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Blitzkrieg relied on close co-operation between infantry and panzers (tanks). Here, infantry use a panzer for cover during attack in Ukraine during September 1941

Blitzkrieg (tysk for "lynkrig") er det populære navn for en militær doktrin, der involverer mobile styrker der laver et overraskelsesangreb med stor hastighed for derved at forhindre fjenden i at etablerer et ordentligt forsvar. Doktrinerne der resulterede i Blitzkrieg blev udviklet i årene efter 1. verdenskrig for at forhindre den skyttegravskrig der havde plaget 1. verdennskrig.

Indholdsfortegnelse

[redigér] Foreløber for Blitzkrieg, 1. verdenskrig

Allerede under 1. verdenskrig så man tidlige former for Blitzkrieg. Slaget ved Cambrai i slutningen af 1917 indeholdt et kæmpe succesfuldt kampvognsangreb. Briterne som havde iværksat angrebet havde ikke fundet ud af hvordan de skulle fastholde det de havde vundet og blevet snart drevet tilbage fra deres tidligere positioener.

Tidligere havde Canada dog vundet en sejr ved Vimy Ridge i April 1917, som var det første veltilrettelagte angreb og brugte en massiv spærreild (omkring 1 million grarnater), efterfulgt af en hurtig erobring af højderyggen. De Allierede mistede aldrig igen kontrollen med Vimy Ridge.

[redigér] Nazi Tyskland og Blitzkrieg

Efter yderligere udvikling brugte den tyske Wehrmacht Blitzkrieg i 2. verdenskrig.

De tidligere operationer i kriger - Angrebene på Polen, Frankrig og Sovjetunionen- var yderst effektive da det lykkedes at lave overraskelsesangreb med dybe indtrængner samtidigt med at fjenden ikke var i stand til at reagerer hurtigt nok på de overlegne tyske doktriner. Tyskerne stod overfor modstandere der var på talmæssigt teknisk overlegne og bevidste derved effektiviteten af deres taktik. Fra dette højdepunkt gik det ned ad bakke for den tyske Wehrmacht. Heinz Guderian, som var en tidlig fortaler for Blitzkrieg, blev fjernet fra hans kommando den 25. December 1941 fordi han beordre en tilbagetrækning stik i mod Hitlers ordre. Dette viste en fundamental forskel på Hitlers syn på militær strategi og det Wehrmachtens efterprøvede system. Denne underminerede tilliden og den militære effektivitet fremover. Efter dette tidspunkt blev Blitzkriegen brugt dårligt og tyskerne kom snart i defensiven. Fra 1943 og fremefter var de tyske blitzkrieg operationer generalt defensive samt en håndfuld fejlslagne offensiver.

Metoder for blitzkrig centrede om at bruge hurtige manøvre heller end opslidningskrig for at slå sin modstander. Derfor krævedes først og fremmest en styrke af mobile aktiver, udvikling af specialiserede støtte køretøjer, nye metoder til kommunikation, nye taktikker samt en effektiv decentraliseret kommandostruktur. Kort sagt krævede blitzkrieg udviklingen af mekaniseret infanteri, selvkørende artilleri og ingeniørkraft der kunne fastholde farten i angrebet. De tyske styrker undveg direkte kampe til fordel for angreb på modstanderens kommunikationslinjer, beslutnings- og forsyningsveje. I kamp efterlod blitzkrieg ikke mange andre muligheder for forsvarerne end at samle sig i små defensive lommer, hvor de så blev omringet og udryddet af det tyske infanteri.

[redigér] Etymologi og moderne betydning

Selvom "blitzkrieg" er et tysk ord, der betyder "lynkrig" kom ordet oprindeligt ikke fra det tyske militær. Det blev første gang brugt af en journalist fra det amerikanske magasin Time for at beskrive det tyske angreb på Poleni 1939.

"Blitzkrieg" has since expanded into multiple meanings in more popular usage. From its original military definition, "blitzkrieg" may be applied to any military operation emphasising the surprise, speed, or concentration stressed in accounts of the Polish September Campaign. During the war, the Luftwaffe terror bombings of London came to be known as The Blitz. Similarly, blitz has come to describe the "blitz" (rush) tactic of American football, and the blitz form of chess in which players are allotted very little time. Blitz or blitzkrieg is used in many other non-military usages.

