Perang China-Jepun Kedua
Dari Wikipedia bahasa Melayu
Perang Cina-Jepun II | |||||||||||
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Sebahagian daripada Perang Dunia II | |||||||||||
![]() Map showing the extent of Japanese control in 1940 |
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Kekuatan | |||||||||||
5,600,000[petikan diperlukan] | 4,100,000 (termasuk 900,000 pihak bekerjasama)[1] | ||||||||||
Pengorbanan | |||||||||||
3,200,000 tentera, 17,530,000 orang awam |
2,100,000 tentera |
Templat:Campaignbox Second Sino-Japanese War Templat:Campaignbox Pacific War
Perang China-Jepun II(Julai 7, 1937–September 9, 1945), dikenali sebagai as the War of Resistance Against Japan(Perang Penentangan terhadap Jepun), adalah perang utama antaraRepublik China and the Empayar Jepun, sebelum dan semasa Perang Dunia II. Walaupun kedua-dua telah meyerang antara satu sama lain, bermula tahun 1931, perang telah berlaku besar-beasran pada tahun 1937 dan hanya diakhiri denganpenyerahan diri Jepun pada tahun 1945. Pencerobohan Jepun adalah satu strategi dilakukan olehTentera Diraja Jepun sebagai rancangan besar untuk menguasai negara Asia tersebut. Sebelum tahun 1937, kedua-dua pihak telah melancarkan serangan yang digelar "insident." Penaklukan Manchuria pada tahun 1931 oleh Jepun dikenali sebagai "Insiden Mukden". 'Insiden' terakhir ialahInsiden Jambatan Marco Polo pada tahun 1937, menandakan permulaan perang antara dua negara. Dari 1937 hingga 1941, China melawan sendiri. Selepas serangan terhadap Pearl Harbor, Perang ini menjadi salah satu medan utama dalam Perang Dunia II.
[Sunting] Fakta-fakta Perang
Dalam Cina, peperangan dikenali sebagai War of Resistance Against Japan(Perang menentang Jepun) (Cina tradisional: 抗日戰爭, Cina Mudah: 抗日战争, pinyin: Kàng Rì Zhànzhēng), dikenali sebagai Perang penentangan 8 tahun(八年抗戰), atau lebih ringkas War of Resistance (抗戰).
Dalam Jepun, dinamakanPerang Jepun-China (日中戦争 Nicchū Sensō?) digunakan kerana bernada neutral. Apabila perang bermula pada Julai 1937 dekat Beijing, kerajaan Jepun menggunakan Insiden China Utara (北支事変, Hokushi Jihen), dengan meletusnya perang, mereka menggunakan Insiden China (支那事変, Shina Jihen).
Perkataan insiden (事変, jihen) digunakan oleh Jepun kerana kedua-dua pihak belum mengisytiharkan perang antara satu sama lain. Jepun ingin mengelakkan campurtangan negara barat seperti Britian dan terutamanya Amerika Syarikat, yang merupakan pengeksport utama besi kepada Jepun. Presiden Amerika Roosevelt akan mengenakan embargo disebsbkan Akta Neutral(Neutrality Acts) jika ia adalah perang. Dalam propaganda Diraja, pencerobohan terhadap China menjadi 'jihad' (seisen), langkah pertama bagi hakko ichi'u (lapan sudut di bawah satu bumbung). Pada tahun 1940, perdan menteri Konoe melancarkan Liga anggota Diet yang mempercayai objektif Jihad. Apabila kedua-dua kerajaan mengisytiharkan perang pada Disember 1941, ia digantikan denganby Perang Asia Timur Raya (大東亜戦争, Daitōa Sensō).
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Walaupun kerajaan Jepun menggunakan frasa "Insiden Shina" in formal documents, because the word Shina is considered a derogatory word by China, media in Japan often paraphrase with other expressions like The Japan-China Incident (日華事変 [Nikka Jihen], 日支事変 [Nisshi Jihen], which were used by media even in the 1930s.
Malah, nama Perang China-Jepun II biasanya tidak digunakan di Jepun, keranaPerang China-Jepun II (日清戦争, Nisshin-Sensō), antara Empayar Qing pada 1894 tidak mempunyai hubungan terus dalam perang ini.
[Sunting] Latar Belakang
Permulaan Perang China-Jepun II boleh dijumpai denganPerang China-Jepun I di 1894-95, di mana China, di bawah Dinasti Qing, dikalahkan oleh Jepun dan dipaksa menyerahkanTaiwan dan mengiktiraf 'kemerdekaan' Korea dalam Perjanjian Shimonoseki. Dinasti Qing berada dalam zaman kejatuhanya disebabkan oleh imperialisme barat dan pemberontakan dalaman, manakala Jepun menjadi kuasa besar melalui proses pemodenan yang efektif.Republik China ditubuhkan pada tahun 1912, selepas Revolusi Xinhai yang mengulingkan Dinasti Qing. Walaubagaimanpun Republik tersebut adalah lemah akibat penguasaan warlords. Prospek menyatukan negara dan menghalau imperialisme adalah tipis . Some warlords even aligned themselves with various foreign powers in an effort to wipe each other out. For example, warlord Zhang Zuolin of Manchuria openly cooperated with the Japanese for military and economic assistance. It was during the early period of the Republic that Japan became the greatest foreign threat to China. In 1915 Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands to further its political and commercial interests in China. Following World War I, Japan acquired German sphere of influence in Shandong. China under the Beiyang government remained fragmented and unable to resist foreign incursions until the Northern Expedition of 1926-28, launched by the Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) rival government based in Guangzhou. The Northern Expedition swept through China until it was checked in Shandong, where Beiyang warlord Zhang Zongchang, backed by the Japanese, attempted to stop the Kuomintang Army from unifying China. This situation culminated in the Jinan Incident of 1928 in which the Kuomintang army and the Japanese were engaged in a short conflict. In the same year, Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin was also assassinated when he became less willing to cooperate with Japan. Following these incidents, the Kuomintang government under Chiang Kai-shek finally succeeded in unifying China in 1928.
