Thảo luận:Hiệp định Genève, 1954
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Bài này nên được đổi thành Hiệp ước Gèneve (1954) vì còn có nhiều hiệp ước khác tại Genève. Mekong Bluesman 05:28, ngày 29 tháng 10 năm 2005 (UTC)
- Đồng ý, bạn sửa dùm nhé. Tôi chưa biết cách sửa tên bài linhbach 05:29, ngày 29 tháng 10 năm 2005 (UTC)
- Trong tiếng Việt hầu hết các sử dụng của cụm từ này nhắc đến hiệp ước của năm 1954. Tôi nghĩ ta nên dùng bài này làm chính và các hiệp ước khác được nhắc đến ở trang định hướng. Nguyễn Hữu Dụng 05:30, ngày 29 tháng 10 năm 2005 (UTC)
[sửa] Bản tiếng Việt
Có ai biết tài liệu tiếng Việt của hiệp ước hiện nay lưu trữ ở đâu không? Có nơi nào trên mạng có bản này không? Tôi nghĩ ở đây nhưng tìm không ra. Nguyễn Hữu Dụng 19:31, ngày 19 tháng 4 năm 2006 (UTC)
[sửa] Về chuyện Bảo Đại không ký
Ở đây có đoạn:
- France signed the armistice in Geneva on behalf of all Vietnamese in the areas it still controlled including the 369,000 members of the Vietnamese National Army that constituted part of the French Union. Bao Dai couldn't sign because the military he had command of only consisted of a personal bodyguard. Although nothing prevented the French from transferring political power to Bao Dai, remember that the Geneva Agreement specified that any successor to the French would have to comply with the agreements. Knowing this, later popular arguments that Bao Dai's refusal to assent to the Final Declaration therefore provided him with the right to reject selected aspects of the agreements don't hold up.
nghĩa là:
- Pháp ký hiệp định Geneva đại diện cho tất cả những người Việt trong các vùng Pháp vẫn kiểm soát, trong đó có lực lượng Quân đội Quốc gia Việt Nam gồm 369.000 người hợp thành một phần của Liên Hiệp Pháp. Bảo Đại đã không thể ký vì lực lượng quân sự mà ông chỉ huy chỉ gồm một đội cận vệ cá nhân. Tuy rằng không có gì cản trở việc Pháp chuyển giao quyền lực chính trị cho Bảo Đại, cần nhớ rằng Hiệp định Geneva chỉ ra rằng chính thể nào nối tiếp Pháp sẽ phải tuân theo nội dung hiệp định. Do đó, các luận cứ phổ biến sau này rằng "việc Bảo Đại từ chối chấp thuận bản Tuyên bố cuối cùng đã cho ông ta quyền phủ nhận một số điều khoản của hiệp định" là không có cơ sở.
Tmct 12:23, ngày 8 tháng 3 năm 2007 (UTC)
[sửa] tài liệu cho phần kết quả hiệp định
Trích [1]
Washington was extremely upset about the prospect of elections in Vietnam, for Washington knew who would win. A high-ranking State Department official said: "it would be an understatement to say that we do not like the terms of the cease-fire agreement just concluded."(Statement by Assist. Secretary Walter S. Robertson, Dept. of State Bulletin (Washington: Department of State, December 1961)) In 1961, the State Department "White Paper" declared: "It was the Communist's calculation that nationwide elections scheduled in the Accords for 1956 would turn all of Viet-Nam over to them. With total control over the more populous North in their hands, the Communists assumed they would be able to promote enough support in the South for their cause to win in any balloting. The primary focus of the Communists' activity during the post-Geneva period was on political action -- promoting discontent with the Government in Saigon and seeking to win supporters for Hanoi. The authorities in South Viet-Nam refused to fall into this well-laid trap."(A Threat to the peace (Washington: Department of State, December 1961), p. 3) In fact, this "trap" constituted an essential provision of the Geneva Agreements and was the major reason the Vietminh had accepted the armistice.
In 1956, Diem's interest in "free" elections was shown by a "referendum" he held in order to vest his regime with some semblance of public support. He received 98.2 percent of the bogus vote. Life Magazine later reported that Diem's American advisors had told him that a 60 percent margin would be sufficient and would look better, "but Diem insisted on 98 %."( Cited in The CIA, A Forgotten History by William Blum: Life Magazine, 13 May 1957.)
The US clearly supported Diem in this stand, although they would have preferred Diem at least paying some lip-service to the Geneva Accords by going "through the motions of trying to organize free elections in cooperation with the Communist North."( Cited in The United States in Vietnam: New York Times, August 9, 1955.) This refusal to participate was a clear reflection of Diem's own estimate of his political strength. On September 21, Diem declared that "... there can be no question of a conference, even less of negotiations" with the Hanoi Government.(The Times (London), September 22, 1955.)
Meanwhile, the Hanoi government continued preparing for elections. After receiving Diem's refusal to meet for consultations, Hanoi sought international support for the elections and appealed to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference for help, and reminded France of its obligations. The French, embarrassed, replied by stating: "We are not entirely masters of our own situation. The Geneva Accords on the one hand and the pressure of the allies on the other creates a very complex juridical situation... France is the guarantor of the Geneva Accords... But we do not have the means alone of making them respected."(Le Monde, February 25, 1956; Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise, Debats Parlementaires, Conseil de la Republique, February 24, 1956.)
On May 8, 1956, the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Accords invited both South and North Vietnam to transmit their view about the time required for opening consultations about nation-wide elections. Hanoi responded by sending Diem a letter requesting that consultations begin immediately. On June 4, Hanoi sent the Co-Chairmen a letter saying that their request had gone unanswered and if the South continued to reject living up to the Geneva Agreements, Hanoi would request a new Geneva Conference. In August, 1956, Hanoi again repeated its request for a new Geneva Conference. Knowing this, a statement 10 years later by the Assistant Secretary of State can best be understood as an obvious attempt to rewrite the history of this period, when he stated to the American public that "...when the issue arose concretely in 1956, the regime in Hanoi... made no effort to respond to the call of the Soviet Union and Great Britain." (They being the Geneva Co-Chairs).
Hanoi continued pursuing the issue through all the accepted channels, but got nowhere. Hanoi wrote letters requesting a conference on the elections with Diem in June 1957, July 1957, March and December 1958, July 1959 and July 1960. Diem refused repeatedly and Moscow and Peking both confined their support for Hanoi to moral platitudes.
Complicating things was the fact that the North was trying to renew its trading relations with the South while all of this election pleading and rejection was going on. In the past, the highly populated North was heavily dependent on the South's surplus rice. Hanoi offered to help "the population in the two zones in all economic, cultural, and social exchange advantageous for the restoration of the normal life of the people."(Vietnam News Agency, February 7, 1955) But, as with elections, Saigon refused to even discuss the matter.
Rebuffed by Saigon and certainly unable to secure any trade relief from the US and its allies, the North had no choice but to look elsewhere for trade partners. The Soviet Union and China responded. Devastated economically by the war, Hanoi began to concentrate more on agrarian reform and the elections took a back seat to this overwhelming need. Foreign aid however, declined from 65.3 percent in 1955 to 21 percent by 1960. Historian Bernard Fall observed that Hanoi's "desire to avoid a new colonialism" was behind Hanoi's independent stance. Although receiving aid from both Moscow and Peking, Hanoi carefully played the middle of the road and never made any irrevocable commitments to either country.
Để tạm đó để thảo luận rồi đưa dần vào bài. Tmct 13:01, ngày 8 tháng 3 năm 2007 (UTC)