[redigér] Interwar period

[redigér] Reichswehr

Udviklingen af Blitzkrieg begyndte umiddelbart efter 1. verdenskrig. Kort efter krigen nedsatte det nye Reichswehr en række komiter til evaluere 57 forskellige forhold fra krigen. Rapporterne fra disse komiter lagde baggrunden for de doktriner og træningsprocedurer der var standard under 2. verdenskrig. Reichswehr var influeret af was influenced by its analysis of pre-war German military thought, in particular its infiltration tactics of the war, and the manoeuvre warfare which dominated the Eastern Front.

Tysk militær historie er blevet kraftigt influeret af Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth Graf von Moltke. De var tilhængere af manøvre, masse og omringning, og deres koncepter blev brugt med succes i den fransk-preussiske krig og man forsøgte at vinde 1. verdenskrig hurtigt med Schlieffen-planen. Efter krigen blev disse koncepter modificeret af Reichswehr. Det chef, Hans von Seeckt, flyttede hæren væk fra det han mente var en overdreven fokus på omringning til noget der fokuserede mere på fart. Hellere, argumenterede von Seeckt, lave gennembrud mod fjenden center når det var mere profitablet end at lave en omringning eller når det var upraktisk at lave en omringninge. Under hans kommando et nyt doktrinalt system kaldet "Bewegungskrieg" og det associerede taktiske system kaldet "Auftragstaktik" blev udviklet, hvilket resulterede i Blietzkrieg effekten. Derudover afviste forestillingen om at stor masse var nødvendig som von Schlieffen og von Moltke havde talt for. Von Seeckt ønskede at skabe en lille professional (frivillig) hær samt en defensivt orienteret militia. Han mente at i moderne krig ville en sådan styrke være bedre i stand til at gennemføre offensive operationer. Den ville være hurtigere til at sætte i gang og billigere at udstyre med moderne våben. Reichswehr blev dog tvunget til at have en hær der var væsentligt mindre end det ellers var planen da Versaillestraktaten betød at hæren højest måtte være på 100.000 mand.

Bewegungskrieg hierarchy. This ability to react and make effective decisions faster is a critical advantage and a major reason for the success of Blitzkreig.

German leadership was also criticised for failing to understand the technical advances of the First World War, having given tank production the lowest priority and having conducted no studies of the machine gun prior to war.[1] In response, German officers attended technical schools after the war.

Infiltration tactics invented by the German Army during the First World War became the basis for later tactics. German infantry had advanced in small, decentralised groups which bypassed resistance in favour of advancing at weak points and attacking rear-area communications. This was aided by co-ordinated artillery and air bombardments, and followed by larger infantry forces with heavy guns, which destroyed centres of resistance. These concepts formed the basis of the Wehrmacht's tactics during the Second World War.

On the war's Eastern Front, combat did not bog down into trench warfare. German and Russian armies fought a war of manoeuvre over hundreds of miles, giving the German leadership unique experience which the trench-bound Western Allies did not have.[2] Studies of operations in the East led to the conclusion that small and co-ordinated forces possessed more combat worth than large and uncoordinated forces.

[redigér] Foreign influence

I denne periode udviklede alle de store spillere teorier om mekaniseret krigsførelse. De vestlige allieredes teorier var væsentligt anderledes end de tyske. Britiske, franske og amerikanske doktriner foretrak en mere stillestående kamp, mindre samarbejde mellem de forskellige styrker og mindre fokus på at koncentrere sine styrker. Tidlige Reichswehr papirer indeholder mange oversættelser, men de blev oftest ikke taget i brug. Den tekniske udvikling udenfor Tyskland blev dog studeret og også brugt.

Charles de Gaulle, i Frankrig, var kendt for at være en fortaler for at koncentrere sit panser og sine fly, noget der ikke just gjorde ham populær ved den franske overkommando, men eftersigende influerede Heinz Guderian.

Det tyske Reichswehr og Den Røde Hær samarbjede om nogen krigsspil og test i Kazan og Lipetsk i begyndelsen af 1926. I I disse to byer, som lå i Sovjetunionen, blev der lavet test med fly og pansrede køretøjer op til battalions niveau. Derudover husede de en officersskole for flyvevåbnet og panservåbnet. Dette blev gjort i Sovjet for at slippe uden om Versailletraktatens kontrolforanstaltninger.

[redigér] Guderian into the Wehrmacht

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General Heinz Guderian, a theorist key to Germany's development of blitzkrieg.