Still, numerous conflicts between China and Japan persisted as Chinese nationalism had been on the rise and one of the ultimate goals of the Three People's Principles was to rid China of foreign imperialism. However, the Northern Expedition had only nominally unified China, and civil wars broke out between former warlords and rival Kuomintang factions. In addition, the Chinese Communists revolted against the central government. Because of these situations, the Chinese central government diverted much attention into fighting these civil wars and followed a policy of first internal pacification before external resistance. This situation provided an easy opportunity for Japan to further its aggression. In 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria right after the Mukden Incident. After five months of fighting, in 1932, the puppet state Manchukuo was established with the last emperor of China, Puyi, installed as its head of state. Unable to challenge Japan directly, China appealed to the League of Nations for help. The League's investigation was published as the Lytton Report, which condemned Japan for its incursion of Manchuria, and led Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. From the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, appeasement was the policy of the international community and no country was willing to take an active stance other than a weak censure. Japan saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw materials and also as a buffer state against the Soviet Union.
Incessant conflicts followed the Mukden Incident. In 1932, Chinese and Japanese soldiers fought a short war in the January 28 Incident. The war resulted in the demilitarization of Shanghai, which forbade the Chinese from deploying troops in their own city. In Manchukuo there was an ongoing campaign to defeat the volunteer armies that arose from the popular frustration at the policy of nonresistance to the Japanese. In 1933, the Japanese attacked the Great Wall region, and in its wake the Tanggu Truce was signed, which gave Japan the control of Rehe province and a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beiping-Tianjin region. The Japanese aim was to create another buffer region, this time between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist government whose capital was Nanjing.
In addition, Japan increasingly utilized the internal conflicts among the Chinese factions to reduce their strength one by one. This was precipitated by the fact that even some years after the Northern Expedition, the political power of the Nationalist government only extended around the Yangtze River Delta region, and other regions of China were essentially held in the hands of regional powers. Thus, Japan often bought off or created special links with these regional powers to undermine the efforts of the central Nationalist government in bringing greater unity to China. To do this, Japan sought various Chinese traitors for cooperation and helped these men lead some "autonomous" governments that were friendly to Japan. This policy was called the Specialization of North China (bahasa Cina: 華北特殊化; pinyin: húaběitèshūhùa), or more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The northern provinces affected by this policy were Chahar, Suiyuan, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong.
In 1935, under Japanese pressure, China signed the He-Umezu Agreement, which forbade the KMT from conducting party operation in Hebei and effectively ended Chinese control of North China. In the same year, the Chin-Doihara Agreement was signed and vacated the KMT from Chahar. Thus, by the end of 1935, the Chinese central government had virtually vacated from North China. In its place, the Japanese-backed East Hebei Autonomous Council and the Hebei-Chahar Political Council were established.
In order to understand the complexity of the involvement of Japan and China, and the later involvement of Russia, UK, and the US in the Sino-Japanese War, it is important to appreciate the underlying reasons and motives of the different parties that they brought to the war.
Japan: The motives of Japan are clear: to create prosperity for Japan and obtain resource from China for that purpose. The Japanese did not intend to govern China directly, rather to create puppet governments that followed Japanese interests. To support these goals, Japan must control sizeable natural resources, such as those in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philipines, which were at the time controlled by Britain, the Netherlands, and the USA, respectively.
China (Nationalist): Nationalist China had several goals: to resist Japanese aggression, to unite China in one central government, to rid China of foreign influence, to defeat communism, and to re-emerge as a strong country.
China (Komunis): Komunis membiarkan Tentera RC to do the majority of the fighting against Japan, while conducting guerilla warfare against the Japanese forces. The CCP sought to avoid direct conflicts with the Japanese Army in order to emerge from the war stronger than the Nationalist forces, so in the inevitable struggle for dominance, the CCP would be the victor.
USSR: To allow Japan to overextend itself in China such that the USSR could fight Germany in the West without having to garrison strong forces in the East against possible Japanese aggression. Also, a weakened China would allow Chinese Communists to develop and eventually take over the country, providing a potential ally and a buffer zone against Western and Japanese expansionism.
UK: The UK had to fight Germany in Europe while at the same time allowing China to fight Japan to a stalemate, in order to buy time to regain its Pacific colonies in Malaysia, Burma, and Singapore. The majority of British forces were committed to fighting in Europe, and could spare little for the war in the Pacific.
USA: The US was generally isolationist prior to the attack of Pearl Harbor and did not wish to directly provoke Japan. Following the American entrance to WWII, the US had to defeat Japan in the Pacific while also fighting Germany in the European Theater, with the emphasis on defeating Germany first. The US began a campaign of island hopping in order to secure bases close enough to Japan to support bombing raids and an eventual invasion. When Germany capitulated, the war in the East was to be finished as fast as possible with minimal US casualties.
It is then clear that Nationalist China had an intensely difficult task in hand, with her Allies all having interests not necessarily in congruence with China's. With these in mind some decisions of the other Allies are much easier to understand.
[Sunting] Invasion of China

Most historians place the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War at the Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) on July 7, 1937. Some Chinese historians, however place the starting point at the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931. Following the Mukden Incident, the Japanese Kwantung Army occupied Manchuria and established the puppet state of Manchukuo on February 18 1932. Japan pressured China into recognising the independence of Manchukuo.
Following the Battle of Lugou Bridge in 1937, the Japanese occupied Shanghai, Nanjing and Southern Shanxi in campaigns involving approximately 350,000 Japanese soldiers, and considerably more Chinese soldiers. Historians estimate up to 300,000 people perished in the Nanjing Massacre, after the fall of Nanjing on December 13 1937, while some Japanese historians denied the existence of a massacre at all.
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident not only marked the beginning of an open, undeclared, war between China and Japan, but also hastened the formation of the Kuomintang-Communist Party of China (CPC) Second United Front. The cooperation took place with salutary effects for the beleaguered CPC. The distrust between the two antagonists was scarcely veiled. Their alliance was forged literally at gun point when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped in the Xi'an incident and forced to ally with the CPC. The uneasy alliance began to break down by late 1938, despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich Yangtze River Valley in central China. After 1940, open conflict between the Nationalists and Communists became more frequent in the areas outside Japanese control, culminating in the New Fourth Army Incident. The Communists expanded their influence wherever opportunities were presented, through mass organizations, administrative reforms, land and tax reform measures favoring peasants, while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence and fight the Japanese at the same time.
