" . Sociology Compass. 12 e12547. doi:10.1111/soc4.12547. ISSN 1751-9020.-->{{cite Q|Q55932802}} * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2010). The Death and Life of American Journalism (Bold Type Books) -->{{cite Q|Q104888067}}. * <!-- Robert W. McChesney; John Nichols (2016). People get ready-->{{cite Q|Q87619174}} * <!--Robert Michels (1911) Les Partis politiques, essai sur les tendances oligarchiques des démocraties-->{{cite Q|Q7210216}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (2017) A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy (Princeton University Press)-->{{cite Q|Q136118590}} * <!--Joel Mokyr (1994) "Cardwell's Law and the political economy of technological progress", Research Policy 23(5)561-574-->{{cite Q|Q139772607}} * <!--Ashley N. Muchow & Taisiia Stanishevska (2026) "From Headlines to Handcuffs: Local News Coverage of Immigrant Crime and Hispanic Arrest", Justice Quarterly, vol. 43(3) (https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2025.2550307)-->{{cite Q|Q141760694}} * <!--Neff and Pickard (2024) "Funding Democracy: Public Media and Democratic Health in 33 Countries"-->{{cite Q|Q131468289}} * <!--Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds. (1997) Britain in the Hanoverian Age, 1714–1837: An Encyclopedia-->{{cite Q|Q141759196|authors = Gerald G. Newman and Leslie Ellen Brown, eds.}} * <!--John Hely Owen (1938) War at Sea Under Queen Anne 1702–1708-->{{cite Q|Q141757101}} * <!--Andrew Pettegree (2015-10-27) Brand Luther: How an Unheralded Monk Turned His Small Town into a Center of Publishing, Made Himself the Most Famous Man in Europe--and Started the Protestant Reformation-->{{cite Q|Q141761223}} * <!--Thomas Piketty (2022) A Brief History of Equality-->{{cite Q|Q139886018}} * <!--Joad Raymond (2006-11-02) Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain-->{{cite Q|Q141761849}} * <!--Nick Roll (2017-07-16) "Correcting Jeff Sessions: Attorney general railed against crime in sanctuary cities, citing two professors’ work. But his claims are contrary to their conclusions.-->{{cite Q|Q141735231}} * <!--J.P. Smits, E. Horlings and J.L. van Zanden (2000) Dutch GDP and its Components 1800-1913 (Groningen Growth and Development Centre)-->{{cite Q|Q137669960}} * <!--I. Sugimoto (2011) ''Economic growth of Singapore in the twentieth century: historical GDP estimates and empirical investigations'' ( World Scientific Publishing)-->{{cite Q|Q137669987}} * <!--Nik Usher and Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell (2022-01) How Loud Does the Watchdog Bark? A Reconsideration of Local Journalism, News Non-profits, and Political Corruption -->{{Cite Q|Q134715465}} * <!--J. L. van Zanden and B. van Leeuwen (2012), ‘Persistent but not consistent: the growth of national income in Holland 1347–1807’, Explorations in Economic History, 49, pp. 119–30-->{{cite Q|Q137670058}} * <!--Brittney Washington (2018-06-19) " A Pamphlet War in England, 1641-1643"-->{{cite Q|Q141822147}} * <!--Tom K. Wong (2017-01-26) "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy"-->{{cite Q|Q98775875}} [[Category:Original research]] [[Category:Research]] [[Category:Economics]] [[Category:Macroeconomics]] [[Category:Gross domestic product]] [[Category:Economic growth]] [[Category:Modern Monetary Theory]] [[Category:Political science]] [[Category:Freedom and abundance]] <!-- https://en.wikiversity.org/wiki/Category_Review --> plh0s0z3snhri5tpa9bcf8vf6uvukd0 3 332623 2842290 2026-10-23T12:50:15Z MathXplore 2888076 vandalism1 ([[m:User:ZbVl/VD|Vandoom]]) 2842290 wikitext text/x-wiki == 2026-10-23 == [[File:Information.svg|25px|alt=Information icon]] Hello, I’m letting you know that one or more of your recent contributions have been reverted because they did not appear constructive. If you would like to experiment, please use the [[Wikiversity:Sandbox|sandbox]] or ask for assistance at the [[Wikiversity:Colloquium|Colloquium]]. Thank you.<!-- Glow-vandalism1 @ 1792759812576.7s --><nowiki></nowiki> [[User:MathXplore|MathXplore]] ([[User talk:MathXplore|discuss]] • [[Special:Contributions/MathXplore|contribs]]) 12:50, 23 October 2026 (UTC) mm070yvd5g5orygkqtz310khwuni9e3 10 332624 2842339 2026-10-23T20:41:25Z KyleWii 3113193 Created page with "{{notice|header=This course is currently being revamped.|Advanced Placement (AP) courses on Wikiversity are being revamped to include all the info necessary for the exam. You can see the progress by clicking here.}}" 2842339 wikitext text/x-wiki {{notice|header=This course is currently being revamped.|Advanced Placement (AP) courses on Wikiversity are being revamped to include all the info necessary for the exam. You can see the progress by clicking here.}} 7gpea0s29oilempq7bl3hpk309hkihc 2842342 2842339 2026-10-23T21:14:39Z KyleWii 3113193 2842342 wikitext text/x-wiki {{notice|header=This course is currently being revamped.|Advanced Placement (AP) courses on Wikiversity are being revamped to include all the info necessary for the exam. You can see the progress by clicking [[Revamping the AP Courses|here]].