Efter Tyskland militære reformer i 1920'erne, kom Heinz Guderian fra som en stærk fortaler for brugen af mekaniserede styrker. Indenfor Inspektoratet for troppetransport lavede Guderian samme med sine kolleger øvelser på både det teoretiske og praktiske plan. Der var dog en del modstand fra officerer som gave infanteriet forrang eller simpelthen bare ikke troppede på kampvogenens effektivitet. Blandt dem var chefen for generalstaben Ludwig Beck (1935-38), som ikke havde stor tiltro til at man kunne vinde med panserstyrkerne. På trods af det blev panserdivisionerne oprettet mens hans var chef for generalstaben.

Guderian argumenterede for at kampvognen var det afgørende våben i krigen. "Hvis kampvogn har succes følger sejr.", skrev han. I en artikel adresseret til kritikerne af kampvognskrig skrev han "indtil vores kritikere kan finde på en ny og bedre metode til at lave et succesfuldt angreb over land end at massakre os selv vil vi blive ved med at tro på at kampvogne - selvsagt rigtigt anvendt - er det mest effektive måde at gennemføre et angreb over land". Da han talte om det faktum at under 1. verdenskrig kunne forsvarerne hurtige forstærke et område end angreberne kunne trænge igennem det. Skrev Guderian at "siden reserverne nu vil være motoriserede, er opbygning af nye defensive fronter lettere end det var tidligere; chancerne for offensiv baseret på artilleri og infantri samarbejde er som et resultat endnu mindre i dag end de var i den sidste krig." Han fortsatte, "Vi tror at ved at angrebe med kampvogne kan vi opnå et højere tempo i fremdriften end det hidtil har været muligt, - og hvad der måske er endnu vigtigere - at vi kan fortsætte med at bevæge os efter vi har lavet et gennembrud." Guderian krævede desuden at taktiske radioer skulle bruges i stor udstrækning for at gøre samarbejde muligt.

[redigér] Panzertruppe and Luftwaffe

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Organisation of a 1941 German panzer division

Blitzkrieg ville ikke have værete muligt uden at man have modificeret det tyske militær. Under bestemmelserne i versaillestraktaten måtte Tyskland ikke have en hær med mere end 100.000 mand. Samtidigt var flyvevåbnet blevet opløst og udvikling af kampvogne forbudt. Efter Hitler kom til magten i 1933 blev versaillestraktaten dog reelt ikke overholdt af tyskerne. Man startede en kommando for panserstyrker indenfor hæren, Panzertruppe, som den senere blev kendt som. Luftwaffe, flyvevåbnet, blev også genetableret, og udviklingen af bombefly og doktriner begyndte. Hitler var en støttede den ny strategi kraftigt. Han observerede panser øvelser og læste Guderians bog Achtung! Panzer!.

[redigér] Spanish Civil War

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PzKpfw I saw extensive use as training and scout vehicles in most blitzkrieg operations

Tyske frivillige testede forskellige aspeketer af blitzkrieg under Den Spanske Borgerkrig i 1936. Bl.a. deltog Panzer Battalion 88, en styrke bygget omkring tre kompagnier af Panzer I kampvogne. Derudover indsatte Luftwaffe deployed eskadriller af jagerfly, bombere samt transportfly. Guderian mente at det var "i for lille størrelse til at man kunne lave præcise vurderinger." Luftwaffe lærte generelt mere end panserstyrkerne da de fik brugt både deres taktik samtidigt med at de fik kamperfaring.

[redigér] Methods of operations

[redigér] Motorisation and combined arms

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"Keil und Kessel" (Wedge and Cauldron): forces achieve a breakthrough at the schwerpunkt (point of maximum effort), then fight a kesselschlacht (annihilation battle) against an encircled and disorganised enemy

Blitzkrieg styrker fik en stor del af deres fordel ved høj fart. At man bevægede sig hurtigere end fjenden betød at tyskerne kunne forstyrre deres planer samt skabe usikkerhed i rækkerne. For at skabe denne fart krævedes det at alle styrker var motoriserede. Til at følge panseret havde man infanteri på lastvogne, artelleri og anti-tank våben, der enten kom frem ved egen kraft eller trukket frem af andre kørertøjer, samt fuldt motoriserede støtte kompagnier. Panserstyrkerne var dog aldrig i stand til rent faktisk at bliver så motoriseret som ønsket og man endte derfor med at bruge en lang række erobrede køretøjer. Gennem hele krigen var langt de fleste af tyskenes kampstyrker ikke motoriserede.