The Japanese had neither the intention nor the capability to directly administer China. Their goal was to create friendly puppet governments favorable to Japanese interests. However, the atrocities committed by the Japanese army made the governments that were set up very unpopular. In addition, the Japanese refused to negotiate with the Kuomintang or the Communist Party of China, which fueled further anti-Japanese sentiments. The Japanese also forced the Chinese people living under their control to change their money into military banknotes, which the current Japanese government still refuses to exchange even today.[petikan diperlukan]
[Sunting] Chinese strategy
Unlike Japan, China was unprepared for total war and had little military-industrial strength, no mechanized divisions, and few armored forces. Up until the mid-1930s China had hoped that the League of Nations would provide countermeasures to Japan's aggression. In addition, the Kuomintang government was mired in a civil war against the Communists. Chiang famously was quoted: "the Japanese are a disease of skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart". Though the communists formed the New Fourth Army and the 8th Route Army which were nominally under the command of the National Revolutionary Army, the United Front was never truly unified, as each side was preparing for a showdown with the other once the Japanese were driven out. All these disadvantages forced China to adopt a strategy whose first goal was to preserve its military strength, whereas a full frontal assault on the enemy would often prove to be suicidal. Also, pockets of resistance were to be continued in occupied areas to pester the enemy and make their administration over the vast lands of China difficult. As a result the Japanese really only controlled the cities and railroads, while the countrysides were almost always hotbeds of partisan activity.
However, Chiang realized that in order to win the support from the United States or other foreign nations, China must prove that it was indeed capable of fighting. A fast retreat would discourage foreign aid so Chiang decided to make a stand in the Battle of Shanghai. Chiang sent his German-trained divisions, the best of his troops, to defend China's largest and most industrialized city from the Japanese. The battle saw heavy casualties on both sides and ended with a Chinese retreat towards Nanjing. While the battle was a military defeat for the Chinese, it proved that China would not be defeated easily and showed China's determination to the world. The battle lasted over three months and proved to be an enormous morale booster for the Chinese people as it ended the Japanese taunt of conquering Shanghai in three days and China in three months.
While this direct army to army fighting lasted during the early phases of the war, large numbers of Chinese defeats compared to few victories eventually led to the strategy of stalling the war. Large areas of China were conquered during the early stages of the war but the Japanese advancements began to stall in mid-1938. The Chinese strategy at this point was to prolong the war until it had sufficient strength to defeat the Japanese. Chinese troops sometimes engaged in a practice of scorched earth in an attempt to slow down the Japanese. Dams and levees were sabotaged which led to the 1938 Huang He flood. In addition, industry was transported from coastal industrialized areas to inland cities such as Chongqing. By 1940, the war had reached a stalemate with both sides making minimal gains. The Chinese had successfully defended their land from oncoming Japanese on several occasions while strong resistance in areas occupied by the Japanese made a victory seem impossible to the Japanese. This frustrated the Japanese and led them to employ the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, loot all, burn all) (三光政策, Hanyu Pinyin: Sānguāng Zhèngcè, Japanese On: Sankō Seisaku). It was during this time period that a bulk of Japanese atrocities were committed.
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, which brought the United States into the war. China officially declared war on Japan on 8 December 1941. It refused to declare war earlier because receiving military aid while officially at war would break the neutrality of the donor nation. At this point, the priority changed from survival to victory. Enriched with foreign aid, China's army, now better trained and equipped, began taking the fight to the enemy. Chinese forces took part in the Burma Campaign to liberate Burma from the Japanese. By 1945 China was making significant progress, liberating large areas conquered by Japan during Operation Ichigo. Operations BETA and CARBONADO, were joint Chinese-American plans to liberate the entire Chinese mainland, starting with a push into Guandong and then north to Shanghai. But the dropping of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war, Operation August Storm, ended the war faster than anyone had expected.
The basis of Chinese strategy during the war, which can be divided into three periods:
- First Period: 7 July 1937 (Battle of Lugou Bridge) – 25 October 1938 (Fall of Hankou). In this period, one key concept is the trading of "space for time" (Chinese: 以空間換取時間). The Chinese army would put up fights to delay Japanese advance to northeastern cities, to allow the home front, along with its professionals and key industries, to retreat west into Chongqing to build up military strength.
- Second Period: 25 October 1938 (Fall of Hankou) - July, 1944. During the second period, the Chinese army adopted the concept of "magnetic warfare" to attract advancing Japanese troops to definite points where they were subjected to ambush, flanking attacks, and encirclements in major engagements. The most prominent example of this tactic is the successful defense of Changsha numerous times.
- Third Period: July 1944 - 15 August 1945. This period employs general full frontal counter-offensives.
[Sunting] Number of troops involved
[Sunting] National Revolutionary Army
- Main article: National Revolutionary Army
The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) throughout its lifespan employed approximately 4,300,000 regulars, in 370 Standard Divisions (正式師), 46 New Divisions (新編師), 12 Cavalry Divisions (騎兵師), 8 New Cavalry Divisions (新編騎兵師), 66 Temporary Divisions (暫編師), and 13 Reserve Divisions (預備師), for a grand total of 515 divisions. However, many divisions were formed from 2 or more other divisions, and many were not active at the same time. Therefore the number of divisions in active service at any given time is much smaller than this. At the start of the war in 1937, there were about 170 NRA divisions. The average NRA division had 4,000–5,000 troops. A Chinese army is roughly the equivalent to a Japanese division in terms of manpower. In addition, the Chinese army was severely understrength due to a general lack of artillery, heavy weapons, and motorized transport. The shortage of military hardware meant that three to four Chinese divisions had the firepower of only one Japanese division. Because of these material constraints, available artillery and heavy weapons were usually assigned to specialist brigades rather than to the general division, which caused more problems as the Chinese command structure lacked precise coordination. The fighting strength of a Chinese division was further reduced with other aspects of warfare, such as intelligence, logistics, communications, and medical services, taken into account.