}} 9jkwxhu2zo764a9t7qzsdbtca3ep8gx 0 332625 2842340 2026-10-23T21:13:20Z KyleWii 3113193 Created page with "Wikiversity's Advanced Placement (AP) courses need significant improvement in organization and depth of information. Almost all the learning resources can be difficult to navigate, not have explanations and leave students confused. This is very crucial because take this for example. an AP Biology resource won't be helpful if they introduce concepts like cellular transport without explaining the difference between passive and active transport. These problems can make inde..." 2842340 wikitext text/x-wiki Wikiversity's Advanced Placement (AP) courses need significant improvement in organization and depth of information. Almost all the learning resources can be difficult to navigate, not have explanations and leave students confused. This is very crucial because take this for example. an AP Biology resource won't be helpful if they introduce concepts like cellular transport without explaining the difference between passive and active transport. These problems can make independent studying extremely difficult, especially for students who need free resources to prepare for AP exams and don't have the money to pay for something like a private tutor. A better course would make Wikivesity an effective learning source. To solve this problem, Wikiversity should reorganize its AP courses around the College Board course frameworks and make subunits for it. Each course should have clearly defined units, learning objectives, sufficient explanations, diagrams, worked examples and practice questions with answer explanations similarly of what will be on the AP exam. Editors should review existing pages to identify what info is missing and outdated content. By working with teachers, edits and students, Wikiversity could make a more useful and accurate resource for studying AP. == Our progress == === AP Courses === Courses marked as ▲ are considered high priority. ==== Arts ==== * AP 2-D Art and Design: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP 3-D Art and Design: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Drawing: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Art History: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Music Theory: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ==== English ==== * AP English Language and Composition: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP English Literature and Composition: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ==== History and Social Sciences ==== * AP African American Studies: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Comparative Government and Politics: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP European History: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Human Geography: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Macroeconomics: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Microeconomics: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Psychology: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ▲ * AP United States Government and Politics: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP United States History: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ▲ * AP World History - Modern: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ▲ ==== Math and Computer Science ==== * AP Calculus AB: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ▲ * AP Calculus BC: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ▲ * AP Computer Science A: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Computer Science Principles: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Precalculus: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Statistics: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ==== Sciences ==== * AP Biology: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ▲ * AP Chemistry: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ▲ * AP Environmental Science: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Physics 1 - Algebra-Based: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Physics 2 - Algebra-Based: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Physics C - Electricity and Magnetism: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Physics C - Mechanics: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ==== AP World Languages and Cultures ==== * AP Chinese Language and Culture: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP French Language and Culture: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP German Language and Culture: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Italian Language and Culture: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Japanese Language and Culture: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Latin: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Spanish Language and Culture: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Spanish Literature and Culture: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ==== AP Capstone Diploma Program ==== * AP Research: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Seminar: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) ==== AP Career Kickstart ==== * AP Business with Personal Finance: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) * AP Cybersecurity: 0% (0 units completed, 0 units in progress and 0 units not started) 1vn263j03ovhh1cv3rxc52bgdqbow0l