Combined arms tactics was the chief reason for insisting that infantry and support operate with panzers. Guderian believed that "the effectiveness of the tanks would gain in proportion to the ability of the infantry, and other division arms to follow them in advance across country." Different arms of the military were complementary to each other.

Panzers were seen as the decisive weapon, and other arms operated primarily to aid them. Motorised infantry and, in smaller quantities, mechanised infantry (Panzergrenadier) provided protection against enemy infantry, especially in restricted terrain. Efforts were made to have armoured infantry as mobile and well-protected as panzers to reduce the number of situations which would separate infantry from panzers (e.g., artillery fire on trucks). Jagdpanzers (tank destroyers) were used en masse to destroy enemy tanks, anti-tank guns, and fortifications.

Artillery consisted of self-propelled, indirect-fire howitzers and rocket launchers, and direct-fire Sturmgeschütz (StuG, assault gun). StuGs functioned as infantry support and ad hoc Jagdpanzers. Indirect-fire artillery was used in conjunction with ground-attack aircraft from the Luftwaffe, which were usually more substantial. Luftwaffe bombers attacked not only immediate targets but also infrastructure and staging areas, disrupting potential counter-attacks.

Mid-war, the kampfgruppe (Combat group) developed in full as a self-contained tactical force. Attached to a panzer or panzergrenadier battalion command would be as many self-propelled artillery, engineer, and support units as necessary to attain a specific objective. Partly a tactic to minimise the effects of consistently understrength regular formations, this was nonetheless a significant development in improving combined arms co-operation.

[redigér] Schwerpunkt

Blitzkrieg søgte at altid at skabe udslagsgivende aktioner. For at gøre dette udvikledes teorien om et schwerpunkt (fokus område), som var det område hvor man lagde den største styrke. Panser og Luftwaffe styrker blev om muligt kun brugt på dette punkt. Ved hjælp af den lokale succes med et schwerpunkt kunne man bryde igennem fjendens linjer og derved få lov til at angribe i fjendens bagland. Guderian kaldte det "Nicht kleckern, klotzen!" (Ikke kilde, ødelæg!)

For at opnå et gennembrud blev der foretaget angreb med infanteriet eller nogen gange panseret, som ellers blev sparet til manøvre bag fjendens linjer, med støtte fra artelleri og bombardementer fra Luftwaffe. Disse styrker skabte så et hul i fjendens linje. Hele panser styrken kunne så trænge igennem dette hul samtidigt med at den styrker der havde lavet gennembruddet angreb flankerne for at skabe større distance til fjenden for panseret.

I denne begyndende fase af en angreb søgte luftwaffe at ødelægge fjendens luftvåben. Man forsøgte at bomb fjendens fly mens de var på jorden eller med overlegende jager kapacitet sørge for at skaffe luftherredømmet. Dette var et mål i sig selv dels for at undgå angreb fra fjendens fly, men det var også nødvendigt at have mulighed for at reconiserer fra luften så panseret vidste hvor det skulle angribe. Senere i krigen fik de allierede luftherredømmet hvilket problematiserede den tyske krigsførelse.

[redigér] Paralysis

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Panther Ausf. D, en af de mere avancerede tyske kampvogne.

Efter at have brudt igennem fjendens linjer forsøgte de tyske styrker at lamme modstanderens muligheder for at tage og implementere beslutninger. Ved at bevæge sig hurtigere end fjendens styrker kunne panser styrkerne udnytte svagheder og handle inden fjenden kunne svare effektivt. Guderian skrev at "Succes skal udnyttes uden henstand og med hvert et gram af styrke, selv om natten. Den besejrede fjende må ikke få fred."

Centralt for at dette kunne lykkedes var at beslutningscyklusen. Enhver beslutning der blev foretaget af såvel tyskerne som de allierede krævede tid til at samle information, tage en beslutning, få ordrerne ud til dem der faktisk skulle udføre dem også selvfølgeligt rent faktisk udføre dem. Gennem større mobilitet og hurtigere beslutningscykluser kunne panser styrkerne være klar hurtigere end modstanderen.

Directive control was a fast and flexible method of command. Rather than receiving an explicit order, a commander would be told of his superior's intent and the role which his unit was to fill in this concept. The exact method of execution was then a matter for the low-level commander to determine as best fit the situation. Staff burden was reduced at the top and spread among commands more knowledgeable about their own situation. In addition, the encouragement of initiative at all levels aided implementation. As a result, significant decisions could be effected quickly and either verbally or with written orders a few pages in length.