The National Revolutionary Army can be divided roughly into two groups. The first one is the so-called dixi (嫡系, "direct descent") group, which was comprised of divisions trained by the Whampoa Military Academy and loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, and can be considered the Central Army (中央軍) of the NRA. The second group is known as the zapai (雜牌, "miscellaneous units"), and was comprised of all divisions led by non-Whampoa commanders, and is more often known as the Regional Army or the Provincial Army (省軍). Even though both military groups were part of the National Revolutionary Army, their distinction lies much in their allegiance to the central government of Chiang Kai-shek. Many former warlords and regional militarists were incorporated into the NRA under the flag of the Kuomintang, but in reality they retained much independence from the central government. They also controlled much of the military strength of China, the most notable of them being the Guangxi, Shanxi, Yunnan and Ma Cliques.
- Main article: Chinese Red Army
Although during the war the Chinese Communist forces fought as a nominal part of the NRA, the number of those on the CPC side, due to their guerrilla status, is difficult to determine, though estimates place the total number of the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and irregulars in the Communist armies at 1,300,000.
For more information of combat effectiveness of communist armies and other units of Chinese forces see Chinese armies in the Second Sino-Japanese War.
[Sunting] Imperial Japanese Army
- Main article: Imperial Japanese Army
- The IJA had approximately 2,000,000 regulars. More Japanese troops were quartered in China than deployed elsewhere in the Pacific Theater during the war. Japanese divisions ranged from 20,000 men in its divisions numbered less than 100, to 10,000 men in divisions numbered greater than 100. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, the IJA had 51 divisions of which 35 were in China, and 39 independent brigades of which all but one were in China. This represented roughly 80% of the IJA's manpower.
- The Collaborationist Chinese Army in 1938 had 78,000 people, and grew to 145,000 in 1940. Their growth was explosive around 1942-43, and according to KMT estimates 1,186,000 people were involved in the collaborationist army by the war's end. However, 2 million is also a figure often-quoted, which would make China the only country in World War II with a collaborationist army which outnumbered the invading army. At their height they fielded a maximum of 900,000 troops. Almost all of them belonged to the regional puppet governments such as Manchukuo, Provisional Government of the Republic of China (Beijing), Reformed Government of the Republic of China (Nanjing) and the later collaborationist Nanjing Nationalist Government or Wang Jingwei regime. The puppet and collaborationist troops were mainly assigned to garrison and logistics duties in areas held by the puppet governments and in occupied territories. They were rarely fielded in combat because of low morale and distrust by the Japanese, and fared poorly in skirmishes against real Chinese forces, whether the KMT or the CPC.
[Sunting] Chinese and Japanese equipment
[Sunting] The National Revolutionary Army
The Central Army possessed 80 Army infantry divisions with approximately 8,000 men each, nine independent brigades, nine cavalry divisions, two artillery brigades, 16 artillery regiments and three armored battalions. The Chinese Navy displaced only 59,000 tonnes and the Chinese Air Force comprised only 600 aircraft.
Chinese weapons were mainly produced in the Hanyang and Guangdong arsenals. However, for most of the German-trained divisions, the standard firearms were German-made 7.92 mm Gewehr 98 and Karabiner 98k. The 98 style rifles were often called the "Chiang Kai-shek" rifles. The standard light machine gun was a local copy of the Czech 7.92 mm Brno ZB26. There were also Belgian and French LMGs. Surprisingly, the NRA did not purchase any of the infamous Maschinengewehr 34s from Germany, but did produce their own copies of them. On average in these divisions, there was one machine gun set for each platoon. Heavy machine guns were mainly locally-made 1924 water-cooled Maxim guns, from German blueprints. On average every battalion would get one HMG. The standard sidearm was the 7.63 mm Mauser M1932 semi-automatic pistol.
Some divisions were equipped with 37mm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns, and/or mortars from Oerlikon, Madsen, and Solothurn. Each infantry division had 6 French Brandt 81 mm mortars and 6 Solothurn 20mm autocannons. Some independent brigades and artillery regiments were equipped with Bofors 72mm L/14, or Krupp 72mm L/29 mountain guns. They were 24 Rheinmetall 150mm L/32 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1934) and 24 Rheinmetall 150mm L/30 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1936).
Infantry uniforms were basically redesigned Zhongshan suits. Leg wrappings are standard for soldiers and officers alike since the primary mode of movement for NRA troops was by foot. The helmets were the most distinguishing characteristic of these divisions. From the moment German M35 helmets (standard issue for the Wehrmacht until late in the European theatre) rolled off the production lines in 1935, and until 1936, the NRA imported 315,000 of these helmets, each with the 12-ray sun emblem of the ROC on the sides. Other equipment included cloth shoes for soldiers, leather shoes for officers and leather boots for high-ranking officers. Every soldier was issued ammunition, ammunition pouch/harness, a water flask, combat knives, food bag, and a gas mask.
On the other hand, warlord forces varied greatly in terms of equipment and training. Some warlord troops were notoriously under-equipped, such as Shanxi's Dadao Teams and the Yunnanese army. Some however were highly professional forces with their own air force and navies. The quality of Guangxi's army was almost on par with the Central Army's, as the Guangzhou region was wealthy and the local army could afford foreign instructors and arms. The Muslim Ma Clique to the Northwest was famed for its well-trained cavalry divisions.
[Sunting] The Imperial Japanese Army
Although Imperial Japan possessed significant mobile operational capacity, it did not possess capability for maintaining a long sustained war. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese Army comprised 17 divisions, each composed of approximately 22,000 men, 5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles and submachine guns, 600 heavy machine guns of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 24 tanks. Special forces were also available. The Japanese Navy displaced a total of 1,900,000 tonnes, ranking third in the world, and possessed 2,700 aircraft at the time. Each Japanese division was the equivalent in fighting strength of four Chinese regular divisions (at the beginning of Battle of Shanghai (1937)).