[redigér] Kesselschlacht

An operation's final phase, the Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle), was a concentric attack on an encircled force. It was here that most losses were inflicted upon the enemy, primarily through the capture of prisoners and weapons.

[redigér] Operations in the Second World War

[redigér] Poland and France, 1939–40

In Poland, panzer divisions created numerous pockets of Polish forces (blue circles) that were destroyed by following infantry.
Forstør
In Poland, panzer divisions created numerous pockets of Polish forces (blue circles) that were destroyed by following infantry.

Despite the term blitzkrieg being coined during the Polish September Campaign of 1939, historians generally hold that German operations during it were more consistent with more traditional methods. The Wehrmacht's strategy was more inline with Vernichtungsgedanken, or a focus on envelopment to create pockets in broad-front annihilation. Panzer forces were deployed among the three German concentrations without strong emphasis on independent use, being used to create or destroy close pockets of Polish forces and seize operational-depth terrain in support of the largely unmotorised infantry which followed. The Luftwaffe gained air superiority early in the campaign by destroying most of the Polish Air force whilst it was on the ground.

The invasion of France consisted of two phases, Operation Yellow and Operation Red. Yellow opened with a feint conducted against Holland and Belgium by two panzer corps and paratroopers. Three days later, the main panzer effort of Panzer Group von Kleist attacked through the Ardennes and achieved a breakthrough with Luftwaffe air support. The group raced to the coast of the English Channel, dislodging the British Expeditionary Force, Belgian Army, and some divisions of the French Army. Panzer forces were halted at the port city of Dunkirk, being used to evacuate the Allied forces, and it was left to the Luftwaffe; its bombing did not prevent the evacuation of most personnel, some 330,000 troops. Operation Red then began with XV Panzer Corps attacking towards Brest and XIV Panzer Corps attacking south, east of Paris, towards Lyon, and XIX Panzer Corps completing the encirclement of the Maginot Line. The defending forces were hard pressed to organise any sort of counter-attack. The French forces were continually ordered to form new lines along rivers, often arriving to find the German forces had already passed them.

[redigér] Soviet Union: the Eastern Front: 1941–45

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After 1941–42, panzer forces were increasingly used as a mobile reserve against Allied breakthroughs.

Use of armoured forces was crucial for both sides on the Eastern Front. Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, involved a number of breakthroughs and encirclements by panzer forces. Its stated goal was "to destroy the Russian forces deployed in the West and to prevent their escape into the wide-open spaces of Russia."[3] This was generally achieved by four panzer armies which encircled surprised and disorganised Soviet forces, followed by marching infantry which completed the encirclement and defeated the trapped forces. The first year of Eastern Front can generally be considered to have had the last successful major blitzkrieg operations.

After Germany's failure to destroy the Soviets before the winter of 1941, the limits of blitzkrieg became visible. Although the German attack took huge areas of Soviet territory, the overall strategic effect was more limited. The Red Army was able to regroup far to the rear, and eventually defeat the German forces for the first time in the Battle of Moscow. In the following summer of 1942, when Germany launched another Blitzkrieg offensive in southern Russia against Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the Soviets again lost tremendous amounts of territory, just to counter-attack again when they stopped in front of the city.

The Battle of Stalingrad shows both the good and bad points of the blitzkrieg concept. The battle opened with a German attack in an unexpected location, sending the defending Soviet forces reeling back over hundreds of kilometres in a matter of days. The movement ended when Hitler became increasingly interested in capturing Stalingrad itself, allowing the Soviet forces to regroup and counter-attack.

The Jagdtiger, one of the most formidable German tank destroyers. This specialised vehicles denied the basics of blitzkrieg because their designs trade mobility for firepower and protection.
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The Jagdtiger, one of the most formidable German tank destroyers. This specialised vehicles denied the basics of blitzkrieg because their designs trade mobility for firepower and protection.

The subsequent Soviet victory depended on the application of increasingly sophisticated combined arms units. This, coupled with German forces attrition, logistics and production problems, eventually resulted in the German defeat.

[redigér] Western Front, 1944–45

As the war progressed, Allied armies began using tactics somewhat resembling the blitzkrieg tactics of Germany. Many operations in the Western Desert and on the Eastern Front relied on massive concentrations of firepower to establish breakthroughs by fast-moving armoured units. These tactics were also decisive in Western Front operations after Operation Overlord.