See Also:
- List of Japanese infantry weapons used in the Second-Sino Japanese War
- List of armour used by the Imperial Japanese Army in the Second Sino-Japanese War
- List of Japanese aircraft in use during the Second Sino-Japanese War
[Sunting] Stalemate and foreign aid
By 1940, the fighting had reached a stalemate. While Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China, guerrilla fighting continued in the conquered areas. The Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek struggled on from a provisional capital at the city of Chongqing; however, realizing that he also faced a threat from communist forces of Mao Zedong, he mostly tried to preserve the remaining strength of his army and avoid heavy battle with the Japanese in the hopes of defeating the Communists once the Japanese left. China, with its low industrial capacities and limited experience in modern warfare, could not launch any decisive counter-offensive against Japan. Chiang could not risk an all-out campaign given the poorly-trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies and opposition to his leadership both within Kuomintang and in China at large. He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and equipped army defending Shanghai and the remaining troops were used to preserve his army. On the other hand, Japan had suffered tremendous casualties from unexpectedly stubborn resistance from China and already developed problems in administering and garrisoning fallen territories. Neither side could make any swift progress in a manner resembling the fall of France and Western Europe to Nazi Germany.
Most military analysts predicted that the Kuomintang could not continue fighting with most of the war factories located in the prosperous areas under or near Japanese control. Other global powers were reluctant to provide any support — unless supporting an ulterior motive — because in their opinion the Chinese would eventually lose the war, and did not wish to antagonize the Japanese who might, in turn, eye their colonial possessions in the region. They expected any support given to Kuomintang might worsen their own relationship with the Japanese, who taunted the Kuomintang with the prospect of conquest within 3 months.
Germany and the Soviet Union did provide support to the Chinese before the war escalated to the Asian theatre of World War II. The Soviet Union was helping the Kuomintang government to hinder the Japanese from invading Siberia, thus saving itself from a two front war. In September 1937 the Soviet leadership signed Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and approved Operation Zet. As part of the secret operation Soviet technicians upgraded and handled some of the Chinese war-supply transport. Bombers, fighters, military supplies and advisors arrived, including future Soviet war hero Georgy Zhukov, who won the Battle of Halhin Gol. It also supported the Communists, at least until war with Germany forced her into conserving everything for her own forces.
Because of Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist nationalist policies and hopes of defeating the CPC, Germany provided the largest proportion of Kuomintang arms imports. German military advisors modernized and trained the Kuomintang armies; Kuomintang officers (including Chiang's second son, Chiang Wei-kuo) were educated in and served in the German army prior to World War II. More than half of the German arms exports during its rearmament period were to China. Nevertheless the proposed 30 new divisions equipped with all German arms did not materialize as the Germans sided with the Japanese later in World War II.
Other prominent powers, including the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France, only officially assisted in war supply contracts up to the attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941, when a significant influx of trained military personnel and supplies boosted the Kuomintang chance of maintaining the fight.
Public opinion in the west was becoming favorable to the Kuomintang. At the start of the 1930s, public opinion had tended to support the Japanese. However, from December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on the USS Panay and the Nanking Massacre, swung public opinion sharply against Japan, and increased fear of Japanese expansionism. In 1938, Australia prevented a Japanese Government-owned company from taking over an iron mine in Australia, and banned iron ore exports.[2]
By mid-1941, the United States organized the American Volunteer Group, or Flying Tigers. Their early combat success of 300 kills against a loss of 12 of their shark painted P-40 fighters earned them wide recognition while Allies were suffering heavy losses. Entering soon after the U.S. and Japan were at war, their dogfighting tactics would be adopted by US forces. They would also transmit the appreciative Chinese thumbs-up gesture for number one into military culture.
In addition, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands East Indies began oil and/or steel embargos. The loss of oil imports made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China. This set the stage for Japan to launch a series of military attacks on the western Allies on December 8 1941 (December 7 in U.S. time zones), such as the raid on Pearl Harbor.
[Sunting] Entrance of Western Allies
Within a few days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the United States and China officially declared war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek continued to receive supplies from the United States, as the Chinese conflict was merged into the Asian theatre of World War II. However, in contrast to the arctic supply route to the Soviet Union that stayed open most of the war, sea routes to China had long been closed, so between the closing of the Burma Road in 1942 and its re-opening as the Ledo Road in 1945, foreign aid was largely limited to what could be flown in over The Hump. Most of China's own industry had already been captured or destroyed by Japan, and the Soviet Union could spare little from the Eastern Front. Because of these reasons, the Chinese government never had the supplies and equipment needed to mount a major offensive.
Chiang was appointed Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theater in 1942. General Joseph Stilwell served for a time as Chiang's Chief of Staff, while commanding US forces in the China Burma India Theater. However, relations between Stilwell and Chiang soon broke down, due to a number of factors. Some historians suggested it is largely due to the corruption and inefficiency of the Chinese government. However, some historians believed it was a more complicated situation. Stilwell had a strong desire to assume control of Chinese troops, which Chiang vehemently opposed. Stilwell did not appreciate the complexity of the situation, including the buildup of the Chinese Communist during the war (essentially Chiang had to fight a multi-front war - the Japanese on one side, the Communists on the other) Stilwell criticized the Chinese government's conduct of the war in the American media, and to President Franklin Roosevelt. Chiang was hesitant to deploy more Chinese troops away from the main front because China already suffered tens of millions of war casualties, and believed that Japan would eventually capitulate to America's overwhelming industrial output and manpower. The Allies began to lose confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean Areas and South West Pacific Area, employing an island hopping strategy. Three months after the cessation of hostilities in the western front, as per the agreement made in the Yalta Conference, the USSR launched an overwhelming attack in Manchuria against the Japanese. Following the surrender of the Japanese to the Allied powers, the USSR proceeded to dismantle nearly all of the industrial equipment in Manchuria for transport back to the USSR. During this time, the CCP took refuge in the area, and looted what the Soviets had left, including most of the arms retreating Japanese forces left behind.
Conflicts among China, the United States, and the United Kingdom also emerged in the Pacific war. Winston Churchill was reluctant to devote British troops, the majority of whom were defeated by the Japanese in earlier campaigns, to reopen the Burma Road. On the other hand, Stilwell believed that the reopening of the Burma Road was vital to China as all the ports on mainland China were under Japanese control. Churchill's "Europe First" policy obviously did not sit well with Chiang. Furthermore, the later British insistence that China send in more and more troops into Indochina in the Burma Campaign, was regarded as an attempt by Great Britain to use Chinese manpower to secure Britain's colonial holdings in Southeast Asia and prevent the gate to India from falling to Japan. Chiang also believed that China should divert its troops to eastern China to defend the airbases of the American bombers, a strategy that Claire Chennault supported. In addition, Chiang voiced his support of Indian Independence in a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi in 1942, which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom.