After the Allied landings at Normandy, Germany made attempts to overwhelm the landing force with panzer divisions, but this failed for lack of co-ordination and Allied air superiority.

Blitzkrieg was attempted next in counter-attack against Operation Cobra, U.S. 12th Army Group's breakout from the Normandy area at St.-Lô. The German Seventh Army attacked towards the coast at St.-Lô, attempting to cut off the U.S. Third Army, commanded by George S. Patton, in Operation Lüttich. It was unable to achieve a breakthrough against defending infantry and, stalled, was encircled and effectively destroyed by U.S. 12th Army Group.

The Allied offensive in central France, spearheaded by armoured units from George S. Patton's Third Army, used breakthrough and penetration techniques that were essentially identical to blitzkrieg. Patton acknowledged that he had read both Guderian and Rommel before the war, and his tactics shared their emphasis on speed and attack. A phrase commonly used in his units was "haul ass and bypass".

Germany's last offensive on its Western front, Operation Autumn Mist, was a blitzkrieg offensive towards the vital port of Antwerp during the winter of 194445. Launched in poor weather against a weakened Allied sector, it achieved surprise and initial success. Allied air power was obviated by cloud cover. However, defence along the Ardennes and few serviceable roads caused delays. Allied forces deployed to the flanks of the German penetration, and Allied aircraft were again able to attack panzer columns. German forces were routed.

[redigér] Countermeasures and limitations

[redigér] Terrain

Blitzkrieg was largely dependent upon terrain and weather conditions. Where the ability for rapid movement across "tank country" was not possible, blitzkrieg was often avoided or resulted in failure. Terrain would ideally be flat, firm, unobstructed by natural barriers or fortifications, and interspersed with roads and railways. If it was instead hilly, wooded, marshy, or urban, panzers would be vulnerable to infantry in close-quarters combat and unable to breakout at full speed. As well, units could be halted by mud (thawing along the Eastern Front regularly slowed both sides) or extreme snow.

[redigér] Air superiority

Ilyushin Il-2, formidable Soviet ground attack aircraft that specialised in destroying German armour
Forstør
Ilyushin Il-2, formidable Soviet ground attack aircraft that specialised in destroying German armour

Allied air superiority became a critical hindrance to German operations during the later years of the war. Early German successes enjoyed air superiority with unencumbered movement of ground forces, close air support, and aerial reconnaissance. However, the Western Allies' air-to-ground attacks were so great following the lead up to Operation Overlord that panzer crews deployed from the Western to Eastern Front showed reluctance to moving en masse during daylight. Indeed, the final German blitzkrieg operation in the west, Operation Autumn Mist, was planned to take place during poor weather which grounded Allied aircraft. Under these conditions, it was difficult for German commanders to employ the panzer arm to its envisioned potential.

[redigér] Counter-tactics

 Stanisław Maczek, one of the early developers of anti-blitzkrieg tactics
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Stanisław Maczek, one of the early developers of anti-blitzkrieg tactics

Blitzkrieg was very effective against static defence doctrines that most countries developed in the aftermath of the First World War. Early attempts to defeat the blitzkrieg can be dated to Polish September Campaign in 1939, where Polish general Stanisław Maczek, commander of 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade, prepared a detailed report of blitzkrieg tactics, its usage, effectiveness and possible precautions for the French military from his experiences. However, the French staff disregarded this report (it was captured, unopened, by the German army). Later, Maczek would become one of the most successful Allied armoured forces commanders in the war.

During the Battle of France in 1940, De Gaulle's 4th Armour Division and elements of the British Armour Brigade in the British Expeditionary Force both made probing attacks on the German flank, actually pushing into the rear of the blitzkrieging armoured columns at times (See Battle of Arras (1940) ). This may have been a reason for Hitler to call a halt to the panzers' advance. Those attacks combined with Maxime Weygand's Hedgehog tactic would become the major basis for responding to blitzkrieg attacks in the future: deploy in depth, roll into a ball and let them slide past you, rely on your anti-tank guns, build strong sides to the blitzkrieg incursion, then cut it off at the base and destroy it in detail. However, Allied forces in 1940 were unable to successfully develop those tactics before they sustained heavy losses and France capitulated.