The United States saw the Chinese theater as a means to tie up a large number of Japanese troops, as well as being a location for American airbases from which to strike the Japanese home islands. In 1944, as the Japanese position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast, the IJA launched Operation Ichigo to attack the airbases which had begun to operate. This brought the Hunan, Henan, and Guangxi provinces under Japanese administration. The failure of the Chinese forces to defend these areas led to the replacement of Stilwell by Major General Albert Wedemeyer. However, Chinese troops under the command of Sun Li-jen drove out the Japanese in North Burma to secure the Ledo Road, a supply route to China. In Spring 1945 the Chinese launched offensives and retook Guangxi and other southwestern regions. With the Chinese army well in the progress training and equipping, Albert Wedemeyer planned to launch Operation Carbonado in summer 1945 to retake Guandong, obtaining a coastal port, and from there drive northwards toward Shanghai. However, the dropping of the atomic bombs hastened Japanese surrender and these plans were not put into action.
[Sunting] Casualties assessment

The conflict lasted for 97 months and 3 days (measured from 1937 to 1945).
[Sunting] Chinese casualties
- The Kuomintang fought in 22 major engagements, most of which involved more than 100,000 troops on both sides, 1,171 minor engagements most of which involved more than 50,000 troops on both sides, and 38,931 skirmishes.
- The Chinese lost approximately 3.22 million soldiers. 9.13 million civilians died in the crossfire, and another 8.4 million as non-military casualties. According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, at least 2.7 million civilians died during the "kill all, steal all, burn all" operation (sanko sakusen) implemented in May 1942 in North China by general Yasuji Okamura and authorized on 3 December 1941 by Imperial Headquarter Order number 575. [3]
Some Chinese historians claimed the total military and non-military deaths of the Chinese were at most 35 million. Most Western historians believed that the casualties were at least 20 million. Property loss of the Chinese valued up to 383,301.3 million US dollars according to the currency exchange rate in July 1937, roughly 50 times of the GDP of Japan at that time (7,700 million US dollars). [petikan diperlukan]
- In addition, the war created 95 million refugees.
[Sunting] Japanese casualties
The Japanese recorded around 1.1 million military casualties, killed, wounded and missing, although this number is disputed. The official death-toll according to the Japan defense ministry was only about 200,000, but this is believed to be extremely low when considering the length of the conflict. The combined Chinese forces claimed to have killed at most 1.77 million Japanese soldiers during the 8-year-war. Most academics put Japanese casualities suffered during the Second Sino-Japanese War at 1.1 million.[petikan diperlukan]
[Sunting] Aftermath

As of mid 1945, all sides expected the war to continue for at least another year. On August 6th, an American B-29 bomber dropped the first atomic bomb used in combat on Hiroshima, in an attempt to force Japan to surrender, which it did not. Two days later, on 8 August the Soviets launched Operation August Storm. The Soviet Union, having renounced its non-aggression pact with Japan, attacked the Japanese in Manchuria, fulfilling its Yalta pledge to attack the Japanese within three months after the end of the war in Europe. The attack was made by three Soviet army groups. In less than two weeks the Kwantung Army in Manchuria consisting of over a million men had been destroyed by the Soviets. Three days later, another atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. Japan capitulated to the Allies on August 15, 1945. The Japanese troops in China formally surrendered on September 9, 1945 and by the provisions of the Cairo Conference of 1943 the lands of Manchuria, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands reverted to China. However, the Ryukyu Islands were maintained as Japanese territory.
In 1945 China emerged from the war nominally a great military power but was actually a nation economically prostrate and on the verge of all-out civil war. The economy deteriorated, sapped by the military demands of a long, costly war and internal strife, by spiraling inflation, and by Nationalist profiteering, speculation, and hoarding. Starvation came in the wake of the war, as large swathes of the prime farming areas were ravaged by the fighting. Millions were rendered homeless by floods and the destruction of towns and cities in many parts of the country. The situation was further complicated by an Allied agreement at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that brought Soviet troops into Manchuria to hasten the termination of war against Japan. Although the Chinese had not been present at Yalta, they had been consulted; they had agreed to have the Soviets enter the war in the belief that the Soviet Union would deal only with the Nationalist government. After the war, the Soviet Union, as part of the Yalta agreement's allowing a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria, dismantled and removed more than half the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese. The Soviet presence in northeast China enabled the Communists to move in long enough to arm themselves with the equipment surrendered by the withdrawing Japanese army. The problems of rehabilitating the formerly Japanese-occupied areas and of reconstructing the nation from the ravages of a protracted war were staggering, to say the least.
The war left the Nationalists severely weakened and their policies left them unpopular. Meanwhile the war strengthened the Communists, both in popularity and as a viable fighting force. At Yan'an and elsewhere in the "liberated areas," Mao was able to adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating their food, and thinking their thoughts. When this failed, however, more repressive forms of coercion, indoctrination and ostracization were also employed. The Red Army fostered an image of conducting guerrilla warfare in defense of the people. In addition, the CPC was effectively split into "Red" (cadres working in the "liberated" areas) and "White" (cadres working underground in enemy-occupied territory) spheres, a split that would later sow future factionalism within the CPC. Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and became a seasoned fighting force. Mao also began preparing for the establishment of a new China, well away from the front at his base in Yan'an. In 1940 he outlined the program of the Chinese Communists for an eventual seizure of power and began his final push for consolidation of CPC power under his authority. His teachings became the central tenets of the CPC doctrine that came to be formalized as "Mao Zedong Thought". With skillful organizational and propaganda work, the Communists increased party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. Soon, all out war broke out between the KMT and CPC, a war that would leave the Nationalists banished to Taiwan and the Communists victorious on the mainland.
[Sunting] Legacy
To this day the war is a major point of contention between China and Japan. The war remains a major roadblock for Sino-Japanese relations today, and many people, particularly in China, harbour grudges over the war and related issues. A small but vocal group of Japanese nationalists and/or right-wingers deny a variety of crimes attributed to Japan. The Japanese invasion of its neighbours is often glorified or whitewashed, and wartime atrocities, most notably the Nanjing Massacre, comfort women, and Unit 731, are frequently denied by such individuals. The Japanese government has also been accused of historical revisionism by allowing the approval of school textbooks omitting or glossing over Japan's militant past. In response to criticism of Japanese textbook revisionism, the PRC government has been accused of using the war to stir up already growing anti-Japanese feelings in order to whip up nationalistic sentiments and divert its citizens' minds from internal matters.