By 1944 the Allied armies' 17 pdr anti-tank guns and 90mm gun-equipped tank destroyers and the Germans' famous 88s were very successful in blunting tank attacks, especially those with little infantry support. By that time the Allies had also developed their own version of both offensive and defensive strategies using armoured forces.

[redigér] Logistics

Although effective in quick campaigns against Poland and France, blitzkrieg could not be sustained by Germany in later years. Blitzkrieg strategy has a constant danger of the attacking force overextending its supply lines, and the strategy as a whole can be defeated by a determined foe who is willing to sacrifice territory for time in which to regroup and rearm, which is exactly what Soviets did on the Eastern Front. Tank and vehicle production was a constant problem; indeed, late in the war many panzer "divisions" had no more than a few dozen tanks.[4] As the end of the war approached, Germany also experienced critical shortages in fuel and ammunition stocks as a result of Anglo-American strategic bombing. Although production of Luftwaffe fighter aircraft continued, they would be unable to fly for lack of fuel. What fuel there was went to panzer divisions, and even then they were not able to operate normally. Of those Tiger tanks lost against the United States Army, nearly half were abandoned for lack of fuel.[5]

[redigér] Influence

Blitzkrieg's widest effects were against Western Allied leadership of the war, some of whom drew inspiration from the Wehrmacht's approach. United States General George S. Patton emphasized fast pursuit, the use of an armoured spearhead to effect a breakthrough, then cut off and disrupt enemy forces prior to their flight. In his comments of the time, he credited Guderian and Rommel's work, notably Infantry Attacks, for insight.

Blitzkrieg has had partial influence on subsequent militaries and doctrines. The Israeli Defense Forces may have been influenced by blitzkrieg in creating a military of flexible armoured spearheads and close air support.[6] The 1990's United States theorists of "Shock and awe" claim blitzkrieg as a subset of strategies which they term "rapid dominance".

[redigér] See also

  • Armoured warfare
  • Attrition warfare
  • The Blitz, the Luftwaffe terror bombings of London
  • Combined arms
  • Deep Battle, the period Soviet concept of warfare
  • Maneuver warfare
  • Methodical Battle, the period French concept of warfare
  • Shock and awe, the 21st century American military doctrine.
  • Vernichtungsgedanken

[redigér] References

  1. ^ "Blitzkrieger" in TIME Vol. XXXIV No. 13, 25 September 1939. http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,761969,00.html
  2. ^ James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 37
  3. ^ Corum, op. cit., 23.
  4. ^ Corum, op. cit., 7.
  5. ^ Argued by Corum, Edwards, and House. This is not to include theories which were not adopted as actual doctrine, on which there are varied views.
  6. ^ Roger Edwards, Panzer: A Revolution in Warfare, 1939-1945 (London: Brockhampton Press, 1998), 23.
  7. ^ Guderian's remarks are from an unnamed article published in the National Union of German Officers, 15 October 1937 as quoted in Panzer Leader, pp. 39-46. Italics removed — the quoted sections are all italics in the original.
  8. ^ Heinz Guderian, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon, Panzer Leader (New York: De Capo Press, 2002), 46.
  9. ^ Edwards, op. cit., 24.
  10. ^ Edwards, op. cit., 145.
  11. ^ Edwards, op. cit., 25.
  12. ^ Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45 (New York: Quill, 1965), 78.
  13. ^ Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brassey's, 2000), 34
  14. ^ Charles Winchester, "The Demodernization of the German Army in World War 2", Osprey Publishing. http://www.ospreypublishing.com/content2.php/cid=68
  15. ^ Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. (U.S. Army Command General Staff College, 1984; reprint University Press of the Pacific, 2002). http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/House/House.asp

[redigér] Further reading

  • Deighton, Len. Blitzkrieg: From the rise of Hitler to the fall of Dunkirk. 1981.
  • Corum, James S. The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform. University Press of Kansas, 1994.
  • Edwards, Roger. Panzer: A Revolution in Warfare, 1939-1945. London: Brockhampton Press, 1998.
  • Skabelon:Book reference
  • House, Jonathan M. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. U.S. Army Command General Staff College, 1984. Reprinted by University Press of the Pacific, 2002.
  • Manstein, Erich von. Lost Victories. Trans. Anthony G. Powell. Presidio, 1994.
  • Mosier, John. The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II. HarperCollins, 2003.
  • Sinesi, Michael P. Modern Bewegungskrieg

German Battle Doctrine, 1920-1940. Thesis submitted to Columbian School of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University, May 2001.