The PRC government has also been accused of greatly exaggerating the CPC's role in fighting the Japanese. The PRC has traditionally emphasized the role of communist guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines and claimed that the KMT refused to fight the Japanese. Such viewpoint is often challenged by contemporary generals and historians. One such notable critic is General Hau Pei-tsun, who refused to attend a joint celebration in China marking the sixtieth anniversary of the end of war in 2005, claiming that the PRC continues to distort history. In reality, the KMT army, including Chiang Kai-shek's central army and other non-Whampoa provincial armies, carried the brunt of combat during the war. The KMT army suffered some 3.2 million casualties while the CPC increased its military strength from practically nothing to 1.7 million men. In addition, many surviving KMT officers and soldiers, who were not able to evacuate to Taiwan following the Chinese Civil War, were also persecuted by the communist government and sent to labor camps for having served under Chiang Kai-shek's command. Their descendants and relatives also faced hardships as they were categorized as "counter-revolutionaries" during the Cultural Revolution.
The legacy of the war is more complicated in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Traditionally, the government has held celebrations marking the Victory Day on September 9 (now known as Armed Forces Day), and Taiwan's Retrocession Day on October 25. However, with the power transfer from KMT to the more pro-Taiwan independence pan-green coalition and the rise of desinicization, events commemorating the war have become less commonplace. Many supporters of Taiwan independence see no relevance in preserving the memory of the war of resistance that happened primarily on mainland China. Still, commemorations are held in regions where politics is dominated by the pan-blue coalition. Many pan-blue supporters, particularly veterans who retreated with the government in 1949, still have an emotional interest in the war. For example, in celebrating the sixtieth anniversary of the end of war in 2005, the cultural bureau of pan-blue stronghold Taipei held a series of talks in the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall regarding the war and post-war developments, while the KMT held its own exhibit in the KMT headquarters.
[Sunting] Who fought the War of Resistance?
The question as to which political group directed the Chinese war effort and exerted most of the effort to resist the Japanese still remains a controversial issue.
In the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial near the Marco Polo Bridge and in mainland Chinese textbooks, the People's Republic of China claims that it was the Communist Party that directed Chinese efforts in the war and did everything to resist the Japanese invasion. Recently, however, with a change in the political climate, the CPC has admitted that certain Nationalist generals made important contributions in resisting the Japanese. The official history in mainland China is that the KMT fought a bloody, yet indecisive, frontal war against Japan, while it was the CPC that engaged the Japanese forces in far greater numbers behind enemy lines. This emphasis on the CPC's central role is partially reflected by the PRC's labeling of the war as the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War of Resistance rather than merely the War of Resistance. According to the PRC official point of view, the Nationalists mostly avoided fighting the Japanese in order to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Communists. However, for the sake of Chinese reunification and appeasing the ROC on Taiwan, the PRC has now "acknowledged" that the Nationalists and the Communists were "equal" contributors because the victory over Japan belonged to the Chinese people, rather than to any political party.
Leaving aside Nationalists sources, scholars researching third party Japanese and Soviet sources have documented quite a different view. Such studies claim that the Communists actually played a miniscule involvement in the war against the Japanese compared to the Nationalists and used guerilla warfare as well as opium sales to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Kuomintang.[4] This is congruent with the Nationalist viewpoint, as demonstrated by history textbooks published in Taiwan, which gives the KMT credit for the brunt of the fighting. According to these third-party scholars, the Communists were not the main participants in any of the 22 major battles, most involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides, between China and Japan. Soviet liaison to the Chinese Communists Peter Vladimirov documented that he never once found the Chinese Communists and Japanese engaged in battle during the period from 1942 to 1945. He also expressed frustration at not being allowed by the Chinese Communists to visit the frontline,[5] although as a foreign diplomat Vladimirov may have been overly optimistic to expect to be allowed to join Chinese guerrilla sorties. The Communists usually avoided open warfare (the Hundred Regiments Campaign and the Battle of Pingxingguan are notable exceptions), preferring to fight in small squads to harass the Japanese supply lines. In comparison, right from the beginning of the war the Nationalists committed their best troops (including the 36th, 83rd, 88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to defend Shanghai from the Japanese, a third of whom were killed or wounded. The Japanese considered the Kuomintang rather than the Communists as their main enemy[6] and bombed the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing to the point that it was the most heavily bombed city in the world to date.[7] Also, the main bulk of Japanese forces were fighting mainly in Central and Southern China, away from major Communist strongholds such as those in Shaanxi.
A third perspective advocated by some historians is that the former warlords actually did most of the fighting with the Japanese, considering that a large part the National Revolutionary Army was actually composed of troops from different factions. Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army sustained heavy casualties in the beginning of the war in Shanghai-Nanjing campaigns and his military strength was never to recover to pre-war levels. This situation forced Chiang to rely on other divisions of the National Revolutionary Army. These non-Whampoa divisions, also known as the "provincial army," were nominally part of the National Revolutionary Army but in reality had their own command structures. Some major engagements after the initial 1937 campaigns, such as Battle of Xuzhou and the Battle of Changsha were fought by former warlords under the banner of the Kuomintang.
[Sunting] References
- Chang, Flora and Ming, Chu-cheng. (July 12 2005). Rewriters of history ignore truth. Taipei Times, pg. 8.
- Gordon, David M. "The China-Japan War, 1931–1945" Journal of Military History (Jan 2006) v 70#1, pp 137–82. Historiographical overview of major books
- Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London, 2005); Jonathan Cape, ISBN 0-679-42271-4
- Annalee Jacoby and Theodore H. White, Thunder out of China, New York: William Sloane Associates, 1946
- Jowett, Phillip (2005). Rays of the Rising Sun: Japan's Asian Allies 1931-45 Volume 1: China and Manchukuo, Helion and Company Ltd. ISBN 1-874622-21-3.- Book about the Chinese and Mongolians who fought for the Japanese during the war.
- Long-hsuen, Hsu; Chang Ming-kai (1972). History of the Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945), Chung Wu Publishers. ASIN B00005W210.
[Sunting] Major figures
[Sunting] China: Nationalist
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[Sunting] China: Communist
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[Sunting] Japan: Imperial Japanese Army
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[Sunting] Kerajaan BonekaManchukuo
Mengjiang
Majilis Autonomi Hebei Timur
Kerajaan Sementara Republik China
Nanjing Nationalist Government
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[Sunting] Foreign personel on Chinese side
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[Sunting] Military engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War
[Sunting] Campaigns
- Honan-Hupeh Campaign
- Western Hunan Campaign
- Japanese Campaigns in Chinese War
[Sunting] Pentempuran
Pertempuran dengan rencana. Bendera menunjukkan pihak pemenang. Tarikh menunjukkan permulaan kecuali Changsa yang bermula dari Dis. 1941.
Mukden September 1931
Penjajahan terhadap Manchuria September 1931
Shanghai (1932) January 1932
Pengamanan Manchukuo March 1932
Operasi Nekka January 1933
- Aksi di Mongolia Dalam(1933-36)
Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) July 1937
Beiping-Tianjin July 1937
Chahar August 1937
Battle of Shanghai August 1937
Beiping–Hankou Railway Operation August 1937
Tianjin–Pukou Railway Operation August 1937
Taiyuan September 1937
Battle of Nanjing December 1937
Battle of Xuzhou December 1937
Northern and Eastern Honan 1938 January 1938
Amoy Operation May 1938
Battle of Wuhan June 1938
Canton Operation October 1938
Hainan Island Operation February 1939
Battle of Nanchang March 1939
Battle of Suixian-Zaoyang May 1939
Swatow Operation June 1939
Battle of Changsha (1939) September 1939
Battle of South Guangxi November 1939
1939-40 Winter Offensive November 1939
Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang May 1940
Hundred Regiments Offensive August 1940
Indochina Expedition September 1940
Central Hopei Operation November 1940
Battle of South Henan January 1941
Western Hopei Operation March 1941
Battle of Shanggao March 1941
Battle of South Shanxi May 1941
Battle of Changsha (1941) September 1941
Battle of Changsha (1942) January 1942
Battle of Yunnan-Burma Road March 1942
Battle of Zhejiang-Jiangxi April 1942
Battle of West Hubei May 1943
Battle of Northern Burma and Western Yunnan October 1943
Battle of Changde November 1943
Battle of Henan-Hunan-Guangxi April 1944
Battle of Changsha (1944) August 1944
Battle of Guilin-Liuzhou August 1944
Battle of West Hunan April - June, 1945
Operation August Storm August – September, 1945
[Sunting] Aerial Engagements
- Aerial Engagements of the Second Sino-Japanese War
[Sunting] Japanese invasion and planned operations
- Sczechwan Invasion
- Kuolichi-Taierhchuang Operation
- CHE-KIANG Operation
- Peiping-Hankow Operation
- Siang-Kwei Operation
- Canton-Hankow Operation
- Kiangsi-Fukien Operation
- Kwanchow-Wan Occupation
- Laohokow Operation
- Chichiang Operation
- Disembarc in Tsingtao
[Sunting] List of Japanese political and military incidents
[Sunting] Attacks on civilians
- Nanjing Massacre
- Unit 731
- Unit 100
- Unit 516
- Unit 1855
- Unit 2646
- Unit 8604
- Unit 9420
- Unit Ei 1644
- Comfort women
- Sanko sakusen
- Shantung Incident
- Taihoku Air Strike
- Bombing of Chongqing
- Kaimingye germ weapon attack
- Changteh Chemical Weapon Attack
- Battle of Zhejiang-Jiangxi
- Sook Ching massacre (against overseas Chinese)
Templat:IJA special research units
[Sunting] Notes
- ↑ Jowett, Phillip, Rays of the Rising Sun, pg.72.
- ↑ "Memorandum by Mr J. McEwen, Minister for External Affairs 10 May 1940"
- ↑ Himeta, Sankô sakusen towa nan dataka-Chûgokujin no mita Nihon no sensô, Iwanami Bukuretto 1996, p.43.
- ↑ Chang and Ming, July 12 2005, pg. 8; and Chang and Halliday, pg. 233, 246, 286–287
- ↑ Chang and Ming, July 12 2005
- ↑ Chang and Halliday, pg. 231
- ↑ Chang and Halliday, pg. 232
[Sunting] See also
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Halaman ini mengandungi teks bahasa Cina. Anda hanya dapat melihat jika anda mempunyai sokongan perisian. Lebih... |
- History of China
- History of the Republic of China
- Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
- History of Japan
- Military of the Republic of China
- Military history of China
- Warlord era
- National Revolutionary Army
- Whampoa Military Academy
- Sino-German cooperation
- Military history of Japan
- Military of the People's Republic of China
- Chinese armies in the Second Sino-Japanese War
- New 1st Army
- Pacific War
- Wang Jingwei Government
- First Sino-Japanese War
- Post-war Germany vs post-war Japan
- Sino-Japanese relations
- Greater East Asia War
- Mitsubishi
- Taihoku Air Strike
- Republic of China Air Force
- Flying Tigers
- German Trained Divisions
- Events preceding World War II in Asia
[Sunting] External links
- World War 2 Newspaper Archives - War in China, 1937-1945
- Annals of the Flying Tigers
- Templat:Zh icon KangZhan.org - Gallery and history of the Sino-Japanese war
- Japanese soldiers in the Sino-Japanese war, 1937-1938 (Japanese)
- History and Commercial Atlas of China, Harvard University Press 1935, by Albert Herrmann, Ph.D. See bottom of the list for 1930's maps.
Templat:WWIITheatre Templat:WWII history by nation Templat:World War II
Kategori: Rencana yang tidak mempunyai sumber petikan | Rencana yang memerlukan terjemahan | Rencana yang mengandungi teks bahasa Cina | Second Sino-Japanese War | Military history of China during World War II | Invasions | Wars involving China | World War II national military histories | World War II politics | Military history of the Republic of China | History of the People's Republic of China | Military history of China | World War II Pacific Theatre